of pure universality. We cannot pin down the individual position qua
individual, only individuality in general. 99. The universality of pure being which has revealed itself as the essence of sensewcertainty involves abstraction, but it is not, as it seemed to be, real abstractionfrom rich contents, but abstraction from the mere meaning or claim to have rich contents. (Individuality on Hegel's view is a mere moment of living, concrete universality.) roo. Since the object of sense-certainty is not the definite contentful thingit claimed to be, the phenomenological emphasis shifts to the Sub- ject. My experience becomes the rich, colourful thing. What I mean is important because it stems from me [Meinen and meinJ. (Like Descartes, Hegel shifts to the individual Subject as that of which we are certain.) 101. But in the flux of experience the me which experiences always has different successive contents to its experience, and cannot there- fore be identified with such contents. The me ofthe moment may mean to be definite in content, but it cannot express this definiteness. It is in a sense as much a plurality as a single me. 102. Theme alsostandsessentiaHyopposed to other mes and cannot say how this me differs from another. Each man is, as an experient, everyman. (The individual as such cannot be understood or deduced.) 103. We now move to a position where not the mere object, nor the mere subject; is the rich, contentful thing, but the whole structured' subject...-object situation. 104-7. The whole structured subject. -objectsituation is asessenti- ally fluctuating as the mere subject or object considered before. The wholly definite time-situation we try to pin down at once becomes a matter of the past: the only present that can survive is a universal present which remains what it is despite variation of content, and which has subordinate presents within it. From the many 'Nows' which arise and pass away we come to a 'Now' which always is, no matter how long a happening may be. This is of course a universaL (The. substantial, the permanent is the Universal not the particular.) 108. The wholly definite 'Here', the poin t, cannot be seized. Every real 'Here' breaks up into 'Heres', or points to 'Heres' beyond itself. But in aU these 'Heres' the universal 'Here' persists. (We cannot get parts, but strictly speaking only the whole of Reality, and the whole of Reality is a universal present in aU its so-called parts.) 109. Sense .. certainty never grasps definite particulars but always deludes itself into thinking that it does. In the Mysteries bread and wine are consumed to show the nullity of the solid things of sense, and hungry animals reveal the same mystical wisdom. 110. Language, being divine and rational, frustrates the attempt