RSR DEVELOPMENT COMPANY

3000F Danville Boulevard #268

Alamo, California 94507
Plaintiff in Pro Per

SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

COUNTY OF CONTRA COSTA

CASE NO. C13-02412

RSR DEVELOPMENT COMPANY
PLAINTIFFS NOTICE OF PENDENCY
Plaintiff, OF ACTION; MOTION FOR LIS
v. PENDENS RECORDATION;
MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
ROBERT LEWIS VAN BLOIS, an AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT
individual, VICKIE G. VAN BLOIS, an THEREOF
individual and DOES 1 THROUGH 10,
inclusive. ACCOMPANYING PAPERS: Declaration
of Ravi Reddy in support hereof; Title
Defendants. Report

TO DEFENDANTS ROBERT LEWIS VAN BLOIS AND VICKIE G. VAN BLOIS AND
THEIR ATTORNEYS OF RECORD:

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on _________________ or on the date allocated by the

e ntitled Court, located at Superior Court Martinez, 725 Court Street, Room 103, Martinez, CA

94553 a cause of action to quiet the title to the real property as described herein will be

commenced by Plaintiff RSR DEVELOPMENT CO. against Defendants VAN BLOIS.

The object of this motion is to quiet the title of the real property located in the city of Layfayette,

County of Contra Costa, State of California and legally described as follows:

Parcel One: Portion Of The Rancho Acalanes, Described As Follows:

Beginning At The Most Northerly Corner Of The Parcel Of Land Described As Parcel One In The
Deed To Fred R. Wagner, Et Ux, Recorded September 27, 1945, Book 827, Official Records,
Page 120; Thence From Said Point Of Beginning Along The Exterior Line Of Said Wagner
Parcel, As Follows: South 19 24 East, 153.05 Feet; North 71 38 15" West, 5.53 Feet And
South 19 24 East, 10 Feet To The North Line Of The 8 Feet In Width Strip Of Land Described
In The Deed To Stewart L. Wade Et Ux, Recorded August 17, 1950, Book 1616, Official Records,
Page 503; Thence South 71 38 15" West, Along Said North Line To The Northeast Line Of The
Parcel Of Land Described As Parcel One In The Deed To Stewart L. Wade, Et
Ux, Recorded November 19, 1951, Book 1853, Official Records, Page 361; Thence North 19 24
West, Along Said Northeast Line, 160.4 Feet To The Northwest Line Of Said Wagner Parcel (827
Or 120); Thence North 70 43 45" East, Along Said Northwest Line, 167.18 Feet To The Point
Of Beginning.

Parcel Two:
"A Right Of Way (Not To Be Exclusive)" Created In Reference, To Parcel One Herein In The
Deed To Stewart L. Wade, Et Ux, Recorded August 17, 1950, Book 1616, Official Records, Page
503", For Use As A Roadway For Vehicles Of All Kinds, Pedestrians And Animals, For Water,
Gas, Oil And Sewer Pipe Lines, And For Telephone, Electric Light And Power Lines, Together
With The Necessary Poles Or Conduits To Carry Said Lines", Over The 8 Feet In Width Strip Of
Land Described In Said Deed (1616 Or 503).

Parcel Three:
A Right Of Way Created In Reference To Parcel One Herein In The Deed To Fred R. Wagner, Et
Ux, Recorded September 27, 1945, Book 827, Official Records, Page 120, As Follows: "A Right
Of Way (Not To Be Exclusive) For Use As A Roadway For Vehicles Of All Kinds, Etc., And
Sewer Pipelines, And For Telephone, Electric Light And Power Lines, Together With The
Necessary Poles Or Conduits To Carry Said Lines, Over That Certain Strip Of Land 8 Feet Wide
Described As Exception 2 In The Deed From Roy R. Bunker And Irene P. Bunker, Husband And
Wife, To Joseph Alfred Forsburg And Carol Anna Forsburg, Husband And Wife, As Joint Tenants,
Dated October 1, 1942, Recorded October 6, 1942, In Book 668, Official Records, Page 107,
Excepting There from That Portion Thereof Lying Within Happy Valley Road."
Apn: 244-140-009 (herein collectively after referred to as the property).

