FMEA Objective, scope and goal(s):

Key Date:
System: Potential
Subsystem: Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
Component: Design
Design Lead:
Core Team:
rev 1.0 42303

Potential P
Potential S Current D R
Potential Failure Cause(s)/ R
Item / Function Effect(s) E Design/Process E P
Mode(s) Mechanism(s) of O
of Failure V Controls T N
Failure B

0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
TLC, 2003
 FMEA Type: Design
ial FMEA Number:
ts Analysis (FMEA) Prepared By:
FMEA Date:
Revision Date:
Page: of

Action Results

New Prob

New RPN
New Sev

New Det
Responsibility &
Recommended
Target Actions Taken
Action(s)
Completion Date

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
 Design FMEA Ex.

Key Date:
System:
Subsystem:
Component:
Design Lead:
Core Team:

Potential Failure
Item / Function
Mode(s)

Seals
Coolant
containment.
Hose connection.
Coolant fill. M

Sensor mount. Compression set

Seal
Sensor mount. Loosen during
Seal sensor
assembly/service

Sensor mount. Damaged internal

Seal thread

Sensor mount. Damaged external

Seal thread

Coolant containment. Crack/break. Burst.

Hose connection. Side wall flex. Bad
Coolant fill. M seal. Poor hose rete

Page 5
 Design FMEA Ex.

System:
Subsystem:
Component:
Design Lead:
Core Team:

Potential Failure
Item / Function
Mode(s)

Coolant containment. Crack/break. Burst.

Hose connection. Side wall flex. Bad
Coolant fill. M seal. Poor hose rete

Coolant containment. Crack/break. Burst.

Hose connection. Side wall flex. Bad
Coolant fill. M seal. Poor hose rete

Hold fluid, flow path, Stress crack

Heat transfer
structure

Hold fluid, flow path, Stress crack

Heat transfer
structure

Hold fluid, flow path, Stress crack

Heat transfer
structure
Hold fluid, flow path, Corrosion
Heat transfer
structure

Hold fluid, flow path, Corrosion

Heat transfer
structure

Hold fluid, flow path, Puncture

Heat transfer
structure

Page 6
 Design FMEA Ex.

System:
Subsystem:
Component:
Design Lead:
Core Team:

Potential Failure
Item / Function
Mode(s)

Hold fluid, flow path, Seam fail

Heat transfer
structure
Hold fluid, flow path, Burst fail
Heat transfer
structure
Hold fluid, flow path, Plugged
Heat transfer
structure

Hold fluid, flow path, Ballooning

Heat transfer
structure

TLC, 2003

Page 7
 Design FMEA Ex.

FMEA Objective, scope and goal(s):

FMEA Type: Design

Potential FMEA Number:
Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) Prepared By:
Design FMEA Date:
Revision Date:
Page: of

Action Results

New Prob
Potential P

New Sev

New Det
Potential S Current D R Responsibility &
Cause(s)/ r Recommended
Effect(s) e Design/Process E P Target Actions Taken
Mechanism(s) of o Action(s)
of Failure v Controls T N Completion Date
Failure b

0
0

Leak 8 Gasket material 7 Pressure cycle 1 56 Use imported

w/cold shock. material
Leak. Fall inside 8 Fitting not held in 2 Added rib. 1 16 Implement holding J.P. Aguire
tank place rib in design. New 11/1/95
fitting design.
Prototype
validation.

Cannot install 5 Damaged during 2 1 10

sensor installation or
transportation
Cannot install wire 4 Damaged during 3 1 12 Damaged fitting
nut shipment to not used by
piracicaba Piracicaba
Leak 8 Over pressure 8 Burst, validation 1 64 Test included in J.P. Aguire 11/1/95
pressure cycle. prototype and E. Eglin 8/1/96
production validation
testing.

Page 8
 Design FMEA Ex.

Potential FMEA Number:

Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) Prepared By:
Design FMEA Date:
Revision Date:
Page: of

Action Results

New Prob
Potential P

New Sev

New Det
Potential S Current D R Responsibility &
Cause(s)/ r Recommended
Effect(s) e Design/Process E P Target Actions Taken
Mechanism(s) of o Action(s)
of Failure v Controls T N Completion Date
Failure b

Failed mount 5 Vibration 9 Vibration w/road 3 135 Obtain GMB J.P. Aguire
tapes vibration road tape.

Hose leak 6 Overpressure. Poor 5 Burst, validation 2 60 Obtain GMB clamps J.P. Aguire 12/1/95
clamp pressure cycle and clamping
w/GMB clamps. specification.

Air conditioning does 0 Operator instruction

not work. Sudden
refrigerant loss.

Air conditioning does 0

not work. Sudden
refrigerant loss.

Leak. Loss of heat 8 Wicking. Material 7 Thermal cycle 1 56 Included in Product E. Eglin 8/1/96
transfer. strength Specification

Air conditioning does this is a test while 0

not work. Sudden dan is here
refrigerant loss.

