E.

INTERNATIONAL BILL OF RIGHTS

1. Pretty v. United Kingdom

Facts:

Diane Pretty was suffering from motor neurone disease and was paralysed
from the neck down, had little decipherable speech and was fed by a tube.
[1]
It is not a crime to commit suicide under English law, but the applicant was
prevented by her disease from taking such a step without assistance. It is
however a crime to assist another to commit suicide (section 2(1) of
the Suicide Act 1961).[2]

Pretty wanted her husband to provide her with assistance in suicide. Because
giving this assistance would expose the husband to liability, the Director of
Public Prosecutions was asked to agree not to prosecute her husband. This
request was refused, as was Pretty's appeal before the Law Lords.[3]

Ruling:

In a unanimous judgment, the Court, composed of seven judges, has found

Pretty's application under articles 2, 3, 8, 9 and 14 of the European
Convention on Human Rights admissible, but found no violation of the
Convention.

Significant conclusions include that no right to die, whether at the hands of a

third person or with the assistance of a public authority, can be derived from
Article 2 of the Convention.[4] As concerns Pretty's right to respect for private
life under Article 8, the Court considered that the interference in this case
might be justified as necessary in a democratic society for the protection of
the rights of others.

2. People v. Cayat

Facts:
Accused Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, and a
member of the non-Christian tribes, was found guilty of violating sections 2
and 3 of Act No. 1639 for having acquired and possessed one bottle of A-1-1
gin, an intoxicating liquor, which is not a native wine. The law made it
unlawful for any native of the Philippines who is a member of a non-Christian
tribe within the meaning of Act 1397 to buy, receive, have in his possession,
or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine or intoxicating liquors of any kind,
other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such
tribes have been accustomed to prior to the passage of the law. Cayat
challenges the constitutionality of Act 1639 on the grounds that it is
discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws, violates due
process clause, and is an improper exercise of police power.
Ruling:
It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the
equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on
reasonable classification. (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must
be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same
class.

Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real or
substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical distinctions. It is not based
upon accident of birth or parentage, as counsel for the appellant asserts,
but upon the degree of civilization and culture. The term non-Christian
tribes refers, not to religious belief but in a way, to the geographical area
and more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of
civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled
communities. (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindora, supra.) This distinction
is unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar
conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes.

The prohibition enshrined in Act 1397 is designed to insure peace and order
in and among non-Christian tribes. It applies equally to all members of the
class evident from perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation
against a certain number of non-Christians by reason of their degree of
culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application.

3. Beltran v. Secretary of Health

Facts: In January of 1994, the New Tropical Medicine Foundation, with the
assistance of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)
released its final report of a study on the Philippine blood banking system
entitled Project to Evaluate the Safety of the Philippine Blood Banking
System. It was revealed that of the blood units collected in 1992, 64.4 %
were supplied by commercial blood banks, 14.5% by the PNRC, 13.7% by
government hospital-based blood banks, and 7.4% by private hospital-based
blood banks ; showing that the Philippines heavily relied on commercial
sources of blood. It was further found, among other things, that blood sold
by persons to blood commercial banks are three times more likely to have
any of the four (4) tested infections or blood transfusion transmissible
diseases, namely, malaria, syphilis, Hepatitis B and Acquired Immune
Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) than those donated to PNRC.
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was then
enacted into law on April 2, 1994. The Act seeks to provide an adequate
supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and by regulating
blood banks in the country. One of the provisions of the said act was the
phasing out of commercial blood banks within 2 years from its effectivity.
Petitioners, comprising the majority of the Board of Directors of the Philippine
Association of Blood Banks assail the constitutionality of RA 7719 on the
ground among others that it is an improper and unwarranted delegation of
legislative power. According to petitioners, the Act was incomplete when it
was passed by the Legislature, and the latter failed to fix a standard to which
the Secretary of Health must conform in the performance of his functions.
Petitioners also contend that the two-year extension period that may be
granted by the Secretary of Health for the phasing out of commercial blood
banks pursuant to Section 7 of the Act constrained the Secretary to legislate,
thus constituting undue delegation of legislative power.
Issue: WHETHER OR NOT SECTION 7 OF R.A. 7719 CONSTITUTES UNDUE
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
Held: In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the statute was
complete in all its terms and provisions when it left the hands of the
Legislature so that nothing was left to the judgment of the administrative
body or any other appointee or delegate of the Legislature. Except as to
matters of detail that may be left to be filled in by rules and regulations to be
adopted or promulgated by executive officers and administrative boards, an
act of the Legislature, as a general rule, is incomplete and hence invalid if it
does not lay down any rule or definite standard by which the administrative
board may be guided in the exercise of the discretionary powers delegated to
it.
Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 is complete
in itself. It is clear from the provisions of the Act that the Legislature
intended primarily to safeguard the health of the people and has mandated
several measures to attain this objective. One of these is the phase out of
commercial blood banks in the country. The law has sufficiently provided a
definite standard for the guidance of the Secretary of Health in carrying out
its provisions, that is, the promotion of public health by providing a safe and
adequate supply of blood through voluntary blood donation. By its provisions,
it has conferred the power and authority to the Secretary of Health as to its
execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law.

