Case Digest:

RE: REQUEST OF THE PLAINTIFFS, HEIRS OF THE PASSENGERS OF THE DOA PAZ TO
SET ASIDE THE ORDER DATED JANUARY 4, 1988 OF JUDGE B.D. CHINGCUANGCO.

FACTS:

In January 1988, a complaint for damages amounting to more than one and a half billion
pesos was filed in the name and behalf of the relatives or heirs of the victims of "the worst sea
disaster in history:" the sinking of the vessel Doa Paz caused by its collision with another vessel.
The complaint, instituted as a "class suit" was prosecuted by 27 plaintiffs in their behalf and in
presentation of approx.. 4,000 persons who are all close relatives and legal heirs of the passengers
of the Doa Paz".

The plaintiffs also filed a "MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE CASE AS PAUPER LITIGANT."
They alleged that "a big majority of them are poor and have no sufficient means to finance the filing
of this case especially because, considering the huge amount of damages involved, the amount of
filing fee alone will run to several thousands of pesos.

Their counsel submitted a certification of the City Assessor of Quezon City of even date to
the effect that there is no property whether land or improvements registered for taxation purposes in
the names of' seven (7) of the named plaintiffs.

The motion was granted by Judge Chingcuangco in his capacity as Executive Judge only in
so far as said seven (7) plaintiffs were concerned.

It is this order that the plaintiffs request this Court to set aside. They ask that they all instead
be allowed to prosecute the case as pauper litigants and they be exempt from paying filing fees.

The defendants, Sulpicio Lines, Inc., et al., in their own comment, point out that there were
only 1,493 passengers on board the Doa Paz at the time of the tragedy, not 4,000; that it is doubtful
whether 27 plaintiffs are sufficiently numerous and representative to fully protect the interests of all
the suit preempts the other claimants' cause of action as to the amount of recovery and as to the
venue of the suit; there are in truth only seven plaintiffs qualified to sue as pauper litigants; and the
claimants not authorized to sue as paupers may continue with the action.

Issue: Whether the rule governing class suits under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court or that
concerning permissive joinder of parties in Section 6 of the same Rule 3 applies in the proceedings
at bar?

Held:

No. In a class suit, what is contemplated is that (a) the subject matter in controversy is of
common or general interest to many persons, and (b) those persons are so numerous as to make it
impracticable to bring them all before the court. Illustrative of the rule is a so-called derivative suit
brought in behalf of numerous stockholders of a corporation to perpetually enjoin or nullify what is
claimed to be a breach of trust or an ultra vires act of the company's board of directors. 2 In such a
suit, there is one, single right of action pertaining to numerous stockholders, not multiple rights
belonging separately to several, distinct persons.

On the other hand, if there are many persons who have distinct, separate rights against the same
party or group of parties, but those rights arise from the same transaction or series of transactions
and there are common questions of fact or law resulting therefrom, the former may join as plaintiffs
in one action against the same defendant. This is authorized by the above mentioned joinder-of-
parties rule in Section 6 of Rule 3.

The other factor that serves to distinguish the rule on class suits from that of permissive joinder of
parties is, of course, the numerousness of parties involved in the former. The rule is that for a class
suit to be allowed, it is needful inter alia that the parties be so numerous that it would be
impracticable to bring them all before the court.

The case at bar not being a proper one for a class suit, it follows that the action may not be
maintained by a representative few in behalf of all the others. Be all this as it may, as regards the
computation of the amount involved in the action for purposes of determining the original jurisdiction
over it, and the correlative matter of the amount of filing fees to be paid, it is immaterial whether the
rule applied be that on class suits or permissive joinder of parties. For in either case, it is the totality
of the amounts claimed by or against the parties that determines jurisdiction, exclusive only of
interest and costs. 14

WHEREFORE, the order complained of being in accordance with law, the solicitation to set aside the
same, and to be exempted from observance of the rule on paupers litigant, is DENIED. The authority
to litigate in the form of a class action is likewise DENIED.