Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
James Michael Ong1, Ma. Laurice Jamero2, Miguel Esteban3, Riki Honda4 and Motoharu Onuki5
1
Graduate Student, Graduate Program in Sustainability Science, The University of Tokyo
Mailing Address: Rm 334, Building of Environmental Studies, 5-1-5 Kashiwanoha, Kashiwa City,
2
Graduate Student, Graduate Program in Sustainability Science, The University of Tokyo
E-mail: laujamero@gmail.com
3
Project Associate Professor, Graduate Program in Sustainability Science, The University of Tokyo
E-mail: esteban.fagan@gmail.com
4
Professor, Graduate Program in Sustainability Science, The University of Tokyo
E-mail: rhonda@k.u-tokyo.ac.jp
5
Professor, Graduate Program in Sustainability Science, The University of Tokyo
E-mail: onuki@k.u-tokyo.ac.jp
1
Abstract
In November 2013, super-typhoon Haiyan left more than 53,000 damaged houses in Tacloban
City. The Philippine government organized housing reconstruction programs relating to on-
site reconstruction and off-site relocation. However, these programs are faced with complex
implementation issues.
The present study investigated the mechanisms of three types of housing reconstruction
analyzing the gaps between community needs and the program outputs. Key informant
2015.
The results showed that on-site reconstruction was delayed due to insufficient and poorly
while offsite relocation was delayed by prolonged land acquisition and issues in
subcontracting. Disruption of critical infrastructure such as the water utility service and lack
of livelihood significantly affected the level of satisfaction of respondents with the recovery
progress. The study also found that the no-dwelling-zone policy was not strictly enforced as
houses were still being rebuilt in high risk areas near the coast. Lastly, permanently relocated
residents struggle, especially with regard to their source of livelihood, as relocation sites are
Keywords: Multi-Layer Safety System, Coastal Land Use Policy, Shelter, Resilience, Sustainable
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Introduction
Typhoon Haiyan (Local Name: Yolanda) struck the Philippines on November 8, 2013 at almost the
peak of its power, causing enormous damage to Leyte, Samar and many other islands in the Visayas
region, the group of islands in Central Philippines. The maximum sustained wind speeds were around
160 knots, some of the largest in recorded history [Schiermeier, 2013; Takagi et al., 2015]. The strong
winds, together with the typhoons extremely low central pressure (895 hPa) caused great damage to
housing, infrastructure and vegetation, leaving behind bare mountains and flattened fields. All
informal dwellings were torn apart and even well-built official government buildings and schools
suffered serious damage, with their roofs being blown away and most windows shattered [ Takagi et
al., 2014]. A large storm surge was also generated by the typhoon, which engulfed several coastal
towns and caused large damage to Tacloban City and the coastline around it [Takagi et al., 2014;
Tajima et al., 2014]. 6,245 individuals were reported dead, 28,626 injured and 1039 are still missing
[NDRRMC, as of 6 March 2014]. It was one of the deadliest disasters to have affected the country,
surpassing that of the 1991 floods in the Ormoc region in western Leyte, where 5,101 perished due to
Tropical Storm Thelma. The number of damaged houses was estimated to be 1,140,332, with 550,928
of them being completely destroyed [NDRRMC, 2014]. The total economic loss could be over 35,000
million pesos (776 million USD), probably the most expensive natural disaster in the history of the
country [Brown, 2013], despite the fact that it frequently suffers heavy loses to agriculture and
housing due to these weather systems [Stromberg et al., 2011; Esteban et al., 2012].
The exceptionally large storm surge was responsible for many of the deaths. A maximum inundation
height of 6-7 m. was observed in Tacloban city, where the largest number of casualties took place
[Shibayama et al., 2014; Tajima et al., 2014; Lagmay et al., 2015; Takagi et al., 2015]. The storm
surge was rather unusual in height and characteristics, possibly due to local amplification of the water
surface elevation due to seiche effects inside Leyte Gulf [Mori et al., 2014] and as a result of various
bathymetric features in the area, which made it manifest itself as a Tsunami-Like Surf Beat [Bricker
and Roeber 2015]. However, the large death toll was caused not only due to large size of the storm
surge but also due to issues related to the level of knowledge and awareness by local residents on
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what is a storm surge [Esteban et al., 2014; Esteban et al., 2015; Lagmay, 2015; Leelawat et al.,
2014].
