LEGAL TECHNIQUE AND LOGIC
context in which the law has been formulated, or
Chapter 5: Fallacies in Legal Reasoning
Fallacy - in logic, fallacy refers to a mistake or error
in thinking and reasoning; a failure in reasoning
that renders an argument invalid; faulty reasoning;
misleading or unsound argument.
Importance of knowing the different fallacies:
Knowing the different kinds of fallacies makes it
easier for us to avoid them or attack them. As
fallacies are deceptive and misleading they tend to
be psychologically persuasive and thus a law
student must be able to determine a fallacy from a
valid and sound reasoning.
2 Main groups of fallacies:
(1) Formal Fallacies - error in form; are those that
may be identified through mere inspection of
the form and structure of an argument.
Fallacies of this kind are found only in
deductive arguments that have identifiable
forms.
(2) Informal Fallacies - error in the content; are
those that can be detected only through
analysis of the content of the argument. The
purpose of informal fallacies is to mislead or
illogically persuade people to believe or accept
something.
3 Categories of Informal Fallacies:
(1) Fallacies of Ambiguity - committed because
of misuse of language, or unclear use of
language. They contain ambiguous or vague
language which is deliberately or consciously
used to misled people.
(2) Fallacies of Irrelevant Evidence - committed
when there is a problem with the connection
between the premises and the conclusion.
They occur when the premises are not logically
relevant to the conclusion. They are misleading
when the premises appear to be
psychologically relevant however the
conclusion seem to be otherwise.
(3) Fallacies of Insufficient Evidence -
committed when the premises fail to provide
evidence strong enough to support the
conclusion. The premises are not supported
with sufficient evidence to cause a reasonable
person to accept the conclusion.
(A) FALLACIES OF AMBIGUITY
(A.1) Equivocation - occurs when the conclusion
of an argument depends on the fact that a word or
phrase is used in two (2) different senses or
meaning in the argument and make it appear to
have only one meaning.
How to correct: It is necessary to go back to the
the intention of the framers of the law.
LAMBINO vs. COMELEC
G.R. No. 174153, Oct. 25, 2006
(CARPIO, J.)
Requirements forInitiativePetition
ConstitutionalAmendment
vs.ConstitutionalRevision
Tests to determine whether amendment or
revision
FACTS:
The Lambino Group commenced gathering
signatures for aninitiativepetition to change
the1987 Constitutionand then filed a petition with
COMELEC to hold a plebiscite for ratification under
Sec. 5(b) and (c) and Sec. 7 of RA 6735.The
proposedchanges under the petition will shift the
present Bicameral-Presidential system to a
Unicameral-Parliamentary form ofgovernment.
COMELEC did not give it due course for lack of an
enabling law governinginitiativepetitions to
amendthe Constitution, pursuant to Santiago v.
Comelec ruling.
ISSUES:
Whether or notthe proposedchanges
constitute an amendment or revision
Whether or not theinitiativepetition is
sufficient compliance with
theconstitutionalrequirement on direct
proposal by the people
RULING:
Initiativepetition does not comply with Sec. 2, Art.
XVII on direct proposal by people
Sec. 2, Art. XVII...is the governing provision that
allows a peoplesinitiativeto propose amendments
tothe Constitution. While this provision does not
expressly state that the petition must set forth
thefull textof theproposed amendments, the
deliberations of the framers of our Constitution
clearly show that: (a) the framers intended to adopt
relevant American jurisprudence on
peoplesinitiative; and (b) in particular, the people
must first see thefull textof theproposed
amendmentsbefore they sign, and that the people
must sign on a petition containing suchfull text.
The essence of amendments directly proposed by
the people throughinitiativeupon a petition is that
the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the
people. This means two essential elements must
be present.
2 elements ofinitiative
1. First, the people must author and thus
sign the entire proposal. No agent or
representative can sign on their behalf.
2. Second, as aninitiativeupon a petition, the
proposal must be embodied in a petition.
These essential elements are present only if thefull
textof theproposed amendmentsis first shown to
the people who express their assent by signing
such complete proposal in a petition. Thefull textof
theproposed amendmentsmay be either written on
the face of the petition, or attached to it. If so
attached, the petition must stated the fact of such
attachment. This is an assurance that everyone of
the several millions of signatories to the petition
had seen thefull textof theproposed
amendmentsbefore not after signing.
Moreover, aninitiativesigner must be informed at
the time of signing of the nature and effect of that
which is proposed and failure to do so is
deceptive and misleading which renders
theinitiativevoid.
In the case of the Lambino Groups petition, theres
not a single word, phrase, or sentence of text ofthe
proposedchanges inthe signaturesheet. Neither
doesthe signaturesheet state that the text ofthe
proposedchanges is attached to it.The
signaturesheet merely asks a question whether the
people approve a shift from the Bicameral-
Presidential to the Unicameral- Parliamentary
system ofgovernment.The signaturesheet does
not show to the people the draft ofthe
proposedchanges before they are asked to
signthe signaturesheet. This omission is fatal.
Aninitiativethat gathers signatures from the people
without first showing to the people thefull textof
theproposed amendmentsis most likely a
deception, and can operate as a gigantic fraud on
the people. Thats whythe Constitutionrequires that
aninitiativemust be directly proposed by the
people x x x in a petition - meaning that the people
must sign on a petition that contains thefull textof
theproposed amendments. On so vital an issue as
amending the nations fundamental law, the writing
of the text of theproposed amendmentscannot be
hidden from the people under a general orspecial
power of attorneyto unnamed, faceless, and
unelected individuals.
Theinitiativeviolates Section 2, Article XVII ofthe
Constitutiondisallowing revision through initiatives
Article XVII ofthe Constitutionspeaks of three
modes of amendingthe Constitution. The first
mode is through Congress upon three-fourths vote
of all its Members. The second mode is through
aconstitutionalconvention. The third mode is
through a peoplesinitiative.
Section 1 of Article XVII, referring to the first and
second modes, applies to any amendment to, or
revision of, this Constitution. In contrast, Section 2
of Article XVII, referring to the third mode, applies
only to amendments to this Constitution. This
distinction was intentional as shown by the
deliberations of theConstitutionalCommission. A
peoplesinitiativeto changethe Constitutionapplies
only to an amendment ofthe Constitutionand not
to its revision. In contrast, Congress or
aconstitutionalconvention can propose both
amendments and revisions tothe Constitution.
Does the Lambino Groupsinitiativeconstitute a
revision ofthe Constitution?
Yes. By any legal test and under any jurisdiction, a
shift from a Bicameral-Presidential to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary system, involving the abolition of the
Office of the President and the abolition of one
chamber of Congress, is beyond doubt a revision,
not a mere amendment.
Amendment vs. Revision
Courts have long recognized the distinction
between an amendment and a revision of a
constitution. Revision broadly implies a change that
alters a basic principle inthe constitution, like
altering the principle of separation of powers or the
system of checks-and-balances. There is also
revision if the change alters the substantial entirety
ofthe constitution, as when the change affects
substantial provisions ofthe constitution.On the
other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change
that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the
basic principle involved. Revision generally affects
several provisions ofthe constitution, while
amendment generally affects only the specific
provision being amended.
Wherethe proposedchange applies only to a
specific provision ofthe Constitutionwithout
affecting any other section or article, the change
may generally be considered an amendment and
not a revision. For example, a change reducing the
voting age from 18 years to 15 years is an
amendment and not a revision. Similarly, a change
reducing Filipino ownership of mass media
companies from 100% to 60% is an amendment
and not a revision. Also, a change requiring a
college degree as an additional qualification for
election to the Presidency is an amendment and
not a revision.
The changes in these examples do not entail any
modification of sections or articles ofthe
Constitutionother than the specific provision being
amended. These changes do not also affect the
structure ofgovernmentor the system of checks-
and-balances among or within the three branches.
However, there can be no fixed rule on whether a
change is an amendment or a revision. A change in
a single word of one sentence ofthe
Constitutionmay be a revision and not an
amendment. For example, the substitution of the
word republican with monarchic or theocratic in governmental plan also includes changes that
Section 1, Article II ofthe Constitutionradically
overhauls the entire structure ofgovernmentand
the fundamental ideological basis ofthe
Constitution. Thus, each specific change will have
to be examined case-by-case, depending on how it
affects other provisions, as well as how it affects
the structure ofgovernment, the carefully crafted
system of checks-and-balances, and the underlying
ideological basis of the existing Constitution.
Since a revision of a constitution affects basic
principles, or several provisions of a constitution, a
deliberative body with recorded proceedings is best
suited to undertake a revision. A revision requires
harmonizing not only several provisions, but also
the altered principles withthose that
remainunaltered. Thus, constitutions normally
authorize deliberative bodies like constituent
assemblies orconstitutionalconventions to
undertake revisions.On the other hand,
constitutions allow peoples initiatives, which do not
have fixed and identifiable deliberative bodies or
recorded proceedings, to undertake only
amendments and not revisions.
Tests to determine whether amendment or revision
In California where the initiative clause allows
amendments but not revisions to the constitution
just like in our Constitution, courts have developed
a two-part test: the quantitative test and the
qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether
the proposed change is so extensive in its
provisions as to change directly the substantial
entirety of the constitution by the deletion or
alteration of numerous existing provisions. The
court examines only the number of provisions
affected and does not consider the degree of the
change.
The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative
effects of the proposed change in the constitution.
The main inquiry is whether the change will
accomplish such far reaching changes in the nature
of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a
revision. Whether there is an alteration in the
structure of government is a proper subject of
inquiry. Thus, a change in the nature of [the] basic
governmental plan includes change in its
fundamental framework or the fundamental powers
of its Branches. A change in the nature of the basic
jeopardize the traditional form of government and
the system of check and balances.
Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests,
the Lambino Groups initiative is a revision and not
merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino
Groups proposed changes overhaul two articles -
Article VI on the Legislature and Article VII on the
Executive - affecting a total of 105 provisions in the
entire Constitution. Qualitatively, the proposed
changes alter substantially the basic plan of
government, from presidential to parliamentary, and
from a bicameral to a unicameral legislature.
