Persons 4th Exam Cases
Republic of the Philippines It appears that on 31 May 1943, the Philippine Sugar Estate
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 58010. March 31, 1993.
EMILIA O'LACO and HUCO LUNA, petitioners, vs. VALENTIN CO CHO
CHIT, O LAY KIA and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Sergio L. Guadiz for petitioners.
Norberto J . Quisumbing & Associates for private respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J p:
History is replete with cases of erstwhile close family relations put
asunder by property disputes. This is one of them. It involves half-
sisters each claiming ownership over a parcel of land. While
petitioner Emilia O'Laco asserts that she merely left the certificate
of title covering the property with private respondent O Lay Kia for
safekeeping, the latter who is the former's older sister insists that
the title was in her possession because she and her husband
bought the property from their conjugal funds. To be resolved
therefore is the issue of whether a resulting trust was intended by
them in the acquisition of the property. The trial court declared that
there was no trust relation of any sort between the sisters. 1 The
Court of Appeals ruled otherwise. 2 Hence, the instant petition for
review on certiorari of the decision of the appellate court together
with its resolution denying reconsideration. 3
Development Company, Ltd., sold a parcel of land, Lot No. 5, Block
No. 10, Plan Psu-10038, situated at Oroquieta St., Sta. Cruz, Manila,
with the Deed of Absolute Sale naming Emilia O'Laco as vendee;
thereafter, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 66456 was issued in her
name.
On 17 May 1960, private respondent-spouses Valentin Co Cho Chit
and O Lay Wa learned from the newspapers that Emilia O'Laco sold
the same property to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila for
P230,000.00, with assumption of the real estate mortgage
constituted thereon. 4
On 22 June 1960, respondent-spouses Valentin Co Cho Chit and O
Lay Kia sued petitioner-spouses Emilia O'Laco and Hugo Luna to
recover the purchase price of the land before the then Court of
First Instance of Rizal, respondent-spouses asserting that petitioner
Emilia O'Laco knew that they were the real vendees of the
Oroquieta property sold in 1943 by Philippine Sugar Estate
Development Company, Ltd., and that the legal title thereto was
merely placed in her name. They contend that Emilia O'Laco
breached the trust when she sold the land to the Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila. Meanwhile, they asked the trial court to
garnish all the amounts still due and payable to petitioner-spouses
arising from the sale, which was granted on 30 June 1960. 5
Petitioner-spouses deny the existence of any form of trust relation.
They aver that Emilia O'Laco actually bought the property with her
own money; that she left the Deed of Absolute Sale and the
corresponding title with respondent-spouses merely for
safekeeping; that when she asked for the return of the documents
evidencing her ownership, respondent-spouses told her that these
were misplaced or lost; and, that in view of the loss, she filed a
petition for issuance of a new title, and on 18 August 1944 the then
Court of First Instance of Manila granted her petition.
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On 20 September 1976, finding no trust relation between the
parties, the trial court dismissed the complaint together with the
counterclaim. Petitioners and respondents appealed.
On 9 April 1981, the Court of Appeals set aside the decision of the
trial court thus
". . . We set aside the decision of the lower court dated September
20, 1976 and the order of January 5, 1977 and another one is
hereby entered ordering the defendants-appellees to pay plaintiffs-
appellants jointly and severally the sum of P230,000.00
representing the value of the property subject of the sale with
assumption of mortgage to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of
Manila with legal interest from the filing of the complaint until fully
paid, the sum of P10,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus costs."
On 7 August 1981, the Court of Appeals denied reconsideration of
its decision, prompting petitioners to come to this Court for relief.
Petitioners contend that the present action should have been
dismissed. They argue that the complaint fails to allege that
earnest efforts toward a compromise were exerted considering that
the suit is between members of the same family, and no trust
relation exists between them. Even assuming ex argumenti that
there is such a relation, petitioners further argue, respondents are
already barred by laches.
We are not persuaded. Admittedly, the present action is between
members of the same family since petitioner Emilia O'Laco and
respondent O Lay Kia are half-sisters. Consequently, there should
be an averment in the complaint that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, pursuant to Art. 222 of the New Civil
Code, 6 or a motion to dismiss could have been filed under Sec. 1,
par. (j), Rule 16, of the Rules of Court. 7 For, it is well-settled that
the attempt to compromise as well as the inability to succeed is a
condition precedent to the filing of a suit between members of the
same family. 8 Hence, the defect in the complaint is assailable at
any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, for lack of cause of
action. 9
But, plaintiff may be allowed to amend his complaint to correct the
defect if the amendment does not actually confer jurisdiction on
the court in which the action is filed, i.e., if the cause of action was
originally within that court's jurisdiction. 10 In such case, the
amendment is only to cure the perceived defect in the complaint,
thus may be allowed.
In the case before Us, while respondent-spouses did not formally
amend their complaint, they were nonetheless allowed to introduce
evidence purporting to show that earnest efforts toward a
compromise had been made, that is, respondent O Lay Kia
importuned Emilia O'Laco and pressed her for the transfer of the
title of the Oroquieta property in the name of spouses O Lay Kia
and Valentin Co Cho Chit, just before Emilia's marriage to Hugo
Luna. 11 But, instead of transferring the title as requested, Emilia
sold the property to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila. This
testimony was not objected to by petitioner-spouses. Hence, the
complaint was deemed accordingly amended to conform to the
evidence, 12 pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 10 of the Rules of Court
which reads
"SECTION 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation
of evidence. When issues not raised by the pleadings are tried
by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated
in all respects, as, if they had been raised in the pleadings . . ."
(emphasis supplied).
Indeed, if the defendant permits evidence to be introduced without
objection and which supplies the necessary allegations of a
defective complaint, then the evidence is deemed to have the
effect of curing the defects of the complaint. 13 The insufficiency
of the allegations in the complaint is deemed ipso facto rectified.
14
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But the more crucial issue before Us is whether there is a trust
relation between the parties in contemplation of law.
We find that there is. By definition, trust relations between parties
may either be express or implied. 15 Express trusts are those
which are created by the direct and positive acts of the parties, by
some writing or deed, or will, or by words evincing an intention to
create a trust. 16 Implied trusts are those which, without being
express, are deducible from the nature of the transaction as
matters of intent, or which are superinduced on the transaction by
operation of law as matters of equity, independently of the
particular intention of the parties.17 Implied trusts may either be
resulting or constructive trusts, both coming into being by
operation of law. 18
Resulting trusts are based on the equitable doctrine that valuable
consideration and not legal title determines the equitable title or
interest 19 and are presumed always to have been contemplated
by the parties. They arise from the nature or circumstances of the
consideration involved in a transaction whereby one person
thereby becomes invested with legal title but is obligated in equity
to hold his legal title for the benefit of another. 20 On the other
hand, constructive trusts are created by the construction of equity
in order to satisfy the demands of justice 21 and prevent unjust
enrichment. They arise contrary to intention against one who, by
fraud, duress or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the legal
right to property which he ought not, in equity and good
conscience, to hold. 22
Specific examples of resulting trusts may be found in the Civil
Code, particularly Arts. 1448, 1449, 1451,1452 and 1453, 23 while
constructive trusts are illustrated in Arts. 1450, 1454, 1455 and
1456. 24
Unlike express trusts concerning immovables or any interest
therein which cannot be proved by parol evidence, 25 implied
trusts may be established by oral evidence. 26 However, in order
to establish an implied trust in real property by parol evidence, the
proof should be as fully convincing as if the acts giving rise to the
trust obligation were proven by an authentic document. 27 It
cannot be established upon vague and inconclusive proof. 28
After a thorough review of the evidence on record, We hold that a
resulting trust was indeed intended by the parties under Art. 1448
of the New Civil Code which states
"ARTICLE 1448. There is an implied trust when property is sold, and
the legal estate is granted to one party but the price is paid by
another for the purpose of having the beneficial interest of the
property. The former is the trustee, while the latter is the
beneficiary . . ." (emphasis supplied).
First. As stipulated by the parties, the document of sale, the
owner's duplicate copy of the certificate of title, insurance policies,
receipt of initial premium of insurance coverage and real estate tax
receipts ware all in the possession of respondent spouses which
they offered in evidence. As emphatically asserted by respondent
O Lay Kia, the reason why these documents of ownership remained
with her is that the land in question belonged to her. 29
Indeed, there can be no persuasive rationalization for the
possession of these documents of ownership by respondent-
spouses for seventeen (17) years after the Oroquieta property was
purchased in 1943 than that of precluding its possible sale,
alienation or conveyance by Emilia O'Laco, absent any machination
or fraud. This continued possession of the documents, together
with other corroborating evidence spread on record, strongly
suggests that Emilia O'Laco merely held the Oroquieta property in
trust for respondent-spouses.
Second. It may be worth to mention that before buying the
Oroquieta property, respondent-spouses purchased another
property situated in Kusang-Loob, Sta. Cruz, Manila, where the
certificate of title was placed in the name of Ambrosio O'Laco,
older brother of Emilia, under similar or identical circumstances.
The testimony of former counsel for respondent-spouses, then
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Associate Justice Antonio G. Lucero of the Court of Appeals, is
enlightening
"Q In the same conversation he told you how he would buy the
property (referring to the Oroquieta property), he and his wife?
"A Yes, Sir, he did.
"Q What did he say?
xxx xxx xxx
"A He said he and his wife has (sic) already acquired by purchase a
certain property located at Kusang-Loob, Sta. Cruz, Manila. He told
me he would like to place the Oroquieta Maternity Hospital in case
the negotiation materialize(s) in the name of a sister of his wife
(O'Laco)" (emphasis supplied). 30
On the part of respondent-spouses, they explained that the reason
why they did not place these Oroquieta and Kusang-Loob
properties in their name was that being Chinese nationals at the
time of the purchase they did not want to execute the required
affidavit to the effect that they were allies of the Japanese. 31
Since O Lay Kia took care of Emilia who was still young when her
mother died, 32 respondent-spouses did not hesitate to place the
title of the Oroquieta property in Emilia's name.
Quite significantly, respondent-spouses also instituted an action for
reconveyance against Ambrosio O'Laco when the latter claimed the
Kusang-Loob property as his own. A similar stipulation of facts was
likewise entered, i.e., respondent-spouses had in their possession
documents showing ownership of the Kusang-Loob property which
they offered in evidence. In that case, the decision of the trial
court, now final and executory, declared respondent-spouses as
owners of the Kusang-Loob property and ordered Ambrosio O'Laco
to reconvey it to them. 33
Incidentally, Ambrosio O'Laco thus charged respondent spouses
Valentin Co Cho Cit and O Lay Kia before the Anti-Dummy Board,
docketed as Case No. 2424, for their acquisition of the Kusang-
Loob and Oroquieta properties. 34 He claimed that respondent-
spouses utilized his name in buying the Kusang-Loob property
while that of petitioner O'Laco was used in the purchase of the
Oroquieta property. In effect, there was an implied admission by
Ambrosio that his sister Emilia, like him, was merely used as a
dummy. However, the Anti-Dummy Board exonerated respondent-
spouses since the purchases were made in 1943, or during World
War II, when the Anti-Dummy Law was not enforceable.
Third. The circumstances by which Emilia O'Laco obtained a new
title by reason of the alleged loss of the old title then in the
possession of respondent-spouses cast serious doubt on the
veracity of her ownership. The petitions respectively filed by Emilia
O'Laco and Ambrosio O'Laco for the Oroquieta and the Kusang-
Loob properties were both granted on the same day, 18 August
1944, by the then Court of First Instance of Manila. These orders
were recorded in the Primary Entry Book of the Register of Deeds
of Manila at the same time, 2:35 o'clock in the afternoon of 1
September 1944, in consecutive entries, Entries Nos. 246117-18.
35 This coincidence lends credence to the position of respondent-
spouses that there was in fact a conspiracy between the siblings
Ambrosio and Emilia to defraud and deprive respondents of their
title to the Oroquieta and Kusang-Loob properties.
Fourth. Until the sale of the Oroquieta property to the Roman
Catholic Archbishop of Manila, petitioner Emilia O'Laco actually
recognized the trust. Specifically, when respondent spouses
learned that Emilia was getting married to Hugo, O Lay Kia asked
her to have the title to the property already transferred to her and
her husband Valentin, and Emilia assured her that "would be
arranged (maaayos na)" after her wedding. 36 Her answer was an
express recognition of the trust, otherwise, she would have refused
the request outright. Petitioners never objected to this evidence;
nor did they attempt to controvert it.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
Fifth. The trial court itself determined that "Valentin Co Cho Chit
and O Lay Kia had some money with which they could buy the
property." 37 In fact, Valentin was the Chief Mechanic of the
Paniqui Sugar Mills, was engaged in the buy and sell business,
operated a gasoline station, and owned an auto supply store as
well as a ten-door apartment in Caloocan City. 38 In contrast,
Emilia O'Laco failed to convince the Court that she was financially
capable of purchasing the Oroquieta property. In fact, she opened a
bank account only in 1946 and likewise began filing income tax
returns that same year, 39 while the property in question was
bought in 1943. Respondent-spouses even helped Emilia and her
brothers in their expenses and livelihood. Emilia could only give a
vague account on how she raised the money for the purchase of
the property. Her narration of the transaction of sale abounds with
"I don't know" and "I don't remember." 40
Having established a resulting trust between the parties, the next
question is whether prescription has set in.
As differentiated from constructive trusts, where the settled rule is
that prescription may supervene, in resulting trust, the rule of
imprescriptibility may apply for as long as the trustee has not
repudiated the trust. 41 Once the resulting trust is repudiated,
however, it is converted into a constructive trust and is subject to
prescription.
A resulting trust is repudiated if the following requisites concur: (a)
the trustee has performed unequivocal acts of repudiation
amounting to an ouster of the cestui qui trust; (b) such positive
acts of repudiation have been made known to the cestui qui trust;
and, (c) the evidence thereon is clear and convincing. 42
In Tale v. Court of Appeals 43 the Court categorically ruled that an
action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust
must perforce prescribe in ten (10) years, and not otherwise,
thereby modifying previous decisions holding that the prescriptive
period was four (4) years.
Neither the registration of the Oroquieta property in the name of
petitioner Emilia O'Laco nor the issuance of a new Torrens title in
1944 in her name in lieu of the alleged loss of the original may be
made the basis for the commencement of the prescriptive period.
For, the issuance of the Torrens title in the name of Emilia O'Laco
could not be considered adverse, much less fraudulent. Precisely,
although the property was bought by respondent-spouses, the
legal title was placed in the name of Emilia O'Laco. The transfer of
the Torrens title in her name was only in consonance with the deed
of sale in her favor. Consequently, there was no cause for any
alarm on the part of respondent-spouses. As late as 1959, or just
before she got married, Emilia continued to recognize the
ownership of respondent-spouses over the Oroquieta property.
Thus, until that point, respondent-spouses were not aware of any
act of Emilia which would convey to them the idea that she was
repudiating the resulting trust. The second requisite is therefore
absent. Hence, prescription did not begin to run until the sale of
the Oroquieta property, which was clearly an act of repudiation.
But immediately after Emilia sold the Oroquieta property which is
obviously a disavowal of the resulting trust, respondent-spouses
instituted the present suit for breach of trust. Correspondingly,
laches cannot lie against them.
After all, so long as the trustee recognizes the trust, the beneficiary
may rely upon the recognition, and ordinarily will not be in fault for
omitting to bring an action to enforce his rights. 44 There is no
running of the prescriptive period if the trustee expressly
recognizes the resulting trust. 45 Since the complaint for breach of
trust was filed by respondent-spouses two (2) months after
acquiring knowledge of the sale, the action therefore has not yet
prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals of 9 April 1981, which reversed
the trial court, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. 704 November 24, 1975
MERCEDES R. VDA. DE GUERRERO, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. HAROLD M. HERNANDO, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AQUINO, J.:
This disbarment case was filed against Atty. Harold M. Hernando of
Sarrat Ilocos Norte by Mercedes Hernando Reyes Vda. de Guerrero
of Laoag City, a septuagenarian, who described herself as a poor,
defenseless and helpless widow.
Malpractice charge. In behalf of eleven plaintiffs, Atty. Hernando
filed in the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte a complaint for
partition against Mrs. Guerrero. After the complaint was filed,
seven of the plaintiffs impleaded in that case, who are Mrs.
Guerrero's cousins, namely, (1) Felicidad B. Reyes-Fonacier, (2)
Rosario B. Reyes-Concepcion, (3) Violeta B. Reyes-Samonte, (4)
Mamerta B. Reyes-Mercado, (5) Mercedes B. Reyes, (6) Federico B.
Reyes and (7) Concepcion B. Reyes, filed manifestations in court,
expressing their surprise because they were included as plaintiffs
although they never authorized Atty. Hernando to represent them
(Civil Case No. 3717-II, Ilocos Norte CFI, Mateo H. Reyes, et al vs.
Mercedes R. Vda. de Guerrero). By reason of those manifestations,
Mrs. Guerrero charged Atty. Hernando with misconduct or
malpractice.
To refute the charge, Atty. Hernando explained that he was
engaged by Mateo H. Reyes to file the complaint for partition; that
Mateo directed him to include as co-plaintiffs the aforenamed
persons, who are his nephew and nieces and who were interested
in the subject-matter of the action; that four of those persons
executed a special power of attorney designating Mateo as their
representative in that litigation (Exh. H or 1); that Mateo told him
that the special power of attorney of his other nieces had already
been mailed and he would receive it in due course, and that after
the said persons revoked the power of attorney and manifested
that they were disinclined to appear as plaintiffs, he (Atty.
Hernando) amended the complaint by dropping them as plaintiffs
and impleading them as defendants.
In view of that explanation, the Solicitor General recommended the
dismissal of the malpractice charge. That recommendation is
justified. Respondent Hernando was not guilty of any professional
misconduct in including as plaintiffs the said persons who, by the
way, had not joined Mrs. Guerrero in filing the disbarment
complaint herein.
Credence can be given to his profession of good faith in including
them as plaintiffs. He did so at the behest of their uncle, Mateo H.
Reyes. Four of them in their special power of attorney appointed
Mateo as their agent in initiating the action. Moreover, in a
partition action all the co-owners should be joined as parties (Sec.
1, Rule 69, Rules of Court; Reyes vs. Cordero, 46 Phil. 658).
Misrepresentation as to exhibition of residence certificate. Mrs.
Guerrero also charged respondent Hernando with having indicated
in the jurat of a tenancy contract, as the residence certificate of
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Tranquilino Bernardo, the residence certificate corresponding to
Antonio Raymundo. That contract was presented in evidence in the
aforecited partition case.
It is incontrovertible that as a notary Atty. Hernando made it
appear in the jurat of the tenancy contract, which was subscribed
and sworn to before him by Evaristo Juan and Tranquilino Bernardo
(and wherein Mrs. Guerrero was an instrumental witness), that
Residence Certificate No. A-2893960 was issued to Bernardo on
January 20, 1963 and that Juan's residence certificate was also
issued on January 20, 1963, whereas, according to the records of
the internal revenue office at Laoag City Residence Certificate No.
A-2893960 was issued to Raymundo on January 15, 1963 and
Juan's residence certificate was also issued on that same date.
Respondent's defense is that he asked Bernardo to produce his
residence certificate; that Mateo H. Reyes interposed that he had
Bernardo's residence certificate but he was not able to bring it at
that time; that a week later Mateo met Atty. Hernando in front of
the post office and, on that occasion, he copied the number and
date appearing in Bernardo's residence certificate, and that
according to the records of the internal revenue office the duplicate
of said residence certificate was issued to Raymundo and the
original to Bernardo.
Atty. Hernando in his answer claimed that the erroneous entry
regarding the number of Bernardo's residence certificate was a
"purely harmless" "clerical or topographical" (should be
typographical) error which did not concern Mrs. Guerrero and which
did not affect the integrity of the document.
That claim cannot be sustained. Bernardo did not testify to support
respondent's pretension that he (Bernardo) was provided with a
residence certificate. The testimony of Mateo H. Reyes that he had
secured a residence certificate for his tenant, Bernardo, which
turned out to have been issued to Raymundo, is obviously
fabricated. No such residence certificate was presented as
evidence. The imputation that Residence Certificate No. A-2893960
was issued twice by the internal revenue clerk is unbelievable.
The exhibition of the residence certificate is required whenever a
document is acknowledged before a notary (Sec. 6,
Commonwealth Act No. 465). Such a requirement may enable the
notary to ascertain the identity of the person appearing before him
and to unmask impostors (Manila Surety & Fidelity Co., Inc. vs.
Luna, 107 Phil. 281). (There is a similar requirement in section 251
of the Revised Administrative Code with respect to the cedula
certificate).
It is not a defense that the complaint against Atty. Hernando might
have been provoked by the act of his client, Mateo H. Reyes, in
filing a disbarment complaint against Atty. Amador C. Castro, Mrs.
Guerrero's counsel in the aforementioned Civil Case No. 3717-II, for
allegedly tampering with the dates appearing in the original
summons and sheriff's return (supposedly to avoid default). That
complaint was dismissed for lack of evidence (Resolution dated
March 14, 1968 in Reyes vs. Castro, Administrative Case No. 616).
We find Atty. Hernando guilty of misconduct as a notary in making
it appear in the jurat of a tenancy contract that affiant Tranquilino
Bernardo exhibited to him a residence certificate when in fact he
did not do so. Such misrepresentation is unquestionably censurable
and justifies disciplinary action against the respondent as a
member of the bar and as a notary public (Cf. National Bureau of
Investigation vs. Morada, 112 Phil. 717; Viuda de Veloso vs.
Madarang, 61 Phil. 773). The respondent violated the mandate in
his attorney's oath to "obey the laws" and "do no falsehood" (Form
28, Appendix of the Rules of Court).
The instant case is different from Samonte vs. Rodrigo, Jr.,
Administrative Case No. 930, December 17, 1970, 36 SCRA 283
where a notary in good faith copied the data of affiant's residence
certificate, as found in his income tax return, and it was later
discovered that the residence certificate mentioned therein was
not actually issued to the affiant. The notary was given an
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admonition and warned to be more careful in the discharge of his

notarial duties.

Considering the irregularity committed by the respondent, we hold

that he deserves a severe censure and that he should be
suspended from acting as notary public for one year.

WHEREFORE, the charge of malpractice against respondent Harold

M. Hernando is dismissed but he is severely censured for the
falsehood which he had committed and at the same time he is
barred or disqualified from acting as a notary public for a period of
one year counted from notice of the entry of judgment in this case.
He is warned that a more drastic punishment would be imposed on
a repetition of the same anomaly.

SO ORDERED.

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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. NO. 154132 August 31, 2006
HIYAS SAVINGS and LOAN BANK, INC. Petitioner,
vs.
HON. EDMUNDO T. ACUA, in his capacity as Pairing Judge
of Regional Trial Court, Branch 122, Caloocan City, and
ALBERTO MORENO, Respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court seeking to nullify the Orders 1 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Caloocan City, Branch 122, dated November 8,
2001 2 and May 7, 2002 3denying herein petitioners Motion to
Dismiss and Motion for Partial Reconsideration, respectively.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On November 24, 2000, Alberto Moreno (private respondent) filed
with the RTC of Caloocan City a complaint against Hiyas Savings
and Loan Bank, Inc. (petitioner), his wife Remedios, the spouses
Felipe and Maria Owe and the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City
for cancellation of mortgage contending that he did not secure any
loan from petitioner, nor did he sign or execute any contract of
mortgage in its favor; that his wife, acting in conspiracy with Hiyas
and the spouses Owe, who were the ones that benefited from the
loan, made it appear that he signed the contract of mortgage; that
he could not have executed the said contract because he was then
working abroad. 4
On May 17, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss on the
ground that private respondent failed to comply with Article 151 of
the Family Code wherein it is provided that no suit between
members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear
from the verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, but that the same have failed.
Petitioner contends that since the complaint does not contain any
fact or averment that earnest efforts toward a compromise had
been made prior to its institution, then the complaint should be
dismissed for lack of cause of action. 5
Private respondent filed his Comment on the Motion to Dismiss
with Motion to Strike Out and to Declare Defendants in Default. He
argues that in cases where one of the parties is not a member of
the same family as contemplated under Article 150 of the Family
Code, failure to allege in the complaint that earnest efforts toward
a compromise had been made by the plaintiff before filing the
complaint is not a ground for a motion to dismiss. Alberto asserts
that since three of the party-defendants are not members of his
family the ground relied upon by Hiyas in its Motion to Dismiss is
inapplicable and unavailable. Alberto also prayed that defendants
be declared in default for their failure to file their answer on time. 6
Petitioner filed its Reply to the Comment with Opposition to the
Motion to Strike and to Declare Defendants in Default. 7 Private
respondent, in turn, filed his Rejoinder. 8
On November 8, 2001, the RTC issued the first of its assailed
Orders denying the Motion to Dismiss, thus:
The court agrees with plaintiff that earnest efforts towards a
compromise is not required before the filing of the instant case
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considering that the above-entitled case involves parties who are
strangers to the family. As aptly pointed out in the cases cited by
plaintiff, Magbaleta v. G[o]nong, L-44903, April 25, 1977 and
Mendez v. [B]iangon, L-32159, October 28, 1977, if one of the
parties is a stranger, failure to allege in the complaint that earnest
efforts towards a compromise had been made by plaintiff before
filing the complaint, is not a ground for motion to dismiss.
Insofar as plaintiffs prayer for declaration of default against
defendants, the same is meritorious only with respect to
defendants Remedios Moreno and the Register of Deeds of
Kaloocan City. A declaration of default against defendant bank is
not proper considering that the filing of the Motion to Dismiss by
said defendant operates to stop the running of the period within
which to file the required Answer. 9
Petitioner filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration. 10 Private
respondent filed his Comment, 11 after which petitioner filed its
Reply. 12 Thereafter, private respondent filed his Rejoinder. 13
On May 7, 2002, the RTC issued the second assailed Order denying
petitioners Motion for Partial Reconsideration. The trial court ruled:
Reiterating the resolution of the court, dated November 8, 2001,
considering that the above-entitled case involves parties who are
strangers to the family, failure to allege in the complaint that
earnest efforts towards a compromise were made by plaintiff, is
not a ground for a Motion to Dismiss.
Additionally, the court agrees with plaintiff that inasmuch as it is
defendant Remedios Moreno who stands to be benefited by Art.
151 of the Family Code, being a member of the same family as that
of plaintiff, only she may invoke said Art. 151. 14
xxx
Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari on the following grounds:
I. Public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when he ruled that
lack of earnest efforts toward a compromise is not a ground for a
motion to dismiss in suits between husband and wife when other
parties who are strangers to the family are involved in the suit.
Corollarily, public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when he applied the
decision in the case of Magbaleta v. Gonong instead of the ruling in
the case of De Guzman v. Genato.
II. Public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when he ruled that a
party who is a stranger to the family of the litigants could not
invoke lack of earnest efforts toward a compromise as a ground for
the dismissal of the complaint. 15
At the outset, the Court notes that the instant Petition
for Certiorari should have been filed with the Court of Appeals (CA)
and not with this Court pursuant to the doctrine of hierarchy of
courts. Reiterating the established policy for the strict observance
of this doctrine, this Court held in Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v.
Melicor 16 that:
Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and the Regional
Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. As we stated
in People v. Cuaresma:
This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not
exclusive. It is shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and
with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction is not,
however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the
writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to
which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a
hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of
appeals, and also serves as a general determinant of the
Page | 11
Persons 4th Exam Cases
appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary writs. A
becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates
that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first
level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court,
and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct
invocation of the Supreme Courts original jurisdiction to issue
these writs should be allowed only when there are special and
important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the
petition. This is [an] established policy. It is a policy necessary to
prevent inordinate demands upon the Courts time and attention
which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Courts
docket.
The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an imposition
upon the precious time of this Court; and (b) it would cause an
inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the
adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be remanded
or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules
of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because
this Court is not a trier of facts.
Thus, this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the
redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and
exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of
national interest and of serious implications, justify the availment
of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari, calling for the
exercise of its primary jurisdiction. Exceptional and compelling
circumstances were held present in the following cases: (a)Chavez
vs. Romulo on citizens right to bear arms; (b) Government of the
United States of America vs. Purgananon bail in extradition
proceedings; (c) Commission on Elections vs. Quijano-Padilla on
government contract involving modernization and computerization
of voters registration list; (d) Buklod ng Kawaning EIIB vs.
Zamoraon status and existence of a public office; and (e) Fortich
vs. Corona on the so-called "Win-Win Resolution" of the Office of
the President which modified the approval of the conversion to
agro-industrial area. 17
In the present case, petitioner failed to advance a satisfactory
explanation as to its failure to comply with the principle of judicial
hierarchy. There is no reason why the instant petition could not
have been brought before the CA. On this basis, the instant petition
should be dismissed.
And even if this Court passes upon the substantial issues raised by
petitioner, the instant petition likewise fails for lack of merit.
Restating its arguments in its Motion for Partial Reconsideration,
petitioner argues that what is applicable to the present case is the
Courts decision in De Guzman v. Genato 18 and not in Magbaleta v.
Gonong, 19 the former being a case involving a husband and wife
while the latter is between brothers.
The Court is not persuaded.
Article 151 of the Family Code provides as follows:
No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless
it should appear from the verified complaint or petition that
earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the
same have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact
made, the case must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of
compromise under the Civil Code.
Article 222 of the Civil Code from which Article 151 of the Family
Code was taken, essentially contains the same provisions, to wit:
No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same
family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, but that the same have failed,
subject to the limitations in Article 2035. 20
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
The Code Commission that drafted Article 222 of the Civil Code
from which Article 151 of the Family Code was taken explains:
[I]t is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a
litigation between members of the same family. It is necessary that
every effort should be made toward a compromise before a
litigation is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is
known that a lawsuit between close relatives generates deeper
bitterness than between strangers. 21
In Magbaleta, the case involved brothers and a stranger to the
family, the alleged owner of the subject property. The Court, taking
into consideration the explanation made by the Code Commision in
its report, ruled that:
[T]hese considerations do not, however, weigh enough to make it
imperative that such efforts to compromise should be a
jurisdictional pre-requisite for the maintenance of an action
whenever a stranger to the family is a party thereto, whether as a
necessary or indispensable one. It is not always that one who is
alien to the family would be willing to suffer the inconvenience of,
much less relish, the delay and the complications that wranglings
between or among relatives more often than not entail. Besides, it
is neither practical nor fair that the determination of the rights of a
stranger to the family who just happened to have innocently
acquired some kind of interest in any right or property disputed
among its members should be made to depend on the way the
latter would settle their differences among themselves. 22 x x x.
Hence, once a stranger becomes a party to a suit involving
members of the same family, the law no longer makes it a
condition precedent that earnest efforts be made towards a
compromise before the action can prosper.
In the subsequent case of De Guzman, the case involved spouses
and the alleged paramour of the wife. The Court ruled that due to
the efforts exerted by the husband, through the Philippine
Constabulary, to confront the wife, there was substantial
compliance with the law, thereby implying that even in the
presence of a party who is not a family member, the requirements
that earnest efforts towards a compromise have been exerted must
be complied with, pursuant to Article 222 of the Civil Code, now
Article 151 of the Family Code.
While De Guzman was decided after Magbaleta, the principle
enunciated in the Magbaleta is the one that now prevails because
it is reiterated in the subsequent cases of Gonzales v.
Lopez, 23 Esquivias v. Court of Appeals,24 Spouses Hontiveros v.
Regional Trial Court, Branch 25, Iloilo City, 25 and the most recent
case of Martinez v. Martinez. 26 Thus, Article 151 of the Family Code
applies to cover when the suit is exclusively between or among
family members.
The Court finds no cogent reason why the ruling in Magbaleta as
well as in all of the aforementioned cases should not equally apply
to suits involving husband and wife.
Petitioner makes much of the fact that the present case involves a
husband and his wife while Magbaleta is a case between brothers.
However, the Court finds no specific, unique, or special
circumstance that would make the ruling in Magbaleta as well as in
the abovementioned cases inapplicable to suits involving a
husband and his wife, as in the present case. In the first place,
Article 151 of the Family Code and Article 222 of the Civil Code are
clear that the provisions therein apply to suits involving "members
of the same family" as contemplated under Article 150 of the
Family Code, to wit:
ART. 150. Family relations include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parents and children;
(3) Among other ascendants and descendants; and
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
(4) Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half blood.
and Article 217 of the Civil Code, to wit:
ART. 217. Family relations shall include those:
(1) Between husband and wife;
(2) Between parent and child;
(3) Among other ascendants and their descendants;
(4) Among brothers and sisters.
Petitioner also contends that the trial court committed grave abuse
of discretion when it ruled that petitioner, not being a member of
the same family as respondent, may not invoke the provisions of
Article 151 of the Family Code.
Suffice it to say that since the Court has ruled that the requirement
under Article 151 of the Family Code is applicable only in cases
which are exclusively between or among members of the same
family, it necessarily follows that the same may be invoked only by
a party who is a member of that same family.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 200969, August 03, 2015
CONSOLACION D. ROMERO AND ROSARIO S.D.
DOMINGO, Petitioners, v. ENGRACIA D. SINGSON, Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the
February 29, 2012 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 114363 which granted herein respondent's Petition for
Review, reversed the December 11, 2009 Order 3 of the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 160 (RTC) in SCA No. 3144, and
reinstated the said RTC's April 29, 2009 Decision. 4
Factual Antecedents
The parties herein - petitioners Consolacion Domingo Romero and
Rosario S.D. Domingo and respondent Engracia Domingo Singson -
are siblings. Their parents, Macario and Felicidad Domingo, own a
223-square meter piece of property (the subject property) located
at 127 F. Sevilla Street, San Juan City, Metro Manila covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. (32600) (23937) 845-R5 (TCT 845-R)
which was issued in 1953. It appears that petitioners and other
siblings, Rafael and Ramon Domingo, are the actual occupants of
the subject property, having stayed there with their parents since
birth. On the other hand, respondent took up residence in
Mandaluyong City after getting married.
On February 22, 1981, Macario passed away, while Felicidad died
on September 14, 1997.6
On June 7, 2006, TCT 845-R was cancelled and a new certificate of
title -Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12575-R7 or 125758 (TCT
12575) - was issued in respondent's name, by virtue of a notarized
"Absolute Deed of Sale"9 ostensibly executed on June 6, 2006 by
and between Macario and Felicidad - as sellers, and respondent -
as buyer. And this despite the fact that Macario and Felicidad were
then already deceased.
Soon thereafter, respondent sent letters to her siblings demanding
that they vacate the subject property, under pain of litigation.
Petitioners and their other siblings just as soon filed a
Complaint10 against respondent and the Register of Deeds of San
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
Juan City for annulment and cancellation of TCT 12575 and the
June 6, 2006 deed of sale, reconveyance, and damages, on the
claim that the deed of sale is a forgery and that as heirs of Macario
and Felicidad, the true owners of the subject property, they were
entitled to a reconveyance of the same. The case was docketed as
Civil Case No. 70898-SJ and assigned to Branch 160 of the RTC of
Pasig City.
Ruling of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)
On September 26, 2006, respondent filed an unlawful detainer suit
against petitioners and her brothers Rafael and Ramon before the
MeTC of San Juan City. Docketed as Civil Case No. 9534 and
assigned to MeTC Branch 58, respondent in her Complaint11 sought
to evict her siblings from the subject property on the claim that she
is the owner of the same; that her siblings' stay therein was merely
tolerated; and that she now needed the premises to serve as her
daughters' residence. Thus, she prayed that her siblings be ordered
to vacate the premises and pay monthly rent of P2,000.00 from
date of demand until they vacate the premises, as well as
attorney's fees and costs of suit.
In their Answer,12 petitioners prayed for dismissal, claiming that the
June 6, 2006 deed of sale was a forgery, and no certificate of title
in her name could be issued; that they thus remained co-owners of
the subject property, and respondent had no right to evict them;
and that the pendency of Civil Case No. 70898-SJ bars the
ejectment suit against them.
After proceedings or on September 17, 2007, the MeTC rendered a
Decision,13 decreeing as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Anent the first issue of jurisdiction, the Court answers in the
affirmative xxx.
xxxx
From the above-quoted verse, the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts have the
exclusive original jurisdiction over this case. Moreover, in the case
of Hilario vs. Court of Appeals, (260 SCRA 420,426 citing: Refugia,
Et al[.] vs. Court of Appeals, Et al[.,] G.R. No. 118284, July 4, 1996)
the Supreme Court held: 'xxx inferior courts retain jurisdiction over
ejectment cases even if the question of possession cannot be
resolved without passing upon the issue of ownership; but this is
subject to the caveat that the issue raised as to ownership be
resolved by the Trial Court for the sole purpose of determining the
issue of possession x x x.' Thus, even where the defendants assert
in their Answer, ownership of or Title to the property, the inferior
Court is not deprived of its jurisdiction, xxx
xxxx
As to the second issue as to whether or not plaintiff may validly
eject the defendants, again this Court answers in the affirmative,
since the plaintiff is a holder of a Torrens Title which is a right in
rem. The defendants in their defense that they have filed a case
before the Regional Trial Court questioning the Title of the plaintiff
is their right and prerogative, unless however restrained by higher
court, this Court will proceed as mandated by law and
jurisprudence. This action for unlawful detainer is sanctioned by
Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which provides:
xxxx
While the defendants claim that their parents are still the owner[s]
of the subject property in litigation and during their lifetime have
not awarded nor alienated said property to anybody, why then has
plaintiff the Title of said property? If it was secured fraudulently,
the same is of no moment since it has its own forum to address to
[sic]. Moreover, the pendency of an action questioning the
ownership of the property does not bar the filing or consideration
of an ejectment suit nor the execution of the judgment therein xxx.
As correctly pointed out by the plaintiff, 'ownership may be
exercised over things or rights,' Art. 427 of the New Civil Code.
Likewise, Art. 428 of the same code provides that: 'the owner has
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other limitations
than those established by law. The owner has also a right of action
against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover it.'
Further, Art. 434 states that 'in an action to recover, the property
must be identified, and the plaintiff must rely on the strength of his
Title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim.' The
defendants therefore can be validly ejected from the premises in
question since this is not accion publiciana as claimed by the
defendants.
Finally, on the third issue of damages and the side issue of
reasonable compensation for the use of the subject premises, the
Supreme Court in the case of Balanon-Anicete vs. Balano, 402
SCRA 514 held: 'xxx persons who occupy the land of another at the
latter's tolerance or permission without any contract between them
[are] necessarily bound by an implied promise that they will vacate
the same upon demand, failing in which a summary action for
ejectment is the proper remedy against them.' Hence, upon
demand, plaintiff is entitled to collect reasonable compensation for
the actual occupation of the subject property which is P2,000.00
per month and the payment of attorney's fees. Since no evidence
was presented relative to damages, the Court cannot award the
same.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
as follows:
1. Ordering the defendants and all persons claiming rights under
them to vacate the subject property known as No. 127 F. Sevilla
St., San Juan, Metro Manila and to surrender peaceful possession
thereof to the plaintiff in this case;
2. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff the amount of P2,000.00
per month for the actual use and occupation of the subject
property reckoned from date of extrajudicial demand which is
August 7, 2006, until defendants shall have finally vacated the
premises;
3. Ordering the defendants to pay plaintiff the amount of
P10,000.00 as and by way of attorney's fees; and
4. The costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.14
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In an appeal before the RTC docketed as SCA Case No. 3144,
petitioners and their co-defendants argued that the MeTC erred in
not resolving the issue of ownership, in ordering them to vacate
the premises, in deciding issues which were not framed by the
parties, and in not granting them damages and awarding the same
instead to respondent.
On April, 29, 2009, the RTC rendered its Decision, 15 pronouncing as
follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Stripped of its non-essentials, the appeal primarily hinges on the
lower court's failure to rule upon the issue on the validity of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12575 of the lot, subject of the
ejectment suit.
Upon a judicious consideration of the arguments raised by the
parties in their respective memorandum vis-a-vis the decision of
the court a quo, this court opines and so holds that the said court
did not err in its findings. The validity of a transfer certificate of
title cannot be raised in the said ejectment suit as it partakes of a
collateral attack against the said title. This is not allowed under the
principle of indefeasibility of a Torrens title. The issue on the
validity of title i.e., whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can
only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose.
The ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of Raymundo and Perla
De Guzman vs. Praxides J. Agbagala, G.R. No. 163566, February 19,
2008 is revelatory, thus:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
'Indeed, a decree of registration or patent and the certificate of
title issued pursuant thereto may be attacked on the ground of
falsification or fraud within one year from the date of their
issuance. Such an attack must be direct and not by a collateral
proceeding. The rationale is this:
xxx [The] public should be able to rely on the registered title. The
Torrens System was adopted in this country because it was
believed to be the most effective measure to guarantee the
integrity of land titles and to protect their indefeasibility once the
claim of ownership is established and recognized.'
For reasons aforestated, the appeal is hereby DENIED.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
affirming in toto in [sic] the decision of the lower court dated
September 17, 2007.
With costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.16cralawlawlibrary
On motion for reconsideration, however, the RTC reversed itself.
Thus, in a December 11, 2009 Order,17 it held that -
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
2. This Court's Findings
At the outset, it should be mentioned that the court a quo should
have dismissed the complaint outright for failure to comply with a
condition precedent under Section 10, Rule 16 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure, the parties being siblings and there being no allegations
in the complaint as regards efforts at compromise having been
exerted, a matter that was raised in the answer of defendants
Consolation Romero and Rosario D. Domingo.
2.1. The Issue of MeTC Jurisdiction
The court a quo is correct in ruling that it has jurisdiction over this
case, the allegations in the complaint being so phrased as to
present one apparently for unlawful detainer. It did not matter that
after answers were filed and further proceedings were had, what
emerged were issues of ownership and possession being intricately
interwoven, the court being clothed with jurisdiction to
provisionally adjudicate the issue of ownership, it being necessary
in resolving the question of possession.
2.2. The Issue of Whether or Not Plaintiff Can Eject Defendants
In Barnachea vs. Court of Appeals, et al., it was held that one of the
features of an unlawful detainer case is possession of property by
defendant being at the start legal, becoming illegal by reason of
the termination of right to possess based on his contract or other
arrangement with plaintiff.
hi this case, the legal possession of subject premises by
defendants-appellants, they being the heirs of original owners
Macario and Felicidad Domingo, has not ceased. The basis for the
claimed ownership by plaintiff-appellee is a deed of absolute sale
dated 06 June 2006 (Exhibit "2") showing the signatures of vendor
Sps. Domingo whose respective death certificates indicate that
Macario died on 22 February 1981 and Felicidad on 14 September
1997. It is clear that the deed of sale became the basis for the
transfer of subject property in plaintiff-appellee's name under TCT
No. 12575 (Exhibit "A"), a fact that prompted herein defendants-
appellants to file a complaint for annulment of sale and
reconveyance of ownership, docketed as Civil Case No. 70898-SJ
earlier than this subject case.
It appearing that defendants-appellants' occupancy of subject
property is premised on their right thereto as co-owners, being
compulsory heirs of their parents, and it not being established that
they had alienated such right in favor of their sister, herein
plaintiff-appellee, the latter cannot eject them therefrom.
2.3. The Issue of Whether or Not Defendants are Entitled to
Damages
While defendants Rafael and Ramon Domingo allege and pray for
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
actual and moral damages and attorney's fees in their answer and
all [the] defendants do so in their position paper, the court can
award only the last, it being established that they were compelled
to litigate to protect their right, and such award being just and
equitable. As for actual and moral damages, there is no sufficient
basis for a grant thereof. It is noted that not a single affidavit of
any of the four defendants is attached to their position paper, as
required under Section 10, Rule 70, Rules of Civil Procedure, and
Section 9, Revised Rule on Summary Procedure.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing considered, the court hereby grants
the motion for reconsideration of its decision on appeal affirming in
toto the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 58, San
Juan City. Consequently, it hereby reverses said decision by
decreeing that plaintiff-appellee has no cause of action against
herein defendants-appellants who are entitled to possession of the
subject premises, rendering the complaint dismissible and hereby
dismisses it. Corrolarily, plaintiff-appellee's motion for execution is
hereby denied. Plaintiff-appellee is hereby ordered to pay
defendants-appellants P8,000.00 each in attorney's fees. Costs
against plaintiff-appellee.
SO ORDERED.18cralawlawlibrary
Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration,19 which the RTC
denied in a subsequent Order20 dated May 17, 2010. The trial court
held:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In essence, plaintiff argues that possession and not ownership
should have been the central issue in this appealed ejectment suit.
As the subject property is titled in plaintiffs name, necessarily, she
has better right of possession than defendants.
The court is not persuaded. Germane is Section 16, Rule 70 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, to wit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 16. Resolving defense of ownership. - When the defendant
raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question
of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession.
Having determined the ownership issue in resolving defendants'
right of possession pursuant to the aforestated rule, the court
hereby finds no cogent reason or sufficient justification to
reconsider its previous ruling dated 11 December 2009.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.21cralawlawlibrary
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Respondent filed a Petition for Review22 with the CA, docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 114363. On February 29, 2012, the CA rendered
judgment, as follows:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Petitioner seeks to reverse and set aside the assailed Orders since
the RTC allegedly erred:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
'I.
IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE EJECTED FROM
THE SUBJECT PREMISES, THEIR OCCUPANCY BEING PREMISED ON
THEIR RIGHT AS CO-OWNERS, BEING COMPULSORY HEIRS OF
THEIR [PETITIONER] PARENTS AND IT NOT BEING ESTABLISHED
THAT THEY HAD ALIENATED SUCH RIGHT IN FAVOR OF THE
PETITIONER.
II.
IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO THE AWARD
OF ATTORNEY'S FEES.'
This Court's Ruling
Contending that the RTC erred when it held that respondents
cannot be ejected from the subject lot because they are co-owners
thereof and heirs of their deceased parents, petitioner points out
that the only issue that should be tackled in an unlawfol detainer
Page | 18
Persons 4th Exam Cases
case is the right of a plaintiff to possession de facto over the
property in question.
For their part, respondents argue that they have legal and actual
possession of the subject lot as they are the heirs of their deceased
parents who are the registered owners of said subject lot. On the
other hand, the title to the subject lot that was registered under
petitioner's name is null and void for it was issued based on a
forged deed of absolute sale.
The petition has merit.
In an unlawful detainer case, the defendant's possession of a
property becomes illegal when he is demanded by the plaintiff to
vacate therefrom due to the expiration or termination of his right to
possess the same under the contract but the defendant refuses to
heed such demand. Thus, the sole issue to be resolved is who
between the parties have [sic] a right to the physical or material
possession of the property involved, independently of any claim of
ownership by any of the parties.
However, where the issue of ownership is raised by any of the
parties, the rule in Sec. 16, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court is
explicit:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 16. Resolving defense of ownership. - When the defendant
raises the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question
of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession.
In other words, while only possession de facto is the issue to be
determined in an ejectment case, the issue of ownership may be
tackled if raised by any of the parties and only for the purpose of
reaching a conclusion on the issue of possession. Thus, inEsmaquel
vs. Coprada, the Supreme Court had the occasion to once again
hold that:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
'The sole issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is
physical or material possession of the property involved,
independent of any claim of ownership by any of the
parties. Where the issue of ownership is raised by any of the
parties, the courts may pass upon the same in order to determine
who has the right to possess the property. The adjudication is,
however, merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an
action between the same parties involving title to the
property. Since the issue of ownership was raised in the unlawful
detainer case, its resolution boils down to which of the parties'
respective evidence deserves more weight.'
In the case at bar, both petitioner and respondents are claiming
ownership over the subject lot. On the part of petitioner, she
maintains that she has a right to possession because she is the
registered owner thereof, as evidenced by TCT No. 12575-R which
was issued in her name in 2006. On the other hand, respondents
maintain that they cannot be ejected from the subject lot because
they are the compulsory heirs of their deceased parents under
whose names the subject lot was registered, as shown in TCT No.
845-R.
As between the two parties, this Court rules in favor of petitioner
for she holds a more recently-issued certificate of title, i.e., 2006,
than that of their deceased parents whose certificate of title was
issued in 1953. The issuance of the certificate of title in 2006 may
be traced from TCT No. 845-R wherein at the last page of its
Memorandum of [E]ncumbrances is an entry which explicitly states
that the title was transferred to the name of petitioner on June 6,
2006 for a consideration of Php1,000.000.00. Clearly, the
certificate of title of the deceased parents was effectively cancelled
in favor of petitioner. Hence, petitioner has a better right to the
possession de facto of the subject lot for, as held in Asuncion
Urieta Vda. de Aguilar vs. Alfaro, 'the titleholder is entitled to all
the attributes of ownership of the property, including possession.'
Respondents' insistence that the Torrens Certificate of petitioner
should not be given any probative weight because it is null and
void is of no moment. The validity of a certificate of title cannot be
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
collaterally attacked. Rather, the attack should be made in an
action instituted mainly for that purpose, x x x
xxxx
In short, a Torrens Certificate is evidence of the indefeasibility of
the title to the property and the person whose name appears
therein is entitled to the possession of the property unless and until
his title is nullified. The reason being that the Torrens System was
adopted as it is the most effective measure that will guarantee the
integrity of land titles and protect their indefeasibility once the
claim of ownership is established and recognized. Hence, the age-
old rule that 'the person who has a Torrens Title over a land is
entitled to possession thereof.'
Unless there is already a judgment declaring petitioner's certificate
of title as null and void, the presumption of its validity must
prevail, x x x
xxxx
All said, petitioner's right to possession over the subject lot must
be respected in view of the certificate of title thereto issued in her
name.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Orders of the
Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 160 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. Its Decision dated April 29, 2009 affirming
the Decision dated September 17, 2007 of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, San Juan City, Branch 58 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.23cralawlawlibrary
Hence, the instant Petition.
In a July 10, 2013 Resolution,24 this Court resolved to give due
course to the Petition.chanrobleslaw
Issues
Petitioners raise the following issues for resolution:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A
THE COURT OF APPEALS (TWELFTH DIVISION) OBVIOUSLY ERRED IN
FAILING TO DISMISS THE COMPLAINT (ANNEX H) BECAUSE IT DID
NOT COMPLY WITH THE JURISDICTIONAL ELEMENT REQUIRED BY
LAW (SEC. 3, RULE 8, REVISED RULE OF COURT).
B
THE DECISION GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT HAVING RULED THAT
RESPONDENT'S CAUSE OF ACTION IN HER EJECTMENT COMPLAINT
(ANNEX H) IS INDISPENSABLY INTERTWINED WITH THE ISSUE OF
OWNERSHIP RAISED BY PETITIONERS' DEFENSE, THUS RENDERING
SAID COMPLAINT NOT AN UNLAWFUL DETAINER CASE OVER WHICH
THE MeTC HAS JURISDICTION, AS DECIDED IN THE ORDER DATED
DECEMBER 9, 2009 (ANNEX X).
C
THE DECISION IS SERIOUSLY MISTAKEN IN NOT HAVING UPHELD
THE AWARD OF DAMAGES BY JUDGE MYRNA Y. LM-VERANO IN
FAVOR OF DEFENDANTS AND AGAINST RESPONDENT WHO
OBVIOUSLY OBAINED HER TITLE (ANNEX F) USING AN
UNDISPUTABLY FRAUDULENT DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE (ANNEX G).
D
THE DECISION INCORRECTLY RULED THAT PETITIONERS IN RAISING
OWNERSHIP AS THEIR DEFENSE (SEC. 16 IN RELATION TO SEC. 18,
RULE 70, REVISED RULES OF COURT) CONSTITUTE A COLLATERAL
ATTACK ON THE TITLE OF RESPONDENT OBVIOUSLY AND
UNDENIABLY PROCURED THRU FRAUD.25cralawlawlibrary
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Petitioners' Arguments
In their Petition and Reply26 seeking reversal of the assailed CA
dispositions and reinstatement of the RTC's December 11, 2009
Order dismissing respondent's ejectment case, petitioners
essentially argue that since the parties to the case are siblings and
Page | 20
Persons 4th Exam Cases
no attempt at compromise was made by the respondent prior to
the filing of Civil Case No. 9534, then it should be dismissed for
failure to comply with Rule 16, Section 1(j) of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure27 in relation to Article 151 of the Family Code28 and
Article 222 of the Civil Code;29 that they could not be evicted from
the subject property since they are co-owners of the same, having
inherited it from their deceased parents; that respondent's title
was derived from a forged deed of sale, which does not make her
the sole owner of the subject property; that as co-owners and since
respondent's title is void, they have a right of possession over the
subject property and they may not be evicted therefrom; that their
defense that respondent obtained her title through a forged deed
of sale does not constitute a collateral attack on such title, but is
allowed in order to prove their legal right of possession and
ownership over the subject property.
Respondent's Arguments
In her Comment30 seeking denial of the Petition, respondent claims
that the Petition should have been dismissed since only two of the
respondents in CA-G.R. SP No. 114363 filed the Petition before this
Court; that the findings of the CA do not merit review and
modification, the same being correct; and that the Petition is a
mere reiteration of issues and arguments already passed upon
exhaustively below.chanrobleslaw
Our Ruling
The Court grants the Petition.
The procedural issue of lack of attempts at compromise should be
resolved in respondent's favor. True, no suit between members of
the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the
verified complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made. However, the failure of a party to
comply with this condition precedent is not a jurisdictional defect.
If the opposing party fails to raise such defect in a motion to
dismiss, such defect is deemed waived.31
hi arriving at its pronouncement, the CA passed upon the issue or
claim of ownership, which both parties raised. While the procedure
taken is allowed -under Section 16, Rule 70 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure,32 the issue of ownership may be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession - the CA nonetheless committed
serious and patent error in concluding that based solely on
respondent's TCT 12575 issued in her name, she must be
considered the singular owner of the subject property and thus
entitled to possession thereof- pursuant to the principle that "the
person who has a Torrens Title over a land is entitled to possession
thereof."33 Such provisional determination of ownership should
have been resolved in petitioners' favor.
When the deed of sale in favor of respondent was purportedly
executed by the parties thereto and notarized on June 6, 2006, it is
perfectly obvious that the signatures of the vendors therein,
Macario and Felicidad, were forged. They could not have signed the
same, because both were by then long deceased: Macario died on
February 22, 1981, while Felicidad passed away on September 14,
1997. This makes the June 6, 2006 deed of sale null and void;
being so, it is "equivalent to nothing; it produces no civil effect; and
it does not create, modify or extinguish a juridical relation." 34
And while it is true that respondent has in her favor a Torrens title
over the subject property, she nonetheless acquired no right or
title in her favor by virtue of the null and void June 6, 2006 deed.
"Verily, when the instrument presented is forged, even if
accompanied by the owner's duplicate certificate of title, the
registered owner does not thereby lose his title, and neither does
the assignee in the forged deed acquire any right or title to the
property."35
In sum, the fact that respondent has in her favor a certificate of
title is of no moment; her title cannot be used to validate the
forgery or cure the void sale. As has been held in the past:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Insofar as a person who fraudulently obtained a property is
concerned, the registration of the property in said person's
Page | 21
Persons 4th Exam Cases
name would not be sufficient to vest in him or her the title
to the property. A certificate of title merely confirms or
records title already existing and vested. The
indefeasibility of the Torrens title should not be used as a
means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of
real property. Good faith must concur with registration because,
otherwise, registration would be an exercise in futility. A Torrens
title does not furnish a shield for fraud, notwithstanding
the long-standing rule that registration is a constructive
notice of title binding upon the whole world. The legal
principle is that if the registration of the land is fraudulent, the
person in whose name the land is registered holds it as a mere
trustee.36 (Emphasis supplied)
Since respondent acquired no right over the subject property, the
same remained in the name of the original registered owners,
Macario and Felicidad. Being heirs of the owners, petitioners and
respondent thus became, and remain co-owners - by succession -
of the subject property. As such, petitioners may exercise all
attributes of ownership over the same, including possession -
whether de facto or dejure; respondent thus has no right to
exclude them from this right through an action for ejectment.
With the Court's determination that respondent's title is null and
void, the matter of direct or collateral attack is a foregone
conclusion as well. "An action to declare the nullity of a void title
does not prescribe and is susceptible to direct, as well as to
collateral, attack;"37 petitioners were not precluded from
questioning the validity of respondent's title in the ejectment case.
It does not appear either that petitioners are claiming exclusive
ownership or possession of the subject property. Quite the
contrary, they acknowledge all this time that the property belongs
to all the Domingo siblings in co-ownership. In the absence of an
allegation - or evidence - that petitioners are claiming exclusive
ownership over the co-owned property, respondent has no
alternative cause of action for ejectment which should prevent the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 9534. The pronouncement in a previous
case applies here:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
True it is that under Article 487 of the Civil Code, 38 a co-owner may
bring an action for ejectment against a co-owner who takes
exclusive possession and asserts exclusive ownership of a common
property. It bears stressing, however, that in this case, evidence is
totally wanting to establish John's or Juliet's exclusive ownership of
the property in question. Neither did Juliet obtain possession
thereof by virtue of a contract, express or implied, or thru
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth. As borne by the record,
Juliet was in possession of the subject structure and the sari-sari
store thereat by virtue of her being a co-owner thereof. As such,
she is as much entitled to enjoy its possession and ownership as
John.39cralawlawlibrary
Indeed, it is respondent who is claiming exclusive ownership of the
subject property owned in common.
Thus, left with no cause of action for ejectment against petitioners,
respondent's ejectment case must be dismissed.
There is likewise no merit to respondent's argument that since only
two of the defendants in the ejectment case filed the instant
Petition, the same must necessarily be dismissed. There is no rule
which requires that all the parties in the proceedings before the CA
must jointly take recourse with this Court or else such recourse
would be dismissible. The fact that Ramon and Rafael did not join
in the instant Petition does not bar petitioners from pursuing their
case before this Court. Moreover, since petitioners, Ramon and
Rafael are siblings, co-heirs, co-owners, and occupants of the
subject property, they all have common interests, and their rights
and liabilities are identical and so interwoven and dependent as to
be inseparable. The reversal of the assailed CA judgment should
therefore inure to the benefit of Ramon and Rafael as well. The
December 11, 2009 Order of the RTC decreeing dismissal as
against petitioners, Ramon, and Rafael, as well as the payment of
attorney's fees to all of them - may be reinstated in all respects.
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Page | 22
Persons 4th Exam Cases

xxx This Court has always recognized the general rule that in
appellate proceedings, the reversal of the judgment on appeal is
binding only on the parties in the appealed case and does not
affect or inure to the benefit of those who did not join or were not
made parties to the appeal. An exception to the rule exists,
however, where a judgment cannot be reversed as to the party
appealing without affecting the rights of his co-debtor, or where
the rights and liabilities of the parties are so interwoven and
dependent on each other as to be inseparable, in which case a
reversal as to one operates as a reversal as to all. This exception,
which is based on a communality of interest of said parties, is
recognized in this jurisdiction. x x x40cralawlawlibrary
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary WHEREFORE, the Petition
is GRANTED. The February 29, 2012 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 114363 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The December 11, 2009 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 160 in SCA No. 3144 is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Page | 23
Persons 4th Exam Cases
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 86355 May 31, 1990
JOSE MODEQUILLO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. AUGUSTO V. BREVA FRANCISCO SALINAS, FLORIPER
ABELLAN-SALINAS, JUANITO CULAN-CULAN and DEPUTY
SHERIFF FERNANDO PLATA respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
The issue in this petition is whether or not a final judgment of the
Court of Appeals in an action for damages may be satisfied by way
of execution of a family home constituted under the Family Code.
The facts are undisputed.
On January 29, 1988, a judgment was rendered by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 09218 entitled"Francisco Salinas, et al.
vs. Jose Modequillo, et al.," the dispositive part of which read as
follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal should be,
as it is hereby, reversed and set aside. Judgment is
hereby rendered finding the defendants-appellees
Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay jointly and
severally liable to plaintiffs-appellants as
hereinbelow set forth. Accordingly, defendants-
appellees are ordered to pay jointly and severally
to:
1. Plaintiffs-appellants, the Salinas spouses:
a. the amount of P30,000.00 by way of
compensation for the death of their son Audie
Salinas;
b. P10,000.00 for the loss of earnings by reason of
the death of said Audie Salinas;
c. the sum of P5,000.00 as burial expenses of
Audie Salinas; and
d. the sum of P5,000.00 by way of moral damages.
2. Plaintiffs-appellants Culan-Culan:
a. the sum of P5,000.00 for hospitalization
expenses of Renato Culan- Culan; and
b. P5,000.00 for moral damages.
3. Both plaintiff-appellants Salinas and Culan-
Culan, P7,000.00 for attorney's fees and litigation
expenses.
All counterclaims and other claims are hereby
dismissed. 1
The said judgment having become final and executory, a writ of
execution was issued by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City to
satisfy the said judgment on the goods and chattels of the
defendants Jose Modequillo and Benito Malubay at Malalag, Davao
del Sur.
Page | 24
Persons 4th Exam Cases
On July 7, 1988, the sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land
located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur containing an area of
600 square meters with a market value of P34,550.00 and
assessed value of P7,570.00 per Tax Declaration No. 87008-01359,
registered in the name of Jose Modequillo in the office of the
Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur; and a parcel of agricultural
land located at Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao del Sur
containing an area of 3 hectares with a market value of P24,130.00
and assessed value of P9,650.00 per Tax Declaration No. 87-08-
01848 registered in the name of Jose Modequillo in the office of the
Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur. 2
A motion to quash and/or to set aside levy of execution was filed
by defendant Jose Modequillo alleging therein that the residential
land located at Poblacion Malalag is where the family home is built
since 1969 prior to the commencement of this case and as such is
exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment under Articles
152 and 153 of the Family Code except for liabilities mentioned in
Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment debt sought to be
enforced against the family home of defendant is not one of those
enumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code. As to the
agricultural land although it is declared in the name of defendant it
is alleged to be still part of the public land and the transfer in his
favor by the original possessor and applicant who was a member of
a cultural minority was not approved by the proper government
agency. An opposition thereto was filed by the plaintiffs.
In an order dated August 26, 1988, the trial court denied the
motion. A motion for reconsideration thereof was filed by
defendant and this was denied for lack of merit on September 2,
1988.
Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari wherein it is
alleged that the trial court erred and acted in excess of its
jurisdiction in denying petitioner's motion to quash and/or to set
aside levy on the properties and in denying petitioner' motion for
reconsideration of the order dated August 26, 1988. Petitioner
contends that only a question of law is involved in this petition. He
asserts that the residential house and lot was first occupied as his
family residence in 1969 and was duly constituted as a family
home under the Family Code which took effect on August 4, 1988.
Thus, petitioner argues that the said residential house and lot is
exempt from payment of the obligation enumerated in Article 155
of the Family Code; and that the decision in this case pertaining to
damages arising from a vehicular accident took place on March 16,
1976 and which became final in 1988 is not one of those instances
enumerated under Article 155 of the Family Code when the family
home may be levied upon and sold on execution. It is further
alleged that the trial court erred in holding that the said house and
lot became a family home only on August 4, 1988 when the Family
Code became effective, and that the Family Code cannot be
interpreted in such a way that all family residences are deemed to
have been constituted as family homes at the time of their
occupancy prior to the effectivity of the said Code and that they
are exempt from execution for the payment of obligations incurred
before the effectivity of said Code; and that it also erred when it
declared that Article 162 of the Family Code does not state that the
provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
Articles 152 and 153 of the Family Code provide as follows:
Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by
the husband and the wife or by an unmarried head
of a family, is the dwelling house where they and
their family reside, and the land on which it is
situated.
Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted
on a house and lot from the time it is occupied as a
family residence. From the time of its constitution
and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually
resides therein, the family home continues to be
such and is exempt from execution, forced sale or
attachment except as hereinafter provided and to
the extent of the value allowed by law.
Page | 25
Persons 4th Exam Cases
Under the Family Code, a family home is deemed constituted on a
house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence.
There is no need to constitute the same judicially or extrajudicially
as required in the Civil Code. If the family actually resides in the
premises, it is, therefore, a family home as contemplated by law.
Thus, the creditors should take the necessary precautions to
protect their interest before extending credit to the spouses or
head of the family who owns the home.
Article 155 of the Family Code also provides as follows:
Art. 155. The family home shall be exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment except:
(1) For non-payment of taxes;
(2) For debts incurred prior to the constitution of
the family home;
(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the
premises before or after such constitution; and
(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics,
architects, builders, material men and others who
have rendered service or furnished material for the
construction of the building.
The exemption provided as aforestated is effective from the time of
the constitution of the family home as such, and lasts so long as
any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein.
In the present case, the residential house and lot of petitioner was
not constituted as a family home whether judicially or
extrajudicially under the Civil Code. It became a family home by
operation of law only under Article 153 of the Family Code. It is
deemed constituted as a family home upon the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988 not August 4, one year after its
publication in the Manila Chronicle on August 4, 1987 (1988 being
a leap year).
The contention of petitioner that it should be considered a family
home from the time it was occupied by petitioner and his family in
1969 is not well- taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it is
provided that "the provisions of this Chapter shall also govern
existing family residences insofar as said provisions are
applicable." It does not mean that Articles 152 and 153 of said
Code have a retroactive effect such that all existing family
residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes
at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code and are exempt from execution for the payment of
obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code.
Article 162 simply means that all existing family residences at the
time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family
homes and are prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a
family home under the Family Code. Article 162 does not state that
the provisions of Chapter 2, Title V have a retroactive effect.
Is the family home of petitioner exempt from execution of the
money judgment aforecited No. The debt or liability which was the
basis of the judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the
vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money judgment
arising therefrom was rendered by the appellate court on January
29, 1988. Both preceded the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988. This case does not fall under the exemptions from
execution provided in the Family Code.
As to the agricultural land subject of the execution, the trial court
correctly ruled that the levy to be made by the sheriff shall be on
whatever rights the petitioner may have on the land.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Page | 26
Persons 4th Exam Cases
[G.R. No. 108532. March 9, 1999]
PABLITO TANEO, JR., JOSE TANEO, NENA T. CATUBIG and
HUSBAND, CILIA T. MORING and
HUSBAND, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
ABDON GILIG, respondents.
The issues in this case are not novel: whether or not the
conveyance made by way of the sheriffs sale pursuant to the wit of
execution issued by the trial court in Civil Case No. 590 is
prohibited under Sec. 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141; and
whether or not the family home is exempt from execution.
As a result of a judgment in Civil Case No. 590 (For recovery of
property) in favor of private respondent, two (2) petitioner's
properties were levied to satisfy the judgment amount of
about P5,000.00: one was a parcel of land located in Barrio Igpit,
Municipality of Opol, Misamis Oriental with an area of about five (5)
hectares, and the other was the family home also located at Igpit,
Opol, Misamis Oriental. The subject properties were sold at public
auction on February 12, 1966 to the private respondent as the
highest bidder. Consequently, after petitioners failure to redeem
the same, a final deed of conveyance was executed on February 9,
1968, definitely selling, transferring, and conveying said properties
to the private respondent.
To forestall such conveyance, petitioners filed an action on
November 5, 1985 (docketed as Civil Case No. 10407) to declare
the deed of conveyance void and to quiet title over the land with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction. In their complaint, it was
alleged that petitioners are the children and heirs of Pablo Taneo
and Narcisa Valaceras who died on February 12, 1977 and
September 12, 1984, respectively. Upon their death, they left the
subject property covered by OCT No. P-12820 and Free Patent No.
548906. Considering that said property has been acquired through
free patent, such property is therefore inalienable and not subject
to any encumbrance for the payment of debt, pursuant to
Commonwealth Act. No. 141. Petitioners further alleged that they
were in continuous, open and peaceful possession of the land and
that on February 9, 1968, Deputy Provincial Sheriff Jose V. Yasay
issued a Sheriffs Deed of Conveyance in favor of the private
respondent over the subject property including their family home
which was extrajudicially constituted in accordance with law. As a
result of the alleged illegal deed of conveyance, private respondent
was able to obtain in his name Tax Declaration No. 851920 over
the land, thus casting a cloud of doubt over the title and ownership
of petitioners over said property.
Private respondent refuted petitioners contentions alleging
that he lawfully acquired the subject properties described as Lot
No. 5545, Cad. 237 which was a private land, by virtue of a Sheriffs
Sale on February 12, 1966. Said sale has become final as no
redemption was made within one year from the registration of the
Sheriffs Certificate of Sale. The validity of the sale in favor of
Abdon Gilig was even confirmed by the Court of appeals in a
related case (CA No. 499965-R) entitled Arriola v. Gilig, where one
Rufino Arriola also claimed ownership over the subject property.
Private respondent averred that the subject land was originally
owned by Lazaro Ba-a who sold the land to Pablo Taneo on
September 18, 1941, as evidenced by an Escritura de
Venta. Despite it being a private land, Pablo Taneo filed an
application for free patent which was made final only in 1979.
As counterclaim, private respondent alleged that since
petitioners are still in possession of the subject property, he has
been deprived of acts of ownership and possession and therefore,
prayed for payment of rentals from February, 1968 until possession
has been restored to them.
In its decision of March 27, 1989, the RTC dismissed the
complaint.
The dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:
Page | 27
Persons 4th Exam Cases

Premises considered, Judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the SO ORDERED.[1]

defendant and against the plaintiffs, ordering the dismissal of the
complaint filed by the plaintiffs; On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision
of the RTC.
a) Declaring OCT No P-12820 and Free Patent No. 548906
both in name of Pablo Taneo as null and void and Hence, this petition.
directing the Register of Deeds to cancel the same,
without prejudice however on the part of the The petition is devoid of merit.
defendant to institute legal proceedings for the
transfer of the said title in the name of defendant
In resolving the issues, the lower court made the following
Abdon Gilig;
findings of fact which this Court finds no cogent reason to disturb:

b) Declaring Abdon Gilig as the absolute and legal owner

1. That the land in question originally belonged to Lazaro
of the land covered by OCT No. P-12820, and covered
Ba-a who sold the same to the late Pablito (sic) Taneo
by Tax Declaration No. 851920, and hence entitled to
father of the herein plaintiff on September 18, 1941,
the possession of the same and as a necessary
by virtue of an Escritura de Venta identified as Reg.
concomitant, admonishing the plaintiffs to refrain from
Not. 50; pages 53, Foleo Not. V, Series of 1941 of the
disturbing the peaceful possession of the defendant
Notarial Register of Ernie Pelaez (Exh. 10);
over the land in question;

2. That on July 19, 1951 Abdon Gilig with his wife filed a
c) Likewise declaring the defendant Abdon Gilig as the
Civil Case No. 590 for recovery of property against
true and absolute owner of the house in question
Pablo Taneo, et al., wherein Judgment was rendered on
formerly declared under Tax Declaration No. 4142 in
June 24, 1964, in favor of Abdon Gilig and against
the name of Pablo Taneo and presently declared under
Pablo Taneo ordering the latter to pay damages in the
Tax Declaration No. 851916 in the name of Abdon
amount of P5,000.00 (Exh. 2);
Gilig; ordering the plaintiffs or any of their
representatives to vacate and return the possession of
the same to defendant Abdon Gilig; 3. That by virtue of said decision, a writ of Execution was
issued on November 22, 1965 against the properties
of Pablo Taneo and on December 1, 1965, a Notice of
d) Ordering the plaintiffs, except the nominal parties
Levy was executed by the Clerk of Court Pedro Perez
herein, to pay to defendant Abdon Gilig the amount
wherein the properties in question were among the
of P500.00 a month as reasonable rental of the house
properties levied by the Sheriff (Exh. 3);
in question to be reckoned from February 9, 1968 until
the possession of the same is returned to the
defendant. 4. That the said properties were sold at public auction
wherein the defendant Abdon Gilig came out as the
highest bidder and on February 12, 1965, a Sheriffs
e) To pay to defendant the amount of P5,000.00 as
Certificate of Sale was executed by Ex-Oficio Provincial
attorneys fees and to pay the costs.

Page | 28
Persons 4th Exam Cases
Sheriff Pedro Perez (Exh. 1) ceding the said properties
in favor of Abdon Gilig and which Certificate of Sale
was registered with the Register of Deeds of March 2,
1966;
5. That for failure to redeem the said property within the
reglementary period, a Sheriffs final Deed of
Conveyance was executed by same Provincial Sheriff
Jose V. Yasay on February 1968, (Exhs. 4, 4-A)
conveying the property definitely to Abdon Gilig.
6. That on April 20, 1966, after his third-party claim which
he filed with the Sheriff in Civil Case No. 590 was not
given due course, Rufino Arriola filed Civil Case No.
2667 entitled Arriola vs. Abdon Gilig, et al., for
Recovery of Property and/or annulment of Sale with
Damages;
7. That Judgment was rendered by the Court thru Judge
Bernardo Teves dismissing the case with costs on
February 21, 1969;
8. That said decision was appealed to the Court of
Appeals which affirmed the decision in toto on June
20, 1979; declaring the alleged Deed of Sale executed
by Abdon Gilig in favor of the plaintiff as null and void
for being simulated or fictitious and executed in fraud
or (sic) creditors;
9. That on March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo constituted the
house in question erected on the land of Plutarco
Vacalares as a family home (Exh. F) but was however,
notarized only on May 2, 1965 and registered with the
Register of Deeds on June 24, 1966;
10. That in the meanwhile, unknown to the defendant,
Pablo Taneo applied for a free patent on the land in
question which was approved on October 13, 1973,
(Exh. B) and the Patent and Title issued on December
10, 1980 (Oct No. P-12820-Exh. 12);
11. On November 3, 1985, the plaintiff filed the present action. [2]
Petitioners contend that under Section 118 of Commonwealth
Act No. 141, the subject land which they inherited from their father
under free patent cannot be alienated or encumbered in violation
of the law. Citing in particular the cases of Oliveros v.
Porciongcola[3] and Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals,[4] the execution or
auction sale of the litigated land falls within the prohibited period
and is, likewise, a disavowal of the rationale of the law which is to
give the homesteader or patentee every chance to preserve for
himself and his family the land which the State had gratuitously
given to him as a reward for his labor in cleaning and cultivating it.
[5]
We are not unmindful of the intent of the law. In fact,
in Republic v. Court of Appeals,[6] the Court elucidated, to wit:
It is well-known that the homestead laws were designed to
distribute disposable agricultural lots of the State to land-destitute
citizens for their home and cultivation. Pursuant to such
benevolent intention the State prohibits the sale or encumbrance
of the homestead (Section 116) within five years after the grant of
the patent. After that five-year period the law impliedly permits
alienation of the homestead; but in line with the primordial purpose
to favor the homesteader and his family the statute provides that
such alienation or conveyance (Section 117) shall be subject to the
right of repurchase by the homesteader, his widow or heirs within
five years. This Section 117 is undoubtedly a complement of
Section 116. It aims to preserve and keep in the family of the
homesteader that portion of public land which the State had
gratuitously given to him. It would, therefore, be in keeping with
this fundamental idea to hold, as we hold, that the right to
repurchase exists not only when the original homesteader makes
the conveyance, but also when it is made by his widow
Page | 29
Persons 4th Exam Cases
or heirs. This construction is clearly deducible from the terms of
the statute.
The intent of the law is undisputable but under the facts of the
case, the prohibition invoked by the petitioners under Section 118
does not apply to them.
Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 reads:
Except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units or
institutions, or legally constituted banking corporations, lands
acquired under free patent or homestead provisions shall not be
subject to encumbrance or alienation from the date of the approval
of the application and for a term of five years from and after the
date of issuance of the patent or grant, nor shall they become
liable to the satisfaction of any debt contracted prior to the
expiration of said period, but the improvements or crops on the
land may be mortgaged or pledged to qualified persons,
associations, or corporations.
x x x.
The prohibition against alienation of lands acquired by
homestead or free patent commences on the date of the approval
of the application for free patent and the five-year period is
counted from the issuance of the patent. The reckoning point is
actually the date of approval of the application. In Amper v.
Presiding Judge,[7] the Court held that:
x x x The date when the prohibition against the alienation of lands
acquired by homesteads or free patents commences is the date of
the approval of the application and the prohibition embraces the
entire five-year period from and after the date of issuance of the
patent or grant. As stated inBeniga v. Bugas, (35 SCRA 111), the
provision would make no sense if the prohibition starting from the
date of the approval of the application would have no termination
date.
The specific period of five years within which the alienation or
encumbrance of a homestead is restricted starts to be computed
from the date of the issuance of the patent. But the prohibition of
alienation commences from the date the application is
approved which comes earlier. (Underlining ours.)
Following this ruling, we agree with the respondent court that
the conveyance made by way of the sheriffs sale was not violative
of the law. The judgment obligation of the petitioners against
Abdon Gilig arose on June 24, 1964. The properties were levied and
sold at public auction with Abdon Gilig as the highest bidder on
February 12, 1966. On February 9, 1968, the final deed of
conveyance ceding the subject property to Abdon Gilig was issued
after the petitioners failed to redeem the property after the
reglementary period. Pablo Taneos application for free patent was
approved only on October 19, 1973.
The sequence of the events leads us to the inescapable
conclusion that even before the application for homestead had
been approved, Pablo Taneo was no longer the owner of the land.
The Deed of conveyance issued on February 9, 1968 finally
transferred the property to Abdon Gilig. As of that date, Pablo
Taneo did not actually have anymore rights over the land which he
could have transferred to herein petitioners. The petitioners are not
the owners of the land and cannot claim to be such by invoking
Commonwealth Act No. 141. The prohibition does not apply since it
is clear from the records that the judgment debt and the execution
sale took place prior to the approval of the application for free
patent. We quote with favor the respondent courts valid
observation on the matter:
x x x the application of Pablo Taneo for a free patent was approved
only on 19 October 1973 and Free Patent was issued on 10
December 1980. Under the aforecited provision, the subject land
could not be made liable for the satisfaction of any debt contracted
from the time of the application and during the 5-year period
following 10 December 1980, or until 10 December 1985. However,
debts contracted prior to the approval of the application for free
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
patent, that is prior to 18 October 1973, are not covered by the
prohibition. This is because they do not fall within the scope of the
prohibited period. In this case, the judgment debt in favor of
defendant-appellee was rendered on 24 June 1964, the writ of
execution issued on 22 November 1965, notice of levy made on 1
December 1965, the execution sale held on 12 February 1966, and
the certificate of sale registered on 2 March 1966, all before Pablo
Taneos application for free patent was approved on 19 October
1973. The execution, therefore, was not violative of the law.[8]
Anent the second issue, petitioners aver that the house which
their father constituted as family home is exempt from
execution. In a last ditch effort to save their property, petitioners
invoke the benefits accorded to the family home under the Family
Code.
A family home is the dwelling place of a person and his
family. It is said, however, that the family home is a real right,
which is gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment,
constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is
situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy
such properties, which must remain with the person constituting it
and his heirs.[9] It cannot be seized by creditors except in certain
special cases.
Under the Civil Code (Articles 224 to 251), a family home may
be constituted judicially and extrajudicially, the former by the filing
of the petition and with the approval of the proper court, and the
latter by the recording of a public instrument in the proper registry
of property declaring the establishment of the family home. The
operative act then which created the family home extrajudicially
was the registration in the Registry of Property of the declaration
prescribed by Articles 240 and 241 of the Civil Code. [10]
Under the Family Code, however, registration was no longer
necessary. Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family
home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is
occupied in the family residence. It reads:
The family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from
the time it is occupied as family residence. From the time of its
constitution and so long as its beneficiaries actually resides
therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment,except as hereinafter
provided and to the extent of the value allowed by law.
It is under the foregoing provision which petitioners seek
refuge to avert execution of the family home arguing that as early
as 1964, Pablo Taneo had already constituted the house in question
as their family home. However, the retroactive effect of the Family
Code, particularly on the provisions on the family home has been
clearly laid down by the court as explained in the case of Manacop
v. Court of Appeals[11] to wit:
Finally, the petitioner insists that the attached property is a family
home, having been occupied by him and his family since 1972, and
is therefore exempt from attachment.
The contention is not well-taken.
While Article 153 of the Family Code provides that the family home
is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it is
occupied as a family residence, it does not mean that said article
has a retroactive effect such that all existing family residences,
petitioners included, are deemed to have been constituted as
family homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity
of the Family Code and henceforth, are exempt from execution for
the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the
Family Code on August 3, 1988 (Modequillo vs. Breva, 185 SCRA
766). Neither does Article 162 of said Code state that the
provisions of Chapter 2, Title V thereof have retroactive effect. It
simply means that all existing family residences at the time of the
effectivity of the Family Code are considered family homes and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home
under the Family Code (Modequillo vs. Breva, supra). Since
petitioners debt was incurred as early as November 25, 1987, it
preceded the effectivity of the Family Code. His property is
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

therefore not exempt from attachment (Annex O, Plaintiffs Position
Paper and Memorandum of Authorities, p. 78). (pp. 5-6, Decision;
pp. 64-65, Rollo) (underscoring ours)
The applicable law, therefore, in the case at bar is still the Civil
Code where registration of the declaration of a family home is a
prerequisite. Nonetheless, the law provides certain instances where
the family home is not exempted from execution, forced sale or
attachment.
Article 243 reads:
The family home extrajudicially formed shall be exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment, except:
Moreover, the constitution of the family home by Pablo Taneo
is even doubtful considering that such constitution did not comply
with the requirements of the law. The trial court found that the
house was erected not on the land which the Taneos owned but on
the land of one Plutarco Vacalares. By the very definition of the law
that the family home is the dwelling house where a person and his
family resides and the land on which it is situated, [13] it is
understood that the house should be constructed on a
land not belonging to another. Apparently, the constitution of a
family home by Pablo Taneo in the instant case was merely an
afterthought in order to escape execution of their property but to
no avail.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

(1) For nonpayment of taxes; SO ORDERED.