The Secretary of Health has been given, under Republic Act No. 7719, broad
powers to execute the provisions of said Act. Specifically, Section 23 of
Administrative Order No. 9 provides that the phase-out period for commercial
blood banks shall be extended for another two years until May 28, 1998
based on the result of a careful study and review of the blood supply and
demand and public safety. This power to ascertain the existence of facts and
conditions upon which the Secretary may effect a period of extension for said
phase-out can be delegated by Congress. The true distinction between the
power to make laws and discretion as to its execution is illustrated by the
fact that the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves
a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as
to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first
cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made.

4. Marcos vs. Manglapus

FACTS: This case involves a petition of mandamus and prohibition asking the
court to order the respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To issue
travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and the immediate members of his
family and to enjoin the implementation of the President's decision to bar
their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that the right of the
Marcoses to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights,
specifically Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino is without
power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court
may do so within the limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their
right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so.
They further assert that under international law, their right to return to the
Philippines is guaranteed particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which has
been ratified by the Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers granted by the
constitution, the President (Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines.
HELD: "It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the
right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the
Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote.
Essentially, the right involved in this case at bar is the right to return to one's
country, a distinct right under international law, independent from although
related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the
right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the
right to leave the country, and the right to enter one's country as separate
and distinct rights. What the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of
movement and residence within the borders of each state". On the other
hand, the Covenant guarantees the right to liberty of movement and freedom
to choose his residence and the right to be free to leave any country,
including his own. Such rights may only be restricted by laws protecting the
national security, public order, public health or morals or the separate rights
of others. However, right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily
deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations to
the right to return to ones country in the same context as those pertaining to
the liberty of abode and the right to travel.
The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it
is a well considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a
generally accepted principle of International Law and under our Constitution
as part of the law of the land.
The court held that President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of
discretion in determining that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his
family poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare. President
Aquino has determined that the destabilization caused by the return of the
Marcoses would wipe away the gains achieved during the past few years after
the Marcos regime.

The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat and therefore prohibiting
their return to the Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.

5. Sin vs. Sin

FACTS: Florence, the petitioner, was married with Philipp, a Portuguese
citizen in January 1987. Florence filed in September 1994, a complaint for
the declaration of nullity of their marriage. Trial ensued and the parties
presented their respective documentary and testimonial evidence. In June
1995, trial court dismissed Florences petition and throughout its trial, the
State did not participate in the proceedings. While Fiscal Jabson filed with
the trial court a manifestation dated November 1994 stating that he found no
collusion between the parties, he did not actively participated therein. Other
than having appearance at certain hearings, nothing more was heard of him.
ISSUE: Whether the declaration of nullity may be declared even with the
absence of the participation of the State in the proceedings.
HELD: Article 48 of the Family Code states that in all cases of annulment or
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the state
to take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. The trial court should have ordered
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor-General to appear as
counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification briefly stating his reasons for his agreement or
opposition as the case may be, to the petition. The records are bereft of an
evidence that the State participated in the prosecution of the case thus, the
case is remanded for proper trial.
6. American Bible Society v. City of Manila
Facts: Plaintiff-appellant is a foreign, non-stock, non-profit, religious,
missionary corporation duly registered and doing business in the Philippines
through its Philippine agency established in Manila in November, 1898. The
defendant appellee is a municipal corporation with powers that are to be
exercised in conformity with the provisions of Republic Act No. 409, known as
the Revised Charter of the City of Manila.
During the course of its ministry, plaintiff sold bibles and other religious
materials at a very minimal profit.
On May 29 1953, the acting City Treasurer of the City of Manila informed
plaintiff that it was conducting the business of general merchandise since
November, 1945, without providing itself with the necessary Mayor's permit
and municipal license, in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, and
Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and 3364, and required plaintiff to secure,
within three days, the corresponding permit and license fees, together with
compromise covering the period from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the 2nd
quarter of 1953, in the total sum of P5,821.45 (Annex A).
Plaintiff now questions the imposition of such fees.
Issue: Whether or not the said ordinances are constitutional and valid
(contention: it restrains the free exercise and enjoyment of the religious
profession and worship of appellant).
Held: Section 1, subsection (7) of Article III of the Constitution, provides
that:
(7) No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof, and the free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall
forever be allowed. No religion test shall be required for the exercise of civil
or political rights. The provision aforequoted is a constitutional guaranty of
the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, which
carries with it the right to disseminate religious information.
It may be true that in the case at bar the price asked for the bibles and other
religious pamphlets was in some instances a little bit higher than the actual
cost of the same but this cannot mean that appellant was engaged in the
business or occupation of selling said "merchandise" for profit. For this
reason. The Court believe that the provisions of City of Manila Ordinance No.
2529, as amended, cannot be applied to appellant, for in doing so it would
impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its religious profession and worship
as well as its rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.
With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended, the Court do not find that
it imposes any charge upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the
Constitution, nor tax the exercise of religious practices.

