SamplePhilosophy114Paper

OTHERBODIESANDOTHERMINDSIN
EDITHSTEIN:
OR,HOWTOTALKABOUTEMPATHY

JUDYMILES

In this paper, I will defend Steins discussion of empathy from certain

feminist critics who have claimed that it is incorrect to describe empathy as

projection. My aim here is to show that it is not only correct to talk about

empathy as projection but that doing so helps to solve certain philosophical

problems about the Other that any other view of empathy would leave

untouched.

Empathy is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as the power of

projecting ones personality into (and so fully comprehending) the object of

contemplation.Thisdefinitionhasitsoriginintheaestheticsofthe19thcentury

GermanpsychologistTheodorLippsanditwashisworkthatservedasthebasis

forEdithSteins1916phenomenologicalanalysisofempathy.Lippspromoteda

theoryofEinfhlung(translatedasempathy)thataccountedforhowwecan

comprehendanaestheticexperienceoraworkofart.Heclaimedthatweproject

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ourselves into the work in order to understand it. Arnulf Zweig summarizes

Lipps approach by saying that Empathy, according to Lipps, is an act of

sympathetic projection into objects or persons distinct from the agent. 1 Stein

points out in her autobiography, Life in a Jewish Family, that What Husserl,

judging by his brief indications, thought of as empathy and what Lipps

designated as such apparently had little in common.2 Since Husserl never

detailedexactlywhatempathyis,EdithSteinsetouttodoso.Shespellsouther

methodinthefirstparagraphofherdissertation:

Allcontroversyoverempathyisbasedontheimpliedassumptionthatforeignsubjects
and their experience are given to us. Thinkers deal with the circumstances of the
occurrence, the effects, and the legitimacy of this givenness. But the most immediate
undertaking is to consider the phenomenon of givenness in and by itself and to
investigateitsessence.3

Steinconcludesthissectionbysaying,

All these data of foreign experience point back to the basic nature of acts in which
foreignexperienceiscomprehended.Wenowwanttodesignatetheseactsasempathy,
regardless of all historical traditions attached to the word. To grasp and describe these
actsinthegreatestessentialgeneralitywillbeourfirstundertaking.4

SoempathyforSteinistheactofgraspingforeignexperienceandshe

aimstodescribewhatthisgraspingconsistsin.Shedescribestheessenceof

empathybycomparingitwithotheracts:

Letustakeanexampletoillustratethenatureoftheactofempathy.Afriendtellsme
thathehaslosthisbrotherandIbecomeawareofhispain.Whatkindofanawarenessis
this?IamnotconcernedherewithgoingintothebasisonwhichIinferthepain.Perhaps
hisfaceispaleanddisturbed,hisvoicetonelessandstrained.Perhapshealsoexpresses
his pain in words. Naturally, these things can all be investigated, but they are not my

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 concernhere.Iwouldliketoknow,nothowIarriveatthisawareness,butwhatititself
is.5

Stein then goes on to compare empathy with outer perception. We

certainlyhavenoouterordirectperceptionofanotherspain.Ourexperienceof

our own pain is what Stein calls a primordial or firsthand experience. Our

awarenessofanotherspainisnonprimordialorsecondhandbuttheexperience

we have of becoming aware of his pain (our awareness of our awareness ofhis

pain) is itself, of course, primordial for us. So the empathized experience the

painoftheOtherinthiscaseisnonprimordialforus.Buthispainthatwhich

wearetryingtograspisofcourseprimordialforthepersonwithwhomweare

empathizing. Hence, empathy is a nonprimordial experience that announces a

primordial one. Our own experiences, too, can be nonprimordial for us when

they are given in memory, expectation or fantasy. Stein describes this in the

followingexample:

