The morality of young children in their early years setting

Pat Gordon-Smith

pat.gsmith@yahoo.co.uk

Key words: behaviour; competence; early years; morality; young children.

Introduction
One afternoon, when my son, Daniel, had just turned 3, we paid a rare visit to a local
playgroup. Being a relative stranger to the place, Daniel chose to play by himself with the
wheeled toys but soon ran into a large plastic Wendy House from which he reappeared
almost immediately, followed by a little girl he did not know. They were both giggling. For a
couple of minutes, they played a chaotic game of tag around the house and then Daniel
ran to me and said, Shes my friend! The game carried on for a few minutes more, during
which time the children made several gleeful declarations of friendship. And then, just as
suddenly as their play had started, it stopped. The two paid no attention to each other for
the next 10 minutes and I assumed that their collaboration was over. But then a little boy
snatched the policemans hat from Daniels head, and Daniel burst into tears. Almost
immediately, Daniels new friend ran across the play area, pushed over the little boy and
grabbed the hat, shouting, No! Thats my friends hat! She walked calmly to Daniel, gave
him his hat, smiled, and went back to what she had been doing. They did not play with
each other again.

I had already begun to think about young childrens morality at the time of this event, so
was more than a little intrigued by it. The girls behaviour seemed to combine two opposing
moral actions one an unkind act of pushing which could have caused hurt, the other an
act which protected her new friends interests. It highlighted the seeming moral
contradictions in young childrens behaviour and generated the idea for an MA research
project through which to understand them.

The research aimed to identify a framework for morality that might recognise the
positive contribution of such paradoxical behaviour to childrens moral development, and to
analyse their moral actions and ideas according to that framework and the discourse
through which it emerged. Influenced by ideas about childrens competence in the
sociology of childhood, the research was informed by the principle that children are and
must be seen as active in the construction and determination of their own social lives
(Prout and James, 1997: 8) and evidence from research that even the very youngest
children find ways to manipulate their environment (Alderson et al , 2005) and that pre-
schoolers have their own ways of dealing with conflict beyond adult influence (Danby and
Baker, 1998).

This article looks briefly at the link between theories of moral development and ideas
about childrens social competence before focusing on the research carried out in a
nursery school during the spring of 2007. It centres on the actions and ideas of five
children aged between 3 and 4 and considers the effect of adult ideas on their real and
perceived status as moral agents. Are the adults views directed by childrens compliance
with or deviance from adult rules (Waksler, 1991), or is there respect for young childrens
different moral behaviour, born of an appreciation that children have a different
understanding which develops over time (Matthews, 1987)? By focusing on one child in
particular, the article reveals the interplay between adult practitioners respect for the
childrens self-directed learning and their impulse to intervene in social behaviour. This has
some implications for practice.

Two frameworks of morality

Through history, western philosophers have argued about whether morality derives from
human nature or human logic (MacIntyre, 1967) and the position taken on this has an
effect on whether or not young children can be regarded as moral agents. This ongoing
dispute was important for the nursery-school study as both the context for the research
and its conduct were influenced by two opposing yet complementary frameworks of
morality, and data gathered in the course of research was analysed in relation to them.
Referred to here as the justice and the caring frameworks terms taken from Gilligan
and Wiggins (1987) the former sees rationality as a necessary condition for positive
moral agency, while the latter conceives morality as an expression of human relationships.

The justice framework

According to the developmental psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg (1969), morality is driven
by human logic. Kohlberg drew on Kants view that the moral principles of justice, honesty
and respect can only be understood and acted upon through mature reasoning (Gert,
2008). In trying to understand how children become rational (adult) moral agents, he
developed a theory identifying six linear stages in the development of moral understanding
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that were linked to biologically predetermined stages in cognitive development. That first
stage towards rational morality began around the age of 10 and reached the ultimate sixth
stage in adults capable of acting according to universal moral principles even in the face of
social and cultural disapproval or against emotional attachments.

Kohlbergs theory extended Piagets (1965 [1932]) earlier work on moral understanding
and, despite a difference in approach, both men concluded that cognitive development in
young children was too primitive for even simple rational morality. They judged young
children to be incapable of moral understanding beyond Kohlbergs first stage, in which
moral behaviour is merely copied from that observed in adults to invite praise and avoid
anger, and is certainly not moral agency. In this influential paradigm, early childhood
attachments are ultimately irrelevant because the pinnacle of rational morality pays no
heed to anything that might divert attention from the universal moral truths. Relationships
must necessarily be discarded on the way towards a detached, impartial morality based on
equality and fairness.

