IChemE SYMPOSIUM SERIES NO.

153 # 2007 IChemE

SEISMIC EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS FOR THE PROCESS INDUSTRY

Ernesto Salzano1, Antonio Di Carluccio2, Anita Garcia Agreda1 and Giovanni Fabbrocino3
1
Istituto di Ricerche sulla Combustione, CNR, P. Tecchio 80, 80125 Napoli (I), Ernesto Salzano,
CNR-IRC, P.Tecchio 80, 0125 Napoli. e-amil: salzano@irc.cnr.it
2
Dipartimento di Ingegneria Strutturale, Universita` di Napoli Federico II, Via Claudio 21, 80125, Napoli (I).
3
Dipartimento S.A.V.A., Engineering & Environment Division, Universita` del Molise, Campobasso, Italia (I).

The recent disaster in US and Asia have demonstrated that the analysis of interaction between
natural events and industrial installations is essential for the prevention and mitigation of large-
scale accidental scenario.
With specific reference to earthquakes, the extension of areas exposed to seismic risk worldwide
is leading regulatory commissions and process industry to develop methodologies for the quantitat-
ive assessment of industrial risks, to introduce acceptable risk criteria and thresholds values for
earthquake intensity, to develop early-design guidelines. In this framework, Early Warning
System (EWS), i.e. a set of actions that can be taken from the moment when a seismic event is trig-
gered with a significant reliability to the moment the quake strikes in a given location, seems to be a
very valuable tool. More specifically, EWS can activate any preventing countermeasure aimed at
limiting the probability of occurrence of catastrophic accidental scenarios, which in turns are trig-
gered by the release of relevant amount of gas or liquid flammable or toxic substances from
damaged equipment.
Quite clearly, EWS needs the knowledge of relations among earthquake occurrence probability,
earthquake intensity probability, seismic reliability of equipment, equipment structure, content
hazards, process conditions, reliability of equipment in terms of safety answer to external
events, consequence analysis, risk of domino effects, i.e. the effectiveness of preventing actions
may be only analysed by an interdisciplinary standpoint, in order to exploit the potentialities and
define even limitations of the approach.
In the paper, EWS are analysed for two typical hazardous process plants located in two sample
location in Italy, Results are given in terms of a specific a-dimensional number which has been
specifically defined for the evaluation of the ability of any industrial system to bear earthquakes.
Essentially, this number is the ratio of characteristic times for the earthquake arrival and the time of
response of safety system. More specifically, it depends on: i) the characteristic time for the seismic
wave to travel from the fault to the installation; ii) the intensity of earthquake expressed in terms of
Peak Ground Acceleration (PGA) and the related probability of occurrence; iii) the ability of struc-
tures (equipment) to resist to any PGA; and iv) the ability of system (e.g. safety interlock systems)
to prevent and/or mitigate the release of substances and the following accidental scenario.
Results are given as plots for anchored and unanchored atmospheric tanks and for pressurised
cylindrical horizontal vessel containing liquefied gas, at three different fill levels.
Finally, PGA threshold values for the earthquake intensity for the structural damage and acciden-
tal scenario are defined and discussed in order to identify cry-wolf issues.

KEYWORDS: natech risks, early warning, risk assessment, structural vulnerability

INTRODUCTION An interesting alternative approach consists of Seismic

Recent disaster in US and Asia have demonstrated that
interaction between natural events and industrial installations
cannot be neglected when prevention and mitigation of
large-scale accidental scenario are concerned (Na-Tech
Analysis). In this framework, Quantitative Risk Analysis
(QRA) of industrial facilities should include multiple exter-
nal hazards threatening critical equipments. Risk analyses of
industrial plants and particularly oil storage installations
located in seismic areas can be found in open literature
[Fabbrocino et al., 2005]. QRA represents a rational tool
to design mitigation measures and interventions on equip-
ments and complex systems, but is not the only option.
Early Warning Systems (EWS): a set of actions that can
be taken from the moment when a seismic event is detected
with a significant reliability, to the moment the quake strikes
in a given location [Iervolino et al., 2006]. EWS needs
multi-risk tasks and strong interaction with seismological
infrastructures and competences, but can prevent disasters
and mitigate effects of natural seismic hazard by means of
activating effective countermeasures aimed at minimizing
either the probability of occurrence of catastrophic acciden-
tal scenarios, or at mitigating the release of relevant amount
of gas or liquid flammable or toxic substances from earth-
quake damaged equipment. Finally, effectiveness of