Iactivelybringtomindaformerjoy,forexample,ofapassedexamination.Itransfer
myselfintoit,i.e.,Iturntothejoyfuleventanddepictittomyselfinallitsjoyfulness.
SuddenlyInoticethatI,thisprimordial,rememberingI,amfullofjoy.Irememberthe
joyfuleventandtakeprimordialjoyintherememberedevent.However,thememoryjoy
andthememoryIhavevanishedor,atmost,persistbesidetheprimordialjoyandthe
primordialI.Naturally,thisprimordialjoyoverpasteventscanalsooccurdirectly.This
wouldbeamererepresentationoftheeventwithoutmyrememberingtheformerjoyor
makingatransitionfromtherememberedtotheprimordialevent.Finally,Imaybe
primordiallyjoyfuloverthepastjoy,makingthedifferencebetweenthesetwoacts
especiallyprominent.6

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 Noticethatthisisallaboutonesreflectionononesownexperience.The

verysameprocedure,however,occurswhentheobjectofreflectionissomeone

elsesjoy.Steincontinues:

Nowletustaketheparalleltoempathy.Myfriendcomestomebeamingwithjoyand
tellsmehehaspassedhisexamination.Icomprehendhisjoyempathically;transferring
myselfintoit,Icomprehendthejoyfulnessoftheeventandamnowprimordiallyjoyful
over it myself. I can also be joyful without first comprehending the joy of the other.
Shouldtheexaminationcandidatestepintothetense,impatientfamilycircleandimpart
thejoyfulnews,inthefirstplace,theywillbeprimordiallyjoyfuloverthisnews.Only
whentheyhavebeenjoyfullongenoughthemselves,willtheybejoyfulovertheirjoy,
orperhapsasthethirdpossibility,bejoyfuloverhisjoy.Buthisjoyisneithergiventous
asprimordialjoyovertheeventnorasprimordialjoyoverhisjoy.Ratheritisgivenas
thisnonprimordialactofempathythatwehavealreadydescribedmoreprecisely. 7

Severalcontemporarywomenwritershaveraisedobjectionstothiswayof

talking about empathy, however. We have seen that the Oxford English

Dictionarydefinesempathyasthepowerofprojectingonespersonalityintothe

object of contemplation and this certainly seems to capture Edith Steins

understanding of the notion. The four authors of Womens Ways of Knowing,

however, complain that the OEDs definition of empathy as projection favors

the masculine point of view. They write, this phallic imagery may capture the

masculine experience of empathy, but it strikes many women Nel Noddings,

forexampleasapeculiardescriptionoffeelingwith.8Empathizingrequires

knowing what the feelings the Other is having feel like, but it does not require

thatonesimultaneouslysharethosefeelingsassympathydoes.Myobjectionto

thesewomensobjectionliesintheirclaimthattheOEDsdefinitionofempathy,

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which involves mental projection, somehow favors the masculine experience of

empathy.Itakethemtomean,whentheycomplainaboutphallicimagery,that

since the masculine experience of sexuality involves physical projection that an

experienceinvolvingmentalprojectionnecessarilyfavorsmales.

Thisargumentseemstomeunsoundforatleasttworeasons.First,itdoes

not follow that empathy, which involves mental projection, has anything to do

with the (stereotypic) male experience of sex. I take the kind of projecting

whichempathyinvolvestobeverymuchliketheexperienceanactresshaswhen

putting herself in character. She contemplates the character she is about to

portray and imagines what it would be like to be that person. She imagines

herself in the others place. This is necessary to being able to portray a role

convincinglyandonesskillatdoingthisiswhatdistinguishesgoodactingfrom

bad.Ifitiscorrecttomodelactsofempathyonactsofsexuality,andifempathy

is necessary to good acting, then it would seem to follow that women would

generally be better actors than men. But acting seems to be one of the few

professionsinwhichthereneverhasbeenanyclaimofagenderwarregarding

skill.Wejustdontsaythatsomeoneislikelytobegoodatactingbecauseofhis

orhergender.

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 My second point about the objection to seeing empathy as projection is

that, if one redefined empathy so that it favored the feminine point of view

(whateverthatmightbe),onewouldstillbefavoringonegenderovertheother.

