EVOLUTIONARY UNIVERSALS IN SOCIETY *

TALCOTT PARSONS
Harvard University

This paper is meant as a contribution to the revival and extension of evolutionary thinking
in sociology. It begins with the conception that in the evolution of Uving systems generaUy,
certain new developments have greatly increased the adaptive capacity of the system^ so
much that without them further major developmental steps would be blocked, though sur-
vival in a "niche" is possible and frequent. For organic evolution the conception is illustrated
by the cases of vision and the human hands and brain. The body of the paper is devoted to
six r^tpc nt. f.hf. social level. The first two are differentiation on the basis of a scale of
sirati^ai'ion-jmd the development of patterns of cultural Tegitimation independent of the
social structure, both of which are important in the transition from primitive social condi-
tions to those of the "archaic" civilizations. The. remaining four cases arein order of treat-
mentbureaucratic organization, money and markets, a universalistic legal system, and the
in both governmental and private forms. These four, taken together.
are fundamental to the structure of the modern type of society, though each is highly com-
plex and subject to a whole series of developmental stages.

I LOWLY and somewhat inarticulately, essentially human, without considering gra-

^ emphasis in both sociological and an-
^ thropological quarters is shifting from
a studied disinterest in problems of social
and cultural evolution to a "new relativity"
that relates its universals to an evolutionary
framework.
The ojder perspectives insisted that social
and cultural systems are made up of indefi-
nitely numerous discrete "traits," that "cul-
tures" are totally separate, or that certain
broad "human" universals, like language
and the incest taboo, should be emphasized.
Varied as they are, these emphases liaye in
common the.iacLthat they divert attention
from specific continuiti&s in patterns of
social change, so that either traits or culture
types must be treated as discretely unique
and basically unconnected, and a pattern,
to be considered universal, must be equally
important to all societies and cultures. De-
spite their ostentatious repudiation of "cul-
ture-boundness," these perspectives have
been conspicuously anthropocentric in set-
ting off problemis of man's modes of life so
sharply from questions of continuity with
the rest of the organic world. But the em-
phasis on human universals has also had a
kind of "levelling" infiuence, tending to
restrict attention to what is generally and
* Editor's Note: This article by Talcott Parsons,
plus the articles by Robert N. Bellah and S. N.
Eisenstadt that foUow, arose from a seminar on
Evolution given by the three men at Harvard Uni-
versity, Spring, 1963.
339
dations within the human category.
The "new relativity" removes this barrier
and tries to consider human ways in direct
continuity with the sub-human. It assumes
that the watershed between subhuman and
human does not mark a cessation of develop-
mental change, but rather a stage in a long
process that begins with many pre-humin
phases and continues through that watershed
into our own time, and beyond. Granting
a wide range of variability of types at all
stages, it assumes that Jevels of evolutionary
advancement may be empirically specified
for the h u m a n . ^ well as the pre-human
phases.
EVOLUTIONARY UNIVERSALS
I shall designate as an evolutionary uni-
versal any organizational development suffi-
ciently important to further evolution that,
rather than emerging only once, it is likely
to be "hit upon" by various systems oper-
ating under different conditions.
In the organic world, vision is a good ex-
ample of an evolutionary universal. Because
it mediates the input of organized informa-
tion from the organism's environment, and
because it deals with both the most distant
and the widest range of information sources,
vision is the most generalized mechanism
of sensory infonnation. It therefore has the
greatest potential significance for adaptation
of the organism to its environment.
340 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
The evidence is that vision has not been Not only is it the primary organ for con-
a "one shot" invention in organic evolution, trolling complex operations, notably manual
but has evolved independently in three dif- skills, and coordinating visual and auditory
ferent phylathe molluscs, the insects, and infonnation, but above all it is tbe organic
the vertebrates. A particularly interesting basis of the capacity to learn and manipu.
feature of this case is that, while the visuaJ late symbols. Hence it is the organic founda-
organs in the three groups are anatomically tion of culture. Interestingly, this develop-
quite different and present no evolutionary ment too is bought at the sacrifice of im-
continuity, biochemically all use the same mediate adaptive advantages. For example
mechanism involving Vitamin A, though the brain occupies so much of the head
there is no evidence that it was not inde- that the jaws are much less effective than
pendently "hit upon" three times.^ Vision, in other mammalian species^but this too
whatever its mechanisms, seems to be a is compensated for by the hands. And the
genuine prerequisite of aU the higher levels large brain is partly responsible for the
of organic evolution. It has been lost only long period of infantile dependency because
by very particular groups like the bats, the child must learn such a large factor of
which have not subsequently given rise to its effective behavior. Hence the burden of
important evolutionary developments. infant care and socialization is far higher
With reference to man and his biological for man than for any other species.
potential for social and cultural evolution, With these organic examples in mind, the
two familiar evolutionary universals may conception of an evolutionary universal may
be dted, namely the hands and the brain. be developed more fully. It should, I sug-
The human hand is, of course, the primordial gest, be formulated with reference to the
general-purpose tool. The combination of A concept of adaptation, which has been so
four mobile fingers and an opposable thimib fundamental to the theory of evolution since
enables it to perform an enormous variety Darwin. Clearly, adaptation should mean,
of operationsgrasping, holding, and manip- not merely passive "adjustment" to environ-
ulating many kinds of objects. Its location mental conditions, but rather the capacity
at the end of an arm with mobile joints of a living system ^ to cope with its environ-
allows it to be maneuvered into many posi- ment. This capacity includes an active con-
tions. Finally, the pairing of the arm-hand cern with mastery, or the ability to change
organs much more than doubles the capacity the environment to meet the needs of the
of each one because it permits cooperation system, as well as an ability to survive in
and a complex division of labor between the face of its unalterable features. Hence
them. the capacity to cope with broad ranges of
It is worth noting that the development environmental factors, through adjustment
of the hands and arms has been bought at or active control, or both, is crudal. Finally,
a heavy cost in locomotion: man on his two a very critical point is the capadty to cope
legs cannot compete in speed and maneuver- with imstable relations between system and
ability with the faster four-legged species. environment, and hence with uncertainty.
Man, however, uses his hands for such a Instability here refers both to predictable
wide range of behavior impossible for hand- variations, sudi as the cycle of the seasons,
less spedes that the loss is far more than and to unpredictable variations, such as
compensated. He can, for instance, protect the sudden appearance of a dangerous pred-
himself with weapons instead of running ator.
away. >L An evolutionary universal, then, is a com-
The human brain is less nearly unique plex of structures and assodated processes
than the hand, but its advantages over the the development of which so increases the
brains of even anthropoids is so great that long-run adaptive capacity of living systems
it is man's most distinctive organ, the most 2 Note that the species rather than the individual
important single source of human capacity. organism is the major system of reference here.
See George Gaylord Simpson, The Meaning oj
1 George Wald, **Life and Light," Scientific Evolution, New Haven: Yale University
American, 201 (October, 1959), pp. 92-108. 1950.
 EVOLUTIONARY UNIVERSALS
in a given class that only systems that de-
velop the complex can attain certain higher
levels of general adaptive capacit5^)This cri-
terion, derived from the famous principle
of natural selection, requires one major ex-
plicit qualification. The relatively disadvan-
taged system not developing a new universal
need not be condemned to extinction. Thus
some species representing all levels of organic
evolution survive todayfrom the imicellu-
lar organisms up. The surviving lower types,
however, stand in a variety of different rela-
tions to the higher. Some occupy special
"niches" within which they live with limited
scope, others stand in symbiotic relations
to higher systems. They are not, by and
large, major threats to the continued exist-
ence of the evolutionarily higher systems.
Thus, though infectious diseases constitute
a serious problem for man, bacteria are not
likely to replace man as the dominant or-
ganic category, and man is symbiotically
dependent on many bacterial species.
Two distinctions should be made here,
because they apply most generally and
throughout. The first is between the impact
of an innovation when it is first introduced
in a given species or society, and its im-
portance as a continuing coinponent of the
system. Certain evolutionary^ universals in
the social world, to be discussed below, ini-
tially provide their societies with major
adaptive advantages over societies not de-
veloping them. Their introduction and insti-
tutionalization have, to be sure, often been
attended with severe dislocations of the pre-
vious social organization, sometimes resulting
in short-run losses in adaptation. Once insti-
tutionalized, however, they tend to become
essential parts of later societies in the rele-
vant lines of development and are seldom
eliminated except by regression. But, as the
system undergoes further evolution, uni-
versals are apt to generate major changes of
their own, generally by developing more
complex structures.