(2) For debts incurred before the declaration was

recorded in the Registry of Property;

(3) For debts secured by mortgages on the premises

before or after such record of the declaration;

(4) For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders,

material-men and others who have rendered service or furnished
material for the construction of the building.[12]

The trial court found that on March 7, 1964, Pablo Taneo

constituted the house in question, erected on the land of Plutarco
Vacalares, as the family home. The instrument constituting the
family home was registered only on January 24, 1966. The money
judgment against Pablo Taneo was rendered on January 24,
1964. Thus, at that time when the debt was incurred, the family
home was not yet constituted or even registered. Clearly,
petitioners alleged family home, as constituted by their father is
not exempt as it falls under the exception of Article 243(2).

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 180587 March 20, 2009
SIMEON CABANG, VIRGINIA CABANG and VENANCIO
CABANG ALIAS "DONDON", Petitioners,
vs.
MR. & MRS. GUILLERMO BASAY, Respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court seeks to annul and set aside the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 76755 1 dated May 31, 20072 which
reversed the Order3 of the Regional Trial Court of Molave,
Zamboanga Del Sur, Branch 23 in Civil Case No. 99-20-127 which
denied respondents motion for execution on the ground that
petitioners family home was still subsisting. Also assailed is the
Resolution dated September 21, 2007 denying the motion for
reconsideration.
The facts as summarized by the appellate court:
Deceased Felix Odong was the registered owner of Lot No. 7777,
Ts- 222 located in Molave, Zamboanga del Sur. Said lot was
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 0-2,768 pursuant to
Decree No. N-64 and issued on March 9, 1966. However, Felix
Odong and his heirs never occupied nor took possession of the lot.
On June 16, 1987, plaintiff-appellants bought said real property
from the heirs of Felix Odong for P8,000.00. Consequently, OCT No.
0-2,768 was cancelled and in its stead, Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-22,048 was issued on August 6, 1987 in the name of plaintiff-
appellants. The latter also did not occupy the said property.
Defendant-appellees, on the other hand, had been in continuous,
open, peaceful and adverse possession of the same parcel of land
since 1956 up to the present. They were the awardees in the
cadastral proceedings of Lot No. 7778 of the Molave Townsite, Ts-
222. During the said cadastral proceedings, defendant-appellees
claimed Lot No. 7778 on the belief that the area they were actually
occupying was Lot No. 7778. As it turned out, however, when the
Municipality of Molave relocated the townsite lots in the area in
1992 as a big portion of Lot No. 7778 was used by the government
as a public road and as there were many discrepancies in the areas
occupied, it was then discovered that defendant-appellees were
actually occupying Lot No. 7777.
On June 23, 1992, plaintiff-appellants filed a Complaint docketed as
Civil Case No. 92-20-127 for Recovery of Property against
defendant-appellees.
On July 19, 1996, the trial court rendered its decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads, thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
defendants and against the plaintiff
1. Holding that the rights of the plaintiffs to recover the
land registered in their names, have been effectively
barred by laches; and
2. Ordering the dismissal of the above-entitled case.
No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, plaintiff-appellants filed an appeal before the Court of
Appeals assailing the above-decision. Said appeal was docketed as
CA-G.R. CV No. 55207.
On December 23, 1998, the Court of Appeals, through the then
Second Division, rendered a Decision reversing the assailed
decision and decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the judgment herein appealed from is hereby
REVERSED, and judgment is hereby rendered declaring the
plaintiffs-appellants to be entitled to the possession of Lot No. 7777
of the Molave Townsite, subject to the rights of the defendants-
appellees under Article (sic) 448, 546, 547 and 548 of the New Civil
Code.
The records of this case are hereby ordered remanded to the court
of origin for further proceedings to determine the rights of the
defendants-appellees under the aforesaid article (sic) of the New
Civil Code, and to render judgment thereon in accordance with the
evidence and this decision.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Page | 33
Persons 4th Exam Cases

Defendant-appellees thereafter filed a petition for review on official surveyor of the Bureau of Lands to conduct the survey of
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court before the Supreme the litigated property.
Court docketed as G.R. No. 139601. On October 18, 1999, the Pursuant to the above Order, the Community Environment and
Supreme Court issued a Resolution denying the petition for late Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of
filing and lack of appropriate service. Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)-Region XI designated
Subsequently, or on February 15, 2000, the Supreme Court Geodetic Engineer Diosdado L. de Guzman to [act] as the official
Resolution had become final and executory. surveyor. On March 2002, Engr. De Guzman submitted his survey
Consequently, the case was remanded to the court a quo and the report which stated, inter alia:
latter commissioned the Municipal Assessor of Molave, Zamboanga 1. That on September 18, 2001, the undersigned had
del Sur to determine the value of the improvements introduced by conducted verification survey of Lot 7777, Ts-222 and the
the defendant-appellees. adjacent lots for reference purposes-with both parties
The Commissioners Report determined that at the time of ocular present on the survey;
inspection, there were three (3) residential buildings constructed 2. That the survey was started from BLLM #34, as directed
on the property in litigation. During the ocular inspection, plaintiff- by the Order, taking sideshots of lot corners, existing
appellants son, Gil Basay, defendant-appellee Virginia Cabang, concrete fence, road and going back to BLLM #34, a point
and one Bernardo Mendez, an occupant of the lot, were present. In of reference;
the report, the following appraised value of the improvements were 3. Considering that there was only one BLLM existing on
determined, thus: the ground, the undersigned conducted astronomical
lawphil.net observation on December 27, 2001 in order to check the
Lot Area Appraised carried Azimuth of the traverse;
Owner Improvement 4. That per result of the survey conducted, it was found out
No. (sq.m.) Value
and ascertained that the area occupied by Mrs. Virginia
Virginia Cabang is a portion of Lot 7777, with lot assignment to be
7777 32.55 Building P21,580.65
Cabang known as Lot 7777-A with an area of 303 square meters
Jovencio and portion of Lot 7778 with lot assignment to be known as
7777 15.75 Building 18,663.75 Lot 7778-A with an area of 76 square meters. On the same
Capuno
lot, portion of which is also occupied by Mr. Bernardo
Amelito Mata 7777 14.00 Building 5,658.10 Mendez with lot assignment to be known as Lot 7777-B
Toilet 1,500.00 with an area of 236 square meters and Lot 7778-B with an
area of 243 square meters as shown on the attached
Plants & sketch for ready reference;
2,164.00
Trees 5. That there were three (3) houses made of light material
erected inside Lot No. 7777-A, which is owned by Mrs.
Virginia Cabang and also a concrete house erected both on
TOTAL P49,566.50
portion of Lot No. 7777-B and Lot No. 7778-B, which is
Thereafter, upon verbal request of defendant-appellees, the court a owned by Mr. Bernardo Mendez. x x x;
quo in its Order declared that the tie point of the survey should be 6. That the existing road had been traversing on a portion
the BLLM (Bureau of Lands Location Monument) and authorized the of Lot 7778 to be know (sic) as Lot 7778-CA-G.R. SP No.

Page | 34
Persons 4th Exam Cases
with an area of 116 square meters as shown on attached
sketch plan.
During the hearing on May 10, 2002, plaintiff-appellants offer to
pay P21,000.00 for the improvement of the lot in question was
rejected by defendant-appellees. The court a quo disclosed its
difficulty in resolving whether or not the houses may be subject of
an order of execution it being a family home.
On June 18, 2002, plaintiff-appellants filed their Manifestation and
Motion for Execution alleging therein that defendant-appellees
refused to accept payment of the improvements as determined by
the court appointed Commissioner, thus, they should now be
ordered to remove said improvements at their expense or if they
refused, an Order of Demolition be issued.
On September 6, 2002, the court a quo issued the herein assailed
Order denying the motion for execution.4
Respondents thereafter elevated their cause to the appellate court
which reversed the trial court in its May 31, 2007 Decision in CA-
G.R. CV No. 76755. Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was
denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution 5 dated September
21, 2007.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners insist that the property subject of the controversy is a
duly constituted family home which is not subject to execution,
thus, they argue that the appellate tribunal erred in reversing the
judgment of the trial court.
The petition lacks merit.
It bears stressing that the purpose for which the records of the
case were remanded to the court of origin was for the enforcement
of the appellate courts final and executory judgment 6 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 55207 which, among others, declared herein respondents
entitled to the possession of Lot No. 7777 of the Molave Townsite
subject to the provisions of Articles 448, 7 546,8 5479 an 54810 of the
Civil Code. Indeed, the decision explicitly decreed that the remand
of the records of the case was for the court of origin "[t]o
determine the rights of the defendants-appellees under the
aforesaid article[s] of the New Civil Code, and to render judgment
thereon in accordance with the evidence and this decision."
A final and executory judgment may no longer be modified in any
respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court
that rendered it or by the highest court in the land. 11 The only
exceptions to this rule are the correction of (1) clerical errors; (2)
the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any
party, and (3) void judgments.12
Well-settled is the rule that there can be no execution until and
unless the judgment has become final and executory, i.e. the
period of appeal has lapsed without an appeal having been taken,
or, having been taken, the appeal has been resolved and the
records of the case have been returned to the court of origin, in
which event, execution shall issue as a matter of right. 13 In short,
once a judgment becomes final, the winning party is entitled to a
writ of execution and the issuance thereof becomes a courts
ministerial duty.14
Furthermore, as a matter of settled legal principle, a writ of
execution must adhere to every essential particulars of the
judgment sought to be executed.15 An order of execution may not
vary or go beyond the terns of the judgment it seeks to enforce. 16 A
writ of execution must conform to the judgment and if it is different
from, goes beyond or varies the tenor of the judgment which gives
it life, it is a nullity. 17 Otherwise stated, when the order of execution
and the corresponding writ issued pursuant thereto is not in
harmony with and exceeds the judgment which gives it life, they
have pro tanto no validity 18 to maintain otherwise would be to
ignore the constitutional provision against depriving a person of his
property without due process of law.19
As aptly pointed out by the appellate court, from the inception of
Civil Case No. 99-20-127, it was already of judicial notice that the
improvements introduced by petitioners on the litigated property
are residential houses not family homes. Belatedly interposing
such an extraneous issue at such a late stage of the proceeding is
tantamount to interfering with and varying the terms of the final
and executory judgment and a violation of respondents right to
due process because
As a general rule, points of law, theories and issues not brought to
the attention of the trial court cannot be raised for the first time on
Page | 35
Persons 4th Exam Cases
appeal. For a contrary rule would be unfair to the adverse party
who would have no opportunity to present further evidence
material to the new theory, which it could have done had it been
aware of if at the time of the hearing before the trial
court.20lawphil.net
The refusal, therefore, of the trial court to enforce the execution on
the ground that the improvements introduced on the litigated
property are family homes goes beyond the pale of what it had
been expressly tasked to do, i.e. its ministerial duty of executing
the judgment in accordance with its essential particulars. The
foregoing factual, legal and jurisprudential scenario reduces the
raising of the issue of whether or not the improvements introduced
by petitioners are family homes into a mere afterthought.
Even squarely addressing the issue of whether or not the
improvements introduced by petitioners on the subject land are
family homes will not extricate them from their predicament.
As defined, "[T]he family home is a sacred symbol of family love
and is the repository of cherished memories that last during ones
lifetime.21 It is the dwelling house where the husband and wife, or
an unmarried head of a family reside, including the land on which it
is situated.22 It is constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or
by an unmarried head of a family." 23 Article 153 of the Family Code
provides that
The family home is deemed constituted from the time it is
occupied as a family residence. From the time of its constitution
and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the
family home continues to be such and is exempt from execution,
forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to
the extent of the value allowed by law.
The actual value of the family home shall not exceed, at the time
of its constitution, the amount of P300,000.00 in urban areas and
P200,000.00 in rural areas. 24 Under the afore-quoted provision, a
family home is deemed constituted on a house and a lot from the
time it is occupied as a family residence. There is no need to
constitute the same judicially or extra-judicially. 25
There can be no question that a family home is generally exempt
from execution,26 provided it was duly constituted as such. It is
likewise a given that the family home must be constituted on
property owned by the persons constituting it. Indeed as pointed
out in Kelley, Jr. v. Planters Products, Inc. 27 "[T]he family home must
be part of the properties of the absolute community or the conjugal
partnership, or of the exclusive properties of either spouse with the
latters consent, or on the property of the unmarried head of the
family."28 In other words:
The family home must be established on the properties of (a) the
absolute community, or (b) the conjugal partnership, or (c) the
exclusive property of either spouse with the consent of the other. It
cannot be established on property held in co-ownership with third
persons. However, it can be established partly on community
property, or conjugal property and partly on the exclusive property
of either spouse with the consent of the latter.1avvphi1
If constituted by an unmarried head of a family, where there is no
communal or conjugal property existing, it can be constituted only
on his or her own property.29 (Emphasis and italics supplied)
Therein lies the fatal flaw in the postulate of petitioners. For all
their arguments to the contrary, the stark and immutable fact is
that the property on which their alleged family home stands is
owned by respondents and the question of ownership had been
long laid to rest with the finality of the appellate courts judgment
in CA-G.R. CV No. 55207. Thus, petitioners continued stay on the
subject land is only by mere tolerance of respondents.
All told, it is too late in the day for petitioners to raise this issue.
Without doubt, the instant case where the family home issue has
been vigorously pursued by petitioners is but a clear-cut ploy
meant to forestall the enforcement of an otherwise final and
executory decision. The execution of a final judgment is a matter of
right on the part of the prevailing party whose implementation is
mandatory and ministerial on the court or tribunal issuing the
judgment.30
The most important phase of any proceeding is the execution of
judgment.31 Once a judgment becomes final, the prevailing party
should not, through some clever maneuvers devised by an
unsporting loser, be deprived of the fruits of the verdict. 32 An
unjustified delay in the enforcement of a judgment sets at naught
the role of courts in disposing of justiciable controversies with
finality.33 Furthermore, a judgment if not executed would just be an
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

empty victory for the prevailing party because execution is the fruit
and end of the suit and very aptly called the life of the law. 34
The issue is moreover factual and, to repeat that trite refrain, the
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. It is not the function of the
Court to review, examine and evaluate or weigh the probative
value of the evidence presented. A question of fact would arise in
such event. Questions of fact cannot be raised in an appeal via
certiorari before the Supreme Court and are not proper for its
consideration.35 The rationale behind this doctrine is that a review
of the findings of fact of the appellate tribunal is not a function this
Court normally undertakes. The Court will not weigh the evidence
all over again unless there is a showing that the findings of the
lower court are totally devoid of support or are clearly erroneous so
as to constitute serious abuse of discretion. 36 Although there are
recognized exceptions37 to this rule, none exists in this case to
justify a departure therefrom.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated May 31, 2007 in CA-G.R. CV No. 76755 declaring
respondents entitled to the writ of execution and ordering
petitioners to vacate the subject property, as well as the Resolution
dated September 21, 2007 denying the motion for reconsideration,
are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
G.R. No. 186322 July 8, 2015
ENRICO S. EULOGIO and NATIVIDAD V. EULOGIO, Petitioners,
vs.
PATERNO C. BELL, SR., ROGELIA CALINGASAN-BELL,
PATERNO WILLIAM BELL, JR., FLORENCE FELICIA VICTORIA
BELL, PATERNO FERDINAND BELL III, and PATERNO
BENERAO BELL IV,Respondents.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision1 in CA-G.R. SP No. 87531 which granted the
Petition for Certiorari filed by respondents and enjoined the
execution sale of their family home for the satisfaction of the
money judgment awarded to petitioners in Civil Case No. 4581, and
the Resolution2which denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
ANTECEDENT FACTS
Respondents Paterno William Bell, Jr., Florence Felicia Victoria Bell,
Paterno Ferdinand Bell III, and Paterno Benerano IV (the Bell
siblings) are the unmarried children of respondent Spouses Paterno
C. Bell and Rogelia Calingasan-Bell (Spouses Bell). In 1995, the Bell
sibling lodged a Complaint for annulment of documents,
reconveyance, quieting of title and damages against petitioner
Enrico S. Eulogio and Natividad Eulogio (the Eulogios). It was
docketed as Civil Case No. 4581 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Batangas City, Branch 84. The complaint sought the annulment of
the contract of sale executed by Spouses Bell over their 329-
square-meter residential house and lot, as well the as the
cancellation of the title obtained by petitioners by virtue of the
Deed.
The RTC granted respondents prayers, but declared Spouses Bell
liable to petitioners in the amount of 1 million plus 12% interest
per annum. The dispositive portion of the Decision dated 15 July
1998 reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, prescinding from all the foregoing, the Court hereby
declares:
1. That the sale of the subject house and lot under Deed of
Sale marked as Exhibit "F" is only an equitable mortgage in
favor of the defendants Enrico Eulogio and Natividad
Eulogio. However, the mortgage cannot bind the property
in question for being violative of Chapter 2, Title 4 of the
Family Code, its encumbrance not having been consented
to in writing by a majority of the beneficiaries who are the
plaintiffs herein;
2. The said equitable mortgage is deemed to be an
unsecured mortgage [sic] for which the Spouses Paterno C.
Bell, Sr. and Rogelia Calingasan Bell as mortgagors are
liable to the defendants-spouses Enrico Eulogio and
Natividad Eulogio in the amount of 1,000,000 plus interest
of 12% per annum. However, under the Fourth Party
Complaint Sps. Paterno C. Bell, Sr. and Rogelia Calingasan
Bell have the right of reimbursement from fourth party
defendants Nicolas Morana and Julieta Morana for whom
their loan of 1,000,000 was secured by Sps. Paterno C. Bell,
Sr. and Rogelia Calingasan Bell. Accordingly, the fourth
party defendants Nicolas Morana and Julieta Morana are
hereby ordered to reimburse Paterno C. Bell, Sr. and
Rogelia Calingasan Bell the loan of 1,000,00 plus interest of
12% per annum to be paid by the latter to defendants
Enrico and Natividad Eulogio;
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
3. The house and lot in question free from any and all
encumbrances by virtue of said equitable mortgage or the
purported sale; and
4. The Deed of Sale (Exhibit "F") is null and void for being
contrary to law and public policy.
Accordingly, (1) the Register of Deeds of Batangas City is hereby
ordered to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-131472 in the
name of defendants Enrico S. Eulogio and Natividad Eulogio and to
re-constitute (sic) Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-680-(5997) as
"family home" of the plaintiffs Florence Felicia Victoria C. Bell,
Paterno William C. Bell Jr., Paterno Ferdinand C. Bell III, Paterno
Benerano C. Bell IV and fourth party plaintiffs Paterno C. Bell Sr.
and Rogelia Calingasan Bell; or in the alternative to issue a new
Transfer Certificate of Title under the same tenor;
2. The City Assessor of Batangas City is hereby directed to issue a
tax declaration covering the said subject property as family home
for the said plaintiffs and fourth party plaintiffs Paterno C. Bell and
Rogelia Calingasan Bell; and
3. Defendants Enrico Eulogio and Natividad Eulogio are ordered to
pay the plaintiffs attorneys fees and litigation expenses of
35,000.00 as the plaintiffs have been compelled to litigate to
protect their property right, and costs,3
Both petitioners and respondent appealed to the CA, but the trial
courts Decision was affirmed en too. Spouses Bell later brought
the case to this Court to question their liability to petitioners in the
amount of 1 million plus interest. The Court, however, dismissed
their Petition for failure to show any reversible error committed by
the CA.4 Thereafter, entry of judgment was made.5
On 9 June 2004 the RTC issued a Writ of Execution as a result of
which respondents property covered by the newly reconstituted
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 54208 [formerly RT-680
(5997)] was levied on execution. Upon motion by respondents, trial
court, on 31 August 2004, ordered the lifting of the writ of the
execution on the ground that the property was a family home. 6
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the lifting of the
writ of execution. Invoking Article 160 of the Family Code, they
posited that the current market value of the property exceeded the
statutory limit of 300,000 considering that it was located in a
commercial area, and that Spouses Bell had even sold it to them
for 1million.7
The RTC, on 13 October 2004, set the case for hearing to
determine the present value of the family hoe of respondents. It
also appointed a Board of Appraisers to conduct a study on the
prevailing market value of their house and lot.8
Respondents sought reconsideration of the above directives and
asked the RTC to cite petitioners for contempt because of forum-
shopping.9 they argued that petitioners bid to determine the
present value of the subject property was just a ploy to re-litigate
an issue that had long been settled with finality.
The RTC, however, denied the Motion for Reconsideration 10 of
respondents and directed the commissioners to canvass
prospective buyers of their house and lot.11
On 23 November 2004, respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari
and Injunction before the CA. 12 where it was docketed as CA-G.R.
SP. No. 87531.
Subsequently, the RTC issued on 25 November 2004 an
Order13 dispensing with the valuation report of the commissioners
and directing the issuance of a writ of execution. Consequently,
respondents filed before the CA a Supplemental Petition with an
urgent prayer for a temporary restraining order.14
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
The CA eventually enjoined. 15 the execution sale set on 22
December 200416 by the RTC.
On 31 July 2008, the CA rendered it Decision granting respondents
Petition for Certiorari, but it rejected their theory that res judicata
had already set in.
The appellate court ruled that the RTC Decision, which had become
final and executory, only declared respondents house and lot as a
family home. Since the issue of whether it may be sold in execution
was incidental to the execution of the aforesaid Decision, there was
as yet no res judicata.
Still, the CA found that the trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion in ordering the execution sale of the subject family home
after finding its present value exceeded the statutory limit. The
basis for the valuation of a family home under Article 160,
according to the appellate court, is its actual value at the time of
its constitution and not the market/present value; therefore, the
trial courts order was contrary to law.17
On 09 February 2009,18 the CA denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration. Hence, this Petition.
ISSUES
The issues to be resolved are: (1) whether petitioners are guilty of
forum-shopping; (2) whether a hearing to determine the value of
respondents family home for purposes of execution under Article
160 of the Family Code is barred under the principle of res judicata;
and (3) whether respondents family home may be sold on
execution under Article 160 of the Family Code.
THE COURTS RULING
The Court denies the Petition for lack of merit.
Petitioners are not guilty of forum-shopping.
Forum shopping can be committed in three ways; (1) by filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the
same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet
(where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) by filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the
same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved
(where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) by filing
multiple cases based on the same cause of action but with
different prayers, or by splitting of causes of action (where the
ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata). 19
The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits
involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either
simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a
favorable judgment through means other than by appeal or
certiorari.20 Forum shopping does not apply to cases that arise from
an initiatory or original action that has been elevated by way of
appeal or certiorari to higher or appellate courts or authorities. This
is so because the issues in the appellate courts necessarily differ
from those in the lower court, and the appealed cases are but a
continuation of the original case and treated as only one case. 21
Respondents contend that the Decision in Civil Case No. 4581,
which declared that property in dispute was a family home, had
long attained finality. Accordingly, respondents maintain that
petitioners bid to re-litigate the present value of the property in
the course of the execution proceedings is barred by res judicata,
and that petitioners should be cited for contempt of court because
of forum-shopping.22
Recall that although the trial court had nullified the Deed of Sale
over respondents family home in Civil Case No. 4581 for lack of a
written consent from its beneficiaries as required under Article 158
of the Family Code,23 the court still recognized the validity of the
transaction as an unsecured loan. Hence, it declared Spouses Bell
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
liable to petitioners in the amount of 1 million plus 12% interest
per annum.
Petitioners bid to satisfy the above judgment cannot be considered
an act of forum shopping. Simply, the execution of a decision is
just the fruit and end of a suit and is very aptly called the life of the
law.24 It is not separate from the main case. Similarly, the filing of
the instant Petitions as a continuation of the execution proceedings
does not constitute forum shopping. Seeking a reversal of an
adverse judgment or order by appeal or certiorari does not
constitute forum shopping. Such remedies are sanctioned and
provided for the rules.25
Indeed, as will be presently discussed, the causes of action in the
main proceedings in Civil Case No. 4581 and the consequent
execution proceedings are identical. Suffice it to say, however, that
the danger of a multiplicity of suits upon one and the same cause
of action, which the judicial policy against forum shopping seeks to
prevent, does not exist in this case.
Re-litigating the issue of the value of respondents family home is
barred by res judicata.
Res judicata (meaning, a "matter adjudged") is a fundamental
principle of law that precludes parties from re-litigating issues
actually litigated and determined by a prior and final
judgment.26 Under the 1997 Rules of Court, there are two aspects
of res judicata, namely: bar by prior judgment. 27 and
conclusiveness of judgment. 28
There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as between the first case in
which the judgment has been rendered and the second case that is
sought to be barred, there is an identity of parties, subject matter,
and causes of action. In this instance, the judgment in the first
case constitutes an absolute bar to the second action. The
judgment or decree on the merits of the court of competent
jurisdiction concludes the litigation between the parties, as well as
their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving
the same cause of action before same or any other tribunal. 29
On the other hand, there is "conclusiveness of judgment" where
there is an identity of parties in the first and second cases, but no
identity of causes of action. Under this rule, the first judgment is
conclusive only as to those matters actually and directly
controverted and determined and not as to matters merely
involved therein. Stated differently, any right, fact, or matter in
issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the
determination of an action before a competent court in which
judgment is rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the
judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the
parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand,
purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same. 30
In this case, the trial courts final decision in Civil Case No. 4581
bars petitioners move to have the property is dispute levied on
execution.
There is no question that the main proceedings in Civil Case No.
4581 and the subsequent execution proceedings in Civil Case No.
4581 and the subsequent execution proceedings involved the
same parties31 and subject matter.32 for these reasons, respondents
argue that the execution sale of the property in dispute under
Article 170 of the Family Code is barred by res judicata, since the
trial court has already determined that the value of the property
fell within the statutory limit.
The CA held that the trial courts Decision which is indisputably
final, only settled the issue of whether the property in dispute was
a family home. The CA ruled thus:
We rule that there is no res judicata.
At the outset, let it be emphasized that the decision of the trial
court dated July 15, 1998, which has become final and executor,
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
only declared the subject property as a family home. As a matter of
fact, private respondents never questioned that such property is a
family home, and consequently, the issue as to whether or not the
property is family home is settled and res judicata lies only with
respect to this issue.
But the issue as to whether or not a family home could be the
subject of an execution sale was not resolved by the trial court.
This issue[was] raised only when the writ of execution was issued
and hence, [was not] resolved with finality. Thus, the issue before
this Court is whether or not the [f]amily [h]ome of petitioners
under the facts and circumstances of the case could be the subject
of a writ execution sold at public auction.33
The Court disagrees with the CA.
"Cause of action" is the act or omission by which a party violates
the right of another. 34 It may be argued that the cause of action the
main proceedings was the sale of the property in dispute, while in
the execution proceedings it was the indebtedness of Spouses Bell
to petitioners.
The settled rule, however, is that identity of causes of action does
not mean absolute identity. Otherwise, a party could easily escape
the operation of res judicata by changing the form of the action or
the relief sought.35 The test to determine whether the causes of
action are identical is to ascertain whether the same evidence will
sustain both actions, or whether is an identity of the facts essential
to the maintenance of the two actions. If the same facts or
evidence would sustain both, the two actions considered the same,
and a judgment in the first case would be a bar to the subsequent
action. Hence, party cannot, by varying the form of action or
adopting a different method of presenting the case, escape the
operation of the principle that one and the same cause of action
shall not be twice litigated between the same parties or their
privies.36
Among several tests resorted to in ascertaining whether two suits
relate to a single or common cause of action are: (1) whether the
same evidence would support and sustain both the first and the
second causes of action and (2) whether the defenses in one case
may be used to substantiate the complaint in the other. Also
fundamental is the test for determining whether the cause of
action in the second case existed at the time of the filing of the
first complaint.37
Applying the above guidelines, the Court finds that the entirety of
Civil Case No. 4581 including the bid of petitioners to execute the
money judgment awarded to them by the trial court is founded
on a common cause of action. Records show that the sole evidence
submitted by petitioners during the execution proceedings was the
Deed of Sale, which the trial court had nullified in the main
proceedings. Concomitantly, the very sane defense raised by
petitioners in the main proceedings, i.e., that they had bought the
property from Spouses Bell for 1 million was utilized to
substantiate the claim that the current value of respondents
family home was actually 1 million. In fact, the trial courts order
for respondents family home to be levied on execution was solely
based on the price stated in the nullified Deed of Sale.
Res judicata applies, considering that the parties are litigating over
the same property. Moreover, the same contentions and evidence
advanced by the petitioners to substantiate their claim over
respondents family home have already been used to support their
arguments in the main proceedings.
Any lingering doubt on the application of res judicata to this case
should be put to rest by the trial courts discussion of the nature
and alienability of the property in dispute, to wit;
The second issue is about the allegation of the plaintiffs that the
family home which has been constituted on the house and lot in
question is exempt from alienation and that its value does not
exceed 300,000. Paterno Bell, Sr. testified that the two-storey
house was built in 1947 and was made of wood and hollow blocks.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
He inherited it in 1976 from his parents and has been living there
with his family. In 1976, when an extra- judicial settlement was
made of the estate of his parents, the fair market value of the
house was 70,000.
City Assessor Rodezinda Pargas testified and presented Tax
Declaration and others, (Exhibit "J", Tax Declaration No. 005-047)
beginning 1985 showing that the subject lot with an area of 329 sq.
m. had a fair market value of 76,000.00 and the residential house
located thereon of 50,000.00, for a total value of 126,000.00. She
testified that during the prior years the assessed values were
lower. This shows that the limit of the value of 300,000.00 under
Article 157, Title 5 of the Family Code has not been exceeded. The
testimonies of the plaintiffs who are children of Sps. Paterno Bell,
Sr. and Rogela Calingasan Bell show that they had lived in that
house together with their said parents. The Court therefore
concludes that the said house is a family home under Chapter 2,
Title 5 of the Family Code. Its alienation by the said Spouses
without the written consent of the majority of the children/plaintiffs
is null and void for being contrary to law and public policy as
enunciated in Art. 158 of the Family Code. 38 [underscoring
supplied]
The foregoing points plainly show that the issue of whether the
property in dispute exceeded the statutory limit of 300,000 has
already been determined with finality by the trial court. Its finding
necessarily meant that the property is exempt from execution.
Assuming for the sake of argument that causes of action in the
main proceedings and in the execution proceedings are different,
the parties are still barred from litigating the issue of whether
respondents family home may be sold on execution sale under the
principle of conclusiveness of judgment.
Respondents family home cannot be sold on execution under
Article 160 of Family Code.
Unquestionably, the family home is exempt from execution as
expressly provided for in Article 153 of the Family Code. 39
It has been said that the family home is a real right that is
gratuitous, inalienable and free from attachment. 40 The great
controlling purpose and policy of the Constitution is the protection
or the preservation of the homestead - the dwelling place. A
houseless, homeless population is a burden upon the energy,
industry, and morals of the community to which it belongs. No
greater calamity, not tainted with crime, can befall a family than to
be expelled from the roof under which it has been gathered and
sheltered.41 The family home cannot be seized by creditors except
in special cases.42
The nature and character of the property that debtors may claim to
be exempt, however, are determined by the exemption statute.
The exemption is limited to the particular kind of property of the
specific articles prescribed by the statute; the exemption cannot
exceed the statutory limit.43
Articles 155 and 160 of the Family Code specify the exceptions
mentioned in Article 153, to wit:
ARTICLE 155. the family home shall be exempt from execution,
forced sale or attachment except;
1. For nonpayment of taxes;
2. For debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family
home;
3. For debts secured by mortgages on the premises before
or after such constitution; and
4. For debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects,
builders, materialmen and others who have rendered
service or furnished material for the construction of the
building.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
ARTICLE 160. when a creditor whose claims is not among those
mentioned in Article 155 obtains a judgment in his favor, and he
has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is actually
worth more than the maximum amount fixed in Article 157, he may
apply to the court which rendered the judgment for an order
directing the sale of the property under execution. The court shall
so order if it finds that the actual value of the family home exceeds
the maximum amount allowed by law as of the time of its
constitution. If the increased actual value exceeds the maximum
allowed in Article 157 and results from subsequent voluntary
improvements introduced by the person or persons constituting
the family home, by the owners of the property, or by any of the
beneficiaries, the same rule and procedure shall apply.
At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for a family
home shall be considered. The proceeds shall be applied first to the
amount mentioned in Article 157, and then to the liabilities under
the judgment and the costs. The excess, is any, shall be delivered
to the judgment debtor.
Related to the foregoing is Article 157 of the Family Code, which
provides:
ARTICLE 157. the actual value of the family home shall not exceed,
at the same time of its constitution, the amount of three hundred
thousand pesos in urban areas, and two hundred thousand pesos
in rural areas, or such amounts as may hereafter be fixed by law.
In any event, if the value of the currency changes after the
adoption of this Code, the value most favorable for the
constitutions of a family home shall be the basis of evaluation.
For purposes of the Article, urban areas are deemed to include
chartered cities and municipalities whose annual income at least
equals that legally required for chartered cities. All others are
deemed to be rural area. [underscoring supplied]
The minutes of the deliberation by the drafters of Family Code on
Article 160 are enlightening, to wit:
Justice Puno inquired if the above Article [160] is still necessary. In
reply, Judge Diy opined that the above Article is intended to cover
a situation where the family home is already worth 500,000 or IM.
Justice Reyes stated that it is possible that a family home,
originally valued at 300,000, later appreciated to almost IM
because of improvements made, like roads and plazas. Justice
Caguioa, however, made a distinction between voluntary and
involuntary improvements in the sense that if the value of the
family home exceeded the maximum amount because of voluntary
improvements by the one establishing the family home, the Article
will apply; but if it is through an involuntary improvement, like
conversion into a residential area or the establishment of roads
and other facilities, the one establishing the family home should
not be punished by making his home liable to creditors. He
suggested that the matter be clarified in the provision.
Prof. Bautista objected to the phrase "is worth" since if they will
specify that the family home is worth more than the maximum
amount at the time it was constituted, they will avoid the suit
because the creditor will be given proper warning. Justice Puno
opined that this is a question of fact. Justice Caguioa added that,
under the second sentence, there will be a preliminary
determination as to whether the family home exceeds the
maximum amount allowed by the law.
Justice Caguia accordingly modified the last sentence as follows:
If the excess in actual value over that allowed in Article 157 is due
to subsequent voluntary improvements by the person or persons
constituting the family home or by the owner or owners of the
property, the same rules and procedure shall apply.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
Prof. Bautista objected to the above provision, because it will in
effect penalize the owner for improving the family home. On the
other hand, Justice Puno opined that the provision covers only the
excess in actual value over that allowed by law. Judge Diy added
that the owner may improve the family home up to 300,000.
Justice Caguioa stated that without the above provision, one can
borrow money, put it all on improvement of the family home even
beyond the maximum value of a family home and, thereby, exempt
it from levy on the part of the creditor. He added that anyway, if
one voluntarily improves his family home out of his money, nobody
can complain because there are no creditors.
Justice Puno posed the question: what is "due to the subsequent
improvement?" is it the "excess" or is it the "increase", or is it the
"increase", which constitutes the "excess"? in reply, Justice Reyes
opined that it is the "increase" which constituted the "excess".
Justice Puno, Justice Reyes and Justice Caguioa modified the last
sentence as follows:
If the increase in actual value exceeds that maximum allowed in
Article 157 and results from subsequent voluntary improvements
introduced by the person or persons constituting the family home
or by the owner or owners of the property, the same rule and
procedure shall apply.
Prof. Bautista commented that the phrase "increase in actual
value" does not include the original value. Justice Puno suggested
that they just say "increased actual value", which the Committee
approved.44
To summarize, the exemption of the family home from execution,
forced sale or attachment is limited to 300,000 in urban areas and
200,000 in rural areas, unless those maximum values are adjusted
by law. If it is shown, though, that those amounts do not match the
present value of the peso because of currency fluctuations, the
amount of exemption shall be based on the value that is most
favorable to the constitution of a family home. Any amount in
excess of those limits can be applied to the payment of any of the
obligations specified in Articles 155 and 160.
Any subsequent improvement or enlargement of the family home
by the persons constituting it, its owners, or any of its beneficiaries
will still be exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
provided the following conditions obtain: (a) the actual value of the
property at the time of its constitution has been determined to fall
below the statutory limit; and (b) the improvement or enlargement
does not result in an increase in its value exceeding the statutory
limit.45 Otherwise, the family home can be the subject of a forced
sale, and any amount above the statutory limit is applicable to the
obligations under Articles 155 and 160.
Certainly, the humane considerations for which the law surrounds
the family home with immunities from levy do not include the
intent to enable debtors to thwart the just claims of their
creditors.46
Petitioners maintain that this case falls under the exceptions to the
exemption of the family home from execution or forced sale. They
claim that the actual value of respondents family home exceeds
the 300,000 limit in urban areas. This fact is supposedly shown by
the Deed of Sale whereby private respondents agreed to sell the
property for 1 million way back in 1995. Therefore, the RTC only
properly ordered the execution sale of the property under Article
160 to satisfy the money judgment awarded to them in Civil Case
No. 4581.47
As earlier discussed, it has been judicially determined with finality
that the property in dispute is a family home, and that its value at
the time of its constitution was within the statutory limit. Moreover,
respondents have timely claimed the exemption of the property
from execution.48 On the other hand, there is no question that the
money judgment awarded to petitioners falls under the ambit of
Article 160.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

Notwithstanding petitioners right to enforce the trial courts
money judgment, however, they cannot obtain its satisfaction at
the expense of respondents rights over their family home. It is
axiomatic that those asserting the protection of an exception from
an exemption must bring themselves clearly within the terms of
the exception and satisfy any statutory requirement for its
enforcement.49
WHEREFORE, the Petitioner for Review on Certiorari is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GG.R SP No. 87531, enjoining the trial court from
proceeding with the sale of the family home of respondents, is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

To warrant the execution sale of respondents family home under

Article 160, petitioners needed to establish these facts: (1) there
was an increase in its actual value; (2) the increase resulted from
voluntary improvements on the property introduced by the persons
constituting the family home, its owners or any of its beneficiaries;
and (3) the increased actual value exceeded the maximum allowed
under Article 157.

During the execution proceedings, none of those facts was alleged

much less proven by petitioners.1wphi1 The sole evidence
presented was the Deed of Sale, but the trial court had already
determined with finality that the contract was null, and that the
actual transaction was an equitable mortgage. Evidently, when
petitioners and Spouses Bells executed the Deed of Sale in 1990,
the price stated therein was not the actual value of the property in
dispute.

The court thus agrees with the CAs conclusion that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the sale on
execution of the property in dispute under Article 160. The trial
court had already determined with finality that the property was a
family home, and there was no proof that is value had increased
beyond the statutory limit due to voluntary improvements by
respondents. Yet, it ordered the execution sale of the property.
There is grave abuse of discretion when one acts in a capricious,
whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of ones
judgment, as in this case in which the assailed order is bereft of
any factual or legal justification.50

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
PERLA G. PATRICIO, G.R. No. 170829
Petitioner,
- versus - .
MARCELINO G. DARIO III and
THE HONORABLE COURT OF Promulgated:
APPEALS, Second Division,
Respondents. November 20, 2006
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeks to annul and set aside the Resolution of the Court of Appeals
dated December 9, 2005[1] in CA-G.R. CV No. 80680, which dismissed
the complaint for partition filed by petitioner for being contrary to law
and evidence.
On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate. He was survived by
his wife, petitioner Perla G. Patricio and their two sons, Marcelino Marc
Dario and private respondent Marcelino G. Dario III. Among the
properties he left was a parcel of land with a residential house and a
pre-school building built thereon situated at 91 Oxford corner Ermin
Garcia Streets in Cubao, Quezon City, as evidenced by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-30731 (175992) of the Quezon City
Registry of Deeds, covering an area of seven hundred fifty five (755)
square meters, more or less.[2]
On August 10, 1987, petitioner, Marcelino Marc and private
respondent, extrajudicially settled the estate of Marcelino V. Dario.
Accordingly, TCT No. RT-30731 (175992) was cancelled and TCT No. R-
213963 was issued in the names of petitioner, private respondent and
Marcelino Marc.
Thereafter, petitioner and Marcelino Marc formally advised private
respondent of their intention to partition the subject property and
terminate the co-ownership. Private respondent refused to partition the
property hence petitioner and Marcelino Marc instituted an action for
partition before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which was
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-01-44038 and raffled to Branch 78.
On October 3, 2002,[3] the trial court ordered the partition of
the subject property in the following manner: Perla G. Patricio, 4/6;
Marcelino Marc G. Dario, 1/6; and Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6. The trial
court also ordered the sale of the property by public auction wherein all
parties concerned may put up their bids. In case of failure, the subject
property should be distributed accordingly in the aforestated manner. [4]
Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which
was denied by the trial court on August 11, 2003, [5] hence he appealed
before the Court of Appeals, which denied the same on October 19,
2005. However, upon a motion for reconsideration filed by private
respondent on December 9, 2005, the appellate court partially
reconsidered the October 19, 2005 Decision. In the now assailed
Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the complaint for partition
filed by petitioner and Marcelino Marc for lack of merit. It held that the
family home should continue despite the death of one or both spouses
as long as there is a minor beneficiary thereof. The heirs could not
partition the property unless the court found compelling reasons to rule
otherwise. The appellate court also held that the minor son of private
respondent, who is a grandson of spouses Marcelino V. Dario and Perla
G. Patricio, was a minor beneficiary of the family home. [6]
Hence, the instant petition on the following issues:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY
ERRED IN REVERSING ITS EARLIER DECISION OF
OCTOBER 19, 2005 WHICH AFFIRMED IN TOTO THE
DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DATED 03 OCTOBER
2002 GRANTING THE PARTITION AND SALE BY PUBLIC
AUCTION OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY.
II.
COROLLARILY, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
PATENTLY ERRED IN APPLYING ARTICLE 159 IN
RELATION TO ARTICLE 154 OF THE FAMILY CODE ON
FAMILY HOME INSTEAD OF ARTICLE 494 IN RELATION
TO ARTICLES 495 AND 498 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE
ON CO-OWNERSHIP.[7]
The sole issue is whether partition of the family home is proper
where one of the co-owners refuse to accede to such partition on the
ground that a minor beneficiary still resides in the said home.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
Private respondent claims that the subject property which is
the family home duly constituted by spouses Marcelino and Perla Dario
cannot be partitioned while a minor beneficiary is still living therein
namely, his 12-year-old son, who is the grandson of the decedent. He
argues that as long as the minor is living in the family home, the same
continues as such until the beneficiary becomes of age. Private
respondent insists that even after the expiration of ten years from the
date of death of Marcelino on July 5, 1987, i.e., even after July 1997,
the subject property continues to be considered as the family home
considering that his minor son, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, who is a
beneficiary of the said family home, still resides in the premises.
On the other hand, petitioner alleges that the subject property
remained as a family home of the surviving heirs of the late Marcelino
V. Dario only up to July 5, 1997, which was the 10 th year from the date
of death of the decedent. Petitioner argues that the brothers Marcelino
Marc and private respondent Marcelino III were already of age at the
time of the death of their father, [8] hence there is no more minor
beneficiary to speak of.
The family home is a sacred symbol of family love and is the
repository of cherished memories that last during ones lifetime. [9] It is
the dwelling house where husband and wife, or by an unmarried head
of a family, reside, including the land on which it is situated. [10] It is
constituted jointly by the husband and the wife or by an unmarried
head of a family.[11] The family home is deemed constituted from the
time it is occupied as a family residence. From the time of its
constitution and so long as any of its beneficiaries actually resides
therein, the family home continues to be such and is exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided
and to the extent of the value allowed by law.[12]
The law explicitly provides that occupancy of the family home either by
the owner thereof or by any of its beneficiaries must be actual. That
which is actual is something real, or actually existing, as opposed to
something merely possible, or to something which is presumptive or
constructive. Actual occupancy, however, need not be by the owner of
the house specifically. Rather, the property may be occupied by the
beneficiaries enumerated in Article 154 of the Family Code, which may
include the in-laws where the family home is constituted jointly by the
husband and wife. But the law definitely excludes maids and
overseers. They are not the beneficiaries contemplated by the Code. [13]
Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who are the beneficiaries of
a family home: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who
is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants,
descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be
legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who
depend upon the head of the family for legal support.
To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur:
(1) they must be among the relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of
the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home; and (3) they are
dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.
Moreover, Article 159 of the Family Code provides that the family home
shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of the
unmarried head of the family for a period of 10 years or for as long as
there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition the same
unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This rule shall apply
regardless of whoever owns the property or constituted the family
home.
Article 159 of the Family Code applies in situations where death occurs
to persons who constituted the family home. Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino
comments on the effect of death of one or both spouses or the
unmarried head of a family on the continuing existence of the family
home:
Upon the death of the spouses or the unmarried
family head who constituted the family home, or of
the spouse who consented to the constitution of his or
her separate property as family home, the property
will remain as family home for ten years or for as long
as there is a minor beneficiary living in it. If there is
no more beneficiary left at the time of death,
we believe the family home will be dissolved or
cease, because there is no more reason for its
existence. If there are beneficiaries who survive
living in the family home, it will continue for ten
years, unless at the expiration of the ten years,
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
there is still a minor beneficiary, in which case
the family home continues until that beneficiary
becomes of age.
After these periods lapse, the property may be
partitioned by the heirs. May the heirs who are
beneficiaries of the family home keep it intact by not
partitioning the property after the period provided by
this article? We believe that although the heirs
will continue in ownership by not partitioning
the property, it will cease to be a family home.
[14]
(Emphasis supplied)
Prof. Ernesto L. Pineda further explains the import of Art. 159 in this
manner:
The family home shall continue to exist despite the
death of one or both spouses or of the unmarried
head of the family. Thereafter, the length of its
continued existence is dependent upon whether
there is still a minor-beneficiary residing
therein. For as long as there is one beneficiary
even if the head of the family or both spouses
are already dead, the family home will continue
to exist (Arts. 153, 159). If there is no minor-
beneficiary, it will subsist until 10 years and
within this period, the heirs cannot partition the
same except when there are compelling reasons
which will justify the partition. This rule applies
regardless of whoever owns the property or who
constituted the family home.[15] (Emphasis supplied)
The rule in Article 159 of the Family Code may thus be expressed in
this wise: If there are beneficiaries who survive and are living in the
family home, it will continue for 10 years, unless at the expiration of 10
years, there is still a minor beneficiary, in which case the family home
continues until that beneficiary becomes of age.
It may be deduced from the view of Dr. Tolentino that as a general rule,
the family home may be preserved for a minimum of 10 years
following the death of the spouses or the unmarried family head who
constituted the family home, or of the spouse who consented to the
constitution of his or her separate property as family home. After 10
years and a minor beneficiary still lives therein, the family home shall
be preserved only until that minor beneficiary reaches the age of
majority. The intention of the law is to safeguard and protect the
interests of the minor beneficiary until he reaches legal age and would
now be capable of supporting himself. However, three requisites must
concur before a minor beneficiary is entitled to the benefits of Art. 159:
(1) the relationship enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2)
they live in the family home, and (3) they are dependent for legal
support upon the head of the family.
Thus, the issue for resolution now is whether Marcelino Lorenzo R.
Dario IV, the minor son of private respondent, can be considered as a
beneficiary under Article 154 of the Family Code.
As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the family home
are: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person who is the head
of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers
and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate. The
term descendants contemplates all descendants of the person or
persons who constituted the family home without distinction; hence, it
must necessarily include the grandchildren and great grandchildren of
the spouses who constitute a family home. Ubi lex non distinguit nec
nos distinguire debemos. Where the law does not distinguish, we
should not distinguish. Thus, private respondents minor son, who is
also the grandchild of deceased Marcelino V. Dario satisfies the first
requisite.
As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must be actually living
in the family home to avail of the benefits derived from Art.
159. Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV, also known as Ino, the son of
private respondent and grandson of the decedent Marcelino V. Dario,
has been living in the family home since 1994, or within 10 years from
the death of the decedent, hence, he satisfies the second requisite.
However, as to the third requisite, Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot
demand support from his paternal grandmother if he has parents who
are capable of supporting him. The liability for legal support falls
primarily on Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IVs parents, especially his
father, herein private respondent who is the head of his immediate
family. The law first imposes the obligation of legal support upon the
shoulders of the parents, especially the father, and only in their default
is the obligation imposed on the grandparents.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV is dependent on legal support not from
his grandmother, but from his father. Thus, despite residing in the
family home and his being a descendant of Marcelino V. Dario,
Marcelino Lorenzo R. Dario IV cannot be considered as beneficiary
contemplated under Article 154 because he did not fulfill the third
requisite of being dependent on his grandmother for legal support. It is
his father whom he is dependent on legal support, and who must now
establish his own family home separate and distinct from that of his
parents, being of legal age.
Legal support, also known as family support, is that which is
provided by law, comprising everything indispensable for sustenance,
dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and transportation,
in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. [16] Legal support has
the following characteristics: (1) It is personal, based on family ties
which bind the obligor and the obligee; (2) It is intransmissible; (3) It
cannot be renounced; (4) It cannot be compromised; (5) It is free from
attachment or execution; (6) It is reciprocal; (7) It is variable in
amount.[17]
Professor Pineda is of the view that grandchildren cannot demand
support directly from their grandparents if they have parents
(ascendants of nearest degree) who are capable of supporting
them. This is so because we have to follow the order of support under
Art. 199.[18] We agree with this view.
The reasons behind Art. 199 as explained by Pineda and Tolentino: the
closer the relationship of the relatives, the stronger the tie that binds
them. Thus, the obligation to support under Art. 199 which outlines the
order of liability for support is imposed first upon the shoulders of the
closer relatives and only in their default is the obligation moved to the
next nearer relatives and so on.
There is no showing that private respondent is without means
to support his son; neither is there any evidence to prove that
petitioner, as the paternal grandmother, was willing to voluntarily
provide for her grandsons legal support. On the contrary, herein
petitioner filed for the partition of the property which shows an
intention to dissolve the family home, since there is no more reason for
its existence after the 10-year period ended in 1997.
With this finding, there is no legal impediment to partition the
subject property.
The law does not encourage co-ownerships among individuals as
oftentimes it results in inequitable situations such as in the instant
case. Co-owners should be afforded every available opportunity to
divide their co-owned property to prevent these situations from arising.
As we ruled in Santos v. Santos,[19] no co-owner ought to be compelled
to stay in a co-ownership indefinitely, and may insist on partition on
the common property at any time. An action to demand partition is
imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches. Each co-owner may
demand at any time the partition of the common property. [20]
Since the parties were unable to agree on a partition, the
court a quo should have ordered a partition by commissioners pursuant
to Section 3, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court. Not more than three
competent and disinterested persons should be appointed as
commissioners to make the partition, commanding them to set off to
the plaintiff and to each party in interest such part and proportion of
the property as the court shall direct.
When it is made to appear to the commissioners that the real estate,
or a portion thereof, cannot be divided without great prejudice to the
interest of the parties, the court may order it assigned to one of the
parties willing to take the same, provided he pays to the other parties
such sum or sums of money as the commissioners deem equitable,
unless one of the parties interested ask that the property be sold
instead of being so assigned, in which case the court shall order the
commissioners to sell the real estate at public sale, and the
commissioners shall sell the same accordingly. [21]
The partition of the subject property should be made in accordance
with the rule embodied in Art. 996 of the Civil Code. [22] Under the law of
intestate succession, if the widow and legitimate children survive, the
widow has the same share as that of each of the children. However,
since only one-half of the conjugal property which is owned by the
decedent is to be allocated to the legal and compulsory heirs (the
other half to be given exclusively to the surviving spouse as her
conjugal share of the property), the widow will have the same share as
each of her two surviving children. Hence, the respective shares of the
subject property, based on the law on intestate succession are: (1)
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

Perla Generosa Dario, 4/6; (2) Marcelino Marc G. Dario II, 1/6 and (3)
Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6.
In Vda. de Daffon v. Court of Appeals,[23] we held that an action for
partition is at once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for
segregation and conveyance of a determinate portion of the properties
involved. If the court after trial should find the existence of co-
ownership among the parties, the court may and should order the
partition of the properties in the same action. [24]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Court of

Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80680 dated December 9, 2005,
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 78, who is directed to
conduct a PARTITION BY COMMISSIONERS and effect the actual
physical partition of the subject property, as well as the improvements
that lie therein, in the following manner: Perla G. Dario, 4/6; Marcelino
Marc G. Dario, 1/6 and Marcelino G. Dario III, 1/6. The trial court
is DIRECTED to appoint not more than three (3) competent and
disinterested persons, who should determine the technical metes and
bounds of the property and the proper share appertaining to each heir,
including the improvements, in accordance with Rule 69 of the Rules of
Court. When it is made to the commissioners that the real estate, or a
portion thereof, cannot be divided without great prejudice to the
interest of the parties, the court a quo may order it assigned to one of
the parties willing to take the same, provided he pays to the other
parties such sum or sums of money as the commissioners deem
equitable, unless one of the parties interested ask that the property be
sold instead of being so assigned, in which case the court shall order
the commissioners to sell the real estate at public sale, and the
commissioners shall sell the same accordingly, and thereafter
distribute the proceeds of the sale appertaining to the just share of
each heir. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 105625 January 24, 1994
MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, VICTORIA BENITEZ LIRIO AND FEODOR
BENITEZ AGUILAR, respondents.
Reynaldo M. Alcantara for petitioner.
Augustus Cesar E. Azura for private respondents.
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the Decision of the 12th Division of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CV No. 30862 dated May 29,
1992. 1
The facts show that the spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel
Chipongian owned various properties especially in Laguna. Isabel
died on April 25, 1982. Vicente followed her in the grave on
November 13, 1989. He died intestate.
The fight for administration of Vicente's estate ensued. On
September 24, 1990, private respondents Victoria Benitez-Lirio and
Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Vicente's sister and nephew, respectively)
instituted Sp. Proc. No. 797 (90) before the RTC of San Pablo City,
4th Judicial Region, Br. 30. They prayed for the issuance of letters
of administration of Vicente's estate in favor of private respondent
Aguilar. They alleged, inter alia, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
4. The decedent is survived by no other heirs or
relatives be they ascendants or descendants,
whether legitimate, illegitimate or legally adopted;
despite claims or representation to the contrary,
petitioners can well and truly establish, given the
chance to do so, that said decedent and his spouse
Isabel Chipongian who pre-deceased him, and
whose estate had earlier been settled extra-
judicial, were without issue and/or without
descendants whatsoever, and that one Marissa
Benitez-Badua who was raised and cared by them
since childhood is, in fact, not related to them by
blood, nor legally adopted, and is therefore not a
legal heir; . . .
On November 2, 1990, petitioner opposed the petition. She alleged
that she is the sole heir of the deceased Vicente Benitez and
capable of administering his estate. The parties further exchanged
reply and rejoinder to buttress their legal postures.
The trial court then received evidence on the issue of petitioner's
heirship to the estate of the deceased. Petitioner tried to prove
that she is the only legitimate child of the spouses Vicente Benitez
and Isabel Chipongian. She submitted documentary evidence,
among others: (1) her Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. 3); (2)
Baptismal Certificate (Exh. 4); (3) Income Tax Returns and
Information Sheet for Membership with the GSIS of the late Vicente
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

naming her as his daughter (Exhs. 10 to 21); and (4) School Costs against appellee.
Records (Exhs. 5 & 6). She also testified that the said spouses
reared an continuously treated her as their legitimate daughter. On SO ORDERED.
the other hand, private respondents tried to prove, mostly thru
testimonial evidence, that the said spouses failed to beget a child In juxtaposition, the appellate court held that the trial court erred
during their marriage; that the late Isabel, then thirty six (36) years in applying Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code.
of age, was even referred to Dr. Constantino Manahan, a noted
obstetrician-gynecologist, for treatment. Their primary witness,
In this petition for review, petitioner contends:
Victoria Benitez-Lirio, elder sister of the late Vicente, then 77 years
of age, 2 categorically declared that petitioner was not the
biological child of the said spouses who were unable to physically 1. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed error
procreate. of law and misapprehension of facts when it failed
to apply the provisions, more particularly, Arts.
164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code in this
On December 17, 1990, the trial court decided in favor of the
case and in adopting and upholding private
petitioner. It dismissed the private respondents petition for letters
respondent's theory that the instant case does not
and administration and declared petitioner as the legitimate
involve an action to impugn the legitimacy of a
daughter and sole heir of the spouses Vicente O. Benitez and Isabel
child;
Chipongian. The trial court relied on Articles 166 and 170 of the
Family Code.
2. Assuming arguendo that private respondents
can question or impugn directly or indirectly, the
On appeal, however, the Decision of the trial court was reversed on
legitimacy of Marissa's birth, still the respondent
May 29, 1992 by the 17th Division of the Court of Appeals. The
appellate Court committed grave abuse of
dispositive portion of the Decision of the appellate court states:
discretion when it gave more weight to the
testimonial evidence of witnesses of private
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from herein is respondents whose credibility and demeanor have
REVERSED and another one entered declaring that not convinced the trial court of the truth and
appellee Marissa Benitez is not the biological sincerity thereof, than the documentary and
daughter or child by nature of the spouse Vicente testimonial evidence of the now petitioner Marissa
O. Benitez and Isabel Chipongian and, therefore, Benitez-Badua;
not a legal heir of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez.
Her opposition to the petition for the appointment
3. The Honorable Court of Appeals has decided the
of an administrator of the intestate of the deceased
case in a way not in accord with law or with
Vicente O. Benitez is, consequently, DENIED; said
applicable decisions of the supreme Court, more
petition and the proceedings already conducted
particularly, on prescription or laches.
therein reinstated; and the lower court is directed
to proceed with the hearing of Special proceeding
No. SP-797 (90) in accordance with law and the We find no merit to the petition.
Rules.

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Articles 164, 166, 170
and 171 of the Family Code to the case at bench cannot be
sustained. These articles provide:
Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the
marriage of the parents are legitimate.
Children conceived as a result of artificial
insemination of the wife with sperm of the husband
or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate
children of the husband and his wife, provided, that
both of them authorized or ratified such
insemination in a written instrument executed and
signed by them before the birth of the child. The
instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry
together with the birth certificate of the child.
Art. 166. Legitimacy of child may be impugned only
on the following grounds:
1) That it was physically impossible for the
husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife
within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth of the child
because of:
a) the physical incapacity of the
husband to have sexual intercourse
with his wife;
b) the fact that the husband and
wife were living separately in such
a way that sexual intercourse was
not possible; or
c) serious illness of the husband,
which absolutely prevented sexual
intercourse.
2) That it is proved that for biological or other
scientific reasons, the child could not have been
that of the husband except in the instance
provided in the second paragraph of Article 164; or
3) That in case of children conceived through
artificial insemination, the written authorization or
ratification of either parent was obtained through
mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation, or undue
influence.
Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of
the child shall be brought within one year from the
knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil
register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of
his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality
where the birth took place or was recorded.
If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do
not reside at the place of birth as defined in the
first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period
shall be two years if they should reside in the
Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of
the child has been concealed from or was unknown
to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be
counted from the discovery or knowledge of the
birth of the child or of the fact of registration of
said birth, which ever is earlier.
Art. 171. The heirs of the husband may impugn the
filiation of the child within the period prescribed in
the preceding Article only in the following case:
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
1) If the husband should die before the expiration
of the period fixed for bringing his action;
2) If he should die after the filing of the complaint,
without having desisted therefrom; or
3) If the child was born after the death of the
husband.
A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not
contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is
alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain
couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband
(or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under
Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of
said child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to
have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of
the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2)
that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not
have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived through
artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification by
either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence,
intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this
reading as they speak of the prescriptive period within which
the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning
the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did
not err when it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench.
For the case at bench is not one where the heirs of the late Vicente
are contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather,
their clear submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente
and Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is
apropos, viz.:
Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil
Code [now Article 170 of the Family Code] is not
well-taken. This legal provision refers to an action
to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case
because this is not an action to impugn the
legitimacy of a child, but an action of the private
respondents to claim their inheritance as legal
heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not
claim that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an
illegitimate child of the deceased, but that she is
not the decedent's child at all. Being neither legally
adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child,
nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat,
Violeta is not a legal heir of the deceased.
We now come to the factual finding of the appellate court that
petitioner was not the biological child or child of nature of the
spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. The appellate
court exhaustively dissected the evidence of the parties as follows:
. . . And on this issue, we are constrained to say
that appellee's evidence is utterly insufficient to
establish her biological and blood kinship with the
aforesaid spouses, while the evidence on record is
strong and convincing that she is not, but that said
couple being childless and desirous as they were of
having a child, the late Vicente O. Benitez took
Marissa from somewhere while still a baby, and
without he and his wife's legally adopting her
treated, cared for, reared, considered, and loved
her as their own true child, giving her the status as
not so, such that she herself had believed that she
was really their daughter and entitled to inherit
from them as such.
The strong and convincing evidence referred to us are the
following:
First, the evidence is very cogent and clear that
Isabel Chipongian never became pregnant and,
therefore, never delivered a child. Isabel's own only
brother and sibling, Dr. Lino Chipongian, admitted
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
that his sister had already been married for ten
years and was already about 36 years old and still
she has not begotten or still could not bear a child,
so that he even had to refer her to the late Dr.
Constantino Manahan, a well-known and eminent
obstetrician-gynecologist and the OB of his mother
and wife, who treated his sister for a number of
years. There is likewise the testimony of the elder
sister of the deceased Vicente O. Benitez, Victoria
Benitez Lirio, who then, being a teacher, helped
him (he being the only boy and the youngest of the
children of their widowed mother) through law
school, and whom Vicente and his wife highly
respected and consulted on family matters, that
her brother Vicente and his wife Isabel being
childless, they wanted to adopt her youngest
daughter and when she refused, they looked for a
baby to adopt elsewhere, that Vicente found two
baby boys but Isabel wanted a baby girl as she
feared a boy might grow up unruly and
uncontrollable, and that Vicente finally brought
home a baby girl and told his elder sister Victoria
he would register the baby as his and his wife's
child. Victoria Benitez Lirio was already 77 years
old and too weak to travel and come to court in
San Pablo City, so that the taking of her testimony
by the presiding judge of the lower court had to be
held at her residence in Paraaque, MM.
Considering, her advanced age and weak physical
condition at the time she testified in this case,
Victoria Benitez Lirio's testimony is highly
trustworthy and credible, for as one who may be
called by her Creator at any time, she would hardly
be interested in material things anymore and can
be expected not to lie, especially under her oath as
a witness. There were also several disinterested
neighbors of the couple Vicente O. Benitez and
Isabel Chipongian in Nagcarlan, Laguna (Sergio
Fule, Cecilia Coronado, and Benjamin C. Asendido)
who testified in this case and declared that they
used to see Isabel almost everyday especially as
she had drugstore in the ground floor of her house,
but they never saw her to have been pregnant, in
1954 (the year appellee Marissa Benitez was
allegedly born, according to her birth certificate
Exh. "3") or at any time at all, and that it is also
true with the rest of their townmates. Ressureccion
A. Tuico, Isabel Chipongian's personal beautician
who used to set her hair once a week at her
(Isabel's) residence, likewise declared that she did
not see Isabel ever become pregnant, that she
knows that Isabel never delivered a baby, and that
when she saw the baby Marissa in her crib one day
she went to Isabel's house to set the latter's hair,
she was surprised and asked the latter where the
baby came from, and "she told me that the child
was brought by Atty. Benitez and told me not to tell
about it" (p. 10, tsn, Nov. 29, 1990).
The facts of a woman's becoming pregnant and
growing big with child, as well as her delivering a
baby, are matters that cannot be hidden from the
public eye, and so is the fact that a woman never
became pregnant and could not have, therefore,
delivered a baby at all. Hence, if she is suddenly
seen mothering and caring for a baby as if it were
her own, especially at the rather late age of 36 (the
age of Isabel Chipongian when appellee Marissa
Benitez was allegedly born), we can be sure that
she is not the true mother of that baby.
Second, appellee's birth certificate Exh. "3" with
the late Vicente O. Benitez appearing as the
informant, is highly questionable and suspicious.
For if Vicente's wife Isabel, who wads already 36
years old at the time of the child's supposed birth,
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
was truly the mother of that child, as reported by
Vicente in her birth certificate, should the child not
have been born in a hospital under the
experienced, skillful and caring hands of Isabel's
obstetrician-gynecologist Dr. Constantino Manahan,
since delivery of a child at that late age by Isabel
would have been difficult and quite risky to her
health and even life? How come, then, that as
appearing in appellee's birth certificate, Marissa
was supposedly born at the Benitez home in
Avenida Rizal, Nagcarlan, Laguna, with no
physician or even a midwife attending?
At this juncture, it might be meet to mention that it
has become a practice in recent times for people
who want to avoid the expense and trouble of a
judicial adoption to simply register the child as
their supposed child in the civil registry. Perhaps
Atty. Benitez, though a lawyer himself, thought that
he could avoid the trouble if not the expense of
adopting the child Marissa through court
proceedings by merely putting himself and his wife
as the parents of the child in her birth certificate.
Or perhaps he had intended to legally adopt the
child when she grew a little older but did not come
around doing so either because he was too busy or
for some other reason. But definitely, the mere
registration of a child in his or her birth certificate
as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid
adoption, does not confer upon the child the status
of an adopted child and the legal rights of such
child, and even amounts of simulation of the child's
birth or falsification of his or her birth certificate,
which is a public document.
Third, if appellee Marissa Benitez is truly the real,
biological daughter of the late Vicente O. Benitez
and his wife Isabel Chipongian, why did he and
Isabel's only brother and sibling Dr. Nilo
Chipongian, after Isabel's death on April 25, 1982,
state in the extrajudicial settlement
Exh. "E" that they executed her estate, "that we
are the sole heirs of the deceased ISABEL
CHIPONGIAN because she died without
descendants or ascendants?" Dr. Chipongian,
placed on a witness stand by appellants, testified
that it was his brother-in-law Atty. Vicente O.
Benitez who prepared said document and that he
signed the same only because the latter told him to
do so (p. 24, tsn, Nov. 22, 1990). But why would
Atty. Benitez make such a statement in said
document, unless appellee Marissa Benitez is not
really his and his wife's daughter and descendant
and, therefore, not his deceased wife's legal heir?
As for Dr. Chipongian, he lamely explained that he
signed said document without understanding
completely the meaning of the words "descendant
and ascendant" (p. 21, tsn, Nov. 22, 1990). This we
cannot believe, Dr. Chipongian being a practicing
pediatrician who has even gone to the United
States (p. 52, tsn, Dec. 13, 1990). Obviously,
Dr. Chipongian was just trying to protect the
interests of appellee, the foster-daughter of his
deceased sister and brother-in-law, as against
those of the latter's collateral blood relatives.
Fourth, it is likewise odd and strange, if appellee
Marissa Benitez is really the daughter and only
legal heir of the spouses Vicente O. Benitez and
Isabel Chipongian, that the latter, before her death,
would write a note to her husband and Marissa
stating that:
even without any legal papers, I
wish that my husband and my child
or only daughter will inherit what is
Page | 57
Persons 4th Exam Cases
legally my own property, in case I
die without a will,
and in the same handwritten note, she even implored her
husband
that any inheritance due him from
my property when he die to
make our own daughter his sole
heir. This do [sic] not mean what he
legally owns or his inherited
property. I leave him to decide for
himself regarding those.
(Exhs. "F-1", "F-1-A" and "F-1-B")
We say odd and strange, for if Marissa Benitez is
really the daughter of the spouses Vicente O.
Benitez and Isabel Chipongian, it would not have
been necessary for Isabel to write and plead for the
foregoing requests to her husband, since Marissa
would be their legal heir by operation of law.
Obviously, Isabel Chipongian had to implore and
supplicate her husband to give appellee although
without any legal papers her properties when she
dies, and likewise for her husband to give Marissa
the properties that he would inherit from her
(Isabel), since she well knew that Marissa is not
truly their daughter and could not be their legal
heir unless her (Isabel's) husband makes her so.
Finally, the deceased Vicente O. Benitez' elder
sister Victoria Benitez Lirio even testified that her
brother Vicente gave the date
December 8 as Marissa's birthday in her birth
certificate because that date is the birthday of their
(Victoria and Vicente's) mother. It is indeed too
much of a coincidence for the child Marissa and the
mother of Vicente and Victoria to have the same
birthday unless it is true, as Victoria testified, that
Marissa was only registered by Vicente as his and
his wife's child and that they gave her the birth
date of Vicente's mother.
We sustain these findings as they are not unsupported by the
evidence on record. The weight of these findings was not negated
by documentary evidence presented by the petitioner, the most
notable of which is her Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. "3")
purportedly showing that her parents were the late
Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian. This Certificate registered
on December 28, 1954 appears to have been signed by the
deceased Vicente Benitez. Under Article 410 of the New Civil Code,
however, "the books making up the Civil Registry and all
documents relating thereto shall be considered public documents
and shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." As
related above, the totality of contrary evidence, presented by the
private respondents sufficiently rebutted the truth of the content of
petitioner's Certificate of Live Birth. of said rebutting evidence, the
most telling was the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate
of the Deceased Isabel Chipongian (Exh. "E") executed on July 20,
1982 by Vicente Benitez, and
Dr. Nilo Chipongian, a brother of Isabel. In their notarized
document, they stated that "(they) are the sole heirs of the
deceased Isabel Chipongian because she died without descendants
or ascendants". In executing this Deed, Vicente Benitez effectively
repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of petitioner where it
appeared that he was petitioner's father. The repudiation was
made twenty-eight years after he signed petitioner's Certificate of
Live Birth.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition for review is dismissed for lack of
merit. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
[G.R. No. 138493. June 15, 2000]
TEOFISTA BABIERA, petitioner, vs. PRESENTACION B.
CATOTAL, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A birth certificate may be ordered cancelled upon adequate proof
that it is fictitious. Thus, void is a certificate which shows that the
mother was already fifty-four years old at the time of the child's
birth and which was signed neither by the civil registrar nor by the
supposed mother. Because her inheritance rights are adversely
affected, the legitimate child of such mother is a proper party in
the proceedings for the cancellation of the said certificate.
Statement of the Case
Submitted for this Courts consideration is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari[1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking reversal
of the March 18, 1999 Decision [2] of the Court of Appeals [3] (CA) in
CA-GR CV No. 56031. Affirming the Regional Trial Court of Lanao
del Norte in Special Proceedings No. 3046, the CA ruled as follows:
"IN VIEW HEREOF, the appealed decision is hereby
AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the instant appeal is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against the
defendant-appellant, TEOFISTA BABIERA, a.k.a.
Teofista Guinto."[4]
The dispositive portion of the affirmed RTC Decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing findings and
pronouncements of the Court, judgment is hereby
rendered, to wit[:]
1) Declaring the Certificate of Birth of respondent
Teofista Guinto as null and void 'ab initio';
2) Ordering the respondent Local Civil Registrar of
Iligan to cancel from the registry of live birth of
Iligan City BIRTH CERTIFICATE recorded as Registry
No. 16035;
Furnish copies of this decision to the Local Civil
Registrar of Iligan City, the City Prosecutor, counsel
for private respondent Atty. Tomas Cabili and to
counsel for petitioner.
SO ORDERED."
The Facts
The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals in
this wise:
"Presentacion B. Catotal (hereafter referred to as
PRESENTACION) filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Lanao del Norte, Branch II, Iligan City, a petition
for the cancellation of the entry of birth of Teofista
Babiera (herafter referred to as TEOFISTA) in the
Civil Registry of Iligan City. The case was docketed
as Special Proceedings No. 3046.
"From the petition filed, PRESENTACION asserted
'that she is the only surviving child of the late
spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa,
who died on May 26, 1996 and July 6, 1990
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
respectively; that on September 20, 1996 a baby
girl was delivered by 'hilot' in the house of spouses
Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera and without the
knowledge of said spouses, Flora Guinto, the
mother of the child and a housemaid of spouses
Eugenio and Hermogena Babiera, caused the
registration/recording of the facts of birth of her
child, by simulating that she was the child of the
spouses Eugenio, then 65 years old and
Hermogena, then 54 years old, and made
Hermogena Babiera appear as the mother by
forging her signature x x x; that petitioner, then 15
years old, saw with her own eyes and personally
witnessed Flora Guinto give birth to Teofista
Guinto, in their house, assisted by 'hilot'; that the
birth certificate x x x of Teofista Guinto is void ab
initio, as it was totally a simulated birth, signature
of informant forged, and it contained false entries,
to wit: a) The child is made to appear as the
legitimate child of the late spouses Eugenio
Babiera and Hermogena Cariosa, when she is not;
b) The signature of Hermogena Cariosa, the
mother, is falsified/forged. She was not the
informant; c) The family name BABIERA is false and
unlawful and her correct family name is GUINTO,
her mother being single; d) Her real mother was
Flora Guinto and her status, an illegitimate child;
The natural father, the carpenter, did not sign it;
that the respondent Teofista Barbiera's birth
certificate is void ab initio, and it is patently a
simulation of birth, since it is clinically and
medically impossible for the supposed parents to
bear a child in 1956 because: a) Hermogena
Cariosa Babiera, was already 54 years old; b)
Hermogena's last child birth was in the year 1941,
the year petitioner was born; c) Eugenio was
already 65 years old, that the void and simulated
birth certificate of Teofista Guinto would affect the
hereditary rights of petitioner who inherited the
estate of cancelled and declared void and
theretofore she prays that after publication, notice
and hearing, judgment [be] render[ed] declaring x
x x the certificate of birth of respondent Teofista
Guinto as declared void, invalid and ineffective and
ordering the respondent local civil registrar of
Iligan to cancel from the registry of live birth of
Iligan City BIRTH CERTIFICATE recorded as Registry
No. 16035.
"Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and
substance, the trial court issued an order directing
the publication of the petition and the date of
hearing thereof 'in a newspaper, the Local Civil
Registrar of Iligan City, the office of the City
Prosecutor of Iligan City and TEOFISTA.
"TEOFISTA filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds
that 'the petition states no cause of action, it being
an attack on the legitimacy of the respondent as
the child of the spouses Eugenio Babiera and
Hermogena Cariosa Babiera; that plaintiff has no
legal capacity to file the instant petition pursuant
to Article 171 of the Family Code; and finally that
the instant petition is barred by prescription in
accordance with Article 170 of the Family Code.'
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss.
"Subsequently, 'Attys. Padilla, Ulindang and Padilla
appeared and filed an answer/opposition in behalf
of private respondent Teofista Babiera, [who] was
later on substituted by Atty. Cabili as counsel for
private respondent.'
"In the answer filed, TEOFISTA averred 'that she
was always known as Teofista Babiera and not
Teofista Guinto; that plaintiff is not the only
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
surviving child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera
and Hermogena C. Babiera, for the truth of the
matter [is that] plantiff Presentacion B. V. Catotal
and [defendant] Teofista Babiera are sisters of the
full-blood. Her Certificate of Birth, signed by her
mother Hermogena Babiera, x x x Certificate of
Baptism, x x x Student's Report Card x x x all
incorporated in her answer, are eloquent
testimonies of her filiation. By way of special and
affirmative defenses, defendant/respondent
contended that the petition states no cause of
action, it being an attack on the legitimacy of the
respondent as the child of the spouses Eugenio
Babiera and Hermogena Carioza Babiera; that
plaintiff has no legal capacity to file the instant
petition pursuant to Article 171 of the Family Code;
and finally that the instant petition is barred by
prescription in accordance with Article 170 of the
Family Code." [5]
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals held that the evidence adduced during trial
proved that petitioner was not the biological child of Hermogena
Babiera. It also ruled that no evidence was presented to show that
Hermogena became pregnant in 1959. It further observed that she
was already 54 years old at the time, and that her last pregnancy
had occurred way back in 1941. The CA noted that the supposed
birth took place at home, notwithstanding the advanced age of
Hermogena and its concomitant medical complications. Moreover,
petitioner's Birth Certificate was not signed by the local civil
registrar, and the signature therein, which was purported to be that
of Hermogena, was different from her other signatures.
The CA also deemed inapplicable Articles 170 and 171 of the
Family Code, which stated that only the father could impugn the
child's legitimacy, and that the same was not subject to a collateral
attack. It held that said provisions contemplated a situation
wherein the husband or his heirs asserted that the child of the wife
was not his. In this case, the action involved the cancellation of the
childs Birth Certificate for being void ab initio on the ground that
the child did not belong to either the father or the mother.
Hence, this appeal.[6]
Issues
Petitioner presents the following assignment of errors:
"1) Respondent (plaintiff in the lower court a quo)
does not have the legal capacity to file the special
proceeding of appeal under CA GR No. CV-56031
subject matter of this review on certiorari;
2) The special proceeding on appeal under CA GR
No. CV-56031 is improper and is barred by [the]
statute of limitation (prescription); [and]
3) The Honorable Court of Appeals, the fifteenth
division utterly failed to hold, that the ancient
public record of petitioner's birth is superior to the
self-serving oral testimony of respondent."[7]
The Courts Ruling
The Petition is not meritorious.
First Issue: Subject of the Present Action
Petitioner contends that respondent has no standing to sue,
because Article 171[8] of the Family Code states that the child's
filiation can be impugned only by the father or, in special
circumstances, his heirs. She adds that the legitimacy of a child is
not subject to a collateral attack.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

This argument is incorrect. Respondent has the requisite standing the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of said
to initiate the present action. Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for
Court, provides that a real party in interest is one "who stands to him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife within
be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party the first 120 days of the 300 days which
entitled to the avails of the suit." [9] The interest of respondent in immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2)
the civil status of petitioner stems from an action for partition that for biological or other scientific reasons, the
which the latter filed against the former. [10] The case concerned the child could not have been his child; (3) that in case
properties inherited by respondent from her parents. of children conceived through artificial
insemination, the written authorization or
Moreover, Article 171 of the Family Code is not applicable to the ratification by either parent was obtained through
present case. A close reading of this provision shows that it applies mistake, fraud, violence, intimidation or undue
to instances in which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wifes influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this
child. The provision, however, presupposes that the child was the reading as they speak of the prescriptive period
undisputed offspring of the mother. The present case alleges and within which the husband or any of his heirsshould
shows that Hermogena did not give birth to petitioner. In other file the action impugning the legitimacy of said
words, the prayer herein is not to declare that petitioner is an child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not
illegitimate child of Hermogena, but to establish that the former is err when it refused to apply these articles to the
not the latter's child at all. Verily, the present action does not case at bench. For the case at bench is not one
impugn petitioners filiation to Spouses Eugenio and Hermogena where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending
Babiera, because there is no blood relation to impugn in the first that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather,
place. their clear submission is that petitioner was not
born to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-
In Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals,[11] the Court ruled thus: Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA
451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is
apropos, viz:
"Petitioners insistence on the applicability of
Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code
to the case at bench cannot be sustained. These Petitioners recourse to Article 263
articles provide: of the New Civil Code [now Art. 170
of the Family Code] is not well-
taken. This legal provision refers to
x x x.....x x x.....x x x
an action to impugn legitimacy. It is
inapplicable to this case because
"A careful reading of the above articles will show this is not an action to impugn the
that they do not contemplate a situation, like in the legitimacy of a child, but an action
instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the of the private respondents to claim
child of nature or biological child of a certain their inheritance as legal heirs of
couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation their childless deceased aunt. They
where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a do not claim that petitioner Violeta
child of his wife. Thus, under Article 166, it is

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate
child of the deceased, but that she
is not the decedents child at all.
Being neither [a] legally adopted
child, nor an acknowledged natural
child, nor a child by legal fiction of
Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not
a legal heir of the
deceased."[12] (Emphasis supplied.)
Second Issue: Prescription
Petitioner next contends that the action to contest her status as a
child of the late Hermogena Babiera has already prescribed. She
cites Article 170 of the Family Code which provides the prescriptive
period for such action:
"Art. 170. The action to impugn the legitimacy of
the child shall be brought within one year from the
knowledge of the birth or its recording in the civil
register, if the husband or, in a proper case, any of
his heirs, should reside in the city or municipality
where the birth took place or was recorded.
"If the husband or, in his default, all of his heirs do
not reside at the place of birth as defined in the
first paragraph or where it was recorded, the period
shall be two years if they should reside in the
Philippines; and three years if abroad. If the birth of
the child has been concealed from or was unknown
to the husband or his heirs, the period shall be
counted from the discovery or knowledge of the
birth of the child or of the fact of registration of
said birth, whichever is earlier."
This argument is bereft of merit. The present action involves the
cancellation of petitioners Birth Certificate; it does not impugn her
legitimacy. Thus, the prescriptive period set forth in Article 170 of
the Family Code does not apply. Verily, the action to nullify the
Birth Certificate does not prescribe, because it was allegedly
void ab initio.[13]
Third Issue: Presumption in Favor of the Birth Certificate
Lastly, petitioner argues that the evidence presented, especially
Hermogenas testimony that petitioner was not her real child,
cannot overcome the presumption of regularity in the issuance of
the Birth Certificate.
While it is true that an official document such as petitioners Birth
Certificate enjoys the presumption of regularity, the specific facts
attendant in the case at bar, as well as the totality of the evidence
presented during trial, sufficiently negate such
presumption. First,there were already irregularities regarding the
Birth Certificate itself. It was not signed by the local civil registrar.
[14]
More important, the Court of Appeals observed that the mothers
signature therein was different from her signatures in other
documents presented during the trial.
Second, the circumstances surrounding the birth of petitioner show
that Hermogena is not the former's real mother. For one, there is
no evidence of Hermogenas pregnancy, such as medical records
and doctors prescriptions, other than the Birth Certificate itself. In
fact, no witness was presented to attest to the pregnancy of
Hermogena during that time. Moreover, at the time of her
supposed birth, Hermogena was already 54 years old. Even if it
were possible for her to have given birth at such a late age, it was
highly suspicious that she did so in her own home, when her
advanced age necessitated proper medical care normally available
only in a hospital.
The most significant piece of evidence, however, is the deposition
of Hermogena Babiera which states that she did not give birth to
petitioner, and that the latter was not hers nor her husband
Eugenios. The deposition reads in part:
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

"q.....Who are your children? All in all, we find no reason to reverse or modify the factual finding
of the trial and the appellate courts that petitioner was not the
a.....Presentation and Florentino Babiera. child of respondents parents.

q.....Now, this Teofista Babiera claims that she is
your legitimate child with your husband Eugenio
Babiera, what can you say about that?
a.....She is not our child.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed
Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

x x x.....x x x.....x x x

q.....Do you recall where she was born?

a.....In our house because her mother was our

house helper.

q.....Could you recall for how long if ever this

Teofista Babiera lived with you in your residence?

a.....Maybe in 1978 but she [would] always go ou[t]

from time to time.

q.....Now, during this time, do you recall if you ever

assert[ed] her as your daughter with your
husband?

a.....No, sir."[15]

Relying merely on the assumption of validity of the Birth

Certificate, petitioner has presented no other evidence other than
the said document to show that she is really Hermogenas child.
Neither has she provided any reason why her supposed mother
would make a deposition stating that the former was not the
latter's child at all.