Given that young children do not figure in the stages of morality conceived by Kohlberg
and Piaget, the justice framework may seem irrelevant to a study of moral understanding
among 3 and 4 year olds. But it cannot be overlooked because the staged model has had
such a significant impact on societys concept of childhood. Mayall (2004: 39 & 40)
characterises this set of outdated beliefs about children as one that restricts childrens
potential for exercising their social competence and she decries the fact that it continues to
structure policies and practice in the UK so that the notion of children as incompetent
vulnerable beings who progress with adult help through the stages needed to turn them
into mature adults has been relied upon by government ministers, civil servants, local
authority staff, social services and education staff. Early childhood education did not
escape this influence, although the UK governments guidance for the Foundation Stage
for children aged 3 to 5 in England formally challenged the idea of predictable stages in
development, referring instead to children learning in different ways and at different rates
(QCA/DfEE 2000: 21).

Even so, the staged model of development runs deep: the governments assertion that
children learn in different ways still refers to stages and gives a conditional example of
what they might do when they are older. In determining the nursery schools impact on
childrens moral understanding, it was instructive to establish whether the nursery staff had
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any age- and/or stage-related views about childrens moral development and
understanding.

The caring framework

The justice framework of morality has been criticised for failing to engage with moral
commitment and, despite its interest in human interaction, for not actually considering
relationships (Burman, 1994). Carol Gilligan challenged the exclusive focus on logic as the
motivation for engaging in moral actions (Gilligan and Wiggins, 1987). Interpreting rational
morality as a form of blind justice most usually understood and exercised by men, she
suggested that a complementary moral framework springs from the kind of caring
relationships most generally identified in the bond between parents and children, and more
frequently expressed by women. In direct opposition to the detachment required by
Kantian ethics, morality in this framework of care relies on strong attachment relationships,
the experience of which generates an ability to understand and respond to the feelings of
others. In the context of attachment, say Gilligan and Wiggins (1987: 280), the child
discovers the patterns of human interaction and observes the ways in which people care
for and hurt one another.

Gilligan and Wiggins explain that, in the justice framework, moral development is
defined by progress from a position of unequal power in adultchild relationships to one of
equality and independence. It is an understanding of morality based on equal justice which
creates a moral injunction on individuals and groups not to treat others unfairly. But,
echoing Kants contemporary David Hume (2000 [1740]), who insisted that morality is
more properly felt than judged of, Gilligan and Wiggins (1987: 281) explain how a focus
on the experience of attachment moves the discourse about morality away from objective
judgements about power relations and equality, and generates a perspective on
relationships that underlies the conception of morality as love. This opens the door for
young childrens feelings and relationships their attachments to be morally important,
and for the actions which spring from their emotional experience to be recognised as
evidence of their social and moral competence. From this perspective, morality is not so
much the basis for an impartial code of conduct but is instead the expression of those
connections which form the bedrock of all human relations and create in children an
awareness that they are capable of having an effect on others. This idea is supported by
early years experts who say that young children exhibit their understanding of feelings in
their behaviour towards others (Bayley 2006; Cousins 1999; Dowling 2005) and that they
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learn best in familiar social contexts (Donaldson (2006 [1978]); Dowling 2005; Hurst and
Joseph 1998).

In work which complements that of Gilligan, Kagan (1984) suggests that emotion is the
conduit through which children display their understanding of the difference between right
and wrong. Like Gilligan and Wiggins, he suggests that there may be two moral processes
one based on feelings; the other on logical consistency with a few deep premises. This
leads him to argue that moral behaviour based on impulsive sentiment is just as much the
act of a moral agent as behaviour based on rational consideration for, in his view, human
adults and children prefer to avoid inconsistency between [rational] belief and [impulsive]
action. So Kagan opens another door, one that enables young childrens impulsive
behaviour to be analysed for evidence of their competence as moral agents.

Gilligan and Wiggins are most interested in arguing the case for caring attachment as a
framework for human morality while Kagan focuses on the importance of emotion, but they
each acknowledge the influence of a Kantian framework based on detached justice. So,
while emotion and care offer the keys for enabling children to be moral agents making
them vital for the analysis of childrens morality in a nursery school it was also important
for the nursery-school study to consider the childrens potential for moral agency with
regard to issues of justice.

The nursery-school context

For a study interested in childrens moral competency, it was important to work in an
environment where children might be free to display it. An early years setting was chosen
because the principles of good early education, upheld by the UK government (QCA/DfEE,
2000), say that young children shape their learning through experiences which are
planned according to their own interests. Where children are acknowledged as active in
their own learning it is likely that adults will believe in their competence or at least in their
potential to be competent.

