Sei sulla pagina 1di 6

CASES UNDER LOAN National Bank, authorized an extension of credit in favor of Puno y

Concepcion, S en C, a co-partnership capitalized at P100,000 and


NAVOA v. COURT OF APPEALS where the wife of Concepcion held a one-half of the capital thereof,
G.R. No. 59255, December 29, 1995 aggregating to P300,000 with only security required consisting of six
Bellosillo, J. (6) demand notes. He was charged in the Court of First Instance of
Cagayan for violation of section 35 of Act No. 2747. He was found
Facts: Private respondents Eduardo and Teresita Domdoma alleged guilty and sentenced to imprisonment for one year and six months
that petitioner Olivia Navoa obtained from them a ring valued at and P3,000 fine. Section 35 of Act No. 2747 reads: The National
P15,000 and issued as security therefor a check for the same amount Bank shall not, directly or indirectly, grant loans to any of the
dated 15 August 1977 with a condition that a ring would be members of the board of directors of the bank nor to agents of the
considered sold if not returned within 15 days. When deposited, the branch banks.
check was dishonored for lack of funds. Likewise, private respondents
granted loans to petitioners in different amounts on different dates, Issue: Whether the granting of a credit of P300,000 a loan or a
all amounting to P40,000. All the loans were secured by discount./ Whether the demand notes signed by the firm a loan or
corresponding checks dated a month after each was obtained. a discount.

Issue: Whether petitioner contracted a loan and the checks issued Held: It was a concession of a credit and not a loan. The concession
served as security therefor. of a credit necessarily involves the granting of loans up to the limit
of the amount fixed in the credit. The demand notes signed by the
Held: Yes. All the loans granted to petitioner were secured by firm were not discount paper but were mere evidences of
corresponding checks dated a month after each was obtained. In this indebtedness because (i) interest was not deducted from the face of
regard, the term security is defined as a means of ensuring the the notes and (ii) they were single-name and not double-name paper.
enforcement of an obligation or of protecting some interest in
property. It may be personal, as when an individual becomes a surety REPUBLIC v. PNB AND FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK OF NEW
or a guarantor; or a property security, as when a mortgage, pledge, YORK
charge, lien, or other device is used to have property held out of G.R. No. L-16106, December 30, 1961
which the person to be made secure can be compensated for loss. Bautista Angelo, J.
Security is something to answer for as a promissory note. That is why
a secured creditor is one who holds a security from his debtor for Facts: The Republic filed a complaint for escheat of certain
payment of a debt. unclaimed bank deposits balances against several banks, including
the First National City Bank of New York. It prayed that credits and
PEOPLE v. CONCEPCION deposits held by them in favor of persons known to be dead or who
G.R. No. L-19190, November 29, 1922 have not made further deposits or withdrawals during the period of
Malcolm, J. 10 years or more be escheated to the Republic by ordering defendant

Facts: Respondent Venancio Concepcion, President of the Philippine


banks to deposit them to its credit with the Treasurer of the Issue: Whether there was a perfected contract to entitle plaintiff of
Philippines. damages.