A change in the structure of government is a
revision
A change in the structure of government is a
revision of the Constitution, as when the three great
co-equal branches of government in the present
Constitution are reduced into two. This alters the
separation of powers in the Constitution. A shift
from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to
a Unicameral-Parliamentary system is a revision of
the Constitution. Merging the legislative and
executive branches is a radical change in the
structure of government. The abolition alone of the
Office of the President as the locus of Executive
Power alters the separation of powers and thus
constitutes a revision of the Constitution. Likewise,
the abolition alone of one chamber of Congress
alters the system of checks-and-balances within
the legislature and constitutes a revision of the
Constitution.
The Lambino Group theorizes that the difference
between amendment and revision is only one of
procedure, not of substance. The Lambino Group
posits that when a deliberative body drafts and
proposes changes to the Constitution, substantive
changes are called revisions because members of
the deliberative body work full-time on the changes.
The same substantive changes, when proposed
through an initiative, are called amendments
because the changes are made by ordinary people
who do not make an occupation, profession, or
vocation out of such endeavor. The SC, however,
ruled that the express intent of the framers and the
plain language of the Constitution contradict the
Lambino Groups theory. Where the intent of the
framers and the language of the Constitution are
clear and plainly stated, courts do not deviate from
such categorical intent and language.
(A.2) Amphiboly - this fallacy consists in
presenting a claim or argument whose meaning
can be interpreted in two or more ways. The
ambiguity usually arises from a mistake in
grammatical construction. The double meaning lies
in the grammatical construction. E.g. unclear
pronoun construction, elliptical construction (where
words are omitted but supposedly understood),
unclear modifier, careless use of only and all.
(police help dog bite victim, mayors cant stop
gambling, cha lawyers give poor free legal advice)
(A.3) Improper Accent - consists of placing
improper emphasis on a word, phrase or particular
aspect of an issue or claim E.g. headings in
newspaper, advertisement. It also includes the
distortion produced by pulling a quoted passage
out of context, putting it in another context and then
form a conclusion that is not drawn in the original
context E.g. quoting a passage
(A.4) Vicious Abstraction - consists in misleading
the people by misusing vague or abstract terms.
Vague words are misused when used as a very
significant term in the premise used to establish a
conclusion.
How to correct: First, we need to sense if our
opponent is attempting to support a particular claim
with a statement containing vague words.
Secondly, we must challenge the acceptability of
the premise, as it does not asses the evidential
value. And lastly, we may disagree with the
opponent about the appropriateness of the
precision that he may assign to it and evaluate the
argument.
(A.5) Composition - consists in wrongly inferring
that what holds true of the individuals automatically
holds true of the group made up of those
individuals. E.g. because a lawyer earns more than
a secretary, therefore all lawyers learn more than
all secretaries.
How to correct: Use words distributively (taken
singly) and collectively (taken in its totality). Thus,
lawyers earn more than secretaries distributively,
but collectively secretaries earn more than lawyers.
(A.6) Division - consist in wrongly assuming that
what is true in general is true in particular. This is
the reverse of the fallacy of composition. This
creates an unwarranted assumption that a
characteristic of the whole is therefore a
characteristic of each of the parts. E.g. it is wrong
to argue that since PNP is the most corrupt agency,
therefore a particular policeman cannot be trusted.
(B) FALLACIES OF IRRELEVANCE
(B.1) Argumentatum ad Hominem (Personal
Attack) - is usually understood as a logical fallacy
in which an argument is rebutted by attacking the
character, motive, or other attribute of the person
making the argument, or persons associated with
the argument, rather than attacking the substance
of the argument itself. It shifts the attention from the
argument to the arguer.
2 Kinds of Argumentatum ad Hominem
(Personal Attack)
(1) Abusive Argumentatum ad Hominem - it
attacks the argument based on the arguers
reputation, personality or some personal
shortcoming. The point here is to win others
approval not on the basis of the merits of the case,
but based on others disdain of the character of the
opponent. E.g. name calling, mudslinging tp
persuade others to their side. A lawyer attacking a
defendants character rather than addressing or
questioning based on the case, e.g., in a case of
theft pointing out the defendants level of poverty.
Other examples:
- A politician degrading another politician during a
political campaign when asked about a specific
policy, e.g. Well, I think we need to look at the
other candidates failures regarding this topic.
- Responding in any debate with an attack on ones
personal beliefs.
- Using someones known background or beliefs to
respond in a way such as Of course you would say
that, because you believe _____.
- Stating that someones argument is incorrect
because of her religious beliefs, such as, Perhaps
if you werent part of the religious group that you
are, you would see this quite differently.
- Attacking someones own sexual orientation in
arguing about the right of LGBT individuals to marry
such as The only reason you could possibly be in
favor of this is because you are not being honest
about your own sexuality.
- Demeaning a teachers decision on grading by
insulting her intelligence, e.g., Well, its not like you
graduated from the best school, so I can see why
you wouldnt know how to properly grade a writing
assignment.
- Using racial slurs to demean a person of another
race in an argument about a crime involving people
of different racial backgrounds, such as, People
like you dont understand what its like to be of my
race so you blatantly have no right to make an
argument about this situation.
(2) Circumstantial - consists in defending ones
position by accusing his critic or other people of
doing the same thing. This is also called Ad
Hominem tu quoque which literally means youre
another. E.g. A father may tell his son not to start
smoking as he will regret it when he is older, and
the son may point out that his father is or was a
smoker. This does not alter the fact that his son
may regret smoking when he is older.
A good and strong counterargument must
effectively blunt the forces of theses kinds of
criticism. Although sometimes this is a valid
defense in matters of provocation. The equitable
defense of in pari delicto which literally means in
equal footing (when both parties are at least
substantially equal responsibility for his injury)
A.M. No. 93-7-696-0 February 21, 1995
In Re JOAQUIN T. BORROMEO, Ex
Rel. Cebu City Chapter of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines
HELD:
Joaquin Borromeo was declared guilty of
constructive contempt of court for repetitiously
disrespecting the decisions and resolutions issued
by the courts, and even by issuing a circular
containing libelous and offending accusations (like
whimsical, capricious, and tyrannical) against the
Supreme Court justices and its employees. He
even delivered a letter accusing lawyers of
defamatory comments and insults. This is due to
his series of dismissed complaints and appeals
against 3 banks namely Traders Royal Bank,
United Coconut Planters Bank, and Security Bank
and Trust Co. from which he obtained loans with
unfulfilled mortgages. In relation to this, he filed
cases against the lawyers of these banks and even
against the clerks of court who signed the minute
resolutions of these cases. The actions reached the
alarming number of 50 cases varying from civil,
criminal, to administrative cases.
In response, the court answered all his
false alleged accusations through a resolution
along with declaring him guilty of contempt of court.
ATTY. MELVIN D.C. MANE v. JUDGE MEDEL
ARNALDO B. BELEN
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2119, 30 June 2008
An alumnus of a particular law school has no
monopoly of knowledge of the law. To
determine the competence primarily on the
basis of ones alma mater is an Argumentum ad
Hominem.
FACTS:
Petitioner Atty. Melvin D.C. Mane filed a letter-
complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) charging respondent Judge Medel Arnaldo
B. Belen of demeaning, humilating, and berating
him during a hearing of Rural Bank of Cabuyao,
Inc. v. Samue Malabanan, et al. where Mane was
counsel for the plaintiff. During the proceedings,
Belen asked Mane about the latters law school.
When Mane answered that he came from Manuel
L. Quezon University (MLQU), Belen told him:
Then youre not from UP. Then you cannot
equate yourself to me because there is a saying
and I know this, not all law students are created
equal, not all law schools are created equal, not all
lawyers are created equal despite what the
Supreme Being that we all are created equal in His
form and substance.
Belen further lambasted Mane and lectured him on
the latters person, seemingly disregarding the case
at hand. Subsequently, the OCA, upon evaluation,
found that Belens insulting remarks were
unwarranted and inexcusable and recommended a
reprimand of Belen.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the statements and actions made
by Judge Belen during the hearing constitute
conduct unbecoming of a judge and a violation of
the Code of Judicial Conduct
HELD:
The Court held that an alumnus of a particular law
school has no monopoly of knowledge of the law.
By hurdling the Bar Examinations which the Court
administers, taking of the Lawyers oath, and
signing of the Roll of Attorneys, a lawyer is
presumed to be competent to discharge his
functions and duties as, inter alia an officer of the
court, irrespective of where he obtained his law
degree. For a judge to determine the fitness or
competence of a lawyer primarily on his alma mater
is clearly an engagement in an argumentum ad
hominem.
A judge must address the merits of the case and
not the person of the counsel. If Judge Belen felt
that his integrity and dignity were being
assaulted, he acted properly when he directed
complainant to explain why he should not be cited
for contempt. He went out of bounds, however,
when he engaged on a supercilious legal and
personal discourse.
The Court reminded members of the bench that
even on the face of boorish behavior from those
they deal with, they ought to conduct themselves in
a manner befitting gentlemen and high officers of
the court.
(B.2) Argumentatum ad Misericordiam (Appeal
to Pity) - is a fallacy in which someone tries to win
support for an argument or idea by exploiting his or
her opponent's feelings of pity or guilt. It is a
specific kind of appeal to emotion. Here, the judge
is persuaded not on the strength of the argument
but because of his pity. It evokes the feelings of
compassion and sympathy when such feelings are
not relevant to the conclusion. E.g. (a)You must
have graded my exam incorrectly. I studied very
hard for weeks specifically because I knew my
career depended on getting a good grade. If you
give me a failing grade I'm ruined! (b) Ladies and
gentlemen of the jury, look at this miserable man, in
a wheelchair, unable to use his legs. Could such a
man really be guilty of embezzlement?"
(B.3) Argumentatum ad Baculum (Appeal to
Force) - is the fallacy committed when one appeals
to force or the threat of force or intimidation to bring
about the acceptance of a conclusion. One
participates in argumentum ad baculum when one
points out the negative consequences of holding
the contrary position (ex. believe what I say, or I will
hit you).
However, not all threats involve fallacies.
E.g. "Study hard or your grades will fall" would not
be fallacious for two reasons: (1) no argument is
present, and (2) the connection between the two
statements of the disjunction suggest a causal
relation of relevancy. It is unfortunate that many
logic sources identify a fallacy occurring in
disjunctive statements like ths.
SY V FINEZA A.M. No. RTJ-03-1808. October 15,
2003
FACTS:
A complaint filed by Radelia C. Sy with the Office of
the Court Administrator, charging the Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City
(Branch 131), Judge Antonio J. Fineza, of bribery,
grave misconduct, conduct unbecoming of a judge
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service. Petitioner Sy is accused of estafa and her
case is pending before Judge Fineza. According to
the petitioner, respondent, Judge Fineza, exerted
undue and improper pressure on her by offering to
dismiss the estafa case in exchange for P300,000.
