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Legal Ethics EH307

Cases 21-40 Digest Garcy Kate D. Go LLB - 1 Quilban vs. Robinol 171 SCRA 768

Facts: On 15 April 1980 the Samahan officers filed this Administrative complaint
before this Court requesting the invention of Atty. Robinol for refusal to return the
P75000 and praying that the court exercise its power to discipline over members of
the bar unworthy to practice law. In his defense, Atty. Robinol maintains that he was
hired by complainants to appeal their case to the CA after they had lost in the lower
court. The agreement as to the attorneys fees was on a contingent basis if he
obtains a reversal of the decision of the lower Courts decision, they will give him a
portion of the property subject matter of the litigation. There was confusion as to
payment and they want the lawyers to be disciplined for the said actions of the
lawyers engaged in their complaint. It is equally true that the Court cannot pass
judgment on complainants pleas that the amount deposited by respondent be
returned to them as this prayer should be ventilated in an ordinary action that he
does not have the slightest intention to appropriate the money in his possession for
himself but he is holding it until the fees are satisfied there being no guarantee for
its satisfaction because of the complainants refusal to pay him.

Issue: WON Atty. Robinol is unworthy to practice law.

Held: Atty. Robinol has, in fact been guilty of ethical infractions and grave
misconduct that make him unworthy to continue in the practice of his profession.
After the CA had rendered a decision favorable to his clients and he had received
the latte rs funds, suddenly he had change of mind and decided to convert a
portion of the land equivalent to that of each plaintiffs to P50000 which he alleges
to be the monetary value of that area. Certainly, Atty. Robinol had no right to
unilaterally appropriate his clients money not only because he is bound by a
written agreement but also because under the circumstances it was highly unjust
for him to do so. His clients were mere squatters who could barely eke out an
existence. They had painstakingly raised their respective quotas per family with
which after having seen the color of money, heartlessly took advantage of them.
The principle of quantum merit applies if a lawyer is employed without a price
agreed upon for his services in which case he would be entitled to receive what he
merits for his services, as much as he has earned. In this case however, there was
an express contract and a stipulated mode of compensation. The implied assumpsit
on quantum merit therefore is inapplicable
Legal Ethics EH307

Cases 21-40 Digest Garcy Kate D. Go LLB - 1 Adelino H. Ledesma v Hon. Rafael C.
Climaco

Facts: Petitioner Ledesma was assigned as counsel de parte for an accused in a case
pending in the sala of the respondent judge. On October 13, 1964, Ledesma was
appointed Election Registrar for the Municipality of Cadiz, Negros Occidental. He
commenced discharged his duties, and filed a motion to withdraw from his position
as counsel de parte. The respondent Judge denied him and also appointed him as
counsel de oficio for the defendents. On November 6, Ledesma filed a motion to be
allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio, because the COMELEC requires full time
service which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense. Judge
denied the motion. So Ledesma instituted this certiorari proceeding.

Issue: WON the order of the respondent judge in denying the motion of the
petitioner is a grave abuse of discretion?

Holding: No, Ledesmas withdrawal would be an act showing his lack of fidelity to
the duty required of the legal profession. He ought to have known that membership
in the bar is burdened with conditions. The legal profession is dedicated to the ideal
of service, and is not a mere trade. A lawyer maybe required to act as counsel de
oficio to aid in the performance of the administration of justice. The fact that such
services are rendered without pay should not diminish the lawyers zeal.

Ratio: The only attorneys who cannot practice law by reason of their office are
judges, or other officials or employees of the superior courts or the Office of the
Solicitor General (Section 32 Rule 127 of the Rules of Court, Section 35 of the Rule
138 of the Revised Rules of Court). The lawyer involved not being among them,
remained as counsel of record since he did not file a motion to withdraw as
defendant-appellant counsels counsel after his appointment as Register of Deeds.
Nor was substitution of attorney asked either by him or by the new counsel for the
defendant-appellant (People vs Williams CA GR. Nos. 00375-76, February 28, 1963).
To avoid any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a
lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio (People v. Daban). Moreover, the
right of an accused in a criminal case to be represented by counsel is a
constitutional right of the highest importance, and there can be no fair hearing with
due process of law unless he is fully informed of his rights in this regard and given
opportunity to enjoy them (People vs Holgado, L-2809, March 22, 1950). The trial
court in criminal case has authority to provide the accused with a counsel de oficio
for such action as it may deem fit to safeguard the rights of the accused (Provincial
Fiscal of Rizal vs. Judge Muoz Palma, L-15325, August 31, 1930). University of San
Carlos School of Law and Governance

Leslie Ui v. Atty. Iris Bonifacio

Facts: 1. A disbarment complaint was filed by complainant (Leslie Ui) before the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP on the ground of immorality, more
particularly for carrying on an illicit relationship with the complainants husband. 2.
Complainants husband, Carlos Ui, was having a relationship with respondent Atty.
Iris Bonifacio, a graduate of the UP and admitted into the Bar in 1982. The two,
Carlos and Iris, met sometime in 1983 and Iris had known him all along to be a
bachelor, with the knowledge however that Carlos had children by a Chinese woman
in Amoy, China from whom he had long been estranged. During one of their trips,
Carlos formalized his intention to marry Iris and they got married in Hawaii in 1985.
Their union resulted to two offspring (1986 and 1988). In 1986, respondent left the
country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and she would only return occasionally to
the Philippines to update her law practice and renew legal ties. 3. Meanwhile,
complainant Leslie Ui is married to Carlos L. Ui last January 24, 1971 and have four
children (Leilani, Lianni, Lindsay and Carl Cavin). 4. When complainant knew of the
relationship between her husband and Atty. Bonifacio, she visited respondent at her
office and introduced herself as the legal wife of Carlos in June 1988. During the
said visit of complainant, respondent admitted that she had begotten a child from
Carlos and that everything between them was over. However, she discovered that
the relationship between Carlos and Iris continued despite what Bonifacio said
during her (Leslie) first visit. Again, in March 1989, she met again with respondent
and pleaded that she discontinues her relationship with her husband. 5. When
respondent discovered Carlos true civil status on June 1988, she cut off all her ties
with him. By way of counterclaim by respondent against the disbarment case filed
by complainant, she sought moral damages in the amount of Php 10 million. 6.
During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar, complainant
charged her husband and respondent with the crime of concubinage. However, said
charge was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause. 7. In
the proceedings before the IBP, respondent attached a certificate of marriage duly
certified by the State Registrar as true copy of the