Issue: Whether the term unclaimed balances under Section 1, Act Held: Yes, there was indeed a perfected consensual contract as
No. 3936 include credits or deposits of money subject to escheat. recognized in Article 1934 of the Civil Code which provides: An
accepted promise to deliver something, by way of commodatum or
Held: It would appear that the term unclaimed balances that are
simple loan is binding upon the parties, but the commodatum or
subject to escheat include credits or deposits of money, or other
simple loan itself shall not be perfected until the delivery of the object
evidence of indebtedness of any kind with banks in favor of any
of the contract.
person unheard of for a period of 10 years or more. The term credit
in its usual meaning is a sum credited on the books of a company to Where an application for a loan of money was approved by resolution
a person who appears to be entitled to it. It presupposes a creditor- of the corporation (lender) and the corresponding mortgage was
debtor relationship, and may be said to imply ability, by reason of executed and registered, there arises a perfected consensual contract
property or estates, to make a promised payment. It is correlative to of loan. While a perfect contract of loan can give rise to an action for
debt or indebtedness, and that which is due to any person, as damages, said contract does not constitute the real contract of loan.
distinguished from that which he owes. The same is true with the The action thus take by both parties was in the nature of mutual
term deposits in banks where the relationship created between the desistance which is a mode of extinguishing obligations. It is a
depositor and the bank is that of creditor and debtor. concept that derives from the principle that since mutual agreement
can create a contract, mutual disagreement by the parties can cause
SAURA IMPORT AND EXPORT COMPANY, INC. v. DBP its extinguishment.
G.R. No. L-24968, April 27, 1972
Makalintal, J. BPI INVESTMENT CORP. v. COURT OF APPEALS, ALS & ANTONIO
LITONJUA
Facts: In July 1953, plaintiff Saura Inc. applied to the Rehabilitation G.R. No. 133632, February 15, 2002
Finance Corporation (RFC), now DBP, for an industrial loan of Quisumbing, J.
P500,000.00 for the construction of a factory building (for the
manufacture of jute sacks), payment of the jute mill machinery and Facts: Frank Roa obtained a loan at an interest rate of 16 % per
equipment and as additional working capital. Said loan was secured annum from Ayala Investment and Development Corporation (now
by a first mortgage on the factory building to be constructed, the land BPIIC), for the construction of a house on his lot in New Alabang
site thereof, and the machinery and equipment to be installed. Village, Muntinlupa. Said house and lot were mortgaged to AIDC to
Subsequent events transpired and in 1964, nine (9) years after the secure the loan. Sometime in 1980, Roa sold the house and lot to
loan agreement, Saura Inc. filed a civil case against DBP. Judgment private respondents ALS and Antonio Litonjua for P850,000. They
rendered ordering DBP to pay actual and consequential damages to paid P350,000 in cash and assumed the P500,000 balance of Roas
Saura Inc. plus interest at the legal rate and attorneys fees. indebtedness with AIDC. AIDC however was not willing to extend the
old interest rate to private respondents and thereby proposed to grant
them a new loan of P500,000 to be applied to Roas debt and secured BONNEVIE v. COURT OF APPEALS
by the same property, at an interest rate of 20% per annum and G.R. No. L-49101, October 24, 1983
service fee of 1% per annum on the outstanding principal balance Guerrero, J.
payable within 10 years in equal monthly amortization of P9,996.58
and penalty interest at the rate of 21% per annum per day from the Facts: Spouses Jose M. Lozano and Josefa P. Lozano were the owners
date of the amortization became due and payable. On September 13, of the property they mortgaged on December 6, 1966 to Philippine
1982, BPIIC released to private respondents P7,146.87 purporting to Bank of Commerce to secure the payment of the loan of P75,000. On
be what was left of their loan after full payment of Roas loan. BPIIC December 8, 1966, they executed in favor of petitioner Honesto
instituted foreclosure proceedings against private respondents. Bonnevie the Deed of Sale with Mortgage for and in consideration of
Private respondents filed a civil case against petitioner alleging they the sum of P100,000, P25,000 of which payable to the Lozanos upon
should not be made to pay amortization before the actual release of the execution of the document and the balance of P75,000 payable to
the P500,000 loan in August and September 1982. Petitioner the Bank. On January 26, 1971, petitioner filed a complaint seeking
contends that a contract of loan is a consensual contract, and a loan to annul the Deed of Mortgage. He contends that when the deed was
contract was perfected at the time the contract of mortgage was executed on December 6, 1966, there was yet no principal obligation
executed on March 1981. to secure as the loan of P75,000 was not received by the Lozano
spouses so much so that the absence of a principal obligation, there
Issue: Whether a contract of loan is a consensual contract / Whether
is want of consideration in the accessory contract, which
the contract of loan was perfected on September 13, 1982 as private
consequently impairs its validity and fatally affects its very existence.
respondents contend or on March 1981 at the time the contract of
mortgage was executed as alleged by petitioner. Issue: Whether there was a perfected contract upon the execution of
the mortgage deed on December 6, 1966.
Held: A contract of loan is not a consensual contract but a real
contract. It is perfected only upon the delivery of the object of the Held: From the recitals of the mortgage deed itself, it is clearly seen
contract. A perfected consensual contract is Bonnevie v. CA and that the mortgage deed was executed for and on condition of the loan
Saura Inc. v. DBP can give rise to an action for damages. However, granted to the Lozano spouses. A contract of loan being a consensual
said contract does not constitute the real contract of loan which contract, the herein contract of loan was perfected at the same time
requires the delivery of the object of the contract for its perfection the contract of mortgage was executed. The promissory note executed
and which gives rise to obligations only on the part of the borrower. on December 12, 1966 was only an evidence of indebtedness and
does not indicate lack of consideration of the mortgage at the time of
The loan contract between BPI, on the one hand, and ALS and
its execution.
Litonjua, on the other, was perfected only on September 13, 1982,
the date of the second release of the loan. Private respondents CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE v. COURT OF APPEALS
obligation to pay commenced only on October 13, 1982, a month G.R. No. L-45710, October 3, 1985
after the perfection of the contract. A contract of loan involves a Makasiar, J.
reciprocal obligation, wherein the obligation or promise of each party
is the consideration for that of the other.
Facts: On April 28, 1965, Island Savings Bank approved the loan erected a warehouse thereat with consent of Francisco. Francisco
application of private respondent Sulpicio M. Tolentino who, as was substituted by Alejandro Mina et al while Andres was succeeded
security for the loan, executed on the same day a real estate by Ruperta Pascual. On May 6, 1909, Pascual petitioned the court to
mortgage over his 100-hectare land located in Cubo, Las Nieves, sell the six-seventh of the one-half of the warehouse, of 14 by 11
Agusan and covered by TCT No. T-305 and which mortgage was meters, together with its lot. Mina et al opposed the petition on the
annotated on the said title the next day. On May 22, 1965, however, a ground that Pascual had included therein the lot occupied by the
mere P17,000 partial release of the P80,000 was made by the Bank, warehouse which they claimed was their exclusive property.
and Sulpicio and wife Editha signed a promissory note for P17,000 at Moreover, plaintiffs Mina et al requested the court to decide the
12% annual interest payable within 3 years from the date of the question of ownership of the lot before it pass upon the petition for
execution of the contract. On August 1, 1968, the Bank filed an the sale of the warehouse. However, the court granted the petition for
application for the extra-judicial foreclosure of the real estate sale of Pascual and subject property was subsequently sold to Cu
mortgage covering the 100-hectare land of Tolentino. Joco.