Unlike biological genes, cultural patterns
are subject to "diffusion." Hence, for the
cultural level, it is necessary to add a second
distinction, between the conditions under
which an adaptive advantage can develop
lor the first time, and those favoring its
adoption from a source in which it is already
established.
341
PREREQUISITES OF THE EVOLUTION OF
CULTURE AND SOCIETY
From his distinctive organic endowment
and from his capacity for and ultimate de-
pendence on generalized learning, man de-
rives his unique ability to create and trans-
mit culture. To quote the biologist Alfred
Emerson, within a major sphere of man's
adaptation, the "gene" has been replaced
by the "symbol." ^ Hence, it is not only the
genetic constitution of the species that de-
termines the "needs" confronting the en-
vironment, but this constitution plus the
cultural tradition. A set of "ngrmative ex-
pectations" pertaining to man's relation ta
his environment delineates the ways in which
adaptation should be developed and ex-
tended. Within the relevant range, cultural^
innovations, especially definitions of what
man's life ought to be, thus replace Dar-
winian variations in genetic constitution.
Cultural "patterns" or orientations, how-
ever, do not implement themselves. Properly
conceived in their most fundamental aspect
as "religious," they must be articulated
with the environment in ways that make
effective adaptation possible. I am inclined
to treat the entire orientational aspect of
culture itself, in the simplest, least evolved
forms, as directly synonymous with religion.*
But since a cultural system^never any more
an individual matter than a genetic pattern
is shared among a plurality of individuals,
mechanisms of communication must exist
to mediate this sharing. T ^ fundamental
evolutionary universal here is language: no
concrete human group lacks it. Neither com-
munication nor the learning processes that
make it possible, however, is conceivable
without determinately organized relations
arnohg^TEose wl5o teach and learn and com-
municate.
jrhe__evoluiioiiai5L nn'gin. f, social organi-
zation seems Jo_^beJkinshi2.._In an evolution-
^ry sense ifis an extension of the mammalTan
sptem jof_ bisexug][,j;gJ2rc^^gpn!~Th^ im-
perative of socialization is of course a cen-
3 Alfred Emerson, "Homeostasis and Comparison
of Systems" in Roy R. Grinker (ed.), Toward a
Unified Theory of Behavior, New York: Basic
Books, 1956.
*Cf. Emile Durkheim, The Elementary Forms
of the Religious Life, London: Allen and Unwin,
191S.
342 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
tral corollary of culture, as is the need to interrelated in the process of "breaking
estabUsh a viable sodal system to "carry out" of what may be called the "primitive"
the culture. Frf>m opi? \ipwpnint, the stage of societal evolution. These are the
pf^ the^ kinship system is. the inrest taboo, j development of a well-marked system of
" the rules " ^ i a l stratification, and that of a system of
and endogamj_5l;ructyii:ij2g., relations explidt cultural legitimation of differentiated
5fiixt, affinity, and r^idence. Finally, since societal functions, preeminently the politi-
the cultural level of action implies the use cal function, independent of kinship. The
of brain, hands, and other organs in actively two are closely connected, but I am inclined
coping with the physical environment, we to think that stratification comes first and
may say that culture implies the existence of is a condition of legitimation of political
technology, which is, in its most undif- function.
ferentiated form, a synthesis of empirical The key to the evolutionary importance
knowledge and practical techniques. of stratification lies in the role in primitive
These four features of even the simplest societies of ascription of social status to
action system"religion," communication criteria of biological relatedness. The kin-
with language, social organization through ship nexus of social organization is intrin-
kinship, and technology^may be regarded sically a "seamless web" of relationships
as an integrated set of evolutionary univer- which, in and of itself, contains no principle
sals at even the earliest human level. No of boundedness for the system as distin-
known human society has existed without guished from certain subgroups within it.
all four in relatively definite relations to Probably the earliest and most important
each other. In fact, their presence constitutes basis of boundedness is the political criterion
the very minimum that may be said to mark of territorial jurisdiction. But the economic
a society as truly human. problem of articulation with the environ-
Systematic relations exist not only among ment, contingent on kinship as well as other
these four elements themselves, but between groups, is also prominent in primitive socie-
them and the more general framework of ties. In the first instance this is structured
biological evolution. Technology clearly is primarily through place of residence, which
the primary focus of the organization of becomes increasingly important as techno-
the adaptive relations of the human system logical development, notably of "settled
to its physical environment. Kinship is the agriculture," puts a premium on definite-
social extension of the individual organism's ness and permanence of location.
basic articulation to the species through For present purposes, I assume that in
bisexual reproduction. But, through plasti- the society we are discussing, the popula-
city and the importance of learning, cultural tion occupying a territorial area is generally
and symbolic communications are integral to endogamous, with marriage of its members
the human level of individual personality to those of other territorial groups being.
organization. Social relations among person- if it occurs, somehow exceptional, and not
alities, to be distinctively human, must be systematically organized.'^ Given a presump-
mediated by linguistic communication. Fi- tively endogamous territorial community,
nallv. the main cultural patterns that regu- comprising a plurality of purely local groups,
late the social, psychological, and organic certain general processes of internal differ-
levels of the total system of action are em- entiation of the society can be explained.
bodied (the more primitive the system, the One aspect of this tends to be a prestige
more exclusively so) in the religious tradi- difference between central or "senior" line-
tion, the focus of the use of S3anbolization age groups and "cadet" groups, whether or
to control the variety of conditions to which not the differentiation is on the basis of
a human system is exposed.
6 See W. Lloyd Warner, A Black Civilization
SOCIAL STRATIFICATION (2nd ed.). New York: Harper, 1958, for an analy-
sis showing that such boundedness can be prob-
Two evolutionary universals are closely lematic.
 EVOLUTIONARY UNIVERSALS 343

birth. Quite generally, the latter must ac- areas, analytically, the political and the
cept less advantageous bases of subsistence, religious. First, the increased complexity
including place of residence, than the former. of a sodety that has grown in population
At least this is apt to be the case where and probably territory and has become dif-
'^e residence groups become foci for the 'terentiated in status terms raises more diffi-
control of resources and as such are sharply cult problems of internal order, e.g. con-
differentiated from more inclusive political trolling violence, upholding property and
groupings. Thus a second aspect of an in- marriage rules, etc., and of defense against
creased level of functional differentiation encroachment from outside. Second, a cul-
among the structures of the sodety tends to tural tradition very close to both the details
be involved. of everyday life and the interests and solidar-
Typically, I think, kinship status, in terms ities of particular groups is put under strain
of both descent criteria and relative prestige by increasing size and diversity. There is,
of marriage opportunities is highly correlated then, pressure to centralize both responsibil-
with relative economic advantage and polit- ity for the symbolic systems, especially the
ical power. This is to say that, under the religious, and authority in collective proc-
conditions postulated, a tendency toward esses, and to redefine them in the direction
vertical differentiation of the society as a of greater generality.
system overrides the pressure of the seamless For the present argument, I assume that
web of kinship to equalize the status of all the tendencies to centralize political and
units of equivalent kinship character. This religious responsibility need not be clearly
tendency is the product of two converging differentiated in any immediate situation.
forces. The main point is that the differentiation
On the one hand, relative advantages are of groups relative to an advantage-disadvan-
differentiated: members of cadet lineages, tage axis tends to converge with the func-
the kinship units with lesser claims to pre- tional "need" for centralization of responsi-
ferment, are "forced" into peripheral posi- bility. Since responsibility and prestige seem
tions. They move to less advantaged resi- to be inherently related in a system of insti-
dential locations and accept less productive tutionalized expectations, the advantaged
economic resources, and they are not in a group tends to assume, or have ascribed to
position to counteract these disadvantages it, the centralized responsibilities. It should
by the use of political power.'' be clear that the problem does not concern
On the other hand, the society as a sys- the balance between services to others and
tem gains functional advantages by con- benefits accruing to the advantaged group,
centrating responsibility for certain func- but the convergence of both sets of forces
tions. This concentration focuses in two tending to the same primary structural out-
6 This analysis has been suggested in part by
come.
Charles Ackerman who bases himself on a variety The development of written language can
of tbe recent studies of kinship systems, but, per- become a fundamental accelerating factor
haps, particularly on Rodney Needham's studies of in this process, because in the nature of the
the Purums, Structure and Sentiment, Chicago: case literacy cannot immediately be extended
University of Chicago Press, 1960.