The writing about childrens moral development points to the vital importance of social
context for promoting childrens moral understanding. The quality of social interaction is
conceived as key to moral development (Kagan, 1984; Matthews, 1987), whether at home
(Dunn, 1987) or at school (Donaldson, 2006 [1978]), while moral learning is said to occur
among peers as they play (Dunn 1987; Gilligan and Wiggins 1987) and is also facilitated
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by adults (Crawford, 2001; Dunn, 1987). There is a long nursery-school tradition of
promoting childrens learning through social play rather than formal tuition (Bruce, 2004),
and this pointed to a state-funded nursery school as a suitable context for research.

According to Broadhead (2004: 27), sociability and cooperation are facilitated for
children in a setting that has free-flow areas, where the children can select, and she
agrees with Fisher (2002) that the environment must be richly resourced so that children
may engage, together, in activities which interest them. By planning for learning in
response to childrens interests rather than to achieve abstract targets, adults foster the
childrens self-respect and this contributes to their respect for others (Hurst and Joseph,
1998). This careful management of the childrens self-directed learning actually cultivates
their dependence on other people in the setting (Crawford, 2001) and helps to build the
emotional connections that are essential to social and moral development (Cousins, 1999;
Kagan, 1984; Gilligan and Wiggins, 1987). Recommendations from a national early
childhood organisation suggested that Willow Nursery School in south London embodied
these principles, and so was chosen as the context for research.

Willow is set in the heart of a deprived housing estate, drawing its 77 children from the
estate and also from local middle-class housing. The building has three classrooms
separated by open arches and divided into areas using tables and low shelving. Most of
these areas are set up to provide the children with daily activities, many of which extend
the interests they have displayed on the previous day. The remaining areas are richly
stocked with resources which the children can access during free play. The small outdoor
area has lots of interest, with static and movable climbing frames, wheeled toys, a pond, a
wild area and a wealth of hands-on resources. The children have free rein over their
choice of location, activity and companions, indoors and out, for almost the entire 2-hour
session. The staff work as a team and any practitioner will play or work with any child or
group of children, although each child has a keyworker with whom they might form a
special relationship.

All participants were invited to opt in to the research. Parents gave consent to their
childrens involvement but the childrens informed consent was directly sought during the
research (Alderson and Morrow, 2004), although it was not eventually achieved.
Observation and conversation with children is at the heart of good early years practice
(QCA/DfEE, 2000); they are the primary tools used by early childhood educators to reflect
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on the childrens interests, direction and needs. The children at Willow were so familiar
with being observed and being engaged in conversation that, in a short research period, it
proved impossible to enable them to perceive the need for consent. Eventually, consent
was inferred through the childrens level of interest and cooperation with the research.
Further research in this area would be helpful.

Following parental consent and a period assessing the childrens consent, five children
from mixed social and ethnic backgrounds were involved in the research. There were two
boys and three girls who spanned the nurserys 3 to 4 age range, with commensurate
experience of the setting. The study was carried out over eleven morning sessions across
four weeks, with nine of the visits spent in the childrens environment. Research with the
children was designed to invite their free expression of ideas. Initial observation ranged
from half-hidden watching to playing with the children at their chosen activities and
informal conversations. Two self-chosen play sessions followed, aimed at discovering the
childrens ideas about emotions and moral behaviour.

Conversation with Tara/Play with trains. Dolls or toys can become characters with a
tale to tell. They have been shown to engage young children in conversation about
their emotions (Bayley, 2006; Dowling, 2005) and are recommended as tools for
encouraging young childrens participation (Miller, 2003). The children were each
offered a chance to either talk to a soft doll Tara a little girl who had moved to
London from the country and had no friends or to play out scenarios with
characters from the Thomas the Tank Engine stories. Both activities covered topics
that had been noted during observations. Participating children were invited to
attend by themselves or with a friend. Sessions were recorded, with the childrens
permission. Transcriptions were analysed for ideas that might fall into the justice or
caring frameworks for morality, those which threw light on relationships between
children and with adults, or which provided commentary on childrens experience in
the environment.
Exploring feelings with picture collages . Clark and Moss (2001) advocate the use of
visual media with which to enable pre-literate children to express themselves.
Multiple copies of colourful images from story books chosen for their potential to
encourage thinking about feelings and motives were laid on a table in one of the
open classrooms. Children were invited to make a collage by sticking images on a
piece of paper and to talk about their choices. They were given coloured stickers
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 with faces drawn on them (green smiley, red sad, yellow neutral) and asked to
choose the one that would best describe the feelings of characters in each collage
image. The childrens collages and their responses were useful for gauging
childrens knowledge and understanding of feelings both their own and those of
other people. The activity was open to all children at the nursery.

Research with adults involved formal interviews and informal conversations with the
headteacher, deputy head, and participating childrens keyworkers and parents. Interviews
with parents delved into the moral values held at home and provided insight into the
childrens moral behaviour and understanding in their most familiar environment.