Issue: Whether the obligations of the parties to a loan contract were Issue: Whether Andres Fontanilla acquired real rights over the
not complied with to justify the foreclosure of real estate mortgage lot/property giving/transferring the same to Pascual to validly sell
over the 100-hectare land. the warehouse and/or lot.

Held: The parties undertook a reciprocal obligation. In reciprocal Held: No. Neither Andres nor his successors paid any consideration
obligations, the obligation of each party is the consideration for that or price whatever for the use of the lot occupied by the said
of the other, and when one party has performed or is ready and warehouse. It appeared more likely that Francisco intended to allow
willing to perform his part of the contract, the other party who has his brother a surface right; but this right supposes the payment of an
not performed or is not ready and willing to perform incurs in delay. annual rent, and Andres had a gratuitous use of the lot. It is,
Here, the promise of the borrower to pay, and he signified his therefore, an essential feature of the commodatum that the use of the
willingness to pay when he executed the real estate mortgage, was thing belonging to another shall for a certain period. Francisco did
the consideration for the obligation of the bank to furnish the not fix any definite period or time which Andres could have the use of
P80,000 loan. And the mere fact of insolvency of the debtor (bank) is the lot. An example of commodatum involving real property is when a
never an excuse for the non-fulfillment of an obligation but instead it person allowed another to build a warehouse on the formers land so
is taken as a breach of the contract by him. that the latter may use the property for a certain period without any
payment of rentals. If no time for use of the land is specified, the
MINA v. PASCUAL contract would be that specie of commodatum called precarium
G.R. No. L-8321, October 14, 1913 expressly recognized in Artcile 1947. If rental is paid, the contract
Arellano, CJ. would be one of lease.