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
[G.R. No. 142877. October 2, 2001]
JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS,
minors, represented by their mother, CAROLINA A.
DE JESUS, petitioners, vs. THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT
JUAN GAMBOA DIZON, ANGELINA V. DIZON, CARLOS
DIZON, FELIPE DIZON, JUAN DIZON, JR. and MARYLIN
DIZON and as proper parties: FORMS MEDIA CORP.,
QUAD MANAGEMENT CORP., FILIPINAS PAPER SALES
CO., INC. and AMITY CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL
ENTERPRISES, INC., respondents.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The petition involves the case of two illegitimate children who,
having been born in lawful wedlock, claim to be the illegitimate
scions of the decedent in order to enforce their respective shares in
the latters estate under the rules on succession.
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married
on 23 August 1964. It was during this marriage that Jacqueline A.
de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein petitioners, were
born, the former on 01 March 1979 and the latter on 06 July 1982.
In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon
acknowledged Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own
illegitimate children by Carolina Aves de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died
intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving behind considerable assets
consisting of shares of stock in various corporations and some real
property. It was on the strength of his notarized acknowledgment
that petitioners filed a complaint on 01 July 1993 for Partition with
Inventory and Accounting of the Dizon estate with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 88, of Quezon City.
Respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of
the decedent Juan G. Dizon, including the corporations of which the
deceased was a stockholder, sought the dismissal of the case,
arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as being one
for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of
petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo
de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate
children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon. The trial
court denied, due to lack of merit, the motion to dismiss and the
subsequent motion for reconsideration on, respectively, 13
September 1993 and 15 February 1994. Respondents assailed the
denial of said motions before the Court of Appeals.
On 20 May 1994, the appellate court upheld the decision of
the lower court and ordered the case to be remanded to the trial
court for further proceedings. It ruled that the veracity of the
conflicting assertions should be threshed out at the trial
considering that the birth certificates presented by respondents
appeared to have effectively contradicted petitioners allegation of
illegitimacy.
On 03 January 2000, long after submitting their answer, pre-
trial brief and several other motions, respondents filed an omnibus
motion, again praying for the dismissal of the complaint on the
ground that the action instituted was, in fact, made to compel the
recognition of petitioners as being the illegitimate children of
decedent Juan G. Dizon and that the partition sought was merely
an ulterior relief once petitioners would have been able to establish
their status as such heirs. It was contended, in fine, that an action
for partition was not an appropriate forum to likewise ascertain the
question of paternity and filiation, an issue that could only be taken
up in an independent suit or proceeding.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
Finding credence in the argument of respondents, the trial
court, ultimately, dismissed the complaint of petitioners for lack of
cause of action and for being improper. [1] It decreed that the
declaration of heirship could only be made in a special proceeding
inasmuch as petitioners were seeking the establishment of a status
or right.
Petitioners assail the foregoing order of the trial court in the
instant petition for review on certiorari. Basically, petitioners
maintain that their recognition as being illegitimate children of the
decedent, embodied in an authentic writing, is in itself sufficient to
establish their status as such and does not require a separate
action for judicial approval following the doctrine enunciated
in Divinagracia vs. Bellosillo.[2]
In their comment, respondents submit that the rule
in Divinagracia being relied by petitioners is inapplicable to the
case because there has been no attempt to impugn legitimate
filiation in Divinagracia. In praying for the affirmance of dismissal
of the complaint, respondents count on the case of Sayson vs.
Court of Appeals,[3] which has ruled that the issue of legitimacy
cannot be questioned in a complaint for partition and accounting
but must be seasonably brought up in a direct action frontally
addressing the issue.
The controversy between the parties has been pending for
much too long, and it is time that this matter draws to a close.
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is
established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate
filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof,
filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous
possession of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other
means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws. [4] The due
recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court of record, or in any
authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgment of the child, and no further court action is
required.[5] In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a
ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary
recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial
approval.[6] Where, instead, a claim for recognition is
predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove
paternity, i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record or an authentic writing,
judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is
essential in order to establish the childs acknowledgment.[7]
A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were
born during the marriage of their parents. The certificates of live
birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly
established and founded on sounder morality and more convincing
reason than the presumption that children born in wedlock are
legitimate.[8] This presumption indeed becomes conclusive in the
absence of proof that there is physical impossibility of access
between the spouses during the first 120 days of the 300 days
which immediately precedes the birth of the child due to (a) the
physical incapacity of the husband to have sexual intercourse with
his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and wife are living
separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is not possible; or
(c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely prevents sexual
intercourse.[9] Quite remarkably, upon the expiration of the periods
set forth in Article 170, [10] and in proper cases Article 171, [11] of the
Family Code (which took effect on 03 August 1988), the action to
impugn the legitimacy of a child would no longer be legally feasible
and the status conferred by the presumption becomes fixed and
unassailable.[12]
Succinctly, in an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation
to the late Juan G. Dizon, petitioners, in effect, would impugn their
legitimate status as being children of Danilo de Jesus and Carolina
Aves de Jesus. This step cannot be aptly done because the law
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

itself establishes the legitimacy of children conceived or born WHEREFORE, the foregoing disquisitions considered, the
during the marriage of the parents. The presumption of instant petition is DENIED. No costs.
legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock,
and only the father,[13] or in exceptional instances the SO ORDERED.
latters heirs,[14] can contest in an appropriate action the
legitimacy of a child born to his wife. Thus, it is only when
the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned
that the paternity of the husband can be rejected.

Respondents correctly argued that petitioners hardly could

find succor in Divinagracia. In said case, the Supreme Court
remanded to the trial court for further proceedings the action for
partition filed by an illegitimate child who had claimed to be an
acknowledged spurious child by virtue of a private document,
signed by the acknowledging parent, evidencing such
recognition. It was not a case of legitimate children asserting to be
somebody elses illegitimate children. Petitioners totally ignored the
fact that it was not for them, given the attendant circumstances
particularly, to declare that they could not have been the
legitimate children, clearly opposed to the entries in their
respective birth certificates, of Danilo and Carolina de Jesus.

The rule that the written acknowledgment made by the

deceased Juan G. Dizon establishes petitioners alleged illegitimate
filiation to the decedent cannot be validly invoked to be of any
relevance in this instance. This issue, i.e., whether petitioners are
indeed the acknowledged illegitimate offsprings of the decedent,
cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action having been first
been instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful
wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount
declaration of legitimacy by law cannot be attacked collaterally,
[15]
one that can only be repudiated or contested in a direct suit
specifically brought for that purpose. [16] Indeed, a child so born in
such wedlock shall be considered legitimate although the mother
may have declared against its legitimacy or may have been
sentenced as having been an adulteress.[17]

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
[G.R. No. 138961. March 7, 2002]
WILLIAM LIYAO, JR., represented by his mother Corazon
Garcia, petitioner, vs. JUANITA TANHOTI-LIYAO, PEARL
MARGARET L. TAN, TITA ROSE L. TAN AND LINDA
CHRISTINA LIYAO, respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
decision dated June 4, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. C.V. No.
45394[1] which reversed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Pasig, Metro Manila, Branch 167 in declaring William Liyao, Jr. as the
illegitimate (spurious) son of the deceased William Liyao and ordering
Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda
Christina Liyao to recognize and acknowledge William Liyao, Jr. as a
compulsory heir of the deceased William Liyao and entitled to all
successional rights as such and to pay the costs of the suit.
On November 29,1976, William Liyao, Jr., represented by his
mother Corazon G. Garcia, filed Civil Case No. 24943 before the RTC of
Pasig, Branch 167 which is an action for compulsory recognition as the
illegitimate (spurious) child of the late William Liyao against herein
respondents, Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L.
Tan and Linda Christina Liyao. [2] The complaint was later amended to
include the allegation that petitioner was in continuous possession and
enjoyment of the status of the child of said William Liyao, petitioner
having been recognized and acknowledged as such child by the
decedent during his lifetime."[3]
The facts as alleged by petitioner are as follows:
Corazon G. Garcia is legally married to but living separately from
Ramon M. Yulo for more than ten (10) years at the time of the
institution of the said civil case. Corazon cohabited with the late
William Liyao from 1965 up to the time of Williams untimely demise on
December 2, 1975. They lived together in the company of Corazons
two (2) children from her subsisting marriage, namely:
Enrique and Bernadette, both surnamed Yulo, in a succession of
rented houses in Quezon City and Manila. This was with the knowledge
of William Liyaos legitimate children, Tita Rose L. Tan and Linda
Christina Liyao-Ortiga, from his subsisting marriage with Juanita
Tanhoti Liyao. Tita Rose and Christina were both employed at the Far
East Realty Investment, Inc. of which Corazon and William were then
vice president and president, respectively.
Sometime in 1974, Corazon bought a lot from Ortigas and Co.
which required the signature of her husband, Ramon Yulo, to show his
consent to the aforesaid sale. She failed to secure his signature and,
had never been in touch with him despite the necessity to meet him.
Upon the advice of William Liyao, the sale of the parcel of land located
at the Valle Verde Subdivision was registered under the name of Far
East Realty Investment, Inc.
On June 9, 1975, Corazon gave birth to William Liyao, Jr. at the
Cardinal Santos Memorial Hospital. During her three (3) day stay at the
hospital, William Liyao visited and stayed with her and the new born
baby, William, Jr. (Billy). All the medical and hospital expenses, food
and clothing were paid under the account of William Liyao. William
Liyao even asked his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez, to
secure a copy of Billys birth certificate. He likewise instructed Corazon
to open a bank account for Billy with the Consolidated Bank and Trust
Company[4] and gave weekly amounts to be deposited therein.
[5]
William Liyao would bring Billy to the office, introduce him as his
good looking son and had their pictures taken together. [6]
During the lifetime of William Liyao, several pictures were taken
showing, among others, William Liyao and Corazon together with Billys
godfather, Fr. Julian Ruiz, William Liyaos legal staff and their wives
while on vacation in Baguio. [7] Corazon also presented pictures in court
to prove that that she usually accompanied William Liyao while
attending various social gatherings and other important meetings.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
During the occasion of William Liyaos last birthday on November 22,
[8]
1975 held at the Republic Supermarket, William Liyao expressly
acknowledged Billy as his son in the presence of Fr. Ruiz, Maurita
Pasion and other friends and said, Hey, look I am still young, I can still
make a good looking son."[9] Since birth, Billy had been in continuous
possession and enjoyment of the status of a recognized and/or
acknowledged child of William Liyao by the latters direct and overt
acts. William Liyao supported Billy and paid for his food, clothing and
other material needs. However, after William Liyaos death, it was
Corazon who provided sole support to Billy and took care of his tuition
fees at La Salle, Greenhills. William Liyao left his personal belongings,
collections, clothing, old newspaper clippings and laminations at the
house in White Plains where he shared his last moments with Corazon.
Testifying for the petitioner, Maurita Pasion declared that she
knew both Corazon G. Garcia and William Liyao who were godparents
to her children. She used to visit Corazon and William Liyao from 1965-
1975. The two children of Corazon from her marriage to Ramon Yulo,
namely, Bernadette and Enrique (Ike), together with some housemaids
lived with Corazon and William Liyao as one family. On some occasions
like birthdays or some other celebrations, Maurita would sleep in the
couples residence and cook for the family. During these occasions, she
would usually see William Liyao in sleeping clothes. When Corazon,
during the latter part of 1974, was pregnant with her child Billy,
Maurita often visited her three (3) to four (4) times a week in Greenhills
and later on in White Plains where she would often see William Liyao.
Being a close friend of Corazon, she was at the Cardinal Santos
Memorial Hospital during the birth of Billy. She continuously visited
them at White Plains and knew that William Liyao, while living with her
friend Corazon, gave support by way of grocery supplies, money for
household expenses and matriculation fees for the two (2) older
children, Bernadette and Enrique. During William Liyaos birthday on
November 22, 1975 held at the Republic Supermarket Office, he was
carrying Billy and told everybody present, including his two (2)
daughters from his legal marriage, Look, this is my son, very guapo
and healthy.[10] He then talked about his plan for the baptism of Billy
before Christmas. He intended to make it engrande and make the bells
of San Sebastian Church ring.[11] Unfortunately, this did not happen
since William Liyao passed away on December 2, 1975. Maurita
attended Mr. Liyaos funeral and helped Corazon pack his clothes. She
even recognized a short sleeved shirt of blue and gray [12] which Mr.
Liyao wore in a photograph [13] as well as another shirt of lime
green[14] as belonging to the deceased. A note was also presented with
the following inscriptions: To Cora, Love From William.[15] Maurita
remembered having invited the couple during her mothers birthday
where the couple had their pictures taken while exhibiting affectionate
poses with one another. Maurita knew that Corazon is still married to
Ramon Yulo since her marriage has not been annulled nor is Corazon
legally separated from her said husband. However, during the entire
cohabitation of William Liyao with Corazon Garcia, Maurita had not
seen Ramon Yulo or any other man in the house when she usually
visited Corazon.
Gloria Panopio testified that she is the owner of a beauty parlor
and that she knew that Billy is the son of her neighbors, William Liyao
and Corazon Garcia, the latter being one of her customers. Gloria met
Mr. Liyao at Corazons house in Scout Delgado, Quezon City in the
Christmas of 1965. Gloria had numerous occasions to see Mr. Liyao
from 1966 to 1974 and even more so when the couple transferred to
White Plains, Quezon City from 1974-1975. At the time Corazon was
conceiving, Mr. Liyao was worried that Corazon might have another
miscarriage so he insisted that she just stay in the house, play
mahjong and not be bored. Gloria taught Corazon how to play mahjong
and together with Atty. Brillantes wife and sister-in-law, had mahjong
sessions among themselves. Gloria knew that Mr. Liyao provided
Corazon with a rented house, paid the salary of the maids and food for
Billy. He also gave Corazon financial support. Gloria knew that Corazon
is married but is separated from Ramon Yulo although Gloria never had
any occasion to see Mr. Yulo with Corazon in the house where Mr. Liyao
and Corazon lived.
Enrique Garcia Yulo testified that he had not heard from his father,
Ramon Yulo, from the time that the latter abandoned and separated
from his family. Enrique was about six (6) years old when William Liyao
started to live with them up to the time of the latters death on
December 2, 1975. Mr. Liyao was very supportive and fond of Enriques
half brother, Billy. He identified several pictures showing Mr. Liyao
carrying Billy at the house as well as in the office. Enriques testimony
was corroborated by his sister, Bernadette Yulo, who testified that the
various pictures showing Mr. Liyao carrying Billy could not have been
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
superimposed and that the negatives were in the possession of her
mother, Corazon Garcia.
Respondents, on the other hand, painted a different picture of the
story.
Linda Christina Liyao-Ortiga stated that her parents, William Liyao
and Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, were legally married. [16] Linda grew up and
lived with her parents at San Lorenzo Village, Makati, Metro Manila until
she got married; that her parents were not separated legally or in fact
and that there was no reason why any of her parents would institute
legal separation proceedings in court. Her father lived at their house in
San Lorenzo Village and came home regularly. Even during out of town
business trips or for conferences with the lawyers at the office, her
father would change his clothes at home because of his personal
hygiene and habits. Her father reportedly had trouble sleeping in other
peoples homes. Linda described him as very conservative and a strict
disciplinarian. He believed that no amount of success would
compensate for failure of a home. As a businessman, he was very
tough, strong, fought for what he believed in and did not give up easily.
He suffered two strokes before the fatal attack which led to his death
on December 2, 1975. He suffered a stroke at the office sometime in
April-May 1974 and was attended by Dr. Santiago Co. He then stayed
in the house for two (2) to three (3) months for his therapy and
acupuncture treatment. He could not talk, move, walk, write or sign his
name. In the meantime, Linda and her sister, Tita Rose Liyao-Tan, ran
the office. She handled the collection of rents while her sister referred
legal matters to their lawyers. William Liyao was bedridden and had
personally changed. He was not active in business and had dietary
restrictions. Mr. Liyao also suffered a milder stroke during the latter
part of September to October 1974. He stayed home for two (2) to
three (3) days and went back to work. He felt depressed, however, and
was easily bored. He did not put in long hours in the office unlike
before and tried to spend more time with his family.
Linda testified that she knew Corazon Garcia is still married to
Ramon Yulo. Corazon was not legally separated from her husband and
the records from the Local Civil Registrar do not indicate that the
couple obtained any annulment[17] of their marriage. Once in 1973,
Linda chanced upon Ramon Yulo picking up Corazon Garcia at the
company garage. Immediately after the death of Lindas father,
Corazon went to Lindas office for the return of the formers alleged
investments with the Far East Realty Investment, Inc. including a parcel
of land sold by Ortigas and Company. Linda added that Corazon, while
still a Vice-President of the company, was able to take out documents,
clothes and several laminated pictures of William Liyao from the office.
There was one instance when she was told by the guards, Mrs. Yulo is
leaving and taking out things again.[18] Linda then instructed the guards
to bring Mrs. Yulo to the office upstairs but her sister, Tita Rose,
decided to let Corazon Garcia go. Linda did not recognize any article of
clothing which belonged to her father after having been shown three
(3) large suit cases full of mens clothes, underwear, sweaters, shorts
and pajamas.
Tita Rose Liyao-Tan testified that her parents were legally married
and had never been separated. They resided at No. 21 Hernandez
Street, San Lorenzo Village, Makati up to the time of her fathers death
on December 2, 1975.[19] Her father suffered two (2) minor cardio-
vascular arrests (CVA) prior to his death. During the first heart attack
sometime between April and May 1974, his speech and hands were
affected and he had to stay home for two (2) to three (3) months under
strict medication, taking aldomet, serpadil and cifromet which were
prescribed by Dr. Bonifacio Yap, for high blood pressure and cholesterol
level control.[20] Tita Rose testified that after the death of Mr. Liyao,
Corazon Garcia was paid the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P100,000.00) representing her investment in the Far East Realty
Investment Inc. Tita Rose also stated that her family never received
any formal demand that they recognize a certain William Liyao, Jr. as
an illegitimate son of her father, William Liyao. After assuming the
position of President of the company, Tita Rose did not come across
any check signed by her late father representing payment to lessors as
rentals for the house occupied by Corazon Garcia. Tita Rose added that
the laminated photographs presented by Corazon Garcia are the
personal collection of the deceased which were displayed at the latters
office.
The last witness who testified for the respondents was Ramon
Pineda, driver and bodyguard of William Liyao from 1962 to 1974, who
said that he usually reported for work at San Lorenzo Village, Makati to
pick up his boss at 8:00 oclock in the morning. At past 7:00 oclock in
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
the evening, either Carlos Palamigan or Serafin Villacillo took over as
night shift driver. Sometime between April and May 1974, Mr. Liyao got
sick. It was only after a month that he was able to report to the office.
Thereafter, Mr. Liyao was not able to report to the office regularly.
Sometime in September 1974, Mr. Liyao suffered from another heart
attack. Mr. Pineda added that as a driver and bodyguard of Mr. Liyao,
he ran errands for the latter among which was buying medicine for him
like capasid and aldomet. On December 2, 1975, Mr. Pineda was called
inside the office of Mr. Liyao. Mr. Pineda saw his employer leaning on
the table. He tried to massage Mr. Liyaos breast and decided later to
carry and bring him to the hospital but Mr. Liyao died upon arrival
thereat. Mrs. Liyao and her daughter, Linda Liyao-Ortiga were the first
to arrive at the hospital.
Mr. Pineda also declared that he knew Corazon Garcia to be one of
the employees of the Republic Supermarket. People in the office knew
that she was married. Her husband, Ramon Yulo, would sometimes go
to the office. One time, in 1974, Mr. Pineda saw Ramon Yulo at the
office garage as if to fetch Corazon Garcia. Mr. Yulo who was also
asking about cars for sale, represented himself as car dealer.
Witness Pineda declared that he did not know anything about the
claim of Corazon. He freely relayed the information that he saw Mr. Yulo
in the garage of Republic Supermarket once in 1973 and then in 1974
to Atty. Quisumbing when he went to the latters law office. Being the
driver of Mr. Liyao for a number of years, Pineda said that he
remembered having driven the group of Mr. Liyao, Atty. Astraquillo,
Atty. Brillantes, Atty. Magno and Atty. Laguio to Baguio for a vacation
together with the lawyers wives. During his employment, as driver of
Mr. Liyao, he does not remember driving for Corazon Garcia on a trip to
Baguio or for activities like shopping.
On August 31, 1993, the trial court rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and
against the defendants as follows:
(a) Confirming the appointment of Corazon G. Garcia as the
guardian ad litem of the minor William Liyao, Jr.;
(b) Declaring the minor William Liyao, Jr. as the illegitimate
(spurious) son of the deceased William Liyao;
(c) Ordering the defendants Juanita Tanhoti Liyao, Pearl
Margaret L. Tan, Tita Rose L. Tan and Christian Liyao, to
recognize, and acknowledge the minor William Liyao, Jr.
as a compulsory heir of the deceased William Liyao,
entitled to all succesional rights as such; and
(d) Costs of suit.[21]
In ruling for herein petitioner, the trial court said it was convinced
by preponderance of evidence that the deceased William Liyao sired
William Liyao, Jr. since the latter was conceived at the time when
Corazon Garcia cohabited with the deceased. The trial court observed
that herein petitioner had been in continuous possession and
enjoyment of the status of a child of the deceased by direct and overt
acts of the latter such as securing the birth certificate of petitioner
through his confidential secretary, Mrs. Virginia Rodriguez; openly and
publicly acknowledging petitioner as his son; providing sustenance and
even introducing herein petitioner to his legitimate children.
The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the ruling of the trial
court saying that the law favors the legitimacy rather than the
illegitimacy of the child and the presumption of legitimacy is thwarted
only on ethnic ground and by proof that marital intimacy between
husband and wife was physically impossible at the period cited in
Article 257 in relation to Article 255 of the Civil Code. The appellate
court gave weight to the testimonies of some witnesses for the
respondents that Corazon Garcia and Ramon Yulo who were still legally
married and have not secured legal separation, were seen in each
others company during the supposed time that Corazon cohabited with
the deceased William Liyao. The appellate court further noted that the
birth certificate and the baptismal certificate of William Liyao, Jr. which
were presented by petitioner are not sufficient to establish proof of
paternity in the absence of any evidence that the deceased, William
Liyao, had a hand in the preparation of said certificates and
considering that his signature does not appear thereon. The Court of
Appeals stated that neither do family pictures constitute competent
proof of filiation. With regard to the passbook which was presented as
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
evidence for petitioner, the appellate court observed that there was
nothing in it to prove that the same was opened by William Liyao for
either petitioner or Corazon Garcia since William Liyaos signature and
name do not appear thereon.
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner filed
the present petition.
It must be stated at the outset that both petitioner and
respondents have raised a number of issues which relate solely to the
sufficiency of evidence presented by petitioner to establish his claim of
filiation with the late William Liyao. Unfortunately, both parties have
consistently overlooked the real crux of this litigation: May petitioner
impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim from the estate of his
supposed father, William Liyao?
We deny the present petition.
Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a
valid marriage is presumed to be legitimate. [22] The presumption of
legitimacy of children does not only flow out from a declaration
contained in the statute but is based on the broad principles of natural
justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is
grounded in a policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium of
illegitimacy.[23]
The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not
conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the
contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Code[24] provides:
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following
the celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days
following its dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be
presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than
that of the physical impossibility of the husband having access to his
wife within the first one hundred and twenty days of the three hundred
which preceded the birth of the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
1) By the impotence of the husband;
2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately
in such a way that access was not possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.
Petitioner insists that his mother, Corazon Garcia, had been living
separately for ten (10) years from her husband, Ramon Yulo, at the
time that she cohabited with the late William Liyao and it was
physically impossible for her to have sexual relations with Ramon Yulo
when petitioner was conceived and born. To bolster his claim,
petitioner presented a document entitled, Contract of Separation,
[25]
executed and signed by Ramon Yulo indicating a waiver of rights to
any and all claims on any property that Corazon Garcia might acquire
in the future.[26]
The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her
husband, Ramon Yulo, at the time petitioner was conceived and born is
of no moment. While physical impossibility for the husband to have
sexual intercourse with his wife is one of the grounds for impugning the
legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis that the grounds for
impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article 255 of the
Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his
heirs under the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code.
[27]
Impugning the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of
the husband, or in exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason
that he is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule
which the infidelity of his wife produces and he should be the one to
decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it in view of the
moral and economic interest involved. [28] It is only in exceptional cases
that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these
cases, none - even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that would
amount o an insult to his memory. [29]
It is therefor clear that the present petition initiated by Corazon G.
Garcia as guardian ad litem of the then minor, herein petitioner, to
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

compel recognition by respondents of petitioner William Liyao, Jr, as WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The assailed
the illegitimate son of the late William Liyao cannot prosper. It is decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 45394 is hereby
settled that a child born within a valid marriage is presumed legitimate AFFIRMED. No costs.
even though the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or
may have been sentenced as an adulteress. [30] We cannot allow SO ORDERED.
petitioner to maintain his present petition and subvert the clear
mandate of the law that only the husband, or in exceptional
circumstances, his heirs, could impugn the legitimacy of a child born in
a valid and subsisting marriage. The child himself cannot choose his
own filiation. If the husband, presumed to be the father does not
impugn the legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed,
and the latter cannot choose to be the child of his mothers alleged
paramour. On the other hand, if the presumption of legitimacy is
overthrown, the child cannot elect the paternity of the husband who
successfully defeated the presumption.[31]

Do the acts of Enrique and Bernadette Yulo, the undisputed

children of Corazon Garcia with Ramon Yulo, in testifying for herein
petitioner amount to impugnation of the legitimacy of the latter?

We think not. As earlier stated, it is only in exceptional cases that

the heirs of the husband are allowed to contest the legitimacy of the
child. There is nothing on the records to indicate that Ramon Yulo has
already passed away at the time of the birth of the petitioner nor at the
time of the initiation of this proceedings. Notably, the case at bar was
initiated by petitioner himself through his mother, Corazon Garcia, and
not through Enrique and Bernadette Yulo. It is settled that the
legitimacy of the child can be impugned only in a direct action brought
for that purpose, by the proper parties and within the period limited by
law.

Considering the foregoing, we find no reason to discuss the

sufficiency of the evidence presented by both parties on the petitioners
claim of alleged filiation with the late William Liyao. In any event, there
is no clear, competent and positive evidence presented by the
petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or recognized his
paternity.

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
[G.R. No. 123450. August 31, 2005]
GERARDO B. CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and MA. THERESA ALMONTE, respondents.
The child, by reason of his mental and physical immaturity,
needs special safeguard and care, including appropriate legal
protection before as well as after birth. [1] In case of assault on his
rights by those who take advantage of his innocence and
vulnerability, the law will rise in his defense with the single-minded
purpose of upholding only his best interests.
This is the story of petitioner Gerardo B. Concepcion and
private respondent Ma. Theresa Almonte, and a child named Jose
Gerardo. Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were married on December 29,
1989.[2] After their marriage, they lived with Ma. Theresas parents
in Fairview, Quezon City.[3] Almost a year later, on December 8,
1990, Ma. Theresa gave birth to Jose Gerardo.[4]
Gerardo and Ma. Theresas relationship turned out to be short-
lived, however. On December 19, 1991, Gerardo filed a petition to
have his marriage to Ma. Theresa annulled on the ground of
bigamy.[5] He alleged that nine years before he married Ma.
Theresa on December 10, 1980, she had married one Mario
Gopiao, which marriage was never annulled. [6] Gerardo also found
out that Mario was still alive and was residing in Loyola Heights,
Quezon City.[7]
Ma. Theresa did not deny marrying Mario when she was
twenty years old. She, however, averred that the marriage was a
sham and that she never lived with Mario at all.[8]
The trial court ruled that Ma. Theresas marriage to Mario was
valid and subsisting when she married Gerardo and annulled her
marriage to the latter for being bigamous. It declared Jose Gerardo
to be an illegitimate child as a result. The custody of the child was
awarded to Ma. Theresa while Gerardo was granted visitation
rights.[9]
Ma. Theresa felt betrayed and humiliated when Gerardo had
their marriage annulled. She held him responsible for the
bastardization of Gerardo. She moved for the reconsideration of
the above decision INSOFAR ONLY as that portion of the decision
which grant(ed) to the petitioner so-called visitation rights between
the hours of 8 in the morning to 12:00 p.m. of any Sunday. [10] She
argued that there was nothing in the law granting visitation rights
in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate child. [11] She further
maintained that Jose Gerardos surname should be changed from
Concepcion to Almonte, her maiden name, following the rule that
an illegitimate child shall use the mothers surname.
Gerardo opposed the motion. He insisted on his visitation
rights and the retention of Concepcion as Jose Gerardos surname.
Applying the best interest of the child principle, the trial court
denied Ma. Theresas motion and made the following observations:
It is a pity that the parties herein seem to be using their son to get
at or to hurt the other, something they should never do if they
want to assure the normal development and well-being of the boy.
The Court allowed visitorial rights to the father knowing that the
minor needs a father, especially as he is a boy, who must have a
father figure to recognize something that the mother alone cannot
give. Moreover, the Court believes that the emotional and
psychological well-being of the boy would be better served if he
were allowed to maintain relationships with his father.
There being no law which compels the Court to act one way or the
other on this matter, the Court invokes the provision of Art. 8, PD
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
603 as amended, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare
Code, to wit:
In all questions regarding the care, custody, education and
property of the child, his welfare shall be the paramount
consideration.
WHEREFORE, the respondents Motion for Reconsideration has to
be, as it is hereby DENIED.[12]
Ma. Theresa elevated the case to the Court of Appeals,
assigning as error the ruling of the trial court granting visitation
rights to Gerardo. She likewise opposed the continued use of
Gerardos surname (Concepcion) despite the fact that Jose Gerardo
had already been declared illegitimate and should therefore use
her surname (Almonte). The appellate court denied the petition
and affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.[13]
On the issue raised by Ma. Theresa that there was nothing in
the law that granted a putative father visitation rights over his
illegitimate child, the appellate court affirmed the best interest of
the child policy invoked by the court a quo. It ruled that [a]t
bottom, it (was) the childs welfare and not the convenience of the
parents which (was) the primary consideration in granting
visitation rights a few hours once a week.[14]
The appellate court likewise held that an illegitimate child
cannot use the mothers surname motu proprio. The child,
represented by the mother, should file a separate proceeding for a
change of name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court to effect the
correction in the civil registry.[15]
Undaunted, Ma. Theresa moved for the reconsideration of the
adverse decision of the appellate court. She also filed a motion to
set the case for oral arguments so that she could better ventilate
the issues involved in the controversy.
After hearing the oral arguments of the respective counsels of
the parties, the appellate court resolved the motion for
reconsideration. It reversed its earlier ruling and held that Jose
Gerardo was not the son of Ma. Theresa by Gerardo but by Mario
during her first marriage:
It is, therefore, undeniable established by the evidence in this case
that the appellant [Ma. Theresa] was married to Mario Gopiao, and
that she had never entered into a lawful marriage with the
appellee [Gerardo] since the so-called marriage with the latter was
void ab initio. It was [Gerardo] himself who had established these
facts. In other words, [Ma. Theresa] was legitimately married to
Mario Gopiao when the child Jose Gerardo was born on December
8, 1990. Therefore, the child Jose Gerardo under the law is the
legitimate child of the legal and subsisting marriage between [Ma.
Theresa] and Mario Gopiao; he cannot be deemed to be the
illegitimate child of the void and non-existent marriage between
[Ma. Theresa] and [Gerardo], but is said by the law to be the child
of the legitimate and existing marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and
Mario Gopiao (Art. 164, Family Code). Consequently, [she] is right
in firmly saying that [Gerardo] can claim neither custody nor
visitorial rights over the child Jose Gerardo. Further, [Gerardo]
cannot impose his name upon the child. Not only is it without legal
basis (even supposing the child to be his illegitimate child [Art.
146, The Family Code]); it would tend to destroy the existing
marriage between [Ma. Theresa] and Gopiao, would prevent any
possible rapproachment between the married couple, and would
mean a judicial seal upon an illegitimate relationship. [16]
The appellate court brushed aside the common admission of
Gerardo and Ma. Theresa that Jose Gerardo was their son. It gave
little weight to Jose Gerardos birth certificate showing that he was
born a little less than a year after Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were
married:
We are not unaware of the movants argument that various
evidence exist that appellee and the appellant have judicially
admitted that the minor is their natural child. But, in the same
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
vein, We cannot overlook the fact that Article 167 of the Family
Code mandates:
The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced
as an adulteress. (underscoring ours)
Thus, implicit from the above provision is the fact that a minor
cannot be deprived of his/her legitimate status on the bare
declaration of the mother and/or even much less, the supposed
father. In fine, the law and only the law determines who are
the legitimate or illegitimate children for ones legitimacy or
illegitimacy cannot ever be compromised. Not even the birth
certificate of the minor can change his status for the information
contained therein are merely supplied by the mother and/or the
supposed father. It should be what the law says and not what
a parent says it is.[17] (Emphasis supplied)
Shocked and stunned, Gerardo moved for a reconsideration of
the above decision but the same was denied.[18] Hence, this appeal.
The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised.
Article 164 of the Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived
[19]
or born during the marriage of his parents is legitimate. [20]
As a guaranty in favor of the child[21] and to protect his status
of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides:
Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may have
been sentenced as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made
in favor of legitimacy.[22] We explained the rationale of this rule in
the recent case of Cabatania v. Court of Appeals[23]:
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow out of a
declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles of
natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. It is
grounded on the policy to protect the innocent offspring from the
odium of illegitimacy.
Gerardo invokes Article 166 (1)(b)[24] of the Family Code. He
cannot. He has no standing in law to dispute the status of Jose
Gerardo. Only Ma. Theresas husband Mario or, in a proper case,
[25]
his heirs, who can contest the legitimacy of the child Jose
Gerardo born to his wife. [26] Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a
strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his
heirs.[27] Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void
from the very beginning, he never became her husband and thus
never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of her child.
The presumption of legitimacy proceeds from the sexual union
in marriage, particularly during the period of conception. [28] To
overthrow this presumption on the basis of Article 166 (1)(b) of the
Family Code, it must be shown beyond reasonable doubt that there
was no access that could have enabled the husband to father the
child.[29] Sexual intercourse is to be presumed where personal
access is not disproved, unless such presumption is rebutted by
evidence to the contrary.[30]
The presumption is quasi-conclusive and may be refuted only
by the evidence of physical impossibility of coitus between
husband and wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days which
immediately preceded the birth of the child. [31]
To rebut the presumption, the separation between the spouses
must be such as to make marital intimacy impossible. [32] This may
take place, for instance, when they reside in different countries or
provinces and they were never together during the period of
conception.[33] Or, the husband was in prison during the period of
conception, unless it appears that sexual union took place through
the violation of prison regulations.[34]
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
Here, during the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were
living together in Fairview, Quezon City, Mario was living in Loyola
Heights which is also in Quezon City. Fairview and Loyola Heights
are only a scant four kilometers apart.
Not only did both Ma. Theresa and Mario reside in the same
city but also that no evidence at all was presented to disprove
personal access between them. Considering these circumstances,
the separation between Ma. Theresa and her lawful husband,
Mario, was certainly not such as to make it physically impossible
for them to engage in the marital act.
Sexual union between spouses is assumed. Evidence sufficient
to defeat the assumption should be presented by him who asserts
the contrary. There is no such evidence here. Thus, the
presumption of legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the issue of
the marriage between Ma. Theresa and Mario, stands.
Gerardo relies on Ma. Theresas statement in her answer [35] to
the petition for annulment of marriage[36] that she never lived with
Mario. He claims this was an admission that there was never any
sexual relation between her and Mario, an admission that was
binding on her.
Gerardos argument is without merit.
First, the import of Ma. Theresas statement is that Jose
Gerardo is not her legitimate son with Mario but her illegitimate
son with Gerardo. This declaration an avowal by the mother that
her child is illegitimate is the very declaration that is proscribed
by Article 167 of the Family Code.
The language of the law is unmistakable. An assertion by the
mother against the legitimacy of her child cannot affect the
legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid marriage.
Second, even assuming the truth of her statement, it does not
mean that there was never an instance where Ma. Theresa could
have been together with Mario or that there occurred absolutely no
intercourse between them. All she said was that she never lived
with Mario. She never claimed that nothing ever happened
between them.
Telling is the fact that both of them were living in Quezon City
during the time material to Jose Gerardos conception and birth. Far
from foreclosing the possibility of marital intimacy, their proximity
to each other only serves to reinforce such possibility. Thus, the
impossibility of physical access was never established beyond
reasonable doubt.
Third, to give credence to Ma. Theresas statement is to allow
her to arrogate unto herself a right exclusively lodged in the
husband, or in a proper case, his heirs. [37] A mother has no right to
disavow a child because maternity is never uncertain. [38] Hence,
Ma. Theresa is not permitted by law to question Jose Gerardos
legitimacy.
Finally, for reasons of public decency and morality, a married
woman cannot say that she had no intercourse with her husband
and that her offspring is illegitimate. [39] The proscription is in
consonance with the presumption in favor of family solidarity. It
also promotes the intention of the law to lean toward the
legitimacy of children.[40]
Gerardos insistence that the filiation of Jose Gerardo was
never an issue both in the trial court and in the appellate court
does not hold water. The fact that both Ma. Theresa and Gerardo
admitted and agreed that Jose Gerardo was born to them was
immaterial. That was, in effect, an agreement that the child was
illegitimate. If the Court were to validate that stipulation, then it
would be tantamount to allowing the mother to make a declaration
against the legitimacy of her child and consenting to the denial of
filiation of the child by persons other than her husband. These are
the very acts from which the law seeks to shield the child.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
Public policy demands that there be no compromise on the
status and filiation of a child.[41] Otherwise, the child will be at the
mercy of those who may be so minded to exploit his
defenselessness.
The reliance of Gerardo on Jose Gerardos birth certificate is
misplaced. It has no evidentiary value in this case because it was
not offered in evidence before the trial court. The rule is that the
court shall not consider any evidence which has not been formally
offered.[42]
Moreover, the law itself establishes the status of a child from
the moment of his birth.[43] Although a record of birth or birth
certificate may be used as primary evidence of the filiation of a
child,[44] as the status of a child is determined by the law itself,
proof of filiation is necessary only when the legitimacy of the child
is being questioned, or when the status of a child born after 300
days following the termination of marriage is sought to be
established.[45]
Here, the status of Jose Gerardo as a legitimate child was not
under attack as it could not be contested collaterally and, even
then, only by the husband or, in extraordinary cases, his heirs.
Hence, the presentation of proof of legitimacy in this case was
improper and uncalled for.
In addition, a record of birth is merely prima facie evidence of
the facts contained therein. [46] As prima facie evidence, the
statements in the record of birth may be rebutted by more
preponderant evidence. It is not conclusive evidence with respect
to the truthfulness of the statements made therein by the
interested parties.[47] Between the certificate of birth which is prima
facie evidence of Jose Gerardos illegitimacy and the quasi-
conclusive presumption of law (rebuttable only by proof beyond
reasonable doubt) of his legitimacy, the latter shall prevail. Not
only does it bear more weight, it is also more conducive to the best
interests of the child and in consonance with the purpose of the
law.
It perplexes us why both Gerardo and Ma. Theresa would
doggedly press for Jose Gerardos illegitimacy while claiming that
they both had the childs interests at heart. The law, reason and
common sense dictate that a legitimate status is more favorable to
the child. In the eyes of the law, the legitimate child enjoys a
preferred and superior status. He is entitled to bear the surnames
of both his father and mother, full support and full inheritance.
[48]
On the other hand, an illegitimate child is bound to use the
surname and be under the parental authority only of his mother.
He can claim support only from a more limited group and his
legitime is only half of that of his legitimate counterpart.
[49]
Moreover (without unwittingly exacerbating the discrimination
against him), in the eyes of society, a bastard is usually regarded
as bearing a stigma or mark of dishonor. Needless to state, the
legitimacy presumptively vested by law upon Jose Gerardo favors
his interest.
It is unfortunate that Jose Gerardo was used as a pawn in the
bitter squabble between the very persons who were passionately
declaring their concern for him. The paradox was that he was made
to suffer supposedly for his own sake. This madness should end.
This case has been pending for a very long time already. What
is specially tragic is that an innocent child is involved. Jose Gerardo
was barely a year old when these proceedings began. He is now
almost fifteen and all this time he has been a victim of incessant
bickering. The law now comes to his aid to write finis to the
controversy which has unfairly hounded him since his infancy.
Having only his best interests in mind, we uphold the
presumption of his legitimacy.
As a legitimate child, Jose Gerardo shall have the right to bear
the surnames of his father Mario and mother Ma. Theresa, in
conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on surnames. [50] A
persons surname or family name identifies the family to which he
belongs and is passed on from parent to child. [51] Hence, Gerardo
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
cannot impose his surname on Jose Gerardo who is, in the eyes of
the law, not related to him in any way.
The matter of changing Jose Gerardos name and effecting the
corrections of the entries in the civil register regarding his paternity
and filiation should be threshed out in a separate proceeding.
In case of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage, Article 49 of the Family Code grants visitation rights to a
parent who is deprived of custody of his children. Such visitation
rights flow from the natural right of both parent and child to each
others company. There being no such parent-child relationship
between them, Gerardo has no legally demandable right to visit
Jose Gerardo.
Our laws seek to promote the welfare of the child. Article 8 of
PD 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, is
clear and unequivocal:
Article 8. Childs Welfare Paramount. In all questions regarding the
care, custody, education and property of the child, his welfare shall
be the paramount consideration.
Article 3 (1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of
a Child of which the Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken
by public or private social welfare institutions, courts
of law, administrative authorities or legislative
bodies, the best interests of the child shall be a
primary consideration.
The State as parens patriae affords special protection to
children from abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial
to their development. It is mandated to provide protection to those
of tender years.[52] Through its laws, the State safeguards them
from every one, even their own parents, to the end that their
eventual development as responsible citizens and members of
society shall not be impeded, distracted or impaired by family
acrimony. This is especially significant where, as in this case, the
issue concerns their filiation as it strikes at their very identity and
lineage. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
September 14, 1995 and January 10, 1996 resolutions of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 40651 are hereby AFFIRMED.Costs
against petitioner.SO ORDERED.
ESTATE OF ROGELIO G. ONG,
Petitioner, G.R. No. 17171
- versus -
Minor JOANNE RODJIN DIAZ,
Represented by Her Mother and
Guardian, JINKY C. DIAZ,
Respondent.
This is a petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure assailing (1) the Decision [1] of
the Court of Appeals dated 23 November 2005 and (2) the
Resolution[2] of the same court dated 1 March 2006denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in CA-G.R. CV No. 70125.
A Complaint[3] for compulsory recognition with prayer for
support pending litigation was filed by minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz
(Joanne), represented by her mother and guardian, Jinky C. Diaz
(Jinky), against Rogelio G. Ong (Rogelio) before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Tarlac City. In her Complaint, Jinky prayed that
judgment be rendered:
(a) Ordering defendant to recognize plaintiff Joanne
Rodjin Diaz as his daughter.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
(b) Ordering defendant to give plaintiff monthly
support of P20,000.00 pendente lite and thereafter
to fix monthly support.
(c) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff
attorneys fees in the sum of P100,000.00.
(d) Granting plaintiff such other measure of relief
as maybe just and equitable in the premises.[4]
As alleged by Jinky in her Complaint in November 1993 in Tarlac
City, she and Rogelio got acquainted. This developed into
friendship and later blossomed into love. At this time, Jinky was
already married to a Japanese national, Hasegawa Katsuo, in a civil
wedding solemnized on 19 February 1993 by Municipal Trial Court
Judge Panfilo V. Valdez.[5]
From January 1994 to September 1998, Jinky and Rogelio cohabited
and lived together at Fairlane Subdivision, and later
at Capitol Garden, Tarlac City.
From this live-in relationship, minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz was
conceived and on 25 February 1998 was born at the Central Luzon
Doctors Hospital, Tarlac City.
Rogelio brought Jinky to the hospital and took minor Joanne and
Jinky home after delivery. Rogelio paid all the hospital bills and the
baptismal expenses and provided for all of minor Joannes needs
recognizing the child as his.
In September 1998, Rogelio abandoned minor Joanne and Jinky,
and stopped supporting minor Joanne, falsely alleging that he is
not the father of the child.
Rogelio, despite Jinkys remonstrance, failed and refused and
continued failing and refusing to give support for the child and to
acknowledge her as his daughter, thus leading to the filing of the
heretofore adverted complaint.
After summons had been duly served upon Rogelio, the latter failed
to file any responsive pleading despite repeated motions for
extension, prompting the trial court to declare him in default in its
Order dated 7 April 1999. Rogelios Answer with Counterclaim and
Special and Affirmative Defenses was received by the trial court
only on 15 April 1999. Jinky was allowed to present her
evidence ex parte on the basis of which the trial court on 23 April
1999 rendered a decision granting the reliefs prayed for in the
complaint.
In its Decision[6] dated 23 April 1999, the RTC held:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Ordering defendant to recognize plaintiff as his
natural child;
2. Ordering defendant to provide plaintiff with a
monthly support of P10,000.00 and further
3. Ordering defendant to pay reasonable attorneys
fees in the amount of P5,000.00 and the cost of the
suit.
On 28 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion to lift the order of default
and a motion for reconsideration seeking the courts understanding,
as he was then in a quandary on what to do to find a solution to a
very difficult problem of his life.[7]
On 29 April 1999, Rogelio filed a motion for new trial with prayer
that the decision of the trial court dated 23 April 1999 be vacated
and the case be considered for trial de novo pursuant to the
provisions of Section 6, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.[8]
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
On 16 June 1999, the RTC issued an Order granting Rogelios Motion
for New Trial:
WHEREFORE, finding defendants motion for new
trial to be impressed with merit, the same is
hereby granted.
The Order of this court declaring defendant in
default and the decision is this court dated April
23, 1999 are hereby set aside but the evidence
adduced shall remain in record, subject to cross-
examination by defendant at the appropriate stage
of the proceedings.
In the meantime defendants answer is hereby
admitted, subject to the right of plaintiff to file a
reply and/or answer to defendants counterclaim
within the period fixed by the Rules of Court.
Acting on plaintiffs application for support
pendente lite which this court finds to be
warranted, defendant is hereby ordered to pay to
plaintiff immediately the sum of P2,000.00 a month
from January 15, 1999 to May 1999 as support
pendente lite in arrears and the amount
ofP4,000.00 every month thereafter as regular
support pendente lite during the pendency of this
case.[9]
The RTC finally held:
The only issue to be resolved is whether or not the
defendant is the father of the plaintiff Joanne
Rodjin Diaz.
Since it was duly established that plaintiffs mother
Jinky Diaz was married at the time of the birth of
Joanne Rodjin Diaz, the law presumes that Joanne
is a legitimate child of the spouses Hasegawa
Katsuo and Jinky Diaz (Article 164, Family
Code). The child is still presumed legitimate even if
the mother may have declared against her
legitimacy (Article 167, Ibid).
The legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on
the following grounds provided for in Article 166 of
the same Code. Paragraph 1 of the said Article
provides that there must be physical impossibility
for the husband to have sexual intercourse with the
wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days
following the birth of the child because of
a) physical incapacity of the
husband to have sexual
intercourse with his wife;
b) husband and wife were living
separately in such a way
that sexual intercourse was
not possible;
c) serious illness of the husband
which prevented sexual
intercourse.
It was established by evidence that the husband is
a Japanese national and that he was living outside
of the country (TSN, Aug. 27, 1999, page 5) and he
comes home only once a year. Both evidence of
the parties proved that the husband was outside
the country and no evidence was shown that he
ever arrived in the country in the year 1997
preceding the birth of plaintiff Joanne Rodjin Diaz.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
While it may also be argued that plaintiff Jinky had
a relationship with another man before she met the
defendant, there is no evidence that she also had
sexual relations with other men on or about the
conception of Joanne Rodjin. Joanne Rodjin was her
second child (see Exh. A), so her first child, a
certain Nicole (according to defendant) must have
a different father or may be the son of Hasegawa
K[u]tsuo.
The defendant admitted having been the one who
shouldered the hospital bills representing the
expenses in connection with the birth of plaintiff. It
is an evidence of admission that he is the real
father of plaintiff. Defendant also admitted that
even when he stopped going out with Jinky, he and
Jinky used to go to motels even after
1996. Defendant also admitted that on some
instances, he still used to see Jinky after the birth
of Joanne Rodjin. Defendant was even the one who
fetched Jinky after she gave birth to Joanne.
On the strength of this evidence, the Court finds
that Joanne Rodjin is the child of Jinky and
defendant Rogelio Ong and it is but just that the
latter should support plaintiff.[10]
On 15 December 2000, the RTC rendered a decision and disposed:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring Joanne Rodjin Diaz to be the illegitimate
child of defendant Rogelio Ong with plaintiff Jinky
Diaz. The Order of this Court awarding support
pendente lite dated June 15, 1999, is hereby
affirmed and that the support should continue until
Joanne Rodjin Diaz shall have reached majority
age.[11]
Rogelio filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied for
lack of merit in an Order of the trial court dated 19 January 2001.
[12]
From the denial of his Motion for Reconsideration, Rogelio
appealed to the Court of Appeals. After all the responsive pleadings
had been filed, the case was submitted for decision and ordered re-
raffled to another Justice for study and report as early as 12 July
2002.[13]
During the pendency of the case with the Court of Appeals,
Rogelios counsel filed a manifestation informing the Court that
Rogelio died on 21 February 2005; hence, a Notice of Substitution
was filed by said counsel praying that Rogelio be substituted in the
case by the Estate of Rogelio Ong, [14] which motion was accordingly
granted by the Court of Appeals.[15]
In a Decision dated 23 November 2005, the Court of Appeals held:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present
appeal is hereby GRANTED. The appealed Decision
dated December 15, 2000 of the Regional Trial
Court of Tarlac, Tarlac, Branch 63 in Civil Case No.
8799 is hereby SET ASIDE. The case is hereby
REMANDED to the courta quo for the issuance of an
order directing the parties to make arrangements
for DNA analysis for the purpose of determining the
paternity of plaintiff minor Joanne Rodjin Diaz, upon
consultation and in coordination with laboratories
and experts on the field of DNA analysis.
No pronouncement as to costs.[16]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by
the Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated 1 March 2006.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
In disposing as it did, the Court of Appeals justified its Decision as
follows:
In this case, records showed that the late
defendant-appellant Rogelio G. Ong, in the early
stage of the proceedings volunteered and
suggested that he and plaintiffs mother submit
themselves to a DNA or blood testing to settle the
issue of paternity, as a sign of good faith.However,
the trial court did not consider resorting to this
modern scientific procedure notwithstanding the
repeated denials of defendant that he is the
biological father of the plaintiff even as he
admitted having actual sexual relations with
plaintiffs mother. We believe that DNA paternity
testing, as current jurisprudence affirms, would be
the most reliable and effective method of settling
the present paternity dispute. Considering,
however, the untimely demise of defendant-
appellant during the pendency of this appeal, the
trial court, in consultation with out laboratories and
experts on the field of DNA analysis, can possibly
avail of such procedure with whatever remaining
DNA samples from the deceased defendant alleged
to be the putative father of plaintiff minor whose
illegitimate filiations is the subject of this action for
support.[17]
Hence, this petition which raises the following issues for resolution:
I definitive result of the DNA testing will decisively lay to rest the
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT DID NOT DISMISS RESPONDENTS
COMPLAINT FOR COMPULSORY RECOGNITION
DESPITE ITS FINDING THAT THE EVIDENCE
PRESENTED FAILED TO PROVE THAT ROGELIO G.
ONG WAS HER FATHER.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT DID NOT DECLARE RESPONDENT AS THE
LEGITIMATE CHILD OF JINKY C. DIAZ AND HER
JAPANESE HUSBAND, CONSIDERING THAT
RESPONDENT FAILED TO REBUT THE PRESUMPTION
OF HER LEGITIMACY.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
WHEN IT REMANDED THE CASE TO THE COURT A
QUO FOR DNA ANALYSIS DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT
IS NO LONGER FEASIBLE DUE TO THE DEATH OF
ROGELIO G. ONG.[18]
Petitioner prays that the present petition be given due course and
the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated November 23, 2005 be
modified, by setting aside the judgment remanding the case to the
trial court for DNA testing analysis, by dismissing the complaint of
minor Joanne for compulsory recognition, and by declaring the
minor as the legitimate child of Jinky and Hasegawa Katsuo. [19]
From among the issues presented for our disposition, this Court
finds it prudent to concentrate its attention on the third one, the
propriety of the appellate courts decision remanding the case to
the trial court for the conduct of DNA testing. Considering that a
issue of the filiation of minor Joanne, we see no reason to resolve
the first two issues raised by the petitioner as they will be rendered
moot by the result of the DNA testing.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
As a whole, the present petition calls for the determination of
filiation of minor Joanne for purposes of support in favor of the said
minor.
Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate
paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with paternity,
such as citizenship, support (as in the present case), or
inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is on the person who
alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the
child. There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional
paternity action which parties have to face: a prima facie case,
affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical
resemblance between the putative father and child.[20]
A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is
presumed legitimate.[21] As a guaranty in favor of the child and to
protect his status of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code
provides:
Article 167. The children shall be considered
legitimate although the mother may have declared
against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced
as an adulteress.
The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in
favor of legitimacy. We explained the rationale of this rule in the
recent case of Cabatania v. Court of Appeals[22]:
The presumption of legitimacy does not only flow
out of a declaration in the statute but is based on
the broad principles of natural justice and the
supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption
is grounded on the policy to protect the innocent
offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.
The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not
conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to
the contrary. Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Code[23] provides:
Article 255. Children born after one hundred and
eighty days following the celebration of the
marriage, and before three hundred days following
its dissolution or the separation of the spouses
shall be presumed to be legitimate.
Against this presumption no evidence shall be
admitted other than that of the physical
impossibility of the husbands having access to his
wife within the first one hundred and twenty days
of the three hundred which preceded the birth of
the child.
This physical impossibility may be caused:
1) By the impotence of the husband;
2) By the fact that husband and wife were living
separately in such a way that access was not
possible;
3) By the serious illness of the husband.[24]
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil
register or a final judgment; or
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the
legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court
and special laws.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same evidence as legitimate children.
There had been divergent and incongruent statements and
assertions bandied about by the parties to the present petition. But
with the advancement in the field of genetics, and the availability
of new technology, it can now be determined with reasonable
certainty whether Rogelio is the biological father of the minor,
through DNA testing.
DNA is the fundamental building block of a persons entire
genetic make-up. DNA is found in all human cells and is the same
in every cell of the same person. Genetic identity is unique. Hence,
a persons DNA profile can determine his identity.[25]
DNA analysis is a procedure in which DNA extracted from a
biological sample obtained from an individual is examined. The
DNA is processed to generate a pattern, or a DNA profile, for the
individual from whom the sample is taken. This DNA profile is
unique for each person, except for identical twins.
Everyone is born with a distinct genetic blueprint
called DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). It is exclusive
to an individual (except in the rare occurrence of
identical twins that share a single, fertilized egg),
and DNA is unchanging throughout life. Being a
component of every cell in the human body, the
DNA of an individuals blood is the very DNA in his
or her skin cells, hair follicles, muscles, semen,
samples from buccal swabs, saliva, or other body
parts.
The chemical structure of DNA has four
bases. They are known as A (Adenine), G
(guanine), C (cystosine) and T (thymine). The order
in which the four bases appear in an individuals
DNA determines his or her physical make up. And
since DNA is a double stranded molecule, it is
composed of two specific paired bases, A-T or T-A
and G-C or C-G. These are called genes.
Every gene has a certain number of the above
base pairs distributed in a particular
sequence. This gives a person his or her genetic
code. Somewhere in the DNA framework,
nonetheless, are sections that differ. They are
known as polymorphic loci, which are the areas
analyzed in DNA typing (profiling, tests,
fingerprinting). In other words, DNA typing simply
means determining the polymorphic loci.
How is DNA typing performed? From a DNA sample
obtained or extracted, a molecular biologist may
proceed to analyze it in several ways. There are
five (5) techniques to conduct DNA typing. They
are: the RFLP (restriction fragment length
polymorphism); reverse dot blot or HLA DQ a/Pm
loci which was used in 287 cases that were
admitted as evidence by 37 courts in the U.S. as of
November 1994; DNA process; VNTR (variable
number tandem repeats); and the most recent
which is known as the PCR-([polymerase] chain
reaction) based STR (short tandem repeats)
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
method which, as of 1996, was availed of by most
forensic laboratories in the world. PCR is the
process of replicating or copying DNA in an
evidence sample a million times through repeated
cycling of a reaction involving the so-called DNA
polymerize enzyme. STR, on the other hand, takes
measurements in 13 separate places and can
match two (2) samples with a reported theoretical
error rate of less than one (1) in a trillion.
Just like in fingerprint analysis, in DNA
typing, matches are determined. To illustrate, when
DNA or fingerprint tests are done to identify a
suspect in a criminal case, the evidence collected
from the crime scene is compared with
the known print. If a substantial amount of the
identifying features are the same, the DNA or
fingerprint is deemed to be a match. But then,
even if only one feature of the DNA or fingerprint is
different, it is deemed not to have come from the
suspect.
As earlier stated, certain regions of human DNA
show variations between people. In each of these
regions, a person possesses two genetic types
called allele, one inherited from each parent. In [a]
paternity test, the forensic scientist looks at a
number of these variable regions in an individual to
produce a DNA profile. Comparing next the DNA
profiles of the mother and child, it is possible to
determine which half of the childs DNA was
inherited from the mother. The other half must
have been inherited from the biological father. The
alleged fathers profile is then examined to
ascertain whether he has the DNA types in his
profile, which match the paternal types in the
child. If the mans DNA types do not match that of
the child, the man is excluded as the father. If the
DNA types match, then he is not excluded as the
father.[26]
In the newly promulgated rules on DNA evidence it is provided:
SEC. 3 Definition of Terms. For purposes of this
Rule, the following terms shall be defined as
follows:
xxxx
(c) DNA evidence constitutes the totality of the
DNA profiles, results and other genetic
information directly generated from DNA
testing of biological samples;
(d) DNA profile means genetic information derived
from DNA testing of a biological sample
obtained from a person, which biological
sample is clearly identifiable as originating
from that person;
(e) DNA testing means verified and credible
scientific methods which include the
extraction of DNA from biological samples,
the generation of DNA profiles and the
comparison of the information obtained
from the DNA testing of biological samples
for the purpose of determining, with
reasonable certainty, whether or not the
DNA obtained from two or more distinct
biological samples originates from the
same person (direct identification) or if the
biological samples originate from related
persons (kinship analysis); and
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
(f) Probability of Parentage means the numerical
estimate for the likelihood of parentage of
a putative parent compared with the
probability of a random match of two
unrelated individuals in a given population.
Amidst the protestation of petitioner against the DNA analysis, the
resolution thereof may provide the definitive key to the resolution
of the issue of support for minor Joanne. Our articulation in Agustin
v. Court of Appeals[27] is particularly relevant, thus:
Our faith in DNA testing, however, was not quite so
steadfast in the previous decade. In Pe Lim v. Court
of Appeals (336 Phil. 741, 270 SCRA
1), promulgated in 1997, we cautioned against the
use of DNA because DNA, being a relatively new
science, (had) not as yet been accorded official
recognition by our courts. Paternity (would) still
have to be resolved by such conventional evidence
as the relevant incriminating acts,verbal and
written, by the putative father.
In 2001, however, we opened the possibility of
admitting DNA as evidence of parentage, as
enunciated in Tijing v. Court of Appeals [G.R. No.
125901, 8 March 2001, 354 SCRA 17]:
x x x Parentage will still be
resolved using conventional
methods unless we adopt the
modern and scientific ways
available. Fortunately, we have
now the facility and expertise in
using DNA test for identification
and parentage testing. The
University of the Philippines Natural
Science Research Institute (UP-
NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has
now the capability to conduct DNA
typing using short tandem repeat
(STR) analysis. The analysis is
based on the fact that the DNA of a
child/person has two (2) copies,
one copy from the mother and the
other from the father. The DNA
from the mother, the alleged father
and child are analyzed to establish
parentage. Of course, being a novel
scientific technique, the use of DNA
test as evidence is still open to
challenge. Eventually, as the
appropriate case comes, courts
should not hesitate to rule on the
admissibility of DNA evidence. For
it was said, that courts should
apply the results of science when
competently obtained in aid of
situations presented, since to reject
said results is to deny progress.
The first real breakthrough of DNA as
admissible and authoritative evidence in Philippine
jurisprudence came in 2002 with out en
banc decision in People v. Vallejo [G.R. No. 144656,
9 May 2002, 382 SCRA 192] where the rape and
murder victims DNA samples from the bloodstained
clothes of the accused were admitted in
evidence. We reasoned that the purpose of DNA
testing (was) to ascertain whether an association
exist(ed) between the evidence sample and the
reference sample. The samples collected (were)
subjected to various chemical processes to
establish their profile.
A year later, in People v. Janson [G.R. No.
125938, 4 April 2003, 400 SCRA 584], we acquitted
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
the accused charged with rape for lack of evidence
because doubts persist(ed) in our mind as to who
(were) the real malefactors. Yes, a complex offense
(had) been perpetrated but who (were) the
perpetrators? How we wish we had DNA or other
scientific evidence to still our doubts.
In 2004, in Tecson, et al. v. COMELEC [G.R.
Nos. 161434, 161634 and 161824, 3 March 2004,
424 SCRA 277], where the Court en banc was faced
with the issue of filiation of then presidential
candidate Fernando Poe, Jr., we stated:
In case proof of filiation or
paternity would be unlikely to
satisfactorily establish or would be
difficult to obtain, DNA testing,
which examines genetic codes
obtained from body cells of the
illegitimate child and any physical
residue of the long dead parent
could be resorted to. A positive
match would clear up filiation or
paternity. In Tijing v. Court of
Appeals, this Court has
acknowledged the strong weight of
DNA testing...
Moreover, in our en
banc decision in People v.
Yatar [G.R. No. 150224, 19 May
2004, 428 SCRA 504], we affirmed
the conviction of the accused for
rape with homicide, the principal
evidence for which included DNA
test results. x x x.
Coming now to the issue of remand of the case to the trial court,
petitioner questions the appropriateness of the order by the Court
of Appeals directing the remand of the case to the RTC for DNA
testing given that petitioner has already died. Petitioner argues
that a remand of the case to the RTC for DNA analysis is no longer
feasible due to the death of Rogelio. To our mind, the alleged
impossibility of complying with the order of remand for purposes of
DNA testing is more ostensible than real.Petitioners argument is
without basis especially as the New Rules on DNA
Evidence[28] allows the conduct of DNA testing, either motu
proprio or upon application of any person who has a legal interest
in the matter in litigation, thus:
SEC. 4. Application for DNA Testing Order. The appropriate
court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on
application of any person who has a legal interest
in the matter in litigation, order a DNA
testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing
and notice to the parties upon a showing of the
following:
(a) A biological sample exists that is relevant to the
case;
(b) The biological sample: (i) was not previously
subjected to the type of DNA testing now
requested; or (ii) was previously subjected
to DNA testing, but the results may require
confirmation for good reasons;
(c) The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid
technique;
(d) The DNA testing has the scientific potential to
produce new information that is relevant to
the proper resolution of the case; and
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
(e) The existence of other factors, if any, which the
court may consider as potentially affecting
the accuracy or integrity of the DNA
testing.
From the foregoing, it can be said that the death of the petitioner
does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as
long as there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA.
As defined above, the term biological sample means any
organic material originating from a persons body, even if found in
inanimate objects, that is susceptible to DNA testing. This includes
blood, saliva, and other body fluids, tissues, hairs and bones. [29]
Thus, even if Rogelio already died, any of the biological
samples as enumerated above as may be available, may be used
for DNA testing. In this case, petitioner has not shown the
impossibility of obtaining an appropriate biological sample that can
be utilized for the conduct of DNA testing.
And even the death of Rogelio cannot bar the conduct of DNA
testing. In People v. Umanito,[30] citing Tecson v. Commission on
Elections,[31] this Court held:
The 2004 case of Tecson v. Commission on
Elections [G.R. No. 161434, 3 March 2004, 424
SCRA 277] likewise reiterated the acceptance of
DNA testing in our jurisdiction in this wise: [i]n case
proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to
satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to
obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes
obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child
and any physical residue of the long dead
parent could be resorted to.
It is obvious to the Court that the determination of
whether appellant is the father of AAAs child,
which may be accomplished through DNA testing,
is material to the fair and correct adjudication of
the instant appeal. Under Section 4 of the Rules,
the courts are authorized, after due hearing and
notice, motu proprio to order a DNA
testing. However, while this Court retains
jurisdiction over the case at bar, capacitated as it is
to receive and act on the matter in controversy,
the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and does
not, in the course of daily routine, conduct
hearings. Hence, it would be more appropriate that
the case be remanded to the RTC for reception of
evidence in appropriate hearings, with due notice
to the parties. (Emphasis supplied.)
As we have declared in the said case of Agustin v. Court of
Appeals[32]:
x x x [F]or too long, illegitimate children
have been marginalized by fathers who choose to
deny their existence. The growing sophistication of
DNA testing technology finally provides a much
needed equalizer for such ostracized and
abandoned progeny. We have long believed in the
merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly
expressed as much in the past. This case comes at
a perfect time when DNA testing has finally
evolved into a dependable and authoritative form
of evidence gathering. We therefore take this
opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that
DNA testing is a valid means of determining
paternity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 November 2005 and its
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

Resolution dated 1 March 2006 are AFFIRMED. Costs against

petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
G.R. No. 108366 February 16, 1994
JOHN PAUL E. FERNANDEZ, ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and CARLITO S.
FERNANDEZ, respondents.
The legal dispute between the parties began when the petitioners filed
Civil Case No. Q-45567 for support against the private respondent
before the RTC of Quezon City. The complaint was dismissed on
December 9, 1986 by Judge Antonio P. Solano, 1 who found that
"(t)here is nothing in the material allegations in the complaint that
seeks to compel (private respondent) to recognize or acknowledge
(petitioners) as his illegitimate children," and that there was no
sufficient and competent evidence to prove the petitioners filiation. 2
Petitioners plodded on. On February 19, 1987, they file the case at
bench, another action for recognition and support against the private
respondent before another branch of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch
87. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-50111.
The evidence shows that VIOLETA P. ESGUERRA, single, is the mother
and guardian ad litem of the two petitioners, CLARO ANTONIO
FERNANDEZ and JOHN PAUL FERNANDEZ, met sometime in 1983, at
the Meralco Compound tennis courts. A Meralco employee and a tennis
enthusiast, Carlito used to spend his week-ends regularly at said
courts, where Violeta's father served as tennis instructor.
Violeta pointed to Carlito as the father of her two sons. She claimed
that they started their illicit sexual relationship six (6) months after
their first meeting. The tryst resulted in the birth of petitioner Claro
Antonio on March 1, 1984, and of petitioner John Paul on not know that
Carlito was married until the birth of her two children. She averred they
were married in civil rites in October, 1983. In March, 1985, however,
she discovered that the marriage license which they used was
spurious.
To bolster their case, petitioners presented the following documentary
evidence: their certificates of live birth, identifying respondent Carlito
as their father; the baptismal certificate of petitioner Claro which also
states that his father is respondent Carlito; photographs of Carlito
taken during the baptism of petitioner Claro; and pictures of
respondent Carlito and Claro taken at the home of Violeta Esguerra.
Petitioners likewise presented as witnesses, Rosario Cantoria, 3 Dr.
Milagros Villanueva, 4 Ruby Chua Cu, 5 and Fr. Liberato Fernandez. 6 The
first three witnesses told the trial court that Violeta Esguerra had, at
different times, 7 introduced the private respondent to them as her
"husband". Fr. Fernandez, on the other hand, testified that Carlito was
the one who presented himself as the father of petitioner Claro during
the latter's baptism.
In defense, respondent Carlito denied Violeta's allegations that he sired
the two petitioners. He averred he only served as one of the sponsors
in the baptism of petitioner Claro. This claim was corroborated by the
testimony of Rodante Pagtakhan, an officemate of respondent Carlito
who also stood as a sponsor of petitioner Claro during his baptism. The
Private respondent also presented as witness, Fidel Arcagua, a waiter
of the Lighthouse Restaurant. He disputed Violeta's allegation that she
and respondent Carlito frequented the said restaurant during their
affair. Arcagua stated he never saw Violeta Esguerra and respondent
Carlito together at the said restaurant. Private respondent also
declared he only learned he was named in the birth certificates of both
petitioners as their father after he was sued for support in Civil Case
No.
Q-45567.
Based on the evidence adduced by the parties, the trial court ruled in
favor of petitioners, viz.:
In view of the above, the Court concludes and so holds
that the plaintiffs minors (petitioners herein) are
entitled to the relief's prayed for in the complaint. The
defendant (herein private respondent) is hereby
ordered to recognize Claro Antonio Carlito Fernandez,
now aged 6, and John Paul Fernandez, now aged 41/2
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
as his sons. As the defendant has admitted that he
has a supervisory job at the Meralco, he shall give the
plaintiffs support in the amount of P2,000 each a
month, payment to be delivered to Violeta Esguerra,
the children's mother and natural guardian, with
arrears reckoned as of the filing of the complaint on
February 19, 1987.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the decision was set aside and petitioners complaint
dismissed by the respondent Court of Appeals 8in its impugned
decision, dated October 20, 1992. It found that the "proof relied upon
by the (trial) court (is) inadequate to prove the (private respondent's)
paternity and filiation of (petitioners)." It further held that the doctrine
of res judicata applied because of the dismissal of the petitioners
complaint in Civil Case No. Q-45567. Petitioners' motion for
reconsideration was denied on December 22, 1992.
Petitioners now contend that the respondent appellate court erred in:
(1) not giving full faith and credit to the testimony in of Violeta
Esguerra; (2) not giving weight and value to the testimony of Father
Liberato Fernandez; (3) not giving probative value to the numerous
pictures of respondent Carlito Fernandez taken during the baptismal
ceremony and inside the bedroom of Violeta Esguerra; (4) not giving
probative value to the birth certificates of petitioners; (5) giving so
much credence to the self-serving and incredible testimony of
respondent Carlito Fernandez; and (6) holding that the principle of res
judicata is applicable in the case at bar.
We find no merit in the petition.
The rule is well-settled that findings of facts of the Court of Appeals
may be reviewed by this court only under exceptional circumstances.
One such situation is when the findings of the appellate court clash
with those of the trial court as in the case at bench. It behooves us
therefore to exercise our extraordinary power, and settle the issue of
whether the ruling of the appellate court that private respondent is not
the father of the petitioners is substantiated by the evidence on record.
We shall first examine the documentary evidence offered by the
petitioners which the respondent court rejected as insufficient to prove
their filiation. Firstly, we hold that petitioners cannot rely on the
photographs showing the presence of the private respondent in the
baptism of petitioner Claro (Exh. "B-8", Exh. "B-12", Exh. "H" and Exh.
"I"). These photographs are far from proofs that private respondent is
the father of petitioner Claro. As explained by the private respondent,
he was in the baptism as one of the sponsors of petitioner Claro. His
testimony was corroborated by Rodante Pagtakhan.
Secondly, the pictures taken in the house of Violeta showing private
respondent showering affection to Claro fall short of the evidence
required to prove paternity (Exhibits "B", "B-1", "B-2", "B-7", "B-14" and
"B-15"). As we held in Tan vs. Trocio, 192 SCRA 764, viz:
. . . The testimonies of complainant and witness
Marilou Pangandaman, another maid, to show unusual
closeness between Respondent and Jewel, like playing
with him and giving him paternity. The same must be
said of . . . (the) pictures of Jewels and Respondent
showing allegedly their physical likeness to each
other. Said evidence is inconclusive to prove paternity
and much less would prove violation of complaint's
person and honor. (Emphasis supplied)
Thirdly, the baptismal certificates (Exh. "D") of petitioner Claro naming
private respondent as his father has scant evidentiary value. There is
no showing that private respondent participated in its preparation. On
this score, we held in Berciles vs. Systems, et al. 128 SCRA 53 (1984):
As to the baptismal certificates, Exh. "7-A", the rule is
that although the baptismal record of a natural child
describes her as a child of the record the decedent
had no intervening, the baptismal record cannot be
held to be a voluntary recognition of parentage. . . .
The reason for this rule that canonical records do not
constitute the authentic document prescribed by Arts.
115 and 117 to prove the legitimate filiation of a child
is that such canonical record is simply proof of the
only act to which the priest may certify by reason of
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

his personal knowledge, an act done by himself or in We have also reviewed the relevant testimonies of the witnesses for
his presence, like the administration of the sacrament the petitioners and we are satisfied that the respondent appellate court
upon a day stated; it is no proof of the declarations in properly calibrated their weight. Petitioners capitalize on the testimony
the record with respect to the parentage of the child of Father Liberato Fernandez who solemnized the baptismal ceremony
baptized, or of prior and distinct facts which require of petitioner Claro. He declared on the witness stand:
separate and concrete evidence.
Q Do you recall Father, whether on
In Macandang vs. Court of Appeals, 100 SCRA 73 (1980), we also ruled that occasion when you called for the
that while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents, father and the mother of the child,
they can only serve as evidence of the administration of the that both father and mother were
sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not necessarily present?
competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect to
the child's paternity. A Yes.