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IChemE SYMPOSIUM SERIES NO. 153
seismic prevention and mitigation actions may be only ana-
lysed according to an interdisciplinary approach with indus-
trial engineering and safety management, in order to exploit
the potentialities and define even limitations of the
methodology.
In the following, some industrial and structural rel-
evant aspects of QRA are discussed with reference to
typical hazardous process plants. The study is focused on
steel structures for the containment of hazardous and flam-
mable substances like atmospheric anchored and unan-
chored tanks, as well as pressurized cylindrical horizontal
vessels containing liquefied gases and pumps.
Valuations made with reference to Peak Ground
Acceleration (PGA) assumed as reference seismic intensity
measure are presented; the ability of structures (equipment)
to stand against a given PGA and the ability of system (e.g.
safety interlock systems) to prevent and/or mitigate the
release of substances and the following accidental scenario
are considered in a probabilistic framework. Finally, based
on available data, PGA threshold values for the earthquake
intensity for the structural damage and accidental scenario
are defined and discussed, also for the identification of
cry-wolf issues.
FAILURE MODES AND FRAGILITY ANALYSIS
FOR INDUSTRIAL EQUIPMENT
The dynamic behaviour of atmospheric storage tanks when
subjected to earthquake is characterised by two predominant
vibrating modes: the first is related to the mass that rigidly
moves together with the tank structure (impulsive mass),
the other corresponds to the liquid sloshing (convective
mass) [Malhotra et al., 2000]. Seismic response of steel
tanks depends however on complex fluid/structure inter-
action that may result in global overturning moments and
base shear induced by horizontal inertial forces. Overturning
moment causes an increase of the vertical stress in the tank
wall and even uplift of the base plate, while the base shear
can lead to relative displacements between the base plate
and the foundation.
Failure modes reflect these specific aspects of the
seismic demand on the structure and basically depend
upon the type of interface at the tank base and the presence
of mechanical devices are used to ensure an effective con-
nection between the base plate and the foundation (un-
anchored or anchored). When unanchored tanks are of
concern, the friction at the base is able to ensure the
needed stability of the structure under environmental
actions, i.e. wind, but can be ineffective when strong
ground motions take place, thus generating large relative
displacements. Indeed, tank sliding reduces the maximum
acceleration suffered by the equipment, however relatively
small frictional factor may produce large relative displace-
ments, hence large deformations and even failure of
piping and connections can occur. In addition, another
large-displacement mechanism is the partial uplift of the
base plate. This phenomenon reduces the hydrodynamic
forces in the tank, but can increases significantly the axial
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compressive stress in the tank wall and the possibility that
a characteristic buckling of the wall (Elephant Foot
Bucking EFB) occurs. EFB is normally associated with
large diameter tanks with height to radius (H/R) ratios in
the range 2 to 3, whereas another common buckling mode,
known as diamond shape buckling (DSB), is associated
with taller tanks, that is H/R ratios about 4. While EFB is
associated with an elastic-plastic state of stress, the DSB
is a purely elastic buckling. Other structural damage are
the collapse of support columns for fixed roof tanks, tank
failures due to foundation collapse, splitting and leakage
associated only with bolted and riveted tanks [ASCE,
1997]. Liquid sloshing during earthquake action produces
several damages by fluid structure interaction phenomena
and can result as the main cause of collapse for full or
nearly full tanks. Historical analysis and assessment of
seismic damages of storage tanks have shown that only
full (or near full) tanks experienced catastrophic failures.
Low H/R tanks only suffered cracks in conical roof connec-
tion, or damage by floating panel sinking. A very
common shell damage is the EFB. For unanchored tanks
and H/R , 0.8, EFB is typically not experienced but the
base plate or the shell connection can fail causing spillage
[Ballantyne and Crouse, 1997]. A full stress analysis is
certainly the more accurate way to design and to evaluate
the risk of steel tanks under earthquake loads. This approach
leads to the direct computation of the interaction between
shell deformations and content motion during earthquakes
[Haroun, 1999]. For base constrained and rigid tanks
(anchored), a complete seismic analysis requires solution
of Laplaces equation for the motion of the contained
liquid, in order to obtain the total pressure history on the
tank shell during earthquakes [Eurocode 8, 1998]. When
flexible tanks are considered, a structural deformation
term must be also added to take account of the impulsive
and convective contributions. Actually the quantitative
assessment of risk within a complex industrial installation
needs the analysis of a large number of components.
Hence, in the light of simplification, statistical and empirical
tools derived from post-accident analysis are useful to define
easy to manage and general vulnerability functions. When
an earthquake occurs, the structural damage produced by
seismic actions on the equipment may be referred as
damage state (DS) [ORourke, 2000]. According to
HAZUS (1997) damage classification, damage states may
be classified as DS1 to DS5 where the absence of damage
is marked with the term DS1, slight damages to structures
have been defined as DS2, moderate damages as DS3, exten-
sive damages as DS4 and the total collapse of structure as
DS5. The DS values is an alternative formulation of the clas-
sical limit state definition, which has been extensively
used to evaluate from a structural perspective the economi-
cal effort needed to repair and restore the tank structures. On
the other hand, all typical accidental scenarios in the process
industry (vapour cloud explosions, flash fires, tank and pool
fires or toxic dispersions) depend on the total amount of
released dangerous substance [Lees, 1996; Salzano, 2003].
Accordingly, seismic vulnerability should be expressed in
IChemE SYMPOSIUM SERIES NO. 153 # 2007 IChemE