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This motion is made on the grounds that Plaintiff has a real property claim to the property
described herein and Plaintiff is likely to prevail on his claims against the Defendants. The
property described herein is unique a n d there exists an inadequacy of remedies should a lis
pendens not be granted. This motion is based on the accompanying Memorandum of Points
and Authorities, the Declaration of Ravi Reddy, the Complaint and exhibits attached thereto, all
of pleadings and papers on file in the underlying cause of action, and upon such other and
further evidence and argument as may be presented at the hearing.

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

A. STATEMENT OF ISSUE TO BE DECIDED

B. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
(i) Plaintiff has a real property claim and files a lis pendens in good faith and in
accordance with the Civil Code of Procedure.
C. SUMMARY OF THE FACTS
(i) Defendant is in breach of contract in a real property Complaint.
(ii) The property is unique to Plaintiff.
(iii) Specific performance and a lis pendens are the appropriate remedies to protect
Plaintiffs real property claim.
D. ARGUMENT
(i) Statutory Requirements.

(ii) The claim is one on which an attachment may issue.

(iii) The probable validity of such claim.
(iv)The attachment is not sought for any purpose other than to secure recovery on the
claim.
(v) Property is unique to Plaintiff and an undertaking is an inappropriate remedy.

E. CONCLUSION

A. STATEMENT OF ISSUE TO BE DECIDED

1. The issue before the Court is whether Plaintiff has met the statutory requirements to
file a bona fide lis pendens on the property described herein. Plaintiff filed a complaint

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 seeking specific performance of the contract and a notice of pendency of action (lis
pendens). (Code Civ. Proc., 405 et seq.)

B. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

2. This motion arises from a Complaint filed for Specific Performance, Breach of Contract,
and Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage. Before the Court is whether the
motion meets the statutory requirements to grant relief as set forth herein.
3. Plaintiff has a right of possession to the property described herein and files for a lis
pendens in good faith thereby giving constructive notice that an action has been filed
affecting title or right to possession of the real property described in the notice.
4. Plaintiff has a real property claim as set forth in the California Civil Code of Procedure
Section 405 seq. to the property described herein.
5. The property described herein is unique to Plaintiff and an undertaking is an inappropriate
remedy pending resolution of the Complaint.

C. SUMMARY OF THE FACTS

The Parties and the Unique Property at Issue
The Parties to this action are as follow: Plaintiff, RSR DEVELOPMENT COMPANY is a
business entity within the state of California. RAVI REDDY, is President and Owner dba as
RSR DEVELOPMENT COMPANY. Defendant, ROBERT LEWIS VAN BLOIS is an
individual attorney practicing at Van Blois & Associates in Oakland California. Defendant,
VICKIE G. VAN BLOIS is an individual, married to ROBERT LEWIS VAN BLOIS. Mr.
and Mrs. VAN BLOIS own the property that is the subject of this dispute as joint tenants.

On or about, November, 2012, Defendants VAN BLOIS were and remain to be the owners of
real property located in Contra Costa County, California, commonly known as 3659 Happy
Valley Road, Lafayette, California 94549 (the property). The property is a vacant lot
suitable for development of a residential home on the lot.

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On or about, November, 2012 Plaintiff became aware of a listing for the sale of said property.
At the time the Plaintiff inquired about the property Defendants had listed the property on the
market for a period of approximately three years, without sale; since at least December 2009
until December 2012 when Plaintiff expressed interest in the property.

Plaintiff was highly interested in purchasing said property. More particularly, Plaintiff was
specifically looking to purchase a vacant lot in the Happy Valley neighborhood in which he
could develop a property because Plaintiff is a developer of high end luxury homes.

Plaintiff submits that the property is unique and valuable to him because the property is a
vacant lot suitable only for construction development. Plaintiff is an experienced developer
and the property was ideal for this purpose, especially given its location in the neighborhood
he had limited his acquisition to.

Plaintiff was enthusiastic about the prospect of the property and immediately contacted the
brokers listed for the property. Plaintiff quit looking for properties to buy upon finding the
Defendants Happy Valley listing and focused his time and energy towards acquiring the
property. As events would prove it to be, Plaintiff eventually executed a Purchase Agreement
in June 2013 for the property.

Negotiations were conducted from the months of May 2013 through to June 2013 until the

parties came to an agreement on the purchase price of the property: nine hundred thousand

dollars. The property has a current (2013) assessed land value of approximately six hundred

thousand dollars. Plaintiffs paid an excessive value for the property because the sale was

contingent on the Defendants agreeing to finance part of the purchase price by securing their

interest with a second mortgage on the property.