Fourth, the certificates of live birth (Exh. "A"; Exh. "B") of the Q Would you able to recognized the
petitioners identifying private respondent as their father are not also father and the mother who were
competent evidence on the issue of their paternity. Again, the records present at that time?
do no show that private respondent had a hand in the preparation of
said certificates. In rejecting these certificates, the ruling of the
A Yes.
respondent court is in accord with our pronouncement in Roces vs.
Local Civil Registrar, 102 Phil. 1050 (1958),viz:
Q Please point to the court?

. . . Section 5 of Act No. 3793 and Article 280 of the

Civil Code of the Philippines explicity prohibited, not A There (witness pointing to the
only the naming of the father or the child born outside defendant, Carlito Fernandez).
wedlock, when the birth certificates, or the
recognition, is not filed or made by him, but, also, the Q For instance, just give us more
statement of any information or circumstances by specifically what question do you
which he could be identified. Accordingly, the Local remember having asked him?
Civil Registrar had no authority to make or record the
paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information A Yes, like for example, do you
of a third person and the certificate of birth of an renounce Satan and his works?
illegitimate child, when signed only by the mother of
the latter, is incompetent evidence of fathership of
Q What was the answer of
said child. (Emphasis supplied)
Fernandez?

We reiterated this rule in Berciles, op. cit., when we held that "a birth
A Yes, I do.
certificate no signed by the alleged father therein indicated is not
competent evidence of paternity."

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
Q I just want to be sure, Father, will
you please look at the defendant
again. I want to be sure if he is the
person who appeared before you on
that occasion?
A I am sure.
(TSN, May 23, 1986, pp. 14-16)
However, on cross examination, Father Fernandez admitted that he has
to be shown a picture of the private respondent by Violeta Esguerra to
recognize the private respondent, viz:
Q When was the, approximately,
when you were first shown this
picture by Violeta Esguerra?
A I cannot recall.
Q At least the month and the year?
A It must be in 1986.
Q What month in 1986.
A It is difficult. . .
Q When was the first time you know
you are going to testify here?
A Let us see, you came there two
times and first one was you want to
get a baptismal certificate and then
the second time was I asked you for
what is this? And you said it is for the
court.
Q On the second time that Ms.
Violeta Esguerra went to your place,
you were already informed that you
will testify here before this Honorable
Court?
A Yes.
Q And you were informed by this Ms.
Violeta Esguerra that this man
wearing the blue T-shirt is the father?
A Yes, sir.
Q So, it was Violeta Esguerra who. . .
A Yes.
(TSN, May 23, 1986, pp. 18 to 22)
Indeed, there is no proof that Father Fernandez is a close friend of
Violeta Esguerra and the private respondent which should render
unquestionable his identification of the private respondent during
petitioner Claro's baptism. In the absence of this proof, we are not
prepared to concede that Father Fernandez who officiates numerous
baptismal ceremonies day in and day out can remember the parents of
the children he has baptized.
We cannot also disturb the findings of the respondent court on the
credibility of Violeta Esguerra. Her testimony is highly suspect as it is
self-serving and by itself, is insufficient to prove the paternity of the
petitioners.
We shall not pass upon the correctness of the ruling of the respondent
appellate court applying the doctrine of res judicata as additional
reason in dismissing petitioners action for recognition and support. It is
unnecessary considering our findings that petitioners evidence failed
to substantiate their cause of action.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED and the Decision of the

respondent court in CA-G.R. CV No. 29182 is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
[G. R. No. 143256. August 28, 2001]
RODOLFO FERNANDEZ and MERCEDES CARANTO
FERNANDEZ, HUSBAND and WIFE, EDDIE C.
FERNANDEZ and LUZ FERNANDEZ,
SPOUSES, petitioners, vs. ROMEO FERNANDEZ,
POTENCIANO FERNANDEZ, FRANCISCO FERNANDEZ,
JULITA FERNANDEZ, WILLIAM FERNANDEZ, MARY
FERNANDEZ, ALEJANDRO FERNANDEZ, GERARDO
FERNANDEZ, RODOLFO FERNANDEZ and GREGORIO
FERNANDEZ,respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the
decision[1] of the respondent Court of Appeals dated December 22,
1999 affirming the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court Branch 40,
Dagupan City in an action for nullity of contracts, partition,
recovery of possession and damages in favor of plaintiffs-
appellees, herein respondents.
The facts as found by the respondent Court of Appeals, are as
follows:[3]
The late Spouses Dr. Jose K. Fernandez, and Generosa A. de
Venecia were the registered owners of a parcel of land located at
Dagupan City covered by TCT No. T-9267 (525) consisting of 194
sq. meters, and the two-storey building constructed thereon
covered by Tax Declaration 22-592-1. It is undisputed that
Generosa gave birth to a baby boy named Rogelio who died when
he was only twelve (12) years old as paralytic. In the testimony of
Romeo Fernandez (TSN, Aug. 31, 1994, pp. 9-14) it was revealed
that the late Spouses being childless by the death of their son,
purchased from a certain Miliang for P20.00 a one (1) month baby
boy. The boy being referred to was later on identified as Rodolfo
Fernandez, the herein appellant. Appellant was taken care of by
the couple and was sent to school and became a dental
technician. He lived with the couple until they became old and
disabled.
On July 20, 1982, Jose K. Fernandez died thereby leaving his wife
Generosa A. de Venecia and Rodolfo Fernandez and an estate
consisting of the following:
(a) A parcel of land (Lot 9132, before Lot No. 444-C, of the
Cadastral Survey of Dagupan, Cadastral Case No. 41,
G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 925), situated in the
Barrio of Pantal, City of Dagupan. Bounded on the NE.
by Lot No. 447; on the SE. by Lot No. 9134; on the
SW. by the Arellano Street; and on the NW. by Lot No.
9131. Containing an area of One Hundred Ninety Four
(194) square meters, more or less. Covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 525 (T-9267)
Pangasinan Registry of Deeds.
(b) A two (2) storey residential building made of concrete
and wood, G.I. roofing with a floor area of 154 square
meters and 126 square meters of the first and second
floor, respectively. Declared under Tax Decl. No. 22-
592-1 and assessed therein at P26,000.00.
On August 31, 1989, appellant and Generosa de Venecia executed
a Deed of Extra-judicial Partition dividing and allocating to
themselves the following:
To: Generosa de Venecia Vda. De Fernandez
(a) 119.5 sq. m. located on the southwestern portion of the land;
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(b) Whole residential house above-mentioned;
To: Rodolfo V. Fernandez
74.5 square meters to be taken on the northeastern portion of the
land.
On the same day, Generosa de Venecia executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale in favor of Eddie Fernandez, appellants son over the
following:
A portion of One Hundred Nineteen and One-Half (119.5) Square
meters including the building and/or all existing thereon to be
taken from the southwestern portion of the parcel of land described
as follows, to wit:
A parcel of land (Lot No. 9132, before Lot No. 444-C, of the
Cadastral Survey of Dagupan, Cadastral Case No. 41,
G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 925), situated in the Barrio of Pantal,
City of Dagupan. Bounded on the NE. by Lot No. 447; on the SE by
Lot No. 9134; on the SW. by the Arellano Street; and on the NW. by
Lot No. 9131. Containing an area of One Hundred and Ninety-Four
(194), Square Meters, more or less, covered by TRANSFER
CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. 525 (T-9267) Pangasinan Registry of
Deeds (Exh. 8, Exhibits for the Defendants)
After learning the transaction, Romeo, Potenciano, Francisco, Julita,
William, Mary, Alejandro, Gerardo, Rodolfo and Gregorio, all
surnamed Fernandez, being nephews and nieces of the deceased
Jose K. Fernandez, their father Genaro being a brother of Jose, filed
on September 21, 1994, an action to declare the Extra-Judicial
Partition of Estate and Deed of Sale void ab initio (docketed as Civil
Case No. 94-00016-D).
The complaint alleged that defendants (herein appellants),
motivated by unmitigated greed, deliberate and malicious acts of
depriving the plaintiff and other heirs (herein appellees) of the
deceased spouses, without basis of heirship or any iota of rights to
succession or inheritance, taking advantage of the total
physical and mental incapacity of the deceased Generosa de
Venecia aggravated by unlawful scheme confederated, colluded
and conspired with each other in causing the fake, simulated
grossly inauthentic contracts purporting to be executed on August
31, 1989 and jointly on the same date, caused the execution of the
deed of absolute sale purportedly signed by Generosa de Venecia
covering the same property described in the deed of extra-judicial
partition and by virtue of the said acts, appellants were able to
secure new land titles in their favor (Records, pp. 3-4,
Complaint). Appellees thus prayed that the Deed of Extra-judicial
Partition, Deed of Absolute Sale and Transfer Certificate of Title No.
54641 be declared void from the beginning.
Significantly, in their answer, defendants alleged:
16. That the deceased Sps. Jose K. Fernandez and Generosa were
husband and wife blessed with one child the herein defendant
Rodolfo V. Fernandez whom they acknowledged during their
lifetime. (underscoring supplied)
18. That the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Deed
of Absolute Sale executed by the late Generosa
de Venecia and defendant Rodolfo V. Fernandez
which are now in question were all made with
the full knowledge, consent and approval of the
parties thereto and for value.(Records, pp. 20-
21, Answer).
On May 10, 1996, the Regional Trial Court rendered a decision
in favor of the plaintiffs, the dispositive portion reads:[4]
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and
against the defendants;
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1. Declaring the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition dated
August 31, 1989 (Exh. 3), the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated August 31, 1989 (Exh. 8), the TCT No. 54641,
and the TCT No. 54693 null and void;
2. Ordering the defendants to reconvey to, and to
peacefully surrender to the plaintiffs the possession of
the house and lot in question;
3. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally to pay to
plaintiffs the following:
(a) P50,000.00 as compensatory damages;
(b) P100,000.00 as moral damages;
(c) P20,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
(d) P2,000.00 as litigation costs.
SO ORDERED.
In so ruling, the trial court found that defendant Rodolfo
Fernandez was not a legitimate nor a legally adopted child of
spouses Dr. Jose Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia Fernandez,
hence Rodolfo could not inherit from the spouses. Rodolfos claim
as a son of the deceased spouses Fernandez was negated by the
fact that (1) he only reached high school and was told to stop
studying so that he could help in the clinic of Dr. Fernandez, (2) he
failed to present any birth certificate, (3) the book entitled Fercolla
clan which was compiled and edited by respected people such as
Ambassador Armando Fernandez, Justice Jorge Coquia and Teresita
Coquia-Sison, showed the geneology of the family of Dr. Jose and
Generosa Fernandez without a child; a pedigree may be admitted
in evidence to prove the facts of genealogy and that entries in a
family bible or other family books or charts, engravings or rings,
family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of
pedigree,[5] (4) the certification issued by the Records Management
and Archives Office that there was no available information about
the birth of petitioner Rodolfo to the spouses Fernandez, (5) the
application of Dr. Jose Fernandez for backpay certificate naming
petitioner Rodolfo as his son was doubtful considering that there
were blemishes or alteration in the original copy; (6) that Rodolfos
baptismal certificate was spurious and falsified since there were no
available records of baptism with the parish from June 7, 1930 to
August 8, 1936, while Rodolfos baptismal certificate which was
issued in 1989 showed that he was baptized on November 24,
1934. The court found that the extra-judicial partition and the deed
of absolute sale were prepared and executed under abnormal,
unusual and irregular circumstances which rendered the
documents null and void.
Defendants Rodolfo Fernandez et. al appealed to the
respondent Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial courts
judgment in its assailed decision dated December 22, 1999.
In resolving the appeal, the respondent court delved into the
legitimacy of defendant-appellant Rodolfo Fernandez filiation with
the deceased spouses. It found that appellants evidence which
consisted of a certificate of baptism stating that he was a child of
the spouses Fernandez and the application for recognition of rights
to back pay under RA 897 filed by Dr. Jose Fernandez, wherein the
latter referred to Rodolfo as his son, did not acquire evidentiary
weight to prove his filiation. The appellate court concluded that
while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents,
they were evidence only to prove the administration of the
sacraments on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity of
the statements or declarations made therein with respect to his
kinsfolk; that while the application for back pay was a public
document, it was not executed to admit the filiation of Jose K.
Fernandez with Rodolfo V. Fernandez, the herein appellant; that the
public document contemplated in Article 172 of the Family Code
referred to the written admission of filiation embodied in a public
document purposely executed as an admission of filiation and not
as obtaining in this case wherein the public document was
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
executed as an application for the recognition of rights to back pay
under Republic Act No. 897. Appellants Rodolfo Fernandez et al
filed their motion for reconsideration which was denied in a
resolution dated May 17, 2000.[6]
Rodolfo Fernandez et al filed the instant petition for review
with the following issues:
I THE CHILD OF SPOUSES DR. JOSE K. FERNANDEZ AND GENEROSA
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT OF
THE TRIAL COURT ORDERING THE DEFENDANTS, PETITIONERS
HEREIN, TO RECONVEY TO, AND PEACEFULLY SURRENDER TO THE
PLAINTIFFS, RESPONDENTS HEREIN, THE POSSESSION OF THE
HOUSE AND LOT IN QUESTION BECAUSE THE SAID ORDER IS
PALPABLY CONTRARY TO THE ADMITTED FACTS THE LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE, FOR THE FOLLOWING REASONS:
(a) THE HOUSE AND LOT IN QUESTION ARE ADMITTED BY THE
PARTIES TO BE CONJUGAL PROPERTIES OF THE SPOUSES DR. JOSE
K. FERNANDEZ AND GENEROSA DE VENECIA, AND
(b) RESPONDENTS, WHO ARE NOT RELATED TO GENEROSA DE
VENECIA BY CONSANGUINITY, ARE NOT HER INTESTATE HEIRS AND
CANNOT SUCCEED AB INTESTATO TO HER INTESTATE ESTATE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE JUDGMENT OF
THE TRIAL COURT DECLARING (1) THE DEED OF EXTRA-JUDICIAL
PARTITION DATED AUGUST 31, 1989 (EXH. 3), THE DEED OF
ABSOLUTE SALE ALSO DATED AUGUST 31, 1989 (EXH. 8), TCT NO.
54641, AND TCT NO. 54693 NULL AND VOID FOR THE FOLLOWING
REASONS:
(a) IT HAS NO FACTUAL BASIS DULY ESTABLISHED BY THE
EVIDENCE ON RECORD, AND
(b) RESPONDENTS, NOT BEING PARTIES TO THE QUESTIONED
DEEDS, HAVE NO PERSONALITY TO CONTEST THE VALIDITY OF
SAID DOCUMENTS.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS
FINDING THAT THE PETITIONER RODOLFO FERNANDEZ WAS NOT
DE VENECIA BECAUSE
(a) THE FILIATION OF PETITIONER RODOLFO FERNANDEZ COULD
NOT BE COLLATERALLY ATTACKED IN AN ACTION FOR DECLARATION
OF NULLITY OF DOCUMENTS, PARTITION, RECOVERY OF
POSSESSION AND DAMAGES, AND;
(b) THE DECISION AS AFFIRMED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS DID
NOT DECLARE IN THE DISPOSITIVE PORTION THEREOF THAT
PETITIONER RODOLFO FERNANDEZ IS NOT THE CHILD OF SPOUSES
DR. JOSE FERNANDEZ AND GENEROSA FERNANDEZ.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE AWARD OF
DAMAGES AND ATTORNEYS FEES TO THE RESPONDENTS, THERE
BEING NO FACTUAL BASIS IN THE AFFIRMED DECISION TO JUSTIFY
SUCH AWARD.
The principal issue for resolution in this case concerns the
rights of the parties to the conjugal property of the deceased
spouses Fernandez.
Petitioners allege that the respondent court found the extra-
judicial partition executed by petitioner Rodolfo Fernandez and
Generosa Fernandez, widow of Dr. Jose Fernandez, null and void
because the former allegedly failed to prove legitimate filiation to
his putative father, the late Dr. Jose Fernandez. Petitioners,
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
contend, however, that the burden of proof lies with the
respondents because they were the ones contesting the filiation of
Rodolfo Fernandez. They insist that both lower courts had no power
to pass upon the matter of filiation because it could not be
collaterally attacked in the present action but in a separate and
independent action directly impugning such filiation.
We are not persuaded.
It must be noted that the respondents principal action was for
the declaration of absolute nullity of two documents, namely: deed
of extra-judicial partition and deed of absolute sale, and not an
action to impugn ones legitimacy. The respondent court ruled on
the filiation of petitioner Rodolfo Fernandez in order to determine
Rodolfos right to the deed of extra-judicial partition as the alleged
legitimate heir of the spouses Fernandez. While we are aware that
ones legitimacy can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, this doctrine has no
application in the instant case considering that respondents claim
was that petitioner Rodolfo was not born to the deceased spouses
Jose and Generosa Fernandez; we do not have a situation wherein
they (respondents) deny that Rodolfo was a child of their uncles
wife. The case of Benitez-Badua vs. Court of Appeals,[7] which has a
similar factual backdrop is instructive:
A careful reading of the above articles [8] will show that they do not
contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child is
alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of a certain
couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where a husband
(or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus, under
Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of
said child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to
have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of
the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2)
that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not
have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived through
artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification by
either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence,
intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this
reading as they speak of the prescriptive period within which the
husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning the
legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate court did not
err when it refused to apply these articles to the case at bench. For
the case at bench is not where the heirs of the late Vicente are
contending that petitioner is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their
clear submission is that petitioner was not born to Vicente and
Isabel. Our ruling in Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court,
166 SCRA 451, 457 cited in the impugned decision is apropos, viz:
Petitioners recourse to Art. 263 of the New Civil Code (now Art. 170
of the Family Code) is not well taken. This legal provision refers to
an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case
because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child,
but an action of the private respondents to claim their inheritance
as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim
that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child of the
deceased, but that she is not the decedents child at all. Being
neither legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged natural child,
nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat, Violeta is not a
legal heir of the deceased.
Thus, it is necessary to pass upon the relationship of petitioner
Rodolfo Fernandez to the deceased spouses Fernandez for the
purpose of determining what legal right Rodolfo has in the property
subject of the extra-judicial partition. In fact, the issue of whether
or not Rodolfo Fernandez was the son of the deceased spouses Jose
Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia was squarely raised by
petitioners in their pre-trial brief [9] filed before the trial court, hence
they are now estopped from assailing the trial courts ruling on
Rodolfos status.
We agree with the respondent court when it found that
petitioner Rodolfo failed to prove his filiation with the deceased
spouses Fernandez. Such is a factual issue which has been
thoroughly passed upon and settled both by the trial court and the
appellate court. Factual findings of the Court of Appeals are
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
conclusive on the parties and not reviewable by this Court and they
carry even more weight[10] when the Court of Appeals affirms the
factual findings of the trial court.[11] We accordingly find no cogent
reason to disagree with the respondent courts evaluation of the
evidence presented, thus:[12]
The Records Management and Archives Office is bereft of any
records of the birth of appellant Rodolfo Fernandez. On October 11,
1995, it issued a certification worded as follows:
This is to certify that the Register of Births for the Municipality of
Dagupan, Pangasinan in the year 1984 is not on file with the
National Archives, hence, there is no available information about
the birth of Rodolfo V. Fernandez alleged to have been born on
November 24, 1934 to the spouses Jose K. Fernandez and
Generosa de Venecia in Dagupan, Pangasinan (Records, p. 146)
Appellant nonetheless, contends that the Application for
Recognition of Back Pay Rights Under Act No. 897 is a public
document and a conclusive proof of the legitimate filiation between
him and the deceased spouses (Rollo, p. 41, Appellants Brief). We
do not agree.
It may be conceded that the Application for Recognition of Back
Pay Rights Under Act No. 897 is a public document nevertheless, it
was not executed to admit the filiation of Jose K. Fernandez with
Rodolfo V. Fernandez, the herein appellant. The public document
contemplated in Article 172 of the Family Code refer to the written
admission of filiation embodied in a public document purposely
executed as an admission of filiation and not as obtaining in this
case wherein the public document was executed as an application
for the recognition of rights to back pay under Republic Act No.
897. Section 23, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence
provides:
Sec. 32. Public documents as evidence Documents consisting of
entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a
public officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated. All other public documents are evidence, even against a
third person, of the fact which gave rise to their execution and of
the date of the latter.
The rule is not absolute in the sense that the contents of a public
document are conclusive evidence against the contracting parties
as to the truthfulness of the statements made therein. They
constitute only prima facie evidence of the facts which give rise to
their execution and of the date of the latter. Thus, a baptismal
certificate issued by a Spanish priest under the Spanish regime
constitutes prima facie evidence of the facts certified to by the
parish priest from his own knowledge such as the administration of
the sacrament on the day and in the place and manner set forth in
the certificate; but it does not constitute proof of the statements
made therein concerning the parentage of the person baptized
(Francisco, Evidence, 1994 ed., p. 516, citing Garcia vs. Gajul, 53
Phil. 642; Adriano vs. de Jesus, 23 Phil. 350; Buan vs. Arquiza, 5
Phil. 193; Siguion vs. Siguion, 8 Phil. 7). Public documents are
perfect evidence of the fact which give rise to their execution and
of the date of the latter if the act which the officer witnessed and
certified to or the date written by him are not shown to be false;
but they are not conclusive evidence with respect to the
truthfulness of the statements made therein by the interested
parties (Martin, Rules of Court in the Philippines with Note and
Comments, vol. 4, p. 577).
Corollarily, the Application for Recognition of Back Pay Rights
Under Act No. 897 is only a proof that Jose K. Fernandez filed said
application on June 5, 1954 in Dagupan City but it does not prove
the veracity of the declaration and statement contained in the said
application that concern the relationship of the applicant
with herein appellant. In like manner, it is not a conclusive proof of
the filiation of appellant with his alleged father, Jose K. Fernandez
the contents being, only prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein.
Additionally, appellant claims that he enjoyed and possessed the
status of being a legitimate child of the spouses openly and
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
continuously until they died (Rollo, p. 42; Appellants Brief). Open
and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child is
meant the enjoyment by the child of the position and privileges
usually attached to the status of a legitimate child such as bearing
the paternal surname, treatment by the parents and family of the
child as legitimate, constant attendance to the childs support and
education, and giving the child the reputation of being a child of
his parents (Sempio-Diy, The Family Code of the Philippines, pp.
245-246). However, it must be noted that, as was held in
Quismundo vs. WCC, 132 SCRA 590, possession of status of a child
does not in itself constitute an acknowledgment; it is only a ground
for a child to compel recognition by his assumed parent.
Lastly, to substantiate his claim of being a legitimate child
appellant presented a baptismal certificate issued by Fr. Rene
Mendoza of the St. John Metropolitan Cathedral of Dagupan City on
August 10, 1989 stating therein that appellant is a child of the late
spouses having been born on November 15, 1934 and baptized on
November 24, 1934 (Exh. "1 Exhibits for the Defendants). As
stated, while baptismal certificates may be considered public
documents, they are evidence only to prove the administration of
the sacraments on the dates therein specified, but not the veracity
of the statements or declarations made therein with respect to his
kinsfolk (Reyes vs. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439). It may be
argued that a baptismal certificate is one of the other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws of proving filiation
but in this case, the authenticity of the baptismal certificate was
doubtful when Fr. Raymundo Q. de Guzman of St. John the
Evangelist Parish of Lingayen-Dagupan, Dagupan City issued a
certification on October 16, 1995 attesting that the records of
baptism on June 7, 1930 to August 8, 1936 were all damaged
(Records, p. 148, Exh. G). Neither the family portrait offered in
evidence establishes a sufficient proof of filiation Pictures do not
constitute proof of filiation (Reyes vs. Court of Appeals) (supra). In
fine, the evidence presented by appellant did not acquire
evidentiary weight to prove his filiation. Consequently the Extra-
Judicial Partition dated August 31, 1989 executed by appellant
Rodolfo Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia is null and void.
Considering the foregoing findings, petitioner Rodolfo is not a
child by nature of the spouses Fernandez and not a legal heir of Dr.
Jose Fernandez , thus the subject deed of extra-judicial settlement
of the estate of Dr. Jose Fernandez between Generosa vda. de
Fernandez and Rodolfo is null and void insofar as Rodolfo is
concerned[13] pursuant to Art.1105 of the New Civil Code which
states:
A partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who
is not, shall be void only with respect to such person.
Petitioners next contend that respondents admitted that the
property in question was the conjugal property of the late spouses
Dr. Jose Fernandez and Generosa de Venecia, thus when Dr. Jose
Fernandez died intestate in 1982, his estate consisted solely of pro
indiviso of the conjugal property and the other half belonged to his
wife Generosa de Venecia; that granting Dr. Jose Fernandez was
only survived by his wife, the respondents nephews and nieces of
Dr. Jose are entitled to inherit the share of the decedents estate
while the share of the conjugal property will still belong to
Generosa as the widow of Dr. Jose Fernandez, hence the trial courts
order reconveying the possession of the subject lot and building to
respondents was contrary to the admitted facts and law since
respondents are not related by consanguinity to Generosa vda de
Fernandez.
We agree.
Article 1001 of the Civil Code provides:
Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow
or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one half of the
inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the
other half.
Generosa was the widow of Dr. Jose Fernandez and as
provided in the above-quoted Article 1001, she is entitled to the of
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the inheritance and the respondents to the other . In effect, pro
indiviso is the share of Generosa as the surviving spouse, i.e., as
her share of the conjugal property estate and of the remaining as
share as heir from her husbands estate. Thus, we find well taken
the petitioners assertion that the annulment of the extra-judicial
partition between Generosa and petitioner Rodolfo does not
necessarily result in respondents having exclusive right to the
conjugal property, as erroneously found by the respondent court.
Generosa, during her lifetime, had the right to enjoy and dispose of
her property without other limitations than those established by
law,[14] which right she exercised by executing a deed of sale in
favor of petitioner Eddie Fernandez.
Petitioners assails respondents right, not being heirs of
Generosa, to question the validity of the deed of sale since the
action for the annulment of contracts may only be instituted by all
who are thereby obliged principally or subsidiarily. [15]
We disagree.
As a rule, a contract cannot be assailed by one who is not a
party obliged principally or subsidiarily under a contract. However,
when a contract prejudices the rights of a third person, he may
exercise an action for nullity of the contract if he is prejudiced in
his rights with respect to one of the contracting parties, and can
show detriment which would positively result to him from the
contract in which he had no intervention. [16] As we have discussed
above, respondents are entitled to the of the entire conjugal
property, ie., lot and building; however considering that widow
Generosa, during her lifetime , sold the entire building to petitioner
Eddie Fernandez, respondents had been deprived of their share
therein, thus the deed of sale was prejudicial to the interest of
respondents as regards their share in the building. Respondents
therefore, have a cause of action to seek the annulment of said
deed of sale.
Petitioners further allege that the respondent court erred in
declaring null and void the deed of sale executed between
Generosa and petitioner Eddie Fernandez concluding that the same
was simulated or false and in affirming the trial courts findings that
the deed was prepared and executed under abnormal, unusual and
irregular circumstances without however, particularly stating the
circumstances.
We agree.
Respondents allege that the deed of sale was fictitious and
simulated because there was no consideration for the sale.
However, this assertion was controverted by vendee petitioner
Eddie Fernandez declaration, that the money he paid for the sale
came from his savings as overseas contract worker in Saudi Arabia
from 1982-1989 which respondents failed to controvert by
presenting evidence to the contrary. The presumption that a
contract has sufficient consideration cannot be overthrown by a
mere assertion that it has no consideration.[17] Under Art. 1354 of
the Civil Code, consideration is presumed unless the contrary is
proven.
Respondents also claim that the signature appearing in the
deed of sale was not that of Generosa because she was already
bedridden with both legs amputated before she died. Forgery
cannot be presumed; it must be proved by clear, positive and
convincing evidence[18] and whoever alleges it has the burden of
proving the same;[19] a burden respondents failed to discharge. The
respondents had not presented any convincing proof to override
the evidentiary value of the duly notarized deed of sale. A notarial
document is evidence of the facts in the clear unequivocal manner
therein expressed. It has in its favor the presumption of regularity.
To contradict all these, there must be evidence that is clear,
convincing and more than merely preponderant.[20]
We note however, that Generosa sold the entire 2 storey
building to petitioner Eddie Fernandez, i.e. she did not only sell her
undivided share in the building but also the share of the
respondents. We rule, that such a sale of the entire building
without the consent of the respondents is not null and void as only
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the rights of the co-owner seller are transferred, thereby making 3. Considering that the deed of sale is valid insofar as the share of
the buyer, petitioner Eddie , a co-owner of the share of the building Generosa sold to petitioner Eddie Fernandez, TCT No. 54693 is
together with the respondents who owned the share therein. [21] cancelled and a new title should be issued in the names of
petitioner Eddie Fernandez and respondents as co-owners of the
Finally, anent the issue of actual and moral damages and and shares respectively in the conjugal building.
attorneys fees awarded by the trial court, we find them to be bereft
of factual basis. A party is entitled to an adequate compensation 4. The awards of actual and moral damages and attorneys fees are
for such pecuniary loss actually suffered by him as he has duly deleted.
proven.[22] Such damages, to be recoverable, must not only be
capable of proof, but must actually be proved with a reasonable SO ORDERED.
degree of certainty.[23] Courts cannot simply rely on speculation,
conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact and amount of
damages.[24] The testimony of respondent Romeo Fernandez that
he suffered around P100,000 actual damages was not supported
by any documentary or other admissible evidence. We also agree
with the petitioners that the respondent court should not have
awarded moral damages in the amount of P100,000 since they also
failed to show proof of moral suffering, mental anguish, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social
humiliation. Attorneys fees should likewise be deleted for lack of
factual basis and legal justification. Both the lower courts did not
cite specific factual basis to justify the award of attorneys fees,
which is in violation of the proscription against the imposition of a
penalty on the right to litigate.[25]

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed judgment is

hereby Affirmed with Modification, as follows:

1. Respondents as legitimate heirs of Dr. Jose Fernandez are

entitled to the share of the conjugal lot and building of the
deceased spouses Jose and Generosa Fernandez who died childless
and intestate;

2. The deed of extra-judicial partition is nullified insofar as the

share of petitioner Rodolfo in the conjugal lot is concerned and the
title issued pursuant thereto in the name of Rodolfo Fernandez;

Page | 104
Persons 4th Exam Cases
[G.R. No. 132305. December 4, 2001]
IDA C. LABAGALA, petitioner, vs. NICOLASA T. SANTIAGO,
AMANDA T. SANTIAGO and HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul the
decision dated March 4, 1997,[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 32817, which reversed and set aside the judgment dated
October 17, 1990,[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch
54, in Civil Case No. 87-41515, finding herein petitioner to be the
owner of 1/3 pro indiviso share in a parcel of land.
The pertinent facts of the case, as borne by the records, are
as follows:
Jose T. Santiago owned a parcel of land covered by TCT No.
64729, located in Rizal Avenue Extension, Sta. Cruz,
Manila. Alleging that Jose had fraudulently registered it in his name
alone, his sisters Nicolasa and Amanda (now respondents herein),
sued Jose for recovery of 2/3 share of the property. [3] On April 20,
1981, the trial court in that case decided in favor of the sisters,
recognizing their right of ownership over portions of the property
covered by TCT No. 64729. The Register of Deeds of Manila was
required to include the names of Nicolasa and Amanda in the
certificate of title to said property.[4]
Jose died intestate on February 6, 1984. On August 5, 1987,
respondents filed a complaint for recovery of title, ownership, and
possession against herein petitioner, Ida C. Labagala, before the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, to recover from her the 1/3 portion
of said property pertaining to Jose but which came into petitioners
sole possession upon Joses death.
Respondents alleged that Joses share in the property belongs
to them by operation of law, because they are the only legal heirs
of their brother, who died intestate and without issue. They
claimed that the purported sale of the property made by their
brother to petitioner sometime in March 1979 [5] was executed
through petitioners machinations and with malicious intent, to
enable her to secure the corresponding transfer certificate of title
(TCT No. 172334[6]) in petitioners name alone.[7]
Respondents insisted that the deed of sale was a forgery. The
deed showed that Jose affixed his thumbmark thereon but
respondents averred that, having been able to graduate from
college, Jose never put his thumbmark on documents he executed
but always signed his name in full. They claimed that Jose could
not have sold the property belonging to his poor and unschooled
sisters who sacrificed for his studies and personal welfare.
[8]
Respondents also pointed out that it is highly improbable for
petitioner to have paid the supposed consideration of P150,000 for
the sale of the subject property because petitioner was
unemployed and without any visible means of livelihood at the
time of the alleged sale. They also stressed that it was quite
unusual and questionable that petitioner registered the deed of
sale only on January 26, 1987, or almost eight years after the
execution of the sale.[9]
On the other hand, petitioner claimed that her true name is
not Ida C. Labagala as claimed by respondent but Ida C.
Santiago. She claimed not to know any person by the name of Ida
C. Labagala. She claimed to be the daughter of Jose and thus
entitled to his share in the subject property.She maintained that
she had always stayed on the property, ever since she was a
child. She argued that the purported sale of the property was in
fact a donation to her, and that nothing could have precluded Jose
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
from putting his thumbmark on the deed of sale instead of his
signature. She pointed out that during his lifetime, Jose never
acknowledged respondents claim over the property such that
respondents had to sue to claim portions thereof. She lamented
that respondents had to disclaim her in their desire to obtain
ownership of the whole property.
Petitioner revealed that respondents had in 1985 filed two
ejectment cases against her and other occupants of the
property. The first was decided in her and the other defendants
favor, while the second was dismissed. Yet respondents persisted
and resorted to the present action.
Petitioner recognized respondents ownership of 2/3 of the
property as decreed by the RTC. But she averred that she caused
the issuance of a title in her name alone, allegedly after
respondents refused to take steps that would prevent the property
from being sold by public auction for their failure to pay realty
taxes thereon. She added that with a title issued in her name she
could avail of a realty tax amnesty.
On October 17, 1990, the trial court ruled in favor of
petitioner, decreeing thus:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered recognizing the
plaintiffs [herein respondents] as being entitled to the ownership
and possession each of one-third (1/3) pro indiviso share of the
property originally covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
64729, in the name of Jose T. Santiago and presently covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 172334, in the name of herein
defendant [herein petitioner] and which is located at No. 3075-A
Rizal Avenue Extension, Sta. Cruz, Manila, as per complaint, and
the adjudication to plaintiffs per decision in Civil Case No. 56226 of
this Court, Branch VI, and the remaining one-third (1/3) pro
indiviso share adjudicated in said decision to defendant Jose T.
Santiago in said case, is hereby adjudged and adjudicated to
herein defendant as owner and entitled to possession of said
share. The Court does not see fit to adjudge damages, attorneys
fees and costs. Upon finality of this judgment, Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 172334 is ordered cancelled and a new title issued in
the names of the two (2) plaintiffs and the defendant as owners in
equal shares, and the Register of Deeds of Manila is so directed to
effect the same upon payment of the proper fees by the parties
herein.
SO ORDERED.[10]
According to the trial court, while there was indeed no
consideration for the deed of sale executed by Jose in favor of
petitioner, said deed constitutes a valid donation. Even if it were
not, petitioner would still be entitled to Joses 1/3 portion of the
property as Joses daughter. The trial court ruled that the following
evidence shows petitioner to be the daughter of Jose: (1) the
decisions in the two ejectment cases filed by respondents which
stated that petitioner is Joses daughter, and (2) Joses income tax
return which listed petitioner as his daughter. It further said that
respondents knew of petitioners existence and her being the
daughter of Jose, per records of the earlier ejectment cases they
filed against petitioner. According to the court, respondents were
not candid with the court in refusing to recognize petitioner as Ida
C. Santiago and insisting that she was Ida C. Labagala, thus
affecting their credibility.
Respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
reversed the decision of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and one is
entered declaring the appellants Nicolasa and Amanda Santiago
the co-owners in equal shares of the one-third (1/3) pro indiviso
share of the late Jose Santiago in the land and building covered by
TCT No. 172334. Accordingly, the Register of Deeds of Manila is
directed to cancel said title and issue in its place a new one
reflecting this decision.
SO ORDERED.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
Apart from respondents testimonies, the appellate court noted
that the birth certificate of Ida Labagala presented by respondents
showed that Ida was born of different parents, not Jose and his
wife. It also took into account the statement made by Jose in Civil
Case No. 56226 that he did not have any child.
Hence, the present petition wherein the following issues are
raised for consideration:
1. Whether or not petitioner has adduced preponderant
evidence to prove that she is the daughter of the late Jose T.
Santiago, and
2. Whether or not respondents could still impugn the filiation
of the petitioner as the daughter of the late Jose T. Santiago.
Petitioner contends that the trial court was correct in ruling
that she had adduced sufficient evidence to prove her filiation by
Jose Santiago, making her his sole heir and thus entitled to inherit
his 1/3 portion. She points out that respondents had, before the
filing of the instant case, previously considered [11] her as the
daughter of Jose who, during his lifetime, openly regarded her as
his legitimate daughter. She asserts that her identification as Joses
daughter in his ITR outweighs the strange answers he gave when
he testified in Civil Case No. 56226.
Petitioner asserts further that respondents cannot impugn her
filiation collaterally, citing the case of Sayson v. Court of
Appeals[12] in which we held that (t)he legitimacy of (a) child can be
impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose, by the
proper parties and within the period limited by law. [13] Petitioner
also cites Article 263 of the Civil Code in support of this contention.
[14]
For their part, respondents contend that petitioner is not the
daughter of Jose, per her birth certificate that indicate her parents
as Leo Labagala and Cornelia Cabrigas, instead of Jose Santiago
and Esperanza Cabrigas.[15] They argue that the provisions of
Article 263 of the Civil Code do not apply to the present case since
this is not an action impugning a childs legitimacy but one for
recovery of title, ownership, and possession of property.
The issues for resolution in this case, to our mind, are (1)
whether or not respondents may impugn petitioners filiation in this
action for recovery of title and possession; and (2) whether or not
petitioner is entitled to Joses 1/3 portion of the property he co-
owned with respondents, through succession, sale, or donation.
On the first issue, we find petitioners reliance on Article 263 of
the Civil Code to be misplaced. Said article provides:
Art. 263. The action to impugn the legitimacy of the child shall be
brought within one year from the recording of the birth in the Civil
Register, if the husband should be in the same place, or in a proper
case, any of his heirs.
If he or his heirs are absent, the period shall be eighteen months if
they should reside in the Philippines; and two years if abroad. If the
birth of the child has been concealed, the term shall be counted
from the discovery of the fraud.
This article should be read in conjunction with the other
articles in the same chapter on paternity and filiation in the Civil
Code. A careful reading of said chapter would reveal that it
contemplates situations where a doubt exists that a child is indeed
a mans child by his wife, and the husband (or, in proper cases, his
heirs) denies the childs filiation. It does not refer to situations
where a child is alleged not to be the child at all of a particular
couple.[16]
Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a
child, to assert and prove that a person is not a mans child by his
wife. However, the present case is not one impugning petitioners
legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely that petitioner is
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at
all.[17] Moreover, the present action is one for recovery of title and
possession, and thus outside the scope of Article 263 on
prescriptive periods.
Petitioners reliance on Sayson is likewise improper. The factual
milieu present in Sayson does not obtain in the instant case. What
was being challenged by petitioners in Sayson was (1) the validity
of the adoption of Delia and Edmundo by the deceased Teodoro
and Isabel Sayson, and (2) the legitimate status of Doribel
Sayson. While asserting that Delia and Edmundo could not have
been validly adopted since Doribel had already been born to the
Sayson couple at the time, petitioners at the same time made the
conflicting claim that Doribel was not the child of the couple. The
Court ruled in that case that it was too late to question the decree
of adoption that became final years before. Besides, such a
challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot be made
collaterally but in a direct proceeding.[18]
In this case, respondents are not assailing petitioners
legitimate status but are, instead, asserting that she is not at all
their brothers child. The birth certificate presented by respondents
support this allegation.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that::
The Certificate of Record of Birth (Exhibit H) [19] plainly states that
Ida was the child of the spouses Leon Labagala and [Cornelia]
Cabrigas. This document states that it was Leon Labagala who
made the report to the Local Civil Registrar and therefore the
supplier of the entries in said Certificate. Therefore, this certificate
is proof of the filiation of Ida. Appellee however denies that Exhibit
H is her Birth Certificate. She insists that she is not Ida Labagala
but Ida Santiago. If Exhibit H is not her birth certificate, then where
is hers? She did not present any though it would have been the
easiest thing to do considering that according to her baptismal
certificate she was born in Manila in 1969. This court rejects such
denials and holds that Exhibit H is the certificate of the record of
birth of appellee Ida
Against such evidence, the appellee Ida could only present her
testimony and a baptismal certificate (Exhibit 12) stating that
appellees parents were Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. But
then, a decisional rule in evidence states that a baptismal
certificate is not a proof of the parentage of the baptized
person. This document can only prove the identity of the baptized,
the date and place of her baptism, the identities of the baptismal
sponsors and the priest who administered the sacrament -- nothing
more.[20] (Citations omitted.)
At the pre-trial conducted on August 11, 1988, petitioners
counsel admitted that petitioner did not have a birth certificate
indicating that she is Ida Santiago, though she had been using this
name all her life.[21]
Petitioner opted not to present her birth certificate to prove
her relationship with Jose and instead offered in evidence her
baptismal certificate.[22] However, as we held in Heirs of Pedro
Cabais v. Court of Appeals:
a baptismal certificate is evidence only to prove the
administration of the sacrament on the dates therein
specified, but not the veracity of the declarations therein
stated with respect to [a persons] kinsfolk. The same is
conclusive only of the baptism administered, according to the
rites of the Catholic Church, by the priest who baptized
subject child, but it does not prove the veracity of the
declarations and statements contained in the certificate
concerning the relationship of the person baptized. [23]
A baptismal certificate, a private document, is not conclusive
proof of filiation.[24] More so are the entries made in an income tax
return, which only shows that income tax has been paid and the
amount thereof.[25]
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
We note that the trial court had asked petitioner to secure a
copy of her birth certificate but petitioner, without advancing any
reason therefor, failed to do so. Neither did petitioner obtain a
certification that no record of her birth could be found in the civil
registry, if such were the case. We find petitioners silence
concerning the absence of her birth certificate telling. It raises
doubt as to the existence of a birth certificate that would show
petitioner to be the daughter of Jose Santiago and Esperanza
Cabrigas. Her failure to show her birth certificate would raise the
presumption that if such evidence were presented, it would be
adverse to her claim. Petitioners counsel argued that petitioner had
been using Santiago all her life. However, use of a family name
certainly does not establish pedigree.
Further, we note that petitioner, who claims to be Ida
Santiago, has the same birthdate as Ida Labagala. [26] The similarity
is too uncanny to be a mere coincidence.
During her testimony before the trial court, petitioner denied
knowing Cornelia Cabrigas, who was listed as the mother in the
birth certificate of Ida Labagala. In her petition before this Court,
however, she stated that Cornelia is the sister of her mother,
Esperanza. It appears that petitioner made conflicting statements
that affect her credibility and could cast a long shadow of doubt on
her claims of filiation.
Thus, we are constrained to agree with the factual finding of
the Court of Appeals that petitioner is in reality the child of Leon
Labagala and Cornelia Cabrigas, and contrary to her averment, not
of Jose Santiago and Esperanza Cabrigas. Not being a child of Jose,
it follows that petitioner can not inherit from him through intestate
succession. It now remains to be seen whether the property in
dispute was validly transferred to petitioner through sale or
donation.
On the validity of the purported deed of sale, however, we
agree with the Court of Appeals that:
This deed is shot through and through with so many intrinsic
defects that a reasonable mind is inevitably led to the
conclusion that it is fake. The intrinsic defects are extractable
from the following questions: a) If Jose Santiago intended to
donate the properties in question to Ida, what was the big
idea of hiding the nature of the contract in the faade of the
sale? b) If the deed is a genuine document, how could it have
happened that Jose Santiago who was of course fully aware
that he owned only 1/3 pro indiviso of the properties covered
by his title sold or donated the whole properties to Ida? c)
Why in heavens name did Jose Santiago, a college graduate,
who always signed his name in documents requiring his
signature (citation omitted) [affix] his thumbmark on this deed
of sale? d) If Ida was [the] child of Jose Santiago, what was the
sense of the latter donating his properties to her when she
would inherit them anyway upon his death? e) Why did Jose
Santiago affix his thumbmark to a deed which falsely stated
that: he was single (for he was earlier married to Esperanza
Cabrigas); Ida was of legal age (for [s]he was then just 15
years old); and the subject properties were free from liens and
encumbrances (for Entry No. 27261, Notice of Adverse Claim
and Entry No. 6388, Notice of Lis Pendens were already
annotated in the title of said properties). If the deed was
executed in 1979, how come it surfaced only in 1984 after the
death of Jose Santiago and of all people, the one in possession
was the baptismal sponsor of Ida?[27]
Clearly, there is no valid sale in this case. Jose did not have
the right to transfer ownership of the entire property to petitioner
since 2/3 thereof belonged to his sisters. [28] Petitioner could not
have given her consent to the contract, being a minor at the time.
[29]
Consent of the contracting parties is among the essential
requisites of a contract,[30] including one of sale, absent which there
can be no valid contract. Moreover, petitioner admittedly did not
pay any centavo for the property, [31] which makes the sale
void. Article 1471 of the Civil Code provides:
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

Art. 1471. If the price is simulated, the sale is void, but the act may
be shown to have been in reality a donation, or some other act or
contract.

Neither may the purported deed of sale be a valid deed of

donation. Again, as explained by the Court of Appeals:

Even assuming that the deed is genuine, it cannot be a valid

donation. It lacks the acceptance of the donee required by Art. 725
of the Civil Code. Being a minor in 1979, the acceptance of the
donation should have been made by her father, Leon Labagala or
[her] mother Cornelia Cabrigas or her legal representative
pursuant to Art. 741 of the same Code. No one of those mentioned
in the law - in fact no one at all - accepted the donation for Ida. [32]

In sum, we find no reversible error attributable to the assailed

decision of the Court of Appeals, hence it must be upheld.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, and the decision of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 32817 is AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
[G.R. No. 146737. December 10, 2001]
In the matter of the intestate estate of the late JUAN "JHONNY"
LOCSIN, SR., LUCY A. SOLINAP (Daughter of the late
Maria Locsin Araneta), the successors of the late
LOURDES C. LOCSIN, MANUEL C. LOCSIN, ESTER LOCSIN
JARANTILLA and the intestate estate of the late JOSE C.
LOCSIN, JR., petitioners, vs. JUAN C. LOCSIN,
JR., respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
A Certificate of Live Birth duly recorded in the Local Civil Registry,
a copy of which is transmitted to the Civil Registry General pursuant to
the Civil Registry Law, is prima facie evidence of the facts therein
stated. However, if there are material discrepancies between them, the
one entered in the Civil Registry General prevails.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking the reversal of the
September 13, 2000 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
57708 which affirmed in toto the September 13, 1996 order of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 30, of Iloilo City in Special Proceeding No.
4742. The September 13 order of the trial court appointed Juan E.
Locsin, Jr., respondent, as the sole administrator of the Intestate Estate
of the late Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr.
Records show that on November 11, 1991, or eleven (11) months
after Juan "Jhonny" Locsin, Sr. [1] died intestate on December 11, 1990,
respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. filed with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
City, Branch 30, a "Petition for Letters of Administration" (docketed as
Special Proceeding No. 4742) praying that he be appointed
Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the deceased. He alleged,
among others, (a) that he is an acknowledged natural child of the late
Juan C. Locsin; (b) that during his lifetime, the deceased owned
personal properties which include undetermined savings, current and
time deposits with various banks, and 1/6 portion of the undivided
mass of real properties owned by him and his siblings, namely: Jose
Locsin, Jr., Manuel Locsin, Maria Locsin Yulo, Lourdes Locsin and Ester
Locsin; and (c) that he is the only surviving legal heir of the decedent.
On November 13, 1991, the trial court issued an order setting the
petition for hearing on January 13, 1992, which order was duly
published,[2] thereby giving notice to all persons who may have
opposition to the said petition.
Before the scheduled hearing, or on January 10, 1992, the heirs of
Jose Locsin, Jr., the heirs of Maria Locsin, Manuel Locsin and Ester
Jarantilla, claiming to be the lawful heirs of the deceased, filed an
opposition to respondents petition for letters of administration. They
averred that respondent is not a child or an acknowledged natural child
of the late Juan C. Locsin, who during his lifetime, never affixed "Sr." in
his name .
On January 5, 1993, another opposition to the petition was filed by
Lucy Salinop (sole heir of the late Maria Locsin Vda. De Araneta, sister
of the deceased), Manuel Locsin and the successors of the late Lourdes
C. Locsin alleging that respondent's claim as a natural child is barred
by prescription or the statute of limitations.
The Intestate Estate of the late Jose Locsin, Jr. (brother of the
deceased) also entered its appearance in the estate proceedings,
joining the earlier oppositors. This was followed by an appearance and
opposition dated January 26, 1993 of Ester Locsin Jarantilla (another
sister of Juan C. Locsin), likewise stating that there is no filial
relationship between herein respondent and the deceased.
Thereupon, the trial court conducted hearings.
To support his claim that he is an acknowledged natural child of
the deceased and, therefore, entitled to be appointed administrator of
the intestate estate, respondent submitted a machine copy (marked as
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
Exhibit "D")[3] of his Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found in the bound
volume of birth records in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo
City. Exhibit "D" contains the information that respondent's father is
Juan C. Locsin, Sr. and that he was the informant of the facts stated
therein, as evidenced by his signatures (Exhibit "D-2" and "D-3"). To
prove the existence and authenticity of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477
from which Exhibit "D" was machine copied, respondent presented
Rosita J. Vencer, the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. She produced
and identified in court the bound volume of 1957 records of birth
where the alleged original of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 is
included.
Respondent also offered in evidence a photograph (Exhibit "C")
[4]
showing him and his mother, Amparo Escamilla, in front of a coffin
bearing Juan C. Locsin's dead body. The photograph, respondent
claims, shows that he and his mother have been recognized as family
members of the deceased.
In their oppositions, petitioners claimed that Certificate of Live
Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") is spurious. They submitted a certified true
copy of Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 found in the Civil Registrar
General, Metro Manila, marked as Exhibit "8",[5] indicating that the birth
of respondent was reported by his mother, Amparo Escamilla, and that
the same does not contain the signature of the late Juan C.
Locsin. They observed as anomalous the fact that while respondent
was born on October 22, 1956 and his birth was recorded on January
30, 1957, however, his Certificate of Live Birth No. 447 (Exhibit "D")
was recorded on a December 1, 1958 revised form. Upon the other
hand, Exhibit "8" appears on a July, 1956 form, already used before
respondent's birth. This scenario clearly suggests that Exhibit "D" was
falsified. Petitioners presented as witness, Col. Pedro L. Elvas, a
handwriting expert. He testified that the signatures of Juan C. Locsin
and Emilio G. Tomesa (then Civil Registrar of Iloilo City) appearing in
Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") are forgeries. He thus
concluded that the said Certificate is a spurious document
surreptitiously inserted into the bound volume of birth records of the
Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City.
After hearing, th trial court, finding that Certificate of Live Birth
No. 477 (Exhibit "D") and the photograph (Exhibit "C") are sufficient
proofs of respondent's illegitimate filiation with the deceased, issued
on September 13, 1996 an order, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this PETITION is hereby GRANTED
and the petitioner Juan E. Locsin, Jr. is hereby appointed Administrator
of the Intestate Estate of the late Juan Johnny Locsin, Sr.
"Let Letters of Administration be issued in his favor, upon his filing of a
bond in the sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) to be
approved by this Court.
"SO ORDERED.[6]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered the challenged Decision
affirming in toto the order of the trial court dated September 13,
1996. Petitioners moved for a reconsideration, while respondent filed a
motion for execution pending appeal. Both motions were, however,
denied by the Appellate Court in its Resolution dated January 10, 2001.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari by petitioners.
The focal issue for our resolution is which of the two documents -
Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") and Certificate of Live
Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "8") is genuine.
The rule that factual findings of the trial court, adopted and
confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and conclusive and may
not be reviewed on appeal[7] does not apply when there appears in
the record of the case some facts or circumstances of weight and
influence which have been overlooked, or the significance of which
have been misinterpreted, that if considered, would affect the result of
the case.[8] Here, the trial court failed to appreciate facts and
circumstances that would have altered its conclusion.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the
persons preferred who are entitled to the issuance of letters of
administration, thus:
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
Section 6. When and to whom letters of administration
granted. If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or
executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a
person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of
kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such
surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if
competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of
kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if
the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after
the death of a person to apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to
one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to
serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be
granted to such other person as the court may select. (Emphasis ours)
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition
for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person,
thus:
Sec.2 Contents of petition for letters of administration. A
petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested
person and must show, so far as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts; x x x" (Emphasis ours)
An "interested party", in estate proceedings, is one who would be
benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against
the estate, such as a creditor.[9] Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase
"next of kin" refers to those whose relationship with the decedent is
such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.
[10]
In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals,[11] this Court held that in the
appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person,
the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate
of the one to be appointed administrator.
Here, undisputed is the fact that the deceased, Juan C. Locsin,
was not survived by a spouse. In his petition for issuance of letters of
administration, respondent alleged that he is an acknowledged
natural son of the deceased, implying that he is an interested
person in the estate and is considered as next of kin. But has
respondent established that he is an acknowledged natural son of the
deceased? On this point, this Court, through Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug,
held:
"The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is
established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register or
a final judgement; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned. In the absence thereof, filiation shall be proved by
(1) the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or (2) any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws. The due recognition of an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is,
in itself, a consummated act of acknowledgement of the child, and no
further court action is required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated
not just a ground for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary
recognition that does not require a separate action for judicial
approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is predicated on other
evidence merely tending to prove paternity, i.e., outside of a record of
birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or an authentic
writing, judicial action within the applicable statute of limitations is
essential in order to establish the child's
acknowledgment."[12] (Emphasis ours)
Here, respondent, in order to establish his filiation with the
deceased, presented to the trial court his Certificate of Live Birth No.
477 (Exhibit "D") and a photograph (Exhibit "C") taken during the burial
of the deceased.
Regarding the genuineness and probative value of Exhibit "D", the
trial court made the following findings, affirmed by the Appellate Court:
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
"It was duly established in Court that the Certificate of Live Birth No.
477 in the name of Juan E. Locsin, Jr., the original having been testified
to by Rosita Vencer, exists in the files of the Local Civil Registrar of
Iloilo. Petitioner since birth enjoyed the open and continuous status of
an acknowledged natural child of Juan C. Locsin, Sr., he together with
his mother was summoned to attend to the burial as evidenced by a
picture of relatives facing the coffin of the deceased with petitioner and
his mother in the picture. x x x. It was duly proven at the trial that the
standard signatures presented by oppositors were not in public
document and may also be called questioned document whereas in the
certificate of live birth No. 477, the signature of Juan C. Locsin, Sr. was
the original or primary evidence. The anomalous and suspicious
characteristic of the bound volume where the certificate of live birth as
alleged by oppositors was found was testified to and explained by
Rosita Vencer of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar that they run out
of forms in 1957 and requisitioned forms. However, the forms sent to
them was the 1958 revised form and that she said their office usually
paste the pages of the bound volume if destroyed. All the doubts
regarding the authenticity and genuineness of the signatures of Juan C.
Locsin, Sr. and Emilio Tomesa, and the suspicious circumstances of the
bound volume were erased due to the explanation of Rosita Vencer."
This Court cannot subscribe to the above findings.
Pursuant to Section 12 of Act 3753 (An Act to Establish a Civil
Register), the records of births from all cities and municipalities in the
Philippines are officially and regularly forwarded to the Civil Registrar
General in Metro Manila by the Local Civil Registrars. Since the records
of births cover several decades and come from all parts of the country,
to merely access them in the Civil Registry General requires
expertise. To locate one single birth record from the mass, a regular
employee, if not more, has to be engaged. It is highly unlikely that any
of these employees in Metro Manila would have reason to falsify a
particular 1957 birth record originating from the Local Civil Registry of
Iloilo City.
With respect to Local Civil Registries, access thereto by interested
parties is obviously easier. Thus, in proving the authenticity of Exhibit
"D," more convincing evidence than those considered by the trial court
should have been presented by respondent.
The trial court held that the doubts respecting the genuine nature
of Exhibit "D" are dispelled by the testimony of Rosita Vencer, Local
Civil Registrar of Iloilo City.
The event about which she testified on March 7, 1994 was the
record of respondent's birth which took place on October 22, 1956, on
37 or 38 years ago. The Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City at that time
was Emilio G. Tomesa. Necessarily, Vencer's knowledge of respondent's
birth record allegedly made and entered in the Local Civil Registry in
January, 1957 was based merely on her general impressions of the
existing records in that Office.
When entries in the Certificate of Live Birth recorded in the Local
Civil Registry vary from those appearing in the copy transmitted to the
Civil Registry General, pursuant to the Civil Registry Law, the variance
has to be clarified in more persuasive and rational manner. In this
regard, we find Vencer's explanation not convincing.
Respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D") was
recorded in a December 1, 1958 revised form. Asked how a 1958
form could be used in 1957 when respondent's birth was recorded,
Vencer answered that "xxx during that time, maybe the forms in 1956
were already exhausted so the former Civil Registrar had requested for
a new form and they sent us the 1958 Revised Form." [13]
The answer is a "maybe", a mere supposition of an event. It does
not satisfactorily explain how a Revised Form dated December 1,
1958 could have been used on January 30, 1957 or almost (2)
years earlier.
Upon the other hand, Exhibit "8" of the petitioners found in the
Civil Registrar General in Metro Manila is on Municipal Form No.
102, revised in July, 1956. We find no irregularity here. Indeed, it is
logical to assume that the 1956 forms would continue to be used
several years thereafter.But for a 1958 form to be used in 1957 is
unlikely.
There are other indications of irregularity relative to Exhibit
"D." The back cover of the 1957 bound volume in the Local Civil
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
Registry of Iloilo is torn. Exhibit "D" is merely pasted with the bound
volume, not sewn like the other entries.
The documents bound into one volume are original copies. Exhibit
"D" is a carbon copy of the alleged original and sticks out like a sore
thumb because the entries therein are typewritten, while the records of
all other certificates are handwritten. Unlike the contents of those
other certificates, Exhibit "D" does not indicate important particulars,
such as the alleged father's religion, race, occupation, address and
business. The space which calls for an entry of the legitimacy of the
child is blank. On the back page of Exhibit "D", there is a purported
signature of the alleged father, but the blanks calling for the date and
other details of his Residence Certificate were not filled up.
When asked to explain the torn back cover of the bound volume,
Vencer had no answer except to state, "I am not aware of this because
I am not a bookbinder." As to why Exhibit "D" was not sewn or bound
into the volume, she explained as follows:
"COURT:
I will butt in. Are these instances where your employees would only
paste a document like this Certificate of Live Birth?
WITNESS:
Yes, Your Honor, we are pasting some of the leaves just to replace the
record. Sometimes we just have it pasted in the record when the
leaves were taken.
ATTY. TIROL:
You mean to say you allow the leaves of the bound volume to be taken
out?
A: No sir. It is because sometimes the leaves are detached so we
have to paste them."[14] (Emphasis ours)
There is no explanation why out of so many certificates, this vital
document, Exhibit "D", was merely pasted with the volume.
Vencer's testimony suffers from infirmities. Far from explaining the
anomalous circumstances surrounding Exhibit "D", she actually
highlighted the suspicious circumstances surrounding its existence.
The records of the instant case adequately support a finding that
Exhibit "8" for the petitioners, not respondent's Exhibit "D", should
have been given more faith and credence by the courts below.
The Civil Registry Law requires, inter alia, the Local Civil Registrar
to send copies of registrable certificates and documents presented to
them for entry to the Civil Registrar General, thus:
Duties of Local Civil Registrar. Local civil registrars shall (a) file
registrable certificates and documents presented to them for entry; (b)
compile the same monthly and prepare and send any information
required of them by the Civil-Registrar; (c) issue certified transcripts or
copies of any document registered upon payment of proper fees; (d)
order the binding, properly classified, of all certificates or documents
registered during the year; (e) send to the Civil Registrar-General,
during the first ten days of each month, a copy of the entries
made during the preceding month, for filing; (f) index the same
to facilitate search and identification in case any information is
required; and (g) administer oaths, free of charge, for civil register
purposes"[15] (Emphasis ours)
In light of the above provisions, a copy of the document sent by
the Local Civil Registrar to the Civil Registrar General should be
identical in form and in substance with the copy being kept by the
latter. In the instant case, Exhibit "8", as transmitted to the Civil
Registrar General is not identical with Exhibit "D" as appearing in the
records of the Local Civil Registrar of Iloilo City. Such circumstance
should have aroused the suspicion of both the trial court and the Court
of Appeals and should have impelled them to declare Exhibit "D" a
spurious document.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

Exhibit "8" shows that respondent's record of birth was made by entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public
his mother. In the same Exhibit "8", the signature and name of Juan C. officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated." In this
Locsin listed as respondent's father and the entry that he and Amparo case, the glaring discrepancies between the two Certificates of Live
Escamilla were married in Oton, Iloilo on November 28, 1954 do not Birth (Exhibits "D" and "8") have overturned the genuineness of Exhibit
appear. "D" entered in the Local Civil Registry. What is authentic is Exhibit "8"
recorded in the Civil Registry General.
In this connection, we echo this Court's pronouncement in Roces
vs. Local Civil Registrar[16] that: Incidentally, respondent's photograph with his mother near the
coffin of the late Juan C. Locsin cannot and will not constitute proof of
Section 5 of Act No. 3753 and Article 280 of the Civil Code of the filiation,[19] lest we recklessly set a very dangerous precedent that
Philippines x x x explicitly prohibit, not only the naming of the father of would encourage and sanction fraudulent claims. Anybody can have a
the child born out of wedlock, when the birth certificate, or the picture taken while standing before a coffin with others and thereafter
recognition, is not filed or made by him, but also, the statement of utilize it in claiming the estate of the deceased.
any information or circumstances by which he could be
identified. Accordingly, the Local Civil Registrar had no authority to Respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. failed to prove his filiation with the
make or record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the late Juan C. Locsin, Sr.. His Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 (Exhibit "D")
information of a third person and the certificate of birth of an is spurious. Indeed, respondent is not an interested person within
illegitimate child, when signed only by the mother of the latter, the meaning of Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court entitled
is incompetent evidence of fathership of said child. (Emphasis to the issuance of letters of administration.
ours)
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged
The Roces ruling regarding illegitimate filiation is further Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 57708
elucidated in Fernandez vs. Court of Appeals [17] where this Court said are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondent's petition for issuance of
that "a birth certificate not signed by the alleged father (who had no letters of administration is ORDERED DISMISSED.
hand in its preparation) is not competent evidence of paternity."
SO ORDERED.
A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by
both the Civil Code and Article 172 of the Family Code for purposes of
recognition and filiation. However, birth certificate offers only prima
facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted by contrary evidence.
[18]
Its evidentiary worth cannot be sustained where there exists strong,
complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity. In this case,
respondent's Certificate of Live Birth No. 477 entered in the records of
the Local Civil Registry (from which Exhibit "D" was machine copied)
has all the badges of nullity. Without doubt, the authentic copy on file
in that office was removed and substituted with a falsified Certificate of
Live Birth.

At this point, it bears stressing the provision of Section 23, Rule

132 of the Revised Rules of Court that "(d)ocuments consisting of

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
[G.R. No. 140500. January 21, 2002]
ERNESTINA BERNABE, petitioner, vs. CAROLINA ALEJO as
guardian ad litem for the minor ADRIAN
BERNABE, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The right to seek recognition granted by the Civil Code to
illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code
took effect cannot be impaired or taken away. The minors have up to
four years from attaining majority age within which to file an action for
recognition.
Statement of the Case
Before us is a Petition[1] for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court, praying for (1) the nullification of the July 7, 1999
Court of Appeals[2] (CA) Decision[3] in CA-GR CV No. 51919 and the
October 14, 1999 CA Resolution [4] denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration, as well as (2) the reinstatement of the two Orders
issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City (Branch 109)
concerning the same case. The dispositive portion of the assailed
Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of the lower court
dismissing Civil Case No. 94-0562 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the
records of this case be remanded to the lower court for trial on the
merits.[5]
The Facts
The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals in
this wise:
The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his
secretary of twenty-three (23) years, herein plaintiff-appellant
Carolina Alejo. The son was born on September 18, 1981 and was
named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993, while
his wife Rosalina died on December 3 of the same year, leaving
Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.
On May 16, 1994, Carolina, in behalf of Adrian, filed the aforesaid
complaint praying that Adrian be declared an acknowledged
illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and as such he (Adrian) be given his
share in Fiscal Bernabes estate, which is now being held by Ernestina
as the sole surviving heir.
On July 16, 1995, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint,
ruling that under the provisions of the Family Code as well as the case
of Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, the complaint is now barred x x x.[6]
Orders of the Trial Court
In an Order dated July 26, 1995, the trial court granted
Ernestina Bernabes Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts
Decision and ordered the dismissal of the Complaint for recognition.
Citing Article 175 of the Family Code, the RTC held that the death of
the putative father had barred the action.
In its Order dated October 6, 1995, the trial court added that since
the putative father had not acknowledged or recognized
Adrian Bernabe in writing, the action for recognition should have been
filed during the lifetime of the alleged father to give him the
opportunity to either affirm or deny the childs filiation.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the interest
of justice, Adrian should be allowed to prove that he was the
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe. Because the boy was born in 1981,
his rights are governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code, which allows an
action for recognition to be filed within four years after the child has
attained the age of majority. The subsequent enactment of the Family
Code did not take away that right.
Hence, this appeal.[7]
Issues
In her Memorandum,[8] petitioner raises the following issues for
our consideration:
I Article 285 of the Civil Code provides the period for filing an
Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a case against
petitioner, the legitimate daughter of the putative father, for
recognition and partition with accounting after the putative fathers
death in the absence of any written acknowledgment of paternity by
the latter.
II
Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that
respondents had four years from the attainment of minority to file an
action for recognition as provided in Art. 285 of the Civil Code, in
complete disregard of its repeal by the [express] provisions of the
Family Code and the applicable jurisprudence as held by the Honorable
Court of Appeals.
III
Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by the petition[er] is
fatally defective for failure to implead the Court of Appeals as one of
the respondents.[9]
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First and Second Issues: Period to File Action for Recognition
Because the first and the second issues are interrelated, we shall
discuss them jointly.
Petitioner contends that respondent is barred from filing an action
for recognition, because Article 285 of the Civil Code has been
supplanted by the provisions of the Family Code. She argues that the
latter Code should be given retroactive effect, since no vested right
would be impaired. We do not agree.
action for recognition as follows:
ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be
brought only during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the
following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the
child, in which case the latter may file the action
before the expiration of four years from the
attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a
document should appear of which nothing had been
heard and in which either or both parents recognize
the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the
finding of the document.
The two exceptions provided under the foregoing provision, have
however been omitted by Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family
Code, which we quote:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall
be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child
during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should
the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases,
the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the
action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive
notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same, evidence as
legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article
173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of
Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent.
Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate
child must be brought within the lifetime of the alleged parent. The
Family Code makes no distinction on whether the former was still a
minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the
new Code a chance to dispute the claim, considering that illegitimate
children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the
legitimate family being aware of their existence. x x x The putative
parent should thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny the
childs filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already
dead.[10]
Nonetheless, the Family Code provides the caveat that rights that
have already vested prior to its enactment should not be prejudiced or
impaired as follows:
ART. 255. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the
Civil Code or other laws.
The crucial issue to be resolved therefore is whether Adrians right
to an action for recognition, which was granted by Article 285 of the
Civil Code, had already vested prior to the enactment of the Family
Code. Our answer is affirmative.
A vested right is defined as one which is absolute, complete and
unconditional, to the exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is
immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency
x x x.[11] Respondent however contends that the filing of an action for
recognition is procedural in nature and that as a general rule, no
vested right may attach to [or] arise from procedural laws. [12]
Bustos v. Lucero[13] distinguished substantive from procedural law
in these words:
x x x. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in
this respect may be said to be synonymous. Substantive rights is a
term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal
system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. Substantive law is
that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or
which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of
action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer;
as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method
of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion. [14] (Citations
omitted)
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
Recently, in Fabian v. Desierto,[15] the Court laid down the test for
determining whether a rule is procedural or substantive:
[I]n determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for
the practice and procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or
modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really
regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights
and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule
takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a
right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive
matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an existing right
then the rule deals merely with procedure.[16]
Applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we hold that Article 285 of
the Civil Code is a substantive law, as it gives Adrian the right to file his
petition for recognition within four years from attaining majority age.
Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take Adrians right to file
an action for recognition, because that right had already vested prior
to its enactment.
Uyguangco v. Court of Appeals[17] is not applicable to the case at
bar, because the plaintiff therein sought recognition as an illegitimate
child when he was no longer a minor. On the other hand, in Aruego Jr.
v. Court of Appeals[18] the Court ruled that an action for recognition filed
while the Civil Code was in effect should not be affected by the
subsequent enactment of the Family Code, because the right had
already vested.
Not Limited to Natural Children
To be sure, Article 285 of the Civil Code refers to the action for
recognition of natural children. Thus, petitioner contends that the
provision cannot be availed of by respondent, because at the time of
his conception, his parents were impeded from marrying each other. In
other words, he is not a natural child.
A natural child is one whose parents, at the time of conception,
were not disqualified by any legal impediment from marrying each
other. Thus, in De Santos v. Angeles,[19] the Court explained:
A childs parents should not have been disqualified to marry each other
at the time of conception for him to qualify as a natural child. [20]
A strict and literal interpretation of Article 285 has already been
frowned upon by this Court in the aforesaid case of Aruego, which
allowed minors to file a case for recognition even if their parents were
disqualified from marrying each other. There, the Complaint averred
that the late Jose Aruego Sr., a married man, had an
extramarital liason with Luz Fabian. Out of this relationship were born
two illegitimate children who in 1983 filed an action for recognition.
The two children were born in 1962 and 1963, while the alleged
putative father died in 1982. In short, at the time of their conception,
the two childrens parents were legally disqualified from marrying each
other. The Court allowed the Complaint to prosper, even though it had
been filed almost a year after the death of the presumed father. At the
time of his death, both children were still minors.
Moreover, in the earlier case Divinagracia v. Rovira,[21] the Court
said that the rules on voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment of
natural children, as well as the prescriptive period for filing such action,
may likewise be applied to spurious children. Pertinent portions of the
case are quoted hereunder:
The so-called spurious children, or illegitimate children other than
natural children, commonly known as bastards, include those
adulterous children or those born out of wedlock to a married woman
cohabiting with a man other than her husband or to a married man
cohabiting with a woman other than his wife. They are entitled to
support and successional rights. But their filiation must be duly proven.
How should their filiation be proven? Article 289 of the Civil Code
allows the investigation of the paternity or maternity or spurious
children under the circumstances specified in articles 283 and 284 of
the Civil Code. The implication is that the rules on compulsory
recognition of natural children are applicable to spurious children.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

Spurious children should not be in a better position than natural
children. The rules on proof of filiation of natural children or the rules
on voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment for natural children may
be applied to spurious children.
That does not mean that spurious children should be acknowledged, as
that term is used with respect to natural children. What is simply
meant is that the grounds or instances for the acknowledgment of
natural children are utilized to establish the filiation of spurious
children.
A spurious child may prove his filiation by means of a record of birth, a
will, a statement before a court of record, or in any authentic writing.
These are the modes of voluntary recognition of natural children.
lifetime of their putative parents. As respondent aptly points out in his
Memorandum,[24] the State as parens patriae should protect a minors
right. Born in 1981, Adrian was only seven years old when the Family
Code took effect and only twelve when his alleged father died in 1993.
The minor must be given his day in court.
Third Issue: Failure to Implead the CA
Under Section 4(a) of Rule 45 of the current Rules of Court, it is
no longer required to implead the lower courts or judges x x x either as
petitioners or respondents. Under Section 3, however, the lower
tribunal should still be furnished a copy of the petition. Hence, the
failure of petitioner to implead the Court of Appeals as a party is not a
reversible error; it is in fact the correct procedure.

In case there is no evidence on the voluntary recognition of the WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed
spurious child, then his filiation may be established by means of the Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
circumstances or grounds for compulsory recognition prescribed in the
aforementioned articles 283 and 284. SO ORDERED.

The prescriptive period for filing the action for compulsory recognition
in the case of natural children, as provided for in article 285 of the Civil
Code, applies to spurious children. [22] (Citations omitted, italics
supplied)

Thus, under the Civil Code, natural children have

superior successional rights over spurious ones.
[23]
However, Rovira treats them as equals with respect to other rights,
including the right to recognition granted by Article 285.

To emphasize, illegitimate children who were still minors at the

time the Family Code took effect and whose putative parent died
during their minority are thus given the right to seek recognition
(under Article 285 of the Civil Code) for a period of up to four years
from attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired or
taken away by the passage of the Family Code.