Typhoon disaster recovery processes are normally divided into rehabilitation and reconstruction
phases. This is often a complex period, when many difficult decisions must be taken, and the
understanding of recovery may differ between people who use this term and fluctuate depending on
the situations in which it is used [Matsumaru, 2015]. The rehabilitation phase typically represents a
quick repair of infrastructure and facilities to restore the economic and social functions of disaster-
affected areas. This might take several weeks to more than a year, depending on the extent of the
damage and infrastructure to be repaired [Matsumaru, 2015]. After the rehabilitation is over, the
reconstruction phase is seen as a long-term restoration that includes not only physical improvement of
the affected communities but also the revival of livelihoods, economy and industry, culture and
against future disasters. In this paper, resilience is defined as the systems capacity to absorb
disturbance, in this case, storm surge as the coastal hazard, and re-organize into a fully functioning
system. It involves not only the systems capacity to return to its original state, but also to move to a
more advanced state through learning and adaptation [Adger et al. 2005; Klein et al., 2003; Folke,
2006; Cutter et al. 2008]. In order to achieve these more advanced resilient states, the concepts of (1)
multi-level safety system, (2) build-back better principle and (3) sustainable socio-economic
Within such a multi-layer safety system, three safety layers can be distinguished [National Water Plan
of the Netherlands, 2012; Esteban et al., 2015; Esteban et al., 2013; Tsimopoulou et al., 2012;
Layer 1 - Prevention: encompasses various measures such as breakwaters or dykes that are aimed
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Layer 2 - Spatial Solutions: using spatial planning and adaptation of buildings to decrease the loss
if a flood does occur. The spatial arrangements that are part of layer 2 measures include the
relocation of settlements away from areas at greatest danger of flooding, for example.
Layer 3 - Emergency Management: includes organizational preparation for floods such as disaster
plans, risk maps, early-warning systems, evacuation and medical help. The main focus of layer 3
While traditional coastal disaster management in developed countries still tends to focus on
studies indicate the need to integrate non-structural (including mostly layer 2 and 3) measures (e.g.
coastal management policies and urban planning) to improve community resilience against future
events. This is even more important for the case of developing countries such as the Philippines,
whose resources for constructing infrastructure are often limited. The present paper will particularly
focus on the development of layer 2 strategies, which require the relocation of those living in areas at
Moreover, the Build Back Better principle is very important in the attempt to create more resilient
societies by reducing the vulnerability to future risks [Schilderman, 2010]. This entails the
implementation of disaster risk reduction measures with an optimum combination of structural and
non-structural measures in the reconstruction process. Different approaches are required for Build
Back Better reconstruction, depending on the type of hazard. Since the damage by storm surges is
mainly caused by water, topographic conditions strongly influence damage patterns. Water intrusion
can be controlled by constructing structural countermeasures, which have been identified as having
future potential for reducing disaster risk, although these require financial investments that would
appear too large for Tacloban City [City Government of Tacloban, 2014]. The preservation of human
lives can be achieved if adequate evacuation systems are in place, as typhoons can be predicted days
in advance. Thus, for the case of Tacloban one of the key components of any Build Back Better plan
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entails the relocation of coastal communities to safer areas to avoid the recurrence of future disasters,
Taking the perspective that the post-disaster recovery phase can be a window of opportunity for
disaster risk reduction [Paul, 2011], disasters are now also being considered as a development
opportunity [Asgary et al., 2006, Harrington, 2005, Wisner et al., 2004, Thiruppugazh, 2007,
Palliyaguru and Amaratunga, 2011]. In this regard, reconstruction projects should foster sustainable
development, not only addressing the reconstruction of physical structures, but also provide new
employment opportunities, improve the quality of life, maintain resource equity and service
distribution to the affected communities [Palliyaguru and Amaratunga, 2011]. The success of recovery
at the household and community level depends on several factors. At the household-level, families
recover at different rates due to the influence of factors such as socio-economic and demographic
characteristics of the individuals, the amount of resources households own or the amount of financial
assistance they receive from external sources [Paul, 2011]. Meanwhile, at the community-level, the
residential, commercial, industrial, social and lifeline components need to be adequately addressed
[Mileti, 1999]. Delay of recovery can also occur due to the setting of new codes or policies and
funding programs on the building process, damage of the structures, horizontal and vertical
integration or social participation into local, regional and national networks [Tobin and Montz, 1997],
prior disaster experience and effective leadership [Paul, 2011]. Hence, to ensure faster recovery,
mapping out an inclusive and holistic approach to address the needs of the disaster-affected
communities is important. Although addressing the socio-economic needs pose challenges, these can
The present study investigates the mechanisms of three different housing reconstruction programs. It
also discusses the sustainability challenges in these programs, by analyzing the gaps between
community needs and the program outputs. Among the phases in disaster management, the recovery
process, which involves the reconstruction phase, is typically the least understood due to its complex
dimensions [Berke et al. 1993; Smith and Wenger, 2006]. More importantly, this study compares the
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different approaches employed to the housing reconstruction programs in terms of the satisfaction of
the beneficiaries, which is rarely observed in literature. Hence, this paper aims to contribute to the
pool of literature regarding the challenges to these housing relocation projects as a layer 2 spatial
solution against future coastal disasters. Such attempts at relocation can easily fail if the new location
is inconvenient or does not offer enough livelihood options [Suzuki, 2012], requiring careful analysis
This paper is composed of 7 sections. Section 2 discusses the changes in the coastal land use policy of
Tacloban after typhoon Haiyan. Based on this policy, Section 3 explains about the various shelter
options that were made available to households who needed to be relocated from their original
locations. Next, section 4 introduces the three selected case study sites and the methodology used for
investigating them, while Section 5 outlines the displacement pattern of affected households from
their original locations based on the survey and key informant interviews. Then, Section 6 focuses on
identifying the project management issues encountered in the housing reconstruction program.