From the onset of negotiations the purchase of the property was contingent on Plaintiff
obtaining a construction loan and the Defendants carrying (financing) a portion of the

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 purchase price. The Defendants loan was to be secured by a second mortgage on the
property.

On June 13th 2013 the parties entered into a formal Purchase Agreement (the agreement)

for the property. The agreed to purchase price of nine hundred thousand dollars was

structured as follows: (i) Plaintiff to finance four hundred thousand dollars in the form of a

construction loan; and (ii) Defendants were to finance five hundred thousand dollars of the

purchase price secured by a second mortgage on the property at the close of escrow. At the

time of signing, Plaintiff gave a deposit of five thousand dollars which was put in escrow by

Defendants.

The Purchase Agreements initial term of escrow was forty-five days for Plaintiff to obtain a
construction loan and close escrow by July 20 2013. The time to close escrow subsequently
had many modifications agreed to by Plaintiff and Defendants. A first addendum was
executed on July 20 2013 which extended Plaintiffs period to close escrow to August 02
2013 which Plaintiff was unable to do pending financing. A second addendum was executed
on August 02 2013 which extended Plaintiffs period to close escrow to August 15 2013
which Plaintiff was unable to do pending financing.

On August 15th 2013 Plaintiff received a Demand to Close Escrow (DCE) from Defendant
within 3 days. Plaintiff did not comply with the DCE because on August 16th 2013 Plaintiff
received an email from the brokers that stated: brokers had met with Defendants and that
they (Defendants) were willing to extend the escrow date providing discussions could be
initiated modifying the funding terms.( the email is attached as exhibit H in the Complaint).
Plaintiff heard nothing further from Defendants and continued to secure financing for the
property which was an elaborate and time consuming process.

On or about October 04th 2013 Plaintiff received a letter from Defendants Van Blois law

office demanding that he sign a Cancellation of Contract by October 09h 2013 or that he (Van

Blois) would commence litigation. The letter stated that Plaintiff had been informed by your

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 real estate broker that you had to sign the Cancellation of Contract and Release of Deposit (the

VB Letter and attached as exhibit I in the Complaint).

Plaintiff submits that no such discussion occurred ever occurred, and if it did, Plaintiff has no

recollection of it. It was never communicated in writing. Regardless, it was a moot point

because Plaintiff had secured a construction loan by the time Van Bois sent the demand that

Plaintiff Cancel the Contract on October 4th. 2013

Plaintiff sought the counsel of attorney David Anderson who responded to the Van Blois letter

immediately. On October 08th 2013 attorney Anderson informed Defendant Van Blois that

escrow number FSJP-6061300928 has been opened at Chicago Title Company and that the full

amount of the property's purchase price is being transferred into escrow at this time.

Anderson further advised Van Blois that Plaintiff is ready, willing, and able to perform under

the agreement at this time. The Anderson letter warned Defendants that failure to close

escrow would expose Plaintiff to substantial losses because of the impending expiration

(November 15th 2013) of the zoning permits (the Anderson letter is attached as exhibit J in the

Complaint).

On or about October 16th 2013 Anderson received a letter from attorney Charles Hansen whom
had been retained by Defendants. Attorney Hansens letter stated that Defendants would not
close with Plaintiff under any circumstances. To quote attorney Hansen, We doubt that a
valid contract ever existed between our clients given that RSR does not appear to be a valid
California business entity. (the Hansen letter attached as exhibit K in the Complaint).

RSR Development Company is a legal entity within the state of California. Ravi Reddy has the
ability to enter into binding agreements in California as an individual dba RSR Development
Company. From a legal principle regarding the ability to contract they are one and the same.

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Attached is a copy of Plaintiffs fiactitiousness business name statement ( the DBA Document
attached as exhibit L in the Complaint).

Defendant refused to close escrow and the zoning permits expired. Plaintiff will have to reapply
for the necessary permits because too many prior extensions had been granted to Defendants in
the past. Had Defendants timely closed Plaintiff would have had the benefits of an extension by
initiating development of the property. Plaintiff is now in the position of having to re-apply; a
costly and time consuming process. Moreover, Plaintiff has lost the benefit of all the due
diligence he conducted regarding the architectural plans and permits pending close of escrow.

The complaint is a case about sellers remorse. Defendant Van Blois entered into a contractual
obligation he regrets and is without legal recourse to rectify it. Defendant threatens Plaintiffs
interest by refusing to close escrow. Defendant threatens Plaintiffs interest by actively listing
the property for sale on an MLS

Plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction seeks to protect his interest in the property
pending resolution of the Complaint.