Table 1. Seismic fragility and probit coefficients for anchored Table 3. Seismic fragility and probit coefficients for
atmospheric steel tanks pressurised horizontal steel storage tanks

Limit Fill m b PGAk Limit Limit m b PGAk

state (RS) level (g) (g) k1 k2 (g) state (DS) state (RS) (g) (g) k1 k2 (g)

2 Near full 0.30 0.60 7.01 1.67 0.074 1 RS1 0.83 0.99 5.36 1.01 0.069
3 Near full 1.25 0.65 4.66 1.54 0.275 2 RS2 1.85 0.85 4.50 1.12 0.196
2 50% 0.71 0.80 5.43 1.25 0.110 3 RS3 4.91 0.84 3.39 1.12 0.526
3 50% 3.72 0.80 3.36 1.25 0.577

Although a large amount of data and analyses are

terms of content release when industrial large-scale QRA is
of concern rather than structural analysis of tank. Therefore,
existing data concerning post-earthquake damage obser-
vations for steel tanks have been reviewed in order to opti-
mize the limit state classifications of equipment response
[Salzano, 2003; Fabbrocino et al., 2005]. Then DS values
have been reviewed as three levels of intensity of loss of
containment, defined as RS (Risk State): no loss RS1,
moderate loss RS2, extensive or total loss of containment
RS3. The RS states have been defined in order to describe
the seismic behaviour of storage tank with reference to the
accidental scenarios which can possibly follow the seismic
structural damage of the tank. Because of incomplete
descriptions of the actual damage to some tanks into empiri-
cal database considered, the definition of damage state DS
and/or RS is somehow left to judgment. Results of observa-
tional analysis based on large number of water storage tank
are reported in Table 1 and Table 2, depending on the design
of tank and its fill level. Details are reported elsewhere
[Salzano et al., 2004; Fabbrocino et al., 2005]. In particular
Table 1 and Table 2 reports the coefficients m and b of
cumulative log-normal distribution for the probability of
occurrence of RS limit state for anchored and unanchored
storage tank respectively. Besides, k1 and k2 are the equiv-
alent probit coefficient with respect of PGA expressed in
terms of g (acceleration of gravity). By means of probit
analysis the threshold value for the PGA for having the
same limit state (PGAk) is also reported for the sake of
EWS definition.
Results reported in Table 1 2 can be used for the pre-
diction of accidental scenarios as fire (pool fire, flash fire,
tank fire), explosion (in the case of formation large vapour
cloud) or, when toxic vapour are formed, for the dispersion
analysis.
reported in literature for atmospheric storage tank, a few
information are found for pressurised equipments, reactor
vessel and pumps, which may be useful for complete risk
assessment. For horizontal pressurised cylinders, Table 3