Mencouldthenclaimthatthedefinitionunfairlyfavoredthefemaleexperienceof

empathyandhencedisadvantagedthem.Thiswouldnotmeanthatthedefinition

had been improved; it would only mean that men and women had exchanged

placesasthevictimsofinjustice.Thiswouldhardlybeprogress.

NelNoddings,however,doeswanttosuggestthattoredefineempathyin

favorofwomenwouldbeanimprovementovertheOEDsdefinition.Sheobjects

thatempathyisdefinedintheOEDasprojectionandclaimsthatthisisafalse

description. She says empathy (again, feeling with on her view) is more like

receptionthanprojection.Idonotproject.Ireceivetheotherintomyself,andI

seeandfeelwiththeother.9Whiletheideaofreceivingtheotherintomyself

might seem a kinder, gentler image than that of projection I think that

Noddingsdescriptionisactuallythewrongwaytotalkaboutempathyandnot

SteinsortheOEDs.

Noddings also wants to object to the claim that we put ourselves in the

othersplaceinempathizing.Butthisjustiswhatweseemtodo.Itscertainly

notthattheOtheriscomingintooursituation,asthedescriptionreceivingthem

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into ourselves suggests. The point is that we are trying to understand another

mindoutsideourselvesamindthatisoutsideusandthatremainsitselfwhile

beingunderstoodbyus.Theexampleofanactressgettingintocharacterserves

wellagainhere.Whenwetrytounderstandanotherwetrytoputourselvesin

thatpersonsmindorsituation.Howbettertodescribethismentalactivitythan

byprojection?Steinsexampleofbeingjoyfuloversomeoneelsesjoyisclearlya

caseofputtingourselvesinthatpersonsplacenotofbringingthemintoours.

Furthermore,whileNoddingsobjectstotheimagesthewordprojectioncreates,

there is good reason to object to the image of taking the Other into myself. It

suggeststhattheOtherisbeingenvelopedbymeandthattheOthersidentityis

beingalteredorevenobliteratedastheOther.Butthisispreciselywhatwedont

want to bring about. Wedont wantto bechanging the Other in the process of

trying to comprehend the Other for then empathy would not be a way of

knowing another mind; it would simply be a way of altering it. This is the

philosophical beauty and utility of Steins view of empathy, namely, that it

allows one to understand a mind outside our own while permitting that other

mindtoremainasubjecttoremainitself.

SowhatnowistheadvantageofsayingwearereceivingtheOtherinto

ourselvesoversayingweareprojectingourselvesintotheOther?Simplythat

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of getting away from the word projection. I think this redefinition is well

intentionedatbestandabsurdatworst.

So what does all this amount to? What does it really matter whether

empathyisdescribedintermsofprojectionorreception?Well,thepointIhave

just made about empathy (as traditionally defined) leaving the Other intact is

one very important implication of the definition. What is so useful about the

traditional notion of empathyis thatit isaway ofperceivingthe Others mind

withoutalteringitatthesametime.Thereneedstobesuchaprovisionforusto

communicateatall,anditseemsthatempathy,astraditionallyconceived,isthe

best way of describing this process. W.V. Quines paper Promoting

Extensionalitysummarizessomeofhismostrelevantpointsconcerningtherole

empathyplaysinlanguageacquisition.IwillconcludebyshowinghowQuines

examplesofempathyprovidefurtherreasonforseeingempathyinthewayStein

hasdescribedit.

The contextofQuines commentsabout empathyisthat of propositional

attitudes.Claimslike

xbelievesthatp,xhopesthatp,xsaysthatp,andtherestareinconspicuous
violationofextensionality.Wemaywellbelievethatpandnotthatq,thoughbothbe
true.

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 Whatisworse,evenscandalous,isthattheseidiomsviolatethesubstitutivityofidentity:
theputtingofequalsforequals.Howcansomethingbetrueandfalseofthesamething
underdifferentnames?