^ I am putting forward this set of differentiating to total adult populations, and yet it confers
factors as an ideal type. Of course, in many par- enormous adaptive advantages. It also has
ticular cases they may not all operate together. a tendency to favor cultural or religious
For example, it may frequently hiappen that the elements over the political.
outer lands to which cadet lineages move are more
productive than the old ones. The net effect of The crucial step in the development of
these discrepancies is probably a tendency toward a stratification system occurs when impor-
diversity of lines of development rather than the tant elements in the population assume the
extinction of the main one sketched here. Indeed prerogatives and functions of higher status
we can go farther and say that unless this advan-
tage of economic resources comes to be combined
with such structural advantages as incorporation 8 See Talcott Parsons, Societies: Comparative
in a stratification system it will not lead to further and Evolutionary Perspectives, Englewood, N.J.:
evolutionary developments. Prentice-Hall, forthcoming, 1964.
344 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
and, at least by implication, exdude all longer a linear rank-order of dasses. But
other elements. This creates an "upper," a """so long as hereditary kinship status is a
"leading" or, possibly, a "ruling" class set primary determinant of the individual's ac-
over against the "mass" of the population. cess to "advantages," we may speak of a
Given early, or, indeed, not so early con- stratified sodety; beyond the lowest level
ditions, it is inevitable that membership in of complexity, every sodety is stratified.
this upper class is primarily if not entirely /- Diffuse as its significance is, stratification
based on kinship status. Thus, an individua^/^s an evolutionary universal because the most
military or other leader may go far toward primitive societies are not in the present
establishing an important criterion of status, sense stratified, but, beyond them, it is on
but in doing so he elevates the status of his two principal counts a prerequisite of a
lineage. He cannot dissociate his relatives very wide range of further advances. First,
from his own success, even presuming he what I have called a "prestige" position is
would wish to. a generalized prerequisite of responsible con-
Stratification in the present sense, then, is centration of leadership. With few excep-
the differentiation of the population on a tions, those who lack a sufficiently "estab-
prestige scale of kinship units such that lished" position cannot afford to "stick their
the distinctions among such units, or classes I necks out" in taking the responsibility for
of them, become hereditary to an important important changes. The second count con-
degree. There are reasons to assume that cerns the availability of resources for imple-
the early tendency, which may be repeated, menting innovations. The dominance of kin-
leads to a ^wo-class system. The most im- ship in social organization is inseparably
pwrtant means of consolidating such a sys- connected with rigidity. People do what they
tem is upper-class endogamy. Since tiis are required to do by virtue of their kinship
repeats the primary principle which, along status. To whatever degree kinship is the
with territoriality, delineates the boundaries basis of solidarity within an upper class,
of early societies, the upper class constitutes closure of that class by endogamy precludes
a kind of subsociety. It is not a class, how- kinship from being the basis of upper-class
ever, unless its counterpart, the lower class, claims on the services and other resources
is clearly included in the same societal com- of the lower groups. So long as the latter are
munity. genuinely within the same sodety, which im-
From this "primordial" two-class system plies solidarity across the class line, relations
there are various possibilities for evolution- of mutual usefulness (e.g., patron-client
ary change. Probably the most important relationships across class lines) on non-kin
leads to a four-class system. This is based bases are possibleopening the door to uni-
on the development of urban communities versalistic definitions of merit as well as
in which political-administrative functions, providing the upper groups with the re-
centralized religious and other cultural activ- sources to pursue their own advantages.
ities, and territorially specialized economic " Social stratification in its initial develop-
action are carried on. Thus, generalized "cen- ment may thus be regarded as one primary
ters" of higher-order activity emerge, but condition of releasing the process of social
the imperatives of social organization re- evolution from the obstacles p)osed by ascrip-
quire that these centers, as local communi- tion. The strong emphasis on kinship in
ties^including, e.g., "provincial" centers much of the sociological literature on stratifi-
cannot be inhabited exclusively by upper- cation tends to obscure the fact that the new
class people. Hence the urban upper class mobility made possible by stratification is
tends to be differentiated from the rural due primarily to such breaks in kinship
upper class,^*^ and the urban from the rural ascription as that across class lines.
lower class. When this occurs there is no Stratification, of course, remains a major
structural feature of subsequent societies
Cf. Gideon Sjoberg, The Preindustrial City, and takes a wide variety of forms in their
Glencoe, DI.: The Free Press, 1960, ch. S. evolution. Since the general process of evo-
10 The upper class will be primarily rural in
societies that take a more or less feudal direction. lutionary change introduces a series of lines
 EVOLUTIONARY UNIVERSALS 345
of differentiation on several bases, it is un- not be; they would be merely spedal groups
likely that a single simple prestige order of kin), they are regarded as not "really
will adequately represent the stratification human," as strange in the sense that their
system in more advanced societies. The relation to "us" is not comprehensible.
"bourgeois" in the late European Middle By explicit cultural legitimation, I mean
/^ges cannot be described simply as a "mid- the emergence of an institutionalized cul-,
dle" class standing between the predomi- tural definition of the society of reference,
nantly rural "feudal" dasses and tiie peas- namely a referent of "we" (e.g., "We, the
antry. Nevertheless, stratification tends to Tikopia" in Firth's study) which is differ-
exert a pressure to generalized hierarchiza- entiated, historically or comparatively or
tion, going beyond particular bases of pres- both, from other societies, while the merit
tige, such as political power, spedal sources of we-ness is asserted in a normative con-
of wealth, etc. This is precisely because it text. This definition has to be religious in
brings these various advantages together in some sense, e.g., stated in terms of a partic-
their relations to the diffuse status of the ular sacred tradition of relations to gods
kinship group, and through kinship inheri- or holy places. It may also ascribe various
tance exerts pressure to continue them from meritorious features to the group, e.g., phys-
generation to generation. Thus, in the transi- ical beauty, warlike prowess, faithful trustee-
tion to full modernity, stratification often ship of sacred territory or tradition, etc^^
becomes a predominantly conservative force This usage of the term legitimation is
in contrast to the opportunities it provides closely associated with Max Weber's anal-
for innovation in the earlier stages. ysis of political authority. For very impor-
tant reasons the primary focus of early
CULTURAL LEGITIMATION stages beyond the primitive is political, in-
volving the society's capadty to carry out
Specialized cultural legitimation is, like coordinated collective action. Stratification,
stratification, intimately invnlvpH in the therefore, is an essential condition of major
emergence from_ pnmitiveriess, and certainly advances in political effectiveness, because,
thrtWO processes are related. Lggitiniation just noted, it gives the advantaged ele-
cQiilii.-^erhfi^)s, be troated firot; in certain ments a secure enough position that they
crucial.respects^t. is.-A.pretequisitfiLliL-lhe can accept certain risks in undertaking col-
tjge^osi- lective leadership.
tion referred to. aLove. The ways in which The differentiation inherent in strat-
this might be the case pose a major problem ification creates new sources of strain and
for more detailed studies of evolutionary potential disorganization, and the use of
processes. Our task here, however, is much advantaged position to undertake major
more modest, namely to call attention to innovations multiplies this strain. Especially ,
the fact that without both stratification and~? if, as is usually the case, the authors of major
legitimation no major advances beyond the/ social innovation are already advantaged,
level of primitive society can be made. ^ ^ they require legitimation for both their ac-
The point of reference for the developn tions and their positions. Thus, a djoiamic
ment of legitimation systems is the cultural inherent in the development of cultural
counterpart of the seamless web of the kin-
11 For lack of space I shall not develop a series
ship nexus with its presumptive equality of of examples here. Fortunately, Bellah's companion
units. This is the cultural definition of the paper covers much of the relevant ground in treat-
social collectivity simply as "we" who are ing the transition from primitive to archaic religion
essentially human or "people" and as such and the principal features of the latter. The basic
phenomena are gods conceived as acting and im-
are undifferentiated, even in certain concepts pinging on human sodety independently of the dif-
of time, from our ancestorsexcept in cer- fuse mythological order, priesthoods, whose mem-
tain senses for the mythical "founders" bers are expert in regulating relations to the gods,
and from contemporary "others." If the and cults organized in relation to the gods, but not
yet, Bellah points out, as bounded collectivities
others are dearly recognized to be others having memberships organized independently of
(in an ideal type seamless web they would "dvil" status.
346 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
systems ^^ revolves about the cultural im-
portance of the question whywhy such
social arrangements as prestige and author-
~ity relations, and particular attendant re-
wards and deprivations, come about and
are structured as they are. This cultural
dynamic converges with the consequences
of the stratification developments already
outlined. Hence the crucial problem here is
distributive, that of justifying advantages
and prerogatives over against burdens and
deprivations. Back of this, however, lies
the problem of the meaning of the societal
enterprise as a whole.