Through a more holistic approach, Section 7 examines the challenges of linking the programs to
Section 7 summarizes lessons that can be learned from Taclobans housing reconstruction programs
7
Coastal Land Use Policy
Prior to the disaster, there was an inadequacy in terms of layer 2 countermeasures in Tacloban.
According to the local government agency (Tacloban City Housing Office), the National Government
secured ownership of the citys coastline within 20 m. from high tide going inland to control
development and therefore, ban construction of houses (Esteban et al., 2015b). However, several
informal settlements had been built up right up to the coastline and even extended onto the sea. These
settlements were particularly badly hit, with all wooden constructions swept away by the storm surge.
As a consequence of the event, authorities have revised the coastal land use policy of Tacloban, which
is now being implemented during the recovery phase [City Government of Tacloban, 2014].
Table 1 shows the development of the coastal land use policy of Tacloban. While the policy initially
designated a No Build Zone (NBZ) along the citys coastline in the earlier stages of recovery, it was
later revised to distinguish between No Dwelling Zone, Unsafe Zone, and Safe Zone. [ Presidential
As of April 2014, the No Dwelling Zone follows a 40 m. limit that has been arbitrarily set by the
National Government until the in-depth risk assessment is finished and formal hazard maps are
finalized. The National Government initially cited the provision from Article 51 of the Water Code of
the Philippines as basis for the 40 m. buffer distance [Philippine National Government-DENR, 1976;
Philippines Shelter Cluster, 2014a]. The limit has consequently been questioned by NGOs as the Code
only protects water sources and does not primarily ensure public safety. Nonetheless, the National
Government reasons that this limit is a conscious effort to protect its local coastal communities
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Based on the recent rehabilitation plan of Tacloban City, the No Dwelling Zone, which is now to be
designated through the hazard maps released by the national government agencies [Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) et al., November 5, 2014; Lapidez et al., 2014], would
ban all houses, hotels or hospitals from the area, though it would allow some tourism, port and
recreational activities to take place. Furthermore, the construction of any buildings (i.e. commercial,
residential or industrial) in land elevation under 5 m. from the high water mark would be restricted to
low density and low rise developments [City Government of Tacloban, 2014]. Coastal zones along the
bays and San Juanico strait would be designated as recreation zones and replanted with mangroves for
For all this to happen it would be necessary for those presently living in areas close to the water to be
relocated, and a number of permanent relocation projects are currently underway, with a target of
more than 10,000 new houses to be built [City Government of Tacloban, 2014]. Such reconstruction
would not only remove people away from danger, but the quality of the houses that are being built
(largely made of concrete with a steel roof) is generally superior to the wooden houses typically
Lastly, it is important to note that this paper adopted the 40-meter buffer distance set by the National
Government in the time of transition to recovery phase as the definition of No Dwelling Zone (NDZ).
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Shelter Options in Tacloban City
After Haiyan, government and non-government organizations provided various shelter options to
affected communities in stages, depending on whether or not they were originally located in safe
zones or no dwelling zones [DSWD et al. 2014] These options included tents (Figure 1a, short-
term) and evacuation centers (Figure 1b, short-term), bunkhouses Figure 1c, medium-term) and
transitional shelters (Figure 1d, medium-term) and permanent housing in the original housing location
(Figure 1e, long-term) or relocation sites (Figure 1f and 1g, long-term), as shown on Table 2 [City
Government of Tacloban, 2014]. Like bunkhouses, transitional shelters also accommodate households
from no dwelling zones awaiting permanent relocation. However, while bunkhouses are made up of
wooden row houses, transitional shelters consist of single, detached native houses. Transitional
shelters are also often situated within close proximity of the permanent houses to which residents
would be relocated. Most affected households moved into these bunkhouses and transitional shelters,
although some families opted to temporarily move in with their relatives instead.
Permanent relocation is only offered to households originally living in no dwelling zones. As there
are numerous government agencies and NGOs offering various forms of housing assistance, the
Tacloban City Housing Office acted as a coordinator during beneficiary selection to prevent the
duplication of efforts. Still, these agencies and organizations ultimately applied their own processes
and set of criteria in choosing target beneficiaries based on their respective program objectives.