Indeed, our overriding consideration is to protect the vested rights

of minors who could not have filed suit, on their own, during the

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
G.R. No. 155733 January 27, 2006
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF THE
DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA
CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA and other HEIRS
OF LUIS DELGADO, namely, HEIRS OF CONCHA VDA. DE
AREVALO, HEIRS OF LUISA DELGADO VDA. DE DANAO,
ANGELA DELGADO ARESPACOCHAGA, TERESA DELGADO
PERLAS, CAROLINA DELGADO-ARESPACOCHAGA, RODOLFO
DELGADO, BENJAMIN DELGADO, GLICERIA DELGADO and
CLEOFAS DELGADO; and HEIRS OF GORGONIO DELGADO,
namely, RAMON DELGADO CAMPO, CARLOS DELGADO
CAMPO, CLARITA DELGADO CAMPO-REIZA, YOLANDA
DELGADO ENCINAS, FELISA DELGADO CAMPO-ENCINAS and
MELINDA DELGADO CAMPO-MADARANG, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, namely,
GUILLERMO R. DAMIAN and JOSE R. DAMIAN; HEIRS OF
HORTENCIA RUSTIA CRUZ, namely, TERESITA CRUZ-SISON,
HORACIO R. CRUZ, JOSEFINA CRUZ-RODIL, AMELIA CRUZ-
ENRIQUEZ and FIDEL R. CRUZ, JR.; HEIRS OF ROMAN
RUSTIA, SR., namely, JOSEFINA RUSTIA ALBANO, VIRGINIA
RUSTIA PARAISO, ROMAN RUSTIA, JR., SERGIO RUSTIA,
FRANCISCO RUSTIA, LETICIA RUSTIA-MIRANDA; and
GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, as Oppositors;1 and GUILLERMA
RUSTIA, as Intervenor,2 Respondents.3
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to reinstate
the May 11, 1990 decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 55,4 in SP Case No. 97668, which was reversed and
set aside by the Court of Appeals in its decision 5 dated October 24,
2002.
FACTS OF THE CASE
This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. 6 The main issue in this case is
relatively simple: who, between petitioners and respondents, are
the lawful heirs of the decedents. However, it is attended by
several collateral issues that complicate its resolution.
The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado may be divided into two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of
Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings,
nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2)
the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters, 7 his
nephews and nieces,8 his illegitimate child,9 and the de
facto adopted child (ampun-ampunan) of the decedents.
10
The alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado
The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa 11 Delgado
by one Lucio Campo. Aside from Josefa, five other children were
born to the couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and
Gorgonio, all surnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married
to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all
natural children of Felisa Delgado.
However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa
Delgados life. Before him was Ramon Osorio 12with whom Felisa
had a son, Luis Delgado. But, unlike her relationship with Lucio
Campo which was admittedly one without the benefit of marriage,
the legal status of Ramon Osorios and Felisa Delgados union is in
dispute.
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The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got
married is crucial to the claimants because the answer will
determine whether their successional rights fall within the ambit of
the rule against reciprocal intestate succession between legitimate
and illegitimate relatives.13 If Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado had
been validly married, then their only child Luis Delgado was a
legitimate half-blood brother of Josefa Delgado and therefore
excluded from the latters intestate estate. He and his heirs would
be barred by the principle of absolute separation between the
legitimate and illegitimate families. Conversely, if the couple were
never married, Luis Delgado and his heirs would be entitled to
inherit from Josefa Delgados intestate estate, as they would all be
within the illegitimate line.
Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were
never married. In support thereof, they assert that no evidence
was ever presented to establish it, not even so much as an
allegation of the date or place of the alleged marriage. What is
clear, however, is that Felisa retained the surname Delgado. So did
Luis, her son with Ramon Osorio. Later on, when Luis got married,
his Partida de Casamiento14 stated that he was "hijo natural de
Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado),15 significantly
omitting any mention of the name and other circumstances of his
father.16 Nevertheless, oppositors (now respondents) insist that the
absence of a record of the alleged marriage did not necessarily
mean that no marriage ever took place.
Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She was
survived by Guillermo Rustia and some collateral relatives, the
petitioners herein. Several months later, on June 15, 1973,
Guillermo Rustia executed an affidavit of self-
adjudication of the remaining properties comprising her estate.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa
Delgado17 but whether a marriage in fact took place is disputed.
According to petitioners, the two eventually lived together as
husband and wife but were never married. To prove their assertion,
petitioners point out that no record of the contested marriage
existed in the civil registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate
naming Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to her as
"Seorita" or unmarried woman.
The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand, insist that
the absence of a marriage certificate did not of necessity mean
that no marriage transpired. They maintain that Guillermo Rustia
and Josefa Delgado were married on June 3, 1919 and from then on
lived together as husband and wife until the death of Josefa on
September 8, 1972. During this period spanning more than half a
century, they were known among their relatives and friends to
have in fact been married. To support their proposition, oppositors
presented the following pieces of evidence:
1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated [December 1,
1944] issued to Mrs. Guillermo J. Rustia by Carlos P.
Romulo, then Resident Commissioner to the United States
of the Commonwealth of the Philippines;
2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia
on June 25, 1947;
3. Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation for
Disability Resulting from Service in the Active Military or
Naval Forces of the United States- Claim No. C-4, 004, 503
(VA Form 526) filed with the Veterans Administration of the
United States of America by Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia wherein
Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia himself [swore] to his marriage to
Josefa Delgado in Manila on 3 June 1919;18
4. Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia
indicated that he was married to Josefa Delgado.
The alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia
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Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With
no children of their own, they took into their home the youngsters
Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children, never
legally adopted by the couple, were what was known in the local
dialect as ampun-ampunan.
During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage
to father an illegitimate child, 19 the intervenor-respondent
Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria. According to
Guillerma, Guillermo Rustia treated her as his daughter, his own
flesh and blood, and she enjoyed open and continuous possession
of that status from her birth in 1920 until her fathers demise. In
fact, Josefa Delgados obituary which was prepared by Guillermo
Rustia, named the intervenor-respondent as one of their children.
Also, her report card from the University of Santo Tomas identified
Guillermo Rustia as her parent/guardian.20
Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that Guillerma
Rustia has no interest in the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia as
she was never duly acknowledged as an illegitimate child. They
contend that her right to compulsory acknowledgement prescribed
when Guillermo died in 1974 and that she cannot claim voluntary
acknowledgement since the documents she presented were not
the authentic writings prescribed by the new Civil Code. 21
On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death of Josefa
Delgado, Guillermo Rustia filed a petition for the adoption 22 of
their ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia. He stated under oath
"[t]hat he ha[d] no legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural
children or natural children by legal fiction." 23 The petition was
overtaken by his death on February 28, 1974.
Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was
survived by his sisters Marciana Rustia vda. deDamian and
Hortencia Rustia-Cruz, and by the children of his predeceased
brother Roman Rustia Sr., namely, Josefina Rustia Albano, Virginia
Rustia Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia, Francisco Rustia
and Leticia Rustia Miranda.24
ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis
Delgado, filed the original petition for letters of administration of
the intestate estates of the "spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo
Rustia" with the RTC of Manila, Branch 55. 25 This petition was
opposed by the following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo Rustia,
namely, Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-
Cruz;26 (2) the heirs of Guillermo Rustias late brother, Roman
Rustia, Sr., and (3) the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia.
The opposition was grounded on the theory that Luisa
Delgado vda. de Danao and the other claimants were barred under
the law from inheriting from their illegitimate half-blood relative
Josefa Delgado.
In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene
in the proceedings, claiming she was the only surviving descendant
in the direct line of Guillermo Rustia. Despite the objections of the
oppositors (respondents herein), the motion was granted.
On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of administration
was amended to state that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia
were never married but had merely lived together as husband and
wife.
On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed a
motion to dismiss the petition in the RTC insofar as the estate of
Guillermo Rustia was concerned. The motion was denied on the
ground that the interests of the petitioners and the other claimants
remained in issue and should be properly threshed out upon
submission of evidence.
On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa substituted
for her sister, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, who had died on May
18, 1987.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda. de de la
Rosa as administratrix of both estates.27 The dispositive portion of
the decision read:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioner and her co-
claimants to the estate of the late Josefa Delgado listed in the
Petitions, and enumerated elsewhere in this Decision, are hereby
declared as the only legal heirs of the said Josefa Delgado who died
intestate in the City of Manila on September 8, 1972, and entitled
to partition the same among themselves in accordance with the
proportions referred to in this Decision.
Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is hereby declared as
the sole and only surviving heir of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia,
and thus, entitled to the entire estate of the said decedent, to the
exclusion of the oppositors and the other parties hereto.
The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of Josefa Delgado
executed by the late Guillermo J. Rustia on June 15, 1973 is hereby
SET ASIDE and declared of no force and effect.
As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not as yet been settled,
and their settlement [is] considered consolidated in this proceeding
in accordance with law, a single administrator therefor is both
proper and necessary, and, as the petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda.
de dela Rosa has established her right to the appointment as
administratrix of the estates, the Court hereby APPOINTS her as
the ADMINISTRATRIX of the intestate estate of the decedent JOSEFA
DELGADO in relation to the estate of DR. GUILLERMO J. RUSTIA.
Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION
issue to the petitioner CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA
upon her filing of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA RUSTIA is hereby ordered
to cease and desist from her acts of administration of the subject
estates, and is likewise ordered to turn over to the appointed
administratix all her collections of the rentals and income due on
the assets of the estates in question, including all documents,
papers, records and titles pertaining to such estates to the
petitioner and appointed administratix CARLOTA DELGADO VDA.
DE DE LA ROSA, immediately upon receipt of this Decision. The
same oppositor is hereby required to render an accounting of her
actual administration of the estates in controversy within a period
of sixty (60) days from receipt hereof.
SO ORDERED.28
On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which was denied on
the ground that the record on appeal was not filed on time. 29 They
then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus 30 which was
dismissed by the Court of Appeals.31 However, on motion for
reconsideration and after hearing the parties oral arguments, the
Court of Appeals reversed itself and gave due course to oppositors
appeal in the interest of substantial justice.32
In a petition for review to this Court, petitioners assailed the
resolution of the Court of Appeals, on the ground that oppositors
failure to file the record on appeal within the reglementary period
was a jurisdictional defect which nullified the appeal. On October
10, 1997, this Court allowed the continuance of the appeal. The
pertinent portion of our decision33 read:
As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be followed.
However, under exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of
an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice.
xxx xxx xxx
The respondent court likewise pointed out the trial courts
pronouncements as to certain matters of substance, relating to the
determination of the heirs of the decedents and the party entitled
to the administration of their estate, which were to be raised in the
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
appeal, but were barred absolutely by the denial of the record on
appeal upon too technical ground of late filing.
xxx xxx xxx
In this instance, private respondents intention to raise valid issues
in the appeal is apparent and should not have been construed as
an attempt to delay or prolong the administration proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx
A review of the trial courts decision is needed.
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court
hereby AFFIRMS the Resolution dated November 27, 1991 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23415, for the APPROVAL of
the private respondents Record on Appeal and
the CONTINUANCE of the appeal from the Manila, Branch LV
Regional Trial Courts May 11, 1990 decision.
SO ORDERED.
Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals 34 partially set aside the
trial courts decision. Upon motion for reconsideration, 35 the Court
of Appeals amended its earlier decision. 36 The dispositive portion of
the amended decision read:
With the further modification, our assailed decision
is RECONSIDERED and VACATED. Consequently, the decision of
the trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is
hereby RENDERED declaring: 1.) Dr. Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado Rustia to have been legally married; 2.) the intestate
estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the
children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) entitled to partition among
themselves the intestate estate of Josefa D. Rustia in accordance
with the proportion referred to in this decision; 3.) the oppositors-
appellants as the legal heirs of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia and
thereby entitled to partition his estate in accordance with the
proportion referred to herein; and 4.) the intervenor-appellee
Guillerma S. Rustia as ineligible to inherit from the late Dr.
Guillermo Rustia; thus revoking her appointment as administratrix
of his estate.
The letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo
Rustia in relation to the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado shall
issue to the nominee of the oppositors-appellants upon his or her
qualification and filing of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).
Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is hereby ordered to
cease and desist from her acts of administration of the subject
estates and to turn over to the appointed administrator all her
collections of the rentals and incomes due on the assets of the
estates in question, including all documents, papers, records and
titles pertaining to such estates to the appointed administrator,
immediately upon notice of his qualification and posting of the
requisite bond, and to render an accounting of her (Guillermina
Rustia Rustia) actual administration of the estates in controversy
within a period of sixty (60) days from notice of the administrators
qualification and posting of the bond.
The issue of the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication
executed by Dr. Guillermo Rustia on June 15, 1973
isREMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings to
determine the extent of the shares of Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and
the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) affected by the said
adjudication.
Hence, this recourse.
The issues for our resolution are:
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1. whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo
Rustia and Josefa Delgado;
2. who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia
and Josefa Delgado are;
3. who should be issued letters of administration.
The marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
A presumption is an inference of the existence or non-existence of
a fact which courts are permitted to draw from proof of other facts.
Presumptions are classified into presumptions of law and
presumptions of fact. Presumptions of law are, in turn, either
conclusive or disputable.37
Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are
satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and
overcome by other evidence:
xxx xxx xxx
(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage;
xxx xxx xxx
In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption
that a valid marriage existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa
Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be
doubted. Their family and friends knew them to be married. Their
reputed status as husband and wife was such that even the
original petition for letters of administration filed by Luisa
Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975 referred to them as "spouses."
Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia
had simply lived together as husband and wife without the benefit
of marriage. They make much of the absence of a record of the
contested marriage, the testimony of a witness 38 attesting that
they were not married, and a baptismal certificate which referred
to Josefa Delgado as "Seorita" or unmarried woman.39
We are not persuaded.
First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary
evidence of marriage, its absence is not always proof that no
marriage in fact took place.40 Once the presumption of marriage
arises, other evidence may be presented in support thereof. The
evidence need not necessarily or directly establish the marriage
but must at least be enough to strengthen the presumption of
marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado
as Mrs. Guillermo Rustia, 41 the passport issued to her as Josefa D.
Rustia,42 the declaration under oath of no less than Guillermo
Rustia that he was married to Josefa Delgado 43 and the titles to the
properties in the name of "Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa
Delgado," more than adequately support the presumption of
marriage. These are public documents which are prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein. 44 No clear and
convincing evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of the
truth of the recitals therein was presented by petitioners.
Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners own witness whose
testimony they primarily relied upon to support their position,
confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had proposed marriage to Josefa
Delgado and that eventually, the two had "lived together as
husband and wife." This again could not but strengthen the
presumption of marriage.
Third, the baptismal certificate45 was conclusive proof only of the
baptism administered by the priest who baptized the child. It was
no proof of the veracity of the declarations and statements
contained therein,46 such as the alleged single or unmarried
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
("Seorita") civil status of Josefa Delgado who had no hand in its
preparation.
Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo
Rustia and Josefa Delgado. In this jurisdiction, every intendment of
the law leans toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together apparently in marriage are presumed to be in fact
married. This is the usual order of things in society and, if the
parties are not what they hold themselves out to be, they would be
living in constant violation of the common rules of law and
propriety. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume
marriage.47
The Lawful Heirs Of Josefa Delgado
To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the
questioned status of the cohabitation of her mother Felisa Delgado
with Ramon Osorio must first be addressed.
As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either conclusive or
disputable. Conclusive presumptions are inferences which the law
makes so peremptory that no contrary proof, no matter how
strong, may overturn them.48 On the other hand, disputable
presumptions, one of which is the presumption of marriage, can be
relied on only in the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary.
Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa
Delgado and Ramon Osorio. The oppositors (now respondents)
chose merely to rely on the disputable presumption of marriage
even in the face of such countervailing evidence as (1) the
continued use by Felisa and Luis (her son with Ramon Osorio) of
the surname Delgado and (2) Luis Delgados and Caridad
Concepcions Partida de Casamiento49 identifying Luis as "hijo
natural de Felisa Delgado" (the natural child of Felisa Delgado).50
All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently
overcame the rebuttable presumption of marriage. Felisa Delgado
and Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence, all the children born
to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio
Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta,
Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed
Delgado,51 were her natural children.52
Pertinent to this matter is the following observation:
Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y with another
woman, C; then X and Y would be natural brothers and sisters, but
of half-blood relationship. Can they succeed each other
reciprocally?
The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate
children and legitimate children of the same parent, even though
there is unquestionably a tie of blood between them. It seems that
to allow an illegitimate child to succeed ab intestato (from) another
illegitimate child begotten with a parent different from that of the
former, would be allowing the illegitimate child greater rights than
a legitimate child. Notwithstanding this, however, we submit that
succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers
and sisters are only of the half-blood. The reason impelling the
prohibition on reciprocal successions between legitimate and
illegitimate families does not apply to the case under
consideration. That prohibition has for its basis the difference in
category between illegitimate and legitimate relatives. There is no
such difference when all the children are illegitimate children of the
same parent, even if begotten with different persons. They all
stand on the same footing before the law, just like legitimate
children of half-blood relation. We submit, therefore, that the rules
regarding succession of legitimate brothers and sisters should be
applicable to them. Full blood illegitimate brothers and sisters
should receive double the portion of half-blood brothers and
sisters; and if all are either of the full blood or of the half-blood,
they shall share equally.53
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to
her by full-blood, except Luis Delgado, her half-brother.
Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they may inherit from
each other. Accordingly, all of them are entitled to inherit from
Josefa Delgado.
We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the
nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa
Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of
representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of the
children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces).
Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and
grandnieces.54 Therefore, the only collateral relatives of Josefa
Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are
her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the
time of her death on September 8, 1972. They have a vested right
to participate in the inheritance. 55 The records not being clear on
this matter, it is now for the trial court to determine who were the
surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa Delgado
at the time of her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia, 56 they are
entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article
1001 of the new Civil Code:57
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with
the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the
inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the
other one-half.
Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia,
Guillermo could not have validly adjudicated Josefas estate all to
himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is clear.
Adjudication by an heir of the decedents entire estate to himself
by means of an affidavit is allowed only if he is the sole heir to the
estate:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs.
If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs are all of
age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal
representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the parties may,
without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among
themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in
the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they
may do so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one
heir, he may adjudicate to himself the estate by means of
an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. x x x
(emphasis supplied)
The Lawful Heirs Of Guillermo Rustia
Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate
child58 of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be entitled to
successional rights only upon proof of an admission or recognition
of paternity.59 She, however, claimed the status of an
acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia only after the
death of the latter on February 28, 1974 at which time it was
already the new Civil Code that was in effect.
Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950),
illegitimate children absolutely had no hereditary rights. This
draconian edict was, however, later relaxed in the new Civil Code
which granted certain successional rights to illegitimate children
but only on condition that they were first recognized or
acknowledged by the parent.
Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or
voluntary.60 Recognition is compulsory in any of the following
cases:
(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the
period of the offense coincides more or less with that of the
conception;
(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a
child of the alleged father (or mother) 61 by the direct acts
of the latter or of his family;
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the
mother cohabited with the supposed father;
(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof
that the defendant is his father. 62
On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in any
authentic writing.63
Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first,
compulsory recognition through the open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child and second,
voluntary recognition through authentic writing.
There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an
illegitimate child from her birth until the death of her putative
father Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not constitute
acknowledgment but a mere ground by which she could have
compelled acknowledgment through the courts.64 Furthermore, any
(judicial) action for compulsory acknowledgment has a dual
limitation: the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative
parent.65 On the death of either, the action for compulsory
recognition can no longer be filed.66 In this case, intervenor
Guillermas right to claim compulsory acknowledgment prescribed
upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on February 28, 1974.
The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillermas second ground)
must likewise fail. An authentic writing, for purposes of voluntary
recognition, is understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of
the parent (in this case, Guillermo Rustia). This includes a public
instrument or a private writing admitted by the father to be
his.67 Did intervenors report card from the University of Santo
Tomas and Josefa Delgados obituary prepared by Guillermo Rustia
qualify as authentic writings under the new Civil Code?
Unfortunately not. The report card of intervenor Guillerma did not
bear the signature of Guillermo Rustia. The fact that his name
appears there as intervenors parent/guardian holds no weight
since he had no participation in its preparation. Similarly, while
witnesses testified that it was Guillermo Rustia himself who drafted
the notice of death of Josefa Delgado which was published in the
Sunday Times on September 10, 1972, that published obituary was
not the authentic writing contemplated by the law. What could
have been admitted as an authentic writing was the original
manuscript of the notice, in the handwriting of Guillermo Rustia
himself and signed by him, not the newspaper clipping of the
obituary. The failure to present the original signed manuscript was
fatal to intervenors claim.
The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina
Rustia Rustia, who was never adopted in accordance with law.
Although a petition for her adoption was filed by Guillermo Rustia,
it never came to fruition and was dismissed upon the latters
death. We affirm the ruling of both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals holding her a legal stranger to the deceased spouses and
therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab intestato. We quote:
Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which [created]
between two persons a relationship similar to that which results
from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption made
through the court, or in pursuance with the procedure laid down
under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is
not of natural law at all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. To
establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly
carried out, otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact
of adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmatively [proven]
by the person claiming its existence.68
Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the
estate of Guillermo Rustia, namely, intervenor Guillerma Rustia and
the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia, are not lawful heirs
of the decedent. Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there
are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving
spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of
the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
the remaining claimants, consisting of his sisters, 69 nieces and
nephews.70
Entitlement To Letters Of Administration
An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer
the intestate estate of the decedent. Rule 78, Section 6 of the
Rules of Court prescribes an order of preference in the
appointment of an administrator:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no
executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a bond, or a person
dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be,
or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to
such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of
kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to
serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be,
or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be
incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow or
next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of
the person to apply for administration or to request that
the administration be granted to some other person, it may
be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if
competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to
serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court
may select.
In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration
is the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. 71 The order
of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-
administrators, specially in cases where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be
represented in the management of the estates, 72a situation which
obtains here.
It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in
the persons of Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and a nominee
of the nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They are the next
of kin of the deceased spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo
Rustia, respectively.
WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11,
1990 decision of the RTC Manila, Branch 55) is hereby DENIED.
The assailed October 24, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals
is AFFIRMED with the following modifications:
1. Guillermo Rustias June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-
adjudication is hereby ANNULLED.
2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half
of the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado. The remaining
half shall pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa
Delgado who survived her and (b) the children of any of
Josefa Delgados full- or half-siblings who may have
predeceased her, also surviving at the time of her death.
Josefa Delgados grandnephews and grandnieces are
excluded from her estate. In this connection, the trial court
is hereby ordered to determine the identities of the
relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to share in her
estate.
3. Guillermo Rustias estate (including its one-half share of
Josefa Delgados estate) shall be inherited by Marciana
Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose
respective shares shall be per capita) and the children of
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia

and whose respective shares shall be per stirpes).
Considering that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and
Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their respective
shares shall pertain to their estates.

4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate

estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado shall issue
to Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a nominee
from among the heirs of Guillermo Rustia, as joint
administrators, upon their qualification and filing of the
requisite bond in such amount as may be determined by
the trial court.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

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Persons 4th Exam Cases

G.R. No. 159785 April 27, 2007 petitioner to Legaspi City to attend a seminar on town planning.
They stayed at the Mayon Hotel.
TEOFISTO I. VERCELES, Petitioner,
vs. On November 11, 1986, at around 11:00 a.m., petitioner fetched
MARIA CLARISSA POSADA, in her own behalf, and as mother Clarissa from "My Brothers Place" where the seminar was being
of minor VERNA AIZA POSADA, CONSTANTINO POSADA and held. Clarissa avers that he told her that they would have lunch at
FRANCISCA POSADA, Respondents. Mayon Hotel with their companions who had gone ahead. When
they reached the place her companions were nowhere. After
DECISION petitioner ordered food, he started making amorous advances on
her. She panicked, ran and closeted herself inside a comfort room
QUISUMBING, J.: where she stayed until someone knocked. She said she hurriedly
exited and left the hotel. Afraid of the mayor, she kept the incident
to herself. She went on as casual employee. One of her tasks was
following-upbarangay road and maintenance projects.

This petition for review seeks the reversal of the Decision 1 dated
On December 22, 1986, on orders of petitioner, she went to Virac,
May 30, 2003 and the Resolution 2 dated August 27, 2003 of the
Catanduanes, to follow up funds for barangayprojects. At around
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50557. The appellate court had
11:00 a.m. the same day, she went to Catanduanes Hotel on
affirmed with modification the Judgment3 dated January 4, 1995 of
instructions of petitioner who asked to be briefed on the progress
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 42, in
of her mission. They met at the lobby and he led her upstairs
Civil Case No. 1401. The RTC held petitioner liable to pay monthly
because he said he wanted the briefing done at the restaurant at
support to Verna Aiza Posada since her birth on September 23,
the upper floor.
1987 as well as moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees
and costs of suit.
Instead, however, petitioner opened a hotel room door, led her in,
and suddenly embraced her, as he told her that he was unhappy
The facts in this case as found by the lower courts are as follows:
with his wife and would "divorce" her anytime. He also claimed he
could appoint her as a municipal development coordinator. She
Respondent Maria Clarissa Posada (Clarissa), a young lass from the succumbed to his advances. But again she kept the incident to
barrio of Pandan, Catanduanes, sometime in 1986 met a close herself.
family friend, petitioner Teofisto I. Verceles, mayor of Pandan. He
then called on the Posadas and at the end of the visit, offered
Sometime in January 1987, when she missed her menstruation, she
Clarissa a job.
said she wrote petitioner that she feared she was pregnant. In
another letter in February 1987, she told him she was pregnant. In
Clarissa accepted petitioners offer and worked as a casual a handwritten letter dated February 4, 1987, he replied:
employee in the mayors office starting on September 1, 1986.
From November 10 to 15 in 1986, with companions Aster de
My darling Chris,
Quiros, Pat del Valle, Jaime and Jocelyn Vargas, she accompanied

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
Should you become pregnant even unexpectedly, I should have no
regret, because I love you and you love me.
Let us rejoice a common responsibility you and I shall take care of
it and let him/her see the light of this beautiful world.
We know what to do to protect our honor and integrity.
Just relax and be happy, if true.
With all my love,
Ninoy
2/4/874
Clarissa explained petitioner used an alias "Ninoy" and addressed
her as "Chris," probably because of their twenty-five (25)-year age
gap. In court, she identified petitioners penmanship which she
claims she was familiar with as an employee in his office.
Clarissa presented three other handwritten letters 5 sent to her by
petitioner, two of which were in his letterhead as mayor of Pandan.
She also presented the pictures 6 petitioner gave her of his youth
and as a public servant, all bearing his handwritten notations at
the back.
Clarissa avers that on March 3, 1987, petitioner, aware of her
pregnancy, handed her a letter and P2,000 pocket money to go to
Manila and to tell her parents that she would enroll in a CPA review
course or look for a job. In June 1987, petitioner went to see her in
Manila and gave her another P2,000 for her delivery. When her
parents learned of her pregnancy, sometime in July, her father
fetched her and brought her back to Pandan. On September 23,
1987,7 she gave birth to a baby girl, Verna Aiza Posada.
Clarissas mother, Francisca, corroborated Clarissas story. She said
they learned of their daughters pregnancy through her husbands
cousin. She added that she felt betrayed by petitioner and shamed
by her daughters pregnancy.
The Posadas filed a Complaint for Damages coupled with
Support Pendente Lite before the RTC, Virac, Catanduanes against
petitioner on October 23, 1987.8
On January 4, 1995, the trial court issued a judgment in their favor,
the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered in favor of the [respondents] and against the [petitioner]
and ordering the latter:
1. to pay a monthly support of P2,000.00 to Verna Aiza
Posada since her birth on September 23, 1987 as he was
proved to be the natural father of the above-named minor
as shown by the exhibits and testimonies of the
[respondents];
2. to pay the amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages;
3. to pay the amount of P30,000.00 as exemplary
damages;
4. to pay the sum of P10,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
5. to pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.9
Verceles appealed to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the
judgment with modification, specifying the party to whom the
damages was awarded. The dispositive portion of the Court of
Appeals decision reads:
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED with WOULD THE RTC COURT HAVE ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER THIS
modification by ordering [petitioner] Teofisto I. Verceles: ISSUE OF APPELLANTS PATERNITY OF THE CHILD, WHICH IS MADE
COLLATERAL TO THIS ACTION FOR DAMAGES?11
1. To pay a monthly support of P2,000.00 to Verna Aiza
Posada from her birth on September 23, 1987. In sum, the pertinent issues in this case are: (1) whether or not
paternity and filiation can be resolved in an action for damages
2. To pay [respondent] Maria Clarissa Posada the sum with support pendente lite; (2) whether or not the filiation of Verna
of P15,000.00 as moral damages and [P]15,000.00 as Aiza Posada as the illegitimate child of petitioner was proven; and
exemplary damages. (3) whether or not respondents are entitled to damages.

3. To pay [respondents] spouses Constantino and Francisca In his Memorandum, petitioner asserts that the fact of paternity
Posada the sum of P15,000.00 as moral damages and filiation of Verna Aiza Posada has not been duly established or
and P15,000.00 as exemplary damages. proved in the proceedings; that the award for damages and
attorneys fees has no basis; and that the issue of filiation should
4. To pay each of the said three [respondents] P10,000.00 be resolved in a direct and not a collateral action.
as attorneys fees; and
Petitioner argues he never signed the birth certificate of Verna Aiza
5. To pay the costs of suit. Posada as father and that it was respondent Clarissa who placed
his name on the birth certificate as father without his consent. He
further contends the alleged love letters he sent to Clarissa are not
SO ORDERED.10
admissions of paternity but mere expressions of concern and
advice.12 As to the award for damages, petitioner argues Clarissa
Hence, this petition. could not have suffered moral damages because she was in pari
delicto, being a willing participant in the "consensual carnal act"
Petitioner now presents the following issues for resolution: between them.13 In support of his argument that the issue on
filiation should have been resolved in a separate action, petitioner
I. cited the case of Rosales v. Castillo Rosales14 where we held that
the legitimacy of a child which is controversial can only be resolved
WAS THERE ANY EVIDENCE ON RECORD TO PROVE THAT in a direct action.15
APPELLANT VERCELES WAS THE FATHER OF THE CHILD?
On the other hand, respondents in their Memorandum maintain
II. that the Court of Appeals committed no error in its decision. They
reiterate that Clarissas clear narration of the circumstances on
WOULD THIS ACTION FOR DAMAGES PROSPER? "how she was deflowered" by petitioner, the love letters and
pictures given by petitioner to Clarissa, the corroborating
testimony of Clarissas mother, the fact that petitioner proffered no
III.
countervailing evidence, are preponderant evidence of paternity.
They cited the case of De Jesus v. Syquia 16 where we held that a

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
conceived child can be acknowledged because this is an act
favorable to the child.17 They also argue that damages should be
awarded because petitioner inveigled Clarissa to succumb to his
sexual advances.18
Could paternity and filiation be resolved in an action for damages?
On this score, we find petitioners stance unmeritorious. The
caption is not determinative of the nature of a pleading. In a string
of cases we made the following rulings. It is not the caption but the
facts alleged which give meaning to a pleading. Courts are called
upon to pierce the form and go into the substance thereof. 19 In
determining the nature of an action, it is not the caption, but the
averments in the petition and the character of the relief sought,
that are controlling.20
A perusal of the Complaint before the RTC shows that although its
caption states "Damages coupled with SupportPendente Lite,"
Clarissas averments therein, her meeting with petitioner, his offer
of a job, his amorous advances, her seduction, their trysts, her
pregnancy, birth of her child, his letters, her demand for support
for her child, all clearly establish a case for recognition of paternity.
We have held that the due recognition of an illegitimate child in a
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in
any authentic writing is, in itself, a consummated act of
acknowledgement of the child, and no further court action is
required. In fact, any authentic writing is treated not just a ground
for compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary recognition
that does not require a separate action for judicial approval. 21
The letters of petitioner marked as Exhibits "A" to "D" are
declarations that lead nowhere but to the conclusion that he sired
Verna Aiza. Although petitioner used an alias in these letters, the
similarity of the penmanship in these letters vis the annotation at
the back of petitioners fading photograph as a youth is
unmistakable. Even an inexperienced eye will come to the
conclusion that they were all written by one and the same person,
petitioner, as found by the courts a quo.
We also note that in his Memorandum, petitioner admitted his
affair with Clarissa, the exchange of love letters between them,
and his giving her money during her pregnancy. 22
Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code are the rules for
establishing filiation. They are as follows:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any
of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a
final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document
or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation
shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate
filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate
children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in
Article 173, except when the action is based on the second
paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought
during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
The letters, one of which is quoted above, are private handwritten
instruments of petitioner which establish Verna Aizas filiation
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

under Article 172 (2) of the Family Code. In addition, the array of
evidence presented by respondents, the dates, letters, pictures
and testimonies, to us, are convincing, and irrefutable evidence
that Verna Aiza is, indeed, petitioners illegitimate child.

Petitioner not only failed to rebut the evidence presented, he

himself presented no evidence of his own. His bare denials are
telling. Well-settled is the rule that denials, if unsubstantiated by
clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving which
merit no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary
value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.23

We, however, cannot rule that respondents are entitled to

damages. Article 221924of the Civil Code which states moral
damages may be recovered in cases of seduction is inapplicable in
this case because Clarissa was already an adult at the time she
had an affair with petitioner.

Neither can her parents be entitled to damages. Besides, there is

nothing in law or jurisprudence that entitles the parents of a
consenting adult who begets a love child to damages. Respondents
Constantino and Francisca Posada have not cited any law or
jurisprudence to justify awarding damages to them.

We, however, affirm the grant of attorneys fees in consonance

with Article 2208 (2)25 and (11)26 of the New Civil Code.

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision dated May 30, 2003 and the
Resolution dated August 27, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 50557 are AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that
the award of moral damages and exemplary damages
be DELETED.

SO ORDERED.

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
SECOND DIVISION
JENIE SAN JUAN DELA CRUZ and minor G.R. No. 177728
CHRISTIANDELA CRUZ AQUINO,
represented by JENIE SANJUAN DELA
CRUZ,
Petitioners
versus
RONALD PAUL S. GRACIA, in his capacity
as City Civil Registrar of Antipolo City,
Respondent.
For several months in 2005, then 21-year old petitioner Jenie
San Juan Dela Cruz (Jenie) and then 19-year old Christian Dominique
Sto. Tomas Aquino (Dominique) lived together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage. They resided in the house of
Dominiques parents Domingo B. Aquino and Raquel Sto. Tomas Aquino
at Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal.
On September 4, 2005, Dominique died. [1] After almost two
months, or on November 2, 2005, Jenie, who continued to live with
Dominiques parents, gave birth to her herein co-petitioner minor child
Christian Dela Cruz Aquino at the Antipolo Doctors Hospital, Antipolo
City.
Jenie applied for registration of the childs birth, using
Dominiques surname Aquino, with the Office of the City Civil
Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of which she submitted the
childs Certificate of Live Birth,[2] Affidavit to Use the Surname of the
Father[3] (AUSF) which she had executed and signed, and Affidavit of
Acknowledgment executed by Dominiques father Domingo Butch
Aquino.[4] Both affidavits attested, inter alia, that during the lifetime of
Dominique, he had continuously acknowledged his yet unborn child,
and that his paternity had never been questioned. Jenie attached to
the AUSF a document entitled AUTOBIOGRAPHY which Dominique,
during his lifetime, wrote in his own handwriting, the pertinent portions
of which read:
AQUINO, CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE S.T.
AUTOBIOGRAPHY
IM CHRISTIAN DOMINIQUE STO. TOMAS
AQUINO, 19 YEARS OF AGE TURNING 20 THIS COMING
OCTOBER 31, 2005.[5] I RESIDE AT PULANG-LUPA
STREET BRGY. DULUMBAYAN, TERESA, RIZAL. I AM THE
YOUNGEST IN OUR FAMILY. I HAVE ONE BROTHER
NAMED JOSEPH BUTCH STO. TOMAS AQUINO. MY
FATHERS NAME IS DOMINGO BUTCH AQUINO AND MY
MOTHERS NAME IS RAQUEL STO. TOMAS AQUINO. x x
x.
xxxx
AS OF NOW I HAVE MY WIFE NAMED JENIE
DELA CRUZ. WE MET EACH OTHER IN OUR
HOMETOWN, TEREZA RIZAL. AT FIRST WE BECAME
GOOD FRIENDS, THEN WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH
OTHER, THEN WE BECAME GOOD COUPLES. AND AS
OF NOW SHE IS PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE
TOGETHER IN OUR HOUSE NOW. THATS ALL.
[6]
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
By letter dated November 11, 2005,[7] the City Civil Registrar of
Antipolo City, Ronald Paul S. Gracia (respondent), denied Jenies
application for registration of the childs name in this wise:
7. Rule 7 of Administrative Order No. 1, Series of
2004 (Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Republic Act No. 9255 [An Act Allowing
Illegitimate Children to Use the Surname of their
Father, Amending for the Purpose, Article 176 of
Executive Order No. 209, otherwise Known as the
Family Code of the Philippines]) provides that:
Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the
Surname of the Father
7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the
surname of the father if a public
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
document is executed by the
father, either at the back of the
Certificate of Live Birth or in a
separate document.
7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made
through a private handwritten
instrument, the child shall use
the surname of the father,
provided the registration is
supported by the following
documents:
a. AUSF[8]
b. Consent of the child, if 18 years
old and over at the time of
the filing of the document.
c. Any two of the following
documents showing clearly
the paternity between the
father and the child:
1. Employment records
2. SSS/GSIS records
3. Insurance
4. Certification of membership in any organization
5. Statement of Assets and Liability
6. Income Tax Return (ITR)
In summary, the child cannot use the surname of his
father because he was born out of wedlock and the
father unfortunately died prior to his birth and has no
more capacity to acknowledge his paternity to the
child (either through the back of Municipal Form No.
102 Affidavit of Acknowledgment/Admission of
Paternity or the Authority to Use the Surname of the
Father). (Underscoring supplied)
Jenie and the child promptly filed a complaint [9] for
injunction/registration of name against respondent before
the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, docketed as SCA Case No. 06-
539, which was raffled to Branch 73 thereof. The complaint alleged
that, inter alia, the denial of registration of the childs name is a
violation of his right to use the surname of his deceased father
under Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9255,[10] which provides:
Article 176. Illegitimate children shall use the
surname and shall be under the parental authority of
their mother, and shall be entitled to support in
conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate
children may use the surname of their father if their
filiation has been expressly recognized by the
father through the record of birth appearing in
the civil register, or when an admission in a public
document or private handwritten instrument is
made by the father. Provided, the father has the right
to institute an action before the regular courts to
prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The legitime of
each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of the
legitime of a legitimate child. (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
They maintained that the Autobiography executed by Dominique
constitutes an admission of paternity in a private handwritten
instrument within the contemplation of the above-quoted provision of
law.
For failure to file a responsive pleading or answer despite
service of summons, respondent was declared in default.
Jenie thereupon presented evidence ex-parte. She testified on
the circumstances of her common-law relationship with Dominique and
affirmed her declarations in her AUSF that during his lifetime, he had
acknowledged his yet unborn child.[11]She offered Dominiques
handwritten Autobiography (Exhibit A) as her documentary evidence-
in-chief.[12] Dominiques lone brother, Joseph Butch S.T. Aquino, also
testified, corroborating Jenies declarations.[13]
By Decision[14] of April 25, 2007, the trial court dismissed the
complaint for lack of cause of action as the Autobiography
was unsigned, citing paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 (Definition of Terms)
of Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 1, Series of 2004 (the Rules
and Regulations Governing the Implementation of R.A.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
9255) which defines private handwritten document through which a
father may acknowledge an illegitimate child as follows:
2.2 Private handwritten instrument an
instrument executed in the handwriting of the father
and duly signed by him where he expressly recognizes
paternity to the child. (Underscoring supplied)
The trial court held that even if Dominique was the author of the
handwritten Autobiography, the same does not contain any express
recognition of paternity.
Hence, this direct resort to the Court via Petition for Review on
Certiorari raising this purely legal issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT THE UNSIGNED
HANDWRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE DECEASED
FATHER OF MINOR CHRISTIAN DELA CRUZ CAN BE
CONSIDERED AS A RECOGNITION OF PATERNITY IN A
PRIVATE HANDWRITTEN INSTRUMENT WITHIN THE
CONTEMPLATION OF ARTICLE 176 OF THE FAMILY
CODE, AS AMENDED BY R.A. 9255, WHICH ENTITLES
THE SAID MINOR TO USE HIS FATHERS SURNAME.
[15]
(Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners contend that Article 176 of the Family Code, as
amended, does not expressly require that the private handwritten
instrument containing the putative fathers admission of paternity must
be signed by him. They add that the deceaseds handwritten
Autobiography, though unsigned by him, is sufficient, for the
requirement in the above-quoted paragraph 2.2 of the Administrative
Order that the admission/recognition must be duly signed by the father
is void as it unduly expanded the earlier-quoted provision of Article 176
of the Family Code.[16]
Petitioners further contend that the trial court erred in not
finding that Dominiques handwritten Autobiography contains a clear
and unmistakable recognition of the childs paternity. [17]
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
submits that respondents position, as affirmed by the trial court, is in
consonance with the law and thus prays for the dismissal of the
petition. It further submits that Dominiques Autobiography merely
acknowledged Jenies pregnancy but not [his] paternity of the child she
was carrying in her womb.[18]
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended by R.A. 9255,
permits an illegitimate child to use the surname of his/her father if the
latter had expressly recognized him/her as his offspring through
the record of birth appearing in the civil register, orthrough
an admission made in a public or private handwritten
instrument. The recognition made in any of these documents is, in
itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the childs paternity;
hence, no separate action for judicial approval is necessary. [19]
Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended, does not, indeed,
explicitly state that the private handwritten instrument acknowledging
the childs paternity must be signed by the putative father. This
provision must, however, be read in conjunction with related provisions
of the Family Code which require that recognition by the father must
bear his signature, thus:
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish
their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same evidence as legitimate children.
xxxx
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in
the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate
filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child through a
written instrument must affix his signature thereon is clearly implied
in Article 176 of the Family Code. Paragraph 2.2, Rule 2 of A.O. No. 1,
Series of 2004, merely articulated such requirement; it did not unduly
expand the import of Article 176 as claimed by petitioners.
In the present case, however, special circumstances exist to
hold that Dominiques Autobiography, though unsigned by
him, substantially satisfies the requirement of the law.
First, Dominique died about two months prior to the childs
birth. Second, the relevant matters in the Autobiography,
unquestionably handwritten by Dominique, correspond to the facts
culled from the testimonial evidence Jenie proffered. [20]Third, Jenies
testimony is corroborated by the Affidavit of Acknowledgment of
Dominiques father Domingo Aquino and testimony of his brother
Joseph Butch Aquino whose hereditary rights could be affected by the
registration of the questioned recognition of the child. These
circumstances indicating Dominiques paternity of the child give life to
his statements in his Autobiography that JENIE DELA CRUZ is
MY WIFE as WE FELL IN LOVE WITH EACH OTHER and NOW SHE IS
PREGNANT AND FOR THAT WE LIVE TOGETHER.
In Herrera v. Alba,[21] the Court summarized the laws, rules,
and jurisprudence on establishing filiation, discoursing in relevant part:
Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence
Establishing Filiation
The relevant provisions of the Family Code
provide as follows:
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish
their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same evidence as legitimate children.
xxxx
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is
established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the
civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in
a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the
legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession
of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules
of Court and special laws.
The Rules on Evidence include provisions on
pedigree. The relevant sections of Rule 130 provide:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree.
The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable
to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person
related to him by birth or marriage, may be received
in evidence where it occurred before the controversy,
and the relationship between the two persons is
shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family
genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and
the places where these facts occurred, and the names
of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family
history intimately connected with pedigree.
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition
regarding pedigree. The reputation or tradition
existing in a family previous to the controversy, in
respect to the pedigree of any one of its members,
may be received in evidence if the witness testifying
thereon be also a member of the family, either by
consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
other family books or charts, engraving on rings,
family portraits and the like, may be received as
evidence of pedigree.
This Court's rulings further specify what
incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence to
establish filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA, a case petitioner
often cites, we stated that the issue of paternity still
has to be resolved by such conventional evidence
as the relevant incriminating verbal and written
acts by the putative father. Under Article 278 of
the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent
shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a
statement before a court of record, or in any
authentic writing. To be effective, the claim of
filiation must be made by the putative father
himself and the writing must be the writing of
the putative father. A notarial agreement to support
a child whose filiation is admitted by the putative
father was considered acceptable evidence. Letters to
the mother vowing to be a good father to the child
and pictures of the putative father cuddling the child
on various occasions, together with the certificate of
live birth, proved filiation. However, a student
permanent record, a written consent to a father's
operation, or a marriage contract where the putative
father gave consent, cannot be taken as authentic
writing. Standing alone, neither a certificate of
baptism nor family pictures are sufficient to establish
filiation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the earlier quoted
statements in Dominiques Autobiography have been made and written
by him. Taken together with the other relevant facts extant herein that
Dominique, during his lifetime, and Jenie were living together as
common-law spouses for several months in 2005 at his parents house
in Pulang-lupa, Dulumbayan, Teresa, Rizal; she was pregnant when
Dominique died on September 4, 2005; and about two months after his
death, Jenie gave birth to the child they sufficiently establish that the
child of Jenie is Dominiques.
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it
fit to adopt the following rules respecting the requirement of affixing
the signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten
instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or
illegitimate child is made:
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece
of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict
compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by the
acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument
is accompanied by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices
that the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made and
handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative
of such other evidence.
Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the
paramount consideration in resolving questions affecting him. [22] Article
3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a Child of which
the Philippines is a signatory is similarly emphatic:
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether
undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or
legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall
be a primary consideration.[23] (Underscoring supplied)
It is thus (t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule
on the investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, especially
of illegitimate children x x x.[24] Too, (t)he State as parens
patriae affords special protection to children from abuse, exploitation
and other conditions prejudicial to their development.[25]
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

In the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father bears

the stigma of dishonor. It is to petitioner minor childs best interests to
allow him to bear the surname of the now deceased Dominique and
enter it in his birth certificate.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The City Civil

Registrar of Antipolo City is DIRECTED to immediately enter the
surname of the late Christian Dominique Sto.
Tomas Aquino as the surname of petitioner minor Christian dela Cruz
in his Certificate of Live Birth, and record the same in the Register of
Births.

SO ORDERED.

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
G.R. No. 181258 March 18, 2010
BEN-HUR NEPOMUCENO, Petitioner,
vs.
ARHBENCEL ANN LOPEZ, represented by her mother ARACELI
LOPEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Respondent Arhbencel Ann Lopez (Arhbencel), represented by her
mother Araceli Lopez (Araceli), filed a Complaint1 with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City for recognition and support against
Ben-Hur Nepomuceno (petitioner).
Born on June 8, 1999, Arhbencel claimed to have been begotten out of
an extramarital affair of petitioner with Araceli; that petitioner refused
to affix his signature on her Certificate of Birth; and that, by a
handwritten note dated August 7, 1999, petitioner nevertheless
obligated himself to give her financial support in the amount ofP1,500
on the 15th and 30th days of each month beginning August 15, 1999.
Arguing that her filiation to petitioner was established by the
handwritten note, Arhbencel prayed that petitioner be ordered to: (1)
recognize her as his child, (2) give her support pendente lite in the
increased amount of P8,000 a month, and (3) give her adequate
monthly financial support until she reaches the age of majority.
Petitioner countered that Araceli had not proven that he was the father
of Arhbencel; and that he was only forced to execute the handwritten
note on account of threats coming from the National Peoples Army. 2
By Order of July 4, 2001, 3 Branch 130 of the Caloocan RTC, on the basis
of petitioners handwritten note which it treated as "contractual
support" since the issue of Arhbencels filiation had yet to be
determined during the hearing on the merits, granted Arhbencels
prayer for support pendente lite in the amount of P3,000 a month.
After Arhbencel rested her case, petitioner filed a demurrer to evidence
which the trial court granted by Order dated June 7, 2006, 4 whereupon
the case was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
The trial court held that, among other things, Arhbencels Certificate of
Birth was not prima facie evidence of her filiation to petitioner as it did
not bear petitioners signature; that petitioners handwritten
undertaking to provide support did not contain a categorical
acknowledgment that Arhbencel is his child; and that there was no
showing that petitioner performed any overt act of acknowledgment of
Arhbencel as his illegitimate child after the execution of the note.
On appeal by Arhbencel, the Court of Appeals, by Decision of July 20,
2007,5 reversed the trial courts decision, declared Arhbencel to be
petitioners illegitimate daughter and accordingly ordered petitioner to
give Arhbencel financial support in the increased amount of P4,000
every 15th and 30th days of the month, or a total of P8,000 a month.
The appellate court found that from petitioners payment of Aracelis
hospital bills when she gave birth to Arhbencel and his subsequent
commitment to provide monthly financial support, the only logical
conclusion to be drawn was that he was Arhbencels father; that
petitioner merely acted in bad faith in omitting a statement of
paternity in his handwritten undertaking to provide financial support;
and that the amount of P8,000 a month was reasonable for Arhbencels
subsistence and not burdensome for petitioner in view of his income.
His Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by Resolution dated
January 3, 2008,6 petitioner comes before this Court through the
present Petition for Review on Certiorari.7
Petitioner contends that nowhere in the documentary evidence
presented by Araceli is an explicit statement made by him that he is
the father of Arhbencel; that absent recognition or acknowledgment,
illegitimate children are not entitled to support from the putative
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
parent; that the supposed payment made by him of Aracelis hospital
bills was neither alleged in the complaint nor proven during the trial;
and that Arhbencels claim of paternity and filiation was not
established by clear and convincing evidence.
Arhbencel avers in her Comment that petitioner raises questions of fact
which the appellate court had already addressed, along with the issues
raised in the present petition.8
The petition is impressed with merit.
The relevant provisions of the Family Code that treat of the right to
9 to petitioner as his illegitimate daughter, falls under Article 195(4). As
support are Articles 194 to 196, thus:
Article 194. Support compromises everything indispensable for
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the
family.1awph!1
The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the
preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or training for some
profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority.
Transportation shall include expenses in going to and from school, or to
and from place of work.
Article 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the
following are obliged to support each other to the whole extent set
forth in the preceding article:
1. The spouses;
2. Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
3. Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and
illegitimate children of the latter;
4. Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate
and illegitimate children of the latter; and
5. Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-
blood.
Article 196. Brothers and sisters not legitimately related, whether of
the full or half-blood, are likewise bound to support each other to the
full extent set forth in Article 194, except only when the need for
support of the brother or sister, being of age, is due to a cause
imputable to the claimant's fault or negligence. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Arhbencels demand for support, being based on her claim of filiation
such, her entitlement to support from petitioner is dependent on the
determination of her filiation.
Herrera v. Alba10 summarizes the laws, rules, and jurisprudence on
establishing filiation, discoursing in relevant part as follows:
Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence
Establishing Filiation
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation
in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
xxxx
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document
or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall
be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws.
The Rules on Evidence include provisions on pedigree. The relevant
sections of Rule 130 provide:
SEC. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of
a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of
another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in
evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the
relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than
such act or declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship,
family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the
places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It
embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with
pedigree.
SEC. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. The
reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy,
in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received
in evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the
family, either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or
other family books or charts, engraving on rings, family portraits and
the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.
This Court's rulings further specify what incriminating acts are
acceptable as evidence to establish filiation. In Pe Lim v. CA, a case
petitioner often cites, we stated that the issue of paternity still has to
be resolved by suchconventional evidence as the relevant
incriminating verbal and written acts by the putative father. Under
Article 278 of the New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent
shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court
of record, or in any authentic writing. To be effective, the claim of
filiation must be made by the putative father himself and the writing
must be the writing of the putative father. A notarial agreement to
support a child whose filiation is admitted by the putative father was
considered acceptable evidence. Letters to the mother vowing to be a
good father to the child and pictures of the putative father cuddling the
child on various occasions, together with the certificate of live birth,
proved filiation. However, a student permanent record, a written
consent to a father's operation, or a marriage contract where the
putative father gave consent, cannot be taken as authentic writing.
Standing alone, neither a certificate of baptism nor family pictures are
sufficient to establish filiation. (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In the present case, Arhbencel relies, in the main, on the handwritten
note executed by petitioner which reads:
Manila, Aug. 7, 1999
I, Ben-Hur C. Nepomuceno, hereby undertake to give and provide
financial support in the amount of P1,500.00 every fifteen and thirtieth
day of each month for a total of P3,000.00 a month starting Aug. 15,
1999, to Ahrbencel Ann Lopez, presently in the custody of her mother
Araceli Lopez without the necessity of demand, subject to adjustment
later depending on the needs of the child and my income.
The abovequoted note does not contain any statement whatsoever
about Arhbencels filiation to petitioner. It is, therefore, not within the
ambit of Article 172(2) vis--vis Article 175 of the Family Code which
admits as competent evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of
filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent
concerned.
The note cannot also be accorded the same weight as the notarial
agreement to support the child referred to in Herrera. For it is not even
notarized. And Herrera instructs that the notarial agreement must be
accompanied by the putative fathers admission of filiation to be an
acceptable evidence of filiation. Here, however, not only has petitioner
not admitted filiation through contemporaneous actions. He has
consistently denied it.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
The only other documentary evidence submitted by Arhbencel, a copy
of her Certificate of Birth, 11 has no probative value to establish filiation
to petitioner, the latter not having signed the same.
At bottom, all that Arhbencel really has is petitioners handwritten
undertaking to provide financial support to her which, without more,
fails to establish her claim of filiation. The Court is mindful that the
best interests of the child in cases involving paternity and filiation
should be advanced. It is, however, just as mindful of the disturbance
that unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace of the
putative fathers legitimate family.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision
of July 20, 2007 is SET ASIDE. The Order dated June 7, 2006 of Branch
130 of the Caloocan City RTC dismissing the complaint for insufficiency
of evidence is REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 165166 August 15, 2012
CHARLES GOTARDO, Petitioner,
vs.
DIVINA BULING, Respondent.
VILLARAMA, JR.,*
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari, 1 filed by petitioner
Charles Gotardo, to challenge the March 5, 2004 decision 2 and the
July 27, 2004 resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA GR CV
No. 76326. The CA decision ordered the petitioner to recognize and
provide legal support to his minor son, Gliffze 0. Buling. The CA
resolution denied the petitioner's subsequent motion for
reconsideration.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On September 6, 1995, respondent Divina Buling filed a complaint
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Maasin, Southern Leyte,
Branch 25, for compulsory recognition and support pendente
lite, claiming that the petitioner is the father of her child Gliffze. 4
In his answer, the petitioner denied the imputed paternity of
Gliffze.5 For the parties failure to amicably settle the dispute, the
RTC terminated the pre-trial proceedings. 6 Trial on the merits
ensued.
The respondent testified for herself and presented Rodulfo Lopez
as witness. Evidence for the respondent showed that she met the
petitioner on December 1, 1992 at the Philippine Commercial and
Industrial Bank, Maasin, Southern Leyte branch where she had
been hired as a casual employee, while the petitioner worked as
accounting supervisor.7 The petitioner started courting the
respondent in the third week of December 1992 and they became
sweethearts in the last week of January 1993. 8 The petitioner gave
the respondent greeting cards on special occasions, such as on
Valentines Day and her birthday; she reciprocated his love and
took care of him when he was ill.9
Sometime in September 1993, the petitioner started intimate
sexual relations with the respondent in the formers rented room in
the boarding house managed by Rodulfo, the respondents uncle,
on Tomas Oppus St., Agbao, Maasin, Southern Leyte.10 The
petitioner rented the room from March 1, 1993 to August 30,
1994.11 The sexual encounters occurred twice a month and became
more frequent in June 1994; eventually, on August 8, 1994, the
respondent found out that she was pregnant. 12 When told of the
pregnancy, the petitioner was happy and made plans to marry the
respondent.13 They in fact applied for a marriage license. 14 The
petitioner even inquired about the costs of a wedding reception
and the bridal gown.15 Subsequently, however, the petitioner
backed out of the wedding plans.16
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
The respondent responded by filing a complaint with the Municipal
Trial Court of Maasin, Southern Leyte for damages against the
petitioner for breach of promise to marry. 17 Later, however, the
petitioner and the respondent amicably settled the case. 18
The respondent gave birth to their son Gliffze on March 9,
1995.19 When the petitioner did not show up and failed to provide
support to Gliffze, the respondent sent him a letter on July 24, 1995
demanding recognition of and support for their child. 20 When the
petitioner did not answer the demand, the respondent filed her
complaint for compulsory recognition and support pendente lite.21
The petitioner took the witness stand and testified for himself. He
denied the imputed paternity, 22 claiming that he first had sexual
contact with the respondent in the first week of August 1994 and
she could not have been pregnant for twelve (12) weeks (or three
(3) months) when he was informed of the pregnancy on September
15, 1994.23
During the pendency of the case, the RTC, on the respondents
motion,24 granted a P2,000.00 monthly child support, retroactive
from March 1995.25
THE RTC RULING
In its June 25, 2002 decision, the RTC dismissed the complaint for
insufficiency of evidence proving Gliffzes filiation. It found the
respondents testimony inconsistent on the question of when she
had her first sexual contact with the petitioner, i.e., "September
1993" in her direct testimony while "last week of January 1993"
during her cross-testimony, and her reason for engaging in sexual
contact even after she had refused the petitioners initial marriage
proposal. It ordered the respondent to return the amount of
support pendente lite erroneously awarded, and to pay P 10,000.00
as attorneys fees.26
The respondent appealed the RTC ruling to the CA. 27
THE CA RULING
In its March 5, 2004 decision, the CA departed from the RTC's
appreciation of the respondents testimony, concluding that the
latter merely made an honest mistake in her understanding of the
questions of the petitioners counsel. It noted that the petitioner
and the respondent had sexual relationship even before August
1994; that the respondent had only one boyfriend, the petitioner,
from January 1993 to August 1994; and that the petitioners
allegation that the respondent had previous relationships with
other men remained unsubstantiated. The CA consequently set
aside the RTC decision and ordered the petitioner to recognize his
minor son Gliffze. It also reinstated the RTC order granting
a P 2,000.00 monthly child support.28
When the CA denied29 the petitioners motion for
reconsideration, the petitioner filed the present petition for review
30
on certiorari.
THE PETITION
The petitioner argues that the CA committed a reversible error in
rejecting the RTCs appreciation of the respondents testimony, and
that the evidence on record is insufficient to prove paternity.
THE CASE FOR THE RESPONDENT
The respondent submits that the CA correctly explained that the
inconsistency in the respondents testimony was due to an
incorrect appreciation of the questions asked, and that the record
is replete with evidence proving that the petitioner was her lover
and that they had several intimate sexual encounters during their
relationship, resulting in her pregnancy and Gliffzes birth on March
9, 1995.
THE ISSUE
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
The sole issue before us is whether the CA committed a reversible
error when it set aside the RTCs findings and ordered the
petitioner to recognize and provide legal support to his minor son
Gliffze.
OUR RULING
We do not find any reversible error in the CAs
ruling.
We have recognized that "[f]iliation proceedings are usually filed
not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right
associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in this
case) or inheritance. [In paternity cases, the burden of proof] is on
the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological
father of the child."31
One can prove filiation, either legitimate or illegitimate, through
the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment, an admission of filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned, or the open and continuous possession of the status of
a legitimate or illegitimate child, or any other means allowed by
the Rules of Court and special laws. 32 We have held that such other
proof of one's filiation may be a "baptismal certificate, a judicial
admission, a family bible in which his name has been entered,
common reputation respecting [his] pedigree, admission by
silence, the [testimonies] of witnesses, and other kinds of proof
admissible under Rule 130 of the Rules of Court." 33
In Herrera v. Alba,34 we stressed that there are four significant
procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action that parties
have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption
of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative
father and the child.35 We explained that a prima facie case exists if
a woman declares supported by corroborative proof that she
had sexual relations with the putative father; at this point, the
burden of evidence shifts to the putative father.36 We explained
further that the two affirmative defenses available to the putative
father are: (1) incapability of sexual relations with the mother due
to either physical absence or impotency, or (2) that the mother had
sexual relations with other men at the time of conception. 37
In this case, the respondent established a prima facie case that the
petitioner is the putative father of Gliffze through testimony that
she had been sexually involved only with one man, the petitioner,
at the time of her conception.38 Rodulfo corroborated her testimony
that the petitioner and the respondent had intimate relationship. 39
On the other hand, the petitioner did not deny that he had sexual
encounters with the respondent, only that it occurred on a much
later date than the respondent asserted, such that it was physically
impossible for the respondent to have been three (3) months
pregnant already in September 1994 when he was informed of the
pregnancy.40 However, the petitioner failed to substantiate his
allegations of infidelity and insinuations of promiscuity. His
allegations, therefore, cannot be given credence for lack of
evidentiary support. The petitioners denial cannot overcome the
respondents clear and categorical assertions.
The petitioner, as the RTC did, made much of the variance between
the respondents direct testimony regarding their first sexual
contact as "sometime in September 1993" and her cross-testimony
when she stated that their first sexual contact was "last week of
January 1993," as follows:
ATTY. GO CINCO:
When did the defendant, according to you, start courting
you?
A Third week of December 1992.
Q And you accepted him?
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

A Last week of January 1993.
Q And by October you already had your sexual intercourse?
A Last week of January 1993.
COURT: What do you mean by accepting?
financial capacity of the family. 46Thus, the amount of support is
variable and, for this reason, no final judgment on the amount of
support is made as the amount shall be in proportion to the
resources or means of the giver and the necessities of the
recipient.47It may be reduced or increased proportionately
according to the reduction or increase of the necessities of the
recipient and the resources or means of the person obliged to
support.48

A I accepted his offer of love.41

In this case, we sustain the award of P 2,000.00 monthly child
support, without prejudice to the filing of the proper motion in the
We find that the contradictions are for the most part more RTC for the determination of any support in arrears, considering
apparent than real, having resulted from the failure of the the needs of the child, Gliffze, during the pendency of this case.
respondent to comprehend the question posed, but this
misunderstanding was later corrected and satisfactorily explained.
WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the petition for lack of merit. The
Indeed, when confronted for her contradictory statements, the
March 5, 2004 decision and the July 27, 2004 resolution of the
respondent explained that that portion of the transcript of
Court of Appeals in CA GR CV No. 76326 are
stenographic notes was incorrect and she had brought it to the
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.
attention of Atty. Josefino Go Cinco (her former counsel) but the
latter took no action on the matter.42
SO ORDERED.
Jurisprudence teaches that in assessing the credibility of a witness,
his testimony must be considered in its entirety instead of in
truncated parts. The technique in deciphering a testimony is not to
consider only its isolated parts and to anchor a conclusion based
on these parts. "In ascertaining the facts established by a witness,
everything stated by him on direct, cross and redirect
examinations must be calibrated and considered." 43Evidently, the
totality of the respondent's testimony positively and convincingly
shows that no real inconsistency exists. The respondent has
consistently asserted that she started intimate sexual relations
with the petitioner sometime in September 1993.44

Since filiation is beyond question, support follows as a matter of

obligation; a parent is obliged to support his child, whether
legitimate or illegitimate.45 Support consists of everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical
attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with the

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 180284, September 11, 2013
NARCISO SALAS, Petitioners, v.ANNABELLE
MATUSALEM, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari which seeks to
reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated July 18, 2006 and
Resolution2 dated October 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 64379.
The factual antecedents:
On May 26, 1995, Annabelle Matusalem (respondent) filed a
complaint for Support/Damages against Narciso Salas (petitioner)
in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ofCabanatuan City (Civil Case No.
2124-AF).
Respondent claimed that petitioner is. the father of her son
Christian Paulo Salas who was born on December 28, 1994.
Petitioner, already 56 years old at the time, enticed her as she was
then only 24 years old, making her believe that he is a widower.
Petitioner rented an apartment where respondent stayed and
shouldered all expenses in the delivery of their child, including the
cost of caesarian operation and hospital confinement. However,
when respondent refused the offer of petitioners family to take the
child from her, petitioner abandoned respondent and her child and
left them to the mercy of relatives and friends. Respondent further
alleged that she attempted suicide due to depression but still
petitioner refused to support her and their child.
Respondent thus prayed for support pendente lite and monthly
support in the amount of P20,000.00, as well as actual, moral and
exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.
Petitioner filed his answer4 with special and affirmative defenses
and counterclaims. He described respondent as a woman of loose
morals, having borne her first child also out of wedlock when she
went to work in Italy. Jobless upon her return to the country,
respondent spent time riding on petitioners jeepney which was
then being utilized by a female real estate agent named Felicisima
de Guzman. Respondent had seduced a senior police officer in San
Isidro and her charge of sexual abuse against said police officer
was later withdrawn in exchange for the quashing of drug charges
against respondents brother-in-law who was then detained at the
municipal jail. It was at that time respondent introduced herself to
petitioner whom she pleaded for charity as she was pregnant with
another child. Petitioner denied paternity of the child Christian
Paulo; he was motivated by no other reason except genuine
altruism when he agreed to shoulder the expenses for the delivery
of said child, unaware of respondents chicanery and deceit
designed to scandalize him in exchange for financial favor.
At the trial, respondent and her witness Grace Murillo testified.
Petitioner was declared to have waived his right to present
evidence and the case was considered submitted for decision
based on respondents evidence.
Respondent testified that she first met petitioner at the house of
his kumadre Felicisima de Guzman at Bgy. Malapit, San Isidro,
Nueva Ecija. During their subsequent meeting, petitioner told her
he is already a widower and he has no more companion in life
because his children are all grown-up. She also learned that
petitioner owns a rice mill, a construction business and a housing
subdivision (petitioner offered her a job at their family-owned Ma.
Cristina Village). Petitioner at the time already knows that she is a
single mother as she had a child by her former boyfriend in Italy.
He then brought her to a motel, promising that he will take care of
her and marry her. She believed him and yielded to his advances,
with the thought that she and her child will have a better life.
Thereafter, they saw each other weekly and petitioner gave her
money for her child. When she became pregnant with petitioners
child, it was only then she learned that he is in fact not a widower.
She wanted to abort the baby but petitioner opposed it because he
wanted to have another child.5
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
On the fourth month of her pregnancy, petitioner rented an
apartment where she stayed with a housemaid; he also provided
for all their expenses. She gave birth to their child on December
28, 1994 at the Good Samaritan Hospital in Cabanatuan City.
Before delivery, petitioner even walked her at the hospital room
and massaged her stomach, saying he had not done this to his
wife. She filled out the form for the childs birth certificate and
wrote all the information supplied by petitioner himself. It was also
petitioner who paid the hospital bills and drove her baby home. He
was excited and happy to have a son at his advanced age who is
his look-alike, and this was witnessed by other boarders, visitors
and Grace Murillo, the owner of the apartment unit petitioner
rented. However, on the 18th day after the babys birth, petitioner
went to Baguio City for a medical check-up. He confessed to her
daughter and eventually his wife was also informed about his
having sired an illegitimate child. His family then decided to adopt
the baby and just give respondent money so she can go abroad.
When she refused this offer, petitioner stopped seeing her and
sending money to her. She and her baby survived through the help
of relatives and friends. Depressed, she tried to commit suicide by
drug overdose and was brought to the hospital by Murillo who paid
the bill. Murillo sought the help of the Cabanatuan City Police
Station which set their meeting with petitioner. However, it was
only petitioners wife who showed up and she was very mad,
uttering unsavory words against respondent. 6
Murillo corroborated respondents testimony as to the payment by
petitioner of apartment rental, his weekly visits to respondent and
financial support to her, his presence during and after delivery of
respondents baby, respondents attempted suicide through
sleeping pills overdose and hospitalization for which she paid the
bill, her complaint before the police authorities and meeting with
petitioners wife at the headquarters.7
On April 5, 1999, the trial court rendered its decision8 in favor of
respondent, the dispositive portion of which
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant as follows:
1. Ordering the defendant to give as monthly
support of TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00)
PESOS for the child Christian Paulo through
the mother;
2. Directing the defendant to pay the plaintiff
the sum of P20,000.00 by way of litigation
expenses; and
3. To pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.9
Petitioner appealed to the CA arguing that: (1) the trial court
decided the case without affording him the right to introduce
evidence on his defense; and (2) the trial court erred in finding that
petitioner is the putative father of Christian Paulo and ordering him
to give monthly support.
By Decision dated July 18, 2006, the CA dismissed petitioners
appeal. The appellate court found no reason to disturb the trial
courts exercise of discretion in denying petitioners motion for
postponement on April 17, 1998, the scheduled hearing for the
initial presentation of defendants evidence, and the motion for
reconsideration of the said order denying the motion for
postponement and submitting the case for decision.
On the paternity issue, the CA affirmed the trial courts ruling that
respondent satisfactorily established the illegitimate filiation of her
son Christian Paulo, and consequently no error was committed by
the trial court in granting respondents prayer for support. The
appellate court thus held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Christian Paulo, in instant case, does not enjoy the benefit of a
record of birth in the civil registry which bears acknowledgment
signed by Narciso Salas. He cannot claim open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child.
It had been established by plaintiffs evidence, however, that
during her pregnancy, Annabelle was provided by Narciso Salas
Page | 152
Persons 4th Exam Cases
with an apartment at a rental of P1,500.00 which he paid for (TSN,
October 6, 1995, p. 18). Narciso provided her with a household
help with a salary of P1,500.00 a month (TSN, October 6, 1995,
ibid). He also provided her a monthly food allowance of P1,500.00
(Ibid, p. 18). Narciso was with Annabelle at the hospital while the
latter was in labor, walking her around and massaging her belly
(Ibid, p. 11). Narciso brought home Christian Paulo to the rented
apartment after Annabelles discharge from the hospital. People
living in the same apartment units were witnesses to Narcisos
delight to father a son at his age which was his look alike. It was
only after the 18th day when Annabelle refused to give him
Christian Paulo that Narciso withdrew his support to him and his
mother.
Said testimony of Annabelle aside from having been corroborated
by Grace Murillo, the owner of the apartment which Narciso rented,
was never rebutted on record. Narciso did not present any
evidence, verbal or documentary, to repudiate plaintiffs evidence.
In the cases of Lim vs. CA (270 SCRA 1) and Rodriguez vs. CA (245
SCRA 150), the Supreme Court made it clear that Article 172 of the
Family Code is an adaptation of Article 283 of the Civil Code. Said
legal provision provides that the father is obliged to recognize the
child as his natural child x x 3) when the child has in his favor any
evidence or proof that the defendant is his father.
In fact, in Ilano vs. CA (230 SCRA 242, 258-259), it was held that
The last paragraph of Article 283 contains a blanket provision that
practically covers all the other cases in the preceding paragraphs.
Any other evidence or proof that the defendant is the father is
broad enough to render unnecessary the other paragraphs of this
article. When the evidence submitted in the action for compulsory
recognition is not sufficient to meet [the] requirements of the first
three paragraphs, it may still be enough under the last paragraph.
This paragraph permits hearsay and reputation evidence, as
provided in the Rules of Court, with respect to illegitimate filiation.
As a necessary consequence of the finding that Christian Paulo is
the son of defendant Narciso Salas, he is entitled to support from
the latter (Ilano vs. CA, supra).
It shall be demandable from the time the person who has the right
to recover the same needs it for maintenance x x. (Art. 203,
Family Code of the Philippines).10
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by
the CA.
Hence, this petition submitting the following
arguments:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. THE VENUE OF THE CASE WAS IMPROPERLY LAID BEFORE THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF CABANATUAN CITY CONSIDERING THAT
BOTH PETITIONER AND RESPONDENT ARE ACTUAL RESIDENTS OF
BRGY. MALAPIT, SAN ISIDRO, NUEVA ECIJA.
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN PRONOUNCING
THAT PETITIONER WAS AFFORDED THE FULL MEASURE OF HIS
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND IN UPHOLDING THAT THE
TRIAL COURT DID NOT GRAVELY ABUSE ITS DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT
DECIDED THE INSTANT CASE WITHOUT AFFORDING PETITIONER
THE RIGHT TO INTRODUCE EVIDENCE IN HIS DEFENSE.
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE FILIATION OF CHRISTIAN PAULO WAS DULY ESTABLISHED
PURSUANT TO ARTICLE 175 IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 172 OF THE
FAMILY CODE AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE AND THEREFORE
ENTITLED TO SUPPORT FROM THE PETITIONER. 11
We grant the petition.
It is a legal truism that the rules on the venue of personal actions
are fixed for the convenience of the plaintiffs and their witnesses.
Equally settled, however, is the principle that choosing the venue
of an action is not left to a plaintiffs caprice; the matter is
regulated by the Rules of Court.12
Page | 153
Persons 4th Exam Cases
In personal actions such as the instant case, the Rules give the
plaintiff the option of choosing where to file his complaint. He can
file it in the place (1) where he himself or any of them resides, or
(2) where the defendant or any of the defendants resides or may
be found.13 The plaintiff or the defendant must be residents of the
place where the action has been instituted at the time the action is
commenced.14
However, petitioner raised the issue of improper venue for the first
time in the Answer itself and no prior motion to dismiss based on
such ground was filed. Under the Rules of Court before the 1997
amendments, an objection to an improper venue must be made
before a responsive pleading is filed. Otherwise, it will be deemed
waived.15 Not having been timely raised, petitioners objection on
venue is therefore deemed waived.
As to the denial of the motion for postponement filed by his
counsel for the resetting of the initial presentation of defense
evidence on April 17, 1998, we find that it was not the first time
petitioners motion for postponement was denied by the trial court.
Records disclosed that after the termination of the testimony of
respondents last witness on November 29, 1996, the trial court as
prayed for by the parties, set the continuation of hearing for the
reception of evidence for the defendant (petitioner) on January 27,
February 3, and February 10, 1997. In the Order dated December
17, 1996, petitioner was advised to be ready with his evidence at
those hearing dates earlier scheduled. At the hearing on January
27, 1997, petitioners former counsel, Atty. Rolando S. Bala,
requested for the cancellation of the February 3 and 10, 1997
hearings in order to give him time to prepare for his defense, which
request was granted by the trial court which thus reset the hearing
dates to March 3, 14 and 17, 1997. On March 3, 1997, upon oral
manifestation by Atty. Bala and without objection from
respondents counsel, Atty. Feliciano Wycoco, the trial court again
reset the hearing to March 14 and 17, 1997. With the non-
appearance of both petitioner and Atty. Bala on March 14, 1997,
the trial court upon oral manifestation by Atty. Wycoco declared
their absence as a waiver of their right to present evidence and
accordingly deemed the case submitted for decision. 16
On July 4, 1997, Atty. Bala withdrew as counsel for petitioner and
Atty. Rafael E. Villarosa filed his appearance as his new counsel on
July 21, 1997. On the same date he filed entry of appearance, Atty.
Villarosa filed a motion for reconsideration of the March 14, 1997
Order pleading for liberality and magnanimity of the trial court,
without offering any explanation for Atty. Balas failure to appear
for the initial presentation of their evidence. The trial court
thereupon reconsidered its March 14, 1997 Order, finding it better
to give petitioner a chance to present his evidence. On August 26,
1997, Atty. Villarosa received a notice of hearing for the
presentation of their evidence scheduled on September 22, 1997.
On August 29, 1997, the trial court received his motion requesting
that the said hearing be re-set to October 10, 1997 for the reason
that he had requested the postponement of a hearing in another
case which was incidentally scheduled on September 22, 23 and
24, 1997. As prayed for, the trial court reset the hearing to October
10, 1997. On said date, however, the hearing was again moved to
December 15, 1997. On February 16, 1998, the trial court itself
reset the hearing to April 17, 1998 since it was unclear whether
Atty. Wycoco received a copy of the motion.17
On April 17, 1998, petitioner and his counsel failed to appear but
the trial court received on April 16, 1998 an urgent motion to
cancel hearing filed by Atty. Villarosa. The reason given by the
latter was the scheduled hearing on the issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction in another case under the April 8, 1998
Order issued by the RTC of Gapan, Nueva Ecija, Branch 36 in Civil
Case No. 1946. But as clearly stated in the said order, it was the
plaintiffs therein who requested the postponement of the hearing
and it behoved Atty. Villarosa to inform the RTC of Gapan that he
had a previous commitment considering that the April 17, 1998
hearing was scheduled as early as February 16, 1998. Acting on
the motion for postponement, the trial court denied for the second
time petitioners motion for postponement. Even at the hearing of
their motion for reconsideration of the April 17, 1998 Order on
Page | 154
Persons 4th Exam Cases
September 21, 1998, Atty. Villarosa failed to appear and instead
filed another motion for postponement. The trial court thus ordered
that the case be submitted for decision stressing that the case had
long been pending and that petitioner and his counsel have been
given opportunities to present their evidence. It likewise denied a
second motion for reconsideration filed by Atty. Villarosa, who
arrived late during the hearing thereof on December 4, 1998. 18
A motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right,
but a request addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
Parties asking for postponement have absolutely no right to
assume that their motions would be granted. Thus, they must be
prepared on the day of the hearing.19Indeed, an order declaring a
party to have waived the right to present evidence for performing
dilatory actions upholds the trial courts duty to ensure that trial
proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed on
the part of one party.20
Atty. Villarosas plea for liberality was correctly rejected by the trial
court in view of his own negligence in failing to ensure there will be
no conflict in his trial schedules. As we held in Tiomico v. Court of
Appeals21:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Motions for postponement are generally frowned upon by Courts if
there is evidence of bad faith, malice or inexcusable negligence on
the part of the movant. The inadvertence of the defense counsel in
failing to take note of the trial dates and in belatedly informing the
trial court of any conflict in his schedules of trial or court
appearances, constitutes inexcusable negligence. It should be
borne in mind that a client is bound by his counsels conduct,
negligence and mistakes in handling the case.22
With our finding that there was no abuse of discretion in the trial
courts denial of the motion for postponement filed by petitioners
counsel, petitioners contention that he was deprived of his day in
court must likewise fail. The essence of due process is that a party
is given a reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any
evidence one may have in support of ones defense. Where a party
was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but
failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due process. If
the opportunity is not availed of, it is deemed waived or forfeited
without violating the constitutional guarantee. 23
We now proceed to the main issue of whether the trial and
appellate courts erred in ruling that respondents evidence
sufficiently proved that her son Christian Paulo is the illegitimate
child of petitioner.
Under Article 175 of the Family Code of the Philippines, illegitimate
filiation may be established in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.
Article 172 of the Family Code of the
Philippines states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or
a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation
shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws. (Underscoring supplied.)
Respondent presented the Certificate of Live Birth24 (Exhibit A-1)
of Christian Paulo Salas in which the name of petitioner appears as
his father but which is not signed by him. Admittedly, it was only
respondent who filled up the entries and signed the said document
Page | 155
Persons 4th Exam Cases
though she claims it was petitioner who supplied the information
she wrote therein.
We have held that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying
the putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when
there is no showing that the putative father had a hand in the
preparation of the certificate.25 Thus, if the father did not sign in
the birth certificate, the placing of his name by the mother, doctor,
registrar, or other person is incompetent evidence of
paternity.26Neither can such birth certificate be taken as a
recognition in a public instrument27 and it has no probative value to
establish filiation to the alleged father.28
As to the Baptismal Certificate29 (Exhibit B) of Christian Paulo
Salas also indicating petitioner as the father, we have ruled that
while baptismal certificates may be considered public documents,
they can only serve as evidence of the administration of the
sacraments on the dates so specified. They are not necessarily
competent evidence of the veracity of entries therein with respect
to the childs paternity.30
The rest of respondents documentary evidence consists of
handwritten notes and letters, hospital bill and photographs taken
of petitioner and respondent inside their rented apartment unit.
Pictures taken of the mother and her child together with the
alleged father are inconclusive evidence to prove
paternity.31 Exhibits E and F32 showing petitioner and open and continuous possession of status of an illegitimate child, it
respondent inside the rented apartment unit thus have scant
evidentiary value. The Statement of Account33 (Exhibit C) from
the Good Samaritan General Hospital where respondent herself
was indicated as the payee is likewise incompetent to prove that
petitioner is the father of her child notwithstanding petitioners
admission in his answer that he shouldered the expenses in the
delivery of respondents child as an act of charity.
As to the handwritten notes34 (Exhibits D to D-13) of petitioner testimonies of witnesses, and other kinds of proof admissible under
and respondent showing their exchange of affectionate words and
romantic trysts, these, too, are not sufficient to establish Christian
Paulos filiation to petitioner as they were not signed by petitioner
and contained no statement of admission by petitioner that he is
the father of said child. Thus, even if these notes were authentic,
they do not qualify under Article 172 (2) vis-- vis Article 175 of the
Family Code which admits as competent evidence of illegitimate
filiation an admission of filiation in a private handwritten
instrument signed by the parent concerned.35
Petitioners reliance on our ruling in Lim v. Court of Appeals36 is
misplaced. In the said case, the handwritten letters of petitioner
contained a clear admission that he is the father of private
respondents daughter and were signed by him. The Court therein
considered the totality of evidence which established beyond
reasonable doubt that petitioner was indeed the father of private
respondents daughter. On the other hand, in Ilano v. Court of
Appeals,37 the Court sustained the appellate courts finding that
private respondents evidence to establish her filiation with and
paternity of petitioner was overwhelming, particularly the latters
public acknowledgment of his amorous relationship with private
respondents mother, and private respondent as his own child
through acts and words, her testimonial evidence to that effect was
fully supported by documentary evidence. The Court thus ruled
that respondent had adduced sufficient proof of continuous
possession of status of a spurious child.
Here, while the CA held that Christian Paulo Salas could not claim
nevertheless considered the testimonial evidence sufficient proof
to establish his filiation to petitioner.
An illegitimate child is now also allowed to establish his claimed
filiation by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws, like his baptismal certificate, a judicial admission, a
family Bible in which his name has been entered, common
reputation respecting his pedigree, admission by silence, the
Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.38 Reviewing the records, we find the
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
totality of respondents evidence insufficient to establish that
petitioner is the father of Christian Paulo.
The testimonies of respondent and Murillo as to the circumstances
of the birth of Christian Paulo, petitioners financial support while
respondent lived in Murillos apartment and his regular visits to her
at the said apartment, though replete with details, do not
approximate the overwhelming evidence, documentary and
testimonial presented in Ilano. In that case, we sustained the
appellate courts ruling anchored on the following factual findings
by the appellate court which was quoted at length in
the ponencia:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
It was Artemio who made arrangement for the delivery of
Merceditas (sic) at the Manila Sanitarium and Hospital. Prior to the
delivery, Leoncia underwent prenatal examination accompanied by
Artemio (TSN, p. 33, 5/17/74). After delivery, they went home to
their residence at EDSA in a car owned and driven by Artemio
himself (id. p. 36).
Merceditas (sic) bore the surname of Ilano since birth without any
objection on the part of Artemio, the fact that since Merceditas
(sic) had her discernment she had always known and called
Artemio as her Daddy (TSN, pp. 28-29, 10/18/74); the fact that
each time Artemio was at home, he would play with Merceditas
(sic), take her for a ride or restaurants to eat, and sometimes
sleeping with Merceditas (sic) (id. p. 34) and does all what a father
should do for his child bringing home goodies, candies, toys and
whatever he can bring her which a child enjoys which Artemio
gives to Merceditas (sic) (TSN, pp. 38-39, 5/17/74) are positive
evidence that Merceditas (sic) is the child of Artemio and
recognized by Artemio as such. Special attention is called to Exh.
E-7 where Artemio was telling Leoncia the need for a frog test This particular entry was caused to be made by Artemio himself in
to know the status of Leoncia.
Plaintiff pointed out that the support by Artemio for Leoncia and
Merceditas (sic) was sometimes in the form of cash personally
delivered to her by Artemio, thru Melencio, thru Elynia (Exhs. E-2
and E-3, and D-6), or thru Merceditas (sic) herself (TSN, p. 40, to petitioner.
5/17/74) and sometimes in the form of a check as the Manila
Banking Corporation Check No. 81532 (Exh. G) and the signature
appearing therein which was identified by Leoncia as that of
Artemio because Artemio often gives her checks and Artemio
would write the check at home and saw Artemio sign the check
(TSN, p. 49, 7/18/73). Both Artemio and Nilda admitted that the
check and signature were those of Artemio (TSN, p. 53, 10/17/77;
TSN, p. 19, 10/9/78).
During the time that Artemio and Leoncia were living as husband
and wife, Artemio has shown concern as the father of Merceditas
(sic). When Merceditas (sic) was in Grade 1 at the St. Joseph
Parochial School, Artemio signed the Report Card of Merceditas
(sic) (Exh. H) for the fourth and fifth grading period(s) (Exh. H-1
and H-2) as the parent of Merceditas (sic). Those signatures of
Artemio [were] both identified by Leoncia and Merceditas (sic)
because Artemio signed Exh. H-1 and H-2 at their residence in
the presence of Leoncia, Merceditas (sic) and of Elynia (TSN, p. 57,
7/18/73; TSN, p. 28, 10/1/73). x x x.
xxx xxx xxx
When Artemio run as a candidate in the Provincial Board of
Cavite[,] Artemio gave Leoncia his picture with the following
dedication: To Nene, with best regards, Temiong. (Exh. I). (pp.
19-20, Appellants Brief)
The mere denial by defendant of his signature is not sufficient to
offset the totality of the evidence indubitably showing that the
signature thereon belongs to him. The entry in the Certificate of
Live Birth that Leoncia and Artemio was falsely stated therein as
married does not mean that Leoncia is not appellees daughter.
order to avoid embarrassment.39
In sum, we hold that the testimonies of respondent and Murillo, by
themselves are not competent proof of paternity and the totality of
respondents evidence failed to establish Christian Paulos filiation
Page | 157
Persons 4th Exam Cases

representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of

Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof
is required to establish paternity and filiation. An order for
recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or
may be an irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it
must be issued only if paternity or filiation is established by clear
and convincing evidence.40
Finally, we note the Manifestation and Motion 41 filed by petitioners
counsel informing this Court that petitioner had died on May 6,
2010.
thirty (30) days from notice.
If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased
party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear within the
specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a
specified time to procure the appointment of an executor or
administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall
immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court
charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the
opposing party, may be recovered as costs.