It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No. 3000 cannot be considered

unconstitutional, however inapplicable to said business, trade or occupation
of the plaintiff. As to Ordinance No. 2529 of the City of Manila, as amended,
is also not applicable, so defendant is powerless to license or tax the
business of plaintiff Society.
7. Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance
Facts: The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of
goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716
seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and enhance its
administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code. There are
various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.
One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because
it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and
S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3
readings as required by the Constitution.
Issue: Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) ofthe
Constitution
Held: The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House
of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not
bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is
required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which
initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must
substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senates
power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose amendments.
Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing
revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt,
private bills and bills of local application must come from the House of
Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from the districts, the
members of the House can be expected to be more sensitive to the local
needs and problems. Nor does the Constitutionprohibit the filing in the
Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the
House, so long as action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt
of the House bill.

The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3
readings on separate days as required by the Constitution because the
second and third readings were done on the same day. But this was because
the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The presidential
certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that
of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a billby the
President the requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and
distribution can be dispensed with is supported by the weightof legislative
practice.
8. Sahin v. Turkey

Brief Fact Summary. A Turkish Muslim by the name Sahin (P) alleged that the
Republic of Turkey (D) violated her rights and freedom under the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms by banning the
wearing of the Islamic headscarf in institutions of higher education.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. Students rights and freedom under the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms are not violated
when a secular country places a ban on wearing religious clothing in institutions
of higher education.

Facts. Sahin (P) had a traditional background of family practicing Muslims and
considered it her religious duty to wear the Islamic headscarf. When she was in
her 5th year at the faculty of medicine of the University of Istanbul in 1998, the
Vice-Chancellor of the University issued a circular which stipulated that students
with beards and wearing the Islamic headscarf would be refused admission to
lectures, courses and tutorials. Sahin (P) was denied access to a written exam
and the University authorities refused to enroll her in a course and to admit her to
various lectures and other written exams because of the Islamic headscarf she
was putting on. She later left the University to further her studies in Vienna and
had lived in Vienna since then. Before leaving Istanbul, Sahin (P) filed an
application against the Republic of Turkey (P) with the European Commission of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms alleging that her rights and freedom
under the Convention had been violated. A judgment was rendered by the
European Court after it heard the case.

Issue. Are students rights and freedom under the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms violated when a secular country
places a ban on the wearing of religious clothing in institutions of higher learning?

Held. No. Students rights and freedom under the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms are not violated when a secular
country places a ban on wearing religious clothing in institutions of higher
education. Constitutionally, Turkey (D) is a secular state founded on the principles
of equality without regard to distinctions based on sex, religion or denomination.
In 1989, Turkeys (D) Constitutional Court decided that granting legal recognition
to a religious symbol such as the Islamic headscarf was not compatible with the
principle that the state education must be neutral and might generate conflicts
between students of different religions. The Vice Chancellor explained the
banning of the headscarf at the University School of Medicine in a memorandum
which was circulated that the ban was not intended to infringe on students
freedom of conscience or religion, but to comply with the laws and regulations in
force and that such compliance would be sensitive to patients rights. Hence, the
ban did not prohibit Muslim students from manifesting their religion in accordance
with habitual forms of Muslim observance and it was not directed only at Muslim
attire. So the view of the Court should not be interchanged for that of the
University who are better placed to evaluate local needs. The right to behave in a
manner governed by a religion belief is not guaranteed by Article 9 and it also
does not confer on people who do so the right to disregard rules that have proved
to be justified. By giving due regard to Turkeys (D) margin of appreciation, the
interference here was justified in principle and proportionate to aim pursued.
Hence, Article 9 was not contravened.

9. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire

FACTS:
Walter Chaplinsky, a Jehovah's Witness, was using the public sidewalk as a
pulpit in downtown Rochester, passing out pamphlets and calling organized
religion a "racket." After a large crowd had begun blocking the roads and
generally causing a scene, a police officer removed Chaplinsky to take him to
police headquarters. Upon seeing the town marshal (who had returned to the
scene after warning Chaplinsky earlier to keep it down and avoid causing a
commotion), Chaplinsky attacked the marshal verbally. He was then
arrested. The complaint against Chaplinsky stated that he shouted: "You are
a God-damned racketeer" and "a damned Fascist". Chaplinsky admitted that
he said the words charged in the complaint, with the exception of the name
of the deity.

For this, he was charged and convicted under a New Hampshire statute
forbidding intentionally offensive speech directed at others in a public place.
Under New Hampshire's Offensive Conduct law (chap. 378, para. 2 of the NH.
Public Laws) it is illegal for anyone to address "any offensive, derisive or
annoying word to anyone who is lawfully in any street or public place ... or to
call him by an offensive or derisive name."

Chaplinsky appealed the fine he was assessed, claiming that the law was
"vague" and that it infringed upon his First Amendment and Fourteenth
Amendment rights to free speech.
Ruling:
The Court, in a unanimous decision, upheld the arrest. Writing the decision
for the Court, Justice Frank Murphy advanced a "two-tier theory" of the First
Amendment. Certain "well-defined and narrowly limited" categories of speech
fall outside the bounds of constitutional protection. Thus, "the lewd and
obscene, the profane, the slanderous," and (in this case) insulting or
"fighting" words neither contributed to the expression of ideas nor possessed
any "social value" in the search for truth.
10. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROMEO DORIQUEZ
FACTS:
Romeo Doriquez, was charged with the offense of grave oral defamation.
with deliberate intent of bringing Attorney Sixto Demaisip into discredit,
disrepute and public contempt, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously speak and utter in a loud voice and in the presence of many
persons against the said Attorney Demaisip the following insulting and
defamatory words and expressions to wit: "Tonto ka nga klase sang tao, quin
pierde mo ang asunto ko, nagastohan ako sing linibo sang ulihi nag pabakal
ikaw kay Purita; pasuguiron ka P30.00 lang ang nabayad ko pero linibo ang
gasto ko," which, translated into English runs as follows: "You are a foolish
class of person, you had to lose my case, I spent thousands of pesos and
later you allowed yourself to be sold to Purita; you had been telling people
that I paid you only P30.00 when I spent thousand of pesos for my case,"
and other similar words of import.
Six days later, or on September 3, 1964, the same Doriquez was indicted
before the same court for discharge of firearm, committed, in the language of
the information, as follows:
That on or about April 22, 1964, in the Municipality of Batad, Province of
Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Court, the said accused,
armed with a revolver and without intent to kill, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously discharge twice said revolver at one Attorney Sixto
Demaisip.
Upon arraignment, he pleaded not guilty to the two indictments. On
December 3, 1964 he moved to dismiss both informations, claiming that (1)
the court a quo has no jurisdiction over the offense of grave oral defamation
in virtue of Republic Act 3828 which enlarged the original exclusive
jurisdiction of city and municipal courts; and (2) the institution of the
criminal action for discharge of firearm places him in double jeopardy or he
had already been in jeopardy once in the municipal court of Batad, Iloilo
which dismissed, without his consent, the information charging him with the
offense of alarm and scandal, allegedly based on the self-same facts relied
upon by Fiscal Simeon A. Barranco in support of the aforesaid information for
discharge of firearm.
In its order of March 8, 1965 the court a quo denied the motion to dismiss.
Ruling:
Doriquezs plea is untenable.
For double jeopardy to attach in his favor, the accused must prove, among
other things, that there is "identity of offenses," so that, in the language of
section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court, his "conviction or
acquittal ... or the dismissal of the case (without his express consent) shall
be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense charged or for any
attempt to, commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the
former complaint or information." It is altogether evident, however, that the
offense of discharge of firearm is not the crime of alarm and scandal, nor is it
an attempt or a frustration of the latter felony. Neither may it be asserted
that every crime of discharge of firearm produces the offense of alarm and
scandal. Nor could the reverse situation be true, for the less grave felony of
discharge of firearm does not include or subsume the offense of alarm and
scandal which is a light felony.
Although the indictment for alarm and scandal filed under article 155(1) of
the Revised Penal Code and the information for discharge of firearm
instituted under article 258 of the same Code are closely related in fact (as
the two apparently arose from the same factual setting, the firing of a
revolver by the accused being a common element), they are definitely
diverse in law. Firstly, the two indictments do not describe the same felony -
alarm and scandal is an offense against public order while discharge of
firearm is a crime against persons. Secondly, the indispensable element of
the former crime is the discharge of a firearm calculated to cause alarm or
danger to the public, while the gravamen of the latter is the discharge of a
firearm against or at a certain person, without intent to kill.
The plea of double jeopardy cannot therefore be accorded merit, as the two
indictments are perfectly distinct in point of law howsoever closely they may
appear to be connected in fact.10
It is a cardinal rule that the protection against double jeopardy may be
invoked only for the same offense11 or identical offense.12 A single act may
offend against two (or more) entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law,
and if one provision requires proof of an additional fact or element which the
other does not, an acquittal or conviction or a dismissal of the information
under one does not bar prosecution under the other.13 Phrased elsewise,
where two different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes,
prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other,
although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves
some important act which is not an essential element of the other.14
In the case at bar, granting that the two indictments arose from the same act
a contention traversed by the State they describe and constitute,
nevertheless, essentially different felonies having fundamentally diverse
indispensable elements. Hence, there can be no such "identity of offenses" as
would support the suggestion that double jeopardy has ensued. The trial
judge, therefore, did not commit abuse of discretion in refusing to dismiss
the information for discharge of firearm.
In sum, we hold that the instant appeal is premature, and that even if it
were treated as a petition for certiorari the contentions and arguments of
the appellant cannot be accorded credit.
11. Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC
FACTS:

Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile in
Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the Holy
Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college degree,
education, in St. Pauls College now Divine Word University also in Tacloban.
Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in Tacloban. She went
to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel
Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In 1954, she
married late President Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a Congressman of
Ilocos Norte and was registered there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was
elected as Senator in 1959, they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she
registered as a voter. In 1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in
Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She
served as member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila
during 1978.

Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative of

the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo, the
incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a candidate
for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did
not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner, in an
honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency, which she
sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and that
"she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. She
arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that she became a
resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement to

be eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte.

HELD:

Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes. The

court are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoners claim of legal
residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own declaration
of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons:

1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas

domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought them to
Leyte;

2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change of

domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and
establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In the
absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be deemed to
continue.

3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the
term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political Law.
When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her domicile of
origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and
acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos, her
actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose
Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add, petitioner
even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte while living
in her brothers house, an act, which supports the domiciliary intention
clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by establishing residences in
Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important milestones.

12. Aquino v. COMELEC

Facts: Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the new 2nd district of
Makati stating that he has been residing there for ten months. When his candidacy
was opposed he filed another certificate of candidacy stating that he has been
residing in Makati for more than a year by virtue of a contract of lease. COMELEC
dismissed petition for Aquinos disqualification and garnered majority vote on 1995
election. Mateo Bedon filed for suspension of his proclamation. COMELEC decided in
favour of Bedon hence the petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether or not Aquino failed the constitutional residency requirement?

Decision: Petition dismissed, COMELEC decision affirmed. In order for Aquino to

qualify he must prove that he has established not just residence but domicile of
choice. Clearly, the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent
home where he eventually intends to return and remain his domicile is what the
Constitution speaks of residence for purposes of election law. Property ownership is
not an indicia of the right to vote or to be voted upon.