Processes usually included beneficiaries writing letters to NGOs and/or drawing by lots, or local
officials endorsing a list of households in need of housing assistance to agencies and organizations.
On the other hand, while selection criteria varied to a certain extent, vulnerability was often
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considered, thus giving preference to families with elderly, pregnant women, lactating mothers and
children members.
In terms of housing design, government agencies and NGOs both complied with the revised minimum
housing design standards set by the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) after
Haiyan. To ensure that permanent housing designs are typhoon-resilient, DPWH now requires one-
storey infrastructures to withstand a wind load design criterion of 250 kph [Regala, 2014]; note that
Haiyans maximum windspeed was around 300 kph. As a result, all permanent houses are now
concrete structures with steel roofing. Moreover, in line with the Build-Back-Better principle, the
standard housing design recommends building on stronger foundations and increasing the size of
structural elements reinforcements, beam and columns- with better connection details [Regala,
After preparing the reconstruction plans and housing designs, national government agencies and
NGOs again coordinate with the City Housing Office (local government agency), and seek their help
in securing necessary permits during the pre-construction phase. The total combined target number of
housing units is 14,433, although only a fraction has been completed (123 families have moved in as
of March 2015). At the same time, 1,027 and 627 families are still residing in bunkhouses and
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Case Study Sites and Methodology
In order to understand the relocation process at the various study sites the authors conducted
structured questionnaire surveys in March 2015 with local residents and displaced persons via a
cluster sampling method, with the community leaders acting as key resource persons in the selection
of respondents. Clusters were formed from areas with different types of housing reconstruction
approaches in Tacloban.
The surveys were conducted in three different locations, as shown on Figure 2. At each location the
aim was to capture the respondents housing reconstruction experiences, including a) their needs
versus assistances received from government and private sources, b) the factors that influenced their
decision to relocate (or not to relocate), and c) their involvement or participation in the reconstruction
process.
The survey was further complemented by focus group discussions with beneficiary households
(between 5 to 8 beneficiary households in one round of discussion for each project site visited), and
key informant interviews with government and non-government organizations (see Table 3).
Discussions and interviews highlighted the challenges faced by households now residing in permanent
housing locations as well as the various initiatives they have launched for coping with various
problems.
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Finally, survey data was analyzed statistically via significance testing (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney Test
for categorical variables, Spearmans Rank Correlation for ordinal variables and One-way Analysis of
Variance for comparison of groups). The results are presented in the next section.
The Magallanes area is composed of mostly informal settlements built along the coastline of
Barangay 52, 54 and 57 in the South Coast of Tacloban with around 750 families in total (see Figure
2). As most of the community is now classified by the National Government as a no dwelling zone,
rebuilding of houses is discouraged in the area. However, many residents still opted to do so and
returned from temporary shelters to their original locations to rebuild their wooden homes on a self-
help basis. Hence, the authors referred to this as owner-driven relocation, as the owners are
essentially in control over the rebuilding process of their houses where they were originally located
(on-site) by using their own means or with external financial and technical assistances.
Global Media Arts (GMA) Kapuso Foundation Housing is a permanent relocation site being
constructed in Barangay 105 in the North coast of Tacloban to accommodate beneficiary households
previously residing in no dwelling zones. GMAs residents originally come from the coastal
barangay of San Jose (Barangay 88), about 24 km to the south (see Figure 2). They are usually
families with 7 members and above, in line with GMAs specific criteria for beneficiary selection.
GMA Kapuso Foundation Housing features concrete, row houses with a floor area of 42 sq. m. mainly
constructed by private contractors with funding from one of the country's largest TV networks, GMA.
Nonetheless, beneficiary households also participate in project implementation via a sweat equity
agreement with GMA that stipulates 500 hours of construction work. The authors thus termed this
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community-driven relocation as the entire community is highly involved in the project of relocating
Aside from the actual housing units, a school with 20 classrooms is also included in the plan.