Moral behaviour at Willow Nursery School

Mornings at Willow were busy. When the children arrived, they settled almost immediately
to the activity of their choosing, sometimes alone but generally in the company of others.
Children were not directed towards specific activities or companions unless they requested
it, and this principle was applied for most of the morning, interrupted by occasional group
or individual sessions offering special help or encouraging particular skills. The freedom of
this environment made it rich for research into morality that is, for a study into the effect
that individuals have on each other and the extent to which they understand and/or are in
control of their impact.

The period available for research was relatively short so it was not possible to make an
in-depth study of the recurring elements in childrens moral interactions or to observe how
individual or group behaviour changed over time. However, there were clear moral themes
to be seen in the childrens behaviour, examples of which can be interpreted broadly within
the two moral frameworks identified earlier.

Morality of justice
According to Gilligan and Wiggins (1987), the justice framework creates a moral injunction
that individuals should not treat others unfairly. Children test this injunction to discover how
far justice can afford protection to the unequal, and might do so with the words, Its not
fair. I did not hear children use these words at Willow, but there were certainly tests of
the justice framework which involved questions of ownership, sharing and turn-taking. For
most of the morning session, all resources were available for any of the children to use
whenever they wished and so personal access to them was a matter for constant
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negotiation. Ownership was generally established by children already occupying a space
or playing with a toy. So, when two children tried to take the toy buggies away from one
participant child and her friend, the owners merely stood their ground and the others soon
retreated.

In most cases, the fluidity of play caused resources or areas to be left behind and so
available to others. When this did not occur, some cooperation was required to ensure the
childrens equal access to those resources and their equality as peers. Staff spoke of the
childrens difficulty with sharing resources and how much of their time was spent planning
for and managing turn-taking. But I observed several occasions where children engaged
spontaneously in sharing, for example when three boys discovered that it was better to
take turns putting cars down a tube than to continue jamming them down at the same time.

Such happy cooperation did not always occur, however. When a participant 3-year-old
with advanced language skills was joined on the plastic cube outside by two others who
had limited language, they appeared to be enjoying shared play as they followed each
other in a serpentine motion through the holes in the equipment. Closer observation
revealed that the first child was not taking turns; she was hanging on to ownership of the
cube. By maintaining her position and ignoring the non-verbal signs of annoyance made
by the others, she eventually saw them off in an apparent failure of the justice framework
to protect individuals from unfair treatment.

Morality of caring
According to Gilligan and Wiggins (1987), the caring framework for morality implies a
different injunction from the justice framework: that individuals should not turn away from
someone in need. Just as children test the power of justice to protect them from inequality,
they test the power of caring to protect them from abandonment, perhaps by saying, I
dont love you.

At Willow, two older girls frequently tested the strength of their attachment to each
other. In the course of three separate disagreements I heard one tell the other, Youre not
my friend. Staff confirmed that it was a habitual practice and that they repeatedly talked to
the girls about how it wasnt kind. It is possible that these pronouncements had caused
distress in the past, but neither girl was observed to be much concerned and their play
resumed within minutes or, on one occasion, continued seamlessly. Dunn and Cuttings
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(1999) observations about friendship pairs in a nursery school suggest that this
relationship was a forum for the girls experience of emotions, contributing to their learning
within the caring framework for morality (Gilligan and Wiggins, 1987; Kagan, 1984).

The effectiveness of care was also tested by watchfulness, a characteristic of moral

learning identified by Dunn (1987). Several children were marching around the circular
bench outside when one child accidentally knocked another to the ground and the fallen
boy started to cry. A practitioner ran to him, sat where he lay and comforted him there. For
a few moments, all the children on the bench stood transfixed, watching the crying boy and
the comforting adult before setting off again as the cries subsided.

Adult policies and practices

The role of education in young childrens moral development is embedded in early years
pedagogy, with policies and practices designed to foster childrens moral development.
This has now been written into the early years curriculum. In the Foundation Stage that
was in place at the time of the research, children aged 3 to 5 moved along stepping
stones towards early learning goals which they might reach by the end of reception.
Several stepping stones have moral content, such as the ability to work harmoniously as
part of a group and to form good relationships, while one of the goals is to understand
what is right, what is wrong and why (QCA/DfEE, 2000: 3442). One of the cornerstones
of the Foundation Stage is that it has a principled approach to early education, and two of
these central principles have clear moral implications. One states that no child should be
excluded or disadvantaged because of ethnicity, culture or religion, home language, family
background, learning difficulties or disabilities, gender or ability and the other says that
practitioners should ensure that all children feel included, secure and valued (QCA/DfEE,
2000: 11). Both are to be applied universally and, as such, promote a justice-based
morality, although the nurturing of individual self-esteem implied in the second principle
suggests that value is also placed on the morality of care. It is significant that in these and
all the remaining principles, the responsibility for childrens learning is placed squarely on
the shoulders of practitioners and despite the curriculums interest in childrens self-
directed learning is not shared by children.