Otherwise, he threatened to convict complainant Sy
of estafa regardless of her innocence. The second
complaint further alleged that on May 23, 2001
complainant Sys counsel in other cases, Atty.
Jubay, had relayed to her that Judge Fineza
warned him that morning during a hearing that she
had not been paying her other lawyers. Judge
Fineza added that complainant Sy had been
threatening to file a case against the former, and
warned that if she does so, she could no longer
appear or set foot in Caloocan City. This eventually
led to the withdrawal of Atty. Jubay as complainant
Sys counsel. Complainant Sy declared that she
delivered money to Judge Fineza six times on
separate occasions. Complainant Sy claimed that
when she was unable to complete the remaining
balance, Judge Fineza began harassing her.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondent has breached the norms
and standards of the judiciary
RULING:
After assessing the pleadings and memoranda
filed, along with the documents and affidavits
attached, the investigating Justice saw no merit in
the charge of bribery but found Judge Fineza guilty
of simple misconduct. As found by the Supreme
Court, bribery is easy to concoct and difficult to
disprove, thus complainant must present a panoply
of evidence in support of such an accusation.
Complainant herein has only her friends to support
her claims who would naturally testify in her favor.
These two incidents clearly show Judge Finezas
utter disrespect for the office he holds as a member
of the judiciary. In the first instance, even assuming
the absence of shouting, finger pointing and
menacing stares, the admitted act of Judge Fineza
in calling complainant Cato sinungaling in the
hallway, already detracts from the equanimity and
judiciousness that are required of a judge. As for
describing one of the complainants witnesses as
BAKLA in a pleading filed before this Court, resort
to argumentum ad hominem is certainly most
unbecoming of a judge, to say the least. While
Judge Fineza denies that the conversation ever
happened, the manifestation of Atty. Jubay cannot
easily be dismissed as a fabrication. It was made
by an officer of the court who could be held liable
for contempt if the same is proven to be false. At
this point, it bears noting that the manifestation was
filed with the court of Judge Fineza and that he
made no mention of ever having imposed sanctions
on Atty. Jubay for making such allegations.The
integrity of the judiciary rests not only upon the fact
that it is able to administer justice but also upon the
perception and confidence of the community that
the people who run the system have done justice.
The assumption of office by a judge places upon
him duties and restrictions peculiar to his exalted
position. He must be perceived, not as a repository
of arbitrary power, but as one who dispenses
justice under the sanction of the rule of law. This
Court has repeatedly reminded members of the
judiciary to be irreproachable in conduct and to be
free from any appearance of impropriety in their
personal behavior, not only in the discharge of their
official duties, but also in their daily life. For no
position exacts a greater demand for moral
righteousness and uprightness of an individual than
a seat in the judiciary. Respondent Judge Fineza is
given one last chance to correct his ways and is
sternly warned that one more transgression will
merit his dismissal from the service. Respondent
Judge Fineza is SUSPENDED from office without
salary and other benefits for six (6) months, with
the STERN WARNING that one more transgression
will merit dismissal from the service.
(B.4) Petitio Principii (Begging the Question) -
this is an informal fallacy, where in the arguments
are said to beg the question. There appears to be
an evidential support, but the evidence is actually
disguised or concealed in the conclusion.
4 Types of Petitio Principii
1. Arguing in Circle (Circular reasoning) - is a
logical fallacy in which the reasoner begins with
what they are trying to end with, this makes use of
its conclusion to serve as its premise. The
argument presupposes the truth of its conclusion.
However there exist no actual difference between
the premise and the conclusion.
E.g. Pvt. Joe Bowers: What are these electrolytes?
Do you even know?
Secretary of State: They're... what they use to
make Brawndo!
Pvt. Joe Bowers: But why do they use them to
make Brawndo?
Secretary of Defense: [raises hand after a
pause] Because Brawndo's got electrolytes.
2. Question-Begging Language - prematurely
assumes that a matter that is or maybe at issue
has already been settled. The arguer begs the
listener to believe or infer that the matter is settled.
When people try to evoke a response to lead or
persuade others of a point that is logically
questionable, the fallacy of the question-begging
language is committed.E.g. This suspect is
charged with killing the other person.
3. Complex Question - this fallacy consists in
asking a question in which some presuppositions
are buried in that question. Another term to refer
this fallacy is loaded question, which suggests that
more questions are embedded in a single question.
Example #1:
How many times per day do you beat your wife?
Explanation: Even if the response is an emphatic,
none! the damage has been done. If you are
hearing this question, you are more likely to accept
the possibility that the person who was asked this
question is a wife-beater, which is fallacious
reasoning on your part.
Example #2:
How many school shootings should we tolerate
before we change the gun laws?
Explanation: The presupposition is that changing
the gun laws will decrease the number of school
shootings. This may be the case, but it is a claim
that is implied in the statement and hidden by a
more complex question. Reactively, when one
hears a question such as this, one's mind will
attempt to search for an answer to the question
which is actually a distraction from rejecting the
implicit claim being made. It is quite brilliant but still
fallacious.
4. Leading Question - this fallacy consists in
directing the respondent to give a particular answer
to a question at issue by the manner in which the
question is asked. A leading question is a question
which subtly prompts the respondent to answer in a
particular way. Leading questions are generally
undesirable as they result in false or slanted
information.
Example #1 Do you have any problems with your
boss? (Leading)
This question prompts the person to question their
employment relationship. In a subtle way it raises
the prospect that there are problems.
Example #2 Tell me about your relationship with
your boss. (Not leading)
This question does not seek any judgment and
there is less implication that there might be
something wrong with the relationship.
(C) FALLACIES OF INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE
(C.1) Argumentatum ad Antiquum (Appeal to the
Ages/Tradition) - this fallacy attempts to persuade
others to believe on his argument by appealing to
their feelings of reverence or respect for some
tradition, instead of giving a rational basis. This is
illogical since pointing out that a particular custom
has the status of tradition sheds no light on whether
it should be followed or not. What was true in the
past may not be true at the present. Given the
social, cultural changes in the society, what may be
acceptable before may not be necessarily
acceptable now. E.g. Cremation over burial.
(C.2) Argumentatum ad Verecundiam (Appeal to
Inappropriate Authority) - this fallacy consists in
persuading others by appealing to people who
command respect or authority but do not have
legitimate authority in the matter at hand. It
happens when: (a) the source is not genuine
authority on the subject at issue (b) source is
biased or has some reason to lie and (c) the
accuracy of the sources observation is
questionable. E.g. Science over religious
authorities (expert opinion based on his expertise -
valid)
(C.3) Accident (dicto simpliciter) - this fallacy
consist in applying a general rule to a particular
case when circumstances suggest that an
exception to the rule should apply. General rules
usually have their exceptions. This fallacy occurs
when such general rules are applied to special
circumstances. This is inappropriate because of the
situations accident or exceptional facts. E.g.
exceptions to the hearsay rule (a dying
declaration), Angara diary exceptions to freedom
of speech (incited a riot, inducement to commit
crimes against public order)
People vs Gacott GR No 116049 13 July1995
Facts:
For failure to check citations of the prosecutions,
the order of respondent RTC Judge Eustaquio
Gacott Jr dismissing a criminal case was annulled
by the Supreme Court. The respondent judge was
also sanctioned with a reprimand and a fine of PHP
10k for gross ignorance of law. The judgment was
made by the Second Division of the Supreme
Court.
Issue:
Whether or not the Second Division of the Supreme
Court has the competence to administratively
discipline respondent judge?
Decision:
To require the entire court to deliberate upon and
participate in all administrative matter or cases
regardless of the sanctions, imposable or imposed,
would result in a congested docket and undue
delay in the adjudication of cases in the Court,
especially in administrative matters, since even
cases involving the penalty of reprimand would
require action by the Court En Banc.
(C.4) Hasty Generalization (Converse Accident)
- this fallacy consists in drawing a general or
universal conclusion from insufficient particular
case. It considers certain exceptional cases and
generalizes it to a rule.Its reasoning is the opposite
of the fallacy of accident. E.g., "Wow! Did you see
that teenager run that red light? Teenage drivers
are really pathetic. E.g., The following argument is
raised to oppose the view that boys have greater
inherent mathematical ability. "When I was four, my
father taught me the beauty of numbers, and I have
excelled in mathematics ever since. My
conclusion? The males who grew up with a high
aptitude for math are not spending enough time
with their daughters."
(C.5) Argumentatum ad Ignorantiam (Arguing
from Ignorance) - the fallacy that a proposition is
true simply on the basis that it has not been proved
false or that it is false simply because it has not
been proved true or its opposite cannot be proven.
It uses the absence of evidence to justify that it is
true and treats such absence as if it were the
presence of evidence. E.g. If one argues that God
or telepathy, ghosts, or UFO's do not exist because
their existence has not been proven beyond a
shadow of doubt, then this fallacy occurs. On the
other hand, if one argues that God, telepathy, and
so on do exist because their non-existence has not
been proved, then one argues fallaciously as well.
(C.6) False Dilemma - this fallacy arises when the
premise of an argument presents us with a choice
between two alternatives and assumes they are
exhaustive when in fact they are not. They are
exhaustive when they cover all possibilities (only
choices) e.g pregnant or not pregnant (exhaustive);
abortion is morally right or wrong (non exhaustive
because it may be morally permissible). By making
non exhaustive alternatives appear otherwise, the
arguer is able to force the person to choose
between the alternatives in the argument. What is
wrong here is that they overlook the fact that there
can be other ways to prove the issue. Common
way to commit: treating contraries (a term and its
opposite) as if they were contradictories (a term
and its negative). In contradictories, one must be
true and the other is false, on the other hand
contraries may be both false.
Chapter 6: Rules of Legal Reasoning
A. Rules of Collision
There are laws that are said to be
incompatible with each other and is therefore the
task of the judiciary to first attempt to reconcile and
harmonize them with each other and if not possible
and would be in vain, uphold one over the other.
But if conflict arises, the Court must provide a
beneficial and effective construction as will render
the provision operative, effective and harmonious.