record on file in the Hawaii State Department of Health which revealed that the date
of marriage between Carlos and Iris was October 22, 1987. 8. The Commission on
Bar Discipline rendered a decision favourable to respondent on the ground that the
Commission failed to find any act on the respondents part that can be considered
as unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. The Board of
Governors of the IBP had likewise adopted and approved the report and
recommendation of the Commission. Ruling: 1. Possession of good moral character
must be continuous as a requirement to the enjoyment of the privilege of law
practice; otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such privilege.
2. In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent that when she met Carlos she
knew and believed him to be single. She fell in love with him and they got married
and had two children. Upon her knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos, she left
him. The facts of the case lead the Court to believe that perhaps respondent would
not have found herself in such compromising situations had she exercised prudence
and been more vigilant in finding out more about Carlos personal background prior
to her intimate involvement with him. 3. A member of the Bar and officer of the
court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships but must also
behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is
flouting those moral standards. Respondents act of immediately distancing herself
from Carlos upon discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moral
indifference and proves that she had no intention of flaunting the law and the high
moral standard of the legal profession. 4. It is the bounden duty of lawyers to
adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality. The legal profession
exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the
integrity of the Bar, free from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their
exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less than the highest degree of
morality. 5. not disbarred, but reprimanded for attaching a photocopy of her
marriage certificate with an altered date

Regala vs. Sandiganbayan

PCGG want to build up their case against Eduardo Coujuanco for the anomalies in
the COCO LEVY FUNDS. PCGG wants petitioners divulge that Cojuangco indeed was
a client of their firm, as well as other information regarding Cojuangco.

Issue: Can the PCGG compel petitioners to divulge its clients name?

Held: NO.

As a matter of public policy, a clients identity should not be shrouded in mystery.


The general is that a lawyer may not invoke the privilege and refuse to divulge the
name or identity of his client.

1) the court has a right to know that the client whose privileged information is
sought to be protected is flesh and blood.

2) the privilege begins to exist only after the attorney-client relationship has been
established. The attorney-client privilege does not attach until there is a client.
3) the privilege generally pertains to the subject matter of the relationship.

Finally, due process considerations require that the opposing party should, as a
general rule, know his adversary. A party suing or sued is entitled to know who his
opponent is. He cannot be obliged to grope in the dark against unknown forces.

Except:

1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the
clients name would implicate that client in the very activity for which he sought the
lawyers advice.

2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability, his identity is privileged.

3) Where the governments lawyers have no case against an attorneys client


unless, by revealing the clients name, the said name would furnish the only link
that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a
crime, the clients name is privileged.

That client identity is privileged in those instances where a strong probability exists
that the disclosure of the client's identity would implicate the client in the very
criminal activity for which the lawyers legal advice was obtained.
Ilusorio vs. Bildner

GR No. 139789, May 12, 2000

FACTS:

Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of age, possessed extensive property


valued at millions of pesos. For many year, he was the Chairman of the Board and
President of Baguio Country Club. He was married with Erlinda Ilusorio, herein
petitioner, for 30 years and begotten 6 children namely Ramon, Lin Illusorio-Bildner
(defendant), Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta and Shereen. They separated from bed and
board in 1972. Potenciano lived at Makati every time he was in Manila and at
Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other
hand, the petitioner lived in Antipolo City.
In 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from US, he stayed with her wife for about 5
months in Antipolo city. The children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this time
their mother overdose Potenciano which caused the latters health to deteriorate.
In February 1998, Erlinda filed with RTC petition for guardianship over the person
and property of Potenciano due to the latters advanced age, frail health, poor
eyesight and impaired judgment. In May 1998, after attending a corporate meeting
in Baguio, Potenciano did not return to Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland
Condominium in Makati. In March 1999, petitioner filed with CA petition for habeas
corpus to have the custody of his husband alleging that the respondents refused her
demands to see and visit her husband and prohibited Potenciano from returning to
Antipolo.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas corpus should be issued.

HELD:

A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention, or


by which the rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one entitled thereto.
To justify the grant for such petition, the restraint of liberty must an illegal and
involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint of liberty must be
actual and effective not merely nominal or moral.

Evidence showed that there was no actual and effective detention or deprivation of
Potencianos liberty that would justify issuance of the writ. The fact that the latter
was 86 years of age and under medication does not necessarily render him
mentally incapacitated. He still has the capacity to discern his actions. With his full
mental capacity having the right of choice, he may not be the subject of visitation
rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to privacy.

The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent to visit a minor child but the
right of a wife to visit a husband. In any event, that the husband refuses to see his
wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do so without threat or any penalty
attached to the exercise of his right. Coverture, is a matter beyond judicial
authority and cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried
out by the sheriffs or by any other process.

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