has been derived from the results obtained by Seligson
et al. (1996). In this work, Mercalli-modified intensity
scale (MMI) to PGA transform is required and obtained
according to Trifunac (1976) equation as reported in
ATC-13 (1985):
logPGA 0:014 0:3MMI (1)
Its worth noting that in this (and in the cases of
reactor and pump), DS1 corresponds to slight movement
of tank support or low probability of failure of some con-
necting pipe, with null or very low release of content
(RS1), DS2 corresponds to failure of most connection
pipes and tank support system, with high likelihood of
release of tank content from pipes (RS2). Finally, DS3
and RS3 correspond to total failure of tank (with buckling).
Its worth noting that in the case of pressurised flammable or
toxic gases, even small crack on tank surface would mean
large release of pressurised gas and catastrophic accidental
scenario. Similar analyses for industrial pumps and reactor
vessels are reported in Tables 4 and 5.
A first comparison of the analysis is given by
Talaslidis (2004) by numerical analysis for atmospheric
storage tank, 50% filling level, with volume of about
37000 m3. Similarly to the present approach, five limit
states for the structural damage were defined and fragility
curves were produced, one for each limit state, although
no reference is made to the loss of containment. These
curves have been compared with observational data reported
herein. Also, probit analysis and threshold values have been
carried out. The basic failure modes considered by

Table 2. Seismic fragility and probit coefficients for

unanchored atmospheric steel tanks Table 4. Seismic fragility and probit coefficients for
pressurised reactor
Limit Fill m b PGAk
state (RS) level (g) (g) k1 k2 (g) Limit Limit m b PGAk
state (DS) state (RS) (g) (g) k1 k2 (g)
2 Near full 0.15 0.70 7.71 1.43 0.029
3 Near full 0.68 0.75 5.51 1.34 0.118 1 RS1 0.79 0.92 5.46 1.10 0.080
2 50% 0.15 0.12 20.83 8.35 0.113 2 RS2 2.02 0.78 4.36 1.22 0.249
3 50% 1.06 0.80 4.93 1.25 0.164 3 RS3 6.35 0.95 3.30 0.99 0.526

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IChemE SYMPOSIUM SERIES NO. 153 # 2007 IChemE

Table 5. Seismic fragility and probit coefficients for pumps

Limit Limit m b PGAk

state (DS) state (RS) (g) (g) k1 k2 (g)

2 RS2 0.81 1.29 5.31 0.77 0.032

3 RS3 2.44 1.00 4.30 1.00 0.195

Talaslidis is material yielding, whereas local buckling

(EFB) and other failure modes as sloshing and uplifting
have been neglected. As a consequence, the values obtained
as threshold PGA are higher than those obtained by means
of historical analysis, which considers all possible failures. Figure 1. Lumped masses model for atmospheric storage tank.
mc convective, mi impulsive and rigid mr masses