In view of these conflicting provisions, the Court
must have the purpose of upholding justice and
equity.
a. Provision vs Provision
The statute must be construed as a
whole and attempted must first be made to
reconcile these conflicting provisions in order to
attain the intent of the law.
a.1 Courts should adopt a construction that
will give effect to every part of the statute. Ut magis
valeat quam pereat (That the thing may rather have
effect than be destroyed.)
a.2 Clauses and phrases of a statute must
not be taken separately but in relation to the
statutes totality.
a.3 when there is in the same statute a
particular and general one, the particular
enactment must be operative and the general
enactment must be taken to affect only such cases
as are not within the particular enactment.
a.4 when the instrument is susceptible of
two interpretations, one which will make it invalid
and illegal and another which will make it valid and
legal, the latter interpretation shall be adopted.
Aisporna v. CA [GR L-39419, 12 April 1982 (113
SCRA 459)]
Facts:
Since 7 March and on 21 June 1969, a Personal
Accident Policy was issued by Perla Compania de
Seguros, through its authorized agent Rodolfo
Aisporna, for a period of 12 months with the
beneficiary designated as Ana M. Isidro. The
insured died by violence during lifetime of policy.
Mapalad Aisporna participated actively with the
aforementioned policy.
For reason unexplained, an information was filed
against Mapalad Aisporna, Rodolfos wife, with the
City Court of Cabanatuan for violation of Section
189 of the Insurance Act on 21 November 1970, or
acting as an agent in the soliciting insurance
without securing the certificate of authority from the
office of the Insurance Commissioner. Mapalad
contends that being the wife of true agent, Rodolfo,
she naturally helped him in his work, as clerk, and
that policy was merely a renewal and was issued
because Isidro had called by telephone to renew,
and at that time, her husband, Rodolfo, was absent
and so she left a note on top of her husbands desk
to renew. On 2 August 1971, the trial court found
Mapalad guilty and sentenced here to pay a fine of
P500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs. On appeal and on
14 August 1974, the trial courts decision was
affirmed by the appellate court (CA-GR 13243-CR).
Hence, the present recourse was filed on 22
October 1974. On 20 December 1974, the Office of
the Solicitor General, representing the Court of
Appeals, submitted that Aisporna may not be
considered as having violated Section 189 of the
Insurance Act.
Issue: Whether Mapalad Aisporna is an insurance
agent within the scope or intent of the Insurance
Act
Held:
Legislative intent must be ascertained from a
consideration of the statute as a whole. The
particular words, clauses and phrases should not
be studied as detached and isolated expressions,
but the whole and every part of the statute must be
considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts
and in order to produce harmonious whole. In the
present case, the first paragraph of Section 189
prohibits a person from acting as agent, subagent
or broker in the solicitation or procurement of
applications for insurance without first procuring a
certificate of authority so to act from the Insurance
Commissioner; while the second paragraph defines
who is an insurance agent within the intent of the
section; while the third paragraph prescribes the
penalty to be imposed for its violation. The
appellate courts ruling that the petitioner is
prosecuted not under the second paragraph of
Section 189 but under its first paragraph is a
reversible error, as the definition of insurance agent
in paragraph 2 applies to the paragraph 1 and 2 of
Section 189, which is any person who for
compensation shall be an insurance agent within
the intent of this section. Without proof of
compensation, directly or indirectly, received from
the insurance policy or contract, Mapalad Aisporna
may not be held to have violated Section 189 of the
Insurance Act. Under the Texas Penal Code 1911,
Article 689, making it a misdemeanor for any
person for direct or indirect compensation to solicit
insurance without a certificate of authority to act as
an insurance agent, an information, failing to allege
that the solicitor was to receive compensation
either directly or indirectly, charges no offense. In
the case of Bolen vs. Stake,19 the provision of
Section 3750, Snyder's Compiled Laws of
Oklahoma 1909 is intended to penalize persons
only who acted as insurance solicitors without
license, and while acting in such capacity
negotiated and concluded insurance contracts for
compensation. It must be noted that the
information, in the case at bar, does not allege that
the negotiation of an insurance contracts by the
accused with Eugenio Isidro was one for
compensation. This allegation is essential, and
having been omitted, a conviction of the accused
could not be sustained. It is well-settled in our
jurisprudence that to warrant conviction, every
element of the crime must be alleged and proved.
After going over the records of this case, we are
fully convinced, as the Solicitor General maintains,
that accused did not violate Section 189 of the
Insurance Act.
G.R. No. 196231 September 4, 2012
EMILIO A. GONZALES III, vs OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
These two petitions have been because they raise
a common thread of issues relating to the
President's exercise of the power to remove from
office herein petitioners who claim the protective
cloak of independence of the constitutionally-
created office to which they belong - the Office of
the Ombudsman.
The cases, G.R. No. 196231 and G.R. No. 196232
primarily seeks to declare as unconstitutional
Section 8(2) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770,
otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of
1989, which gives the President the power to
dismiss a Deputy Ombudsman of the Office of
the Ombudsman.
FACTS: G.R. No. 196231: A formal charge for
Grave Misconduct (robbery, grave threats, robbery
extortion and physical injuries) was filed before
PNP-NCR against Manila Police District Senior
Inspector (P/S Insp.) Rolando Mendoza and four
others. Private complainant, Christian M. Kalaw,
before the Office of the City Prosecutor, filed a
similar charge. While said cases were still pending,
the Office of the Regional Director of the National
Police Commission (NPC) turned over, upon the
request of petitioner Gonzales III, all relevant
documents and evidence in relation to said case to
the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
appropriate administrative adjudication.
Subsequently a case for Grave Misconduct was
lodged against P/S Insp. Rolando Mendoza and his
fellow police officers in the Office of the
Ombudsman. Meanwhile, the case filed before the
Office of the city Prosecutor was dismissed upon a
finding that the material allegations made by the
complainant had not been substantiated "by any
evidence at all to warrant the indictment of
respondents of the offenses charged." Similarly, the
Internal Affairs Service of the PNP issued a
Resolution recommending the dismissal without
prejudice of the administrative case against the
same police officers, for failure of the complainant
to appear in three (3) consecutive hearings despite
due notice. However, upon the recommendation of
petitioner Gonzales III, a Decision finding P/S Insp.
Rolando Mendoza and his fellow police officers
guilty of Grave Misconduct was approved by the
Ombudsman. Mendoza and his colleagues filed for
a motion for reconsideration which was forwarded
to Ombudsman Gutierrez for final approval, in
whose office it remained pending for final review
and action when P/S Insp. Mendoza hijacked a
bus-load of foreign tourists on that fateful day of
August 23, 2010 in a desperate attempt to have
himself reinstated in the police service.
In the aftermath of the hostage-taking incident,
which ended in the tragic murder of eight
HongKong Chinese nationals, the injury of seven
others and the death of P/S Insp. Rolando
Mendoza, a public outcry against the blundering of
government officials prompted the creation of the
Incident Investigation and Review Committee
(IIRC). It was tasked to determine accountability for
the incident through the conduct of public hearings
and executive sessions. The IIRC found Deputy
Ombudsman Gonzales committed serious and
inexcusable negligence and gross violation of
their own rules of procedure by allowing
Mendoza's motion for reconsideration to
languish for more than nine (9) months without
any justification, in violation of the Ombudsman
prescribed rules to resolve motions for
reconsideration in administrative disciplinary
cases within five (5) days from submission. The
inaction is gross, considering there is no opposition
thereto. The prolonged inaction precipitated the
desperate resort to hostage-taking. Petitioner was
dismissed from service. Hence the petition.
G.R. No. 196232: Acting Deputy Special
Prosecutor of the Office of the Ombudsman
charged Major General Carlos F. Garcia, his wife
Clarita D. Garcia, their sons Ian Carl Garcia, Juan
Paulo Garcia and Timothy Mark Garcia and several
unknown persons with Plunder and Money
Laundering before the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan denied Major General Garcia's
urgent petition for bail holding that strong
prosecution evidence militated against the grant of
bail. However, the government, represented by
petitioner, Special Prosecutor Barreras-Sulit and
sought the Sandiganbayan's approval of a Plea
Bargaining Agreement ("PLEBARA") entered into
with the accused. The Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution finding the change of plea warranted
and the PLEBARA compliant with jurisprudential
guidelines.
Outraged by the backroom deal that could allow
Major General Garcia to get off the hook with
nothing but a slap on the hand notwithstanding
the prosecution's apparently strong evidence of
his culpability for serious public offenses, the
House of Representatives' Committee on
Justice conducted public hearings on the
PLEBARA. At the conclusion of these public
hearings, the Committee on Justice passed and
adopted Committee Resolution No. 3,
recommending to the President the dismissal of
petitioner Barreras-Sulit from the service and
the filing of appropriate charges against her
Deputies and Assistants before the appropriate
government office for having committed acts
and/or omissions tantamount to culpable
violations of the Constitution and betrayal of
public trust, which are violations under the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and
grounds for removal from office under the
Ombudsman Act. Hence the petition.
ISSUE: Whether the Office of the President has
jurisdiction to exercise administrative
disciplinary power over a Deputy Ombudsman
and a Special Prosecutor who belong to the
c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y - c r e a t e d O f fi c e o f t h e
Ombudsman.
HELD: YES. The Ombudsman's administrative
disciplinary power over a Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor is not
exclusive. While the Ombudsman's authority to
discipline administratively is extensive and covers
all government officials, whether appointive or
elective, with the exception only of those officials
removable by impeachment such authority is by no
means exclusive. Petitioners cannot insist that they
should be solely and directly subject to the
disciplinary authority of the Ombudsman. For, while
Section 21 of R.A. 6770 declares the
Ombudsman's disciplinary authority over all
government officials, Section 8(2), on the other
hand, grants the President express power of
removal over a Deputy Ombudsman and a Special
Prosecutor. A harmonious construction of these two
apparently conflicting provisions in R.A. No. 6770
leads to the inevitable conclusion that Congress
had intended the Ombudsman and the President to
exercise concurrent disciplinary jurisdiction over
petitioners as Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor, respectively. Indubitably, the manifest
intent of Congress in enacting both provisions -
Section 8(2) and Section 21 - in the same Organic
Act was to provide for an external authority, through
the person of the President, that would exercise the
power of administrative discipline over the Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor without in the
least diminishing the constitutional and plenary
authority of the Ombudsman over all government
officials and employees. Such legislative design is
simply a measure of "check and balance" intended
to address the lawmakers' real and valid concern
that the Ombudsman and his Deputy may try to
protect one another from administrative liabilities.
