After having examined the decision of the prosecutors office, the groups position was

that the decision of the prosecutors exhibited bias when it considered the 1) character of the
complainant, 2) standard of doubt required for the existence of probable cause, and 3) the
evidence in the complaint.

First, the decision dismissed the complainants allegation that force was used against her
due to her character as a lesbian stuntwoman. Considering the respondents very very tiny
penis and the complainants description as a lesbian who was physically fit, agile and strong,
of medium build and tall at around five feet six inches, the court did not believe she was forced
to do the act.1 The decision seemed to insinuate that since the complainant was not only
physically fit but also a lesbian, she was therefore more masculine and was more than capable of
defending herself against the respondents advances.

Moreover, the decision took a tone which insinuated disbelief when it examined the
complainants testimony. It used quotation marks on the words force and push during its
analysis of the complainants testimony in the first page of the case. This stylistic choice made it
seem as though the writer of the decision did not believe the complainant from the very start;
even before it discussed the evidence and the laws applicable to the case. Hence, the odds were
immediately stacked against the complainant.

Second, the standard of doubt that was applied by the prosecutor was in effect proof
beyond reasonable doubt instead of probable cause, as required by law in preliminary
investigations. In Navarra v. Office of the Ombudsman 2, probable cause was defined as "such
facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the
respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial." Although the defendant
enjoyed the presumption of innocence, a prima facie examination of the elements of rape vis-a-
viz the evidence engendered a well founded belief that a crime was committed, which was in
essence the insertion of the male genitalia or any other object or instrument inside the genitalia,
anal orifice, or mouth of another person. With the said standard supported by jurisprudence, it
was alarming that the prosecutor was under the presumption that because vividness was wanting
in the complaint and that the complainant is bound to resist the consummation of rape. Such
presumption should be considered as a bias with the way a woman should act in rape cases.

In the words of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against

Women they represent inflexible assumptions as to what women or girls should
be or what they should have done when confronted with a situation of rape based
merely on preconceived notions of what defines a rape victim or a victim of
gender-based violence.97 They embody the belief that women will or should
always, physically resist sexual assault and that if sex is truly non-consensual, a
woman will fight back and physically defend herself and the perpetrator will have
to use physical force or the threat of violence to overcome her.

These assumptions obscure the reality that fear, shock and power dynamics
influence the behaviour of survivors of sexual assault crimes in many different
ways and that coercion will often involve many forms of non-violent threats,
intimidation and duress.3

1 Maria Santos vs. Juan dela Cruz, XV-03-INV-14-D-04396 (2014) (unreported) at 1 and 2.
2 Navarro v. Office of the Ombudsman, 607 SCRA 355, 363 (2009).
Hence, the crime of Rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code should not be
construed as a mere attack against the person because the reality of its effects were different
compared to other crimes against persons. With this premise, the presumption of self-defense and
resistance would not hold. Therefore, considering all the affidavits and evidence and applying the
standard of probable cause, there was a prima facie case of rape against respondent Juan De La
Cruz.

Lastly, the consideration of the evidence in the complaint:

The purpose of Article 226-A of the Revised Penal Code was to punish males who took
advantage of women through sexual acts and manners. Primarily, the court dismissed the
argument of the complainant in relation to the use of force, threat and intimidation. The court
said that the complainant, did not expound on the acts of grabbing, pulling and forcing. In
addition to this, the court also said that, there was no evidence that respondent threatened her
with physical harm or with a weapon if she would not submit to his desires. The court has
diverted its attention to the physique of the complainant. With this regard, it can be deduced that
the assumption of the court is based on the physical attributes of the complainant, which lead
them to the conclusion that the complainant had the ability to protect herself. In line with this,
the court should have also taken notice of how the complainant was instructed by the
respondents driver to go inside the SUV.
The court also failed to have exhausted in its interpretation and usage of Article 266-A
paragraph 1. The complainant mentioned that aside from the respondent forcing his penis to the
complainants mouth, there were also succeeding acts done by the respondent, such as the
respondent masturbating in front of the complainant until he ejaculated, as well as placing his
hand inside the complainants shorts and inserting his finger into her vagina4. The court only
focused on the insertion of the respondents penis on the complainants mouth. This only
accounted for the second paragraph of Article 226-A. The court has based a part of its conclusion
solely on the insertion of the penis in the complainants mouth. It did not dwell on the other acts,
which could have given a strong basis for the complainant. One act that the court could have also
focused on, was the fingering of the complainants vagina. This can be dealt with by using the
first paragraph of Article 266-A. Even though fingering was not expressly stated in any of the
circumstances mentioned in the first paragraph, it was implied in the phrase carnal knowledge.
This was because it referred to sexual intercourse. Therefore, fingering a woman wasalready
considered as a sexual act. It cannot be limited to the acts described in paragraph 2 of Article
266-A, due to the phrase carnal knowledge since it would mean all sexual acts.

3 International Commission of Jurist, Sexual Violence Against Women: Eradicating Harmful Gender
Stereotypes and Assumptions in Laws and Practice, (2015), 22.
4 Maria Santos vs. Juan dela Cruz, XV-03-INV-14-D-04396 (2014) at 1.