Yettheseidiomsareusefultothepointofindispensability.Moreover,Ithinktheyare
rootedintheearlieststagesoflanguage.Ipicturetheearliestidiomofpropositional
attitudeasxperceivesthatp,wherepstandsforanobservationsentencesuchasIts
raining,Thatsmilk,Thatsadog.Whenthemotherismonitoringthechilds
utteranceofsuchasentence,shehastoempathizewithhim.Sheimaginesherselfinhis
place,facinginthesamedirection,andthencheckswhethershe,thusoriented,feels
movedtovolunteerthesentenceherself.Inshort,shechecks,howeverinarticulately,
whetherthechildreallyperceivesthatitsraining,thatitsmilk,thatitsadog.This
muchinthewayofanidiomofpropositionalattitude,allunspoken,isessentialtothe
veryhandingdownoflanguagefromgenerationtogeneration;forobservationsentences
arethechildsenteringwedgetolanguage.10

QuinegoesontosaythatwhenFregewasconfrontedwiththeproblemof

the failure of substitutivity of identity, he concluded that in those idioms the

recalcitrant terms have changed their reference and taken to referring to what

wouldnormally betheirmeanings,orsenses, rather thantheir normal objects.

Quineclaimsthatempathycanhelpansweraphilosophicalquestionaboutthis

failure of substitutivity and his example suggests that he also sees empathy in

termsofputtingoneselfintheothersplace.Hecontinues:

A better solution is suggested by the mothers relation to the child in monitoring his
observationsentence;namelyempathy.Whensomeoneascribesapropositionalattitude
tosomeone,heimpersonatesthatpersontosomedegree.Thesubordinateclauseofthe
constructionisutteredfromthesubjectspointofview,somewhatasiffromthesubjects
mouth. No wonder substitutivity ofidentity fails; the subject, poor fellow, didnt know
the things were identical. Likewise for failure of extensionality: the subject would have
beenunpreparedtointerchangethetwocoextensiveclausesinquestion,simplybecause
hedidntknowtheywerecoextensive.11

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 I do not have time to discuss the full implications of Quines claim that

empathymaybetheanswertothepuzzleaboutthefailureofsubstitutivitybutI

wanted at least to mention his examples because his suggestions are such

interesting ones and because they offer further evidence that empathy is

ordinarilyunderstoodtobeprojectionandnotreception.

I now want to anticipate an objection Nel Noddings might have to my

own. I suspect she would deny that the Other is altered or obliterated when

takenintooneself.

ButeveniftheOtherisntaltered,receptionjustdoesnotseemtobeas

natural or accurate a word for the process our minds go through in what we

typically call empathy. Projection, rather, comes up over and over in the

literature and in our everyday descriptions of our experience. We transfer

ourselvesintotheexperienceoftheotherasSteinsaysorweputourselvesin

theothersplaceasanactresssaysorweimpersonateorutterasiffromthe

subjectsmouthasQuinesays.

Thesedescriptionshavearingoftruthwhichdescriptionsofempathyas

receptionlack.

NOTES

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1.EncyclopediaofPhilosophy,NewYork:Macmillan,1967,Vol.4,p.485.

2.EdithStein,LifeinaJewishFamily,Washington,DC:ICSPublications,1986,p.
277.

3.EdithStein,OntheProblemofEmpathy,3d.rev.ed.Washington,DC:ICS
Publications,1989,p.3.

4.Ibid.,p.3.

5.Ibid.,p.6.

6.Ibid.,p.13.

7.Ibid.,pp.1314.

8.MaryFieldBelenky,BlytheMcVickerClinchy,NancyRuleGoldberger,and
JillMattuckTarule,WomensWaysofKnowing,NewYork:BasicBooks,1986,p.
122.

9.NelNoddings,Caring,Berkeley:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,1984,p.30.

10.W.V.Quine,PromotingExtensionality,Synthese,98(1994),p.145.

11.Ibid.

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