D. ARGUMENT
(i) Statutory Requirements
A lis pendens is a recorded document giving constructive notice that an action has been
filed affecting title or right to possession of the real property described in the notice.
(Code Civ. Proc., 409) (Urez Corp. v. Superior Court (1987) 190 Cal. App. 3d 1141,
1144 [235 Cal. Rptr. 837].)

A lis pendens may be filed by any party in an action who asserts a real property claim.
(Code Civ. Proc., 405.20.) 'Real property claim' means the cause or causes of action in a
pleading which would, if meritorious, affect (a) title to, or the right to possession of,
specific real property.

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 The effect of such notice is that anyone who acquires an interest in the property after the
action has been filed will be bound by any judgment which may thereafter be rendered in
the action. ( Kendall-Brief Co. v. Superior Court (1976) 60 Cal.App.3d 462, 468 [131
Cal.Rptr. 515].) ( Bishop Creek Lodge v. Scira (1996) 46 Cal.App.4th 1721, 1733 [54 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 745].)

(ii) The claim is one on which an attachment may issue

Case law has determined that certain types of actions clearly do, or clearly do not, affect title or
possession. (Cal. Lis Pendens Practice, supra, 3.20-3.40, at pp. 111-123; Weil & Brown, Cal.
Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 1999) PP 15:27-15:44, pp. 15-5
to 15-9 (rev. # 1 1999); 3 Miller & Starr, Cal. Real Estate (2d ed. 1989) 8:123, pp. 501-507.) At
one extreme, "[a] buyer's action for specific performance of a real property purchase and sale
agreement is a classic example of an action in which a lis pendens is both appropriate and
necessary." (Cal. Lis Pendens Practice, supra, 3.21, at p. 112; Hilberg v. Superior Court (1989)
215 Cal. App. 3d 539, 542 [263 Cal. Rptr. 675]; Stewart Development Co. v. Superior
Court (1980) 108 Cal. App. 3d 266, 272-273 [166 Cal. Rptr. 450].) At the other extreme, an
action for money only, even if it relates in some way to specific real property, will not support
a lis pendens. ( Ziello v. Superior Court (1995) 36 Cal. App. 4th 321, 332 [42 Cal. Rptr. 2d
251]; Deane v. Superior Court, supra, 164 Cal. App. 3d 292, 297.) Code of Civil Procedure
section 409.1 provides that a notice of lis pendens shall be expunged upon motion of a party to
the action, "unless the party filing the notice shows to the satisfaction of the court, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that: . . . [the] action does affect title to or right of possession of
the real property described in the notice;" and that the party filing the notice brought its action for
a proper purpose and in good faith. Under this code section the burden is upon the party who
recorded the lis pendens to show by a preponderance of evidence that the action affects title or
right to possession. (See Malcolm v. Superior Court (1981) 29 Cal.3d 518, 525-526 [174
Cal.Rptr. 694, 629 P.2d 495]; McKnight v. Superior Court(1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 291, 302 [215
Cal.Rptr. 909].)

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We are therefore obliged to construe the entire agreement of the parties here, as reflected in the

three written instruments which they signed. Our duty is to determine what the parties intended as

expressed in what they said. In so doing, we may consider the surrounding circumstances insofar

as they are shown by the record. (See Pacific Gas & E. Co. v. G. W. Thomas Drayage etc. Co.

(1968) 69 Cal.2d 33, 38-39 [69 Cal.Rptr. 561, 442 P.2d 641, 40 A.L.R.3d 1373].) (Nash v.

Superior Court, 86 Cal. App. 3d 690 (Cal. App. 2d Dist. 1978)

(iii) The probable validity of such claim

Probable validity: A claim has " probable validity " where "it is more likely than not that the
plaintiff will obtain a judgment against the defendant on the claim." ( 405.3.)

The burden of proof on a motion to expunge under sections 405.31 and 405.32 rests in each case
with the claimant. ( 405.30.) Palmer v. Zaklama, 109 Cal. App. 4th 1367 (Cal. App. 5th Dist.
2003)
we must remember that the Legislature used the phrase probable validity, not certain validity,
in section 405.32, Mix v. Superior Court, 124 Cal. App. 4th 987 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2004)
One, the notice of lis pendens will be maintained throughout the duration of the appeal and
continue to effectively prevent the sale of the property even though the claim has already been
rejected by one level of the judiciary. Or, alternatively, the notice of lis pendens will be expunged
and the claimant will run the risk the property will be sold and any possibility of relief as to that
particular property will be lost.