The action for support having been filed in the trial court when WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED.
petitioner was still alive, it is not barred under Article 175 (2) 42 of The Decision dated July 18, 2006 and Resolution dated October 19,
the Family Code. We have also held that the death of the putative 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR. CV No. 64379 are
father is not a bar to the action commenced during his lifetime by herebyREVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 2124-AF of the
one claiming to be his illegitimate child.43 The rule on substitution Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 26 is DISMISSED.
of parties provided in Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, thus applies. No pronouncement as to costs. chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. Whenever a party to a
pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it SO ORDERED.
shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty
(30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the
name and address of his legal representative or representatives.
Failure of counsel to comply with his duty shall be a ground for
disciplinary action.

The action must be brought within the same period specified in

Article 173, except when the action is based on the second
paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought
during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the

deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or
administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for
the minor heirs.

The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or

Page | 158
Persons 4th Exam Cases
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 200169, January 28, 2015
RODOLFO S. AGUILAR, Petitioner v. EDNA G.
SIASAT, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to set aside the August
1
30, 2006 Decision2 and December 20, 2011 Resolution3 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 64229 affirming the
August 17, 1999 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Bacolod City, Branch 49 in Civil Case No. 96-9591 and denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Factual Antecedents
Spouses Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (the Aguilar
spouses) died, intestate and without debts, on August 26, 1983
and February 8, 1994, respectively. Included in their estate are two
parcels of land (herein subject properties) covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-25896 and T-(15462) 1070 of the
Registries of Deeds of Bago and Bacolod (the subject
titles).6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In June 1996, petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar filed with the RTC of
Bacolod City (Bacolod RTC) a civil case for mandatory injunction
with damages against respondent Edna G. Siasat. Docketed as
Civil Case No. 96-9591 and assigned to Branch 49 of the Bacolod
RTC, the Complaint7 alleged that petitioner is the only son and sole
surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses; that he (petitioner)
discovered that the subject titles were missing, and thus he
suspected that someone from the Siasat clan could have stolen the
same; that he executed affidavits of loss of the subject titles and
filed the same with the Registries of Deeds of Bacolod and Bago;
that on June 22, 1996, he filed before the Bacolod RTC a Petition for
the issuance of second owners copy of Certificate of Title No. T-
25896, which respondent opposed; and that during the hearing of
the said Petition, respondent presented the two missing owners
duplicate copies of the subject titles. Petitioner thus prayed for
mandatory injunctive relief, in that respondent be ordered to
surrender to him the owners duplicate copies of the subject titles
in her possession; and that damages, attorneys fees, and costs of
suit be awarded to him.
In her Answer,8 respondent claimed that petitioner is not the son
and sole surviving heir of the Aguilar spouses, but a mere stranger
who was raised by the Aguilar spouses out of generosity and
kindness of heart; that petitioner is not a natural or adopted child
of the Aguilar spouses; that since Alfredo Aguilar predeceased his
wife, Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, the latter inherited the conjugal
share of the former; that upon the death of Candelaria Siasat-
Aguilar, her brothers and sisters inherited her estate as she had no
issue; and that the subject titles were not stolen, but entrusted to
her for safekeeping by Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar, who is her aunt.
By way of counterclaim, respondent prayed for an award of moral
and exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.
During trial, petitioner testified and affirmed his relationship to the
Aguilar spouses as their son. To prove filiation, he presented the
following documents, among others:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. His school records at the Don J.A. Araneta Elementary
School, Purok No. 2, Bacolod-Murcia Milling Company
(BMMC), Bacolod City (Exhibit C and submarkings),
wherein it is stated that Alfredo Aguilar is petitioners
parent;chanrobleslaw
2. His Individual Income Tax Return (Exhibit F), which
indicated that Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar is his
mother;chanrobleslaw
3. Alfredo Aguilars Social Security System (SSS) Form E-1
dated October 10, 1957 (Exhibit G), a public instrument
subscribed and made under oath by Alfredo Aguilar during
his employment with BMMC, which bears his signature and
thumb marks and indicates that petitioner, who was born
on March 5, 1945, is his son and dependent;chanrobleslaw
Page | 159
Persons 4th Exam Cases
4. Alfredo Aguilars Information Sheet of Employment with
BMMC dated October 29, 1954 (Exhibit L), indicating that
petitioner is his son;chanrobleslaw
5. Petitioners Certificate of Marriage to Luz Abendan (Exhibit
M), where it is declared that the Aguilar spouses are his
parents; and
6. Letter of the BMMC Secretary (Exhibit O) addressed to a
BMMC supervisor introducing petitioner as Alfredo Aguilars
son and recommending him for employment.
7. Certification dated January 27, 1996 issued by the Bacolod
City Civil Registry to the effect that the record of births
during the period 1945 to 1946 were all destroyed by
nature, hence no true copies of the Certificate of Live
Birth of petitioner could be issued as requested (Exhibit
Q).9
Petitioner also offered the testimonies of his wife, Luz Marie
Abendan-Aguilar (Abendan-Aguilar), and Ester Aguilar-Pailano
(Aguilar-Pailano), his aunt and sister of Alfredo Aguilar. Abendan-
Aguilar confirmed petitioners identity, and she testified that
petitioner is the son of the Aguilar spouses and that during her
marriage to petitioner, she lived with the latter in the Aguilar
spouses conjugal home built on one of the subject properties. On
the other hand, 81-year old Aguilar-Pailano testified that she is the
sister of Alfredo Aguilar; that the Aguilar spouses have only one
son herein petitioner who was born at BMMC; that after the
death of the Aguilar spouses, she and her siblings did not claim
ownership of the subject properties because they recognized
petitioner as the Aguilar spouses sole child and heir; that
petitioner was charged with murder, convicted, imprisoned, and
later on paroled; and that after he was discharged on parole,
petitioner continued to live with his mother Candelaria Siasat-
Aguilar in one of the subject properties, and continues to live there
with his family.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
For her evidence, respondent testified among others that she is a
retired teacher; that she does not know petitioner very well, but
only heard his name from her aunt Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar; that
she is not related by consanguinity or affinity to petitioner; that she
attended to Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar while the latter was under
medication in a hospital until her death; that Candelaria Siasat-
Aguilars hospital and funeral expenses were paid for by Nancy
Vingno; that Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar executed an affidavit to the
effect that she had no issue and that she is the sole heir to her
husband Alfredo Aguilars estate; that she did not steal the subject
titles, but that the same were entrusted to her by Candelaria
Siasat-Aguilar; that a prior planned sale of the subject properties
did not push through because when petitioners opinion thereto
was solicited, he expressed disagreement as to the agreed
price.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondent likewise offered the testimony of Aurea Siasat-
Nicavera (Siasat-Nicavera), 74 years old, who stated that the
Aguilar spouses were married on June 22, 1933 in Miag-ao, Iloilo;
that she is the sister of Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar; that she does not
know petitioner, although she admitted that she knew a certain
Rodolfo whose nickname was Mait; that petitioner is not the
son of the Aguilar spouses; and that Alfredo Aguilar has a sister
named Ester Aguilar-Pailano. 12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondent also offered an Affidavit previously executed by
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilar (Exhibit 2) announcing among others
that she and Alfredo have no issue, and that she is the sole heir to
Alfredos estate.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On August 17, 1999, the Bacolod RTC issued its Decision, decreeing
as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
From the evidence thus adduced before this Court, no solid
evidence attesting to the fact that plaintiff herein is either a
biological son or a legally adopted one was ever presented.
Neither was a certificate of live birth of plaintiff ever introduced
confirming his biological relationship as a son to the deceased
spouses Alfredo and Candelaria S. Aguilar. As a matter of fact, in
the affidavit of Candelaria S. Aguilar (Exhibit 2) she expressly
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
announced under oath that Alfredo and she have no issue and that
she is the sole heir to the estate of Alfredo is (sic) concrete proof
that plaintiff herein was never a son by consanguinity nor a legally
adopted one of the deceased spouses Alfredo and Candelaria
Aguilar.
This being the case, Petitioner is not deemed vested with sufficient
interest in this action to be considered qualified or entitled to the
issuance of the writ of mandatory injunction and damages prayed
for.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing plaintiffs
complaint with cost.
The counterclaim of the defendant is likewise dismissed for lack of
legal basis.
SO ORDERED.13
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner filed an appeal with the CA.14 Docketed as CA-G.R. CEB-
CV No. 64229, the appeal essentially argued that petitioner is
indeed the Aguilar spouses son; that under Article 172 of the
Family Code,15 an admission of legitimate filiation in a public
document or a private handwritten instrument signed by the
parent concerned constitutes proof of filiation; that through the
documentary evidence presented, petitioner has shown that he is
the legitimate biological son of the Aguilar spouses and the sole
heir to their estate. He argued that he cannot present his
Certificate of Live Birth as all the records covering the period 1945-
194616 of the Local Civil Registry of Bacolod City were destroyed as
shown by Exhibits Q to Q-3; for this reason, he presented the
foregoing documentary evidence to prove his relationship to the
Aguilar spouses. Petitioner made particular reference to, among
others, Alfredo Aguilars SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit G), arguing that
the same was made under oath and thus sufficient under Article
172 of the Family Code to establish that he is a child and heir of
the Aguilar spouses. Finally, petitioner questioned the trial courts
reliance upon Candelaria Siasat-Aguilars affidavit (Exhibit 2)
attesting that she and Alfredo have no children and that she is the
sole heir to the estate of Alfredo, when such piece of evidence has
been discarded by the trial court in a previous Order dated April 1,
1998, stating thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Except for defendants Exhibit 2, all other Exhibits, Exhibits 1,
3, 4 and 5, together with their submarkings, are all admitted
in evidence.17
On August 30, 2006, the CA issued the assailed Decision affirming
the trial courts August 17, 1999 Decision, pronouncing
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The exhibits relied upon by plaintiff-appellant to establish his
filiation with the deceased spouses Aguilar deserve scant
consideration by this Court. The Elementary School Permanent
Record of plaintiff-appellant cannot be considered as proof of
filiation. As enunciated by the Supreme Court in the case of Reyes
vs. Court of Appeals, 135 SCRA 439:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Student record or other writing not signed by alleged father do
not constitute evidence of filiation.
As regards the Income Tax Return of plaintiff-appellant filed with
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, WE hold that it cannot be
considered as evidence of filiation. As stated by the Supreme
Court in the case of Labagala vs. Santiago, 371 SCRA
360:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A baptismal certificate, a private document is not conclusive proof
of filiation. More so are the entries made in an income tax return,
which only shows that income tax has been paid and the amount
thereof.
With respect to the Certificate of Marriage x x x wherein it is shown
that the parents of the former are Alfredo and Candelaria Siasat
Aguilar does not prove filiation. The Highest Tribunal declared that
a marriage contract not signed by the alleged father of bride is not
competent evidence of filiation nor is a marriage contract
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
recognition in a public instrument.
The rest of the exhibits offered x x x, except the Social Security
Form E-1 (Exhibit G) and the Information Sheet of Employment of
Alfredo Aguilar (Exhibit L), allegedly tend to establish that
plaintiff-appellant has been and is presently known as Rodolfo
Siasat Aguilar and he has been bearing the surname of his alleged
parents.
WE cannot sustain plaintiff-appellants argument. Use of a family
surname certainly does not establish pedigree.
Insofar as the SSS Form E-1 and Information Sheet of Employment
of Alfredo Aguilar are concerned, WE cannot accept them as
sufficient proof to establish and prove the filiation of plaintiff-
appellant to the deceased Aguilar spouses. While the former is a
public instrument and the latter bears the signature of Alfredo
Aguilar, they do not constitute clear and convincing evidence to
show filiation based on open and continuous possession of the
status of a legitimate child. Filiation is a serious matter that must
be resolved according to the requirements of the law.
All told, plaintiff-appellants evidence failed to hurdle the high
standard of proof required for the success of an action to establish
ones legitimate filiation when relying upon the provisions
regarding open and continuous possession or any other means
allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Having resolved that plaintiff-appellant is not an heir of the
deceased spouses Aguilar, thereby negating his right to demand
the delivery of the subject TCTs in his favor, this Court cannot grant
the writ of mandatory injunction being prayed for.
xxxx
In the present case, plaintiff-appellant failed to show that he has a
clear and unmistakable right that has been violated. Neither had
he shown permanent and urgent necessity for the issuance of the
writ.
With respect to the damages prayed for, WE sustain the trial court
in denying the same. Aside from the fact that plaintiff-appellant
failed to show his clear right over the subject parcels of land so
that he has not sustained any damage by reason of the withholding
of the TCTs from him, there is no clear testimony on the anguish or
anxiety he allegedly suffered as a result thereof. Well entrenched
in law and jurisprudence is the principle that the grant of moral
damages is expressly allowed by law in instances where proofs of
the mental anguish, serious anxiety and moral shock were shown.
ACCORDINGLY, in line with the foregoing disquisition, the appeal is
hereby DENIED. The impugned Decision of the trial court is
AFFIRMED IN TOTO.
SO ORDERED.18
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration,19 but in a December
20, 2011 Resolution, the CA held its ground. Hence, the present
Petition.
Issues
In an August 28, 2013 Resolution,20 this Court resolved to give due
course to the Petition, which raises the following
issues:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In issuing the assailed DECISION affirming in toto the Decision of
RTC Branch 49, Bacolod City, and the Resolution denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, the Honorable Court of
Appeals committed reversible error [in] not taking into
consideration petitioners Exhibit G (SSS E-1 acknowledged and
notarized before a notary public, executed by Alfredo Aguilar,
recognizing the petitioner as his son) as public document that
satisfies the requirement of Article 172 of the [Family] Code in the
establishment of the legitimate filiation of the petitioner with his
father, Alfredo Aguilar.
The herein [P]etition raises the issue of pure question of law with
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
respect to the application of Article 172 of the Family Code
particularly [paragraph] 3 thereof in conjunction with Section 19
and Section 23, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court relating to public
document which is substantial enough to merit consideration of
this Honorable Court as it will enrich jurisprudence and forestall
future litigation.21
Petitioners Arguments
In his Petition and Reply22 seeking to reverse and set aside the
assailed CA dispositions and praying that judgment be rendered
ordering respondent to surrender the owners duplicates of Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-25896 and T-(15462) 1070, petitioner
argues that Alfredo Aguilars SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit G) satisfies
the requirement for proof of filiation and relationship to the Aguilar
spouses under Article 172 of the Family Code. Petitioner contends
that said SSS Form E-1 is a declaration under oath by his father,
Alfredo Aguilar, of his status as the latters son; this recognition
should be accorded more weight than the presumption of
legitimacy, since Article 172 itself declares that said evidence
establishes legitimate filiation without need of court action. He
adds that in contemplation of law, recognition in a public
instrument such as the SSS Form E-1 is the highest form of
recognition which partake (sic) of the nature of a complete act of
recognition bestowed upon him as the son of the late Alfredo
Aguilar; that respondent has no personality to impugn his
legitimacy and cannot collaterally attack his legitimacy; that the
action to impugn his legitimacy has already prescribed pursuant to
Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code;23 and that having proved
his filiation, mandatory injunction should issue, and an award of
damages is in order.
Respondents Arguments
In her Comment24 and Memorandum,25 respondent simply echoes
the pronouncements of the CA, adding that the Petition is a mere
rehash of the CA appeal which has been passed upon succinctly by
the appellate court.
Our Ruling
The Court grants the Petition.
This Court, speaking in De Jesus v. Estate of Dizon,26 has held that
The filiation of illegitimate children, like legitimate children, is
established by (1) the record of birth appearing in the civil register
or a final judgment; or (2) an admission of legitimate filiation
in a public document or a private handwritten instrument
and signed by the parent concerned. In the absence thereof,
filiation shall be proved by (1) the open and continuous possession
of the status of a legitimate child; or (2) any other means allowed
by the Rules of Court and special laws. The due recognition of
an illegitimate child in a record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record, or in any authentic writing is, in
itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child,
and no further court action is required. In fact, any
authentic writing is treated not just a ground for
compulsory recognition; it is in itself a voluntary
recognition that does not require a separate action for
judicial approval. Where, instead, a claim for recognition is
predicated on other evidence merely tending to prove paternity,
i.e., outside of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court
of record or an authentic writing, judicial action within the
applicable statute of limitations is essential in order to establish
the childs acknowledgment.
A scrutiny of the records would show that petitioners were born
during the marriage of their parents. The certificates of live
birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father.
There is perhaps no presumption of the law more firmly
established and founded on sounder morality and more
convincing reason than the presumption that children born
in wedlock are legitimate. This presumption indeed becomes
conclusive in the absence of proof that there is physical
impossibility of access between the spouses during the first 120
days of the 300 days which immediately precedes the birth of the
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
child due to (a) the physical incapacity of the husband to have
sexual intercourse with his wife; (b) the fact that the husband and
wife are living separately in such a way that sexual intercourse is
not possible; or (c) serious illness of the husband, which absolutely
prevents sexual intercourse. Quite remarkably, upon the
expiration of the periods set forth in Article 170, and in proper
cases Article 171, of the Family Code (which took effect on 03
August 1988), the action to impugn the legitimacy of a child would
no longer be legally feasible and the status conferred by the
presumption becomes fixed and unassailable.27 (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, applying the foregoing pronouncement to the instant case, it
must be concluded that petitioner who was born on March 5,
1945, or during the marriage of Alfredo Aguilar and Candelaria
Siasat-Aguilar28 and before their respective deaths29 has
sufficiently proved that he is the legitimate issue of the Aguilar
spouses. As petitioner correctly argues, Alfredo Aguilars SSS Form
E-1 (Exhibit G) satisfies the requirement for proof of filiation and
relationship to the Aguilar spouses under Article 172 of the Family
Code; by itself, said document constitutes an admission of
legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
Petitioner has shown that he cannot produce his Certificate of Live
Birth since all the records covering the period 1945-1946 of the
Local Civil Registry of Bacolod City were destroyed, which
necessitated the introduction of other documentary evidence
particularly Alfredo Aguilars SSS Form E-1 (Exhibit G) to prove
filiation. It was erroneous for the CA to treat said document as
mere proof of open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child under the second paragraph of Article 172 of the
Family Code; it is evidence of filiation under the first paragraph
thereof, the same being an express recognition in a public
instrument.
To repeat what was stated in De Jesus, filiation may be proved by
an admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned, and such due recognition in any authentic writing is, in
itself, a consummated act of acknowledgment of the child, and no
further court action is required. And, relative to said form of
acknowledgment, the Court has further held
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In view of the pronouncements herein made, the Court sees it fit to
adopt the following rules respecting the requirement of affixing the
signature of the acknowledging parent in any private handwritten
instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a legitimate or
illegitimate child is made:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1) Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of
evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should be strict
compliance with the requirement that the same must be signed by
the acknowledging parent; and
2) Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied by
other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that the claim of
filiation therein be shown to have been made and handwritten by
the acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of such
other evidence.
Our laws instruct that the welfare of the child shall be the
paramount consideration in resolving questions affecting him.
Article 3(1) of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of a
Child of which the Philippines is a signatory is similarly
emphatic:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Article 3
1. In all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public
or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall
be a primary consideration.cralawred
It is thus (t)he policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on
the investigation of the paternity and filiation of children, especially
of illegitimate children x x x. Too, (t)he State as parens
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

patriae affords special protection to children from abuse, Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-CV No. 64229, as well as the August 17,
exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch
development.30 (Emphasis supplied) 49 in Civil Case No. 96-9591 areREVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent Edna G. Siasat is hereby ordered to SURRENDER to
This case should not have been so difficult for petitioner if only he the petitioner Rodolfo S. Aguilar the owners duplicates of Transfer
obtained a copy of his Certificate of Live Birth from the National Certificates of Title Nos. T-25896 and T-(15462) 1070.
Statistics Office (NSO), since the Bacolod City Civil Registry copy
thereof was destroyed. He would not have had to go through the SO ORDERED.
trouble of presenting other documentary evidence; the NSO copy
would have sufficed. This fact is not lost on petitioner; the
Certification dated January 27, 1996 issued by the Bacolod City
Civil Registry (Exhibit Q) contained just such an advice for
petitioner to proceed to the Office of the Civil Registrar General at
the NSO in Manila to secure a copy of his Certificate of Live Birth,
since for every registered birth in the country, a copy of the
Certificate of Live Birth is submitted to said office.

As to petitioners argument that respondent has no personality to

impugn his legitimacy and cannot collaterally attack his legitimacy,
and that the action to impugn his legitimacy has already
prescribed pursuant to Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code,
the Court has held before that
Article 26331 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child,
to assert and prove that a person is not a mans child by his wife.
However, the present case is not one impugning petitioners
legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not merely that petitioner is
not a legitimate child of Jose, but that she is not a child of Jose at
all.32

Finally, if petitioner has shown that he is the legitimate issue of the

Aguilar spouses, then he is as well heir to the latters estate.
Respondent is then left with no right to inherit from her aunt
Candelaria Siasat-Aguilars estate, since succession pertains, in the
first place, to the descending direct
line.33chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The August 30, 2006

Decision and December 20, 2011 Resolution of the Court of

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
G.R. No. 163362 July 8, 2015
ALEJANDRA ARADO HEIRS: JESUSA ARADO, VICTORIANO
ALCORIZA, PEDRO ARADO, HEIRS: JUDITHO ARADO, JENNIFER
ARADO, BOBBIE ZITO ARADO, SHIRLY ABAD, ANTONIETA
ARADO, NELSON SOMOZA, JUVENIL ARADO, NICETAS VENTULA,
and NILA ARADO, PEDRO ARADO, TOMASA V.
ARADO, Petitioners,
vs.
ANACLETO ALCORAN and ELENETTESUNJACO, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Under review on certiorari is the decision promulgated on February 28,
2003,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the judgment
rendered on January 15, 1997 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, in
Dumaguete City (RTC)2 dismissing the complaint and the counterclaim
for being without merit.
Antecedents
Raymundo Alcoran (Raymundo) was married to Joaquina Arado
(Joaquina), and their marriage produced a son named Nicolas Alcoran
(Nicolas).3 In turn, Nicolas married Florencia Limpahan (Florencia), 4 but
their union had no offspring. During their marriage, however, Nicolas
had an extramarital affair with Francisca Sarita (Francisca), who gave
birth to respondent Anacleto Alcoran (Anacleto) on July 13,
19515 during the subsistence of Nicolas' marriage to Florencia. 6 In
1972, Anacleto married Elenette Sunjaco.7
Raymundo died in 1939, while Nicolas died in 1954. Likewise, Florencia
died in 1960, and Joaquina in 1981. 8
Florencia had three siblings, namely: Sulpicio, Braulia and Veronica
Limpahan.9 Joaquina had four siblings, i.e., Alejandra, Nemesio,
Celedonia and Melania, all surnamed Arado. 10 Nemesio had six
children, namely: (1) Jesusa, who was married to Victoriano Alcoriza;
(2) Pedro, who was married to Tomasa Arado; (3) Teodorico; (4)
Josefina; (5) Gliceria;11 and (6) Felicisima.12 During the pendency of the
case, Pedro died, and was substituted by his following heirs, to wit: (1)
Juditho and his spouse, Jennifer Ebrole; (2) Bobbie Zito and his spouse,
Shirly Abad; (3) Juvenil and his spouse, Nicetas Ventula; (4) Antonieta
and her spouse, Nelson Somoza; and (5) Nila.
On January 14, 1992, Alejandra, Jesusa, Victoriano Alcoriza, Pedro and
Tomasa filed in the RTC a complaint for recovery of property and
damages (with application for a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction) against Anacleto and Elenette.13 Named as unwilling co-
plaintiffs were Sulpicio, Braulia and Veronica Limpahan, along with
Teodorico, Josefina, Gliceria and Felicisima.
The properties subject of the action were the following: ( 1) Lot No.
4100, covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. OV-1379; (2) Lot
No. 4054, covered by OCT No. OV-1380; (3) a parcel of land covered by
Tax Declaration No. 6065; ( 4) a parcel of land covered by Tax
Declaration No. 20470; (5) a parcel of land covered by Tax Declaration
No. 11-028-A; (6) Lot No. 709 covered by OCT No. OV-7784; (7) a parcel
of land covered by Tax Declaration No. 87-011-215-A; (8) a parcel of
land covered by Tax Declaration No. 87-011-217; (9) Lot No. 5234
covered by OCT No. 3489-A; and (10) Lot No. 5224 covered by Tax
Declaration No. 8-201.14 The parties later stipulated that the first eight
of the subject properties had previously belonged to Raymundo, while
the last two had been the paraphemal properties of Joaquina. 15
The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that when Raymundo died in
1939, his properties were inherited by his son Nicolas alone "as it was
during the period of the old Civil Code, where the spouse could not
inherit but only a share of the usufruct, which was extinguished upon
the death of the usufructuary;" 16 that when Nicolas died in 1954
without issue, half of his properties were inherited by his wife,
Florencia, and the other half by his mother, Joaquina; that Florencia
was, in turn, succeeded by her siblings Sulpicio, Braulia and Veronica;
that during the marriage of Nicolas and Florencia, the former had an
affair with Francisca, from which affair Anacleto was born, but it was
unknown whether he was the spurious son of Nicolas; that Nicolas did
not recognize Anacleto as his spurious child during Nicolas' lifetime;
hence, Anacleto was not entitled to inherit from Nicolas; that
nonetheless, Anacleto claimed entitlement to the properties as the heir
of Nicolas and by virtue of the will executed by Joaquina; that the will
was void for not having been executed according to the formalities of
the law, and the same did not reflect the true intention of Joaquina;
that the supposed testator did not acknowledge the will, which was not
submitted for probate; that they were the rightful heirs to the
properties; that notwithstanding their repeated demands for the return
of the properties, the defendants persistently refused; that a writ of
preliminary mandatory injunction should issue to prevent the
defendants from further violating their rights in the properties; and
that the defendants should be ordered to reconvey the properties, and
to pay P20,000.00 as actual damages, P20,000.00 as moral and
exemplary damages, and P20,000.00 as attorney's fees.17
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
In their answer,18 the defendants (respondents herein) countered that
Anacleto was expressly recognized by Nicolas as the latter's son, a fact
evidenced by the certificate of birth of Anacleto; that Anacleto thus
had the right to inherit the properties from Nicolas; that because
Anacleto was still too young when Nicolas died, the administration of
the properties passed to Anacleto's grandmother, Joaquina; that
Joaquina executed a last will and testament in Anacleto's favor; that
Joaquina's possession of the properties was for and in behalf of
Anacleto, who had been living with her since his birth; that such
possession began in 1954 when Nicolas died and continued until
Joaquina' s death in 1981; that Anacleto then took over the possession
of the properties to the exclusion of all others; that granting for the
sake of argument that the plaintiffs had rights in the properties, the
same were already lost through laches, estoppel and prescription; and
that Anacleto was the rightful owner of the properties, and his
ownership and possession should not be disturbed.
By way of counterclaim, the defendants prayed that the plaintiffs be
ordered to pay P50,000.00 as moral damages, In ,000.00 "as initial
expenses as costs of this litigation which will increase as the case
progresses"19and Pl0,000.00 as attorney's fees.
Veronica Limpahan and Sulpicio Limpahan likewise filed their
Answer20 to the complaint, stating that they were not interested in
pursuing any claim of ownership in the properties; that assuming that
they were entitled, they were abandoning their rights, interests, title
and participation in the properties; and that they be excluded from
further court processes.
Judgment of the RTC
On January 15, 1997, the RTC rendered judgment, decreeing thusly:
Wherefore, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered
dismissing the complaint and the counterclaim for lack of merit.
Costs against the plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.21
The RTC opined that Anacleto established that he was really the
acknowledged illegitimate son of Nicolas. It cited the certificate of birth
of Anacleto (Exhibit 4) and Page 53, Book 4, Register No. 214 of the
Register of Births of the Municipality of Bacong (Exhibit 3 ), which
proved that Nicolas had himself caused the registration of Anacleto' s
birth by providing the details thereof and indicating that he was the
father of Anacleto. It observed that the name of Nicolas appeared
under the column "Remarks" in the register of births, which was the
space provided for the name of the informant; that because the
plaintiffs did not present evidence to refute the entry in the register of
births, the entry became conclusive with respect to the facts contained
therein; that Anacleto' s claim of recognition was bolstered by his
baptismal certificate (Exhibit F), in which was indicated that his parents
were Nicolas Alcoran and Francisca Sarita; that also presented was a
picture taken during the wake of Nicolas (Exhibit 5) showing the young
Anacleto being carried by Joaquina, and also Nicolas' wife, Florencia;
that in addition, the school records of Anacleto (Exhibit 6) showed that
Joaquina stood as his guardian during his grade school years; that
when Anacleto got married, it was Joaquina who gave consent to his
marriage because he was then still a minor (Exhibit 8); and that
Joaquina executed her will in 1978 (Exhibit 9), bequeathing the subject
properties to Anacleto, but the will was yet to be probated. As the case
was filed during the effectivity of the Family Code, the RTC ruled that
Articles 172,22 17323 and 17524 of the Family Code allowed Anacleto to
establish his filiation during his lifetime through the record of his birth
appearing in the civil register. It further ruled that because there were
no legitimate children of Nicolas who contested Anacleto's right to
inherit, the rule on the separation of the legitimate from the
illegitimate family was rendered irrelevant; and that, accordingly,
Anacleto was entitled to possess the subject properties upon having
established that he was the acknowledged illegitimate son of Nicolas.
Consequently, it also dismissed the defendants' counterclaim for lack
of sufficient basis.
The plaintiffs appealed to the CA.25
Decision of the CA
On February 28, 2003, the CA promulgated its decision, 26 affirming the
judgment of the RTC in this wise:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby
DISMISSED. Accordingly, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Dumaguete City, Branch 43 stands.
The CA sustained the ruling of the RTC to the effect that Anacleto was
an acknowledged illegitimate son of Nicolas. It agreed that the Register
of Births of the Municipality of Bacong, Negros Oriental showed that
Nicolas was the father of Anacleto, and that the former had supplied
the information on the latter's birth. It declared that the plaintiffs did
not rebut the filiation of Anacleto by contrary evidence; that the
baptismal certificate of Anacleto and the picture taken during the wake
of Nicolas further showed that Anacleto had been acknowledged by
Nicolas; that based on the Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family
Code, the law applicable at the time of the filing of the case, Anacleto's
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
filiation was established by the record of his birth appearing in the civil
register; and that Anacleto possessed rights in the subject properties.
Anent the successional rights of the parties, the CA pronounced that
after Raymundo died in 1939, his wife, Joaquina, and his son, Nicolas,
inherited his properties; that when Nicolas died in 1954, he was
survived by Joaquina (his mother), Florencia (his legitimate wife), and
Anacleto (his illegitimate son); that Joaquina was entitled to one-half of
Nicolas' estate, and the remaining half should be divided between
Florencia and Anacleto; that in 1960, when Florencia died without
issue, the share she had inherited from Nicolas was inherited by her
siblings Sulpicio, Braulia and Veronica; and that when Joaquina died in
1981, she was survived by her sibling Alejandra; her nieces
Jesusa,27 Josefina, Gliceria and Felicisima; her nephews Pedro and
Teodorico; and her illegitimate grandson, Anacleto.
The CA declared that the plaintiffs were already barred from asserting
their rights in the properties by estoppel by laches; that Joaquina had
executed her last will and testament on April 19, 1978, whereby she
bequeathed her properties to Anacleto; that the properties were thus
transmitted to Anacleto upon her death in 1981; that the plaintiffs filed
their complairtt in the RTC only on January 14, 1992; that it would be
unjust to award the subject properties to the plaintiffs who had slept on
their rights for a long time; and that the plaintiffs could probably
pursue their claim in the appropriate intestate or testate proceedings.
The plaintiffs filed a Motion for Reconsideration,28 but the CA denied
their motion on March 24, 2004.
Issues
In this appeal, the plaintiffs, herein petitioners, 29 implore the Court to
nullify the assailed rulings of the CA, and to determine once and for all
the following issues:
(a) Whether Anacleto Alcoran is the illegitimate son of Nicolas
Alcoran x x x; and
(b) Whether he is entitled to the properties in litigation. 30
The petitioners insist that Anacleto was not duly recognized as Nicolas'
illegitimate son; that inasmuch as Anacleto was born to Francisca
during the subsistence of Nicolas' marriage to Florencia, Anacleto could
only be the spurious child of Nicolas; that there was no law for the
acknowledgment of a spurious child; that even if Anacleto would be
given the benefit of the doubt and be considered a natural child, Article
278 of the Civil Code states that "[r]ecognition shall be made in the
record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record, or in any
authentic writing;" that the appearance of the father's name in the
certificate of birth alone, without his actual intervention, was
insufficient to prove paternity; that the mere certificate by the civil
registrar that the father himself registered the child, without the
father's signature, was not proof of the father's voluntary
acknowledgment; that the baptismal certificate was insufficient proof
of paternity; and that if there was ground for Anacleto's recognition,
the period to claim recognition already prescribed.
The petitioners reject the claim of Anacleto that Joaquina bequeathed
the subject properties to him by last will and testament. They assail
the validity and due execution of the will, which was not submitted for
probate; that the joint affidavit allegedly executed in favor of Anacleto
by Sulpicio, Braulia and Veronica Limpahan, with Josefina, Gliceria and
Felicisima Arado, whereby they ceded their rights in the subject
properties in favor of Anacleto, was unwarranted; and that the veracity
of the affidavit was doubtful because it was purportedly inconsistent
with Anacleto' s stance that he had inherited the properties in his own
right.
In turn, the defendants, herein respondents, counter that Nicolas
recognized Anacleto as his illegitimate child because Nicolas had
himself caused the registration of Anacleto's birth; that the petitioners'
allegation of prescription lacked basis inasmuch as Anacleto was not
seeking compulsory recognition; and that Anacleto had already been
voluntarily recognized by Nicolas as his illegitimate son.
Ruling of the Court
We affirm the dismissal of the petitioners' complaint by the RTC, albeit
for different reasons.
The complaint filed by the petitioners in the RTC to recover the subject
properties is properly characterized as an accion reivindicatoria.
According to Caneza v. Bautista,31 an "[a}ccion reivindicatoria seeks
the recovery of ownership and includes the jus utendi and the }us
fruendi brought in the proper regional trial court. Accion reivindicatoria
is an action whereby plaintiff alleges ownership over a parcel of land
and seeks recovery of its full possession." In essence, the petitioners
seek to put an end to Anacleto's possession of the properties on the
basis of their being the rightful heirs considering that Anacleto, being
the spurious child of Nicolas, held no successional rights in the estate
of Nicolas.
The burden of proof to establish the averments of the complaint by
preponderance of evidence pertained to the petitioners as the
plaintiffs. In that regard, we have discoursed on preponderance of
evidence in Amoroso v. Alegre, Jr.,32 thusly:
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
"Preponderance of evidence" is the weight, credit, and value of the
aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be
synonymous with the term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater
weight of the credible evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a
phrase which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is
evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than
that which is offered in opposition thereto. If plaintiff claims a right
granted or created by law, he must prove his claim by competent
evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not
upon the weakness of that of his opponent. (Bold underscoring for
emphasis)
The petitioners did not discharge their burden of proof.
At the outset, the Court affirms the holding by the RTC and the CA that
the provisions of the Family Code 33 should apply because the
petitioners' complaint was filed, litigated and decided by the RTC
during the effectivity of the Family Code. Under the Family Code, the
classification of children is limited to either legitimate or
illegitimate.34Illegitimate filiation is proved in accordance with Article
175 of the Family Code, to wit:
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation
in the same way and on the same evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article
173, except when the action is based on the second paragraph of
Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent.
On the other hand, legitimate filiation is established in accordance with
Articles 172 and 173 of the Family Code, which state:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or
a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall
be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws.
ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child
during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should
the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases,
the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the
action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive
notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.
Rightly enough, the RTC and the CA unanimously concluded that
Nicolas had duly acknowledged Anacleto as his illegitimate son. The
birth certificate of Anacleto appearing in the Register of Births of the
Municipality of Bacong, Negros Oriental (Exhibits 3, 3-A) showed that
Nicolas had himself caused the registration of the birth of Anacleto.
The showing was by means of the name of Nicolas appearing in the
column "Remarks" in Page 53, Book 4, Register No. 214 of the Register
of Births. Based on the certification (Exhibit 3-B) issued by the Local
Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Bacong, Negros Oriental, the
column in the Register of Births entitled "Remarks" (Observaciones)
was the space provided for the name of the informant of the live birth
to be registered. Considering that Nicolas, the putative father, had a
direct hand in the preparation of the birth certificate, reliance on the
birth certificate of Anacleto as evidence of his paternity was fully
warranted.35
Anacleto's baptismal certificate (Exhibit 7) was of no consequence in
determining his filiation. We have already held in Cabatania v. Court of
Appeals36 that "while a baptismal certificate may be considered a
public document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of
the sacrament on the date specified but not the veracity of the entries
with respect to the child's paternity;" and that baptismal certificates
were "per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation," and thus
"cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove
[filiation]." Hence, we attach no probative value to the baptismal
certificate as proof of the filiation of Anacleto.
The weight accorded by the R TC and the CA to the picture depicting
the young Anacleto in the arms of Joaquina as she stood beside the
coffin of the departed Nicolas (Exhibit 5) was also undeserved. At best,
the picture merely manifested that it was Joaquina who had
acknowledged her filiation with Anacleto. Cautioning against the
admission in evidence of a picture of similar nature, we have pointed
out in Solinap v. Locsin, Jr.37 that:
[R]espondent's photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late
Juan C. Locsin cannot and will not constitute proof of filiation, lest we
Page | 169
Persons 4th Exam Cases
recklessly set a very dangerous precedent that would encourage and
sanction fraudulent claims. Anybody can have a picture taken while
standing before a coffin with others and thereafter utilize it in claiming
the estate of the deceased.
The school records of Anacleto (Exhibit 6), which evinced that Joaquina
was the guardian of Anacleto in his grade school years, and the
marriage contract between Anacleto and Elenette (Exhibits 8 to 8-C),
which indicated that Joaquina had given consent to Anacleto's
marriage, did not have the evidentiary value accorded by the RTC and
the CA. Joaquina's apparent recognition of Anacleto mattered little, for,
as we stressed in Cenido v. Apacionado, 38the recognition "must be
made personally by the parent himself or herself, not by any brother,
sister or relative; after all, the concept of recognition speaks of a
voluntary declaration by the parent, of if the parent refuses, by judicial
authority, to establish the paternity or maternity of children born
outside wedlock."
The lack of probative value of the respondents' aforecited
corroborative evidence notwithstanding, Anacleto 's recognition as
Nicolas' illegitimate child remained beyond question in view of the
showing that Nicolas had personally and directly acknowledged
Anacleto as his illegitimate son.
How should the acknowledgment of Anacleto by Nicolas affect the
respective rights of the parties in relation to the specific properties
subject of the complaint?
To recall, the parties stipulated that the first eight of the subject
properties had previously belonged to Raymundo, while the remaining
two had been the paraphernal properties of Joaquina.
With Raymundo having died in 1939, the Spanish Civil Code of 1889
was the governing law on succession. Under Article 807
thereof,39 Joaquina and Nicolas, i.e., the surviving spouse and the
legitimate son of Raymundo, were the forced heirs who acquired legal
title to Raymundo's estate upon his death. In accordance with Article
834 thereof,40 Nicolas was entitled to inherit the entire estate of
Raymundo, while Joaquina was entitled to a portion in usufruct equal to
the one third portion available for betterment.
When Nicolas died in 1954, the Civil Code of the Philippines was
already in effect.41 Under Article 1000 thereof,42the heirs entitled to
inherit from Nicolas's estate were Joaquina (his mother), Florencia (his
surviving spouse), and Anacleto (his acknowledged illegitimate son).
Said heirs became co-owners of the properties comprising the entire
estate of Nicolas prior to the estate's partition in accordance with
Article 107843 of the Civil Code.
Anacleto had an established right to inherit from Nicolas, whose estate
included the first eight of the subject properties that had previously
belonged to Raymundo Anacleto became a co-owner of said properties,
pro indiviso, when Nicolas died in 1954. 44 Likewise, Joaquina succeeded
to, and became a pro indiviso co-owner of, the properties that formed
part of the estate of Nicolas. When Joaquina died in 1981, her
hereditary estate included the two remaining properties, as well as her
share in the estate of Nicolas. Inasmuch as Joaquina died without any
surviving legitimate descendant, ascendant, illegitimate child or
spouse, Article 100345 of the Civil Code mandated that her collateral
relatives should inherit her entire estate.
Contrary to the rulings of the lower courts, Anacleto was barred by law
from inheriting from the estate of Joaquina.1wphi1 To start with,
Anacleto could not inherit from Joaquina by right of representation of
Nicolas, the legitimate son of Joaquina. 46 Under Article 992 of the Civil
Code, an illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the
legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; in the same
manner, such children or relatives shall not inherit from the illegitimate
child. As certified in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 47 the right of
representation is not available to illegitimate descendants of legitimate
children in the inheritance of a legitimate grandparent. And, secondly,
Anacleto could not inherit from the estate of Joaquina by virtue of the
latter's last will and testament, i.e., the Katapusan Tugon (Testamento)
(Exhibit K). Article 838 of the Civil Code dictates that no will shall pass
either real or personal property unless the same is proved and allowed
in accordance with the Rules of Court. We have clarified in Gallanosa v.
Arcangel48 that in order that a will may take effect, "it has to be
probated, legalized or allowed in the proper testamentary proceeding.
The probate of the will is mandatory." It appears that such will
remained ineffective considering that the records are silent as to
whether it had ever been presented for probate, and had been allowed
by a court of competent jurisdiction. The petitioners alleged this fact in
their complaint, and the respondents did not controvert the allegation.
In the absence of proof showing that the supposed will of Joaquina had
been duly approved by the competent court, we hold that it had not
been so approved. Hence, we cannot sustain the CA' s ruling to the
effect that Joaquina had bequeathed her properties to Anacleto by will,
and that the properties had been transmitted to him upon her death.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

As the petitioners were among the collateral relatives of Joaquina, they

are the ones entitled to inherit from her estate.
Nonetheless, the petitioners' appeal still fails because the parties did
not establish that the estates of Raymundo, Nicolas and Joaquina had
been respectively settled with finality through the appropriate testate
or intestate proceedings, and partitioned in due course. Unless there
was a proper and valid partition of the assets of the respective estates
of Raymundo, Nicolas and Joaquina, whether extrajudicially or
judicially, their heirs could not adjudicate unto themselves and claim
specific portions of their estates, because, as we have declared in
Carvajal v. Court of Appeals:49
x x x Unless a project of partition is effected, each heir cannot claim
ownership over a definite portion of the inheritance. Without partition,
either by agreement between the parties or by judicial proceeding, a
co-heir cannot dispose of a specific portion of the estate. For where
there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before
its partition, owned in common by such heirs. Upon the death of a
person, each of his heirs becomes the undivided owner of the whole
estate left with respect to the part or portion which might be
adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus formed
among the co-owners of the estate or co-heirs while it remains
undivided.
Without the showing that the respective estates of Raymundo, Nicolas
and Joaquina had been previously partitioned, the Court concludes and
holds that none of the parties herein can lay claim over any of the
disputed specific properties. The petitioners cannot contend, therefore,
that they were the rightful owners of the properties of the late Joaquina
to the exclusion of Anacleto. Thus, we uphold the dismissal of the
petitioners' complaint for recovery of such properties.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on February
28, 2003 by the Court of Appeals; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay
the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 197099, September 28, 2015
EUGENIO SAN JUAN GERONIMO, Petitioner, v. KAREN
SANTOS, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
At bar is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision1 and
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 88650
promulgated on January 17, 2011 and May 24, 2011, respectively,
which affirmed the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malolos City, Bulacan, Branch 8. Both courts a quo ruled that the
subject document titled Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman is null
and void, and ordered herein petitioner Eugenio San Juan Geronimo
(Eugenio), who was previously joined by his brother Emiliano San
Juan Geronimo (Emiliano) as co-defendant, to vacate the one-half
portion of the subject 6,542-square meter property and surrender
its possession to respondent Karen Santos. In a Resolution 4 dated
November 28, 2011, this Court ordered the deletion of the name of
Emiliano from the title of the instant petition as co-
petitioner, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x The Court resolves:
xxxx
cralawlawlibrary
(2) to AMEND the title of this petition to read
The following facts were found by the trial court and adopted by
the appellate court in its assailed
Decision, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On April 17, 2001, plaintiff Karen Santos, claiming to be the only
child of deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo filed a complaint
for annulment of document and recovery of possession against the
defendants Eugenio and Emiliano Geronimo who are the brothers
of her father. She alleged that with the death of her parents, the
property consisting of one-half of the parcel of land located at San
Jose, Paombong, Bulacan with Tax Declaration No. 99-02017-00219
and belonging to her parents was passed on to her by the law on
intestacy; that lately, she discovered that defendants executed a
document entitled Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman declaring
themselves as the only heirs of spouses Rufino and Caridad and
adjudicating to themselves the property in question; and that
consequently they took possession and were able to transfer the
tax declaration of the subject property to their names. She prayed
that the document Exhibit C be annulled and the tax declaration of
the land transferred to her, and that the defendants vacate the
property and pay her damages.
In an amended answer, the defendants denied the allegation that
plaintiff was the only child and sole heir of their brother. They
disclosed that the deceased Rufino and Caridad Geronimo were
childless and took in as their ward the plaintiff who was in truth,
the child of Caridad's sister. They claimed that the birth certificate
of the plaintiff was a simulated document. It was allegedly
impossible for Rufino and Caridad to have registered the plaintiff in
Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur because they had never lived or sojourned in
the place and Caridad, who was an elementary teacher in Bulacan
never filed any maternity leave during the period of her service
from August 1963 until October 1984.
The plaintiff took the stand and testified that her parents were
Rufino and Caridad Geronimo. The defendants Eugenio and
Emiliano were the half-brothers of her father Rufino, being the
children of Rufino's father Marciano Geronimo with another woman
Carmen San Juan. Rufino co-owned Lot 1716 with the defendants'
mother
"Eugenio
Carmen,
San and
Juanupon
Geronimo,
his death
petitioner
in 1980,
vs.when
Karen
the
Santos,
plaintiff
respondent,"
was consideri
only 8 years old, his share in the property devolved on his heirs. In
1998, some 18 years later, Caridad and she executed an extra-
judicial settlement of Rufino's estate entitled Pagmamanahan Sa
Labas ng Hukuman Na May Pagtalikod Sa Karapatan, whereby the
plaintiffs mother Caridad waived all her rights to Rufino's share and
in the land in question to her daughter the plaintiff. Be that as it
may, in 1985, guardianship proceedings appeared to have been
instituted with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos by Caridad in
which it was established that the plaintiff was the minor child of
Caridad with her late husband Rufino. Caridad was thus appointed
guardian of the person and estate of the plaintiff.
Page | 172
Persons 4th Exam Cases
The plaintiff further declared that she and her mother had been
paying the real estate taxes on the property, but in 2000, the
defendants took possession of the land and had the tax declaration
transferred to them. This compelled her to file the present case.
Eugenio Geronimo, the defendant, disputes the allegation that the
plaintiff is the only child and legal heir of his brother Rufino. He
disclosed that when Rufino's wife could not bear a child, the couple
decided to adopt the plaintiff who was Caridad's niece from Sta.
Maria, Ilocos Sur. It was in 1972, 13 years after the marriage, when
Karen joined her adoptive parents' household. Believing that in the
absence of a direct heir, his brother Emiliano and he should
succeed to the estate of their brother, they executed in 2000 an
extra-judicial settlement called Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman.
Eugenio was able to obtain a copy of the plaintiffs alleged birth
certificate. It had irregular features, such as that it was written in
pentel pen, the entry in the box date of birth was erased and the
word and figure April 6, 1972 written and the name Emma
Dao was superimposed on the entry in the box intended for the
informant's signature.
Two more witnesses were adduced. Atty. Elmer Lopez, a legal
consultant of the DECS in Bulacan brought the plaintiffs service
record as an elementary school teacher at Paombong[,] Bulacan to
show that she did not have any maternity leave during the period
of her service from March 11, 1963 to October 24, 1984, and a
certification from the Schools Division Superintendent that the
plaintiff did not file any maternity leave during her service. He
declared that as far as the service record is concerned, it reflects
the entry and exit from the service as well as the leaves that she
availed of. Upon inquiry by the court, he clarified that
the leaves were reflected but the absences were not. Testifying on
the plaintiffs birth certificate, Exhibit 14, Arturo Reyes, a
representative of the NSO, confirmed that there was an alteration
in the date of birth and signature of the informant. In view of the
alterations, he considered the document
questionable.6ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On October 27, 2006, the trial court ruled in favor of
respondent, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. Declaring the document Pagmamana sa Labas ng Hukuman
dated March 9, 2000 executed in favor of Eugenio San Juan-
Geronimo and Emilio San Juan-Geronimo as null and
void;cralawlawlibrary
2. Annulling Tax Declaration No. 99-02017-01453 of the subject
property in the names of Eugenio San Juan-Geronimo and Emiliano
San Juan-Geronimo;cralawlawlibrary
3. Ordering defendants Eugenio San Juan-Geronimo and Emiliano
San Juan-Geronimo to vacate the 1/2 portion of the subject
property and to surrender the possession to the
plaintiff;cralawlawlibrary
4. Ordering the defendants to pay the plaintiff the amount of
[P]30,000.00 as attorney's fees;cralawlawlibrary
5. To pay the costs of the suit.
SO ORDERED.7ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The trial court ruled that respondent is the legal heir - being the
legitimate child - of the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad
Geronimo (spouses Rufino and Caridad). It found that respondent's
filiation was duly established by the certificate of live birth which
was presented in evidence. The RTC dismissed the claim of
petitioner that the birth certificate appeared to have been
tampered, specifically on the entries pertaining to the date of birth
of respondent and the name of the informant. The trial court held
that petitioner failed to adduce evidence to explain how the
erasures were done. Petitioner also failed to prove that the
alterations were due to the fault of respondent or another person
who was responsible for the act. In the absence of such contrary
evidence, the RTC relied on the prima facie presumption of the
veracity and regularity of the birth certificate as a public
Page | 173
Persons 4th Exam Cases
document.
The trial court further stated that even granting arguendo that the
birth certificate is questionable, the filiation of respondent has
already been sufficiently proven by evidence of her open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child under
Article 172 of the Family Code of the Philippines. The RTC
considered the following overt acts of the deceased spouses as
acts of recognition that respondent is their legitimate child: they
sent her to school and paid for her tuition fees; Caridad made
respondent a beneficiary of her burial benefits from the
Government Service Insurance System; and, Caridad filed a
petition for guardianship of respondent after the death of her
husband Rufino. Lastly, the trial court held that to be allowed to
impugn the filiation and status of respondent, petitioner should
have brought an action for the purpose under Articles 170 and 171
of the Family Code. Since petitioner failed to file such action, the
trial court ruled that respondent alone is entitled to the ownership
and possession of the subject land owned by Rufino. The
extrajudicial settlement executed by petitioner and his brother was
therefore declared not valid and binding as respondent is Rufino's
only compulsory heir.
On appeal, petitioner raised the issue on the alterations in the birth
certificate of respondent and the offered evidence of a mere
certification from the Office of the Civil Registry instead of the birth
certificate itself. According to petitioner, respondent's open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child is only
secondary evidence to the birth certificate itself. Respondent
questioned if it was legally permissible for petitioner to question
her filiation as a legitimate child of the spouses Rufino and Caridad
in the same action for annulment of document and recovery of
possession that she herself filed against petitioner and his then co-
defendant. Respondent argued that the conditions enumerated
under Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code, giving the putative
father and his heirs the right to bring an action to impugn the
legitimacy of the child, are not present in the instant case. She
further asserted that the Family Code contemplates a direct action,
thus her civil status may not be assailed indirectly or collaterally in
this suit.
In the assailed Decision dated January 17, 2011, the appellate
court held that under Article 170, the action to impugn the
legitimacy of the child must be reckoned from either of these two
dates: the date the child was born to the mother during the
marriage, or the date when the birth of such child was recorded in
the civil registry. The CA found no evidence or admission that
Caridad indeed gave birth to respondent on a specific date. It
further resolved that the birth certificate presented in this case,
Exhibit 14, does not qualify as the valid registration of birth in the
civil register as envisioned by the law, viz.:
x x x The reason is that under the statute establishing the civil
register, Act No. 3753,the declaration of the physician or midwife
in attendance at the birth or in default thereof, that declaration of
either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the
registration of birth in the civil register. The document in question
was signed by one Emma Dao who was not identified as either
the parent of the plaintiff or the physician or midwife who attended
to her birth. Exhibit 14, legally, cannot be the birth certificate
envisioned by the law; otherwise, with an informant as shadowy as
Emma Dao, the floodgates to spurious filiations will be opened.
Neither may the order of the court Exhibit E be treated as the final
judgment mentioned in Article 172 as another proof of filiation. The
final judgment mentioned refers to a decision of a competent court
finding the child legitimate. Exhibit G is merely an order granting
letters of guardianship to the parent Caridad based on her
representations that she is the mother of the
plaintiff.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Noting the absence of such record of birth, final judgment or
admission in a public or private document that respondent is the
legitimate child of the spouses Rufino and Caridad, the appellate
court similar to the trial court - relied on Article 172 of the Family
Code which allows the introduction and admission of secondary
evidence to prove one's legitimate filiation via open and
continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. The CA
Page | 174
Persons 4th Exam Cases
agreed with the trial court that respondent has proven her
legitimate filiation, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
We agree with the lower court that the plaintiff has proven her
filiation by open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child. The evidence consists of the following: (1) the
plaintiff was allowed by her putative parents to bear their family
name Geronimo; (2) they supported her and sent her to school
paying for lier tuition fees and other school expenses; (3) she was
the beneficiary of the burial benefits of Caridad before the GSIS;
(4) after the death of Rufino, Caridad applied for and was
appointed legal guardian of the person and property of the plaintiff
from the estate left by Rufino; and (5) both Caridad and the
plaintiff executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Rufino
on the basis of the fact that they are both the legal heirs of the
deceased.
It is clear that the status enjoyed by the plaintiff as the legitimate
child of Rufino and Caridad has been open and continuous, x x x
The conclusion follows that the plaintiff is entitled to the property
left by Rufino to the exclusion of his brothers, the defendants,
which consists of a one-half share in Lot
1716.9ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Petitioners moved for reconsideration10 but the motion was denied
in the assailed Resolution dated May 24, 2011. Hence, this petition
raising the following assignment of
errors:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION, WHEN IT ALLOWED THE
INTRODUCTION OF SECONDARY EVIDENCE AND
RENDERED JUDGMENT BASED THEREON
NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXISTENCE OF PRIMARY
EVIDENCE OF BIRTH CERTIFICATE [EXHIBIT 14].
II. THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION, AMOUNTING TO
LACK OF JURISDICTION WHEN IT RULED THAT
PETITIONERS HAVE NO PERSONALITY TO IMPUGN
RESPONDENT'S LEGITIMATE FILIATION.11
On the first issue, petitioner argues that secondary evidence to
prove one's filiation is admissible only if there is no primary
evidence, i.e, a record of birth or an authentic admission in
writing.12 Petitioner asserts that herein respondent's birth
certificate, Exhibit 14, constitutes the primary evidence
enumerated under Article 172 of the Family Code and the ruling of
both courts a quo that the document is not the one "envisioned by
law" should have barred the introduction of secondary evidence.
Petitioner expounds this
proposition, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The findings of the courts a quo that the birth certificate [Exhibit
14] is not [the] one envisioned by law finds support in numerous
cases decided by the Honorable Supreme Court. Thus, a certificate
of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not
competent evidence as to the issue of paternity, when there is no
showing that the putative father had a hand in the preparation of
said certificates, and the Local Civil Registrar is devoid of authority
to record the paternity of an illegitimate child upon the information
of a third person. Where the birth certificate and the baptismal
certificate are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation,
they cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to
prove the same. x x x
x x x The birth certificate Exhibit 14 contains erasures. The date of
birth originally written in ball pen was erased and the date April 6,
1972 was superimposed using a pentel pen; the entry on the
informant also originally written in ball pen was erased and the
name E. Dao was superimposed using also a pentel pen; there is
no signature as to who received it from the office of the registry.
Worst, respondent Karen confirms the existence of her birth
certificate when she introduced in evidence [Exhibit A] a mere
Certification from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Sta.
Maria, Ilocos Sur, which highlighted more suspicions of its
existence, thus leading to conclusion and presumption that if such
evidence is presented, it would be adverse to her claim. True to the
suspicion, when Exhibit 14 was introduced by the petitioner and
testified on by no less than the NSO representative, Mr. Arturo
Reyes, and confirmed that there were alterations which renders the
Page | 175
Persons 4th Exam Cases
birth certificate questionable.
Argued differently, with the declaration that the birth certificate is
a nullity or falsity, the courts a quo should have stopped there,
ruled that respondent Karen is not the child of Rufino, and
therefore not entitled to inherit from the
estate.13ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On the second issue, petitioner alleges that the CA gravely erred
and abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it
ruled that he does not have personality to impugn respondent's
legitimate filiation.14 While petitioner admits that the CA "did not
directly rule on this particular issue,"15 he nonetheless raises the
said issue as an error since the appellate court affirmed the
decision of the trial court. Petitioner argues that in so affirming, the
CA also adopted the ruling of the trial court that the filiation of
respondent is strictly personal to respondent's alleged father and
his heirs under Articles 170 and 171 of the Family Code,16 thereby
denying petitioner the "right to impugn or question the filiation and
status of the plaintiff."17 Petitioner
argues, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x [T]he lower court's reliance on Articles 170 and 171 of the
Family Code is totally misplaced, with due respect. It should be
read in conjunction with the other articles in the same chapter on
paternity and filiation of the Family Code. A careful reading of said
chapter would reveal that it contemplates situations where a doubt
exists that a child is indeed a man's child, and the father [or, in
proper cases, his heirs] denies the child's filiation. It does not refer
to situations where a child is alleged not to be the child at all of a
particular couple. Petitioners are asserting not merely that
respondent Karen is not a legitimate child of, but that she is not a
child of Rufino Geronimo at all. x x x18ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
We grant the petition.
Despite its finding that the birth certificate which respondent
offered in evidence is questionable, the trial court ruled that
respondent is a legitimate child and the sole heir of deceased
spouses Rufino and Caridad. The RTC based this conclusion on
secondary evidence that is similar to proof admissible under the
second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code to prove the
filiation of legitimate children, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any
of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a
private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the following evidence, the legitimate filiation
shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Petitioner argues that such secondary evidence may be admitted
only in a direct action under Article 172 because the said provision
of law is meant to be instituted as a separate action, and proof of
filiation cannot be raised as a collateral issue as in the instant case
which is an action for annulment of document and recovery of
possession.
Petitioner is correct that proof of legitimacy under Article 172, or
illegitimacy under Article 175, should only be raised in a direct and
separate action instituted to prove the filiation of a child. The
rationale behind this procedural prescription is stated in the case
of Tison v. Court of Appeals,19viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x [W]ell settled is the rule that the issue of legitimacy cannot
be attacked collaterally.
The rationale for these rules has been explained in this
wise:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
"The presumption of legitimacy in the Family Code xxx actually
fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and that civil
status cannot be attacked collaterally. The legitimacy of the child
can be impugned only in a direct action brought for that purpose,
by the proper parties, and within the period limited by law.
The legitimacy of the child cannot be contested by way of
defense or as a collateral issue in another action for a
different purpose.The necessity of an independent action
directly impugning the legitimacy is more clearly expressed in the
Mexican Code (Article 335) which provides: 'The contest of the
legitimacy of a child by the husband or his heirs must be made by
proper complaint before the competent court; any contest made in
any other way is void.' This principle applies under our Family
Code. Articles 170 and 171 of the code confirm this view, because
they refer to "the action to impugn the legitimacy."
This action can be brought only by the husband or his heirs and
within the periods fixed in the present articles.
Upon the expiration of the periods provided in Article 170, the
action to impugn the legitimacy of a child can no longer be
brought. The status conferred by the presumption, therefore,
becomes fixed, and can no longer be questioned. The obvious
intention of the law is to prevent the status of a child born in
wedlock from being in a state of uncertainty for a long time. It also
aims to force early action to settle any doubt as to the paternity of
such child, so that the evidence material to the matter, which must
necessarily be facts occurring during the period of the conception
of the child, may still be easily available.
xxxx
Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child born to his
wife. He is the one directly confronted with the scandal and ridicule
which the infidelity of his wife produces; and he should decide
whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it, in view of the moral
and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases that
his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these
cases, none - even his heirs - can impugn legitimacy; that would
amount to an insult to his memory."20ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
What petitioner failed to recognize, however, is that this procedural
rule is applicable only to actions where the legitimacy - or
illegitimacy - of a child is at issue. This situation does not obtain in
the case at bar.
In the instant case, the filiation of a child - herein respondent - is
not at issue. Petitioner does not claim that respondent is not the
legitimate child of his deceased brother Rufino and his wife
Caridad. What petitioner alleges is that respondent is not the child
of the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad at; all. He proffers this
allegation in his Amended Answer before the trial court by way of
defense that respondent is not an heir to his brother Rufino. When
petitioner alleged that respondent is not a child of the deceased
spouses Rufino and Caridad in the proceedings below,
jurisprudence shows that the trial court was correct in admitting
and ruling on the secondary evidence of respondent - even if such
proof is similar to the evidence admissible under the second
paragraph of Article 172 and despite the instant case not being a
direct action to prove one's filiation. In the following cases, the
courts a quoand this Court did not bar the introduction of
secondary evidence in actions which involve allegations that the
opposing party is not the child of a particular couple even if such
evidence is similar to the kind of proof admissible under the second
paragraph of Article 172.
In the 1994 case of Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals,21 therein
deceased spouses Vicente Benitez (Vicente) and Isabel Chipongian
(Isabel) owned various properties while they were still living. Isabel
departed in 1982, while Vicente died intestate in 1989. In 1990,
Vicente's sister (Victoria Benitez-Lirio) and nephew (Feodor Benitez
Aguilar) instituted an action before the trial court for the issuance
of letters of administration of his estate in favor of Feodor. In the
said proceedings, they alleged that Vicente was "survived by no
other heirs or relatives be they ascendants or descendants,
whether legitimate, illegitimate or legally adopted x x x." 22 They
Page | 177
Persons 4th Exam Cases
further argued that one "Marissa Benitez[-]Badua who was raised
and cared for by them since childhood is, in fact, not related to
them by blood, nor legally adopted, and is therefore not a legal
heir [of Vicente]."23 Marissa opposed the petition and proffered
evidence to prove that she is an heir of Vicente. Marissa submitted
the following evidence, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. her Certificate of Live Birth (Exh. 3);cralawlawlibrary
2. Baptismal Certificate (Exh. 4);cralawlawlibrary
3. Income Tax Returns and Information Sheet for Membership with
the GSIS of the late Vicente naming her as his daughter (Exhs. 10
to 21); and
4. School Records (Exhs. 5 & 6).
She also testified that the said spouses reared and continuously
treated her as their legitimate
daughter.24ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Feodor and his mother Victoria offered mostly testimonial evidence
to show that the spouses Vicente and Isabel failed to beget a child
during their marriage. They testified that the late Isabel, when she
was 36 years old, was even referred to an obstetrician-gynecologist
for treatment. Victoria, who was 77 years old at the time of her
testimony, also categorically stated that Marissa was not the
biological child of the said spouses who were unable to physically
procreate.25cralawred
The trial court, relying on Articles 166 and 170 of the Family Code,
declared Marissa as the legitimate daughter and sole heir of the
spouses Vicente and Isabel. The appellate court: reversed the RTC's
ruling holding that the trial court erred in applying Articles 166 and
170 of the Family Code. On appeal to this Court, we affirmed the
reversal made by the appellate
court, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A careful reading of the above articles will show that they do not
contemplate a situation, like in the instant case, where a child
is alleged not to be the child of nature or biological child of
a certain couple. Rather, these articles govern a situation where
a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a child of his wife. Thus,
under Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy
of said child by proving: (1) it was physically impossible for him to
have sexual intercourse, with his wife within the first 120 days of
the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of the child; (2)
that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not
have been his child; (3) that in case of children conceived through
artificial insemination, the written authorization or ratification by
either parent was obtained through mistake, fraud, violence,
intimidation or undue influence. Articles 170 and 171 reinforce this
reading as they speak of the prescriptive period within which
the husband or any of his heirs should file the action impugning
the legitimacy of said child. Doubtless then, the appellate
court did not err when it refused to apply these articles to
the case at bench. For the case at bench is not one where
the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that petitioner
is not his child by Isabel. Rather, their clear submission is that
petitioner was not born to Vicente and Isabel. Our ruling in
Cabatbat-Lim vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 166 SCRA 451, 457
cited in the impugned decision is
apropos, viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
"Petitioners' recourse to Article 263 of the New Civil Code [now Art.
170 of the Family Code] is not well-taken. This legal provision refers
to an action to impugn legitimacy. It is inapplicable to this case
because this is not an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child,
but an action of the private respondents to claim their inheritance
as legal heirs of their childless deceased aunt. They do not claim
that petitioner Violeta Cabatbat Lim is an illegitimate child
of the deceased, but that she is not the decedent's child at
all. Being neither legally adopted child, nor an acknowledged
natural child, nor a child by legal fiction of Esperanza Cabatbat,
Violeta is not a legal heir of the
deceased."26ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Similarly, the 2001 case of Labagala v. Santiago27 originated from a
complaint for recovery of title, ownership and possession before
the trial court. Respondents therein contended that petitioner is
not the daughter of the decedent Jose and sought to recover from
Page | 178
Persons 4th Exam Cases
her the 1/3 portion of the subject property pertaining to Jose but
which came into petitioner's sole possession upon Jose's death.
Respondents sought to prove that petitioner is not the daughter of
the decedent as evidenced by her birth certificate which did not
itself indicate the name of Jose as her father. Citing the case
of Sayson v. Court of Appeals and Article 263 of the Civil Code (now
Article 170 of the Family Code),28petitioner argued that
respondents cannot impugn her filiation collaterally since the case
was not an action impugning a child's legitimacy but one for
recovery of title, ownership and possession of property. We ruled in
this case that petitioner's reliance on Article 263 of the Civil Code
is misplaced and respondents may impugn the petitioner's filiation
in an action for recovery of title and possession. Thus, we affirmed
the ruling of the appellate court that the birth certificate of
petitioner Labagala proved that she "was born of different parents,
not Jose and his wife."29 Citing the aforecited cases of Benitez-
Badua and Lim v. Intermediate Appellate Court,30 we
stated, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
This article should be read in conjunction with the other articles in
the same chapter on paternity and filiation in the Civil Code. A
careful reading of said chapter would reveal that it contemplates
situations where a doubt exists that a child is indeed a man's child
by his wife, and the husband (or, in proper cases, his heirs) denies
the child's filiation. It does not refer to situations where a child is
alleged not to be the child at all of a particular couple. 31
Article 263 refers to an action to impugn the legitimacy of a child,
to assert and prove that a person is not a man's child by his
wife. However, the present case is not one impugning
petitioner's legitimacy. Respondents are asserting not
merely that petitioner is not a legitimate child of Jose, but
that she is not a child of Jose at all. x x
x32ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Be that as it may, even if both courts a quo were correct in
admitting secondary evidence similar to the proof admissible under
Article 172 of the Family Code in this action for annulment of
document and recovery of possession, we are constrained to rule
after a meticulous examination of the evidence on record that all
proof points to the conclusion that herein respondent is not a child
of the deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad. While we ascribe to
the general principle that this Court is not a trier of facts, 33 this rule
admits of the following exceptions where findings of fact may be
passed upon and reviewed by this
Court, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil.
257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken,
absurd or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3)
Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95
Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing, L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953);
(5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-
9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.); (6) When the Court of Appeals, in
making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee
(Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil. 401
[1958]); (7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to
those of the trial court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33 SCRA 622
[1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When
the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set
forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners' main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The
finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record
(Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242
[1970]).34ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
It is clear in the case at bar that the ruling of both courts a
quo declaring respondent as a legitimate child and sole heir of the
deceased spouses Rufino and Caridad is one based on a
misapprehension of facts.
A mere cursory reading of the birth certificate of respondent would
show that it was tampered specifically on the entries pertaining to
the date of birth of respondent and the name of the informant.
Using pentel ink, the date of birth of respondent - April 6, 1972 -
Page | 179
Persons 4th Exam Cases
and the name of the informant -Emma Dao - were both
superimposed on the document. Despite these glaring erasures,
the trial court still relied on the prima facie presumption of the
veracity and regularity of the birth certificate for failure of
petitioner to explain how the erasures were done and if the
alterations were due to the fault of respondent. It thus ruled that
respondent's filiation was duly established by the birth certificate.
The appellate court did not agree with this finding and instead
ruled that the birth certificate presented does not qualify as the
valid registration of birth in the civil register as envisioned by the
law. We reiterate the relevant pronouncement of the
CA, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x The document in question was signed by one Emma Dao
who was not identified as either the parent of the plaintiff or the
physician or midwife who attended to her birth. Exhibit 14, legally,
cannot be the birth certificate envisioned by the law; otherwise,
with an informant as shadowy as Emma Dao, the floodgates to
spurious filiations will be opened. Neither may the order of the
court Exhibit E be treated as thefinal judgment mentioned in Article
172 as another proof of filiation. The final judgment mentioned
refers to a decision of a competent court finding the child
legitimate. Exhibit G is merely an order granting letters of
guardianship to the parent Caridad based on her representations
that she is the mother of the plaintiff.35ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Nonetheless, the appellate court agreed with the trial court that
respondent has proven her filiation by showing that she has
enjoyed that open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child of the deceased spouses Rufino and
Caridad, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x The evidence consists of the following: (1) the plaintiff was
allowed by her putative parents to bear their family name
Geronimo; (2) they supported her and sent her to school paying for
her tuition fees and other school expenses; (3) she was the
beneficiary of the burial benefits of Caridad before the GS1S; (4)
after the death of Rufino, Caridad applied for and. was appointed
legal guardian of the person and property of the plaintiff from the
estate left by Rufino; and (5) both Caridad and the plaintiff
executed an extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Rufino on the
basis of the fact that they are both the legal heirs of the
deceased.36ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
We do not agree with the conclusion of both courts a quo. The
appellate court itself ruled that the irregularities consisting of the
superimposed entries on the date of birth and the name of the
informant made the document questionable. The corroborating
testimony of Arturo Reyes, a representative of the NSO, further
confirmed that the entries on the date of birth and the signature of
the informant are alterations on the birth certificate which
rendered the document questionable. To be sure, even the
respondent herself did not offer any evidence to explain such
irregularities on her own birth certificate. These irregularities and
the totality of the following circumstances surrounding the alleged
birth of respondent are sufficient to overthrow the presumption of
regularity attached to respondent's birth
certificate, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. The identity of one Emma Dao, whose name was superimposed
as the informant regarding the birth of respondent, remains
unknown.
2. The testimony of Atty. Elmer De Dios Lopez, a legal consultant of
the Department of Education in Bulacan, proved that the deceased
Caridad did not have any maternity leave during the period of her
service from March 11, 1963 to October 24, 1984 as shown by her
Service Record as an elementary school teacher at Paombong,
Bulacan. This was corroborated by a certification from Dr. Teofila R.
Villanueva, Schools Division Superintendent, that she did not file
any maternity leave during her service. No testimonial or
documentary evidence was also offered to prove that the deceased
Caridad ever had a pregnancy.
3. Based on the birth certificate, respondent was born in 1972 or
13 years into the marriage of the deceased spouses Rufino and
Caridad. When respondent was born, Caridad was already 40 years
old. There are no hospital records of Caridad's delivery, and while it
may have been possible for her to have given birth at her own
home, this could have been proven by medical or non-medical
records or testimony if they do, in fact, exist.
Page | 180
Persons 4th Exam Cases
4. It is worthy to note that respondent was the sole witness for
herself in the instant case.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Finally, we also find that the concurrence of the secondary
evidence relied upon by both courts a quodoes not sufficiently
establish the one crucial fact in this case: that respondent is indeed
a child of the deceased spouses. Both the RTC and the CA ruled
that respondent is a legitimate child of her putative parents
because she was allowed to bear their family name "Geronimo",
they supported her and her education, she was the beneficiary of
the burial benefits of Caridad in her GSIS policy, Caridad applied for
and was appointed as her legal guardian in relation to the estate
left by Rufino, and she and Caridad executed an extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of Rufino as his legal heirs.
In the case of Rivera v. Heirs of Romnaldo Villanueva37 which
incisively discussed its parallelisms and contrasts with the case
of Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals,38 we ruled that the presence
of a similar set of circumstances - which were relied upon as
secondary proof by both courts a quo in the case at bar - does not
establish that one is,a child of the putative parents. Our discussion
in the Rivera case is instructive, viz.:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In Benitez-Badua v. Court of Appeals, Marissa Benitez-Badua, in
attempting to prove that she was the sole heir of the late Vicente
Benitez, submitted a certificate of live birth, a baptismal certificate,
income tax returns and an information sheet for membership in the
Government Service Insurance System of the decedent naming her
as his daughter, and her school records. She also testified that she
had been reared and continuously treated as Vicente's daughter.
By testimonial evidence alone, to the effect that Benitez-Badua's
alleged parents had been unable to beget children, the siblings of
Benitez-Badua's supposed father were able to rebut all of the
documentary evidence indicating her filiation. One fact that was
counted against Benitez-Badua was that her supposed mother
Isabel Chipongian, unable to bear any children even after ten years
of marriage, all of a sudden conceived and gave birth to her at the
age of 36.
Of great significance to this controversy was the following
pronouncement:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
But definitely, the mere registration of a child in his or her
birth certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not
a valid adoption, does not confer upon the child the status
of an adopted child and the legal rights of such child, and
even amounts to simulation of the child's birth or falsification of his
or her birth certificate, which is a public document, (emphasis
ours)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Furthermore, it is well-settled that a record of birth is merely
a prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein. It is not
conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements made
there by the interested parties. Following the logic of Benitez,
respondent Angelina and her co-defendants in SD-857 should have
adduced evidence of her adoption, in view of the contents of her
birth certificate. The records, however, are bereft of any such
evidence.
There are several parallels between this case and Benitez-
Badua that are simply too compelling to ignore. First, both Benitez-
Badua and respondent Angelina submitted birth certificates as
evidence of filiation. Second, both claimed to be children of parents
relatively advanced in age. Third, both claimed to have been born
after their alleged parents had lived together childless for several
years.
There are, however, also crucial differences between Benitez-
Badua and this case which ineluctably support the conclusion that
respondent Angelina was not Gonzales' daughter, whether
illegitimate or adopted. Gonzales, unlike Benitez-Badua's alleged
mother Chipongian, was not only 36 years old but 44 years old,
and on the verge of menopause at the time of the alleged birth.
Unlike Chipongian who had been married to Vicente Benitez for
only 10 years, Gonzales had been living childless with Villanueva
for 20 years. Under the circumstances, we hold that it was not
sufficiently established that respondent Angelina was Gonzales'
biological daughter, nor even her adopted daughter. Thus, she
Page | 181
Persons 4th Exam Cases

cannot inherit from Gonzales. Since she could not have validly
participated in Gonzales' estate, the extrajudicial partition which
she executed with Villanueva on August 8, 1980 was
invalid.39ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In view of these premises, we are constrained to disagree with both
courts a quo and rule that the confluence of the circumstances and
the proof presented in this case do not lead to the conclusion that
respondent is a child of the deceased spouses.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed

Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
88650 dated January 17, 2011 and May 24, 2011, respectively,
areREVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Complaint in Civil Case No.
268-M-2001 for Annulment of Document and Recovery of
Possession is hereby ordered DISMISSED.