An alternative, complementary approach to the Foundation Stage is found in the Quality

in diversity framework (ECEF, 2003). Without government backing, it cannot influence
early years practice as widely as the Foundation Stage, but its approach is regarded by
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many experts as crucial for childrens meaningful learning (Beels, 2007). The Quality in
diversity goals for early learning include several with moral content, for example that
children are forming mutually respectful relationships and learning to understand and
reflect on the effect of their choices and decisions on others. These goals are not so much
targets for behaviour as statements of respect for the many ways in which young children
learn. As such, they share the responsibility for learning between practitioners and children
and so are distinct from the focus on practitioner responsibility in the Foundation Stage.

Ideas about morality and moral development

Observation established that Willow Nursery School enables varied and significant social
interactions and moral behaviours among the children. The environment is also imbued
with strong moral principles, where certain kinds of moral behaviour and understanding are
promoted. Investigation into the staffs personal beliefs about morality and moral
development revealed the underlying moral principles at work in the setting. This enabled
analysis of how these principles guide the policies and practices towards childrens moral
learning and colour the staffs view of the childrens potential to develop competence
through experience.

Questions to Willow staff about what they understood by the term morality revealed
an inclination towards principles of justice. The deputy head, who was responsible for
writing the nurserys Positive Behaviour Policy, defined morality as respect for other
people and for their beliefs. Whats central to morality , she said, is the idea that you
would want everyone to feel OK, and anything that hurts that feeling must be wrong .
Keyworker R echoed the deputys views, saying that morality is respect for other pe ople
and who they are . Another keyworker (Danielle, who features later in this article) was the
only research participant who linked morality to belief in God. She said that if children
were told about a higher authority and a higher morality, they would know that doing good
is not just about pleasing parents . Her views reveal an adherence to the idea that doing
good for children is an act of Piagetian egocentrism.

The existence of a Piagetian strand of thinking was confirmed by the head, who
specifically referred to very young children as egocentric. Keyworker A said that children
are by nature quite selfish and they have to learn to be unselfish . But this seemed to
contradict her view that it is the experience of care and feelings not an understanding of
rules, which leads young children towards moral behaviour: I think only by understanding
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other peoples feelings other childrens feelings can they understand what they feel
themselves and be able to project what they would have felt on to the other child. In these
two sentences lies a tension between the belief that children need direct adult instruction
in order to learn and the belief that they learn through experience whether or not it is
enabled by adults.

Learning through Instru ction and experience

Willows Positive Behaviour Policy states that practitioners should have an underlying
belief that all [children] can behave appropriately given the right support. Staff placed a
high value on the effectiveness of their talking to the children about their actions as the
right support required for resolving disputes. Keyworker A said that it might take a lot of
an adult talking and maybe pointing out how the other persons feeling for them to
understand what their action is doing to the other person , while Danielle said, When
theyve done something good, you can give them praise and tell them, Can you see how
happy youve made them? On the face of it, these practices reflect Dowlings (2005) view
about the importance of discussion for childrens learning. But both practitioners focus
exclusively on what they say as being central to the childrens learning about morality,
while Dowling says that childrens active learning is not dependent on what others tell
them; that they bring their own ideas to situations.

Interestingly, Dowlings approach to active learning was celebrated by staff in other

aspects of their provision. Practitioners stood back as children jumped until they were
soaked through in a massive puddle which had appeared overnight. They made no
attempt to instruct children how to experience the puddle (some splashed, some found
things to float, some avoided it altogether), nor did they tell the children what they were
learning in the water. Yet the same practitioners felt it important to tell children about kind
and unkind actions towards each other. They focused on their responsibility towards the
childrens learning rather than on the childrens contributions and this seemed to generate
a negative appreciation of the childrens moral actions. Adults were most likely to describe
children as innately selfish when they talked about their own approaches to managing
childrens apparently unjust or uncaring behaviour. For example, the heads comment
about young childrens egocentricity came during a conversation about how staff were
teaching the children about sharing by using stickers to show how many turns they had
taken on the popular bikes. The approach overlooks Millers (2003: 34) observation that
children find turn-taking much easier if they have some control over the process.
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 Another kind of telling the children about morality included the informal pronouncement
of rules about behaviour. This was most frequently observed when the children were
gathered into groups at the end of the morning to listen to a story, sing songs or have a
chat. It was the only daily adult-led session in which all the children participated.
Observation revealed that this was consistently the time when children were told what to
do, where contributions that did not fit practitioners plans were deflected and where
negative moral judgements were made about behaviour which might have been
acceptable or even encouraged in free-play sessions. This is drawn out below in a case
study featuring Afolabe.