As the bases of legitimation are inherently
cultural, meeting the legitimation need nec-
essarily involves putting some kind of a
premium on certain cultural services, and
from this point of view there is clearly some
potential advantage in specializing cultural
action. Whether, under what conditions, and
in what ways political and religious leader-
ship or prestige status are differentiated
from each other are exceedingly important
general problems of societal evolution, but
we cannot go into them here. A "God-King"
may be the primary vehicle of legitimation
for his own political regime, or the political
"ruler" may be dependent on a priestly class
that is in some degree structurally independ-
ent of his regime. But the main problems
have to do with explicating the cultural
basis of legitimation and institutionalizing
agencies for implementing that function.
The functional argument here is essen-
tially the same as that for stratification.
Over an exceedingly wide front and rela-
tively independently of particular cultural
variations, political leaders must on the long
run have not only sufficient power, but also
legitimation for it. Particularly when bigger
implementive steps are to be legitimized,
legitimation must become a relatively ex-
plicit and, in many cases, a socially differ-
entiated function. The combination of dif-
ferentiated cultural patterns of legitimation
with socially differentiated agencies is the
essential aspect of the evolutionary universal
of legitimation.
As evolutionary universals, stratification
and legitimation are associated with the
12 Claude Levi-Strauss, Totemism, Boston: Bea-
con Paperbacks, 1963.
developmental problems of breaking through
the ascriptive nexus of kinship, on the one
hand, and of "traditionalized" culture, on
^ e other. In turn they provide the basis
for differentiation of a system that has previ-
ously, in the relevant resf>ects, been undif-
ferentiated. Differentiation must be carefully
distinguished from segmentation, i.e., from
either the development of undifferentiated
segmental units of any given type within
the system, or the splitting off of units from
the system to form new societies, a process
that appears to be particularly common at
primitive levels. Differentiation requires
solidarity and integrity of the system as a
whole, with both common loyalties and com-
mon normative definitions of the situation.
Stratification as here conceived is a hierarch-
ical status differentiation that cuts across
the overall seamless web of kinship and
eccurs definitely within a single collectivity,
a "societal community." Legitimation is the
differentiation of cultural definitions of
normative patterns from a completely em-
bedded, taken-for-granted fusion with the
social structure, accompanied by institution-
alization of the explicit, culture-oriented,
legitimizing function in subsystems of the
society.
Legitimation, of course, continues to pre-
sent functional problems at later stages of
evolution. The type associated with archaic
religions is bound up with the relatively
particularistic, arbitrary favor of divine
patrons. A crucial step, represented by Bel-
lah's "historic" religions, relates human
society to a conception of supernatural order
with which men must come to terms, rather
than to particular divinities. Where a divin-
ity is involved, like Jahweh, his relations
with people are conceived in terms of an
order which he makes binding on them, but
to which, faith assures them, he will also
^3 Another problem in this field concerns the
implications of the dualism, so prominent in the
historic religions, between the conceptions of tbis
world and the other-wordly ideal order, and
whether an empirical society and secular action
within it may be considered religiously or morally
"good" when set over against the other-worldly
order. A transcendence of this dualism that permits
a successful relation to the supernatural order
through secular action, if it is highly moral, but
which nevertheless maintains the transcendence of
 EVOLUTIONARY UNIVERSALS 347
BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATION not apply.) Power in this sense is the capac-
ity of a unit in the social system, collective
A second pair of evolutionary universals oj^individual, to establish or activate com-
'^velop, each with varying degrees of com- mitments to performance that contributes
'pleteness and relative importance, in socie- to, or is in the interest of, attainment of
ties that have moved considerably past the the goals of a collectivity. It is not itself a
primitive stage, particularly those with well "factor" in effectiveness, nor a "real" output
institutionalized literacy.^* These universals of the process, but a medium of mobiliza-
are administrative bureaucracy, which in tion and acquisition of factors and outputs.
early stages is found overwhelmingly in gov- In this respect, it is like money.
ernment, and money and markets. I shall Office implies the differentiation of the
discuss bureaucracy first because its devel- role of incumbent from a person's other
opment is likely to precede that of money role-involvements, above all from his kin-
and markets. ship roles. Hence, so far as function in the
Despite the criticisms made of it, mainly collectivity is defined by the obligations of
in the light of the complexities of modern ascriptive kinship status, the organizational
organizations, Weber's ideal type can serve status cannot be an office in the present
as the primary point of reference for a dis- sense. Neither of the other two types of
cussion of bureaucracy,^^ Its crucial feature ^ authority that Weber discussestraditional
is the institutionalization of the authority and charismaticestablishes this differen-
oj office. This means that both individual tiation between organizational role and the
incumbents and, perhaps even more im- "personal" status of the incumbent. Hence
portantly, the bureaucratic organization bureaucratic authority is always rational-
itself, may act "officially" for, or "in the lfigaLui^J^e. Weber's well-known proposi-
name of," the organization, which could not tion that the top of a bureaucratic structure
otherwise exist. I shall call this capacity to \ cannot itself be bureaucratic may be re-
act, or more broadly, that to make and garded as a statement about the modes of
promulgate binding decisions, power in a articulation of such a structure with other
strict analytical sense .^ structures in the society. These may involve
Although backed by coercive sanctions, the ascribed traditional authority of royal
up to and including the use of physical force, | families, some form of charismatic leader-
at the same time power rests on the con- ship, or the development of democratic as-
sensual solidarity of a system that includes sociational control, to be discussed briefly
both the users of power and the "objects" of below.
its use. (Note that I do not say against
Internally, a bureaucratic system is al-
whom it is used: the "against" may or may
ways characterized by an institutionalized
the supernatural order over tbis-wordly concerns, hierarchy of authority, which is differen-
is central in developing legitimacy for modem so- tiated on two axes: level of authority and
cial structures. Cf. Ernst Troeltscb, Social Teach-
ings oj the Christian Churches, New York: Harper
"sphere" of competence. Spheres of compe-
Torchbooks, 1960. tence are defined either on segmentary bases,
^*As a predominantly cultural innovation, lit- e.g., territorially, or on functional bases,
eracy is not discussed bere. Cf. Parsons, Societies, e.g., supply vs. combat units in an army.
op. dt., ch. 1. The hierarchical aspect defines the levels
"See "Tbe Analysis of Formal Organizations,"
Part I of my Structure and Process in Modern at which a higher authority's decisions, in
Societies, Glencoe, HI.: Tbe Free Press, 1960; Peter case of conflict, take precedence over those
M. Blau, "Critical Remarks on Weber's Tbeory of of a lower authority. It is a general bureau-
Authority," American Political Science Review, 57 cratic principle that the higher the level,
(June, 1963), pp. 305-316, and The Dynamics of
Bureaucracy (2nd ed.) Chicago: University of
the smaller the relative number of decision-
Chicago Press, 1963; Carl J . Friedricb (ed.). making agencies, whether individual or col-
Authority (Nomos I ) , Cambridge: Harvard Uni- legial, and the wider the scope of each, so
versity Press, 1958, especially Friedricb's own con- that at the top, in principle, a single agency
tribution, "Autbority and Reason." must carry responsibility for any problems
" Cf. Talcott Parsons, "On tbe Concept of Poli-
tical Power," Proceedings of the American Phil-
affecting the organization. Such a hierarchy
osophical Society, 107 (June, 1963), pp. 232-262. is one of "pure" authority only so far as
348 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
status within it is differentiated from other ^ The second boundary problem concerns
components of status, e.g., social class. Even pK)litical support. An organization is bureau-
^ t h rather clear differentiation, however, CTatic so far as incumbents of its offices can
position in a stratification system is likely function independently of the influence of
to be highly correlated with position in a elements having special "interests" in its
hierarchy of authority. Seldom, if ever, are output, except where such elements are
high bureaucratic officials unequivocally properly involved in the definition of the
members of the lowest social class.^'^ organization's goals through its nonbureau-
Externally, two particularly important cratic top. Insulation from such influence,
boundaries ix)se difficulties for bureaucracies. for example through such crude channels
The first has to do with recruiting manpower as bribery, is difficult to institutionalize and,
and obtaining facilities. In ideal type, a as is well known, is relatively rare.^
position in a bureaucratic organization con- In the optimal case, internal hierarchy
stitutes an occupational role, which implies and division of functions, recruitment of
that criteria of eligibility should be defined manpower and facilities, and exclusion of
in terms of competence and maximal re- "improper" infiuence, are all regulated by
sponsibility to the organization, not to universalistic norms. This is implicit in the
"private" interests independent of, and po- proposition that bureaucratic authority be-
tentially in conflict with, those of the organ- longs to Weber's rational-legal type. Of
ization. Thus high aristocrats may put course, in many concrete instances this con-
loyalty to their lineage ahead of the obli- dition is met very imperfectly, even in the
gations of office, or clergymen in political most highly developed societies.