Leak. Loss of heat 8 Coolant quality.
transfer. Contamination.
Environment - int/ext.
7 SWAT, service 5 280 Brazilian coolant to J.P. Aguirre 11/1/95 Coolant ordered
simulation. Coolant be evaluated. Zince
evaluation. lined tubes may need
to be released.
Simulated service
test w/GMB coolant
to be performed.

Leak. Loss of heat 8 External damage. 10 Leak test. Simulated 1 80 100% cores tested in E. Eglin 8/1/96
transfer. Coolant velocity. No service. production.
reinf sawcut. Simulated service
included in Product
Specificatin.

Page 9
 Design FMEA Ex.

Potential FMEA Number:

Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) Prepared By:
Design FMEA Date:
Revision Date:
Page: of

Action Results

New Prob
Potential P

New Sev

New Det
Potential S Current D R Responsibility &
Cause(s)/ r Recommended
Effect(s) e Design/Process E P Target Actions Taken
Mechanism(s) of o Action(s)
of Failure v Controls T N Completion Date
Failure b

Leak. Loss of heat 5 Environment - int/ext. 1 SWAT, service 1 5 Included in Product E. Eglin 8/1/96
transfer. simulation. Specification.

Leak. Loss of heat 8 Over pressure 2 Burst/leak pressure 5 80 GMB to study engine GMB 12/1/95 Study originated
transfer. contamination. cleanliness.

Loss of heat transfer. 8 Contamination. 7 1 56 GMB coolant to be J.P. Aguirre 11/1/95 Coolant ordered
Leakage due to Coolant quality. evaluated. GMB to
increase flow velocity study engine
cleanliness.
Leak. Loss of heat 5 Over pressure 9 8 360 GMB to study engine GMB 12/1/95
transfer. contamination. cleanliness.
Clustomer profile to
be determined.
0
0
0

Page 10
 Design FMEA Ex.

n Results
New RPN

0
0

Page 11
 Design FMEA Ex.

n Results
New RPN

Page 12
 Design FMEA Ex.

n Results
New RPN

0
0
0

Page 13
 Severity Criteria

System FMEA Severity Rating

Effect SEVERITY of Effect Ranking

Hazardous without Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode 10
warning affects safe system operation without warning
Hazardous with Very high severity ranking when a potential failure mode 9
warning affects safe system operation with warning
Very High System inoperable with destructive failure without 8
compromising safety
High System inoperable with equipment damage 7

Moderate System inoperable with minor damage 6

Low System inoperable without damage 5

Very Low System operable with significant degradation of performance 4

Minor System operable with some degradation of performance 3

Very Minor System operable with minimal interference 2

None No effect 1

Page 14
Severity Criteria

Page 15
 Severity Criteria

General SEVERITY RANKING TABLE

Rank Category External and Internal Effect

10 Liability Failure will affect safety or compliance to law
9 Catastrophic customer impact
Moderate to major reliability failures
Reliability / End user recalls
Reputation Premature end-of-life (wear out)
at risk Increased early life failures
Intermittent functionality
Major customer impact
8 Minor reliability failures
7 Customer line impact / lines down
Impacts the yield of customer
Customer Wrong package / part / marking
quality Products performing marginally
inconveniences Involved customer's special handling
Damaged the customer's equipment
6 Product assembly error
5 Equipment cross contamination
Internal yield Damaged to down stream equipment
or special Major yield hit
4 handling Significant line yield loss
required Minor yield hit
3 Low line yield loss
2 Special internal handling, effort or annoyance
1 Unnoticed Unnoticed either internally or externally

Page 16
Severity Criteria

Page 17
Severity Criteria

Page 18
Severity Criteria

Page 19
 Prob. of Failure Criteria

PROBABILITY of Failure Failure Prob Ranking

Very High: Failure is almost inevitable >1 in 2 10
1 in 3 9
High: Repeated failures 1 in 8 8
1 in 20 7
Moderate: Occasional failures 1 in 80 6
1 in 400 5
1 in 2,000 4
Low: Relatively few failures 1 in 15,000 3
1 in 150,000 2
Remote: Failure is unlikely <3.4 in 1,000,000 1

Page 20
 Detectability Criteria

Detection Likelihood of DETECTION by Design Control Ranking

Cannot Detect Design control cannot detect potential cause/mechanism and 10
subsequent failure mode
Very Remote Very remote chance the design control will detect potential 9
cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode
Remote Remote chance the design control will detect potential 8
cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode
Very Low Very low chance the design control will detect potential 7
cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode
Low Low chance the design control will detect potential 6
cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode
Moderate Moderate chance the design control will detect potential 5
cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode
Moderately High Moderately High chance the design control will detect 4
potential cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode
High High chance the design control will detect potential 3
cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode
Very High Very high chance the design control will detect potential 2
cause/mechanism and subsequent failure mode
Almost Certain Design control will detect potential cause/mechanism and 1
subsequent failure mode

Page 21
RPN Interpretation
RPN Number
High Due to prob. of failure
High Due to severity
High Due to detection
Moderate Due to detection
Moderate Due to prob. of failure
Moderate Due to severity
Low All
Change design or process
Change design or process
Change process control/test method
Consider improving present control/test method
Consider changing design or process
Consider changing design or process
Maintain present status