Section 9
RP v. De Castellvi, et. al.
-Requisites in the taking of property for purposes of eminent
domain:
(1)Expropriator must enter a property (2) the entry
must be for more than momentary period (3) the entry must
be under warrant of legal authority (4) must be devoted to
public use (5) the utilization for public use must be in such a
way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment of the property
-taking of property: (1) entrance is for permanent or indefinite
period (2) owner was ousted from the property
RP, Air Transportation Office vs. Sarabia
-The owner of the property should be compensated only for
what he actually loses and what he loses is only the actual
value of his property at the time it was taken.
Epza v. Dulay
-The determination of just compensation is a judicial function.
RP v. De Knecht
-Expropriation proceeding may be undertaken by RP not only
by voluntary negotiation with the land owners but also by
taking appropriate court action or by legislation
Manotok v. NHA
-For compensation to be just, the government must have at
the least commenced a proceeding, judicial or otherwise for
this purpose.
Ardona v. Reyes
-The concept of public use is not limited to traditional
purposes.
Manosca v. CA
-It is accurate to state then that at present whatever maybe
beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the
requirement of public use.
Masikip v. CA
-Scope of judicial review of the exercise of eminent domain: (1)
adequacy of compensation (2) necessity of the taking (3)
public use of character of the purpose of the taking
Section 10
Banat Party List v. COMELEC
-There is impairment if a subsequent law (1) changes the
terms of the contract between the parties (2) imposes new
conditions (3) dispenses with those agreed upon or withdraws
remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties *(4)
authorizes something different
Section 12
People v. Lauga
-Barangay-based volunteer organizations in the nature of
watch groups, as in the case of the Bantay Bayan are
recognized by the local government to perform functions
relating to peace and order at the barangay level.
People v. Endino
-Such confession does not form part of custodial investigation
as it was not given to police but to media in an attempt to
elicit sympathy and forgiveness from public.
People v. Taliman
-Municipal mayor cannot be considered a competent and
independent counsel qualified to assist a person under
custodial investigation. There is a conflict of interest
between the role of the mayor as the counsel and at the same
time as the mayor of that place.
People v. Tomaquin
-An effective and vigilant counsel necessarily and logically
requires that the lawyer be present and be able to advise and
assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first
question asked by the investigating officer until the signing of
the extrajudicial confession.
Dela Torre v. CA
- A police lineup is not considered part of any custodial inquest
because it is conducted before that stage is reached.
Lumiqued v. Exevea
-The right to counsel which cannot be waived unless the
waiver is in writing and in presence of counsel, is a right
afforded to a suspect or an accused during custodial
investigation.
Section 13
De la Camara v. Enage
-The guidelines in the fixing of bail was there summarized, in
the opinion of Justice Sanchez, as follows: "(1) ability of the
accused to give bail; (2) nature of the offense; (3) penalty for
the offense charged; (4) character and reputation of the
accused; (5) health of the accused; (6) character and strength
of the evidence; (7) probability of the accused appearing in
trial; (8) forfeiture of other bonds; (9) whether the accused
wasa fugitive from justice when arrested; and (10) if the
accused is under bond for appearance at trial in other cases."
Yap v. CA
- to fix bail at the amount equivalent to the civil liability is to
permit the impression that the amount paid is as bail is an
exaction of the civil liability that accused is charged of... this
cannot be allowed because bail is not intended as punishment,
nor as a satisfaction of civil liability.
Section 14
People v. Ortega
- An accused cannot be convicted of an offense, unless it is
clearly charged in the complaint or information. Convicting
him of an offense other than that charged would violate his
right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation
against him.
Martin v. Ver
-Factors that may be considered and balanced (speedy
disposition of cases): (1) length of delay (2) reason for the
delay (3) defendant's assertion or non-assertion of his right,
and (4) prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay
Garcia v. Domingo
- Public trial possesses that character when anyone interested
in observing the manner a judge conducts the proceedings in
his courtroom may do so
People v. Gorospe
- While cross-examination is a right available to the adverse
party, it is not absolute in the sense that a cross-examination
could determine for himself the length and scope of his cross
examination of a witness. The court has always the discretion
to limit the cross-examination and to consider it terminated if
it would serve the ends of justice.
People v. Bardaje
-Considering that his case involved a prosecution for a capital
offense, the lower court acted precipitously in not having
Narita brought to court, by ordering her arrest if necessary.
Section 15, 16, 17
Cabal v. Kapunan
-This prohibition against compelling a person to take a stand
as a witness against himself applies to criminal, quasi-criminal
and penal proceedings, including a proceeding civil in form for
forfeiture of property by reason of the omission of an offense,
but not a proceeding in which the penalty recoverable is civil
or remedial in nature.
Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners
- If petitioner would be compelled to testify against himself, he
could suffer not the forfeiture of property but revocation of his
license as a medical practitioner
US v. Tan Teng
-The prohibition of self incrimination in the bill of rights is a
prohibition of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort
communications from him, and not an exclusion of his body as
evidence, when it may be material.
Beltran v. Samson
-Writing is more than moving the body, or the hands, or the
fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it
requires the application of intelligence and attention.
People v. Suarez
-We have held that reenactments are covered by the right
against self-incrimination.
Agustin v. CA
-The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but
against testimonial compulsion.
Section 18-22
People v. Echegaray
-Death penalty is not a cruel, unjust, excessive or unusual
punishment.
-Punishments are cruel if they involve torture or lingering
death.
Lozano v. Martinez
-Offense punished by B.P. 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its
presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of the
obligation which the law punishes.
Cudia v. CA
-to invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the requisites are:
(1) the first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second
(2) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated (3)
the second jeopardy must be for the same offense or the
second offense includes or is necessarily included in the
offense charged in the first information or is an attempt to
commit the same or a frustration thereof.
-for the jeopardy to attach: (a)court of competent jurisdiction
(b) valid complaint (c) after arraignment (d) valid plea entered
(e) defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express
consent of the accused
People v. Salico *reiterated in People v.
Obsania
-when the case is dismissed with the express consent of the
defendant, the dismissal will not be a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense because his action in having
the case dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional
right for the reason that he hereby prevents the court from
proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment
of conviction against him
People v. Pilpa
-The court held that the oral manifestation at the hearing
made by the counsel that he had no objection is considered an
express consent to its termination within Section 9 of Rule
117.
People v. Court of Silay
- Two instances of dismissal that there is jeopardy which bars
another prosecution of the same act: (1) ground for dismissal
was due to insufficiency of evidence (2) when the proceedings
have been reasonably prolonged as to violate the right of the
accused to speedy trial.
Kepner v. US *reiterated in People v. CA, Francisco and
Pacao
- Verdicts of acquittal are to be regarded as absolutely final
and irreversible.
People v. Yorac *reiterated in People v. Adil
- It was held that if after the first prosecution, a new fact
supervenes on which the defendant may be held liable,
resulting in altering the character of the crime and giving rise
to a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to
be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense.
People v. Relova
- If the second sentence of the double jeopardy provision had
not been written into the Constitution, conviction or acquittal
under a municipal ordinance would never constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act under a national statute.