However, as of March 2015, most of the houses were still under construction and only 106 out of 400
4.3. NHA Ridgeview Socialized Housing: Contractor-driven off-site relocation (Case 3), (n 3=12)
Ridgeview is also a permanent relocation site located in Barangay 97 in the Mid-coast. It is one of the
National Housing Authoritys (NHA) 13 project sites for Tacloban city residents. This case was
termed contractor-driven as the NHA has engaged with private contractors for the implementation
of its concrete, loftable, row housing design across all project sites. Each unit costs PhP 295,000 or
US$6,500, has a floor area of 22 sq. meters (another 11 sq. m. is loftable) and is built to withstand 250
kph wind speed. However, as of March 2015, only 17 out of 1,000 target units had been completed
and occupied at NHA-Ridgeview. Residents also originally come from San Jose (Barangay 88) which
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Displacement Patterns
Figure 3 presents the distribution of the respondent samples according to the location of their original
houses, either inside or outside the No Dwelling Zone (NDZ). Across all study sites most
interviewed households lived inside NDZs (i.e. 74%, 75% and 100%, respectively). This was
expected of Cases 2 and 3, which are both off-site permanent relocation programs, as beneficiary
selection criteria prioritized precisely those living in the NDZ. However, the same finding raises
concerns for Case 1 (on-site reconstruction) as it confirms that most residents have indeed rebuilt in
unsafe areas. Analysis in the succeeding sections further stratified the respondents from Case 1 (on-
site reconstruction) into those living inside the NDZ (Case 1a) and outside the NDZ (Case 1b) to
Through the questionnaire surveys, it was possible to ascertain the movement of respondents from
their original houses into evacuation centers or tents (short-term), bunkhouses or transitional shelters
At the onset of the super-typhoon in November 2013, respondents from Case 1 (on-site
reconstruction, n=53) transferred from their own houses to evacuation centers or tents (92%) or to
15
their relatives houses (8%). However, it is important to note that there is uncertainty about the exact
timing of this transfer due to data limitations during the immediate disaster relief period (shown as a
grey-shaded region in Figure 4). In February 2014, about three months after the event, the households
then started to leave the short-term shelter options to return and rebuild their houses at their original
Residents now living in Case 2 (community-driven off-site relocation) also left evacuation centers,
tents or their relatives houses after 3 months. However, rather than going back to their original
housing locations, they moved in to transitional shelters or bunkhouses instead (60%), where they
stayed for 9 months. Relocation to the North Coast, which is 24 km away from their original housing
location, began around August 2014 once the first permanent houses were completed.
Lastly, for Case 3 (contractor-driven off-site relocation case), beneficiaries only began to transfer to
the housing units around November 2014, a year after Typhoon Haiyan struck. As of March 2015,
only 17 out of the planned 1000 units have been completed and occupied, signaling delays in housing
construction and overall recovery process as compared to Case 2 (community-driven relocation site),
where 106 out of 400 units (27%) have already been completed.
It can be noted that Case 2 residents started to move in to their housing units in August 2014, 3
months earlier than Case 3. However, in terms of moving in to transitional shelters, most Case 3
residents were able to move in earlier (by May 2014) compared to Case 2 as some opted to stay in
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Project Management Challenges to Post-disaster Housing Programs
The housing projects in Tacloban, including both on-site reconstruction and off-site relocation
programs, are encountering problems in the different stages (i.e. preparation, design and construction
stages) of project planning and implementation. These interconnected challenges are highlighted in
this section.
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6.1 On-site Reconstruction Inside and Outside the No Dwelling Zone (NDZ)
Households located in areas highly affected by storm surge were provided with various schemes [City
socialized housing program or permanent relocation to sites in the North Coast of Tacloban,
and
The first option was made available to residents living outside the NDZ. In addition, the government
prescribed guidelines on how to build safer houses in safe zones [Philippines Shelter Cluster, 2014b].
However, some rebuilt houses in Case 1b (on-site reconstruction, outside the NDZ) were observed to
On the other hand, only the second and third options were made available to residents living inside the
NDZ as the revised coastal land use policy of the city government requires them to relocate to areas
with lower risk to storm surge instead. However, as discussed in Section 5.2, several residents of Case
1a (on-site reconstruction inside the NDZ) still rebuilt inside the NDZ, indicating poor
implementation of the policy. This situation also points to problems regarding the availability of
assistance to all households that need to be relocated, delay in the construction of the resettlement
houses, and lack of information dissemination on assistance options to target beneficiaries. According
to the Tacloban City Housing Office (local government agency), the 14,433 target number of units
only initially accommodates 36 barangays located within NDZ and is inadequate to serve all the
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6.2 Off-site Relocation
The main challenge to project implementation in Cases 2 and 3 for off-site permanent relocation is the
delay in housing construction. As of March 2015, only 123 out of 14,433 target housing units have
projects.
On the one hand, land acquisition proved to be challenging and time-consuming as reaching an
agreement with land owners needed thorough negotiation. On the other hand, especially for Case 3
(contractor-driven off-site relocation), subcontracting has become a serious issue as many contractors
have been distributing part of their obligation to subcontractors, compromising construction quality
and materials. Interview with Tacloban City Housing Office revealed that a number of materials have
already been returned to suppliers due to poor quality, and an NGO-funded (Habitat-for-Humanity)
housing reconstruction project has already been stopped due to the use of sub-standard materials.
Such poor construction management may only inadvertently increase risks to future disasters.