With costs against the respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Page | 182
Persons 4th Exam Cases
G.R. No. 85044 June 3, 1992
MACARIO TAMARGO, CELSO TAMARGO and AURELIA
TAMARGO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE HON. ARISTON L. RUBIO, RTC
Judge, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur; VICTOR BUNDOC; and
CLARA BUNDOC, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
On 20 October 1982, Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of
age, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle causing injuries which
resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for damages was
filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur,
docketed as Civil Case No. 3457-V, by petitioner Macario Tamargo,
Jennifer's adopting parent, and petitioner spouses Celso and Aurelia
Tamargo, Jennifer's natural parents against respondent spouses Victor
and Clara Bundoc, Adelberto's natural parents with whom he was living
at the time of the tragic incident. In addition to this case for damages,
a criminal information or Homicide through Reckless Imprudence was
filed [Criminal Case No. 1722-V] against Adelberto Bundoc. Adelberto,
however, was acquitted and exempted from criminal liability on the
ground that he bad acted without discernment.
Prior to the incident, or on 10 December 1981, the spouses Sabas and
Felisa Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto
Bundoc in Special Proceedings No. 0373-T before the then Court of First
Instance of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption was grunted on, 18
November 1982, that is, after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.
In their Answer, respondent spouses Bundoc, Adelberto's natural
parents, reciting the result of the foregoing petition for adoption,
claimed that not they, but rather the adopting parents, namely the
spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura, were indispensable parties to the
action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents
from the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed.
Petitioners in their Reply contended that since Adelberto Bundoc was
then actually living with his natural parents, parental authority had not
ceased nor been relinquished by the mere filing and granting of a
petition for adoption.
The trial court on 3 December 1987 dismissed petitioners' complaint,
ruling that respondent natural parents of Adelberto indeed were not
indispensable parties to the action.
Petitioners received a copy of the trial court's Decision on 7 December
1987. Within the 15-day reglementary period, or on 14 December
1987, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration followed by a
supplemental motion for reconsideration on 15 January 1988. It
appearing, however, that the motions failed to comply with Sections 4
and 5 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of Court that notice of the
motion shall be given to all parties concerned at least three (3) days
before the hearing of said motion; and that said notice shall state the
time and place of hearing both motions were denied by the trial
court in an Order dated 18 April 1988. On 28 April 1988, petitioners
filed a notice of appeal. In its Order dated 6 June 1988, the trial court
dismissed the notice at appeal, this time ruling that the notice had
been filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period ending 22
December 1987.
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on a petition
for mandamus and certiorari questioning the trial court's Decision
dated 3 December 1987 and the Orders dated 18 April 1988 and 6 June
1988, The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, ruling that
petitioners had lost their right to appeal.
In the present Petition for Review, petitioners once again contend that
respondent spouses Bundoc are the indispensable parties to the action
for damages caused by the acts of their minor child, Adelberto Bundoc.
Resolution of this Petition hinges on the following issues: (1) whether or
not petitioners, notwithstanding loss of their right to appeal, may still
file the instant Petition; conversely, whether the Court may still take
cognizance of the case even through petitioners' appeal had been filed
out of time; and (2) whether or not the effects of adoption, insofar as
parental authority is concerned may be given retroactive effect so as
to make the adopting parents the indispensable parties in a damage
case filed against their adopted child, for acts committed by the latter,
when actual custody was yet lodged with the biological parents.
1. It will be recalled that, petitioners' motion (and supplemental
motion) for reconsideration filed before the trial court, not having
complied with the requirements of Section 13, Rule 41, and Section 4,
Rule 15, of the Revised Rules of Court, were considered pro forma and
hence did not interrupt and suspend the reglementary period to
appeal: the trial court held that the motions, not having contained a
notice of time and place of hearing, had become useless pieces of
paper which did not interrupt the reglementary period. 1 As in fact
repeatedly held by this Court, what is mandatory is the service of the
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
motion on the opposing counsel indicating the time and place of
hearing. 2
In view, however, of the nature of the issue raised in the instant.
Petition, and in order that substantial justice may be served, the Court,
invoking its right to suspend the application of technical rules to
prevent manifest injustice, elects to treat the notice of appeal as
having been seasonably filed before the trial court, and the motion
(and supplemental motion) for reconsideration filed by petitioner in the
trial court as having interrupted the reglementary period for appeal. As
the Court held in Gregorio v. Court of Appeals: 3
Dismissal of appeal; purely on technical grounds is
frowned upon where the policy of the courts is to
encourage hearings of appeal on their merits. The
rules of procedure ought not be applied in a very rigid
technical sense, rules of procedure are used only to
help secure not override, substantial justice. if d
technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made
their aim would be defeated. 4
2. It is not disputed that Adelberto Bundoc's voluntary act of shooting
Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle gave rise to a cause of action
on quasi-delict against him. As Article 2176 of the Civil Code provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to
pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between
the parties, is called a quasi-delict . . .
Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the father
and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages
that may be caused by a minor child who lives with them. Article 2180
of the Civil Code reads:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable
not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the
mother, are responsible for the damages caused by
the minor children who live in their company.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease
when the person herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
to prevent damage. (Emphasis supplied)
This principle of parental liability is a species of what is frequently
designated as vicarious liability, or the doctrine of "imputed
negligence" under Anglo-American tort law, where a person is not only
liable for torts committed by himself, but also for torts committed by
others with whom he has a certain relationship and for whom he is
responsible. Thus, parental liability is made a natural or logical
consequence of the duties and responsibilities of parents their
parental authority which includes the instructing, controlling and
disciplining of the child. 5 The basis for the doctrine of vicarious liability
was explained by the Court in Cangco v. Manila Railroad Co. 6 in the
following terms:
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising
from negligence, whether of act or omission, it is
competent for the legislature to elect and our
Legislature has so elected to limit such liability to
cases in which the person upon whom such an
obligation is imposed is morally culpable or, on the
contrary, for reasons of public policy. to extend that
liability, without regard to the lack of moral culpability,
so as to include responsibility for the negligence of
those persons whose acts or omissions are imputable,
by a legal fiction, to others who are in a position to
exercise an absolute or limited control over them. The
legislature which adopted our Civil Code has elected
to limit extra-contractual liability with certain well-
defined exceptions to cases in which moral
culpability can be directly imputed to the persons to
be charged. This moral responsibility may consist in
having failed to exercise due care in one's own acts,
or in having failed to exercise due care in the
selection and control of one's agent or servants, or in
the control of persons who, by reasons of their status,
occupy a position of dependency with respect to the
person made liable for their conduct. 7(Emphasis
Supplied)
The civil liability imposed upon parents for the torts of their
minor children living with them, may be seen to be based upon
the parental authority vested by the Civil Code upon such
parents. The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated
child living with its parents commits a tortious acts, the
parents were negligent in the performance of their legal and
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in their
custody and control. Parental liability is, in other words,
anchored upon parental authority coupled with presumed
parental dereliction in the discharge of the duties
accompanying such authority. The parental dereliction is, of
course, only presumed and the presumption can be overtuned
under Article 2180 of the Civil Code by proof that the parents
had exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent the damage.
In the instant case, the shooting of Jennifer by Adelberto with an air
rifle occured when parental authority was still lodged in respondent
Bundoc spouses, the natural parents of the minor Adelberto. It would
thus follow that the natural parents who had then actual custody of the
minor Adelberto, are the indispensable parties to the suit for damages.
The natural parents of Adelberto, however, stoutly maintain that
because a decree of adoption was issued by the adoption court in favor
of the Rapisura spouses, parental authority was vested in the latter as
adopting parents as of the time of the filing of the petition for
adoption that is, before Adelberto had shot Jennifer which an air rifle.
The Bundoc spouses contend that they were therefore free of any
parental responsibility for Adelberto's allegedly tortious conduct.
Respondent Bundoc spouses rely on Article 36 of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code 8 which reads as follows:
Art. 36. Decree of Adoption. If, after considering the
report of the Department of Social Welfare or duly
licensed child placement agency and the evidence
submitted before it, the court is satisfied that the
petitioner is qualified to maintain, care for, and
educate the child, that the trial custody period has
been completed, and that the best interests of the
child will be promoted by the adoption, a decree of
adoption shall be entered, which shall be effective he
date the original petition was filed. The decree shall
state the name by which the child is thenceforth to be
known. (Emphasis supplied)
The Bundoc spouses further argue that the above Article 36
should be read in relation to Article 39 of the same Code:
Art. 39. Effect of Adoption. The adoption shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the natural
parents, except where the adopter is the spouse of
the surviving natural parent;
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
and urge that their Parental authority must be deemed to have been
dissolved as of the time the Petition for adoption was filed.
The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under the Civil Code, the
basis of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship
existing between the parents and the minor child living with them and
over whom, the law presumes, the parents exercise supervision and
control. Article 58 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, re-enacted this
rule:
Article 58 Torts Parents and guardians are
responsible for the damage caused by the child under
their parental authority in accordance with the civil
Code. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines 9 has similarly insisted
upon the requisite that the child, doer of the tortious act, shall have
beer in the actual custody of the parents sought to be held liable for
the ensuing damage:
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising
parental authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries
and damages caused by the acts or omissions of their
unemancipated children living in their company and
under their parental authority subject to the
appropriate defenses provided by law. (Emphasis
supplied)
We do not believe that parental authority is properly regarded as
having been retroactively transferred to and vested in the adopting
parents, the Rapisura spouses, at the time the air rifle shooting
happened. We do not consider that retroactive effect may be giver to
the decree of adoption so as to impose a liability upon the adopting
parents accruing at a time when adopting parents had no actual or
physically custody over the adopted child. Retroactive affect may
perhaps be given to the granting of the petition for adoption where
such is essential to permit the accrual of some benefit or advantage in
favor of the adopted child. In the instant case, however, to hold that
parental authority had been retroactively lodged in the Rapisura
spouses so as to burden them with liability for a tortious act that they
could not have foreseen and which they could not have prevented
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

(since they were at the time in the United States and had no physical
custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and unconscionable.
Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the philosophical
and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability. Put a little
differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of the
adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since
Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort
was committed.
Article 35 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code fortifies the conclusion
reached above. Article 35 provides as follows:
Art. 35. Trial Custody. No petition for adoption shall
be finally granted unless and until the adopting
parents are given by the courts a supervised trial
custody period of at least six months to assess their
adjustment and emotional readiness for the legal
union. During the period of trial custody, parental
authority shall be vested in the adopting
parents. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the above Article 35, parental authority is provisionally vested in
the adopting parents during the period of trial custody, i.e., before the
issuance of a decree of adoption, precisely because the adopting
parents are given actual custody of the child during such trial period. In
the instant case, the trial custody period either had not yet begun or
bad already been completed at the time of the air rifle shooting; in any
case, actual custody of Adelberto was then with his natural parents,
not the adopting parents.
Accordingly, we conclude that respondent Bundoc spouses, Adelberto's
natural parents, were indispensable parties to the suit for damages
brought by petitioners, and that the dismissal by the trial court of
petitioners' complaint, the indispensable parties being already before
the court, constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is hereby
GRANTED DUE COURSE and the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
6 September 1988, in C.A.-G.R. No. SP-15016 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Petitioners' complaint filed before the trial court is hereby
REINSTATED and this case is REMANDED to that court for further
proceedings consistent with this Decision. Costs against respondent
Bundoc spouses. This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
[G.R. No. 143989. July 14, 2003]
ISABELITA S. LAHOM, petitioner, vs. JOSE MELVIN SIBULO
(previously referred to as DR. MELVIN S.
LAHOM), respondent.
DECISION
VITUG, J.:
The bliss of marriage and family would be to most less than
complete without children. The realization could have likely
prodded the spouses Dr. Diosdado Lahom and Isabelita Lahom to
take into their care Isabelitas nephew Jose Melvin Sibulo and to
bring him up as their own. At the tender age of two, Jose Melvin
enjoyed the warmth, love and support of the couple who treated
the child like their own. Indeed, for years, Dr. and Mrs. Lahom
fancied on legally adopting Jose Melvin. Finally, in 1971, the couple
decided to file a petition for adoption. On 05 May 1972, an order
granting the petition was issued that made all the more intense
than before the feeling of affection of the spouses for Melvin. In
keeping with the court order, the Civil Registrar of Naga City
changed the name Jose Melvin Sibulo to Jose Melvin Lahom.
A sad turn of events came many years later. Eventually, in
December of 1999, Mrs. Lahom commenced a petition to rescind
the decree of adoption before the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 22, of Naga City. In her petition, she averred -
7. That x x x despite the proddings and pleadings of said spouses,
respondent refused to change his surname from Sibulo to Lahom,
to the frustrations of petitioner particularly her husband until the
latter died, and even before his death he had made known his
desire to revoke respondents adoption, but was prevented by
petitioners supplication, however with his further request upon
petitioner to give to charity whatever properties or interest may
pertain to respondent in the future.
xxxxxxxxx
10. That respondent continued using his surname Sibulo to the
utter disregard of the feelings of herein petitioner, and his records
with the Professional Regulation Commission showed his name as
Jose Melvin M. Sibulo originally issued in 1978 until the present,
and in all his dealings and activities in connection with his practice
of his profession, he is Jose Melvin M. Sibulo.
xxxxxxxxx
13. That herein petitioner being a widow, and living alone in this
city with only her household helps to attend to her, has yearned for
the care and show of concern from a son, but respondent remained
indifferent and would only come to Naga to see her once a year.
14. That for the last three or four years, the medical check-up of
petitioner in Manila became more frequent in view of a leg ailment,
and those were the times when petitioner would need most the
care and support from a love one, but respondent all the more
remained callous and utterly indifferent towards petitioner which is
not expected of a son.
15. That herein respondent has recently been jealous of petitioners
nephews and nieces whenever they would find time to visit her,
respondent alleging that they were only motivated by their desire
for some material benefits from petitioner.
16. That in view of respondents insensible attitude resulting in a
strained and uncomfortable relationship between him and
petitioner, the latter has suffered wounded feelings, knowing that
after all respondents only motive to his adoption is his expectancy
of his alleged rights over the properties of herein petitioner and her
late husband, clearly shown by his recent filing of Civil Case No.
99-4463 for partition against petitioner, thereby totally eroding her
love and affection towards respondent, rendering the decree of
adoption, considering respondent to be the child of petitioner, for
all legal purposes, has been negated for which reason there is no
more basis for its existence, hence this petition for revocation. [1]
Prior to the institution of the case, specifically on 22 March
1998, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8552, also known as the Domestic
Adoption Act, went into effect. The new statute deleted from the
law the right of adopters to rescind a decree of adoption.
Section 19 of Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 now reads:
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
SEC. 19. Grounds for Rescission of Adoption. Upon petition of the
adoptee, with the assistance of the Department if a minor or if over
eighteen (18) years of age but is incapacitated, as
guardian/counsel, the adoption may be rescinded on any of the
following grounds committed by the adopter(s): (a) repeated
physical and verbal maltreatment by the adopter(s) despite having
undergone counseling; (b) attempt on the life of the adoptee; (c)
sexual assault or violence; or (d) abandonment and failure to
comply with parental obligations.
Adoption, being in the best interest of the child, shall not
be subject to rescission by the adopter(s). However, the
adopter(s) may disinherit the adoptee for causes provided
in Article 919 of the Civil Code. (emphasis supplied)
Jose Melvin moved for the dismissal of the petition,
contending principally (a) that the trial court had no jurisdiction
over the case and (b) that the petitioner had no cause of action in
view of the aforequoted provisions of R.A. No. 8552. Petitioner
asseverated, by way of opposition, that the proscription in R.A. No.
8552 should not retroactively apply, i.e., to cases where the ground
for rescission of the adoption vested under the regime of then
Article 348[2] of the Civil Code and Article 192[3] of the Family Code.
In an order, dated 28 April 2000, the trial court held thusly:
On the issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit,
Section 5(c) of R.A. No. 8369 confers jurisdiction to this Court,
having been designated Family Court in A.M. No. 99-11-07 SC.
On the matter of no cause of action, the test on the sufficiency of
the facts alleged in the complaint, is whether or not, admitting the
facts alleged, the Court could render a valid judgment in
accordance with the prayer of said complaint (De Jesus, et al. vs.
Belarmino, et al., 95 Phil. 365).
Admittedly, Section 19, Article VI of R.A. No. 8552 deleted the right
of an adopter to rescind an adoption earlier granted under the
Family Code. Conformably, on the face of the petition, indeed there
is lack of cause of action.
Petitioner however, insists that her right to rescind long acquired
under the provisions of the Family Code should be
respected. Assuming for the sake of argument, that petitioner is
entitled to rescind the adoption of respondent granted on May 5,
1972, said right should have been exercised within the period
allowed by the Rules. From the averments in the petition, it
appears clear that the legal grounds for the petition have been
discovered and known to petitioner for more than five (5) years,
prior to the filing of the instant petition on December 1, 1999,
hence, the action if any, had already prescribed. (Sec. 5, Rule 100
Revised Rules of Court)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing consideration, the petition is
ordered dismissed.[4]
Via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Court, petitioner raises the following questions; viz:
1. May the subject adoption, decreed on 05 May 1972,
still be revoked or rescinded by an adopter after the
effectivity of R.A. No. 8552?
2. In the affirmative, has the adopters action prescribed?
A brief background on the law and its origins could provide
some insights on the subject. In ancient times, the Romans
undertook adoption to assure male heirs in the family. [5] The
continuity of the adopters family was the primary purpose of
adoption and all matters relating to it basically focused on the
rights of the adopter. There was hardly any mention about the
rights of the adopted.[6] Countries, like Greece, France, Spain and
England, in an effort to preserve inheritance within the family,
neither allowed nor recognized adoption.[7] It was only much later
when adoption was given an impetus in law and still later when the
welfare of the child became a paramount concern. [8] Spain itself
which previously disfavored adoption ultimately relented and
accepted the Roman law concept of adoption which, subsequently,
was to find its way to the archipelago. The Americans came and
introduced their own ideas on adoption which, unlike most
countries in Europe, made the interests of the child an overriding
consideration.[9] In the early part of the century just passed, the
rights of children invited universal attention; the Geneva
Declaration of Rights of the Child of 1924 and the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, [10] followed by the United
Nations Declarations of the Rights of the Child, [11] were written
instruments that would also protect and safeguard the rights of
adopted children. The Civil Code of the Philippines [12] of 1950 on
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
adoption, later modified by the Child and Youth Welfare
Code[13] and then by the Family Code of the Philippines, [14] gave
immediate statutory acknowledgment to the rights of the
adopted. In 1989, the United Nations initiated the Convention of
the Rights of the Child. The Philippines, a State Party to the
Convention, accepted the principle that adoption was impressed
with social and moral responsibility, and that its underlying intent
was geared to favor the adopted child. R.A. No. 8552 secured these
rights and privileges for the adopted. Most importantly, it affirmed
the legitimate status of the adopted child, not only in his new
family but also in the society as well. The new law withdrew the
right of an adopter to rescind the adoption decree and gave to the
adopted child the sole right to sever the legal ties created by
adoption.
Petitioner, however, would insist that R.A. No. 8552 should not
adversely affect her right to annul the adoption decree, nor deprive
the trial court of its jurisdiction to hear the case, both being vested
under the Civil Code and the Family Code, the laws then in force.
The concept of vested right is a consequence of the
constitutional guaranty of due process [15] that expresses a present
fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice is
protected against arbitrary state action; [16] it includes not only legal
or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand but also
exemptions from new obligations created after the right has
become vested.[17] Rights are considered vested when the right to
enjoyment is a present interest, [18] absolute, unconditional, and
perfect[19] or fixed and irrefutable.
In Republic vs. Court of Appeals, [20] a petition to adopt Jason
Condat was filed by Zenaida C. Bobiles on 02 February 1988 when
the Child and Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No. 603)
allowed an adoption to be sought by either spouse or both of
them.After the trial court had rendered its decision and while the
case was still pending on appeal, the Family Code of the Philippines
(Executive Order No. 209), mandating joint adoption by the
husband and wife, took effect. Petitioner Republic argued that
the case should be dismissed for having been filed by Mrs. Bobiles
alone and without being joined by the husband. The Court
concluded that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by
the statute in force at the time of the commencement of
the action. The petition to adopt Jason, having been filed
with the court at the time when P.D. No. 603 was still in
effect, the right of Mrs. Bobiles to file the petition, without being
joined by her husband, according to the Court had become
vested. In Republic vs. Miller,[21] spouses Claude and Jumrus Miller,
both aliens, sought to adopt Michael Madayag. On 29 July 1988,
the couple filed a petition to formalize Michaels adoption having
theretofore been taken into their care. At the time the action was
commenced, P.D. No. 603 allowed aliens to adopt. After the decree
of adoption and while on appeal before the Court of Appeals, the
Family Code was enacted into law on 08 August 1988 disqualifying
aliens from adopting Filipino children. The Republic then prayed for
the withdrawal of the adoption decree. In discarding the argument
posed by the Republic, the Supreme Court ruled that the
controversy should be resolved in the light of the law
governing at the time the petition was filed.
It was months after the effectivity of R.A. No. 8552 that herein
petitioner filed an action to revoke the decree of adoption granted
in 1975. By then, the new law, [22] had already abrogated and
repealed the right of an adopter under the Civil Code and the
Family Code to rescind a decree of adoption. Consistently with its
earlier pronouncements, the Court should now hold that the action
for rescission of the adoption decree, having been initiated by
petitioner after R.A. No. 8552 had come into force, no longer could
be pursued.
Interestingly, even before the passage of the statute, an
action to set aside the adoption is subject to the fiveyear bar rule
under Rule 100[23] of the Rules of Court and that the adopter would
lose the right to revoke the adoption decree after the lapse of that
period.The exercise of the right within a prescriptive period is a
condition that could not fulfill the requirements of a vested right
entitled to protection. It must also be acknowledged that a person
has no vested right in statutory privileges. [24] While adoption has
often been referred to in the context of a right, the privilege to
adopt is itself not naturally innate or fundamental but rather a right
merely created by statute.[25] It is a privilege that is governed by
the states determination on what it may deem to be for the best
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

interest and welfare of the child. [26] Matters relating to adoption,

including the withdrawal of the right of an adopter to nullify the
adoption decree, are subject to regulation by the State.
[27]
Concomitantly, a right of action given by statute may be
taken away at anytime before it has been exercised.[28]
While R.A. No. 8552 has unqualifiedly withdrawn from an
adopter a consequential right to rescind the adoption decree even
in cases where the adoption might clearly turn out to be
undesirable, it remains, nevertheless, the bounden duty of the
Court to apply the law. Dura lex sed lex would be the hackneyed
truism that those caught in the law have to live with. It is still
noteworthy, however, that an adopter, while barred from severing
the legal ties of adoption, can always for valid reasons cause the
forfeiture of certain benefits otherwise accruing to an undeserving
child. For instance, upon the grounds recognized by law, an
adopter may deny to an adopted child his legitime and, by a will
and testament, may freely exclude him from having a share in the
disposable portion of his estate.
WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the court a quo is
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

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Persons 4th Exam Cases

DIWATA RAMOS LANDINGIN G.R. No. 164948 paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos; their biological mother,
Petitioner, Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there and now has two children by
Present her second marriage and no longer communicated with her
children by Manuel Ramos nor with her in-laws from the time she
PANGANIBAN, C.J., left up to the institution of the adoption; the minors are being
Chairperson, financially supported by the petitioner and her children, and
YNARES-SANTIAGO, relatives abroad; as Maria passed away on November 23, 2000,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, CALLEJO, SR., and petitioner desires to adopt the children; the minors have given
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ. their written consent[8] to the adoption; she is qualified to adopt as
Promulgated: shown by the fact that she is a 57-year-old widow, has children of
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, her own who are already married, gainfully employed and have
Respondent. June 27, 2006 their respective families; she lives alone in her own home in Guam,
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - USA, where she acquired citizenship, and works as a restaurant
--x server. She came back to thePhilippines to spend time with the
minors; her children gave their written consent [9] to the adoption of
DECISION the minors. Petitioners brother, Mariano Ramos, who earns
substantial income, signified his willingness and commitment to
CALLEJO, SR., J.: support the minors while in petitioners custody.

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of Petitioner prayed that, after due hearing, judgment be
the Rules of Court is the Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals in CA- rendered in her favor, as follows:
G.R. CV No. 77826 which reversed the Decision [2] of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Tarlac City, Branch 63 in Civil Case No. 2733 WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed
granting the Petition for Adoption of the petitioner herein. to this Honorable Court that after publication and
hearing, judgment be rendered allowing the
The Antecedents adoption of the minor children Elaine Dizon Ramos,
Elma Dizon Ramos, and Eugene Dizon Ramos by
On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the petitioner, and ordering that the minor
the United States of America (USA), of Filipino parentage and a childrens name follow the family name of
resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition [3] for the adoption of minors petitioner.
Elaine Dizon Ramos who was born on August 31, 1986;[4] Elma
Dizon Ramos, who was born on September 7, 1987;[5] and Eugene Petitioner prays for such other reliefs, just
Dizon Ramos who was born on August 5, 1989. [6] The minors are and equitable under the premises.[10]
the natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioners brother, and
Amelia Ramos. On March 5, 2002, the court ordered the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD) to conduct a case study as
Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when mandated by Article 34 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as
Manuel died on May 19, 1990, [7] the children were left to their amended, and to submit a report thereon not later than April 4,

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
2002, the date set for the initial hearing of the petition. [11] The
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance [12] but
deputized the City Prosecutor of Tarlac to appear in its behalf.
[13]
Since her petition was unopposed, petitioner was allowed to
present her evidence ex parte.[14]
The petitioner testified in her behalf. She also presented
Elaine Ramos, the eldest of the adoptees, to testify on the written
consent executed by her and her siblings. [15] The petitioner marked
in evidence the Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her
children Ann, Errol, Dennis and Ricfel Branitley, all surnamed
Landingin, and notarized by a notary public in Guam, USA, as proof
of said consent.[16]
On May 24, 2002, Elizabeth Pagbilao, Social Welfare Officer
II of the DSWD, Field Office III, Tarlac, submitted a Child Study
Report, with the following recommendation:
In view of the foregoing, undersigned finds minors
Elaine, Elma & Eugene all surnamed Ramos,
eligible for adoption because of the following
reasons:
1. Minors surviving parent, the mother
has voluntarily consented to their
adoption by the paternal aunt, Diwata
Landingin this is in view of her inability
to provide the parental care, guidance
and support they need. An Affidavit of
Consent was executed by the mother
which is hereto attached.
2. The three minors subject for adoption
have also expressed their willingness
to be adopted and joins the petitioners
in Guam, USA in the future. A joint
Affidavit of consent is hereto
attached. The minors developed close
attachment to the petitioners and they
regarded her as second parent.
3. The minors are present under the
care of a temporary guardian who has
also family to look after. As young
adolescents they really need parental
love, care, guidance and support to
ensure their protection and well being.
In view of the foregoing, it is hereby
respectfully recommended that minors
Elaine D. Ramos, Elma D. Ramos and
Eugene D. Ramos be adopted by their
maternal aunt Diwata Landingin. Trial
custody is hereby further recommended to
be dispensed with considering that they
are close relatives and that close
attachments was already developed
between the petitioner and the 3 minors.[17]
Pagbilao narrated what transpired during her interview, as
follows:
The mother of minors came home together
with her son John Mario, this May 2002 for 3 weeks
vacation. This is to enable her appear for the
personal interview concerning the adoption of her
children.
The plan for the adoption of minors by their
paternal aunt Diwata Landingin was conceived
after the death of their paternal grandmother and
guardian. The paternal relatives including the
petitioner who attended the wake of their mother
were very much concerned about the well-being of
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
the three minors. While preparing for their
adoption, they have asked a cousin who has a
family to stay with minors and act as their
temporary guardian.
The mother of minors was consulted about
the adoption plan and after weighing the benefits
of adoption to her children, she voluntarily
consented. She realized that her children need
parental love, guidance and support which she
could not provide as she already has a second
family & residing in Italy. Knowing also that the
petitioners & her children have been supporting
her children up to the present and truly care for
them, she believes her children will be in good
hands. She also finds petitioners in a better
position to provide a secured and bright future to
her children.[18]
However, petitioner failed to present Pagbilao as witness
and offer in evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos to the
adoption; petitioner, likewise, failed to present any documentary
evidence to prove that Amelia assents to the adoption.
On November 23, 2002, the court, finding merit in the
petition for adoption, rendered a decision granting said petition.
The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, it is hereby ordered that
henceforth, minors Elaine Dizon Ramos, Elma Dizon
Ramos, Eugene Dizon Ramos be freed from all legal
obligations obedience and maintenance from their
natural parents and that they be declared for all
legal intents and purposes the children of Diwata
Ramos Landingin. Trial custody is dispensed with
considering that parent-children relationship has
long been established between the children and
the adoptive parents. Let the surnames of the
children be changed from Dizon-Ramos to Ramos-
Landingin.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished the
Local Civil Registrar of Tarlac, Tarlac for him to
effect the corresponding changes/amendment in
the birth certificates of the above-mentioned
minors.
SO ORDERED.[19]
The OSG appealed[20] the decision to the Court of Appeals
on December 2, 2002. In its brief[21] for the oppositor-appellant, the
OSG raised the following arguments:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK OF
CONSENT OF THE PROPOSED ADOPTEES
BIOLOGICAL MOTHER.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE THE LACK OF
THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF THE PETITIONERS
CHILDREN AS REQUIRED BY LAW.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE
PETITION FOR ADOPTION DESPITE PETITIONERS
FAILURE TO ESTABLISH THAT SHE IS IN A POSITION
TO SUPPORT THE PROPOSED ADOPTEES.
On April 29, 2004, the CA rendered a decision [22] reversing
the ruling of the RTC. It held that petitioner failed to adduce in
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
evidence the voluntary consent of Amelia Ramos, the childrens
natural mother. Moreover, the affidavit of consent of the petitioners
children could not also be admitted in evidence as the same was
executed in Guam, USA and was not authenticated or
acknowledged before a Philippine consular office, and although
petitioner has a job, she was not stable enough to support the
children. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
appealed decision dated November 25, 2002 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, Tarlac City in Spec.
Proc. No. 2733 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.[23]
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration[24] on May 21,
2004, which the CA denied in its Resolution dated August 12, 2004.
[25]
Petitioner, thus, filed the instant petition for review
on certiorari[26] on September 7, 2004, assigning the following
errors:
1. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT HAS
OVERLOOKED AND MISAPPLIED SOME FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH ARE OF WEIGHT AND
IMPORTANCE AND WHICH IF CONSIDERED WOULD
HAVE AFFECTED THE RESULT OF THE CASE.
2. THAT THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT
ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE PETITIONER-
APPELLEE IS NOT FINANCIALLY CAPABLE TO
SUPPORT THE THREE CHILDREN.[27]
The issues raised by the parties in their pleadings are the
following: (a) whether the petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors
without the written consent of their biological mother, Amelia
Ramos; (b) whether or not the affidavit of consent purportedly
executed by the petitioner-adopters children sufficiently complies
with the law; and (c) whether or not petitioner is financially capable
of supporting the adoptees.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
It has been the policy of the Court to adhere to the liberal
concept, as stated in Malkinson v. Agrava,[28] that adoption
statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interest and welfare
of the child to be of paramount consideration and are designed to
provide homes, parental care and education for unfortunate, needy
or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and
family in the person of the adopter as well as to allow childless
couples or persons to experience the joys of parenthood and give
them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the
manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable
intendment should thus be sustained to promote and fulfill these
noble and compassionate objectives of the law.[29]
However, in Cang v. Court of Appeals,[30] the Court also
ruled that the liberality with which this Court treats matters leading
to adoption insofar as it carries out the beneficent purposes of the
law to ensure the rights and privileges of the adopted child arising
therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount consideration is the
overall benefit and interest of the adopted child, should be
understood in its proper context and perspective. The Courts
position should not be misconstrued or misinterpreted as to extend
to inferences beyond the contemplation of law and jurisprudence.
Thus, the discretion to approve adoption proceedings is not to be
anchored solely on best interests of the child but likewise, with due
regard to the natural rights of the parents over the child. [31]
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the
Domestic Adoption Act of 1998, provides:
Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the
Adoption. - After being properly counseled and
informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her
approval of the adoption, the written consent of the
following to the adoption is hereby required:
(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age
or over;
(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if
known, or the legal guardian, or the
proper government instrumentality
which has legal custody of the child;
(c) The legitimate and adopted
sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age
or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee,
if any;
(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten
(10) years of age or over, of the
adopter, if living with said adopter and
the latters souse, if any;
(e) The spouse, if any, of the person
adopting or to be adopted.
The general requirement of consent and notice to the
natural parents is intended to protect the natural parental
relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to
insure the opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child
in the manner of the proposed adoption.[32]
Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is
indispensable for the validity of a decree of adoption. Indeed, the
natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent must
be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be
terminated and re-established in adoptive parents. In this case,
petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to
the adoption.
We note that in her Report, Pagbilao declared that she was
able to interview Amelia Ramos who arrived in the Philippines with
her son, John Mario in May 2002. If said Amelia Ramos was in
the Philippines and Pagbilao was able to interview her, it is
incredible that the latter would not require Amelia Ramos to
execute a Written Consent to the adoption of her minor
children. Neither did the petitioner bother to present Amelia Ramos
as witness in support of the petition.
Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that the written consent of
the biological mother is no longer necessary because when
Amelias husband died in 1990, she left for Italy and never came
back. The children were then left to the guidance and care of their
paternal grandmother. It is the paternal relatives, including
petitioner, who provided for the childrens financial needs. Hence,
Amelia, the biological mother, had effectively abandoned the
children. Petitioner further contends that it was by twist of fate that
after 12 years, when the petition for adoption was pending with the
RTC that Amelia and her child by her second marriage were on
vacation in the Philippines. Pagbilao, the DSWD social worker, was
able to meet her, and during the meeting, Amelia intimated to the
social worker that she conformed to the adoption of her three
children by the petitioner.
Petitioners contention must be rejected. When she filed her
petition with the trial court, Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in
effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent of the
biological parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of the
legal guardian of the minors will suffice. If, as claimed by
petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors had indeed
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abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced the written

consent of their legal guardian. Q From whom did you learn that?
A From others who came from Italy, sir.
Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption
of his child without his consent, is a conduct which evinces a Q Did you come to know whether she has children
settled purpose to forego all parental duties. [33] The term means by her second marriage?
neglect and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of A Yes, sir, she got two kids.[37]
love and support. If a parent withholds presence, love, care, the
opportunity to display filial affection, and neglects to lend support
and maintenance, the parent, in effect, abandons the child. [34] Elaine, the eldest of the minors, testified, thus:

Merely permitting the child to remain for a time Q Where is your mother now?
undisturbed in the care of others is not such an abandonment. [35] To A In Italy, sir.
dispense with the requirement of consent, the abandonment must
be shown to have existed at the time of adoption.[36] Q When did your mother left for Italy?
A After my father died, sir.
In this case, petitioner relied solely on her testimony and
that of Elaine Ramos to prove her claim that Amelia Ramos had Q How old were you when your mother left
abandoned her children. Petitioners testimony on that matter for Italy in 1990?
follows: A Two years old, sir.

Q Where is the mother of these three children now? Q At the time when your mother left for Italy, did
A She left for Italy on November 20, 1990, sir. your mother communicate with you?
A No, sir.[38]
Q At the time when Amelia Ramos left for Italy, was
there an instance where she However, the Home Study Report of the DSWD Social
communicated with the family? Worker also stated the following:
A None, sir.
IV. Background of the Case:
Q How about with her children?
A None, sir. xxxx

Q Do you know what place in Italy did she reside?
A I do not know, sir.
Q Did you receive any news about Amelia Ramos?
A What I know, sir, was that she was already
married with another man.
Since the mother left for Italy, minors siblings had
been under the care and custody of their maternal
grandmother. However, she died in Nov. 2001 and
an uncle, cousin of their deceased father now
serves as their guardian. The petitioner,
together with her children and other

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
relatives abroad have been supporting the
minor children financially, even during the
time that they were still living with their
natural parents. Their mother also sends
financial support but very minimal.[39]
xxxx
V. Background Information about the
Minors Being Sought for Adoption:
xxxx
As the eldest she tries her best to be a role model
to her younger siblings. She helps them in their
lessons, works and has fun with them. She also
encourages openness on their problems and
concerns and provides petty counseling. In
serious problems she already consult (sic)
her mother and petitioner-aunt.[40]
xxxx
In their 5 years of married life, they begot 3
children, herein minors, Amelia recalled that they
had a happy and comfortable life. After the death
of her husband, her in-laws which include the
petitioner had continued providing support for
them. However being ashamed of just depending
on the support of her husbands relatives, she
decided to work abroad. Her parents are also in
need of financial help as they are undergoing
maintenance medication. Her parents mortgaged
their farm land which she used in going to Italy and
worked as domestic helper.
When she left for Italy in November 1990, she
entrusted her 3 children to the care & custody of
her mother-in-law who returned home for good,
however she died on November 2000.
While working in Italy, she met Jun Tayag, a
married man from Tarlac. They became live-in
partners since 1995 and have a son John Mario who
is now 2 years old. The three of them are
considered Italian residents. Amelia claimed that
Mr. Tayag is planning to file an annulment of his
marriage and his wife is amenable to it. He is
providing his legitimate family regular support.
Amelia also sends financial support ranging
from P10,000-P15,000 a month through her
parents who share minimal amount of
P3,000-P5,000 a month to his (sic)
children. The petitioner and other paternal
relatives are continuously providing support for
most of the needs & education of minors up to
present.[41]
Thus, when Amelia left for Italy, she had not intended to abandon
her children, or to permanently sever their mother-child
relationship. She was merely impelled to leave the country by
financial constraints. Yet, even while abroad, she did not surrender
or relinquish entirely her motherly obligations of rearing the
children to her now deceased mother-in-law, for, as claimed by
Elaine herself, she consulted her mother, Amelia, for serious
personal problems. Likewise, Amelia continues to send financial
support to the children, though in minimal amounts as compared
to what her affluent in-laws provide.
Let it be emphasized, nevertheless, that the adoption of
the minors herein will have the effect of severing all legal ties
between the biological mother, Amelia, and the adoptees, and that
the same shall then be vested on the adopter. [42] It would thus be
against the spirit of the law if financial consideration were to be the
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paramount consideration in deciding whether to deprive a person the Republic of the Philippines,
of parental authority over his/her children. More proof has to be acting within the country or place
adduced that Amelia has emotionally abandoned the children, and to which he is accredited, or (2) a
that the latter will not miss her guidance and counsel if they are notary public or officer duly
given to an adopting parent.[43] Again, it is the best interest of the authorized by law of the country to
child that takes precedence in adoption. take acknowledgments of
instruments or documents in the
Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides that the Court place where the act is done.
shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be (b) The person taking the
specified. The offer of evidence is necessary because it is the duty acknowledgment shall certify that
of the Court to rest its findings of fact and its judgment only and the person acknowledging the
strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties. Unless and until instrument or document is known
admitted by the court in evidence for the purpose or purposes for to him, and that he is the same
which such document is offered, the same is merely a scrap of person who executed it, and
paper barren of probative weight. Mere identification of documents acknowledged that the same is his
and the markings thereof as exhibits do not confer any evidentiary free act and deed. The certificate
weight on documents unless formally offered.[44] shall be under his official seal, if he
is by law required to keep a seal,
Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilaos Report and of the and if not, his certificate shall so
Joint Affidavit of Consent purportedly executed by her children; the state. In case the acknowledgment
authenticity of which she, likewise, failed to prove. The joint written is made before a notary public or
consent of petitioners children[45] was notarized on January 16, an officer mentioned in subdivision
2002 in Guam, USA; for it to be treated by the Rules of Court in the (2) of the preceding paragraph, the
same way as a document notarized in this country it needs to certificate of the notary public or
comply with Section 2 of Act No. 2103,[46] which states: the officer taking the
acknowledgment shall be
Section 2. An instrument or document authenticated by an ambassador,
acknowledged and authenticated in a foreign minister, secretary of
country shall be considered authentic if the legation, charg de affaires, consul,
acknowledgment and authentication are made in vice-consul, or consular agent of
accordance with the following requirements: the Republic of the Philippines,
acting within the country or place
(a) The acknowledgment shall be to which he is accredited. The
made before (1) an ambassador, officer making the authentication
minister, secretary of shall certify under his official seal
legation, charg d affaires, consul, that the person who took the
vice-consul, or consular agent of acknowledgment was at the time

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
duly authorized to act as notary
public or that he was duly
exercising the functions of the
office by virtue of which he
assumed to act, and that as such
he had authority under the law to
take acknowledgment of
instruments or documents in the
place where the acknowledgment
was taken, and that his signature
and seal, if any, are genuine.
As the alleged written consent of petitioners legitimate
children did not comply with the afore-cited law, the same can at
best be treated by the Rules as a private document whose
authenticity must be proved either by anyone who saw the
document executed or written; or by evidence of the genuineness
of the signature or handwriting of the makers.[47]
Since, in the instant case, no further proof was introduced
by petitioner to authenticate the written consent of her legitimate
children, the same is inadmissible in evidence.
In reversing the ruling of the RTC, the CA ruled that petitioner was
not stable enough to support the children and is only relying on the
financial backing, support and commitment of her children and her
siblings.[48] Petitioner contradicts this by claiming that she is
financially capable as she has worked in Guam for 14 years, has
savings, a house, and currently earns $5.15 an hour with tips of not
less than $1,000.00 a month. Her children and siblings have
likewise committed themselves to provide financial backing should
the need arise. The OSG, again in its comment, banks on the
statement in the Home Study Report that petitioner has limited
income. Accordingly, it appears that she will rely on the financial
backing of her children and siblings in order to support the minor
adoptees. The law, however, states that it is the adopter who
should be in a position to provide support in keeping with the
means of the family.
Since the primary consideration in adoption is the best interest of
the child, it follows that the financial capacity of prospective
parents should also
be carefully evaluated and considered. Certainly, the adopter
should be in a position to support the would-be adopted child or
children, in keeping with the means of the family.
According to the Adoption Home Study Report [49] forwarded by the
Department of Public Health & Social Services of the Government
of Guam to the DSWD, petitioner is no longer supporting her
legitimate children, as the latter are already adults, have individual
lives and families. At the time of the filing of the petition, petitioner
was 57 years old, employed on a part-time basis as a waitress,
earning $5.15 an hour and tips of around $1,000 a
month. Petitioners main intention in adopting the children is to
bring the latter to Guam, USA. She has a house at Quitugua
Subdivision in Yigo, Guam, but the same is still being
amortized. Petitioner likewise knows that the limited income might
be a hindrance to the adoption proceedings.
Given these limited facts, it is indeed doubtful whether petitioner
will be able to sufficiently handle the financial aspect of rearing the
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

three children in the US. She only has a part-time job, and she is
rather of age. While petitioner claims that she has the financial
support and backing of her children and siblings, the OSG is correct
in stating that the ability to support the adoptees is personal to the
adopter, as adoption only creates a legal relation between the
former and the latter. Moreover, the records do not prove nor
support petitioners allegation that her siblings and her children are
financially able and that they are willing to support the minors
herein. The Court, therefore, again sustains the ruling of the CA on
this issue.

While the Court recognizes that petitioner has only the best of
intentions for her nieces and nephew, there are legal infirmities
that militate against reversing the ruling of the CA. In any case,
petitioner is not prevented from filing a new petition for adoption of
the herein minors.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is

hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
IN RE: PETITION FOR G.R. Nos. 168992-93
ADOPTION OF MICHELLE P.
LIM, Present:
MONINA P. LIM,
IN RE: PETITION FOR BERSAMIN, JJ.
ADOPTION OF MICHAEL JUDE
P. LIM,
Promulgated:
MONINA P. LIM,
Petitioner. May 21, 2009
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Monina P. Lim
(petitioner) seeking to set aside the Decision [1] dated 15 September
2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch 22
(trial court), in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, which
dismissed without prejudice the consolidated petitions for adoption
of Michelle P. Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim.
The Facts
The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is an optometrist by
profession. On 23 June 1974, she married Primo Lim (Lim). They
were childless. Minor children, whose parents were unknown, were
entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban (Ayuban). Being so
eager to have a child of their own, petitioner and Lim registered
the children to make it appear that they were the childrens
parents. The children[2] were named Michelle P. Lim (Michelle) and
Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael). Michelle was barely eleven days old
when brought to the clinic of petitioner. She was born on 15 March
1977.[3] Michael was 11 days old when Ayuban brought him to
petitioners clinic. His date of birth is 1 August 1983. [4]
The spouses reared and cared for the children as if they were their
own. They sent the children to exclusive schools. They used the
surname Lim in all their school records and documents.
Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim died. On 27 December
2000, petitioner married Angel Olario (Olario), an American citizen.
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the children by availing of
the amnesty[5] given under Republic Act No. 8552[6] (RA 8552) to
those individuals who simulated the birth of a child. Thus, on 24
April 2002, petitioner filed separate petitions for the adoption of
Michelle and Michael before the trial court docketed as SPL PROC.
Case Nos. 1258 and 1259, respectively. At the time of the filing of
the petitions for adoption, Michelle was 25 years old and already
married, while Michael was 18 years and seven months old.
Michelle and her husband gave their consent to the adoption as
evidenced by their Affidavits of Consent.[7] Michael also gave his
consent to his adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent.
[8]
Petitioners husband Olario likewise executed an Affidavit of
Consent[9] for the adoption of Michelle and Michael.
In the Certification issued by the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD), Michelle was considered as an abandoned
child and the whereabouts of her natural parents were unknown.
[10]
The DSWD issued a similar Certification for Michael. [11]
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered judgment
dismissing the petitions. The trial court ruled that since petitioner
had remarried, petitioner should have filed the petition jointly with
her new husband. The trial court ruled that joint adoption by the
husband and the wife is mandatory citing Section 7(c), Article III of
RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision but the
motion was denied in the Order dated 16 June 2005. In denying the
motion, the trial court ruled that petitioner did not fall under any of
the exceptions under Section 7(c), Article III of RA 8552. Petitioners
argument that mere consent of her husband would suffice was
untenable because, under the law, there are additional
requirements, such as residency and certification of his
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
qualification, which the husband, who was not even made a party
in this case, must comply.
As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated
and joint adoption is merely for the joint exercise of parental
authority, the trial court ruled that joint adoption is not only for the
purpose of exercising parental authority because an emancipated
child acquires certain rights from his parents and assumes certain
obligations and responsibilities.
Hence, the present petition.
Issue
Petitioner appealed directly to this Court raising the sole issue of
whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.
The Courts Ruling
Petitioner contends that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed
because it is the duty of the court and the State to protect the
paramount interest and welfare of the child to be adopted.
Petitioner argues that the legal maxim dura lex sed lex is not
applicable to adoption cases. She argues that joint parental
authority is not necessary in this case since, at the time the
petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already married,
while Michael was already 18 years of age. Parental authority is not
anymore necessary since they have been emancipated having
attained the age of majority.
We deny the petition.
Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife
It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for adoption were
filed, petitioner had already remarried. She filed the petitions by
herself, without being joined by her husband Olario. We have no
other recourse but to affirm the trial courts decision denying the
petitions for adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit. Section
7, Article III of RA 8552 reads:
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. - The following may adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession of
full civil capacity and legal rights, of good moral
character, has not been convicted of any crime
involving moral turpitude, emotionally and
psychologically capable of caring for children, at
least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee,
and who is in a position to support and care for
his/her children in keeping with the means of the
family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year
difference between the age of the adopter and
adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the
biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse of
the adoptees parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications as
above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided, That
his/her country has diplomatic relations with the
Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has been
living in the Philippines for at least three (3)
continuous years prior to the filing of the
application for adoption and maintains such
residence until the adoption decree is entered, that
he/she has been certified by his/her diplomatic or
consular office or any appropriate government
agency that he/she has the legal capacity to adopt
in his/her country, and that his/her government
allows the adoptee to enter his/her country as
his/her adopted son/daughter: Provided,
further, That the requirements on residency and
certification of the aliens qualification to adopt in
his/her country may be waived for the following:
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to
adopt a relative within the fourth (4th)
degree of consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate
son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen
and seeks to adopt jointly with his/her
spouse a relative within the fourth (4 th)
degree of consanguinity or affinity of the
Filipino spouses; or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after the
termination of the guardianship and clearance of
his/her financial accountabilities.
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in
the following cases:
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the
legitimate son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own
illegitimate son/daughter: Provided,
however, That the other spouse has
signified his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated
from each other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one
spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of the
other, joint parental authority shall be exercised by
the spouses. (Emphasis supplied)
The use of the word shall in the above-quoted provision means
that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This
is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over
the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is
elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to
require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony
between the spouses.[12]
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having
remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must
jointly adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by
petitioner herself, without joining her husband, Olario, the trial
court was correct in denying the petitions for adoption on this
ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions
enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not
the legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband Olario.
Second, the children are not the illegitimate children ofpetitioner.
And third, petitioner and Olario are not legally separated from each
other.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the adoption as shown in
his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are certain
requirements that Olario must comply being an American citizen.
He must meet the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552
such as: (1) he must prove that his country has diplomatic relations
with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must have been living in
the Philippines for at least three continuous years prior to the filing
of the application for adoption; (3) he must maintain such
residency until the adoption decree is entered; (4) he has legal
capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee is
allowed to enter the adopters country as the latters adopted child.
None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the
trial.
These requirements on residency and certification of the aliens
qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to
Section 7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within the
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of Olario.
Neither are the adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.
Effects of Adoption
Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is not anymore
necessary since the children have been emancipated having
reached the age of majority. This is untenable.
Parental authority includes caring for and rearing the children for
civic consciousness and efficiency and the development of their
moral, mental and physical character and well-being. [13] The father
and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the
persons of their common children.[14] Even the remarriage of the
surviving parent shall not affect the parental authority over the
children, unless the court appoints another person to be the
guardian of the person or property of the children.[15]
It is true that when the child reaches the age of emancipation that
is, when he attains the age of majority or 18 years of
age[16] emancipation terminates parental authority over the person
and property of the child, who shall then be qualified and
responsible for all acts of civil life. [17] However, parental authority is
merely just one of the effects of legal adoption. Article V of RA
8552 enumerates the effects of adoption, thus:
ARTICLE V
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
SEC. 16. Parental Authority. - Except in cases where
the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter,
all legal ties between the biological parent(s) and
the adoptee shall be severed and the same shall
then be vested on the adopter(s).
SEC. 17. Legitimacy. - The adoptee shall be
considered the legitimate son/daughter of the
adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as such
is entitled to all the rights and obligations provided
by law to legitimate sons/daughters born to them
without discrimination of any kind. To this end, the
adoptee is entitled to love, guidance, and support
in keeping with the means of the family.
SEC. 18. Succession. - In legal and intestate
succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall
have reciprocal rights of succession without
distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if the
adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had left a
will, the law on testamentary succession shall
govern.
Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1) sever all legal ties
between the biological parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the
biological parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2) deem the
adoptee as a legitimate child of the adopter; and (3) give adopter
and adoptee reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including but not limited to: (i) the
right of the adopter to choose the name the child is to be known;
and (ii) the right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and
compulsory heirs of each other. [18] Therefore, even if emancipation
terminates parental authority, the adoptee is still considered a
legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights[19] of a legitimate
child such as: (1) to bear the surname of the father and the
mother; (2) to receive support from their parents; and (3) to be
entitled to the legitime and other successional rights. Conversely,
the adoptive parents shall, with respect to the adopted child, enjoy
all the benefits to which biological parents are entitled [20] such as
support[21] and successional rights.[22]
We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes, being humane
and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child to be of
paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes,
parental care and education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned
children and give them the protection of society and family, as well
as to allow childless couples or persons to experience the joys of
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the
adopted for the manifestation of their natural parental instincts.
Every reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and
fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. [23] But,
as we have ruled in Republic v. Vergara:[24]
case, joint adoption by the husband and the wife is required. We
reiterate our ruling above that since, at the time the petitions for
adoption were filed, petitioner was married to Olario, joint adoption
is mandatory.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision

We are not unmindful of the main purpose of dated 15 September 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, General
adoption statutes, which is the promotion of the Santos City, Branch 22 in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259.
welfare of the children. Accordingly, the law should Costs against petitioner.
be construed liberally, in a manner that will sustain
rather than defeat said purpose. The law must also SO ORDERED.
be applied with compassion, understanding and
less severity in view of the fact that it is intended to
provide homes, love, care and education for less
fortunate children. Regrettably, the Court is not in a
position to affirm the trial courts decision favoring
adoption in the case at bar, for the law is clear
and it cannot be modified without violating
the proscription against judicial
legislation. Until such time however, that the law
on the matter is amended, we cannot sustain the
respondent-spouses petition for adoption.
(Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions for adoption
were filed, should have jointly filed the petitions with her husband.
We cannot make our own legislation to suit petitioner.

Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that subsequent events

would show that joint adoption could no longer be possible
because Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his marriage to
petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior Court.

We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of the marriage

between petitioner and Olario is of no moment. It is not equivalent
to a decree of dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is a
judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage between
petitioner and Olario, the marriage still subsists. That being the

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
G.R. No. 188801, October 15, 2014
ROSARIO MATA CASTRO AND JOANNE BENEDICTA
CHARISSIMA M. CASTRO, A.K.A. "MARIA SOCORRO M.
CASTRO" AND "JAYROSE M. CASTRO," Petitioners, v. JOSE
MARIA JED LEMUEL GREGORIO AND ANA MARIA REGINA
GREGORIO, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The policy of the law is clear. In order to maintain harmony, there
must be a showing of notice and consent. This cannot be defeated
by mere procedural devices. In all instances where it appears that
a spouse attempts to adopt a child out of wedlock, the other
spouse and other legitimate children must be personally notified
through personal service of summons. It is not enough that they be
deemed notified through constructive service.
This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision of
1 2
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101021, which denied the
petition for annulment of judgment filed by petitioners. The
petition before the appellate court sought to annul the judgment of
the trial court that granted respondents' decree of
adoption.3chanrobleslaw
The case originally stemmed from the adoption of Jose Maria Jed
Lemuel Gregorio (Jd) and Ana Maria Regina Gregorio (Regina) by
Atty. Jose G. Castro (Jose). Jose is the estranged husband of Rosario
Mata Castro (Rosario) and the father of Joanne Benedicta
Charissima M. Castro (Joanne), also known by her baptismal name,
"Maria Socorro M. Castro" and her nickname, "Jayrose."
Rosario alleged that she and Jose were married on August 5, 1962
in Laoag City. Their marriage had allegedly been troubled. They
had a child, Rose Marie, who was born in 1963, but succumbed to
congenital heart disease and only lived for nine days. Rosario
allegedly left Jose after a couple of months because of the
incompatibilities between them.4chanrobleslaw
Rosario and Jose, however, briefly reconciled in 1969. Rosario gave
birth to Joanne a year later. She and Jose allegedly lived as
husband and wife for about a year even if she lived in Manila and
Jose stayed in Laoag City. Jose would visit her in Manila during
weekends. Afterwards, they separated permanently because
Rosario alleged that Jose had homosexual tendencies. 5 She
insisted, however, that they "remained friends for fifteen (15) years
despite their separation(.)"6chanrobleslaw
On August 1, 2000, Jose filed a petition7 for adoption before the
Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte. In the petition, he
alleged that Jed and Regina were his illegitimate children with
Lilibeth Fernandez Gregorio (Lilibeth),8 whom Rosario alleged was
his erstwhile housekeeper. 9 At the time of the filing of the petition,
Jose was 70 years old.10chanrobleslaw
According to the Home Study Report11 conducted by the Social
Welfare Officer of the trial court, Jose belongs to a prominent and
respected family, being one of the three children of former
Governor Mauricio Castro.
He was also a well-known lawyer in Manila and Ilocos Norte. 12 The
report mentioned that he was once married to Rosario, but the
marriage did not produce any children.13 It also stated that he met
and fell in love with Lilibeth in 1985, and Lilibeth was able to bear
him two children, Jed on August 1987, and Regina on March
1989.14 Under "Motivation for Adoption," the social welfare officer
noted:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Since, he has no child with his marriaged [sic] to Rosario Mata, he
was not able to fulfill his dreams to parent a child. However, with
the presence of his 2 illegitimate children will fulfill his dreams [sic]
and it is his intention to legalize their relationship and surname. . . .
15
At the time of the report, Jose was said to be living with Jed and
Regina temporarily in Batac, Ilocos Norte. 16 The children have
allegedly been in his custody since Lilibeth's death in July
1995.17chanrobleslaw
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
On October 16, 2000, the trial court approved the
adoption,18 having ruled that "[n]o opposition had been received by
this Court from any person including the government which was
represented by the Office of the Solicitor General."19 A certificate of
finality20 was issued on February 9, 2006.
Meanwhile, on July 3, 2006, Rosario, through her lawyer, Atty. Rene
V. Saguisag, filed a complaint for disbarment against Jose with the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines.21 In her complaint, she alleged
that Jose had been remiss in providing support for their daughter,
Joanne, for the past 36 years.22She alleged that she single-
handedly raised and provided financial support to Joanne while Jose
had been showering gifts to his driver and alleged lover, Larry R.
Rentegrado (Larry), and even went to the extent of adopting
Larry's two children, Jed and Regina, without her and Joanne's
knowledge and consent.23 She also alleged that Jose made blatant
lies to the trial court by alleging that Jed and Regina were his
illegitimate children with Larry's wife, Lilibeth, to cover up for his
homosexual relationship with Larry.24chanrobleslaw
In his answer before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose
denies being remiss in his fatherly duties to Joanne during her
minority. He alleged that he always offered help, but it was often
declined.25 He also alleged that he adopted Jed and Regina because
they are his illegitimate children. He denied having committed any
of the falsification alluded to by Rosario. He also stated that he had
suffered a stroke in 1998 that left him paralyzed. He alleged that
his income had been diminished because several properties had to
be sold to pay for medical treatments.26 He then implored the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines to weigh on the case with "justice
and equity."27chanrobleslaw
On October 8, 2006, Jose died in Laoag City, Ilocos
Norte.28chanrobleslaw
On October 18, 2007, Rosario and Joanne filed a petition for
annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure with the Court of Appeals, seeking to annul the October
16, 2000 decision of the trial court approving Jed and Regina's
adoption.29chanrobleslaw
In their petition, Rosario and Joanne allege that they learned of the
adoption sometime in 2005.30They allege that Rosario's affidavit of
consent, marked by the trial court as "Exh. K," 31 was
fraudulent.32 They also allege that Jed and Regina's birth
certificates showed different sets of information, such as the age of
their mother, Lilibeth, at the time she gave birth. They argue that
one set of birth certificates states the father to be Jose and in
another set of National Statistic Office certificates shows the father
to be Larry, Jose's driver and alleged lover. 33 It was further alleged
that Jed and Regina are not actually Jose's illegitimate children but
the legitimate children of Lilibeth and Larry who were married at
the time of their birth.34chanrobleslaw
On May 26, 2009, the Court of Appeals denied the petition.
While admittedly, no notice was given by the trial court to Rosario
and Joanne of the adoption, the appellate court ruled that there is
"no explicit provision in the rules that the spouse and legitimate
child of the adopter . . . should be personally notified of the
hearing."35chanrobleslaw
The appellate court "abhor[red] the mind baffling scheme
employed by [Jose] in obtaining an adoption decree in favor of [his
illegitimate children] to the prejudice of the interests of his
legitimate heirs"36 but stated that its hands were bound by the trial
court decision that had already attained "finality and
immutability."37chanrobleslaw
The appellate court also ruled that the alleged fraudulent
information contained in the different sets of birth certificates
required the determination of the identities of the persons stated
therein and was, therefore, beyond the scope of the action for
annulment of judgment. The alleged fraud was also perpetrated
during the trial and could not be classified as extrinsic fraud, which
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
is required in an action for annulment of judgment. 38chanrobleslaw
When Rosario and Joanne's motion for reconsideration was denied
on July 10, 2009,39 they filed this petition.
The issue before this court is whether the Court of Appeals erred in
denying the petition for annulment for failure of petitioners to (1)
show that the trial court lacked jurisdiction and (2) show the
existence of extrinsic fraud.
In their petition, petitioners argue that the appellate court erred in
its application of the law on extrinsic fraud as ground to annul a
judgment.40 They argue that because of the fabricated consent
obtained by Jose and the alleged false information shown in the
birth certificates presented as evidence before the trial
court,41 they were not given the opportunity to oppose the petition
since the entire proceedings were concealed from
them.42chanrobleslaw
Petitioners also argue that the appellate court misunderstood and
misapplied the law on jurisdiction despite the denial of due
process, notice, and non-inclusion of indispensable parties. 43 They
argue that the adoption of illegitimate children requires the
consent, not only of the spouse, but also the legitimate children 10
years or over of the adopter, and such consent was never secured
from Joanne.44chanrobleslaw
Respondents, however, argue in their comment that petitioners
could not have been deprived of their day in court since their
interest was "amply protected by the participation and
representation of the Solicitor General through the deputized
public prosecutor."45chanrobleslaw
Respondents also argue that there was constructive notice through
publication for three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation, which constitutes not only notice to them but also
notice to the world of the adoption proceedings.46 They argue that
since the alleged fraud was perpetrated during the trial, it cannot
be said to be extrinsic fraud but intrinsic fraud, which is not a
ground for annulment of judgment.47 They also argue that
petitioners were not indispensable parties because adoption is an
action in rem and, as such, the only indispensable party is the
state.48chanrobleslaw
The petition is granted.
Annulment of judgment under Rule 47
of the Rules of Civil Procedure
Under Rule 47, Section 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, a party
may file an action with the Court of Appeals to annul judgments or
final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts.
This remedy will only be available if "the ordinary remedies of new
trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of the petitioner." 49chanrobleslaw
In Dare Adventure Farm Corporation v. Court of
Appeals:50chanrobleslaw
A petition for annulment of judgment is a remedy in equity so
exceptional in nature that it may be availed of only when other
remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment, final order or final
resolution sought, to be annulled was rendered by a court lacking
jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. Yet, the remedy, being
exceptional in character, is not allowed to be so easily and readily
abused by parties aggrieved by the final judgments, orders or
resolutions. The Court has thus instituted safeguards by limiting
the grounds for the annulment to lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic
fraud, and by prescribing in Section 1 of Rule 47 of the Rules of
Court that the petitioner should show that the ordinary remedies of
new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies
are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. A petition
for annulment that ignores or disregards any of the safeguards
cannot prosper.
The attitude of judicial reluctance towards the annulment of a
judgment, final order or final resolution is understandable, for the
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
remedy disregards the time-honored doctrine of immutability and
unalterability of final judgments, a solid corner stone in the
dispensation of justice by the courts. The doctrine of immutability
and unalterability serves a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid
delay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to
make orderly the discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put an
end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which
is precisely why the courts exist. As to the first, a judgment that
has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and is no
longer to be modified in any respect even if the modification is
meant to correct an erroneous conclusion of fact or of law, and
whether the modification is made by the court that rendered the
decision or by the highest court of the land. As to the latter,
controversies cannot drag on indefinitely because fundamental
considerations of public policy and sound practice demand that the
rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense
for an indefinite period of time.51 (Emphasis supplied)
Because of the exceptional nature of the remedy, there are only
two grounds by which annulment of judgment may be availed of:
extrinsic fraud, which must be brought four years from discovery,
and lack of jurisdiction, which must be brought before it is barred
by estoppel or laches.52chanrobleslaw
Lack of jurisdiction under this rule means lack of jurisdiction over
the nature of the action or subject matter, or lack of jurisdiction
over the parties.53 Extrinsic fraud, on the other hand, is "[that
which] prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his
entire case to the court, or [that which] operates upon matters
pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it
is procured."54chanrobleslaw
The grant of adoption over respondents should be annulled as the
trial court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over the proceedings,
and the favorable decision was obtained through extrinsic fraud.
Jurisdiction over adoption proceedings
vis-a-vis the law on adoption
Petitioners argue that they should have been given notice by the
trial court of the adoption, as adoption laws require their consent
as a requisite in the proceedings.
Petitioners are correct.
It is settled that "the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the
statute in force at the time of the commencement of the
action."55 As Jose filed the petition for adoption on August 1, 2000,
it is Republic Act No. 855256 which applies over the proceedings.
The law on adoption requires that the adoption by the father of a
child born out of wedlock obtain not only the consent of his wife
but also the consent of his legitimate children.
Under Article III, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8552, the husband
must first obtain the consent of his wife if he seeks to adopt his
own children born out of wedlock:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ARTICLE III
ELIGIBILITY
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. The following may
adopt:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following
cases:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of the
other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate
son/daughter: Provided, however, That the other spouse has
signified, his/her consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each other. . .
(Emphasis supplied)
The provision is mandatory. As a general rule, the husband and
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
wife must file a joint petition for adoption. The rationale for this is
stated in In Re: Petition for Adoption of Michelle P.
Lim:57chanrobleslaw
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted provision means
that joint adoption by the husband and the wife is mandatory. This
is in consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over
the child which is the ideal situation. As the child to be adopted is
elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural to
require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures harmony
between the spouses.58
The law provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a
situation where a spouse seeks to adopt his or her own children
born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not
necessary. However, the spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain
the consent of his or her spouse.
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose
and Rosario remained legally married despite their de facto
separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario
must first signify her consent to the adoption. Jose, however, did
not validly obtain Rosario's consent. His submission of a fraudulent
affidavit of consent in her name cannot be considered compliance
of the requisites of the law. Had Rosario been given notice by the
trial court of the proceedings, she would have had a reasonable
opportunity to contest the validity of the affidavit. Since her
consent was not obtained, Jose was ineligible to adopt.
The law also requires the written consent of the adopter's children
if they are 10 years old or older. In Article III, Section 9 of Republic
Act No. 8552:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
SEC. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. After being
properly counseled and informed of his/her right to give or withhold
his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent of the
following to the adoption is hereby
required:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of
age or over, of the adopter(s) and adoptee, if any; (Emphasis
supplied)
The consent of the adopter's other children is necessary as it
ensures harmony among the prospective siblings. It also
sufficiently puts the other children on notice that they will have to
share their parent's love and care, as well as their future legitimes,
with another person.
It is undisputed that Joanne was Jose and Rosario's legitimate child
and that she was over 10 years old at the time of the adoption
proceedings. Her written consent, therefore, was necessary for the
adoption to be valid.
To circumvent this requirement, however, Jose manifested to the
trial court that he and Rosario were childless, thereby preventing
Joanne from being notified of the proceedings. As her written
consent was never obtained, the adoption was not valid.
For the adoption to be valid, petitioners' consent was required by
Republic Act No. 8552. Personal service of summons should have
been effected on the spouse and all legitimate children to ensure
that their substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to rely
on constructive notice as in this case. Surreptitious use of
procedural technicalities cannot be privileged over substantive
statutory rights.
Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario
and Joanne of the proceedings, it never validly acquired
jurisdiction.
There was extrinsic fraud
The appellate court, in denying the petition, ruled that while fraud
may have been committed in this case, it was only intrinsic fraud,
rather than extrinsic fraud. This is erroneous.
In People v. Court of Appeals and Socorro Florece:59chanrobleslaw
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
Extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party
in litigation committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby
the defeated party is prevented from fully exhibiting his
side of the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by
his opponent, such as by keeping him away from court, by
giving him a false promise of a compromise, or where the
defendant never had the knowledge of the suit, being kept in
ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff, or where an attorney
fraudulently or without authority connives at his
defeat.60 (Emphasis supplied)
An action for annulment based on extrinsic fraud must be brought
within four years from discovery.61Petitioners alleged that they
were made aware of the adoption only in 2005. The filing of this
petition on October 18, 2007 is within the period allowed by the
rules.
The badges of fraud are present in this case.
First, the petition for adoption was filed in a place that had no
relation to any of the parties. Jose was a resident of Laoag City,
llocos Norte.62 Larry and Lilibeth were residents of Barangay 6,
Laoag City.63 Jed and Regina were born in San Nicolas, Ilocos
Norte.64 Rosario and Joanne were residents of Paraaque City,
Manila.65 The petition for adoption, however, was filed in the
Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte.66 The trial court gave
due course to the petition on Jose's bare allegation in his petition
that he was a resident of Batac,67 even though it is admitted in the
Home Study Report that he was a practicing lawyer in Laoag
City.68chanrobleslaw
Second, using the process of delayed registration, 69 Jose was able
to secure birth certificates for Jed and Regina showing him to be
the father and Larry as merely the informant.70 Worse still is that
two different sets of fraudulent certificates were procured: one
showing that Jose and Lilibeth were married on December 4, 1986
in Manila,71 and another wherein the portion for the mother's name
was not filled in at all.72 The birth certificates of Jed and Regina
from the National Statistics Office, however, show that their father
was Larry R. Rentegrado.73 These certificates are in clear
contradiction to the birth certificates submitted by Jose to the trial
court in support of his petition for adoption.
Third, Jose blatantly lied to the trial court when he declared that his
motivation for adoption was because he and his wife, Rosario, were
childless,74 to the prejudice of their daughter, Joanne. The consent
of Rosario to the adoption was also disputed by Rosario and
alleged to be fraudulent.75chanrobleslaw
All these tactics were employed by Jose, not only to induce the trial
court in approving his petition, but also to prevent Rosario and
Joanne from participating in the proceedings or opposing the
petition.
The appellate court erroneously classified the fraud employed by
Jose as intrinsic on the basis that they were "forged instruments or
perjured testimonies"76 presented during the trial. It failed to
understand, however, that fraud is considered intrinsic when the
other party was either present at the trial or was a participant in
the proceedings when such instrument or testimony was presented
in court, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[I]ntrinsic fraud refers to the acts of a party at a trial that
prevented a fair and just determination of the case, but the
difference is that the acts or things, like falsification and false
testimony, could have been litigated and determined at the trial or
adjudication of the case. In other words, intrinsic fraud does not
deprive the petitioner of his day in court because he can guard
against that kind of fraud through so many means, including a
thorough trial preparation, a skillful, cross-examination, resorting
to the modes of discovery, and proper scientific or forensic
applications. Indeed, forgery of documents and evidence for use at
the trial and perjury in court testimony have been regarded as not
preventing the participation of any party in the proceedings, and
are not, therefore, constitutive of extrinsic fraud.77 (Emphasis
supplied)
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
When fraud is employed by a party precisely to prevent the
participation of any other interested party, as in this case, then the
fraud is extrinsic, regardless of whether the fraud was committed
through the use of forged documents or perjured testimony during
the trial.
Jose's actions prevented Rosario and Joanne from having a
reasonable opportunity to contest the adoption. Had Rosario and
Joanne been allowed to participate, the trial court would have
hesitated to grant Jose's petition since he failed to fulfill the
necessary requirements under the law. There can be no other
conclusion than that because of Jose's acts, the trial court granted
the decree of adoption under fraudulent circumstances.
The law itself provides for penal sanctions for those who violate its
provisions. Under Article VII, Section 21 of Republic Act No.
8552:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ARTICLE VII
VIOLATIONS AND PENALTIES
SEC. 21. Violations and Penalties.
(a) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from six (6) years and one
(1) day to twelve (12) years and/or a fine not less than Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000.00), but not more than Two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000.00) at the discretion of the court
shall be imposed on any person who shall commit any of the
following acts:
(i) obtaining consent for an adoption through coercion, undue
influence, fraud, improper material inducement, or other similar
acts;
(ii) non-compliance with the procedures and safeguards provided
by the law for adoption; or
(iii)subjecting or exposing the child to be adopted to danger,
abuse, or exploitation.
(b) Any person who shall cause the fictitious registration of the
birth of a child under the name(s) of a person(s) who is not
his/her biological parent(s) shall be guilty of simulation of birth,
and shall be punished by prision mayor in its medium period
and a fine not exceeding Fifty thousand pesos (P50.000.00).
(Emphasis supplied)
Unfortunately, Jose's death carried with it the extinguishment of
any of his criminal liabilities.78Republic Act No. 8552 also fails to
provide any provision on the status of adoption decrees if the
adoption is found to have been obtained fraudulently. Petitioners
also cannot invoke Article VI, Section 19 of Republic Act No.
855279 since rescission of adoption can only be availed of by the
adoptee. Petitioners, therefore, are left with no other remedy in law
other than the annulment of the judgment.
The fraud employed in this case has been to Joanne's prejudice.
There is reason to believe that Joanne has grown up having never
experienced the love and care of a father, her parents having
separated a year after her birth. She has never even benefited
from any monetary support from her father. Despite all these
adversities, Joanne was able to obtain a medical degree from the
University of the Philippines College of Medicine 80 and is now
working as a doctor in Canada.81 These accomplishments, however,
are poor substitutes if the injustice done upon her is allowed to
continue.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision dated
October 16, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte,
Branch 17 in SP. Proc. No. 3445-17 is rendered NULL and VOID.
SO ORDERED.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
G.R. No. 192531 November 12, 2014
BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, Petitioner,
vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES,
INC., Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Nature of the Case
This Appeal, filed under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, seeks to annul
the March 17, 2010 Decision 1 of the Employees Compensation
Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. SL-18483-0218-10, entitled
Bernardina P. Bartolome v. Social Security System (SSS) [Scanmar
Maritime Services, Inc.}, declaring that petitioner is not a beneficiary
of the deceased employee under Presidential Decree No. (PD) 442,
otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by
PD 626.2
The Facts
John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was employed as electrician
by Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc., on board the vessel Maersk
Danville, since February 2008. As such, he was enrolled under the
government's Employees' Compensation Program
(ECP).3 Unfortunately, on June 2, 2008, an accident occurred on board
the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John, which led to his untimely
death the following day.4
John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus,
petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome, Johns biological mother and,
allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits
under PD 626 with the Social Security System (SSS) at San Fernando
City, La Union. However, the SSS La Union office, in a letter dated June
10, 20095 addressed to petitioner, denied the claim, stating:
We regret to inform you that wecannot give due course to your claim
because you are no longer considered as the parent of JOHN COLCOL
as he was legally adopted by CORNELIO COLCOL based on documents
you submitted to us.
The denial was appealed tothe Employees Compensation Commission
(ECC), which affirmed the ruling of the SSS La Union Branch through
the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the claim is
hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.6
In denying the claim, both the SSS La Union branch and the ECC ruled
against petitioners entitlement to the death benefits sought after
under PD 626 on the ground she can no longer be considered Johns
primary beneficiary. As culled from the records, John and his sister
Elizabeth were adopted by their great grandfather, petitioners
grandfather, Cornelio Colcol (Cornelio), by virtue of the Decision 7 in
Spec. Proc. No. 8220-XII of the Regional Trial Court in Laoag City dated
February 4, 1985, which decree of adoption attained
finality.8Consequently, as argued by the agencies, it is Cornelio who
qualifies as Johns primary beneficiary, not petitioner. Neither, the ECC
reasoned, would petitioner qualify as Johns secondary beneficiary
even if it wereproven that Cornelio has already passed away. As the
ECC ratiocinated:
Under Article 167 (j) of P.D. 626, as amended, provides (sic) that
beneficiaries are the "dependent spouse until he remarries and
dependent children, who are the primary beneficiaries. In their
absence, the dependent parentsand subject to the restrictions imposed
on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate
descendants who are the secondary beneficiaries; Provided; that the
dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a
primary beneficiary when there are no other dependent children who
are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit."
The dependent parent referred to by the above provision relates to the
legitimate parent of the covered member, as provided for by Rule XV,
Section 1 (c) (1) of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation.
This Commission believes that the appellant is not considered a
legitimate parent of the deceased, having given up the latter for
adoption to Mr. Cornelio C. Colcol. Thus, in effect, the adoption
divested her of the statusas the legitimate parent of the deceased.
xxxx
In effect, the rights which previously belong [sic] to the biological
parent of the adopted child shall now be upon the adopting parent.
Hence, in this case, the legal parent referred to by P.D. 626, as
amended, as the beneficiary, who has the right to file the claim, is the
adoptive father of the deceased and not herein appellant. 9 (Emphasis
supplied)
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was
likewise denied by the ECC.10 Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues in the petition:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
I. The Honorable ECCs Decision is contrary to evidence on
record.
II. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse in denying the
just, due and lawful claims of the petitioner as a lawful
beneficiary of her deceased biological son.
III. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse of discretion in
not giving due course/denying petitioners otherwise
meritorious motion for reconsideration.11
In resolving the case, the pivotal issue is this: Are the biological
parents of the covered, but legally adopted, employee considered
secondary beneficiaries and, thus, entitled, in appropriate cases, to
receive the benefits under the ECP?
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The ECCs factual findings are not consistent with the evidence on
record
To recall, one of the primary reasons why the ECC denied petitioners
claim for death benefits is that eventhough she is Johns biological
mother, it was allegedly not proven that his adoptive parent, Cornelio,
was no longer alive. As intimated by the ECC:
Moreover, there had been no allegation in the records as to whether
the legally adoptive parent, Mr. Colcol, is dead, which would
immediately qualify the appellant [petitioner] for Social Security
benefits. Hence, absent such proof of death of the adoptive father, this
Commission will presume him to be alive and well, and as such, is the
one entitled to claim the benefit being the primary beneficiary of the
deaceased. Thus, assuming that appellant is indeed a qualified
beneficiary under the Social Security law, in view of her status as other
beneficiary, she cannot claim the benefit legally provided by law to the
primary beneficiary, in this case the adoptive father since he is still
alive.
We disagree with the factual finding of the ECC on this point.
Generally, findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally
accorded great respect, if not finality, by the courts by reason of the
special knowledge and expertise of said administrative agenciesover
matters falling under their jurisdiction.12 However, in the extant case,
the ECC had overlooked a crucial piece of evidence offered by the
petitioner Cornelios death certificate. 13
Based on Cornelios death certificate, it appears that Johns adoptive
father died on October 26, 1987, 14 or only less than three (3) years
since the decree of adoption on February 4, 1985, which attained
finality.15 As such, it was error for the ECC to have ruled that it was not
duly proven that the adoptive parent, Cornelio, has already passed
away.
The rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate parents is
contrary to law
This brings us to the question of whether or not petitioner is entitled to
the death benefits claim in view of Johns work-related demise. The
pertinent provision, in this regard, is Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code,
as amended, which reads:
ART. 167. Definition of terms. - Asused in this Title unless the context
indicates otherwise:
xxxx
(j) 'Beneficiaries' means the dependent spouse until he remarries and
dependent children, who are the primary beneficiaries. In their
absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions
imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and
legitimate descendants who are the secondary beneficiaries; Provided,
that the dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as
a primary beneficiary when there are no other dependent children who
are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit. (Emphasis
supplied)
Concurrently, pursuant to the succeeding Article 177(c) supervising the
ECC "[T]o approve rules and regulations governing the processing of
claims and the settlement of disputes arising therefrom as prescribed
by the System," the ECC has issued the Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation, interpreting the above-cited provision as follows:
RULE XV BENEFICIARIES
SECTION 1. Definition. (a) Beneficiaries shall be either primary or
secondary, and determined atthe time of employees death.
(b) The following beneficiaries shall be considered
primary:
(1) The legitimate spouse living with the
employee at the time of the employees
death until he remarries; and
(2) Legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or
acknowledged natural children, who are
unmarried not gainfully employed, not over
21 years of age, or over 21 years of age
provided that he is incapacitated and
incapable of self - support due to physicalor
mental defect which is congenital or acquired
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
during minority; Provided, further, that a
dependent acknowledged natural child shall
be considered as a primary beneficiary only
when there are no other dependent children
who are qualified and eligible for monthly
income benefit; provided finally, that if there
are two or more acknowledged natural
children, they shall be counted from the
youngest and without substitution, but not
exceeding five.
(c) The following beneficiaries shall be considered
secondary:
(1) The legitimate parentswholly dependent
upon the employee for regular support;
(2) The legitimate descendants and
illegitimate children who are unmarried, not
gainfully employed, and not over 21 years of
age, or over 21 years of age providedthat he
is incapacitated and incapable of self -
support dueto physical or mental defect
which is congenital or acquired during
minority. (Emphasis supplied)
Guilty of reiteration, the ECC denied petitioners claim on the ground
that she is no longer the deceaseds legitimate parent, as required by
the implementing rules. As held by the ECC, the adoption decree
severed the relation between John and petitioner, effectively divesting
her of the status of a legitimate parent, and, consequently, that of
being a secondary beneficiary.
We disagree.
a. Rule XV, Sec. 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation deviates from the clear language of Art. 167 (j) of the
Labor Code, as amended
Examining the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation in light of
the Labor Code, as amended, it is at once apparent that the ECC
indulged in an unauthorized administrative legislation. In net effect,
the ECC read into Art. 167 of the Code an interpretation not
contemplated by the provision. Pertinent in elucidating on this point
isArticle 7 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which reads:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their
violation or non-observance shall not beexcused by disuse, or custom
or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the
Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid
only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.
(Emphasis supplied)
As applied, this Court held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Fortune Tobacco Corporation16 that:
As we have previously declared, rule-making power must be confined
to details for regulating the mode or proceedings in order to carry into
effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be extended to
amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters
not covered by the statute. Administrative regulations must always be
in harmony with the provisions of the law because any resulting
discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the
basic law. (Emphasis supplied)
Guided by this doctrine, We find that Rule XV of the Amended Rules on
Employees Compensation is patently a wayward restriction of and a
substantial deviation from Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code when it
interpreted the phrase "dependent parents" to refer to "legitimate
parents."
It bears stressing that a similar issue in statutory construction was
resolved by this Court in Diaz v. Intermediate Appellate Court 17 in this
wise:
It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in
its general acceptation. Amicus curiae Prof. Ruben Balane has this to
say:
The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not
defined by it. In accordancetherefore with the canons of statutory
interpretation, it should beunderstood to have a general and inclusive
scope, inasmuch as the term is a general one. Generalia verba sunt
generaliter intelligenda. That the law does not make a distinction
prevents us from making one: Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos
distinguera debemus. xxx
According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992
in a more restrictive sense thanit is used and intended is not warranted
by any rule ofinterpretation. Besides, he further states that when the
law intends to use the termin a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the
term with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New
Civil Code.
Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute
it embraces not only collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
person spoken of, unless the context indicates that it was used in a
more restrictive or limited sense which as already discussed earlier,
is not so in the case at bar. (Emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, the term "parents" in the phrase "dependent
parents" in the afore-quoted Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is
usedand ought to be taken in its general sense and cannot be unduly
limited to "legitimate parents" as what the ECC did. The phrase
"dependent parents" should, therefore, include all parents, whether
legitimate or illegitimate and whether by nature or by adoption. When
the law does not distinguish, one should not distinguish. Plainly,
"dependent parents" are parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate,
biological or by adoption,who are in need of support or assistance.
Moreover, the same Article 167 (j),as couched, clearly shows that
Congress did not intend to limit the phrase "dependent parents" to
solely legitimate parents. At the risk of being repetitive, Article 167
provides that "in their absence, the dependent parents and subject to
the restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate
children and legitimate descendants who are secondary beneficiaries."
Had the lawmakers contemplated "dependent parents" to mean
legitimate parents, then it would have simply said descendants and not
"legitimate descendants." The manner by which the provision in
question was crafted undeniably show that the phrase "dependent
parents" was intended to cover all parents legitimate, illegitimate or
parents by nature or adoption.
b. Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees
Compensation is in contravention of the equal protection clause
To insist that the ECC validly interpreted the Labor Code provision is an
affront to the Constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the
laws for the rule, as worded, prevents the parents of an illegitimate
child from claiming benefits under Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as
amended by PD 626. To Our mind, such postulation cannot be
countenanced.
As jurisprudence elucidates, equal protection simply requires that all
persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies
and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner.18 In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law
requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not
drawdistinctions between individuals solely on differences that are
irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.19
The concept of equal protection, however, does not require the
universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires isequality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal
protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to
be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four
requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It
is germane tothe purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same
class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification." 20
In the instant case, there is no compelling reasonable basis to
discriminate against illegitimate parents. Simply put, the above-cited
rule promulgated by the ECC that limits the claim of benefits to the
legitimate parents miserably failed the test of reasonableness since the
classification is not germane to the law being implemented. We see no
pressing government concern or interest that requires protection so as
to warrant balancing the rights of unmarried parents on one hand and
the rationale behind the law on the other. On the contrary, the SSS can
better fulfill its mandate, and the policy of PD 626 that employees
and their dependents may promptly secure adequate benefits in the
event of work-connected disability or death - will be better served if
Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is not so narrowly interpreted.
There being no justification for limiting secondary parent beneficiaries
to the legitimate ones, there can be no other course of action to take
other than to strikedown as unconstitutional the phrase "illegitimate"
as appearing in Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on
Employees Compensation.
Petitioner qualifies as Johns dependent parent
In attempting to cure the glaring constitutional violation of the
adverted rule, the ECC extended illegitimate parents an opportunity to
file claims for and receive death benefitsby equating dependency and
legitimacy to the exercise of parental authority. Thus, as insinuated by
the ECC in its assailed Decision, had petitioner not given up John for
adoption, she could have still claimed death benefits under the law.
To begin with, nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that
"legitimate parents" pertain to those who exercise parental authority
over the employee enrolled under the ECP. Itwas only in the assailed
Decision wherein such qualification was made. In addition, assuming
arguendothat the ECC did not overstep its boundaries in limiting the
adverted Labor Code provision to the deceaseds legitimate parents,
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
and that the commission properly equated legitimacy to parental
authority, petitioner can still qualify as Johns secondary beneficiary.
True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adoptedJohn, then about two (2) years
old, petitioners parental authority over John was severed. However,
lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside from
Cornelios death, was that when the adoptive parent died less than
three (3) years after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at
about four (4) years of age.
Johns minority at the time of his adopters death is a significant factor
in the case at bar. Under such circumstance, parental authority should
be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents.
Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a
personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue
of adoption,21 who was then left to care for the minor adopted child if
the adopter passed away?
To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of
the biological parents is not a novel concept. Section 20 of Republic Act
No. 855222 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act,
provides:
Section 20. Effects of Rescission. If the petition [for rescission of
adoption] is granted, the parental authority of the adoptee's biological
parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the Department shall be
restored if the adoptee is still a minoror incapacitated. The reciprocal
rights and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other
shall be extinguished. (emphasis added)
The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy insofar as the
restoration of custody is concerned.1wphi1 The manner herein of
terminating the adopters parental authority, unlike the grounds for
rescission,23 justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations
between the adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent
restoration of parental authority in favor of the biological parents,
simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not
left to fend for himself at such a tender age.
To emphasize, We can only apply the rule by analogy, especially since
RA 8552 was enacted after Cornelios death. Truth be told, there is a
lacuna in the law as to which provision shall govern contingencies in all
fours with the factual milieu of the instant petition. Nevertheless, We
are guided by the catena of cases and the state policies behind RA
855224 wherein the paramount consideration is the best interest of the
child, which We invoke to justify this disposition. It is, after all, for the
best interest of the child that someone will remain charged for his
welfare and upbringing should his or her adopter fail or is rendered
incapacitated to perform his duties as a parent at a time the adoptee
isstill in his formative years, and, to Our mind, in the absence or, as in
this case, death of the adopter, no one else could reasonably be
expected to perform the role of a parent other than the adoptees
biological one.
Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though
parental authority is severed by virtue of adoption, the ties between
the adoptee and the biological parents are not entirely eliminated. To
demonstrate, the biological parents, insome instances, are able to
inherit from the adopted, as can be gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family
Code:
Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted
shall be governed by the following rules:
xxx
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate
ascendants of the adopted concur withthe adopter, they shall divide
the entire estate, one-half tobe inherited by the parents or ascendants
and the other half, by the adopters;
xxx
(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then
the ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession shall apply.
Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcols death, which was prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code, the governing provision is Art. 984 of the
New Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children
or descendants, his parents and relatives by consanguinity and not by
adoption, shall be his legal heirs.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain
their rights of succession tothe estate of their child who was the
subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an SSS
covered employee do not form part of the estateof the adopted child,
the pertinent provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals
the policy on the rights of the biological parents and those by adoption
vis--vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the same
way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too
should certain obligations, which, We rule, include the exercise of
parental authority, in the event of the untimely passing of their minor
offsprings adoptive parent. We cannot leave undetermined the fate of
a minor child whose second chance ata better life under the care of the
adoptive parents was snatched from him by deaths cruel grasp.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