office may place loyalty to the church Bureaucracy tends to develop earliest in
ahead of obligation to the civil government. governmental administration primarily be-
Also, remunerating officials and providing cause even a modest approximation to the
facilities for their functions presents a seri- essential criteria requires a considerable
ous problem of differentiation and hence of concentration of power, which, as noted
independence. The "financing of public above, depends both on prestige and on
bodies," as Weber calls it,^^ cannot be fully legitimation. In the very important cases,
bureaucratic in this sense unless payment like the polis of antiquity, where power is
is in money, the sources of which are outside widely dispersed, private units of organiza-
the control of the recipients. Various forms tion are not likely either to be large enough
of benefices and prebends only very imper- or to command sufficient resources to become
fectly meet these conditions, but modem highly bureaucratized. Perhaps the oikos
salaries and operating budgets approximate organization of the interests of important
them relatively closely.^
trial labor force. S. N. Eisenstadt, The Political
^7 Tbe Ottoman Empire, wbere many bigb offi- Systems of Empires, New York: Tbe Free Press of
cials were "slaves" of the Sultan, is not an excep- Glencoe, 1963, especially cb. 3; Martin P. Nilsson,
tion. In sucb circumstances slaves took on the Imperial Rome, New York: Harcoiurt, Brace, 1926;
status of tbeir master's "household," and hence Neil J. Smelser, Social Change in the Industrial
were outside the normal stratification system. See Revolution, Cbicago: University of Cbicago Press,
HA.R. Gibb, Studies on the Civilization of Islam, 1959.
Boston: Beacon Press, 1962. 20 The difficulty of mobilizing political support
18 Max Weber, "Tbe Financing of Political for bureaucratic regimes is exemplified by tbe par-
Bodies," in The Theory of Social and Economic ticularly important case of tbe struggle between
Organization, Glencoe, III.: Tbe Free Press, 1947, monarcbs and aristocracies in early modem Europe.
pp. 310ff. In spite of tbe obvious dangers of absolutism to
^^ Problems of tbis type bave been exceedingly tbe freedoms of tbe urban classes, tbe alliance be-
common over wide ranges and long periods. Eisen- tween tbem and tbe monarcbs was an essential way
stadt gives many illustrations of tbe loss of fluidity of developing sufficient support to coimteract the
of resources tbrough aristocratization and similar traditionalizing influence of tbe aristocracies. The
developments. A very important one is tbe ruraliza- spedal place of tbe latter in military organization
tion of tbe Roman legions in tbe later imperial made tbe task of monarcbies more difficult. Mas
periodtbey became essentially a border militia. Beloff, The Age of Absolutism, New York: Harper
At a lower level, a particularly good example is Torcbbooks, 1962; Jobn B. Wolf, The Emergence
the difficulty of institutionalizing tbe differentiation of the Great Powers, New York: Harper Torch-
of occupational from familial roles for tbe indus- books, 1962; especially cbs. 4 and 7.
 EVOLUTIONARY UNIVERSALS 349
aristocratic lineages in late antiquity consti- damental difficulty because of the role of
one of the most important relatively explicit or implied coercion"you con-
y examples approximating private tfibute, or else . . . "while the acti-
bureaucracy. The Western Church is clearly vation of non-political commitments, a
another, as are modern business firms. category comprising at least two others,
The basis on which I classify bureaucracy raises the issue of alternative obligations.
as an evolutionary universal is very simple.^ The man appealed to in the interest of his
As Weber said, it is the most effective large-^ ethnic group, may ask, "what about the
scale administrative organization that man problems of my family?" In contrast, mar-
has invented, and there is no direct sub- ket exchange avoids three dilemmas: first,
stitute for it.^^ Where capadty to carry out that I must do what is expected or face
large-scale organized operations is important, punishment for noncompliance; second, if
e.g., military operations with mass forces, I do not comply, I will be disloyal to certain
water control, tax administration, policing larger groups, identification with which is
of large and heterogeneous populations, and very important to my general status; third,
productive enterprise requiring large capital if I do not comply, I may betray the unit
investment and much manpower, the unit which, like my family, is the primary basis
that commands effective bureaucratic organ- of my immediate personal security.
ization is inherently superior to the one that Market exchange makes it possible to ob-
does not. It is by no means the only struc- tain resources for future action and yet
tural factor in the adaptive capacity of social avoid such dilemmas as these, because
systems, but no one can deny that it is an money is a generalized resource for the con-
important one. Above all, it is built on fur- sumer-recipient, who can purchase "good
ther specializations ensuing from the b r o a d ^ things" regardless of his relations to their
emancipation from ascription that stratifi- sources in other respects. Availability
cation and spjecialized legitimation make through the market cannot be unlimited
possible. one should not be able to purchase conjugal
love or ultimate political loyaltybut pos-
MONEY AND THE MARKET COMPLEX session of physical commodities, and by ex-
tension, control of personal services by pur-
Immediate effectiveness of coUlective
chase, certainly can, very generally, be
function, especially on a large scale, depends
on concentration of power, as noted. Power legitimized in the market nexus.
is in part a funcdon of the mobility of the As a symbolic medium, monev "stands
resources available for use in the interests for" the economic utility of the real assets
of the collective goals in question. Mobility for which it is exchangeable, but it represents
of resources, however, is a direct function the concrete objects so abstractly that it is
of access to them through the market. neutral among the competing claims of vari-
Though the market is the most general ous other orders in which the same objects
mekns of such access, it does have two prin- are significant. It thus directs attention
cipal competitors. First is requisitioning away from the more consummatory and, by
through the direct application of political and large, immediate significance of these
power, e.g., defining a collective goal as objects toward their instrumental signifi-
having military significance and requisition- cance as potential means to further ends.
ing manpower under it for national defense. Thus money becomes the great mediator
A second type of mobilization is the activa- of the instrumental use of goods and services.
tion of nonpolitical solidarities and commit- M ^ e t s , involving both the access of the
ments, such as those of ethnic or religious consuming unit to objects it needs for con-
membership, local community, caste, etc. sumption and the access of producing units
The essential theme here is, "as one of us, to "outlets" that are not ascribed, but con-
it is your duty. . . " tingent on the voluntary decisions of "cus-
The political power path involves a fun- tomers" to purchase, may be stabilized in-
stitutionally. Thus this universal "emanci-
^^ Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic pates" resources from such ascriptive bonds
Organization, op. dt., p. 377.
 350 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
I as demands to give kinship expectations adiieve high productivity with a relatively
> priority, to be loyal in highly specific senses nsrinimal reliance on monetary and market
to certain political groups, or to submit the "Mechanisms, sul2st|tutiji^ biufiaua:a^ for
"Ifletails of daily life to the specific impera- Ijiem. But too radical a "demonetization"
tives of religious sects. has negative consequences even for such an
In the money and market system, money advanced economy as that of the Soviet
as a medium of exchange and property Union.
rights, including rights of alienation, must A prindpal reason for placing money and
be institu^onalized. In general it is a further markets after bureaucracy in the present
step that institutionalizes broadly an indi- series of evolutionary universals is that the
vidual's contractual right to sell his services conditions of their large-scale development
in a labor market without seriously involv- are more precarious. This is particularly
I ing himself in diffuse dependency relation- true in the very impyortant areas where a
Lships, which at lower status levels are usually generalized system of universalistic norms
in some ways "unfree." Property in land, has not yet become firmly established. Mar-
on a basis that provides for its alienation, jket operations, and the monetary medium
presents a very important problem. Its wide ^tself, are inevitably highly dependent on
extension seems, except in a very few cases, political "protection." The very fact that the
to be a late development. The institution of mobilization of political power, and its im-
contract in exchange of money and goods plementation through bureaucratic organiza-
is also a complex area of considerable vari- tion, is so effective generates interests against
ation. Finally, money itself is by no means sarcrificing certain short-run advantages to
a simple entity, and in particular the de- favor the enhanced flexibility that market
velopment of credit Instruments, banking systems can provide. This has been a major
and the Hke, has many variations.^^ field of conflict historically, and it is being
These institutional elements are to a con- repeated today in underdeveloped societies.
siderable degree independently variable and The strong tendency for developing societies
are often found unevenly developed. But if to adopt a "socialistic" pattern refiects a
the main ones are sufficiently developed and preference for increasing productivity
integrated, the market system provides the through governmentally controlled bureau-
operating imits of the society, including of cratic means rather than more decentralized
course its government, with a pool of dis- market-oriented means.^* But in general
posable resources that can be applied to the money and market system has undoubt-
any of a range of uses and, within limits, edly made a fundamental contribution to
can be shifted from use to use. The impor- the adaptive capacity of the societies in
tance of such a pool is shown by the serious which it has developed; those that restrict
consequences of its shrinkage for even such it too drastically are likely to suffer from
highly organized political systems as some severe adaptive disadvantages in the long
of the andent empires.^^ run.