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Linking Housing Reconstruction Projects to Sustainable Development
The new paradigm for post-disaster reconstruction recognized that disaster can be an opportunity to
build back better rather than merely satisfying the demand of communities to return to their original
state immediately [Kates et al., 2006; Thiruppugazh, 2007; World Bank, 2014]. Hence, decision-
makers have a choice of whether to restore the status quo or to enhance development in disaster-
stricken regions. Following the above section on challenges to housing reconstruction projects, this
section highlights the challenge to incorporate soft solutions into these infrastructure-based projects in
order to promote a more holistic approach to recovery. The analysis below evaluates the need for this
holistic approach by checking the level of satisfaction of households with the housing reconstruction
programs (i.e. whether or not the assistance received was related to their actual needs). It also
identifies the types of assistances that would lead to greater satisfaction for each case of housing
reconstruction project.
Respondents from all cases received a variety of assistance types, as shown in Figure 7. Financial aid
was given by the national government (Department of Social Welfare and Development via 4P
Poverty Alleviation Program) and an international NGO (Tzu Chi Foundation via outright donation or
cash-for-work). Construction materials or shelter repair kits (containing plywood, lumber, galvanized
iron sheet, hammer, handsaw and nails approximately worth around US$ 400) were also provided by
other humanitarian agencies (International Organization of Migrants, Oxfam International and Red
Cross). Finally, however, as not everyone can be relocated at the same time, only households meeting
a set of criteria were selected by government agencies and NGOs as priority for permanent relocation.
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Household respondents were asked to indicate their level of satisfaction regarding their post-disaster
status, which also reflects their satisfaction with assistance received from government agencies and
NGOs. This parameter had already been used in past literature to measure project performance
[Lizarralde, 2009; Karunasena and Rameezdeen, 2010] and user and community participation
[Barenstein, 2008; Bouraoui and Lizarralde, 2013; ESSC, 2014]. In this paper, the level of satisfaction
was tested for significance against potential variables coming from 6 main categories including
financial aid, safety of location, utility service, community initiatives, livelihood opportunities and
type of assistances received. Finally, the significant variables were further assessed as to how these
Figure 8 shows the level of satisfaction of the households for the different case types; note that lower
values indicate higher satisfaction level based on a 5-point Likert scale. Case 2 (community-driven
off-site relocation) had high level of satisfaction (mean= 1.60), while Cases 1 (on-site reconstruction)
and 3 (contractor-driven off-site relocation) had relatively neutral satisfaction (means= 2.54 and 2.64)
and slight level of dissatisfaction (mean= 3.67), respectively.. Comparing the means of satisfaction
level via one-way analysis of variance, authors found a statistically significant difference (F=25.94,
p<0.001) amongst the three cases. Hence, further analysis was done to better understand why such
Significance testing was employed to assess which variables significantly affected the level of
satisfaction of the households surveyed. Statistical parameters representing the degree (effect size)
21
For Case 1a (on-site reconstruction, inside the NDZ), shelter repair kits significantly affected the level
of satisfaction of the respondents. Generally, the main objective of distributing shelter repair kits is to
promote self-recovery, particularly in terms of shelter. However, as the repair kits were distributed to
residents living inside the NDZ, it enabled them to rebuild in the high-risk zone as well. This situation
could have been due to misallocation of aid as well as miscommunication of the NDZ policy to
affected households. Based on Figure 6, approximately 32% of the respondents of Case 1a were able
to receive this assistance. Significance testing also found livelihood training assistance as a significant
variable for determining the satisfaction level. Based on Figure 6, only less than 10% of respondents
received such type of aid, potentially explaining their low satisfaction level. Hence, their perceived
level of satisfaction on their recovery status depends on the types of assistances received and how
successful these assistances were given to specific target households in the communities, as similarly
On the other hand, for Case 1b (on-site reconstruction, outside the NDZ), the variables found to
significantly influence the level of satisfaction included estimated housing damage and water utility
disruption duration. While all housing structures inside the NDZ were completely washed away by the
storm surge, some structures outside the NDZ (30%) were spared and only suffered slight to partial
damage (Figure 9), contributing to a higher level of satisfaction. Another important factor for
satisfaction is water availability, indicating the need to prioritize the restoration of access to water
services, including water and electricity, have close interrelationships with other critical
infrastructure, and can potentially impact communities and associated industries after the
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For Case 2 (community-driven off-site relocation), the provision of construction skills training to
households can positively affect the level of satisfaction. However, only 15% of the respondents were
able to join the training, as shown in Figure 6. Nonetheless, beyond the 500-hour sweat equity
agreement with the funding NGO, some men are also able to work as laborers or skilled workers in
the construction of the relocation site as temporary income source (more details provided in Section
7.2.2 below). Despite their limited coverage, the construction skills training and construction work