Facts: Francisco Fontanilla acquired a lot in the center of the town of CATHOLIC VICAR APOSTOLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS
Laoag, Ilocos Norte through a public auction. His brother Andres G.R. No. 80294, September 21, 1988
Gancayco, J.
contended that the same was negotiable like any other commercial
Facts: Petitioner questioned the CAs decision affirming the trial unit.
courts decision finding the two lots (Lot 1 and Lot 4) to be possessed
Issue: Whether a deposit was constituted in the case at hand.
by the predecessor-in-interests by private respondents under claim of
ownership in good faith from 1906 to 1951. It contends that
Held: That the defendant received P2,498 was a fact proven.
petitioner has been in possession of the same lot as bailee in
Defendant drew up document declaring that they remained in his
commodatum up to 1951 when petitioner repudiated the trust and
possession, which he could not have said had he not received them.
when it applied for registration in 1962, that it had jest been in
They remained in his possession, surely in no other sense than to
possession as owner for 11 years, hence there is no possibility of
take care of them, for they remained has no other purpose. They
acquisitive prescription requiring 10 years possession with just title
remained in the defendants possession at the disposal of Veraguth.
and 30 years of possession without, that the principle of res judicata
The document in question was neither a loan nor negotiable.
on these findings by the CA will bar a reopening of these questions of
facts, and those facts may no longer be altered. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS v. INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT and ZSHORNACK
Issue: Whether the petitioner as bailee can acquire title by way of
G.R. No. L-66826, August 19, 1988
ordinary acquisitive prescription.
Cortes, J.
Held: The petitioner/bailee declared the lots in question in its name
for taxation purposes. The action of the bailee by such adverse claim Facts: Private respondent Rizaldy T. Zshornacks entrusted to
could not ripen into title by way of ordinary acquisitive prescription Commercial Bank and Trust Company/COMTRUST (later on
because of the absence of a just title. absorbed by BPI through corporate merger), thru its Assistant
Branch Manager of COMTRUST Quezon City, US$3,000.00 cash
CASES UNDER DEPOSIT (popularly known as greenbacks) for safekeeping, and that the
agreement was embodied in a document, a copy of which was
U.S. v. IGPUARA
attached to and made part of the complaint filed by Zshornacks for
G.R. No. L-7593, March 27, 1913
the return of the money. COMTRUST averred that the US$3,000 was
credited to Zshornacks peso current account at prevailing conversion
Facts: Defendant Jose M. Igpuara was charged with estafa for rates.
swindling Juana Montilla and Eugenio Veraguth out of P2,498 which
he took on deposit from the former to be at the latters disposal. The Issue: Whether a contract embodied in the document is a deposit or
document setting forth the obligation reads: We hold at the disposal not.
of Eugenio Veraguth the sum of two thousand four hundred and
ninety-eight pesos (P2,498), the balance from Juana Montillas sugar. Held: The document which embodies the contract states that the

Iloilo, June 26, 1911, - Jose Igpuara, for Ramirez and Co. US$3,000 was received by the bank for safekeeping. The subsequent
Defendant averred that said certificate was a loan and likewise acts of the parties also show that the intent of the parties was really
for the bank to safely keep the dollars and to return it to Zshornakcs
at a later time. The above arrangement is that contract defined in
Article 1962 which reads: A deposit is constituted from the moment a
person receives a thing belonging to another, with the obligation of
safely keeping it and of returning the same. If the safekeeping of the
thing delivered is not the principal purpose of the contract, there is no
deposit but some other contract.