26 Peter Schwartz

moved from a world where prediction was a reasonable goal of fore-

casting to one where the value is mainly in what we can learn. Devel-
oping and thinking through the consequences of surprising but plausible
scenarios has proven to be the most useful tool for dealing with a world
saturated with novelty. Scenarios are a reasonably systematic tool for
a world where the value of history is balanced against the impact of
innovation.
So what do you do if prediction is impossible? Of what value is
forecasting if uncertainty is profound and essentially irreducible? Per-
ceptive anticipation can prepare the mind's eye to recognize signicant
changes in a timely way. Many early adopters of the Internet saw the
meaning of the World Wide Web, and the development of browsers
turned that early perception into some of the quickest fortunes in his-
tory. Taking a long view can aid in identifying and developing new
competencies needed to assure long-term survival. Good scenarios can
be a powerful tool in bounding and managing risk. The goal becomes
making the most adaptive decisions in a timely fashion rather than get-
ting the future right.

In a time rich with discontinuities, a central question becomes how

much should one believe a forecast or any scenario of the future. How
much can one base decisions and actions upon that view? From a meth-
odological point of view there are at least three dierent approaches to
creating the suspension of disbelief needed to take on radical new ideas.
The rst and most obvious is simply in-depth research supporting one's
scenarios. Beyond that is the use of what we call ``learning journeys.''
Put most simply, getting out and seeing things. This is especially eective
because a group of decision makers will have shared experiences. Third is
the power of simulation. This can range from simple but interactive
models all the way to sophisticated forms of virtual reality.
A function of the belief formation process is assessing the balance of
risks. The fundamental question is one of regret. What is the cost of
being wrong? Is it a fatal error? Can you recover from the error? How
costly is the insurance or hedge? Is it an opportunity you would pro-
foundly regret failing to grasp?
In the end, it is decision and action that matter. But what does one
do in the face of profound uncertainty? If one's belief is low, risks are
low, and costs are high, then the primary initial action may simply be