The staffs impulse to instruct did not preclude the children from forging their own moral
learning and it is important to note that the environment which gave the children so many
opportunities for self-generated moral behaviour was actively afforded by the adult staff.
The deputy talked about giving children the tools to manage conflict by, for example,
showing them how to say, Its not alright to do that to me. Informally, practitioners had a
phrase use your words! which invited the children to tell others what they wanted or
why they were unhappy. While the practitioners discussion still focused on what they did
to empower the children, observations revealed that this phrase was a signal to children
who appealed for adult help that they were in charge of the resolution.

Of course, one might suggest that, simply by saying use your words, practitioners were
not so much trusting the children to make their own resolutions as giving them permission
to do so. Certainly, keyworker A said that, if a child was being excluded, she would
intervene if the child hasnt got enough language or communication enough to be able to
break into the group , suggesting that very young children or those with language
difficulties are not thought capable of conflict resolution and therefore not given
permission to act. But this should not negate the staffs willingness to encourage
childrens self-directed moral learning. On each of the occasions when I heard the phrase
use your words, the practitioner involved left the scene immediately and the children were
left to their own devices. Furthermore, the head said that she did not see the benefit of
insisting that children say sorry. Instead, as McTavish (2007) suggests, children may find
other ways to acknowledge that a hurt has happened, and not always with the help of a
practitioner. Both approaches showed respect for childrens ability to act competently.

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The Positive Behaviour Policy
The Foundation Stage focus on practitioner responsibility for childrens learning is reflected
in Willows Positive Behaviour Policy (PBP), which places emphasis on how adults should
approach children and their behaviour: Staff will use active listening techniques, remaining
open, approachable and accessible. The tone of voice should convey understanding and
acceptance. Children are given time, love, acceptance, respect and encouragement to
express themselves. The childrens input and the role of their experiences appear only in
relation to the staffs duty to give children the freedom to experiment and make mistakes.
Again, a permission to act, and one which anticipates the childrens errors. To be truly
enabling, it might simply have said children have freedom to experiment.

The PBP maintains practitioners control over their approach to children who
themselves remain passive, so that the childs feelings are acknowledged as valid and a
child may be encouraged to express their anger in an appropriate way such as tearing up
paper [my italics]. How different might the approach be if the policy stated that childrens
feelings are valid or that children can express their anger in many appropriate ways? The
implications for how the moral framework at Willow affects on the childrens own
development and competence is investigated through a case study focusing on Afolabe
a black Eritrean boy aged 3 years and 5 months who had been at Willow for just six
weeks. (All names featured in this example are fictitious.)

The Two Afolabes

Although he was new to the setting, Afolabe seemed quite at ease. He played impulsively
and happily with a relatively large selection of boys and his limited grasp of language
seemed no barrier to forming relationships. The relationship between Afolabe and his
keyworker, Danielle, was already quite warm at the beginning of the research and had
grown significantly four weeks later. Despite this, Afolabes behaviour noticeably breached
Danielles expectations and those of other adults during adult-led activities. A pattern soon
emerged in his behaviour and the way in which it was perceived by adults. When left to his
own devices to play as he wished and with whom he chose Afolabe frequently acted
according to a generosity of spirit that enabled long periods of play despite a strong
tendency to insist on ownership of certain toys. But while his generosity was still evident in
adult-led situations, it was often misinterpreted by adults or perceived as disruptive rather
than caring. This effect was seen across two observations.

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 One morning, I observed Afolabe playing at a large water container in the company of
three boys, two of whom were his frequent companions. Early in the observation, a little
girl came and stood next to Afolabe. She looked under 2 years and was probably the sister
of a child attending Willow. Her mother stood nearby, talking to a practitioner who was
loosely supervising the water play. Neither adult saw the girl scoop up some bubbles and
put them repeatedly into her mouth but Afolabe saw and he stopped to watch. First of all
he just grinned but, as she continued, he turned and said to the adults standing behind
him, Look, hes eating it. They didnt hear, and the girl continued to feed herself bubbles
while Afolabe grinned and, every so often, pulled her hand away from her mouth. The girls
mother eventually took her daughter away, apparently unaware that anything had
happened.

Soon after, one of Afolabes friends arrived at the water tray. Hello, Kyle!, Afolabe
welcomed him brightly. At almost the same moment, the supervising practitioner noticed
another boy crying nearby and said to him, You know what Afolabe is doing? He put a car
in the water! In response, Afolabe turned his attention from Kyle and towards the crying
boy, who was not one of his special friends. Hello! he said, just as brightly and with equal
welcome as he had done for Kyle.