Modern sodalist sodeties appear to be
exceptional because, up to a point, they GENERALIZED UNIVERSALISTIC NORMS
22 A useful typology of the organization of eco- A feature common to bureaucratic author-
nomic exchange relations, from an evolutionary
point of view, is given by Neil J . Smelser, The 2* See Gregory Grossman, "The Structure and
Sociology of Economic Life, Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Organization of the Soviet Economy" in the Slavic
Prentice-Hall, 1963; pp. 86-88. Review, 21 (June, 1962), pp. 203-222. The con-
23 S. N . Eisenstadt, op. cit. for example, makes striction of the market system may also have been
a great deal of this factor, particularly in accoimt- a major factor in the difficulties suffered by the
ing for the gradual decline of the political power Chinese Communist regime in connection with the
of the Byzantine Empire. This analysis is also "Great Leap Forward" of 1958 and subsequent
closely related to Weber's thesis in his famous years. Audrey Donnithome, "The Organization of
essay on the decline of the Roman Empire. Weber, Rural Trade in China Since 1958," China Quarterly,
however, particularly emphasized the mobility of No. 8 (October-December, 1961), pp. 77-91, and
manpower through slavery. Max Weber, "The So- Leo A. Orleans, "Problems of Manpower Absorp-
cial Causes of the Decay of Andent Civilization," tion in Rural China," China Quarterly, No. '
Joumal of General Education (October, 1950). (July-September, 1961), pp. 69-84.
 EVOLUTIONARY UNIVERSALS 351
ity and the market system is that they in- vance beyond certain points, or from insta-
-(5rporate, and are hence dependent on, bility leading in many cases to retrogres-
universalistic norms. For bureaucracy, these^ - sion.2^ Although many of the elements of
involve definitions of the powers of office, such a general normative order appeared in
the terms of access to it, and the line divid- quite highly developed form in earlier socie-
ing proper from improper pressure or in- ties, in my view their crystallization into a
fluence. For money and markets, the rele-^j. coherent system represents a distinctive new
vant norms include the whole complex of'^ step, which more than the industrial revolu-
property rights, first in commodities, later tion itself, ushered in the modern era of
in land and in monetary assets. Other norms social evolution.2'^ '
regulate the monetary medium and contrac- The clear differentiation of secular gov-
tual relations among the parties to transac- ernment from religious organization has been
tions. Here relations between contracts of a long and complicated process, and even in
service or employment and other aspects of the modern world its results are unevenly
the civil and personal statuses of the persons developed. It has perhaps gone farthest in
concerned are particularly crucial. the sharp separation of Church and State
Up to a point, the norms governing a in the United States. Bureaucracy has, of
bureaucratic organization may be regarded course, played an important part in this
as independent of those governing property process. The secularization of government
or those regulating the status of private per- is associated with that of law, and both of
sons in the same society. As noted, however, these are related to the level of generality
there are also certain intrinsic connections, of the legal system.
such as that between bureaucratic organi- Systems of law that are directly religiously
zation and the mobiltiy of resources .^^ sanctioned, treating compliance as a reli-'
Although it is very difficult to pin down gious obligation, also tend to be "legalistic"
just what the crucial components are, how in the sense of emphasizing detailed pre-
they are interrelated, and how they develop, scriptions and prohibitions, each of which is
one can identify the development of a gen- given specific Divine sanction. Preeminent
eral legal system as a crucial aspect of socie- examples are the Hebrew law of Leviticus,
tliTevolution. A general legal system is an the later developments in the Talmudic
integrated system of universalistic norms, tradition, and Islamic law based on the
applicable to the society as a whole rather Koran and its interpretations. Legal deci-
than to a few functional or segmental sec- sions and the formulation of rules to cover
tors, highly generalized in terms of princi- new situations must then be based as di-
ples and standards, and relatively independ- rectly as possible on an authoritative sacred
ent of both the religious agencies that text.
legitimize the normative order of the society Not only does religious law as such tend
and vested interest groups in the operative to inhibit generalization of legal principle,
sector, particularly in government. but it also tends to favor what Weber called
The extent to which both bureaucratic substantive over formal rationality.^^ The
organization and market systems can develop standard of legal correctness tends to be
without a highly generalized universalistic
the implementation of religious precepts,
normative order should not be underesti-
not procedural propriety and consistency of
mated. Such great Empires as the Mesopo-
tamian, the ancient Chinese, and, perhaps general principle. Perhaps the outstanding
the most extreme example, the Roman, in- difference between the legal systems of the
cluding its Byzantine extension, certainly other Empires, and the patterns that were
testify to this. But these societies suff^ed developed importantly in Roman law, was
I either from a static quality, failing to ad- the development of elements of formal ra-
se Eisenstadt, op. dt., pp. 349 ff.
" I t goes without saying that one of the largest 27 Parsons, Sodeties, op. dt.
channels of government spending in modern socie- 28 Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic
: les is for the purchase of goods and services in Organization, op. dt., p p . 184 ff, a n d Max Weber
[the markets, including the payment of civil servants on Law in Economy and Sodety, Cambridge:
[and military personnel. H a r v a r d University Press, 1954, ch. 8.
352 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
tionality, which we may regard as a differ- neyer developed, the jurisconsults in their
entiation of legal norms out of "embedded- Unofficial" status did constitute a genuine
^ess" in the religious culture. The older professional group, and they systematized
systems^many of which still existtended the law very extensively, in the later phases
to treat "justice" as a direct implementation strongly under the influence of Stoic Philos-
of precepts of religious and moral conduct, ophy.^^
in terms of what Weber called Wertration- Though Roman law had a variety of more
alitdt, without institutionalizing an inde- or less "archaic" features, its "failure" was
pendent system of societal norms, adapted surely on the level of institutionalization
to the function of social control at the socie- more than in any intrinsic defect of legal
tal level and integrated on its own terms. content. Roman society of that period
The most important foci of such an inde- "backed the institutional capacity, through
pendent system are, first, some kind of government, religious legitimation, and
"codification" of norms under principles not other channels, to integrate the immense
directly moral or religious, though they gen- variety of peoples and cultures within the
erally continue to be grounded in religion, Empire, or to maintain the necessary eco-
and, second, the formalization of procedural nomic, political, and administrative struc-
rules, defining the situations in which judg- tures.^2 Roman law remained, however, the
ments are to be made on a societal basis. cultural reference point of all the significant
Especially important is the establishment later developments.
of courts for purposes other than permitting The next phase, of course, was the devel-
political and religious leaders to make pro- opment of Catholic Canon Law, incorpo-
nouncements and "examples."^* rating much of Roman law. A major char-
Something similar can be said about what acteristic of the Western Church, Canon law
I have called operative vested interests, no- was not only very important in maintaining
tably government. Advantages are to be and consolidating the Church's differentia-
gained, on the one hand, by binding those tion from secular government and society,
outside the direct control of the group in but, with the Justinian documents, it also
question with detailed regulation, while, on preserved the legal tradition.
the other hand, leaving maximum freedom The third phase was the revival of the
for the group's leadership. This duality study of Roman/Secular law in Renaissance
Weber made central to his concept of tradi- Italy and its >^adual adoption by the de-
tional authority, with its sphere of tradi- veloping nauonal states of early modern
tionalized fixity, on the one hand, and that Europe. The result was that the modern
of personal prerogative, reaching its extreme national state developed as, fundamentally,
form in "sultanism," on the other.^*^ Both a Rechtsstaat. In Continental Europe, how-
aspects are highly resistant to the type of ever, one fundamental limitation on this
rationalization that is essential to a general- development was the degree to which the
ized universalistic legal system. law continued to be intertwined and almost
Though the Chinese Empire, Hindu law identified with government. For example,
(Manu), Babylonia, and to some extent, most higher civil servants were lawyers.