opportunities complemented the livelihood self-sufficiency variable, which in turn increased the level
of satisfaction of some respondents. In this sense, researchers studying the recovery of coastal
communities affected by the 2004 Asian tsunami such as Pomeroy et al. [2006] have also similarly
highlighted the importance of revitalizing livelihood options as a means of addressing the root cause
Meanwhile, for Case 3 (contractor-driven off-site relocation), no independent variable from the
collected survey data was found to be significant. As shown earlier in Figure 6, most respondents
from Case 3 did not receive any livelihood training or construction skills training assistance, although
all of them were selected for the relocation program and were able to receive relief goods. Further
investigation is warranted to better understand which type of assistance would address the needs of
Past relocation experiences in the Philippines indicate that greater participation of beneficiaries in
building and even designing their own houses have the following advantages [Ballesteros and Egana,
2012]: (1) beneficiaries can have freedom to address their need for bigger space as their family size
increases and (2) greater involvement and investment in housing construction increases community
participation and provides incentives for relocated beneficiaries to establish more effective
homeowners association. However, partially because most households have only recently moved in to
Case 2 (community-driven off-site relocation) and Case 3 (contractor-driven off-site relocation) sites,
the impact of using a community or contractor driven approach to permanent housing construction on
the level of satisfaction is not yet clear. How such factors will affect the case of Tacloban will be the
In both community- and contractor-driven relocation projects a number of critical social challenges
have already emerged at the time of writing, raising concerns about the long-term viability of the
projects. The following sections will discuss several other essential and challenging aspects that are
critical for a successful relocation, based on information from key-informants and discussions with
Permanent relocation sites are located more than 20 km north of downtown Tacloban, and takes about
an hour ride from the city center. As the sites are currently poorly served by public transport, residents
are faced with various related issues such as the cost of transportation, availability of livelihood and
accessibility of schools.
Each permanent house in Cases 2 (community-driven off-site relocation) and 3 (contractor-driven off-
site relocation) is to be provided with individual water and electricity connections. However, as the
construction of the relocation sites is still currently ongoing, these connections have not yet been
prepared. To address this gap, each household was provided with solar lamps by UNHCR in
partnership with IOM. In terms of water, residents of Case 2 currently have to buy water from an
outside source for PhP30/day or US$0.68/day (at least 10% of the daily incomes of those who have
work) or fetch it from a deep well around the site. It is important to note that many of the resettlement
beneficiaries previously lived as informal settlers in coastal barangays and are beneficiaries of
DSWDs 4P conditional cash transfer program which is mainly for families living below the countrys
poverty threshold (Case 2: 60% and Case 3: 33% of samples). As of the first semester of 2014, this
threshold was pegged at an average of PhP8,788 or US$198.6 per month for the basic food and non-
24
food needs of a family of 5 (Philippine Statistics Authority National Statistical Coordination Body,
2014).
According to the community leader of Case 2 (community-driven off-site relocation), in the long-term
residents will have to utilize their own money to obtain an electricity and water connection, which
cost PhP870 (US$20) and PhP2,500 (US$57), respectively. Water billing will be pegged at PhP250
per month (US$5.65/month), assuming that each household only consumes 10 cubic meters of water
or less. However, as of March 2015, water pipe connections are only available to some blockhouses
close to the road. Still, given the lack of income due to poor livelihood opportunities in the relocation
sites, acquiring electricity and water connections (when they are finally available) may remain a great
The issue of livelihood is one of the most pressing for households in Cases 2 (community-driven off-
site relocation) and 3 (contractor-driven off-site relocation). As the sites are located far from
downtown Tacloban, access to jobs and other income-generating activities have become difficult for
residents. This was especially the case for women who used to work as market vendors and domestic
service providers, as there are no markets or business establishments near the relocation sites. On the
other hand, especially for Case 2 (community-driven off-site relocation), some men are able to work
in the construction of the permanent relocation site for PhP250/day (US$5.65/day) for laborers, and
While still staying in their transitional shelters, Case 2 residents were able to participate in a month-
long carpentry training provided by the International Labor Organization (ILO) upon the request of
the City Housing Office. ILO also provided participants with complete personal protective gears, tools
25
and a daily salary of PhP300 (US$6.8). The training was attended by both men and women (50%-50%
Sumali lang ako para maka-ano yung mga eskwela ko, para makabili ng books... Hindi
na [ako nagtrabaho pagkatapos ng training]. Ang hirap, hindi ko kaya. Napasubo lang
ako dahil sa kahirapan. Para mapunuan ang pagkukulang, PhP1,800 yun per week. (I
only joined the training so my kids can continue studying, and buy their books. I did not
actually work after that because it is very difficult, I cannot take it. I just joined out of
poverty, so that we can address our financial needs. That was also PhP1,800 per week.).
Site observation by the authors also indicated that construction workers in the relocation site were
mostly men.