The interaction which prompted Afolabes moral acts was not linked to his play
alongside the boys already at the water tray. Instead, it involved children coming into the
context and suggests the importance of a free-flow environment for encouraging the kind
of diverse interaction which makes moral behaviour possible in Afolabes case, the
willingness to take action on behalf of others. By noticing the girl as she put bubbles in her
mouth, and pointing it out to the adults, Afolabe demonstrated how young children pay
attention when something does not fit the norm and which is an important step in the
development of moral understanding (Kagan, 1984). Having failed to gain the adults
attention Afolabe went further and tried to prevent the girl from putting more bubbles in her
mouth. It was a competent moral act, with no input from adults.

Later on, the likelihood that Afolabe would welcome a child who is not his special friend
was predicted by the practitioner who, out of all the children collected around the water
tray, chose Afolabe as the figure who might encourage the crying child to come and play.
This compares significantly with what happened just a few moments later. Having fully
investigated the water as individuals, Afolabe and his friend Clayton began interacting
14
more fully, taking it in turns to splash each others face, both encouraged by the others
grinning. The same practitioner did not notice at first, but when she did it was at a point
when Afolabe had just splashed Clayton. She immediately told him to stop, saying that he
was making the area wet and was being unkind to Clayton a comment which identified
his play as morally questionable, although it was almost certainly driven by an unspoken
adult rule about not making too much mess indoors; there was no such direction to stop
splashing when the children were playing in the big puddle outside. The practitioner spoke
gently to Afolabe, with the acceptance required by the schools Positive Behaviour Policy
(PBP), but her statement demonstrates how the childrens moral behaviour was called into
question when practitioners felt the need to manage a situation. This was demonstrated
even more clearly in a group session run by Danielle and an observation which started
with another expression of generosity from Afolabe.

The children had just sat down in a circle on the carpet when boy Emmanuel arrived to
join in. He stood uncertainly at the edge of the group for a few minutes before Danielle
suggested that he sit next to Afolabe, and he quickly did so. Unnoticed by Danielle, who
was now talking to the whole group, Afolabe turned to Emmanuel, touched his arm and
fixed him with a momentary gaze of extraordinary gentleness which, to my eyes, said,
Youre OK with me. As with the little girl and the bubbles, this action had no obvious
benefit to Afolabe he and Emmanuel did not emerge as particular friends and had not
been generated by adults. Immediately afterwards, Danielle began to direct the progress
of storytime so that Afolabe was no longer able to choose how to act. A Hello song was
sung to each child in turn, starting with a child of Danielles choosing and moving in a
clockwise direction. Every time the song moved to a new child, Afolabe shouted excitedly
that they should sing to Clayton next, although Clayton was seated in the position which
meant he would be sung to last. Danielle let it pass a couple of times and then said, You
want to sin g about Clayton, dont you Afolabe, because Clayton is your friend. But its
Laras turn now. Almost immediately, Afolabe broke out of the circle, crawled over the
other children and began to squirm about on the sofa nearby. He continued to do so for
some minutes, despite repeated requests from Danielle that he should stop, and only
came back to the circle when another practitioner collected him and sat down with him.

While Afolabes enthusiasm to involve Clayton might have been welcomed as a positive
contribution during free play, it was characterised as unfair in the context of an imposed
order. Under the terms of the PBP, it was Danielles responsibility to ensure that all the
15
children had equal access to experiences in a context of justice, fairness and mutual
respect, and visible turn-taking was her way of managing this during storytime. Danielle
acted with understanding and acceptance towards Afolabe, and also according to good
early years practice, taking care to employ the technique of reflective listening to tell
Afolabe that she understood his point of view before telling him why things had to be
different (McTavish, 2007). But the order in which children were sung to was Danielles
decision, and it was arbitrary; she had taken responsibility for the childrens equality rather
than helping them to generate it themselves. Hers was a pragmatic approach to
managing groups of children that is common among adults working in the early years
and, indeed, in life I certainly recognise it in some of my own attempts to mediate
between my children. For Afolabe, it failed to take advantage of his tendency to do things
which benefited others, and I later wondered if this approach informed his attitude towards
adult problem-solving. In response to a question during our Thomas session about how
the adult engine (Henry) might solve a dispute between two child engines over a
favourite truck, Afolabe showed Henry taking the truck away from both. He implied this
was unkind and then showed the two children taking the truck back and playing with it
together: a self-directed resolution.