Islam made important beginnings in the One might ask whether this represented
direction I am discussing, the Roman legal a "legalization of bureaucracy" or a bureau-
system of the Imperial period was uniquely cratization of the law and the legal profes-
advanced in these respects. Though the sion. But with elaborate bodies of law, law
early jus civUis was very bound religiously, faculties as major constituents of every
this was not true to the same extent of the important university, and the prominence
jus gentium, or of the later system as a
totality. While a professional judiciary 81A handy summary of Roman legal develop-
ment is "The Sdence of Law" by F. de Zulueta in
29 Weber, Max Weber on Law in Economy and Cyrus Bailey (ed.). The Legacy of Rome, London:
Sodety, op. cit. Oxford University Press, 1923.
80 Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic 82 Weber, "The Sodal Causes of the Decay of
Organization, op. dt. Ancient Civilization," op. dt.
 EVOLUTIONARY UNIVERSALS 353
of university-trained legal professions, Con- of modern society. So much is it no accident
'tTnental European nations certainly had well That the Industrial Revolution occurred first
institutionalized legal systems. in England, that I think it legitimate to re-
In England, however, the development gard the English type of legal system as a
went, in a highly distinctive way, still far- fundamental prerequisite of the first occur-
ther. Although the differentiation of English rence of the Industrial Revolution.^*
Common Law from Continental Roman law
had late Mediaeval roots, the crucial period THE DEMOCRATIC ASSOCIATION
was the early 17 th century, when Justice
Coke asserted the independence of the Com- A rather highly generalized universalistic
mon law from control by royal prerogative. legal^orjier is in all likelihood ajiecessarv
With this, the establishment of the organiza- pr'erequisite for the development of the last
tional independence of the Judiciary was the structural "complex to be discussed as uni-
crucial symbolic development. Substantially, versal to social evolution, the democratic
the Common Law came to emphasize the assoaalion with elective leadership and fully
protection of personal rights,^^ the institution enfranchised membership. At least this seems
of property in private hands, and both free- true of the institutionalization of this pat-
dom of contract and protection of contrac- tern in the governments of large-scale socie-
tual interests far more strongly than did the ties. This form of democratic association
Continental law. Common Law also em- originated only in the late 18th century
phasized the development of institutions, in the Western world and was nowhere com-
including both the adversary system, in plete, if universal adult suffrage is a cri-
which parties are highly independent of the terion, until well into the present century.
Court, and procedural protections.** Of course, those who regard the Communist
society as a stable and enduring type might \
Significantly, these Common Law devel-
well dispute that democratic government in
opments were integral parts of the more
this sense is an evolutionary universal. But
general development of British institutions
before discussing that issue, I will outline
associated with the Puritan movement,^^
the history and principal components of this
including the later establishment of the in-
universal.
dependence of Parliament and the develop-
ment of physical sdence. Surely it is significant that the earliest
This development of English Common cases of democratic government were the
Law, with its adoption and further develop- poleis of classical antiquity, which were also
ment in the overseas English-speaking world, the primary early sources of universalistic
not only constituted the most advanced case law. The democratic polis, however, not only
of universalistic normative order, but was was small in scale by modern standards (note
probably decisive for the modern world. Aristotle's belief that a citizen body should
This general type of legal order is, in my never be too large to assemble within ear-
opinion, the most important single hallmark shot of a given speaker, of course without
the aid of a public address system), but
i ^^A particularly clear analysis of the fundamen- also its democratic associational aspects
tal principles underlying this normative order is never included a total society. It is estimated
in the paper by John Rawls, "Constitutional Lib- that during the Periclean age in Athens,
erty and the Concept of Justice," in C. J. Friedrich
(ed.). Justice (Nomos VI), New York: Atherton only about 30,000 of a total population of
Press, 1963. Rawl's discussion is not, however, spe- about 150,000 were citizens, the rest being
cially oriented to legal problems. metics and slaves. And, of course, citizen
" See Roscoe Pound, The Spirit of the Common women were not enfranchised. Thus even in
Law, Boston: Beacon Paperbacks, 1963; especially
chs, 2-4. '^ It is exceedingly important here once more to
^= David Little, "The Logic of Order; An Exami- distinguish the first occurrence of a sodal innova-
nation of the Sources of Puritan-Anglican Con- tion from its subsequent diffusion. The latter can
troversy and of their Relations to Prevailing Legal occur without the whole set of prerequisite societal
Conceptions of Corporation in the Late 16th and conditions necessary for the former. Cf. my Struc-
I Early 17th Century in England," unpublished PhD. ture and Process in Modem Societies, op. dt., ch.
thesis. Harvard University, 1963. 3.
354 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
its democratic phase the poUs was em- whether occupied by individuals, executive
phaticaUy a two-class system. And under bodies, or coUegial groups like legislatures.
the conditions of the time, when Roman The second is the franchise, the institution-
society increased in scale away from the alized participation of members in collective
polis type of situation, citizenship, at least v decision-making through the election of
for large proportions of the Empire's popu- officers and often through voting on spe-
lation, was bound to lose political functions cific policy issues. Third is the institution-
almost in proportion to its gains in legal alization of procedural rules for the voting
significance. cess and the determination of its out-
The basic principle of democratic associa- come and for the process of "discussion" or
tion, however, never completely disappeared. campaigning for votes by candidates or ad-
To varying degrees and in varying forms, it vocates of policies. Fourth is the institution-
survived in the municipia of the Roman Em- alization of the nearest possible approxima-
pire, in the Roman Senate, and in various tion to the voluntary principle in regard to
aspects of the organization of the Christian-^membership status. In the private association
Church, though the Church also maintained this is fundamentalno case where mem-
certain hierarchical aspects. Later the col- bership is ascribed or compulsory can be
legial pattern, e.g., the college of Cardinals, called a "pure" democratic association. In
continued to be cin aspect of Church struc- government, however, the coercive and com-
ture. In the Italian and North European pulsory elements of power, as well as the
dty-states of the late Middle Ages and recruitment of societal commimities largely
early modern period, it had its place in by birth, modify the principle. Hence uni-
government, for example in "senates," versality of franchise tends to replace the
which though not democratically elected, voluntary membership principle.
were internally organized as democratic Formalization of definite procedural rules
bodies. Another important case was the governing voting and the counting and
guild, as an association of merchants or evaluation of votes may be considered a case
craftsmen. In modem times there have, of formal rationality in Weber's sense.
of course, been many different types of pri- since it removes the consequences of the act
vate association in many different fields. from the control of the particular actor. It
It is certainly safe to say that, even apart limits his control to the specific act of cast-
from government, the democratic associa- ing his ballot, choosing among the alterna-
tion is a most prominent and important tives officially presented to him. Indirectly
constituent of modern societies. his vote might contribute to an outcome he
At the level of national government, we did not desire, e.g., through splitting the
can speak first of the long development of opposition to an undesirable candidate and
Parliamentary assemblies functioning as thus actually aiding him, but he cannot
democratic associations and legislating for control this, except in the voting act itself.
the nation, whose members have been to Besides such formalization, however, Rok-
some degree elected from fairly early times. kan has shown in his comparative and his-
Secondly, there has been a stepwise exten- torical study of Western electoral systems.
sion of both the franchise for electing legis- that there is a strikingly general tendency
lative representatives and the legislative to develop three other features of the fran-
supremacy of their assemblies, following chise.^'^ The first of these is universalit)'
the lead of England, which developed ^minimizing if not eliminating the overlap
rapidly in these respects after 1688. Later, between membership and disenfranchise-
the French and American Revolutions dra- ment. Thus property qualifications and
matized the conception of the total national most recently, sex qualifications have beeo
community as essentially a democratic as- removed so that now the main Western
sociation in this sense. democratic polities, with minimal exceptioni
There are four critically important com- have universal adult suffrage. The second is
ponents of the democratic association. Fifst 37 Stein Rokkan, "Mass Suffrage, Secret Votinf
is the institutionalization of the leadership and Political Participation," The European Jrni
function in the form of an elective office. of Sociology, 2 (1961), pp. 132-152.