FRAGILITY ANALYSIS BY MEANS OF SEISMIC

weight.
STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS
Early investigations on the seismic behaviour of tanks have
been carried out by Housner (1963). The author, based on mc mYc (2)
experimental and theoretical observations, proposed a sim- mi mYi (3)
plified model for seismic analysis of anchored tanks with
rigid walls. It was assumed that a tank with a free liquid mr mYr (4)
surface subjected to horizontal ground acceleration forces m pR2 H rw (5)
to participate to the motion only a part of the total volume
of contained liquid as rigid mass, while the remaining part
starts to oscillate determining dynamic forces on the The natural frequencies of convective mass, vc and
tank walls. impulsive mass, vi are given by expressions (6) and (7):
This force is equivalent to the one applied to a lumped
mass, known as convective mass, laterally restrained by a s
 
g H
horizontal spring. Newmark and Rosenblueth (1971) modi-
vc 1:84 tanh 1:84 (6)
fied the expression initially suggested by Housner to esti- R R
mate the convective and rigid masses and gave updated s
formulations for the evaluation of the seismic design P E
forces of liquid storage tanks. In 1983, Haroun developed vi (7)
H rs
a model to evaluate of the seismic response of storage
tanks including the deformation of the wall. In this model
a part of the liquid moves independently of tank shell, where E and rs are the modulus of elasticity and density of
again convective motion, while another part of the liquid tanks wall respectively and P is a dimensionless parameter
oscillates at unison with the tank. If the flexibility of the which is a function of liquid height to radius tank ratio H/R.
tank wall is considered, a part of this mass moves indepen- This is the structural model herein used for the incremental
dently (impulsive mass) while the remaining accelerates dynamic analysis (IDA) aimed at the estimation of the
back and forth with the tank (rigid mass). Figure 1 shows seismic demand. The investigation was repeated changing
the idealised structural model of a liquid storage tank. The the geometry (three different volume capacity were con-
lumped masses model can take account of damping, depend- sidered) of the tank and then considered filling ratio
ing on the selected mass; however it is neglected in the fol- (Table 7). Besides, for unanchored tank the investigations
lowing analysis, without any loss of generality and were performed depending on friction coefficients. The
relevance of the results. Total liquid volume can be first step in the IDA analysis (Figure 2) procedure consisted
divided into the following lumped masses: mc convective, of the acquisition of suitable set records. For the analysis
mi impulsive and rigid mr masses. The convective and presented in the paper a set of 300 European records was
impulsive masses are connected to the tank wall by different considered. The selected earthquake ground motions
equivalent spring having stiffness kc and ki, respectively. records are all stiff soil records with a broad range of mag-
This model for anchored storage tank has been extended nitude and distances. All accelerogram used in the present
to analyse unanchored and even base-isolated liquid study have been retrieved from the European Strong
storage tanks [Shrimali et al., 2002]. The effective masses Motion Database (www.isesd.cv.ic.ac.uk). To obtain the
are defined in terms of liquid mass m in Equations (25) seismic demand at selected ground motion intensity levels,
where Yc, Yi, and Yr are the function of the H/R ratio, seismic records are scaled in terms of Peak Ground Accel-
which is a filling coefficient and rw is the liquids specific eration (PGA).