13.Agote vs. Lorenzo

FACTS:
Petitioner Vicente Agote was charged to have violated Presidential Decree No.
1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms) and COMELEC Resolution No. 2826
(Gun Ban) for having in possession one (1) .38 cal. Rev. with four (4) live
bullets in a public place during the election period without having secured the
necessary license and authority from the COMELEC. During the pendency of
the case, Republic Act No. 8294 was approved into law. Eventually, the trial
court rendered judgment of conviction in both cases wherein separate
penalties were imposed respectively. Petitioner moved for reconsideration,
claiming that the penalty for illegal possession of firearms under P.D. No.
1866 had already been reduced by the subsequent enactment of Republic Act
No. 8294, which the trial court subsequently denied. He then filed a petition
before the Court of Appeals which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 2991-
UDK, but was likewise dismissed.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not Republic Act No. 8294 should be applied retroactively.
2) Whether or not such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as a
special aggravating circumstance.

HELD:
1) Yes. The rule is that penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as
they favor the person guilty of a felony. Republic Act No. 8294 lowers the
penalty for illegal possession of firearms depending on the class of firearm
possessed. The lighter penalty may be imposed to a person who shall
unlawfully possess any firearm or ammunition, unless no other crime was
committed. Moreover, the Court has already ruled in Gonzales vs. Court of
Appeals that said law must be given retroactive effect in favor of those
accused under P.D. No. 1866. But as violation of COMELEC Resolution No.
2826 or the Gun Ban was also committed by the petitioner at the same time,
the Court cannot but set aside petitioners conviction for illegal possession of
firearm.

2) No. Section 1 of RA 8294 substantially provides that any person who shall
unlawfully possess any firearm or ammunition shall be penalized, unless no
other crime was committed. It further provides that such use of an
unlicensed firearm shall be considered only as an aggravating circumstance
in cases of homicide or murder. Since the crime committed was in violation of
COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 or the Gun Ban, illegal possession of firearms
cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance.

14. People vs. Ladjaalam

FACTS:
Four Informations were filed against appellant Walpan Ladjaalam in the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City (Branch 16), three of which he was found
guilty, to wit: 1) maintaining a drug den in violation of Section 15-A, Article III,
of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972); 2) illegal possession of
firearm and ammunition in violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 as amended
by Republic Act. No. 8294; and 3) direct assault with multiple attempted
homicide. The following information was provided by the prosecution:
1) In the afternoon of September 24, 1997, more than thirty (30) policemen
proceeded to the house of appellant and his wife to serve the search warrant
when they were met by a volley of gunfire coming from the second floor of the
said house. They saw that it was the appellant who fired the M14 rifle towards
them.
2) After gaining entrance, two of the police officers proceeded to the second floor
where they earlier saw appellant firing the rifle. As he noticed their presence, the
appellant jumped from the window to the roof of a neighboring house. He was
subsequently arrested at the back of his house after a brief chase.
3) Several firearms and ammunitions were recovered from appellants house.
Also found was a pencil case with fifty (50) folded aluminum foils inside, each
containing methamphetamine hydrochloride.
4) A paraffin test was conducted and the casts taken both hands of the appellant
yielded positive for gunpowder nitrates.
5) Records show that appellant had not filed any application for license to
possess firearm and ammunition, nor has he been given authority to carry
firearms.

ISSUE:
Whether or not such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance.

HELD:
No. Section 1 of RA 8294 substantially provides that any person who shall
unlawfully possess any firearm or ammunition shall be penalized, unless no
other crime was committed. Furthermore, if homicide or murder is committed
with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance. Since the crime committed was
direct assault and not homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot
be deemed an aggravating circumstance.

15. Poe-Llamanzares v. COMELEC

Facts

Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a

newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar
(Edgardo) on 3 September 1968. Parental care and custody over petitioner was
passed on by Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and his wife.
Three days after, 6 September 1968, Emiliano reported and registered petitioner
as a foundling with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo ). In
her Foundling Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, the petitioner was given
the name Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar

When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe
(a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a
petition for her adoption with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City.
On 13 May 1974, the trial court granted their petition and ordered that
petitioners name be changed from Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar to
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe. Although necessary notations were made by
OCR-Iloilo on petitioners foundling certificate reflecting the court decreed
adoption

Issue

Whether the Petitioner Poe is QUALIFIED to be a candidate for President in the

National and Local Elections of 9 May 2016

Held

Yes, the Petitioner was found eligible for candidacy due to the new ruling that
foundlings are presumed under international law to have been born of citizens of
the place where they are found, also she reacquired her natural-born Philippine
citizenship under the provisions of R.A. No. 9225, hence she has complied with
the law, therefore Petitioner can run for Presidency on May 2016 Elections.