Our instinct, as appellate judges, is to side with the first alternative (keeping the notice of lis
pendens on the property pending appeal), since it both preserves the status quo and the
opportunity for meaningful appellate relief, particularly in cases where the claimant requests
specific performance

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A motion to expunge for failure to plead a real property claim requires judicial examination of the
pleadings. The analysis required is analogous to, but more limited than, the analysis
undertaken by a court on a demurrer. Rather than analyzing whether the pleading states any claim
at all, as on a general demurrer, the court must undertake the more limited analysis of whether the
pleading states a real property claim. (Code com., 14 West's Ann. Code Civ. Proc., supra, com. 2
foll. 405.31, p. 224.) The burden of proof is on the claimant. (Code com., supra, com. 4 foll.
405.30, p. 223.)

Whether or not the parties have agreed that a buyer's right is conditioned upon performance on a
specified date requires an interpretation of the contract between buyer and seller. Courts have
recognized that the inclusion of language such as "time is of the essence" does not necessarily
require a court to conclude that the buyer's rights would be so strictly limited. (See, e.g., Katemis
v. Westerlind (1953) 120 Cal.App.2d 537 [261 P.2d 553].)

(iv) The attachment is not sought for any purpose other than to secure recovery on
the claim
At any time after notice of pendency of an action has been recorded pursuant to Section 409 or
other law, the court in which the action is pending shall, upon motion of a party to the action
supported by affidavit, order that the notice be expunged, unless the party filing the notice shows
to the satisfaction of the court, by a preponderance of the evidence that:

"(a) The action does affect title to or right of possession of the real property described in the
notice; and

"(b) Insofar as the action affects title to or right of possession of the real property described in the
notice, the party recording the notice has commenced or prosecuted the action for a proper
purpose and in good faith

(v) Property is unique to Plaintiff Undertaking by Defendant is insufficient

damages
Code of Civil Procedure section 409.1 provides, in pertinent part: "The court, as a condition of
granting or denying the motion to expunge, may require that the party prevailing upon such
motion give the other party an undertaking of such nature, and in such amount as shall be fixed by

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the court, such undertaking to be to the effect that such prevailing party will indemnify the other
party for all damages which he may incur if he ultimately prevails in the action."

There exists an exception to this rule. Property is unique. Per Court of Appeal
Lay out fact pattern.
The question whether there was a valid extension of the option, or whether the option
automatically terminated, is a question for the trier of fact. The question whether to expunge or
not to expunge a lis pendens is committed to the sound discretion of the superior court. Code of
Civil Procedure section 409.2 provides for the expungement of the lis pendens upon the filing of
an undertaking, ". . . if the court finds that adequate relief can be secured to the party recording
the notice by the giving of such undertaking." Avid Sheets Et Al., Petitioners, v. The Superior
Court Of Los Angeles County, Respondent; Hahn Devcorp, Real Party In Interest Cal. App. 3d
68; 149 Cal. Rptr. 912; 1978 Cal. App. Lexis 2048

When, after a full hearing, the superior court refused to expunge the lis pendens, it impliedly
found that Devcorp would not be secured adequately by the filing of an undertaking. Devcorp's
verified return shows, and it is not denied, that Devcorp is ready, willing and able to perform the
contract, if any, in all respects. It says it wants the land, and not damages. Certainly, if Sheets
fears that the value of the land may decrease, Sheets need merely accept Devcorp's tender to
perform. Avid Sheets Et Al., Petitioners, v. The Superior Court Of Los Angeles County,
Respondent; Hahn Devcorp, Real Party In Interest Cal. App. 3d 68; 149 Cal. Rptr. 912; 1978 Cal.
App. Lexis 2048

While we recognize the fact that a lis pendens is often misused in transactions involving real
estate, in this case which involves a fairly large and unique piece of commercial real estate we
cannot say that the superior court has abused its discretion. Sheets can, of course, move to
advance and specially set for trial. Avid Sheets Et Al., Petitioners, v. The Superior Court Of Los
Angeles County, Respondent; Hahn Devcorp, Real Party In Interest Cal. App. 3d 68; 149 Cal.
Rptr. 912; 1978 Cal. App. Lexis 2048

E. CONCLUSION

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.

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