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IChemE SYMPOSIUM SERIES NO. 153
Figure 2. The incremental dynamic analysis (IDA)
The scaling factor x varies to get the PGA from 0.05 g
to 2 g. A procedure to solve the equation of motion was
implemented in a MatLab computer code using the
Wilson theta method. Results of present analysis are
reported in Table 6, assuming EC8 (1998) guidelines to
evaluate the ultimate stress. This approach will be extended
to all relevant failure modes of atmospheric storage tanks
reported above. Similar results are obtained using different
guidelines for the ultimate stress estimation as that reported
by Kim & Kim (2002). From a structural perspective, it is
worth to analyse the results of the structural dynamic analy-
sis carried out to derive vulnerability functions for the
anchored storage tanks reported in Figure 3. Probability of
failure is plotted on the right side depending on PGA,
which in turns affects the demand of the structure as demon-
strated by the left plot. The latter shows numerical data and
trends (in terms of average and average + standard devi-
ation) of the demand in terms of vertical shell stress and con-
firms that a correlation between parameters exists. As a
consequence, vulnerability evaluations carried out in terms
300
Structural Demand [MPa]
200
100
0 0
0 0.4
Figure 3. Left: Structural demand (vertical shell stress) of anchored atmospheric storage tank with V 30000 m3, fill level 80%,
with respect to PGA. Dotted line represents the standard deviation. Right: For the same tank, and probability of failure (fragility) in
terms of fragility with respect to PGA
# 2007 IChemE
of PGA can be effectively used in QRA contexts. In the
next future, similar analysis will be performed for any
failure mode for either anchored or un-anchored storage
tanks and for pressurised equipment (either horizontal or
spherical).
FINAL REMARKS AND OPEN ISSUES ON EWS
Early Warning System requires the knowledge of several
complex relations among earthquake and equipment in
order to be effective for the protection of industrial
systems. To this aim, preliminary analyses for the seismic
occurrence probability and its corresponding intensity is
necessary, together with the structural analysis for the defi-
nition of different seismic failure modes of any specific
equipment. When large number of analyses are needed,
these analyses have to be simplified but on the same time
reliable results are needed for avoiding economical losses
and sometime dangerous cry-wolfs. In this framework, our
approach has recurred to the threshold values for a single
degree of freedom variable, the Peak Ground Acceleration
(PGAk). In this work, PGAk for atmospheric storage tank,
pressurised horizontal tank and pumps have been obtained
starting from historical analysis and literature data, by con-
sidering all possible failure modes and earthquake intensity,
for different tank design and fill level, and considering also
the loss of containment intensity from the damaged equip-
ment. Structural analysis for the evaluation of PGAk with
respect to the Elephant Foot Buckling failure mode is also
presented, for a preliminary validation of results obtained.
Quite clearly, on the industrial side, other information are
needed on the hazards related to the substances, process con-
ditions. Hence, EWS is only effective of actions follow
seismic alarm. To this regard, Safety Interlock Systems
(SIS) are important protective measures for automatic
actions on abnormal plant events which are controlled by
basic control systems and manual interventions [Green
and Dowell, 1995]. Maintenance of SIS present a special
challenge created by the infrequent need for these systems
1
0.8
Fragility [-]
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.8 1.2 1.6 2 0 0.4 0.8 1.2 1.6 2
PGA [g] PGA [g]
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Table 6. Seismic fragility and probit coefficients for EFB of different atmospheric fuel tanks at different fill level for structural
damage level DS2 and loss of containment level RS2

Vol Tank Tank Fill level m b PGAk

[m3] height (m) radius (m) (%) (g) (g) k1 k2 (g)

250 7.55 3.25 50 DS1 DS1 DS1 DS1 DS1

80 2.55 0.57 3.05 1.61 0.50
5000 10.8 12.25 25 DS1 DS1 DS1 DS1 DS1
50 DS1 DS1 DS1 DS1 DS1
80 1.74 0.76 4.53 1.34 0.25
30000 18.5 22.75 25 DS1 DS1 DS1 DS1 DS1
50 2.08 0.79 4.33 1.24 0.26
80 0.78 0.97 5.46 1.05 0.07

to act; i.e. SIS are only needed on rare occasions when
normal process controls are inadequate to keep the process
within acceptable bounds. Furthermore, SIS are typically
designed on the base of relatively fast, process-related
loss of control. In this framework, SIS can be usefully
re-designed taking into account the time allowed for the
seismic wave to reach the installation location and taking
into account its intensity, for the mitigation of earthquake
effects on plants, processes and storage systems.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors wish to thank Dipartimento della Protezione
Civile della Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri for finan-
cial support in the framework of RELUIS Line 9 Research
Project Monitoraggio ed early warning di strutture ed infra-
strutture strategiche (UniMol coordinator: G.Fabbrocino)
and Na-Tech Project (IRC coordinator: E.Salzano).
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