By granting express statutory
power to the President to remove
a Deputy Ombudsman and a
Special Prosecutor, Congress
merely filled an obvious gap in
the law. While the removal of the Ombudsman
himself is also expressly provided for in the
Constitution, which is by impeachment under
Section 2 of the same Article, there is, however, no
constitutional provision similarly dealing with the
removal from office of a Deputy Ombudsman, or a
Special Prosecutor, for that matter. By enacting
Section 8(2) of R.A. 6770, Congress simply filled a
gap in the law without running afoul of any
provision in the Constitution or existing statutes. In
fact, the Constitution itself, under Section 2,
authorizes Congress to provide for the removal of
all other public officers, including the Deputy
Ombudsman and Special Prosecutor, who are not
subject to impeachment.
The Power of the President to
Remove a Deputy Ombudsman
and a Special Prosecutor is
Implied from his Power to
Appoint. In giving the President the power to
remove a Deputy Ombudsman and Special
Prosecutor, Congress simply laid down in express
terms an authority that is already implied from the
President's constitutional authority to appoint the
aforesaid officials in the Office of the Ombudsman.
The integrity and effectiveness of the Deputy
Ombudsman for the MOLEO as a military
watchdog looking into abuses and irregularities that
affect the general morale and professionalism in
the military is certainly of primordial importance in
relation to the President's own role as Commander-
in-Chief of the Armed Forces. It would not be
incongruous for Congress, therefore, to grant the
President concurrent disciplinary authority over the
Deputy Ombudsman for the military and other law
enforcement offices.
Granting the President the Power
to Remove a Deputy Ombudsman
does not Diminish the
Independence of the Office of the
Ombudsman. he claim that Section 8(2) of R.A.
No. 6770 granting the President the power to
remove a Deputy Ombudsman from office totally
frustrates, if not resultantly negates the
independence of the Office of the Ombudsman is
tenuous. The independence which the Office of the
Ombudsman is vested with was intended to free it
from political considerations in pursuing its
constitutional mandate to be a protector of the
people. What the Constitution secures for the
Office of the Ombudsman is, essentially, political
independence. This means nothing more than that
"the terms of office, the salary, the appointments
and discipline of all persons under the office" are
"reasonably insulated from the whims of
politicians."
Petitioner Gonzales may not be
removed from office where the
questioned acts, falling short of
constitutional standards, do not
constitute betrayal of public trust. Petitioner's
act of directing the PNP-IAS to endorse P/S Insp.
Mendoza's case to the Ombudsman without citing
any reason therefor cannot, by itself, be considered
a manifestation of his undue interest in the case
that would amount to wrongful or unlawful conduct.
After all, taking cognizance of cases upon the
request of concerned agencies or private parties is
part and parcel of the constitutional mandate of the
Office of the Ombudsman to be the "champion of
the people." The factual circumstances that the
case was turned over to the Office of the
Ombudsman upon petitioner's request; that
administrative liability was pronounced against P/S
Insp. Mendoza even without the private
complainant verifying the truth of his statements;
that the decision was immediately implemented; or
that the motion for reconsideration thereof
remained pending for more than nine months
cannot be simply taken as evidence of petitioner's
undue interest in the case considering the lack of
evidence of any personal grudge, social ties or
business affiliation with any of the parties to the
case that could have impelled him to act as he did.
There was likewise no evidence at all of any bribery
that took place, or of any corrupt intention or
questionable motivation. The OP's pronouncement
of administrative accountability against petitioner
and the imposition upon him of the corresponding
penalty of dismissal must be reversed and set
aside, as the findings of neglect of duty or
misconduct in office do not amount to a betrayal of
public trust. Hence, the President, while he may be
vested with authority, cannot order the removal of
petitioner as Deputy Ombudsman, there being no
intentional wrongdoing of the grave and serious
kind amounting to a betrayal of public trust.
The Office of the President is vested
with statutory authority to proceed
administratively against petitioner
Barreras-Sulit to determine the
existence of any of the grounds for
her removal from office as provided
for under the Constitution and the
Ombudsman Act.
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 196231, the decision of
the Office of the President in OP Case No. 10-
J-460 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner
Emilio A. Gonzales III is ordered REINSTATED with
payment of backwages corresponding to the period
of suspension effective immediately, even as the
Office of the Ombudsman is directed to proceed
with the investigation in connection with the above
case against petitioner. In G.R. No. 196232, We
AFFIRM the continuation of OP-DC Case No. 11-
B-003 against Special Prosecutor Wendell
Barreras-Sulit for alleged acts and omissions
tantamount to culpable violation of the Constitution
and a betrayal of public trust, in accordance with
Section 8(2) of the Ombudsman Act of 1989.
The challenge to the constitutionality of Section
8(2) of the Ombudsman Act is hereby DENIED.
b. Laws vs Constitution - The Civil Code
provides:
Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by
subsequent ones, and their violation or non-
observance shall not be excused by disuse, or
custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to
be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former
shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts,
orders and regulations shall be valid only when
they are not contrary to the laws or the
Constitution.
DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC
(G.R. No. 127325 - March 19, 1997)
Facts:
Private respondent Atty. Jesus Delfin,
president of Peoples Initiative for Reforms,
Modernization and Action (PIRMA), filed with
COMELEC a petition to amend the constitution to
lift the term limits of elective officials, through
Peoples Initiative. He based this petition on Article
XVII, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution, which
provides for the right of the people to exercise the
power to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution. Subsequently the COMELEC issued
an order directing the publication of the petition and
of the notice of hearing and thereafter set the case
for hearing. At the hearing, Senator Roco, the IBP,
Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon, Public
Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino appeared as intervenors-oppositors.
Senator Roco filed a motion to dismiss the Delfin
petition on the ground that one which is cognizable
by the COMELEC. The petitioners herein Senator
Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Isabel Ongpin
filed this civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court against COMELEC and the
Delfin petition rising the several arguments, such
as the following: (1) The constitutional provision on
peoples initiative to amend the constitution can
only be implemented by law to be passed by
Congress. No such law has been passed; (2) The
peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the
Constitution, not to revision thereof. Lifting of the
term limits constitutes a revision, therefore it is
outside the power of peoples initiative. The
Supreme Court granted the Motions for
Intervention.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Sec. 2, Art. XVII of the
1987 Constitution is a self-executing provision.
(2) Whether or not COMELEC Resolution
No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is valid,
considering the absence in the law of specific
provisions on the conduct of such initiative.
(3) Whether the lifting of term limits of
elective officials would constitute a revision or an
amendment of the Constitution.
Held:
Sec. 2, Art XVII of the Constitution is not
self executory, thus, without implementing
legislation the same cannot operate. Although the
Constitution has recognized or granted the right,
the people cannot exercise it if Congress does not
provide for its implementation.
The portion of COMELEC Resolution No.
2300 which prescribes rules and regulations on the
conduct of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, is void. It has been an established rule
that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated
(potestas delegata non delegari potest). The
delegation of the power to the COMELEC being
invalid, the latter cannot validly promulgate rules
and regulations to implement the exercise of the
right to peoples initiative.
The lifting of the term limits was held to be
that of a revision, as it would affect other provisions
of the Constitution such as the synchronization of
elections, the constitutional guarantee of equal
access to opportunities for public service, and
prohibiting political dynasties. A revision cannot be
done by initiative. However, considering the Courts
decision in the above Issue, the issue of whether or
not the petition is a revision or amendment has
become academic.
c. Laws vs Laws
Lex posteriori derogat priori - more recent
law prevails over (abrogrates, overrrules, trumps)
an inconsistent earlier law. One test that is applied
in circumstances when (1) both customary and
treaty sources of law exist and (2) these two
sources cannot be construed consistently. E.g
computation of time art 13 of CC versus Admin
Code of 1987, the recent law governs.
A later law repeals an earlier one because
it is the later legislative will. It is to be presumed
that the lawmakers knew the older law and
intended to change it.
Between common law and statutory
provision, latter prevails.
The doctrine of implied repeal is a concept
in constitutional theory which states that where an
Act of Parliament or an Act of Congress (or of some
other legislature in a common law system) conflicts
with an earlier one, the later Act takes precedence
and the conflicting parts of the earlier Act becomes
legally inoperable. This doctrine is expressed in the
Latin phrase "leges posteriores priores contrarias
abrogant. Implied repeal is to be contrasted with
the express repeal of legislation by the legislative
body. Under United States law, "implied repeal" is a
disfavored doctrine. That is, if a court can reconcile
the two statutes with any reasonable interpretation,
that interpretation is preferred to one that treats the
earlier statute as invalidated by the later one.[1]
d. General laws vs. Special laws
Generalia specializes non derogant, the
provisions of a general statute must yield to those
of a special one.
If the general and special law are
irreconcilable, the general statute must give way to
the special or particular provisions as an exception
to the general provision.
In case of conflict between a general
provision of a special law and a particular provision
of general law, the latter will prevail.
FRANCISCO T. DUQUE III, in his capacity as
Chairman of the CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION,
Petitioner, v. FLORENTINO VELOSO,
Respondent.
FACTS:
Respondent, then District Supervisor of Quedan
and Rural Credit Guarantee Corporation
(Quedancor), Cagayan de Oro City, was
administratively charged with three (3) counts of
dishonesty in connection with his unauthorized
withdrawals of money deposited by Juanito Quino
(complainant), a client of Quedancor. The
complainant applied for a restructuring of his loan
with Quedancor and deposited the amount of
P50,000.00 to Quedancors cashier for his Manila
account. In three (3) separate occasions, the
respondent, without notice and authority from the
complainant and with the assistance of
Quedancor's cashier, managed to withdraw the
P50,000.00 deposit. Upon the discovery of the
withdrawals, the complainant demanded the return
of the money and called the attention of the
manager of Quedancor in Cagayan de Oro City,
who issued to the respondent a memorandum
requiring him to explain the withdrawals and to
return the money.
From the established facts, the respondent was
charged by Quedancor with dishonesty, and was
subsequently found guilty of the charges and
dismissed from the service. The CSC affirmed the
findings and conclusions of Quedancor on appeal.
Dissatisfied with the adverse rulings of Quedancor
and the CSC, the respondent elevated his case to
the CA which adjudged him guilty of dishonesty, but
modified the penalty of dismissal to one (1) year
suspension from office without pay.