The examples of Afolabes positive moral behaviour suggest that he already had a
moral understanding and that his moral competence was prompted by connection with
others through the kind of impulsive access to his emotions described by Kagan (1984)
and by Gilligan and Wiggins (1987), not the kind of reasoning offered by Danielle. Danielle
described Afolabe as someone who tested boundaries and who was attention-seeking,
suggesting that she may not have identified him formally as a moral agent. Yet both she
and the practitioner supervising the water activity unconsciously recognised his reliability
as a caring moral actor by choosing him as the person who might draw an outsider into an
existing social context an informal recognition that was substantiated by his responses in
both situations.

None of this is intended to suggest that Afolabe was a misjudged angel. On one
occasion I watched as he repeatedly attempted to take a truck by force from another child,
screaming as he did so and pushing the other child hard enough to make him cry. But a
shift in perception might have enabled practitioners to see this behaviour not as attention-
seeking or selfish but as a vital element in his moral learning, illustrative of Dunns (1987:
107) view that childrens morality cannot be appreciated through a focus on empathetic
16
behaviour alone. Such a shift might enable negative behaviour to be seen as a positive
contribution to learning; one that could be embraced through the Quality in diversity
framework (ECEF, 2003). It might also have allowed the practitioners recognition of
Afolabes competent generosity to inform all their approaches to his behaviour, and
suggested more participative practices in adult-led sessions.

Conclusion
Gilligan and Wiggins (1987) and Kagan (1984) envisage the justice and caring frameworks
of morality as complementary, not as exclusive. The differing adult perceptions of
Afolabes behaviour suggest this interplay, as do the seemingly inconsistent actions of my
son Daniels playgroup friend. Afolabes experiences also point to the problems created for
young children if their actions are interpreted entirely according to the justice framework.
Only the caring framework makes it possible to see Afolabes impulsive behaviour as
evidence of a developing moral competence.

Although it is unlikely that Danielle had frameworks of morality in mind, she perceived
Afolabes wish to sing out of turn as a tension between justice and care, saying that he
could not prioritise the interests of his special friend (care ) above those of other children
(injustice ). However, her perception of justice was not objective; she had imposed an
arbitrary order and deemed it as representing justice. If the children were involved in
organising the group sessions deciding how to say hello to each other, choosing what
stories would be told Afolabes request may have been easily incorporated. Indeed, he
may not have made it at all if he had been involved in decisions which illustrate how group
cooperation works. This would have given Afolabe a chance to be perceived as being both
caring and just. It highlights the need always to keep in mind Millers (2003)
recommendations for young childrens participation and suggests that young children can
only benefit if the inclusive approach of Quality in diversity (ECEF, 2003) is used to offset
the Foundation Stage (QCA/DfEE, 2000) focus on practitioner responsibility. Observation
is key to effective practice within both frameworks.

Danielles relationship with Afolabe illustrates the effect of adults interpretation of

childrens behaviour and their view about childrens competency as moral agents.
Conversations with Danielle revealed a warmth in her regard for Afolabe which suggested
her willingness to engage in a caring relationship with him. But, in telling me about
Afolabes understanding of right and wrong, Danielle focused on the attention-seeking
17
(unjust ) elements of his behaviour which created management difficulties rather than on
the generosity which caused her to suggest that Emmanuel sit next to him, or even her
own sense of fondness for him (care ). Her professional thoughts were on her duty to
manage what appeared to be Afolabes lack of moral competence rather than on engaging
his competence at forging relationships. This leads me to ponder on the tension between
the adults eagerness to approach the children with affection and their tendency to speak
of the children as selfish when considering specific questions of behaviour management.
The caring approach seems to be overlooked in relation to professional thinking and
behaviour management. If, in considering Afolabes understanding of right and wrong,
Danielle had talked about his generosity instead of his attention-seeking had focused
on her affection for him rather than her responsibility to manage her planning for adult-
led group activities may have been different. A different approach to observing children
might be helpful here. The design of the Foundation Stage encourages practitioners to tie
observations directly to the stepping stones in childrens development identified in the
framework, and perhaps makes it harder for practitioners to apply what they know of
individual children to the ideas and behaviour they observe.

If Afolabes impulsive generosity and his ability to engender affection can be perceived
as evidence of a caring morality and I believe that they should then his repeated
competence in these regards suggests that a Kantian link between rational thinking and
moral action is not a prerequisite for moral agency and that early years practitioners can
place greater confidence in their feelings towards children when planning for their
experiences. In this way, they will enable young children to recognise their own moral
agency, and to forge a greater trust in childrens morality among adults.

A note about the early years curriculum

This article refers to the Curriculum guidance for the Foundation Sta ge (QCA/DfEE, 2000) in
England which has been superseded by the Early Years Foundation Stage (EYFS) (DfES, 2007). I
have used the original document because it was guiding practice at the time of the study. The
EYFS came into effect in September 2008. Commentary is dated with regard to contemporary
discussion about the EYFS, although a lot of the approach and most of the curriculum content are
the same in both documents.

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