 EVOLUTIONARY UNIVERSALS 355
equality, eliminating "class" systems, like ^ o r t u n i t y on the bureaucratic boundary of
the Prussian system in the German Empire, the polity.^^
in favor of the principle, one citizen, one Especially, though not exclusively, in na-
vote.^^ Finally, secrecy of the ballot in-. tional territorial states, the stable democra-
sulates the voting decision from pressures^ tic association is notoriously difficult to
emanating from status superiors or peers institutionalize. Above all this seems to be
e if ih h i a function of the difficulty in motivating
that might interfere with the expression of h l d g
the voter's personal preferences. holders of inunediately effective power to
Certain characteristics of elective office relinquish their opportunities voluntarily
directly complementary to those of the despite the seriousness of the interest at
franchise can be formulated. Aside from the stakerelinquishment of control of govern-
mental machinery after electoral defeat be-
ways of achieving office and the rules of
i"g ^^^ most striking problem.^o The sys-
tenure in it, they are very similar to the, difficulties,
pattern of bureaucratic office. The first, c o r r corruption and "populist" ir-
responding to the formalization of electoral , as weU as de facto dictator-
rules, is that conduct in office must be legaUy furthermore, such difficulties are by
egulated by universalistic norms. Second, .
^ . . . . - , . v^ r ,, V no means absent in private associations, as
corresponding to the universality of the^ Tm-fnooo +1,^ t tt 4.- l * l
^ . ^, .... , , ,. . witness the rarityy of effective electoral sys-
franchise, is the principle of subordinating tems in i large trade unions.^
segmental or private interests to the collec- The basic argument for considering demo-
tive interest within the sphere of competence cratic association a universal, despite such
of the office. Third, corresponding to equal- problems, is that, the larger and more com-f^
ity of the franchise, is the principle of ac-, plex a society becomes, the more important^'
countability for decisions to a total electo-'^^ is effective political organization, not only
I rate. And finally, corresponding to secrecy in its administrative capacity, but also, and
of the ballot, is the principle of limiting the not least, in its support of a universalistic
powers of office to specified spheres, in sharp. ' legal order. Political effectiveness includes
contrast to the diffuseness of both tradi- "^ both the scale and operative flexibility of
tional and charismatic authority. ^ ^ organization of power. Power, however.
The adoption of even such a relatively Precisely as a generalized societal medium,
specific pattern as equality of the franchise depends overwhelmingly on a consensual
may be considered a universal tendency, ^he ordered institutionaliza-
essentially because, under the principle that
power system to the higher-order societal
^the membership rightfully chooses both the
ibroad orientations of coUective policy and institutional form basically different
jthe elements having leadership privileges the democratic association can, not
[and responsibilities, there is, among those specifically legitimize authority and power
with minimal competence, no universalistic in the most general sense, but mediate con-
basis for discriminating among classes of
members. As a limitation on the hierarchical ^'arsons, "On the Concept of PoUtical

y ot franchise is the limiting or .J

boundary condition of the democratic as-
^odation, corresponding to equality of OD-
- The recent decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court
the outlawing the Georgia
t>licitly
this was a direct apphcation of
The New York Times, March 19,1963.
Laski was fond of saying that no "ruling class"
would ever relinquish its position peacefully. Yet,
l!" ?^ ^^^^ ^^^'^' ^^^ ^"^^ ^^^^^^ government
both mtroduced the "welfare state" and set India
Seymour Martin Lipset, Martin Trow, and
'^ ^*'^^^^"' ^^'^ Democracy, Glencoe HI.:
The Free Press, 1956.
" ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ' "^^ '^' Concept of PoUtical Power,"
he dt
* ' ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ' " ^ ^ ^ C"<^^Pt of Influence," PubUc
Opinion Quarterly, 27 (Spring, 1963), pp. 37--62.
356 AMERICAN SOCIOLOGICAL REVIEW
sensus in its exercise by particular persons iUustration an especially important type of
afid groups, and in the formation of par- structural innovation that has appeared in
ticular binding policy decisions. At high '"til^ course of sodal change. I have attempted
levels of structural differentiation in the to clarify the concept "evolutionary uni-
sodety itself and in its governmental sys- versal" by briefly discussing a few examples
tem, generalized legitimation cannot fill this from organic evolution, namely, vision, the
gap adequately. Providing structured par- human hands, and the human brain. I have
ticipation in the selection of leaders and interpreted these as innovations endowing
formation of basic policy, as well as in op- their possessors with a very substantial in-
portunities to be heard and exert influence crease in generalized adaptive capacity, so
and to have a real choice among alternatives, substantial that species lacking them are
is the crucial function of the associational relatively disadvantaged in the major areas
system from this point of view. in which natural selection operates, not so
I realize that to take this position I must much for survival as for the opportunity to
maintain that communist totalitarian or- initiate further major developments.
ganization will probably not fully match Four features of human societies at the
"democracy" in political and integrative level of culture and sodal organization were
capacity in the long run. I do indeed pre- cited as having universal and major signifi-
dict that it will prove to be unstable and cance as prerequisites for sodo-cultural de-
wiU either make adjustments in the general velopment: technology, kinship organization
direction of electoral democracy and a plural based on an incest taboo, communication
party system or "regress" into generally based on language, and religion. Primary at-
less advanced and poUHcally less effective tention, however, was given to six organiza-
forms of organization, failing to advance as tional complexes that develop mainly at the
rapidly or as far as otherwise may be ex- level of social structure. The first two, par-
pected. One important basis of this predic- ticularly important for the emergence of
tion is that the Communist Party has every- societies from primitiveness, are stratifica-
where emphagzed_jts function in educsima tion, involving a primary break with primi-
the people for the new society.** In the long tive kinship ascription, and cultural legiti-
run its legitimacy wiU certainly be under- mation, with institutionalized agendes that
mined if the party leadership continues to are independent of a diffuse religious tradi-
be unwilling to Unist the people it has edu- tion.
cated. In the present context, however, to Fundamental to the structure of modem
trust the people is to entrust them with a sodeties are, taken together, the other four
share of f)olitical responsibility. This can complexes: bureaucratic organization of col-
only mean that eventually the single mono- lective goal-attainment, money and market
litMc party must relinquish its monopoly systems, generalized universalistic legal sys-
of such responsibility. (This is not to tems, and the democratic association witi
analyze the many complex ways in which elective leadership and mediated member-
this development might proceed, but only ship support for policy orientations. Al-
to indicate the direction in which it is most though these have developed very unevenly.
likely to move and the consequences it must some of them going back a very long time.
bear if it fails in taking that direction.) aU are dearly much more than simple "in-
ventions" of particular sodeties.
CONCLUSION Perhaps a single theme tying them to-
gether is that differentiation and attendant
This paper is not meant to present even
reduction in ascription has caused the initial
the schematic outline of a "theory" of socie-
two-class system to give way to more coni
tal evolution. My aim is much more limited:
plex structures at the levels of social strati
I have selected for detailed attention and
fication and the relation between soda
**Paul Hollander, "The New Man and His structure and its cultural legitimation.
Enemies: A Study of the Stalinist Conceptions of this more complex system is characterize'^
Good and Evil Personified," unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, Princeton University, 1963. See also by a highly generalized universalistic
Allen Kassofs forthcoming book on Soviet youth. tive structure in all fields. Second,
 EVOLUTIONARY UNIVERSALS 357
under such normative orders have greater rapid "modernization" in present "under-
autonomy both in pursuing their own goals ^^ifiveloped" societies is extremely important.
^ d interests and in serving others instru- Certain cultural developments such as the
mentally. Third, this autonomy is linked "philosophic breakthroughs" that produced
^th the probability that structural units what Bellah calls the "historic" religions or
^'ill develop greater diversity of interests the emergence of modern science in the 16th
and subgoals. Finally, this diversity results and 17th centuries, are of significance equal
in pluralization of scales of prestige and to the developments discussed above. In-
therefore of differential access to economic deed, the level of institutionalization of sci-
resources, power, and influence.*^ entific investigation and technological ap-
Comparatively, the institutionalization of plication of science in the present century
these four complexes and their interrelations has become a structural complex ranking in
is very uneven. In the broadest frame of importance with the four I have described
reference, however, we may think of them as as essential to modernity.
together constituting the main outline of the In closing I wish to express the hope
structural foundations of modern society. that the reader will not be too concerned
Clearly, such a combination, balanced rela- with the details of my characterizations of
tive to the exigencies of particular societal particular evolutionary universals, my spe-
units, confers on its possessors an adaptive cific judgments about their concrete histori-
advantage far superior to the structural po- cal developments, or my detailed evaluations
tential of societies lacking it. Surely the of their importance. These parts of the
bearing of this proposition on problems of paper are meant primarily for illustration.
I hope he will give particular attention to
it be forgotten, what I have called the the idea of the evolutionary universal and
legitimation complex represents above all the differ- its grounding in the conception of general-
entiation between societal and cultural systems. ized adaptive capacity. If this idea is sound,
The maintenance and extension of this differentia-
tion is taken for granted in the present description empirical shortcomings in its application
of developments internal to the sodal system. can be remedied by research and criticism.