The CSC argues that the CA disregarded the
applicable law and jurisprudence which penalize
the offense of dishonesty with dismissal from the
service. The CSC also argues that there are no
mitigating circumstances to warrant a reduction of
the penalty.
ISSUE: Whether or not dishonesty is the proper
administrative penalty to be imposed on the
respondent?
HELD: Court of Appeals decision is reversed
and set aside.
Dismissal from the service is the prescribed penalty
imposed by Section 52(A)(1), Rule IV of the
Uniform Rules for the commission of dishonesty
even as a first offense. The aforesaid rule
underscores the constitutional principle that public
office is a public trust and only those who can live
up to such exacting standard deserve the honor of
continuing in public service. It is true that Section
53, Rule IV of the Uniform Rules provides the
application of mitigating, aggravating or alternative
circumstances in the imposition of administrative
penalties. Section 53, Rule IV applies only when
clear proof is shown, using the specific standards
set by law and jurisprudence, that the facts in a
given case justify the mitigation of the prescribed
penalty.
While in most cases, length of service is
considered in favor of the respondent, it is not
considered where the offense committed is found to
be serious or grave; or when the length of service
helped the offender commit the infraction. The
factors against mitigation are present in this case.
The circumstance that this is the respondent's first
administrative offense should not benefit him. By
the express terms of Section 52, Rule IV of the
Uniform Rules, the commission of an administrative
offense classified as a serious offense (like
dishonesty) is punishable by dismissal from the
service even for the first time. In other words, the
clear language of Section 52, Rule IV does not
consider a first-time offender as a mitigating
circumstance. Likewise, under statutory
construction principles, a special provision prevails
over a general provision. Section 53, Rule IV of the
Uniform Rules, a general provision relating to the
appreciation of mitigating, aggravating or
alternative circumstances, must thus yield to the
provision of Section 52, Rule IV of the Uniform
Rules which expressly provides for the penalty of
dismissal even for the first commission of the
offense.
We reject as mitigating circumstances the
respondent's admission of his culpability and the
restitution of the amount. As pointed out by the
CSC, the respondent made use of the
complainants money in 2001 while the restitution
was made only in 2003, during the pendency of the
administrative case against him. Under the
circumstances, the restitution was half-hearted and
was certainly neither purely voluntary nor made
because of the exercise of good conscience; it was
triggered, more than anything else, by his fear of
possible administrative penalties. The admission of
guilt and the restitution effected were clearly mere
afterthoughts made two (2) years after the
commission of the offense and after the
administrative complaint against him was filed. With
these circumstances in mind, we do not find it
justified to relieve the respondent of the full
consequences of his dishonest actions.
Thus, the Constitution stresses that a public office
is a public trust and public officers must at all times
be accountable to the people, serve them with
utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead
modest lives. These constitutionally-enshrined
principles, oft-repeated in our case law, are not
mere rhetorical flourishes or idealistic sentiments.
They should be taken as working standards by all
in the public service.
GRANTED.
e. Laws vs Ordinances
The tests of a valid ordinance are well
established. A long line of decisions has held that
for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be
within the corporate powers of the local
government unit to enact and must be passed
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it
must also conform to the following substantive
requirements: (1) must not contravene the
Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or
oppressive; (3) must not be partial or
discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may
regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent
with public policy; and (6) must not be
unreasonable.
An essential requisite of a valid ordinance
is that it must not contravene the statute, for it is a
fundamental principle that ordinance are inferior in
status and subordinate to the laws of the state. An
administrative rule of regulation cannot contravene
the law in which it is based.
B. Rules of Interpretation and Construction
CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION,
DISTINGUISHED
Construction is the drawing of conclusions with
respect to subjects that are beyond the direct
expression of the text, while interpretation is the
process of discovering the true meaning of the
language used.
Interpretation is limited to exploring the written text.
Construction on the other hand is the drawing of
conclusions, respecting subjects that lie beyond the
direct expressions of the text.
Supreme Court is the one and only Constitutional
Court and all other lower courts are statutory courts
and such lower courts have the power to construe
and interpret written laws.
DUTY OF THE COURTS TO CONSTRUE AND
INTERPRET THE LAW; REQUISITES
1. There must be an actual case or controversy,
2. There is ambiguity in the law involved in the
controversy.
Ambiguity exists if reasonable persons can find
different meanings in a statute, document, etc.
A statute is ambiguous if it is admissible of two or
more possible meanings.
If the law is clear and unequivocal, the Court has
no other alternative but to apply the law and not to
interpret.
Construction and interpretation of law come only
after it has been demonstrated that application is
impossible or inadequate without them.
Daoang v Municipal Judge
G.R. No. L-34568
28 March 1988
Facts:
Petitioners are grandchildren of private
respondents Agonoy. Private respondents filed a
petition before the MTC of San Nicolas seeking
adoption of two minors. Petitioners filed an
opposition to the adoption invoking the provisions
of the Civil Code. That the respondents have a
legitimate child, the mother of the petitioners, now
deceased, as such they are not qualified to adopt
as per Article 335 of the aforesaid Code. The
petition for adoption was granted. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not private respondents are
disqualified to adopt under paragraph 1 of Art. 335.
Held:
No. The provision invoked by the petitioners
is clear and unambiguous. Therefore, no
construction or interpretation should be made. To
add grandchildren in this article where no such
word is included would be in violation to the legal
maxim that what is expressly included would
naturally exclude what is not included.
C. Rules of Judgment
Like almost all powers conferred by the
Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject
to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual
case or controversy calling for the exercise of
judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act
must have the standing to question the validity of
the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he
must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain,
direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the
question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.
A justiciable controversy involves a
definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal
relations of the parties having adverse legal
interest.
 The proper forum for interpretation and
construction of a law to takes place is within the
halls of the judiciary. No judge or court shall decline
to render judgment by reason of silence, obscurity
or insufficiency of the laws.
It is the duty of the judiciary to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack and or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the government.
Ang Tibay vs CIR, 69 Phil635
Facts:
Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay, a
leather company which supplies the Philippine
Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio
caused the layoff of members of National Labor
Union (NLU). NLU averred that Toribios act is not
valid. The CIR, decided the case and elevated it to
the SC, but a motion for new trial was raised by the
NLU. But Ang Tibay filed a motion for opposing the
said motion.
Issue:
What is the function of CIR as a special court?
Held:
To begin withthe issuebefore us is to realize the
functions of the CIR. The CIR is a special court
whose functions are specifically stated in the law of
its creation which is the Commonwealth Act No.
103). It is more an administrativeboardthan a part
of the integrated judicialsystemofthe nation. It is
not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the
government. Unlike a court of justice which is
essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction
is invoked and deciding only cases that are
presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of
the CIR, as will appear from perusal of its organic
law is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not
onlyexercisesjudicial or quasi-judicial functions in
the determination of disputes between employers
and employees but its functions are far more
comprehensive and extensive. It has jurisdiction
over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate,
decide, and settle any question, matter controversy
or disputes arising between, and/ or affecting
employers and employees or laborers, and
landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, and
regulates the relations between them, subject to,
and in accordance with, the provisions of CA 103.
The CIR is free from rigidity of certain procedural
requirements, but this not mean that it can in
justiciable cases coming before it, entirely ignore or
disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character.
Thereare cardinalprimary rights which must be
respected even inproceedingsof this
character:
(1) the right to a hearing, which includes the
right to present ones cause and submit
evidence in support thereof;
(2) The tribunal must consider the evidence
presented;
(3) The decision must have something to
support itself;
(4) The evidence must be substantial;
(5) The decision must be based on the evidence
presented at the hearing; or at least contained
in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected;
(6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges
must act on its own independent consideration
of the law andfactsof the controversy, and not
simply accept the views of a subordinate;
(7) TheBoardor body should, in all
controversial questions, render its decision in
such manner that the parties to the proceeding
can know the various Issue involved, andthe
reasonfor the decision rendered.
The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved
is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely
affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a
new trial should be, and the same is hereby
granted, and the entire record of this case shall be
remanded to the CIR, with instruction that it reopen
the case receive all such evidence as may be
relevant, and otherwise proceed in accordance with
the requirements set forth.
Interpolation - The process of inserting additional
words in a complete document or instrument in
such manner as to alter its intended meaning; the
addition of words to a complete document or
instrument.
Evisceration - To take away a vital or essential part
of; weaken, damage, or destroy.
REPUBLIC FLOUR MILLS INC. VS. THE
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and THE
COURT OF TAX APPEALS, G.R. No. L-28463,
May 31, 1971
FACTS:
From December 1963 to July 1964,
Republic Flour Mills (petitioner) exported Pollard
and/or bran which was loaded from lighters
alongside vessels engaged in foreign trade while
anchored near the breakwater. The Commissioner
of Customs and The Court of Tax Appeals
(respondent) assessed the petitioner by way of
wharfage dues on the said exportations in the sum
of P7,948.00, which assessment was paid by kept closed. Otherwise, the end result would be not
petitioner under protest respect for, but defiance of, a clear legislative
mandate
In this case, Republic Flour Mills, Inc.
would want the Court to interpret the words The decision of respondent Court of Tax
products of the Philippines found in Section 2802 Appeals of November 27, 1967 is affirmed with
, costs against petitioner.
of the Tariff and Custom Code as excluding bran
(ipa) and pollard (darak) on the ground that, coming
as they do from wheat grain which is imported in
the Philippines, they are merely waste from the
Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs.
production of flour. Another main argument of the Intermediate Appellate Court and BF Homes
petitioner is that no government or private wharves
G.R. No. 74851 (December 9, 1999)
or government facilities were utilized in exporting
such products. In that way, it would not be liable at
all for the wharfage dues assessed under such Facts:
section by respondent Commission of Customs.

On the other hand, the stand of respondent
Commissioner of Customs was that petitioner was
liable for wharfage dues upon receipt or discharge
of the exported goods by a vessel engaged in
foreign trade regardless of the non-use of
government-owned or private wharves.
Respondent Court of Tax Appeals sustained the
action taken by the Commissioner of Customs
under the appropriate provision of the Tariff and
Customs Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not such collection of wharfage
dues was in accordance with law
RULING/HELD:
Petitioner RCBC is a mortgagor-creditor of the
party respondent BF Homes. BF Homes, being a
distressed firm, filed before the Securities and
Exchange Commission a Petition for Rehabilitation
and for Declaration of Suspension of Payments.