Thus, while women were able to participate in the training, they were unlikely to proceed to actual
construction work, leaving them with lesser livelihood opportunities compared to men. Still, as
One of the main requirements for proper relocation is for adequate livelihood opportunities to be
available [Cernea, 1997]. However, as of March 2015, limited livelihood programs have been
relocation). Most residents are still awaiting livelihood assistance from the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD) in partnership with the International Emergency and
Development Aid (IEDA) Relief Philippines. Under the DSWD scheme, residents will be provided
with livelihood capital based on the business proposals they have previously submitted. Based on the
beneficiaries own capacity and preference, they can propose to start or restart businesses in dress-
making, cooking and market-vending, among others. Funding will also depend on the proposal.
However, the program has already been delayed several times and frustration has grown among target
beneficiaries. Nonetheless, the Memorandum of Agreement between DSWD and the implementing
26
organization, International Emergency and Development Aid (IEDA), has already been signed. IEDA
Although learning facilities like day care centers and even elementary schools are included in the
plans for relocation sites, construction of such infrastructure has not yet been started as of March
2015. In this sense, it appears that the priority is to complete the row houses and move in all
beneficiary families first, before commencing the construction of other facilities. For Case 2
(community-driven off-site relocation), an elementary school is located about 3 kilometers from the
site, which children can access by walking for an hour each way or by commuting for PhP10
(US$0.23) each way. However, for Case 3 (contractor-driven off-site relocation), participants of focus
group discussion revealed that their children have stopped going to school due to the inability to pay
for commuting fares and school allowance. At the same time, because their children do not go to
school anymore they have stopped receiving assistance from DSWD's 4P program. Based on
Administrative Order No. 16 of DSWD (2008), the 4P program grants households PhP300 or US$7
(for elementary students) or PhP500 or US$11 (for high school students) each month on the condition
Following all these challenges, many target beneficiaries who are still awaiting relocation might be
deterred from moving into their new houses after they have finally been completed. Similarly, they
might also accept the new houses but, at the same time, keep another house in informal settlements
close to downtown Tacloban (which might eventually result in a partial failure of the relocation
inhabitants, clearly a problem in an area with high fertility rates). In fact, as in Case 1a (on-site
reconstruction, inside the NDZ), many of the residents of these informal settlements had already
27
28
Conclusion
The post-Haiyan recovery effort in Tacloban has emphasized the need to incorporate the build-back-
better resilience-thinking to the housing reconstruction program in the affected coastal communities.
Under this framework, spatial solutions, which involved land use planning and building adaptation as
part of the multi-layer safety approach [Hoss et al. 2011], have been integrated with the shelter option
programs of government and non-government organizations through the no dwelling zone (NDZ)
policy. However, based on the survey conducted, some households were still living inside the NDZ.
This endangers the lives of these households against future disasters by failing to reduce the
vulnerability of communities in high-risk zones. In this regard, further studies on their choice of
shelter options (ex. why some households still decided to rebuild inside the NDZ) needs to be
investigated in detail.
The study also compared the challenges faced by three post-disaster housing reconstruction
approaches: Case 1 (on-site reconstruction), Case 2 (community-driven off-site relocation) and Case
relating to lack of crucial assistance types (e.g. livelihood training) and, at the same time,
misallocation of others (e.g. shelter repair kit) as well as poor information dissemination.
Furthermore, this study found that prolonged disruption of water utility service and high severity of
damage to housing structures hampered the speed of household recovery in the affected areas.
On the other hand, for Case 2, insufficient livelihood training programs and opportunities posed a
challenge to the recovery of the displaced community, potentially affecting their perceived level of
self-sufficiency after the disaster. These factors were determined to be significant contributors towards
achieving sustainable socio-economic development for the communities in the relocation site.
In addition, for both Cases 2 and 3, issues such as delay in project implementation, problem in land
acquisition, and poor quality of construction work were apparent. These problems need to be
addressed for permanent relocation projects to bear positive impacts to the displaced household.
29
Finally, it is clear that there is significant room for improvements in the permanent housing programs
discussed, including setting up sound evaluation criteria for site acceptability prior to land acquisition
(e.g. accessible and safe), providing assistance to beneficiaries regarding sustainable livelihoods,
repairing critical infrastructure (e.g. transportation, electricity, water), pre-planning land acquisition to
expedite rebuilding process, improving the transparency and accountability of projects by keeping
target beneficiaries informed of the progress of reconstruction, and increasing the involvement of
beneficiaries. Further research into the lessons that can be learned from this disaster should be
30
Acknowledgements
Funds for the field survey were mainly provided by the Graduate Program in Sustainability Science
Global Leadership Initiative (GPSS-GLI, The University of Tokyo), the Strategic Research
Foundation Grant-aided Project for Private Universities from Ministry of Education (Waseda
University), and a research grant of Tokyo Institute of Technology. The authors would also like to
acknowledge the contribution of International Emergency and Development Aid (IEDA) Relief
31
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