Consequently, RCBC requested the sheriff of Rizal
to levy on execution the properties of party
respondent, and consequently obtained favorable
judgment. RCBC being the highest bidder during
the public auction is now seeking for the transfer
certificate of titles from the Register of Deeds
issued in its name. It is worthy to note that it was on

As stated on the Section 2802 of the Tariff October 26, 1984 that RCBC obtained favor over
and Custom Code, "There shall be levied, collected the execution of the respondents properties, and it
and paid on all articles imported or brought into the was only on March 18, 1985 that a Management
Philippines, and on products of the Philippines
Committee was organized by the SEC for BF
exported from the Philippines, a charge of two
pesos per gross metric ton as a fee for wharfage." Homes.
appears to be quite precise. Section 2802 refers to
what is imported and exported.
Issue:
The objective of this act must be carried
out. Even if there is doubt to the meaning of the
Whether or not the Court may depart from the
language employed, the interpretation should not
be at war with the end sought to be attained. If words of the law which clearly provides that a
petitioner were to prevail, subsequent pleas creditor may levy execution on a firms properties
motivated by the same desire to be excluded from when such execution precedes SECs organization
the operation of the Tariff and Customs Code would
of a Management Committee to act as its receiver.
likewise be entitled to sympathetic consideration. It
was desirable then that the gates to such efforts at
unjustified restriction of the coverage of the Act are Held:
PD 209-A states that suspension of claims against
a corporation under rehabilitation is counted or
figured up only upon the appointment of a
management committee or a rehabilitation receiver.
The holding that suspension of actions for claims
against a corporation under rehabilitation takes
effect as soon as the application or a petition for
rehabilitation is filed with the SEC may, to some,
be more logical and wise but unfortunately, such is
incongruent with the clear language of the law.
Suspension of actions for claims commences only
from the time a management committee or receiver
is appointed by the SEC. Petitioner RCBC rightfully
moved for the extrajudicial foreclosure of its
mortgage on October 26, 1984 because a
management committee was not appointed by the
SEC until March 18, 1985.
No matter how practical and noble a reason would
be, in order to depart from the words of the law
stated in clear and unambiguous manner, would be
to encroach upon legislative prerogative to define
the wisdom of the law. Such is plainly judicial
legislation.
Regalado vs. Yulo
No. 42935 15February1935
FACTS:
This case was brought about by the action quo
warranto to determine the respective rights of the
petitioner Felipe Regalado and one of the
respondents, Esteban T. Villar, to the office of
Justice of the peace of Malinao, Albay.
Felipe Regalado qualified for the office of justice of
the peace of Malinao, Albay on April 12, 1906. On
September 13, 1934 Regalado became 65 yrs old.
As a consequence thereafter the judge of first
instance of Albay, acting in accordance w/
instructions from the Sec of Justice, designated
Esteban T. Villar, Justice of the peace of Malinao,
Albay. Regalado surrendered the office to Villar
under protest.
ISSUES:
Whether or not under the provisions of section 203
of the Administrative Code, as amended by the Act
No. 3899, the Justices and auxiliary justices
appointed prior to the approval of the Act No. 3899
who reached the age of 65 yrs after said Act took
effect shall cease to hold office upon reaching the
age of 65 yrs.
No, Because justices appointed prior to the
approval of the act and who completed 65 yrs of
age on September 13 1934, subsequent to the
approval of the Act which was on November 16
1931 and who by law is required to cease to hold
office on January 1, 1933 is not affected by the said
act.
HELD:
RESPONDENT ESTEBAN VILLAR BE OUSTED
FROM THE OFFICE OF JUSTICE OF THE PEACE
OF MALINAO, ALBAY, AND THAT THE
PETITIONER FELIPE REGALADO BE PLACED IN
POSSESSION OF THE SAME.
STAT CON LESSON:
The intent of the law is to be ascertained from the
words used in its construction. (If legislative intent
is not expressed in some appropriate manner, the
courts cannot by interpretation speculate as to an
intent and supply a meaning not found in the
phraseology of the law.)
REPUBLIC v. COURT OF APPEALS
GR Nos. 103882, 105276 November 25, 1998
FACTS:
On June 22, 1957, RA 1899 was approved granting
authority to all municipalities and chartered cities to
undertake and carry out at their own expense the
reclamation by dredging, filling, or other means, of
any foreshore lands bordering them, and to
establish, provide, construct, maintain and repair
proper and adequate docking and harbor facilities
as such municipalities and chartered cities may
determine in consultation with the Secretary of
Finance and the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications.
Pursuant to the said law, Ordinance No. 121 was
passed by the city of Pasay for the reclamation of
foreshore lands within their jurisdiction and entered
into an agreement with Republic Real Estate
Corporation for the said project.
Republic questioned the agreement. It contended,
among others, that the agreement between RREC
and the City of Pasay was void for the object of the
contract is outside the commerce of man, it being a
foreshore land.
Pasay City and RREC countered that the object in
question is within the commerce of man because
RA 1899 gives a broader meaning on the term
foreshore land than that in the definition provided
by the dictionary.
RTC rendered judgment in favour of Pasay City
and RREC, and the decision was affirmed by the
CA with modifications.
ISSUE:
I. Whether or not the term foreshore land organization (like a group of individuals, "business"
includes the submerged area.
II. Whether or not foreshore land and the convicted of a crime can be ordered to pay a fine,
reclaimed area is within the commerce of man.
HELD:
The Court ruled that it is erroneous and
unsustainable to uphold the opinion of the
respondent court that the term foreshore land
includes the submerged areas. To repeat, the term
"foreshore lands" refers to:
The strip of land that lies between the high and low
water marks and that is alternately wet and dry
according to the flow of the tide.
A strip of land margining a body of water (as a lake
or stream); the part of a seashore between the low-
water line usually at the seaward margin of a low-
tide terrace and the upper limit of wave wash at
high tide usually marked by a beach scarp or berm.
(Webster's Third New International Dictionary)
The duty of the court is to interpret the enabling
Act, RA 1899. In so doing, we cannot broaden its
meaning; much less widen the coverage thereof. If
the intention of Congress were to include
submerged areas, it should have provided
expressly. That Congress did not so provide could
only signify the exclusion of submerged areas from
the term foreshore lands.
It bears stressing that the subject matter of Pasay
City Ordinance No. 121, as amended by Ordinance
No. 158, and the Agreement under attack, have
been found to be outside the intendment and scope
of RA 1899, and therefore ultra vires and null and
void.
D. Rules of Procedure
These refers to the process of how a
litigant would protect his right through the
intervention of the court or any other administrative
body. These rules should be viewed as mere tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice.
Administrative rules of procedure are
generally given a liberal construction. This is due to
the fact that administrative proceedings are
generally summary in nature.
Civil procedure is the body of law that
sets out the rules and standards that courts follow
when adjudicating civil lawsuits (as opposed to
procedures in criminal law matters).
Criminal procedure is the adjudication
process of the criminal law. While criminal
procedure differs dramatically by jurisdiction, the
process generally begins with a formal criminal
charge and results in the conviction or acquittal of
the defendant.
Criminal procedure is different from civil
procedure because the burdens andresults are
dramatically different. In criminal matters, action is
taken by the "state" (a federal, state or local
government agency) against an individual or an
or other entity) for violation of law. Someone
can be put on probation, or confinedto serve time
in jail. The sentence imposed on a defendant who
pleads or is found guilty is meant to deter that
person from acting in the same manner in the
future, to deter others from acting in a similar
manner, and to punish the criminal. The state has a
burden of proof to meet before someone can have
their liberties restrained by confinement in jail.
How Civil Procedure is Different
In a civil matter, the controversy is between
two or more "people" (including individuals,
businesses or government agencies). The typical
result is an award of a money judgment to be paid
by one party to the other. The judgment is imposed
to make the aggrieved person "whole" for the harm
that has been caused by the other. The judgment in
a civil matter does not include the imposition of a
criminal sentence.
The rules of civil procedure are different
from those of criminal procedure in part because
the results and objectives of the litigation differ.
Criminal procedures are generally designed to
protect a defendants rights. For example, many
states have codified the landmark case Miranda v.
Arizona(i.e. - Miranda warnings), into very similar
state rules that require an officer to warn you
before you make statements that could hurt your
case and send you to jail. Civil rules are designed
to give both parties a set of equal rules to go by. In
civil procedure, you are not warned before making
incriminating statements, because the result -
losing money - is generally considered less serious
than the criminal alternative - losing your liberty.
Probably the most significant difference
between civil and criminal procedures is the
discovery process. In a civil case, you can be
required to give depositions and disclose evidence,
which could be used against you later at trial. In a
criminal case, you are never required to give
evidence against yourself so the statecan use
itagainst you later. It is always the states burden to
prove you are guilty and the criminal rules of
procedure are designed to insure that you rights
are protected.
 People vs. Kottinger
DoP: 29 Oct 1923
Ponente: Malcolm
Nature: Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of
Manila
Quick Summary: Pictures depicting native
inhabitants in their native attire and in poses
showing how they live in real life is not obscene or
indecent.
Facts:
On November 24, 1992 detective Juan Tolentino
raided Camera Supply Co. located at 110 Escolta,
Manila where he found and confiscated postcards
depicting non-Christian inhabitants of the
Philippines in their native attire and in poses
showing how they live. The six pictures are as
follows:
Exhibit Legend
A Philippines, Bontoc Woman.
A-1 Gree>ngs from the Philippines (depic>ng ve
young boys)
A-2 Ifugao Belle, Philippines
A-3 Igorrot Girl, Rice Field Costume.
A-4 Kalinga Girls, Philippines.
A-5 Moros, Philippines.
J.J. Kottinger, the manager of the company, was
charged of having kept for sale in the store,
obscene and indecent pictures in violation of
section 12 of Act. No. 277 (The Philippine Libel
Law).
The prosecution produced no evidence proving the
obscenity and indecency of the postcards as they
believed the postcards themselves are the best
evidence of that.
Dr. H. Otley Beyer, a UP professor, and
corroborated by other witnesses, testified that none
of the pictures showed anything that he did not see
on various occasions in his studies.
The defendant interposed a demurrer1 based upon
the ground that the facts alleged therein do not
constitute an offense and were not contrary to law.
The trial court overruled the demurrer. The
defendant was found guilty of the offense.
1 an objec>on that an opponent's point is irrelevant or invalid, while gran>ng the factual basis of the point
The question was one of first impression not just in
the Philippines, but also in the US, Great Britain
and elsewhere, which is why the case was
submitted en banc for decision.
Issue:
1. (technical argument) WoN section 12 prohibits
the taking, selling, and publishing of alleged
obscene and indecent pictures and prints.
2. (decisive issue) WoN the pictures portraying the
inhabitants of the country in native dress and as
they appear and can be seen in the regions in
which they live, are obscene or indecent.
Held: The Court disagrees with the appellant on his
technical argument but agrees with him on his main
contention.
1. While the information is lacking in precision, and
while the content of section 12 of the Libel Law is
not as inclusive as it might be, the information is
not fatally defective and covers the alleged facts.
Act. No. 277, section 12 states:
Any person who writes composes, stereotypes,
prints, publishes, sells, or keeps for sale,
distributes, or exhibits any obscene or indecent
writing, paper, book, or other matter, or who
designs, copies, draws, engraves, paints, or
otherwise prepares any obscene picture or print, or
who moulds, cuts, casts, or otherwise makes any
obscene or indecent figure, who writes, composes
or prints any notice or advertisement of any such
writing, paper, book, print, or figure shall be guilty of
a misdemeanor and punished by a fine of not
exceeding 1000 dollars or by imprisonment not
exceeding one year, or both.
The law provides punishment for the sale or
exhibition of any obscene/indecent writing, paper,
book, or other matter. Or other matter is added as
a catch-all phrase, intended to cover kindred
subjects as its antecedent. The rule of ejusdem
generis is not a universal rule, and should be
applied in order to carry out the legislative intent.
While it may be conceded that section 12 does not
cover the present case, article 571, no. 2 of the
Penal Code and section 730 of the Revised
Ordinances of the City of Manila may be applied.
Section 730 states that not person shall exhibit,
circulate, distribute, sell [] any lewd, indecent, or
obscene book, picture [] or any other thing
2. Pictures portraying the inhabitants of the country
in native dress and as they appear and can be
seen in the regions in which they live are not
obscene or indecent within the meaning of the Libel
Law.
Not one parallel case could be found, so the Court
perforced reason from the general to the specific,
from universal principle to actual fact.
Obscenity is defined as something offensive to
chastity, decency or delicacy. Indecency is an act
against good behavior and a just delicacy. The test
for obscenity is whether the tendency of the matter
charged as obscene is to deprave or corrupt those
whose minds are open to such immoral influences
and into whose hands a publication or other article
charged as being obscene may fall. Another test is
whether or not it shocks the ordinary and common
sense of men as an indecency.
The Libel Law does not define what constitutes
obscene or indecent writings, pictures, etc. but the
words obscenity and indecency are themselves they actually live, without attempted presentation of
descriptive, words in common use and every
person of average intelligence understands their
meaning. Whether a picture is obscene/indecent
must depend on the circumstances of the case.
The Court turned to Federal Laws prohibiting the
use and importation of obscene materials into the
Philippines in order to shed light on what
constitutes as obscene or indecent. Obscene as
used in the Federal statutes makes it a criminal
offense to place in the mail any obscene, lewd, or
lascivious publication, signifies that form of
immorality which has relation to sexual impurity,
has the same meaning given at common law in
prosecutions for obscene libel.
In the case of U.S. vs. Harmon (regarding a
violation of the Postal Law), the Court held that the
word obscene, in the absence of a definition in
the statute, is presumed to be employed by the
lawmaker in the ordinary sense of the word and
cannot be said to have acquired any technical
significance. A standard dictionary defines
obscene as offensive to chastity and decency;
expressing or presenting to the mind or view
something which delicacy, purity, and decency
forbid to be exposed.
In Rex vs. Hicklin, the Chief Justice said The test
of obscenity is this: [] and where it would suggest
to the minds of the young of either sex, or even to
persons of more advanced years, thoughts of the
most impure, causing lewd thoughts of an immoral
tendency.
Laws of this character are made for society in the
aggregate, and not in particular. So while there may
be some individuals or societies whose moral
sense would neither be depraved or offended, such
cannot be allowed to be a standard which
obscenity/indecency is to be tested. The test,
rather, is what is the judgment of the aggregate
sense of the community reached by it? What is the
probable effect on the sense of decency, purity and
chastity of society, extending to the family (the
foundation of the state)?
It appears that a national standard has been set up
by the Congress of the US. There are copies of
reputable magazines which circulate freely
throughout the US and other countries and
admitted in the Philippines which contain
illustrations similar to the pictures in questions.
Publications of the Philippine Government (Ifugao
Law, Philippine Journal of Science, Reports of
the Philippine Commission for 1903, 1912, 1913)
have also been offered in evidence.
The pictures in question merely depict persons as
persons in unusual postures or dress. The
aggregate judgment of the Philippine community,
the moral sense of all the people in the Philippines,
would not be shocked by photographs of this type.
The Court is convinced the postcards cannot be
characterized as offensive to chastity, or foul, or
filthy. The Court notes the statement of the
proprietor of the photos that he would on his own
initiative place suitable and explicit inscriptions on
the pictures so that no one may be misled and may
even withdraw from sale certain pictures that may
be offensive to the sensibilities of his customers.
Dispositive: Judgment reversed. Information is
dismissed. Defendant-appellant is acquitted with all
costs de oficio.
Dissenting Opinion (Romualdez)
While the pictures cannot strictly be termed
obscene, they must be regarded as indecent.
Such pictures offend modesty and refinement, and
as such, is indecent. This is shown by common
sense as no woman claiming to be decent would
stand before the public in Manila (where the
pictures where exhibited) in the same fashion as
the pictures.
In non-Christian regions, such pictures may not be
offensive, but in Manila, where they were exhibited,
they are.
FLORIAN R. GAOIRAN v. HON. ANGEL C.
ALCALA, ET AL.
GR No. 150178 444 SCRA 428 26
NOVEMBER 2004

Callejo, Sr., J.:
FACTS:
On October 29, 1997, a letter-complaint
was filed with CHED against Florian Gaoiran
(petitioner), Head Teacher III in the High School
Department of the Angadanan Agro-Industrial
College (AAIC), a state-supervised school in
Angadanan, Isabela. Edmond M. Castillejo,
Administrative Officer II of the same school,
charged petitioner of mauling him while he was
performing his duties. Appended to the letter-
complaint were the verified criminal complaint filed
by Castillejo against petitioner and the sworn
statements of his witnesses. The criminal complaint
for assault to a person in authority was filed with
the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Angadanan-San
Guillermo.
Joel Voltaire V. Mayo, who was later
appointed Director of the Legal Affairs Service of
CHED, issued a Resolution dated February 20,
1999, dismissing the administrative complaint
against the petitioner on the ground that the letter-
complaint was not under oath. However, Hon.
Angel C. Alcala, then Chairman of CHED, unaware
of the existence of Mayos resolution, issued
another Resolution dated June 3, 1999, finding
petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
Petitioner was dismissed form service.
Petitioner then filed with the RTC of
Cauayan, Isabela, Branch 20, a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and injunction. He alleged
grave abuse of discretion on the part of Alcala in
issuing the Resolution despite that a previous
Resolution already dismissed the administrative
complaint against him. The RTC sided with the
petitioner and declared the Resolution of Alcala null
and void.

The letter-complaint was referred to the

Legal Affairs Service of the CHED. Atty. Felina S.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside
Dasig, then OIC of the Office of the Director III,
the decision of RTC. It declared as valid Alcalas
Legal Affairs Service, conducted a fact-finding
Resolution. Hence, this petition for review.
investigation on the mauling incident. After the fact-
finding investigation was terminated, and upon
finding of a prima facie case against the petitioner
for grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the The petitioner continuously argued that the
best interest of the service, Atty. Dasig issued the letter-complaint is inexistent because it was not
Formal Charge and Order of Preventive made under oath and does not contain a
Suspension dated July 27, 1998. certification of non-forum shopping. Petitioner cites
Section 2, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of EO No. 292 and Section
4(d) of Civil Service Commission Resolution No.
The petitioner did not submit his written
94-0521 (Uniform Rules of Procedure in the
counter-affidavit or answer to the charges against
Conduct of Administrative Legislation). Hence, the
him. Instead, he filed with the RTC of Cauayan,
formal charge and order of preventive suspension
Isabela, Branch 20, a petition for certiorari and
stemming from it is likewise null and void.
prohibition to restrain enforcement of the preventive
suspension order. Having served the suspension,
the case was dismissed for being moot and
academic. Petitioner then sought reconsideration of ISSUE: Whether or not the letter-complaint should
the formal charge and preventive suspension order, be deemed inexistent as it was not made under
contending that the letter-complaint was not under oath.
oath and that he was not informed nor apprised of
the complaint against him.
HELD:

The Court is not persuaded. The pertinent

provisions governing the initiation of administrative
complaints against civil service officials or
employees are provided in Book V of EO No. 292,
Sections 46 (c) and 48 (1) and (2), Chapter 6,
Subtitle A. It must be pointed out that, while the
letter-complaint was not verified, appended thereto
were the verified criminal complaint that Castillejo
filed against the petitioner, as well as the sworn
statements of his witnesses. These documents
could very well be considered as constituting the
complaint against the petitioner. In fact, this Court,
through the Court Administrator, investigates and
takes cognizance of, not only unverified, but also
even anonymous complaints filed against court
employees or officials for violations of the Code of
Ethical Conduct. It is not totally uncommon that a
government is given wide latitude in the scope and
exercise of its investigative powers. Administrative
proceedings, technical rules of procedure and
evidence are not strictly applied.

In any case, the letter-complaint of

Castillejo is not a complaint within the meaning of
the provisions cited. The letter-complaint did not by
itself commence the administrative proceedings
against the petitioner. It merely triggered a fact-
finding investigation by CHED. The Court cannot
uphold the petitioners contention as it would result
to an absurd and restrictive interpretation of EO No.
292. It was the formal charge and order of
preventive suspension filed by Atty. Dasig that
constituted the complaint. Atty. Dasig signed the
formal charge in her capacity as the OIC. As the
complaint was initiated by the appropriate
disciplining authority under EO No. 292, the same
need not be subscribed and sworn to. Neither is it
required that the same contain a verification of non-
forum shopping. Jurisdiction was properly acquired
over the case.

Petition is denied.