Otherwise, the adopted childs quality of life might have been better Johns minority. Since the parent by adoption already died, then the
off not being adopted at all if he would only find himself orphaned in death benefits under the Employees' Compensation Program shall
the end. Thus, We hold that Cornelios death at the time of accrue solely to herein petitioner, John's sole remaining beneficiary.
Johnsminority resulted in the restoration of petitioners parental WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The March 17, 2010
authority over the adopted child. Decision of the Employees' Compensation Commission, in ECC Case
On top of this restoration of parental authority, the fact of petitioners No. SL-18483-0218-10, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The ECC is hereby
dependence on John can be established from the documentary directed to release the benefits due to a secondary beneficiary of the
evidence submitted to the ECC. As it appears in the records, petitioner, deceased covered employee John Colcol to petitioner Bernardina P.
prior to Johns adoption, was a housekeeper. Her late husband died in Bartolome.
1984, leaving her to care for their seven (7) children. But since she was No costs.
unable to "give a bright future to her growing children" as a SO ORDERED.
housekeeper, she consented to Cornelios adoption of Johnand
Elizabeth in 1985.
Following Cornelios death in 1987, so records reveal, both petitioner
and John repeatedly reported "Brgy. Capurictan, Solsona, Ilocos Norte"
as their residence. In fact, this veryaddress was used in Johns Death
Certificate25 executed in Brazil, and in the Report of Personal Injury or
Loss of Life accomplished by the master of the vessel boarded by
John.26 Likewise, this is Johns known address as per the ECCs assailed
Decision.27Similarly, this same address was used by petitioner in filing
her claim before the SSS La Union branch and, thereafter, in her appeal
with the ECC. Hence, it can be assumed that aside from having been
restored parental authority over John, petitioner indeed actually
execised the same, and that they lived together under one roof.
Moreover, John, in his SSS application, 28 named petitioner as one of his
beneficiaries for his benefits under RA 8282, otherwise known as the
"Social Security Law." While RA 8282 does not cover compensation for
work-related deaths or injury and expressly allows the designation of
beneficiaries who are not related by blood to the member unlike in PD
626, Johns deliberate act of indicating petitioner as his beneficiary at
least evinces that he, in a way, considered petitioner as his dependent.
Consequently, the confluence of circumstances from Cornelios death
during Johns minority, the restoration ofpetitioners parental authority,
the documents showing singularity of address, and Johns clear
intention to designate petitioner as a beneficiary - effectively made
petitioner, to Our mind, entitled to death benefit claims as a secondary
beneficiary under PD 626 as a dependent parent.
All told, the Decision of the ECC dated March 17, 2010 is bereft of legal
basis. Cornelios adoption of John, without more, does not deprive
petitioner of the right to receive the benefits stemming from Johns
death as a dependent parent given Cornelios untimely demise during

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
[G.R. No. 127578. February 15, 1999]
MANUEL DE ASIS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
JAIME T. HAMOY, Branch 130, RTC, Kalookan City and
GLEN CAMIL ANDRES DE ASIS represented by her
mother/guardian VIRCEL D. ANDRES, respondents.
DECISION
PURISIMA, J.:
Petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court seeking to nullify the decision of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the trial courts Orders, dated November 25, 1993 and
February 4, 1994, respectively, denying petitioners Motion to
Dismiss the Complaint in Civil Case No. C-16107, entitled Glen
Camil Andres de Asis, etc. vs. Manuel de Asis, and the motion for
reconsideration.
The pertinent facts leading to the filing of the petition at bar
are, as follows:
On October 14, 1988, Vircel D. Andres, (the herein
private respondent) in her capacity as the legal guardian of the
minor, Glen Camil Andres de Asis, brought an action for
maintenance and support against Manuel de Asis, docketed as Civil
Case No. Q-88-935 before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 94, alleging that the defendant Manuel de Asis (the
petitioner here) is the father of subject minor Glen Camil Andres de
Asis, and the former refused and/or failed to provide for the
maintenance of the latter, despite repeated demands.
In his Answer, petitioner denied his paternity of the said minor
and theorized that he cannot therefore be required to provide
support for him.
On July 4, 1989, private respondent Vircel D. Andres, through
counsel, sent in a manifestation the pertinent portion of which,
reads;
1. That in his proposed Amended Answer, defendant (herein
petitioner) has made a judicial admission/declaration that 1)
defendant denies that the said minor child (Glen Camil) is his
child; 2) he (petitioner) has no obligation to the plaintiff Glen
Camil xxx.
2. That with the aforesaid judicial admissions/declarations by
the defendant, it seems futile and a useless exercise to claim
support from said defendant.
3. That under the foregoing circumstances it would be more
practical that plaintiff withdraws the complaint against the
defendant subject to the condition that the defendant should
not pursue his counterclaim in the above-entitled case, xxx. [1]
By virtue of the said manifestation, both the plaintiff and the
defendant agreed to move for the dismissal of the case. Acting
thereupon, the Regional Trial Court a quo issued the following
Order of August 8, 1989, dismissing Civil Case No. Q-88-935 with
prejudice, to wit:
Acting on the manifestation of Atty. Romualdo C. delos Santos,
counsel for the defendant, that counsel for the plaintiff Atty. Ismael
J. Andres has no objection that this case be withdrawn provided
that the defendant will withdraw the counterclaim, as prayed for,
let the case be dismissed with prejudice.
SO ORDERED.[2]
On September 7, 1995, another Complaint for maintenance
and support was brought against Manuel A. de Asis, this time in the
name of Glen Camil Andres de Asis, represented by her legal
guardian/mother, Vircel D. Andres. Docketed as Civil Case No. C-
16107 before Branch 130 of the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan,
the said Complaint prayed, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that
judgment be rendered ordering defendant:
1. To pay plaintiff the sum of not less than P2,000.00 per month for
every month since June 1, 1987 as support in arrears which
defendant failed to provide plaintiff shortly after her birth in June
1987 up to the present;
2. To give plaintiff a monthly allowance of P5,000.00 to be paid in
advance on or before the 5th of each and every month;
3. To give plaintiff by way of support pendente lite, a monthly
allowance of P5,000.00 per month, the first monthly allowance to
start retroactively from the first day of this month and the
subsequent ones to be paid in advance on or before the 5th of
each succeeding month;
4. To pay the costs of suit.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
Plaintiff prays for such other relief just and equitable under the
premises.[3]
On October 8, 1993, petitioner moved to dismiss the
Complaint on the ground of res judicata, alleging that Civil Case C-
16107 is barred by the prior judgment which dismissed with
prejudice Civil Case Q-88-935.
In the Order dated November 25, 1993 denying subject
motion to dismiss, the trial court ruled that res judicata is
inapplicable in an action for support for the reason that
renunciation or waiver of future support is prohibited by law.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the said Order met the
same fate. It was likewise denied.
Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition
for Certiorari. But on June 7, 1996, the Court of Appeals found the
said Petition devoid of merit and dismissed the same.
Undaunted, petitioner found his way to this court via the
present petition, posing the question whether or not the public
respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction in upholding the denial of the motion to
dismiss by the trial court, and holding that an action for support
cannot be barred by res judicata.
To buttress his submission, petitioner invokes the previous
dismissal of the Complaint for maintenance and support, Civil
Case Q-88-935, filed by the mother and guardian of the minor,
Glen Camil Andres de Asis, (the herein private respondent). In said
case, the complainant manifested that because of the defendants
judicial declaration denying that he is the father of subject minor
child, it was futile and a useless exercise to claim support from
defendant. Because of such manifestation, and defendants
assurance that he would not pursue his counterclaim anymore, the
parties mutually agreed to move for the dismissal of the
complaint. The motion was granted by the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court, which then dismissed the case with prejudice.
Petitioner contends that the aforecited manifestation, in
effect, admitted the lack of filiation between him and the minor
child, which admission binds the complainant, and since the
obligation to give support is based on the existence of paternity
and filiation between the child and the putative parent, the lack
thereof negates the right to claim for support. Thus, petitioner
maintains that the dismissal of the Complaint by the lower court on
the basis of the said manifestation bars the present action for
support, especially so because the order of the trial court explicitly
stated that the dismissal of the case was with prejudice.
The petition is not impressed with merit.
The right to receive support can neither be renounced
nor transmitted to a third person. Article 301 of the Civil Code, the
law in point, reads:
Art. 301. The right to receive support cannot be renounced, nor
can it be transmitted to a third person. Neither can it be
compensated with what the recipient owes the obligor. xxx
Furthermore, future support cannot be the subject of a
compromise.
Article 2035, ibid, provides, that:
No compromise upon the following questions shall be valid:
(1) The civil status of persons;
(2) The validity of a marriage or legal separation;
(3) Any ground for legal separation
(4) Future support;
(5) The jurisdiction of courts;
(6) Future legitime.
The raison d etre behind the proscription against renunciation,
transmission and/or compromise of the right to support is stated,
thus:
The right to support being founded upon the need of the recipient
to maintain his existence, he is not entitled to renounce or transfer
the right for this would mean sanctioning the voluntary giving up
of life itself. The right to life cannot be renounced; hence, support,
which is the means to attain the former, cannot be renounced.
xxx
To allow renunciation or transmission or compensation of the
family right of a person to support is virtually to allow either
suicide or the conversion of the recipient to a public burden. This is
contrary to public policy.[4]
In the case at bar, respondent minors mother, who was the
plaintiff in the first case, manifested that she was withdrawing the
case as it seemed futile to claim support from petitioner who
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
denied his paternity over the child. Since the right to claim for
support is predicated on the existence of filiation between the
minor child and the putative parent, petitioner would like us to
believe that such manifestation admitting the futility of claiming
support from him puts the issue to rest and bars any and all future
complaint for support.
The manifestation sent in by respondents mother in the first
case, which acknowledged that it would be useless to pursue its
complaint for support, amounted to renunciation as it severed the
vinculum that gives the minor, Glen Camil, the right to claim
support from his putative parent, the petitioner. Furthermore, the
agreement entered into between the petitioner and respondents
mother for the dismissal of the complaint for maintenance and
support conditioned upon the dismissal of the counterclaim is in
the nature of a compromise which cannot be countenanced. It
violates the prohibition against any compromise of the right to
support.
Thus, the admission made by counsel for the wife of the facts
alleged in a motion of the husband, in which the latter prayed that
his obligation to support be extinguished cannot be considered as
an assent to the prayer, and much less, as a waiver of the right to
claim for support.[5]
It is true that in order to claim support, filiation and/or
paternity must first be shown between the claimant and the
parent. However, paternity and filiation or the lack of the same is a
relationship that must be judicially established and it is for the
court to declare its existence or absence. It cannot be left to the
will or agreement of the parties.
The civil status of a son having been denied, and this civil status,
from which the right to support is derived being in issue, it is
apparent that no effect can be given to such a claim until an
authoritative declaration has been made as to the existence of the
cause.[6]
Although in the case under scrutiny, the admission may be
binding upon the respondent, such an admission is at most
evidentiary and does not conclusively establish the lack of filiation.
Neither are we persuaded by petitioners theory that the
dismissal with prejudice of Civil Case Q-88-935 has the effect of res
judicata on the subsequent case for support. The case of Advincula
vs. Advincula[7] comes to the fore. In Advincula, the minor, Manuela
Advincula, instituted a case for acknowledgment and support
against her putative father, Manuel Advincula. On motion of both
parties and for the reason that the plaintiff has lost interest and is
no longer interested in continuing the case against the defendant
and has no further evidence to introduce in support of the
complaint, the case was dismissed. Thereafter, a similar case was
instituted by Manuela, which the defendant moved to dismiss,
theorizing that the dismissal of the first case precluded the filing of
the second case.
In disposing such case, this Court ruled, thus:
The new Civil Code provides that the allowance for support is
provisional because the amount may be increased or decreased
depending upon the means of the giver and the needs of the
recipient (Art. 297); and that the right to receive support cannot be
renounced nor can it be transmitted to a third person; neither can
it be compensated with what the recipient owes the obligator (Art.
301). Furthermore, the right to support can not be waived or
transferred to third parties and future support cannot be the
subject of compromise (Art. 2035; Coral v. Gallego, 38 O.G. 3135,
cited in IV Civil Code by Padilla, p. 648, 1956 Ed.). This being true,
it is indisputable that the present action for support can be
brought, notwithstanding the fact the previous case filed against
the same defendant was dismissed. And it also appearing that the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 3553, was not an adjudication upon the
merits, as heretofore shown, the right of herein plaintiff-appellant
to reiterate her suit for support and acknowledgment is available,
as her needs arise. Once the needs of plaintiff arise, she has the
right to bring an action for support, for it is only then that her
cause of action accrues.xxx
xxx
It appears that the former dismissal was predicated upon a
compromise. Acknowledgment, affecting as it does the civil status
of persons and future support, cannot be the subject of
compromise. (pars. 1 & 4, Art. 2035, Civil Code). Hence, the first
dismissal cannot have force and effect and can not bar the
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

filing of another action, asking for the same relief against

the same defendant.(emphasis supplied)
Conformably, notwithstanding the dismissal of Civil Case 88-
935 and the lower courts pronouncement that such dismissal was
with prejudice, the second action for support may still prosper.
WHEREFORE, the petition under consideration is hereby
DISMISSED and the decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
[G.R. No. 145527. May 28, 2002]
AUGUSTUS CAEZAR R. GAN, petitioner, vs. HON. ANTONIO C.
REYES, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC-Br. 61,
Baguio City, ALBERT G. TOLENTINO, in his capacity as
RTC Sheriff of Baguio City, and FRANCHESKA JOY C.
PONDEVIDA, assisted by BERNADETTE C.
PONDEVIDA, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Quite apprehensive that she would not be able to send to school
her three (3)-year old daughter Francheska Joy S. Pondevida,
Bernadette S. Pondevida wrote petitioner Augustus Caezar R.
Gan[1] demanding support for their "love child." Petitioner, in his reply,
denied paternity of the child.An exasperated Bernadette thereafter
instituted in behalf of her daughter a complaint against petitioner for
support with prayer for support pendente lite.[2]
Petitioner moved to dismiss on the ground that the complaint
failed to state a cause of action. He argued that since Francheska's
certificate of birth indicated her father as "UNKNOWN," there was no
legal or factual basis for the claim of support. [3] His motion, however,
was denied by the trial court.[4]
Despite denial of his motion, petitioner failed to file his answer
within the reglementary period. Thus, on 19 January 2000 private
respondent moved that petitioner be declared in default, which motion
was granted. In its Order declaring petitioner in default the trial court
noted that petitioner's Motion to Admit Answer was filed more than
ninety (90) days after the expiration of the reglementary period, and
only after private respondent moved that petitioner be declared in
default. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was also denied. Hence,
the court received the evidence of private respondent ex parte.
After finding that the claim of filiation and support was adequately
proved, the trial court rendered its Decision on 12 May 2000 ordering
petitioner to recognize private respondent Francheska Joy S. Pondevida
as his illegitimate child and support her with P20,000.00 every month
to be paid on or before the 15th of each month starting 15 April
2000. Likewise petitioner was ordered to pay Francheska Joy S.
Pondevida the accumulated arrears of P20,000.00 per month from the
day she was born, P50,000.00 as attorney's fees and P25,000.00 for
expenses of litigation, plusP20,000.00 on or before the 15th of every
month from 15 May 2000 as alimony pendente lite should he desire to
pursue further remedies against private respondent. [5]
Forthwith, private respondent moved for execution of the
judgment of support, which the trial court granted by issuing a writ of
execution, citing as reason therefor private respondent's immediate
need for schooling.[6] Pursuant to the writ, the sheriff levied upon a
motor vehicle, a Honda City, with Plate No. UMT 884, registered in the
name of "A.B. Leasing & Fin. Corp., Leased to: G & G Trading," and
found within the premises of petitioner's warehouse in Caloocan City. [7]
Meanwhile, petitioner appealed the Judgment to the Court of
Appeals.[8]
On 9 June 2000 petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the Court of Appeals imputing grave abuse of
discretion to the trial court for ordering the immediate execution of the
judgment. Petitioner averred that the writ of execution was issued
despite the absence of a good reason for immediate
enforcement. Petitioner insisted that as the judgment sought to be
executed did not yet attain finality there should be an exceptional
reason to warrant its execution. He further alleged that the writ
proceeded from an order of default and a judgment rendered by the
trial court in complete disregard of his "highly meritorious defense."
Finally, petitioner impugned the validity of the writ as he argued that it
was issued without notice to him. Petitioner stressed the fact that he
received copy of the motion for immediate execution two (2)
weeks after its scheduled hearing.[9]
On 31 August 2000 the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on
the ratiocination that under Sec. 4, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure judgments for support are immediately executory and
cannot be stayed by an appeal. Thus, it did not help petitioner any to
argue that there were no good reasons to support its immediate
execution. The second challenge hurled against the validity of the writ
concerning the lack of notice and hearing was likewise dismissed with
the appeals court favoring substantial justice over
technicalities. Lastly, petitioner's justification for belatedly filing his
answer, i.e., miscommunication with his lawyer, was disregarded since
it fell short of the statutory requirements of "fraud, accident, mistake
or excusable negligence."[10]
His motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioner
came to us impugning the dismissal of his petition for
certiorari. Petitioner argues that under the rules a judgment for support
which is subject of an appeal cannot be executed absent any good
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
reason for its immediate execution.Petitioner likewise attacks the
validity of the writ asserting that it was issued in violation of his right
to notice and hearing. Petitioner also seeks the setting aside of the
default order and the judgment rendered thereafter for the reason that
should he be allowed to prove his defense of adultery, the claim of
support would be most likely denied. [11] Petitioner claims that in an
action by a child against his putative father, adultery of the child's
mother would be a valid defense to show that the child is a fruit of
adulterous relations for, in such case, it would not be the child of the
defendant and therefore not entitled to support. Parenthetically, how
could he be allowed to prove the defense of adultery when it was not
even hinted that he was married to the mother of Francheska
Joy. Petitioner consents to submit to Dioxyribonucleic Acid (DNA)
Testing to resolve the issue of paternity, which test he claims has a
reputation for accuracy.[12]
A careful review of the facts and circumstances of this case fails
to persuade this Court to brand the issuance of the writ of execution by
the trial court and affirmed by the Court of Appeals with the vice of
grave abuse of discretion. There is no evidence indeed to justify the
setting aside of the writ on the ground that it was issued beyond the
legitimate bounds of judicial discretion.
Section 4, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court clearly states that, unless
ordered by the trial court, judgments in actions for support are
immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal. This is an
exception to the general rule which provides that the taking of an
appeal stays the execution of the judgment and that advance
executions will only be allowed if there are urgent reasons therefor. The
aforesaid provision peremptorily calls for immediate execution of all
judgments for support and makes no distinction between those which
are the subject of an appeal and those which are not. To consider then
petitioner's argument that there should be good reasons for the
advance execution of a judgment would violate the clear and explicit
language of the rule mandating immediate execution.
Petitioner is reminded that to the plain words of a legal provision
we should make no further explanation. Absoluta sententia expositore
non indiget. Indeed, the interpretation which petitioner attempts to
foist upon us would only lead to absurdity, its acceptance negating the
plain meaning of the provision subject of the petition.
Petitioner would also have us annul the writ of execution on the
ground that he was not notified of its issuance. We are unable to
accept such a plea for enough has been done by petitioner to delay the
execution of the writ. As the records show, in partial fulfillment of the
writ of execution petitioner surrendered a sedan which apparently was
not his as it was later ordered released to a third party who laid claim
over the levied vehicle.[13] Also, petitioner filed before the Court of
Appeals a Motion for Leave to Deposit in Court Support Pendente
Lite promising to deposit the amount due as support every 15th of the
month, but to date has not deposited any amount in complete
disavowal of his undertaking.[14] He was not even deterred from
appealing before us and needlessly taking up our time and energy by
posing legal questions that can be characterized, at best, as flimsy and
trivial. We are thus not prepared to abrogate the writ of execution
issued in favor of private respondent for substantial justice would be
better served if petitioner be precluded from interposing another
barrier to the immediate execution of the support judgment.
We are not intimating that in every case the right to notice of
hearing can be disregarded. That is not so. It appears in this case that
there has been too much temporizing in the execution of the writ which
must not be allowed to thwart the constitutional mandate for speedy
disposition of cases. As has been said, a technicality should be an aid
to justice and not its great hindrance and chief enemy. [15] Truly, if the
writ of execution would be voided on this ground alone, then
procedural rules which were primarily drafted to protect parties in the
realm of constitutional guarantees would acquire a new sanctity at the
expense of equity and justice.
Lastly, we note that no useful purpose would be served if we dwell
on petitioner's arguments concerning the validity of the judgment by
default and his insistence that he be subjected, together with private
respondent Bernadette C. Pondevida to DNA testing to settle the issue
of paternity.The futility of his arguments is very apparent. It is not for
us at this instance to review or revise the Decision rendered by the trial
court for to do so would pre-empt the decision which may be rendered
by the Court of Appeals in the main case for support.
In all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare are always
the paramount concerns. There may be instances where, in view of the
poverty of the child, it would be a travesty of justice to refuse him
support until the decision of the trial court attains finality while time
continues to slip away. An excerpt from the early case of De Leon v.
Soriano[16] is relevant, thus:
The money and property adjudged for support and education should
and must be given presently and without delay because if it had to
wait the final judgment, the children may in the meantime have
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

suffered because of lack of food or have missed and lost years in

school because of lack of funds. One cannot delay the payment of such
funds for support and education for the reason that if paid long
afterwards, however much the accumulated amount, its payment
cannot cure the evil and repair the damage caused. The children with
such belated payment for support and education cannot act as
gluttons and eat voraciously and unwisely, afterwards, to make up for
the years of hunger and starvation. Neither may they enrol in several
classes and schools and take up numerous subjects all at once to make
up for the years they missed in school, due to non-payment of the
funds when needed.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the Decision sought
to be reviewed, the instant petition is DENIED. The 31 August
2000 Decision of the Court of Appeals dismissing the Petition for
Certiorari instituted by petitioner Augustus Caezar C. Gan and
upholding the validity of the 2 June 2000 Writ of Execution issued by
the Regional Trial Court Br. 61, Baguio City, in Civil Case No. 4234-R, is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

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Persons 4th Exam Cases

required consent per Article 85 of the New Civil Code, [4] it was annulled
on 11 August 1975 by the Quezon City Juvenile and Domestic Relations
MA. BELEN B. MANGONON, Court.[5]
for and in behalf of her
minor children REBECCA On 25 March 1976, or within seven months after the annulment of their
ANGELA DELGADO marriage, petitioner gave birth to twins Rica and Rina. According to
and REGINA ISABEL petitioner, she, with the assistance of her second
DELGADO. husband Danny Mangonon, raised her twin daughters as private
Petitioner, respondents had totally abandoned them. At the time of the institution
- versus - of the petition, Rica and Rina were about to enter college in the United
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, States of America (USA) where petitioner, together with her daughters
HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA and second husband, had moved to and finally settled in. Rica was
GUEVARA-SALONGA, admitted to the University of Massachusetts (Amherst) while Rina was
Presiding Judge, RTC- accepted by the Long Island University and Western New
Makati, Branch 149, England College. Despite their admissions to said universities, Rica
FEDERICO C. DELGADO and and Rinawere, however, financially incapable of pursuing collegiate
FRANCISCO C. DELGADO, education because of the following:

i) The average annual cost for college education in

Respondents.
the US is about US$22,000/year, broken down as
follows:

Tuition Fees US$13,000.00

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Room & Board 5,000.00
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated 20 March 1996, affirming the Books 1,000.00
Order, dated 12 September 1995 [2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Yearly Transportation &
Branch 149, Makati, granting supportpendente lite to Rebecca Angela Meal Allowance 3,000.00
(Rica) and Regina Isabel (Rina), both surnamed Delgado. Total US$ 22,000.00

The generative facts leading to the filing of the present petition are as or a total of US$44,000.00, more or less, for both Rica
follows: and Rina

On 17 March 1994, petitioner Ma. Belen B. Mangonon filed, in behalf of
her then minor children Rica and Rina, a Petition for Declaration of
Legitimacy and Support, with application for support pendente lite with
the RTC Makati.[3] In said petition, it was alleged that on 16 February
1975, petitioner and respondent Federico Delgado were civilly married
by then City Court Judge Eleuterio Agudo in Legaspi City, Albay. At that
time, petitioner was only 21 years old while respondent Federico was
only 19 years old. As the marriage was solemnized without the
ii) Additionally, Rica and Rina need general
maintenance support each in the amount of
US$3,000.00 per year or a total of US$6,000 per year.
iii) Unfortunately, petitioners monthly income from her
2 jobs is merely US$1,200 after taxes which she can
hardly give general support to Rica and Rina, much
less their required college educational support.

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
iv) Neither can petitioners present husband be
compelled to share in the general support and college
education of Rica and Rina since he has his own son
with petitioner and own daughter (also in college) to
attend to.
v) Worse, Rica and Rinas petitions
for Federal Student Aid have been
rejected by the U.S. Department of
Education.[6]
Petitioner likewise averred that demands[7] were made upon
Federico and the latters father, Francisco, [8] for general support and for
the payment of the required college education of Rica and Rina. The
twin sisters even exerted efforts to work out a settlement concerning
these matters with respondent Federico and respondent Francisco, the
latter being generally known to be financially well-off. [9] These
demands, however, remained unheeded. Considering the impending
deadline for admission to college and the opening of classes, petitioner
and her then minor children had no choice but to file the petition
before the trial court.
Petitioner also alleged that Rica and Rina are her legitimate
daughters by respondent Federico since the twin sisters were born
within seven months from the date of the annulment of her marriage to
respondent Federico. However, as respondent Federico failed to sign
the birth certificates of Rica and Rina, it was imperative that their
status as legitimate children of respondent Federico, and as
granddaughters of respondent Francisco, be judicially declared
pursuant to Article 173 of the Family Code.[10]
As legitimate children and grandchildren, Rica and Rina are
entitled to general and educational support under Articles 174 [11] and
195(b)[12] in relation to Articles 194(1 and 2) [13] and 199(c)[14] of the
Family Code. Petitioner alleged that under these provisions, in case of
default on the part of the parents, the obligation to provide support
falls upon the grandparents of the children; thus, respondent Federico,
or in his default, respondent Francisco should be ordered to provide
general and educational support for Rica and Rina in the amount of
US$50,000.00, more or less, per year.
Petitioner also claimed that she was constrained to seek
support pendente lite from private respondents - who are millionaires
with extensive assets both here and abroad - in view of the imminent
opening of classes, the possibility of a protracted litigation, and Rica
and Rinas lack of financial means to pursue their college education in
the USA.
In his Answer,[15] respondent Francisco stated that as the birth
certificates of Rica and Rina do not bear the signature of respondent
Federico, it is essential that their legitimacy be first established as
there is no basis to claim support until a final and executory judicial
declaration has been made as to the civil status of the children.
[16]
Whatever good deeds he may have done to Rica and Rina,
according to respondent Francisco, was founded on pure acts of
Christian charity. He, likewise, averred that the order of liability for
support under Article 199 of the Family Code is not concurrent such
that the obligation must be borne by those more closely related to the
recipient. In this case, he maintained that responsibility should rest on
the shoulders of petitioner and her second husband, the latter having
voluntarily assumed the duties and responsibilities of a natural
father. Even assuming that he is responsible for support, respondent
Francisco contends that he could not be made to answer beyond what
petitioner and the father could afford.
On 24 May 1994, petitioner filed a Motion to Declare
Defendant (respondent herein) Federico in Default. [17] This was
favorably acted upon by the trial court in the Order dated 16 June
1994.[18]
On 5 August 1994, respondent Federico filed a Motion to Lift
Order of Default alleging that the summons and a copy of the petition
were not served in his correct address. [19] Attached thereto was his
Answer[20] where he claimed that petitioner had no cause of action
against him. According to him, he left for abroad and stayed there for a
long time [w]ithin the first one hundred twenty (120) days of the three
hundred days immediately preceding March 25, 1976 and that he only
came to know about the birth of Rica and Rina when the twins
introduced themselves to him seventeen years later. In order not to
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
antagonize the two, respondent Federico claimed he did not tell them
that he could not be their father. Even assuming that Rica and Rinaare,
indeed, his daughters, he alleged that he could not give them the
support they were demanding as he was only making P40,000.00 a
month.
Finding sufficient ground in the motion filed by respondent
Federico, the trial court lifted its Order dated 16 June 1994 and
admitted his Answer.[21]
In the meantime, on 25 April 1994, petitioner filed an Urgent
Motion to Set Application for Support Pendente Lite for Hearing
because Rica and Rina both badly needed immediate financial
resources for their education. [22] This Motion was opposed by
respondent Francisco.[23] After both parties submitted supplemental
pleadings to bolster their respective positions, the trial court resolved
the motion in an Order dated 12 September 1995 in this wise:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing
considerations, respondents are hereby directed to
provide a monthly
support (pendente lite) of P5,000.00 each or a total
of P10,000.00 for the education of Rebecca Angela
and Regina Isabel Delgado to be delivered within the
first five days of each month without need of demand.
[24]
Unsatisfied with the Order of the trial court, petitioner brought
the case to the Court of Appeals via Petition for Certiorari. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the holding of the trial court and disposed the petition
in the following manner:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby
DISMISSED and the Order of the lower court
dated September 12, 1995 is hereby AFFIRMED.[25]
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied through the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 16 May 1996.[26]
Petitioner is now before this Court claiming that the Decision of the
Court of Appeals was tainted with the following errors:
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
CONCLUDING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE DID NOT
COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FIXING THE
AMOUNT OF MONTHLY SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE
GRANTED TO PETITIONERS CHILDREN AT A
MEASLEY P5,000.00 PER CHILD.
I.
RESPONDENT COURT IGNORED EVIDENCE ON RECORD
OF THE FINANCIAL INCAPACITY OF RICA AND RINAS
PARENTS IN DEFAULT OF WHOM THE OBLIGATION TO
GIVE SUPPORT DEVOLVES ON THE GRANDFATHER.
II.
IT BEING ESTABLISHED THAT THE PERSON OBLIGED
TO GIVE SUPPORT GRANDFATHER DON PACO IS
UNDOUBTEDLY CAPABLE OF GIVING THE AMOUNT
DEMANDED, RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN NOT
HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT JUDGE ACTED WITH
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN FIXING AN AMOUNT
OF SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE THAT IS OBVIOUSLY
INADEQUATE TO SUPPORT THE EDUCATIONAL
REQUIREMENTS OF THE RECIPIENTS.[27]
At the time of the filing of the present Petition, it is alleged that Rica
had already entered Rutgers University in New Jersey with a budget of
US$12,500.00 for academic year 1994-1995. She was able to obtain a
tuition fee grant of US$1,190.00 and a Federal Stafford loan from
the US government in the amount of US$2,615.00. [28] In order to defray
the remaining balance of Ricas education for said school year,
petitioner claims that she had to secure a loan under the Federal Direct
Student Loan Program.
Meanwhile, Rina entered CW Post, Long Island University,
where she was expected to spend US$20,000.00 for the school year
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
1994-1995. She was given a financial grant of US$6,000.00, federal
work study assistance of US$2,000.00, and a Federal Stafford loan of
US$2,625.00.[29] Again, petitioner obtained a loan to cover the
remainder of Rinas school budget for the year.
Petitioner concedes that under the law, the obligation to furnish
support to Rica and Rina should be first imposed upon their
parents. She contends, however, that the records of this case
demonstrate her as well as respondent Federicos inability to give the
support needed for Rica and Rinas college education. Consequently,
the obligation to provide support devolves upon respondent Francisco
being the grandfather of Rica and Rina.
Petitioner also maintains that as respondent Francisco has the financial
resources to help defray the cost of Rica and Rinas schooling, the Court
of Appeals then erred in sustaining the trial courts Order directing
respondent Federico to pay Rica and Rinathe amount of
award P5,000.00 each as monthly support pendente lite.
On the other hand, respondent Francisco argues that the trial court
correctly declared that petitioner and respondent Federico should be
the ones to provide the support needed by their twin daughters
pursuant to Article 199 of the Family Code. He also maintains that
aside from the financial package availed of by Rica and Rina in the
form of state tuition aid grant, work study program and federal student
loan program, petitioner herself was eligible for, and had availed
herself of, the federal parent loan program based on her income and
properties in the USA. He, likewise, insists that assuming he could be
held liable for support, he has the option to fulfill the obligation either
by paying the support or receiving and maintaining in the dwelling
here in the Philippines the person claiming support. [30] As an additional
point to be considered by this Court, he posits the argument that
because petitioner and her twin daughters are now US citizens, they
cannot invoke the Family Code provisions on support as [l]aws relating
to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even
though living abroad.[31]
Respondent Federico, for his part, continues to deny having sired Rica
and Rina by reiterating the grounds he had previously raised before the
trial court. Like his father, respondent Federico argues that assuming
he is indeed the father of the twin sisters, he has the option under the
law as to how he would provide support. Lastly, he assents with the
declaration of the trial court and the Court of Appeals that the parents
of a child should primarily bear the burden of providing support to their
offspring.
The petition is meritorious.
As a preliminary matter, we deem it necessary to briefly discuss the
essence of support pendente lite. The pertinent portion of the Rules of
Court on the matter provides:
Rule 61
SUPPORT PENDENTE LITE
SECTION 1. Application.- At the commencement of the
proper action or proceeding, or at any time prior to
the judgment or final order, a verified application for
support pendente lite may be filed by any party
stating the grounds for the claim and the financial
conditions of both parties, and accompanied by
affidavits, depositions or other authentic documents in
support thereof.
xxxx
SEC. 4. Order.- The court shall determine provisionally
the pertinent facts, and shall render such orders as
justice and equity may require, having due regard to
the probable outcome of the case and such other
circumstances as may aid in the proper resolution of
the question involved. If the application is granted,
the court shall fix the amount of money to be
provisionally paid or such other forms of support as
should be provided, taking into account the
necessities of the applicant and the resources or
means of the adverse party, and the terms of
payment or mode for providing the support. If the
application is denied, the principal case shall be tried
and decided as early as possible.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
Under this provision, a court may temporarily grant
support pendente lite prior to the rendition of judgment or final
order. Because of its provisional nature, a court does not need to delve
fully into the merits of the case before it can settle an application for
this relief. All that a court is tasked to do is determine the kind and
amount of evidence which may suffice to enable it to justly resolve the
application. It is enough that the facts be established by affidavits or
other documentary evidence appearing in the record. [32]
After the hearings conducted on this matter as well as the evidence
presented, we find that petitioner was able to establish, by prima
facie proof, the filiation of her twin daughters to private respondents
and the twins entitlement to support pendente lite.In the words of the
trial court
By and large, the status of the twins as children of
Federico cannot be denied. They had maintained
constant communication with their
grandfather Francisco. As a matter of fact, respondent
Francisco admitted having wrote several letters to
Rica and Rina (Exhs. A, B, C, D, E, F, G, G-1 to G-
30). In the said letters, particularly at the bottom
thereof, respondent Francisco wrote the names of Rica
and Rina Delgado. He therefore was very well aware
that they bear the surname Delgado. Likewise, he
referred to himself in his letters as either Lolo Paco or
Daddy Paco. In his letter of October 13, 1989 (Exh. G-
21), he said as the grandfather, am extending a
financial help of US$1,000.00. On top of this,
respondent Federico even gave the twins a treat
to Hongkong during their visit to
the Philippines. Indeed, respondents, by their
actuations, have shown beyond doubt that the twins
are the children of Federico.[33]
Having addressed the issue of the propriety of the trial courts grant of
support pendente lite in favor of Rica and Rina, the next question is
who should be made liable for said award.
The pertinent provision of the Family Code on this subject states:
ART. 199. Whenever two or more persons are
obliged to give support, the liability shall devolve
upon the following persons in the order herein
provided:
(1) The spouse;
(2) The descendants in the nearest degree;
(3) The ascendants in the nearest degree;
and
(4) The brothers and sisters.
An eminent author on the subject explains that the
obligation to give support rests principally on those more closely
related to the recipient. However, the more remote relatives may
be held to shoulder the responsibility should the claimant prove
that those who are called upon to provide support do not have the
means to do so.[34]
In this case, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
held respondent Federico liable to provide monthly
support pendente lite in the total amount of P10,000.00 by taking
into consideration his supposed income of P30,000.00
to P40,000.00 per month. We are, however, unconvinced as to the
veracity of this ground relied upon by the trial court and the Court
of Appeals.
It is a basic procedural edict that questions of fact cannot be
the proper subject of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule finds a more stringent application
where the Court of Appeals upholds the findings of fact of the trial
court; in such a situation, this Court, as the final arbiter, is generally
bound to adopt the facts as determined by the appellate and the lower
courts. This rule, however, is not ironclad as it admits of the following
recognized exceptions: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave
abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting;
(6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both basket. It is a very demanding letter, that is
the appellant and the appellee; (7)when the findings are contrary to what I do not like at all.
that of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the ATTY. LOPEZ:
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and
reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings Q: It is stated in this letter that I am making this
of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and request to you and not to your son, Rico, for
contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of reasons we both are aware of. Do you know
Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by what reason that is?
the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different
conclusion.[35] The case at bar falls within the seventh and eleventh A: Yes. The reason is that my son do not have
exceptions. fix employment and do not have fix
salary and income and they want to
The trial court gave full credence to respondent Federicos allegation in depend on the lolo.
his Answer[36] and his testimony[37] as to the amount of his income. We
have, however, reviewed the records of this case and found them xxxx
bereft of evidence to support his assertions regarding his employment
and his earning. Notably, he was even required by petitioners counsel Q: Would you have any knowledge if Federico owns a
to present to the court his income tax return and yet the records of this house and lot?
case do not bear a copy of said document. [38] This, to our mind,
severely undermines the truthfulness of respondent Federicos A: Not that I know. I do not think he has
assertion with respect to his financial status and capacity to provide anything.
support to Rica and Rina.
Q: How about a car?
In addition, respondent Francisco himself stated in the witness stand
that as far as he knew, his son, respondent Federico did not own A: Well, his car is owned by my company.[39]
anything
Respondent Federico himself admitted in court that he had no property
Atty. Lopez: of his own, thus:

I have here another letter under the letter head of Mr. Q: You also mentioned that you are staying at
& Mrs. Dany Mangonon, dated October 19, Mayflower Building and you further earlier testified
1991 addressed to Mr. Francisco Delgado signed by that this building belongs to Citadel Corporation. Do
sincerely, Danny Mangonon, can you remember. you confirm that?

xxxx A: Yes, sir.

WITNESS: Q: What car are you driving, Mr. Witness?

A: I do remember this letter because it really irritated A: I am driving a lancer, sir.

me so much that I threw it away in a waste

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
Q: What car, that registered in the name of the
corporation?
A: In the corporation, sir.
Q: What corporation is that?
A: Citadel Commercial, Inc., sir.
Q: What properties, if any, are registered in your
name, do you have any properties, Mr. Witness?
A: None, sir.[40] (Emphasis supplied.)
Meanwhile, respondent Francisco asserts that petitioner possessed the
capacity to give support to her twin daughters as she has gainful
employment in the USA. He even went as far as to state that
petitioners income abroad, when converted to Philippine peso, was
much higher than that received by a trial court judge here in
the Philippines. In addition, he claims that as she qualified for the
federal parent loan program, she could very well support the college
studies of her daughters.
We are unconvinced. Respondent Franciscos assertion that petitioner
had the means to support her daughters education is belied by the fact
that petitioner was even forced by her financial status in the USA to
secure the loan from the federal government. If petitioner were really
making enough money abroad, she certainly would not have felt the
need to apply for said loan. The fact that petitioner was compelled to
take out a loan is enough indication that she did not have enough
money to enable her to send her daughters to college by
herself. Moreover, even Rica and Rina themselves were forced by the
circumstances they found themselves in to secure loans under their
names so as not to delay their entrance to college.
There being prima facie evidence showing that petitioner and
respondent Federico are the parents of Rica and Rina, petitioner and
respondent Federico are primarily charged to support their childrens
college education. In view however of their incapacities, the obligation
to furnish said support should be borne by respondent Francisco. Under
Article 199 of the Family Code, respondent Francisco, as the next
immediate relative of Rica and Rina, is tasked to give support to his
granddaughters in default of their parents. It bears stressing that
respondent Francisco is the majority stockholder and Chairman of the
Board of Directors of Citadel Commercial, Incorporated, which owns
and manages twelve gasoline stations, substantial real estate, and is
engaged in shipping, brokerage and freight forwarding. He is also the
majority stockholder and Chairman of the Board of Directors of Citadel
Shipping which does business with Hyundai of Korea. Apart from these,
he also owns the Citadel Corporation which, in turn, owns real
properties in different parts of the country. He is likewise the Chairman
of the Board of Directors of Isla Communication Co. and he owns
shares of stocks of Citadel Holdings. In addition, he owns real
properties here and abroad.[41] It having been established that
respondent Francisco has the financial means to support his
granddaughters education, he, in lieu of petitioner and respondent
Federico, should be held liable for support pendente lite.
Anent respondent Francisco and Federicos claim that they have the
option under the law as to how they could perform their obligation to
support Rica and Rina, respondent Francisco insists that Rica
and Rina should move here to the Philippines to study in any of the
local universities. After all, the quality of education here, according to
him, is at par with that offered in the USA. The applicable provision of
the Family Code on this subject provides:
Art. 204. The person obliged to give support shall
have the option to fulfill the obligation either by
paying the allowance fixed, or by receiving and
maintaining in the family dwelling the person who has
a right to receive support. The latter alternative
cannot be availed of in case there is a moral or legal
obstacle thereto.
Under the abovecited provision, the obligor is given the choice as to
how he could dispense his obligation to give support. Thus, he may
give the determined amount of support to the claimant or he may
allow the latter to stay in the family dwelling. The second option
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

cannot be availed of in case there are circumstances, legal or moral, The issue of the applicability of Article 15 of the Civil Code on
which should be considered. petitioner and her twin daughters raised by respondent Francisco is
best left for the resolution of the trial court. After all, in case it would
be resolved that Rica and Rina are not entitled to
support pendente lite, the court shall then order the return of the
amounts already paid with legal interest from the dates of actual
In this case, this Court believes that respondent Francisco
payment.[44]
could not avail himself of the second option. From the records, we
gleaned that prior to the commencement of this action, the
relationship between respondent Francisco, on one hand, and
petitioner and her twin daughters, on the other, was indeed quite WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Petition
pleasant. The correspondences exchanged among them expressed is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
profound feelings of thoughtfulness and concern for one anothers well- 20 March 1996 and Resolution dated 16 May 1996 affirming the Order
being. The photographs presented by petitioner as part of her exhibits dated 12 September 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
presented a seemingly typical family celebrating kinship. All of these, 149, Makati, fixing the amount of support pendente lite to P5,000.00
however, are now things of the past. With the filing of this case, and for Rebecca Angela and Regina Isabel, are hereby MODIFIED in that
the allegations hurled at one another by the parties, the relationships respondent Francisco Delgado is hereby held liable for
among the parties had certainly been affected. Particularly difficult for support pendente lite in the amount to be determined by the trial court
Rica and Rina must be the fact that those who they had considered pursuant to this Decision. Let the records of this case be remanded to
and claimed as family denied having any familial relationship with the trial court for the determination of the proper amount of
them. Given all these, we could not see Rica and Rina moving back support pendente lite for Rebecca Angela and Regina Isabel as well as
here in the Philippines in the company of those who have disowned the arrearages due them in accordance with this Decision within ten
them. (10) days from receipt hereof. Concomitantly, the trial court is directed
to proceed with the trial of the main case and the immediate resolution
of the same with deliberate dispatch. The RTC Judge, Branch
149, Makati, is further directed to submit a report of his compliance
Finally, as to the amount of support pendente lite, we take our bearings
with the directive regarding the support pendente lite within ten (10)
from the provision of the law mandating the amount of support to be
days from compliance thereof.
proportionate to the resources or means of the giver and to the
necessities of the recipient. [42] Guided by this principle, we hold
respondent Francisco liable for half of the amount of school expenses
incurred by Rica and Rina as support pendente lite. As established by SO ORDERED.
petitioner, respondent Francisco has the financial resources to pay this
amount given his various business endeavors.

Considering, however, that the twin sisters may have already been
done with their education by the time of the promulgation of this
decision, we deem it proper to award support pendente lite in
arrears[43] to be computed from the time they entered college until they
had finished their respective studies.

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
SPOUSES PRUDENCIO and G.R. No. 163209
FILOMENA LIM,
Petitioners,
- versus
MA. CHERYL S. LIM,
for herself and on behalf of
her minor children LESTER
EDWARD S. LIM, CANDICE
GRACE S. LIM, and MARIANO Promulgated:
S. LIM, III,
Respondents.
The Case
For review[1] is the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals, dated 28
April 2003, ordering petitioners Prudencio and Filomena Lim
(petitioners) to provide legal support to respondents Cheryl, Lester
Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III, all surnamed Lim
(respondents).
The Facts
In 1979, respondent Cheryl S. Lim (Cheryl) married Edward Lim
(Edward), son of petitioners. Cheryl bore Edward three children,
respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III. Cheryl,
Edward and their children resided at the house of petitioners in
Forbes Park, Makati City, together with Edwards ailing
grandmother, Chua Giak and her husband Mariano Lim (Mariano).
Edwards family business, which provided him with a monthly salary
of P6,000, shouldered the family expenses. Cheryl had no steady
source of income.
On 14 October 1990, Cheryl abandoned the Forbes Park
residence, bringing the children with her (then all minors), after a
violent confrontation with Edward whom she caught with the in-
house midwife of Chua Giak in what the trial court described a very
compromising situation.[3]
Cheryl, for herself and her children, sued petitioners, Edward, Chua
Giak and Mariano (defendants) in the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 140 (trial court) for support. The trial court ordered
Edward to provide monthly support of P6,000pendente lite.[4]
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On 31 January 1996, the trial court rendered judgment
ordering Edward and petitioners to jointly provide P40,000 monthly
support to respondents, with Edward shouldering P6,000 and
petitioners the balance of P34,000 subject to Chua Giaks subsidiary
liability.[5]
The defendants sought reconsideration, questioning their
liability. The trial court, while denying reconsideration, clarified that
petitioners and Chua Giak were held jointly liable with Edward
because of the latters inability x x x to give sufficient support x x x.
[6]
Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals assailing, among
others, their liability to support respondents. Petitioners argued
that while Edwards income is insufficient, the law itself sanctions
its effects by providing that legal support should be in keeping with
the financial capacity of the family under Article 194 of the Civil
Code, as amended by Executive Order No. 209 (The Family Code of
the Philippines).[7]
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision dated 28 April 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court. On the issue material to this appeal, that is, whether
there is basis to hold petitioners, as Edwards parents, liable with
him to support respondents, the Court of Appeals held:
The law on support under Article 195 of the Family
Code is clear on this matter. Parents and their
legitimate children are obliged to mutually support
one another and this obligation extends down to
the legitimate grandchildren and great
grandchildren.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
In connection with this provision, Article 200
paragraph (3) of the Family Code clearly provides
that should the person obliged to give support
does not have sufficient means to satisfy all claims,
the other persons enumerated in Article 199 in its
order shall provide the necessary support. This is
because the closer the relationship of the relatives,
the stronger the tie that binds them. Thus, the
obligation to support is imposed first upon the
shoulders of the closer relatives and only in their
default is the obligation moved to the next nearer
relatives and so on.[8]
Petitioners sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied
their motion in the Resolution dated 12 April 2004.
Hence, this petition.
The Issue
The issue is whether petitioners are concurrently liable with
Edward to provide support to respondents.
The Ruling of the Court
We rule in the affirmative. However, we modify the appealed
judgment by limiting petitioners liability to the amount of monthly
support needed by respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and
Mariano III only.
Petitioners Liable to Provide Support
but only to their Grandchildren
By statutory[9] and jurisprudential mandate,[10] the liability of
ascendants to provide legal support to their descendants is beyond
cavil. Petitioners themselves admit as much they limit their petition
to the narrow question of when their liability is triggered,
not if they are liable. Relying on provisions[11] found in Title IX of the
Civil Code, as amended, on Parental Authority, petitioners theorize
that their liability is activated only upon default of parental
authority, conceivably either by its termination [12] or
suspension [13]
during the childrens minority. Because at the time
respondents sued for support, Cheryl and Edward exercised
parental authority over their children, [14] petitioners submit that the
obligation to support the lattersoffspring ends with them.
Neither the text of the law nor the teaching of jurisprudence
supports this severe constriction of the scope of familial obligation
to give support. In the first place, the governing text are the
relevant provisions in Title VIII of the Civil Code, as amended, on
Support, not the provisions in Title IX on Parental Authority. While
both areas share a common ground in that parental authority
encompasses the obligation to provide legal support, [15] they differ
in other concerns including the duration of the obligation and
its concurrence among relatives of differing degrees. [16] Thus,
although the obligation to provide support arising from parental
authority ends upon the emancipation of the child,[17] the same
obligation arising from spousal and general familial ties ideally
lasts during the obligee's lifetime.. Also, while parental authority
under Title IX (and the correlative parental rights) pertains to
parents, passing to ascendants only upon its termination or
suspension, the obligation to provide legal support passes on to
ascendants not only upon default of the parents but also for the
latters inability to provide sufficient support. As we observed in
another case raising the ancillary issue of an ascendants obligation
to give support in light of the fathers sufficient means:
Professor Pineda is of the view that grandchildren
cannot demand support directly from their
grandparents if they have parents (ascendants of
nearest degree) who are capable of supporting
them. This is so because we have to follow the
order of support under Art. 199. We agree with this
view.
xxxx
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
There is no showing that private respondent
is without means to support his son; neither is
there any evidence to prove that petitioner, as the
paternal grandmother, was willing to voluntarily
provide for her grandson's legal support. x x
x[18] (Emphasis supplied; internal citations omitted)
Here, there is no question that Cheryl is unable to discharge her
obligation to provide sufficient legal support to her children, then
all school-bound. It is also undisputed that the amount of support
Edward is able to give to respondents, P6,000 a month, is
insufficient to meet respondents basic needs. This inability of
Edward and Cheryl to sufficiently provide for their children shifts a
portion of their obligation to the ascendants in the nearest degree,
both in the paternal (petitioners) and maternal[19]lines, following
the ordering in Article 199. To hold otherwise, and thus subscribe to
petitioners theory, is to sanction the anomalous scenario of
tolerating extreme material deprivation of children because of
parental inability to give adequate support even if ascendants one
degree removed are more than able to fill the void.
However, petitioners partial concurrent obligation extends only to
their descendants as this word is commonly understood to refer to
relatives, by blood of lower degree. As petitioners grandchildren by
blood, only respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano
III belong to this category. Indeed, Cheryls right to receive support
from the Lim family extends only to her husband Edward, arising
from their marital bond.[20] Unfortunately, Cheryls share from the
amount of monthly support the trial court awarded cannot be
determined from the records. Thus, we are constrained to remand
the case to the trial court for this limited purpose. [21]
Petitioners Precluded from Availing
of the Alternative Option Under
Article 204 of the Civil Code, as Amended
As an alternative proposition, petitioners wish to avail of the option
in Article 204 of the Civil Code, as amended, and pray that they be
allowed to fulfill their obligation by maintaining respondents at
petitioners Makati residence. The option is unavailable to
petitioners.
The application of Article 204 which provides that
The person obliged to give support shall have the
option to fulfill the obligation either by paying the
allowance fixed, or by receiving and maintaining in
the family dwelling the person who has a right to
receive support. The latter alternative cannot
be availed of in case there is
a moral or legal obstacle thereto. (Emphasis
supplied)
is subject to its exception clause. Here, the persons entitled to
receive support are petitioners grandchildren and daughter-in-law.
Granting petitioners the option in Article 204 will secure to the
grandchildren a well-provided future; however, it will also force
Cheryl to return to the house which, for her, is the scene of her
husbands infidelity. While not rising to the level of a legal obstacle,
as indeed, Cheryls charge against Edward for concubinage did not
prosper for insufficient evidence, her steadfast insistence on its
occurrence amounts to a moral impediment bringing the case
within the ambit of the exception clause of Article 204, precluding
its application.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision of
the Court of Appeals, dated 28 April 2003, and its Resolution dated
12 April 2004 with the MODIFICATION that petitioners Prudencio
and Filomena Lim are liable to provide support only to
respondents Lester Edward, Candice Grace and Mariano III, all
surnamed Lim. We REMAND the case to the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 140, for further proceedings consistent with
this ruling.
SO ORDERED.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
G.R. No. 182367 December 15, 2010
CHERRYL B. DOLINA, Petitioner,
vs.
GLENN D. VALLECERA, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case is about a mothers claim for temporary support of an
unacknowledged child, which she sought in an action for the issuance
of a temporary protection order that she brought against the supposed
father.
The Facts and the Case
In February 2008 petitioner Cherryl B. Dolina filed a petition with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary protection order against
respondent Glenn D. Vallecera before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Tacloban City in P.O. 2008-02-071 for alleged woman and child abuse
under Republic Act (R.A.) 9262. 2 In filling out the blanks in the pro-
forma complaint, Dolina added a handwritten prayer for financial
support3 from Vallecera for their supposed child. She based her prayer
on the latters Certificate of Live Birth which listed Vallecera as the
childs father. The petition also asked the RTC to order Philippine
Airlines, Valleceras employer, to withhold from his pay such amount of
support as the RTC may deem appropriate.
Vallecera opposed the petition. He claimed that Dolinas petition was
essentially one for financial support rather than for protection against
woman and child abuses; that he was not the childs father; that the
signature appearing on the childs Certificate of Live Birth is not his;
that the petition is a harassment suit intended to force him to
acknowledge the child as his and give it financial support; and that
Vallecera has never lived nor has been living with Dolina, rendering
unnecessary the issuance of a protection order against him.
On March 13, 20084 the RTC dismissed the petition after hearing since
no prior judgment exists establishing the filiation of Dolinas son and
granting him the right to support as basis for an order to compel the
giving of such support. Dolina filed a motion for reconsideration but the
RTC denied it in its April 4, 2008 Order, 5 with an admonition that she
first file a petition for compulsory recognition of her child as a
prerequisite for support. Unsatisfied, Dolina filed the present petition
for review directly with this Court.
The Issue Presented
The sole issue presented in this case is whether or not the RTC
correctly dismissed Dolinas action for temporary protection and
denied her application for temporary support for her child.
The Courts Ruling
Dolina evidently filed the wrong action to obtain support for her child.
The object of R.A. 9262 under which she filed the case is the protection
and safety of women and children who are victims of abuse or
violence.6 Although the issuance of a protection order against the
respondent in the case can include the grant of legal support for the
wife and the child, this assumes that both are entitled to a protection
order and to legal support.
Dolina of course alleged that Vallecera had been abusing her and her
child.1avvphil But it became apparent to the RTC upon hearing that
this was not the case since, contrary to her claim, neither she nor her
child ever lived with Vallecera. As it turned out, the true object of her
action was to get financial support from Vallecera for her child, her
claim being that he is the father. He of course vigorously denied this.
To be entitled to legal support, petitioner must, in proper action, first
establish the filiation of the child, if the same is not admitted or
acknowledged. Since Dolinas demand for support for her son is based
on her claim that he is Valleceras illegitimate child, the latter is not
entitled to such support if he had not acknowledged him, until Dolina
shall have proved his relation to him.7 The childs remedy is to file
through her mother a judicial action against Vallecera for compulsory
recognition.8 If filiation is beyond question, support follows as matter of
obligation.9 In short, illegitimate children are entitled to support and
successional rights but their filiation must be duly proved. 10
Dolinas remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action against
Vallecera for compulsory recognition in order to establish filiation and
then demand support. Alternatively, she may directly file an action for
support, where the issue of compulsory recognition may be integrated
and resolved.11
It must be observed, however, that the RTC should not have dismissed
the entire case based solely on the lack of any judicial declaration of
filiation between Vallecera and Dolinas child since the main issue
remains to be the alleged violence committed by Vallecera against
Dolina and her child and whether they are entitled to protection. But of
course, this matter is already water under the bridge since Dolina
failed to raise this error on review. This omission lends credence to the
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

conclusion of the RTC that the real purpose of the petition is to obtain
support from Vallecera.
While the Court is mindful of the best interests of the child in cases
involving paternity and filiation, it is just as aware of the disturbance
that unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace of the
putative fathers legitimate family. 12 Vallecera disowns Dolinas child
and denies having a hand in the preparation and signing of its
certificate of birth. This issue has to be resolved in an appropriate case.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the
Regional Trial Court of Tacloban Citys Order dated March 13, 2008 that
dismissed petitioner Cherryl B. Dolinas action in P.O. 2008-02-07, and
Order dated April 4, 2008, denying her motion for reconsideration
dated March 28, 2008. SO ORDERED.

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
G.R. Nos. 175279-80 June 5, 2013
SUSAN LIM-LUA, Petitioner,
vs.
DANILO Y. LUA, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, petitioner
seeks to set aside the Decision 1 dated April 20, 2006 and
Resolution2 dated October 26, 2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dismissing her petition for contempt (CA-G.R. SP No. 01154) and
granting respondent's petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No.
01315).
The factual background is as follows:
On September 3, 2003,3 petitioner Susan Lim-Lua filed an action
for the declaration of nullity of her marriage with respondent
Danilo Y. Lua, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-29346 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 14.
In her prayer for support pendente lite for herself and her two
children, petitioner sought the amount ofP500,000.00 as monthly
support, citing respondents huge earnings from salaries and
dividends in several companies and businesses here and abroad. 4
After due hearing, Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. issued an
Order5 dated March 31, 2004 granting support pendente lite, as
follows:
From the evidence already adduced by the parties, the amount of
Two Hundred Fifty (P250,000.00) Thousand Pesos would be
sufficient to take care of the needs of the plaintiff. This amount
excludes the One hundred thirty-five (P135,000.00) Thousand
Pesos for medical attendance expenses needed by plaintiff for the
operation of both her eyes which is demandable upon the conduct
of such operation. The amounts already extended to the two (2)
children, being a commendable act of defendant, should be
continued by him considering the vast financial resources at his
disposal.
According to Art. 203 of the Family Code, support is demandable
from the time plaintiff needed the said support but is payable only
from the date of judicial demand. Since the instant complaint was
filed on 03 September 2003, the amount of Two Hundred Fifty
(P250,000.00) Thousand should be paid by defendant to plaintiff
retroactively to such date until the hearing of the support pendente
lite. P250,000.00 x 7 corresponding to the seven (7) months that
lapsed from September, 2003 to March 2004 would tantamount to
a total of One Million Seven Hundred Fifty (P1,750,000.00)
Thousand Pesos. Thereafter, starting the month of April 2004, until
otherwise ordered by this Court, defendant is ordered to pay a
monthly support of Two Hundred Fifty Thousand (P250,000.00)
Pesos payable within the first five (5) days of each corresponding
month pursuant to the third paragraph of Art. 203 of the Family
Code of the Philippines. The monthly support of P250,000.00 is
without prejudice to any increase or decrease thereof that this
Court may grant plaintiff as the circumstances may warrant i.e.
depending on the proof submitted by the parties during the
proceedings for the main action for support.6
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration,7 asserting that
petitioner is not entitled to spousal support considering that she
does not maintain for herself a separate dwelling from their
children and respondent has continued to support the family for
their sustenance and well-being in accordance with familys social
and financial standing. As to the P250,000.00 granted by the trial
court as monthly support pendente lite, as well as
theP1,750,000.00 retroactive support, respondent found it
unconscionable and beyond the intendment of the law for not
having considered the needs of the respondent.
In its May 13, 2004 Order, the trial court stated that the March 31,
2004 Order had become final and executory since respondents
motion for reconsideration is treated as a mere scrap of paper for
violation of the threeday notice period under Section 4, Rule 15 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, and therefore did
not interrupt the running of the period to appeal. Respondent was
given ten (10) days to show cause why he should not be held in
contempt of the court for disregarding the March 31, 2004 order
granting support pendente lite.8
His second motion for reconsideration having been denied,
respondent filed a petition for certiorari in the CA.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
On April 12, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision, 9 finding merit in
respondents contention that the trial court gravely abused its
discretion in granting P250,000.00 monthly support to petitioner
without evidence to prove his actual income. The said court thus
decreed:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, this petition is given
due course. The assailed Orders dated March 31, 2004, May 13,
2004, June 4, 2004 and June 18, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 14, Cebu City issued in Civil Case No. CEB No. 29346
entitled "Susan Lim Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua" are hereby nullified
and set aside and instead a new one is entered ordering herein
petitioner:
a) to pay private respondent a monthly support pendente
lite of P115,000.00 beginning the month of April 2005 and
every month thereafter within the first five (5) days
thereof;
b) to pay the private respondent the amount
of P115,000.00 a month multiplied by the number of
months starting from September 2003 until March 2005
less than the amount supposedly given by petitioner to the
private respondent as her and their two (2) children
monthly support; and
c) to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.10
Neither of the parties appealed this decision of the CA. In a
Compliance11 dated June 28, 2005, respondent attached a copy of
a check he issued in the amount of P162,651.90 payable to
petitioner. Respondent explained that, as decreed in the CA
decision, he deducted from the amount of support in arrears
(September 3, 2003 to March 2005) ordered by the CA
-- P2,185,000.00 -- plus P460,000.00 (April, May, June and July
2005), totalingP2,645,000.00, the advances given by him to his
children and petitioner in the sum of P2,482,348.16 (with attached
photocopies of receipts/billings).
In her Comment to Compliance with Motion for Issuance of a Writ
of Execution,12 petitioner asserted that none of the expenses
deducted by respondent may be chargeable as part of the monthly
support contemplated by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740.
On September 27, 2005, the trial court issued an Order 13 granting
petitioners motion for issuance of a writ of execution as it rejected
respondents interpretation of the CA decision. Respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration and subsequently also filed a motion for
inhibition of Judge Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr. On November 25,
2005, Judge Yrastorza, Sr. issued an Order 14 denying both motions.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, both motions are
DENIED. Since a second motion for reconsideration is prohibited
under the Rules, this denial has attained finality; let, therefore, a
writ of execution be issued in favor of plaintiff as against defendant
for the accumulated support in arrears pendente lite.
Notify both parties of this Order.
SO ORDERED.15
Since respondent still failed and refused to pay the support in
arrears pendente lite, petitioner filed in the CA a Petition for
Contempt of Court with Damages, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
01154 ("Susan Lim Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua"). Respondent, on the
other hand, filed CA-G.R. SP No. 01315, a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court ("Danilo Y. Lua versus Hon.
Raphael B. Yrastorza, Sr., in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
Regional Trial Court of Cebu, Branch 14, and Susan Lim Lua"). The
two cases were consolidated.
By Decision dated April 20, 2006, the CA set aside the assailed
orders of the trial court, as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
a) DISMISSING, for lack of merit, the case of Petition for
Contempt of Court with Damages filed by Susan Lim Lua
against Danilo Y. Lua with docket no. SP. CA-GR No. 01154;
b) GRANTING Danilo Y. Luas Petition for Certiorari docketed
as SP. CA-GR No. 01315. Consequently, the assailed Orders
dated 27 September 2005 and 25 November 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Cebu City issued in Civil
Case No. CEB-29346 entitled "Susan Lim Lua versus Danilo
Y. Lua, are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE, and instead a
new one is entered:
i. ORDERING the deduction of the amount of
PhP2,482,348.16 plus 946,465.64, or a total of
PhP3,428,813.80 from the current total support in
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
arrears of Danilo Y. Lua to his wife, Susan Lim Lua
and their two (2) children;
ii. ORDERING Danilo Y. Lua to resume payment of
his monthly support of PhP115,000.00 pesos
starting from the time payment of this amount was
deferred by him subject to the deductions
aforementioned.
iii. DIRECTING the issuance of a permanent writ of
preliminary injunction.
SO ORDERED.16
The appellate court said that the trial court should not have
completely disregarded the expenses incurred by respondent
consisting of the purchase and maintenance of the two cars,
payment of tuition fees, travel expenses, and the credit card
purchases involving groceries, dry goods and books, which
certainly inured to the benefit not only of the two children, but
their mother (petitioner) as well. It held that respondents act of
deferring the monthly support adjudged in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740
was not contumacious as it was anchored on valid and justifiable
reasons. Respondent said he just wanted the issue of whether to
deduct his advances be settled first in view of the different
interpretation by the trial court of the appellate courts decision in
CA-G.R. SP No. 84740. It also noted the lack of contribution from
the petitioner in the joint obligation of spouses to support their
children.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by
the CA.
Hence, this petition raising the following errors allegedly
committed by the CA:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING
RESPONDENT GUILTY OF INDIRECT CONTEMPT.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THE
DEDUCTION OF THE AMOUNT OF PHP2,482,348.16 PLUS
946,465.64, OR A TOTAL OF PHP3,428,813.80 FROM THE
CURRENT TOTAL SUPPORT IN ARREARS OF THE
RESPONDENT TO THE PETITIONER AND THEIR CHILDREN. 17
The main issue is whether certain expenses already incurred by the
respondent may be deducted from the total support in arrears
owing to petitioner and her children pursuant to the Decision dated
April 12, 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740.
The pertinent provision of the Family Code of the Philippines
provides:
Article 194. Support comprises everything indispensable for
sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance, education and
transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in
the preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or training for
some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of
majority. Transportation shall include expenses in going to and
from school, or to and from place of work. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner argues that it was patently erroneous for the CA to have
allowed the deduction of the value of the two cars and their
maintenance costs from the support in arrears, as these items are
not indispensable to the sustenance of the family or in keeping
them alive. She points out that in the Decision in CA-G.R. SP No.
84740, the CA already considered the said items which it deemed
chargeable to respondent, while the monthly support pendente lite
(P115,000.00) was fixed on the basis of the documentary evidence
of respondents alleged income from various businesses and
petitioners testimony that she needed P113,000.00 for the
maintenance of the household and other miscellaneous expenses
excluding the P135,000.00 medical attendance expenses of
petitioner.
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that disallowing the
subject deductions would result in unjust enrichment, thus making
him pay for the same obligation twice. Since petitioner and the
children resided in one residence, the groceries and dry goods
purchased by the children using respondents credit card,
totallingP594,151.58 for the period September 2003 to June 2005
were not consumed by the children alone but shared with their
mother. As to the Volkswagen Beetle and BMW 316i respondent
bought for his daughter Angelli Suzanne Lua and Daniel Ryan Lua,
respectively, these, too, are to be considered advances for support,
in keeping with the financial capacity of the family. Respondent
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

stressed that being children of parents belonging to the upper-class
society, Angelli and Daniel Ryan had never in their entire life
commuted from one place to another, nor do they eat their meals
at "carinderias". Hence, the cars and their maintenance are
indispensable to the childrens day-to-day living, the value of which
were properly deducted from the arrearages in support pendente
lite ordered by the trial and appellate courts.
As a matter of law, the amount of support which those related by
marriage and family relationship is generally obliged to give each
other shall be in proportion to the resources or means of the giver
and to the needs of the recipient.18 Such support comprises
everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing,
medical attendance, education and transportation, in keeping with
the financial capacity of the family.
Upon receipt of a verified petition for declaration of absolute nullity
of void marriage or for annulment of voidable marriage, or for legal
separation, and at any time during the proceeding, the court, motu
proprio or upon verified application of any of the parties, guardian
or designated custodian, may temporarily grant support pendente
lite prior to the rendition of judgment or final order. 19 Because of its
provisional nature, a court does not need to delve fully into the
merits of the case before it can settle an application for this relief.
All that a court is tasked to do is determine the kind and amount of
evidence which may suffice to enable it to justly resolve the
application. It is enough that the facts be established by affidavits
or other documentary evidence appearing in the record.20
In this case, the amount of monthly support pendente lite for
petitioner and her two children was determined after due hearing
and submission of documentary evidence by the parties. Although
the amount fixed by the trial court was reduced on appeal, it is
clear that the monthly support pendente lite of P115,000.00
ordered by the CA was intended primarily for the sustenance of
petitioner and her children, e.g., food, clothing, salaries of drivers
and house helpers, and other household expenses. Petitioners
testimony also mentioned the cost of regular therapy for her
scoliosis and vitamins/medicines.
ATTY. ZOSA:
xxxx
Q How much do you spend for your food and your two (2) children
every month?
A Presently, Sir?
ATTY. ZOSA:
Yes.
A For the food alone, I spend not over P40,000.00 to P50,000.00 a
month for the food alone.
xxxx
ATTY. ZOSA:
Q What other expenses do you incur in living in that place?
A The normal household and the normal expenses for a family to
have a decent living, Sir.
Q How much other expenses do you incur?
WITNESS:
A For other expenses, is around over a P100,000.00, Sir.
Q Why do you incur that much amount?
A For the clothing for the three (3) of us, for the vitamins and
medicines. And also I am having a special therapy to straighten my
back because I am scoliotic. I am advised by the Doctor to hire a
driver, but I cannot still afford it now. Because my eyesight is not
reliable for driving. And I still need another househelp to
accompany me whenever I go marketing because for my age, I
cannot carry anymore heavy loads.
xxxx
ATTY. FLORES:
xxxx
Q On the issue of the food for you and the two (2) children, you
mentioned P40,000.00 to P50,000.00?
A Yes, for the food alone.
Q Okay, what other possible expenses that you would like to
include in those two (2) items? You mentioned of a driver, am I
correct?
A Yes, I might need two (2) drivers, Sir for me and my children.
Q Okay. How much would you like possibly to pay for those two (2)
drivers?
A I think P10,000.00 a month for one (1) driver. So I need two (2)
drivers. And I need another househelp.

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Persons 4th Exam Cases

Q You need another househelp. The househelp nowadays would
charge you something between P3,000.00 toP4,000.00. Thats
quite
A Right now, my househelp is receiving P8,000.00. I need another
which I will give a compensation of P5,000.00.
Q Other than that, do you still have other expenses?
A My clothing.
COURT:
How about the schooling for your children?
WITNESS:
A The schooling is shouldered by my husband, Your Honor.
COURT:
Everything?
A Yes, Your Honor.
xxxx
ATTY. FLORES:
Q Madam witness, let us talk of the present needs. x x x. What
else, what specific need that you would like to add so I can tell my
client, the defendant.
WITNESS:
A I need to have an operation both of my eyes. I also need a
special therapy for my back because I am scoliotic, three (3) times
a week.
Q That is very reasonable. [W]ould you care to please repeat that?
A Therapy for my scoliotic back and then also for the operation
both of my eyes. And I am also taking some vitamins from excel
that will cost P20,000.00 a month.
Q Okay. Lets have piece by piece. Have you asked the Doctor how
much would it cost you for the operation of that scoliotic?
A Yes before because I was already due last year. Before, this eye
will cost P60,000.00 and the other eyesP75,000.00.
Q So for both eyes, you are talking of P60,000.00 plus P75,000.00
is P135,000.00?
A Yes.
xxxx
Q You talk of therapy?
A Yes.
Q So how much is that?
A Around P5,000.00 a week.21
As to the financial capacity of the respondent, it is beyond doubt
that he can solely provide for the subsistence, education,
transportation, health/medical needs and recreational activities of
his children, as well as those of petitioner who was then
unemployed and a full-time housewife. Despite this, respondents
counsel manifested during the same hearing that respondent was
willing to grant the amount of only P75,000.00 as monthly support
pendente lite both for the children and petitioner as spousal
support. Though the receipts of expenses submitted in court
unmistakably show how much respondent lavished on his children,
it appears that the matter of spousal support was a different
matter altogether. Rejecting petitioners prayer for P500,000.00
monthly support and finding the P75,000.00 monthly support
offered by respondent as insufficient, the trial court fixed the
monthly support pendente lite at P250,000.00. However, since the
supposed income in millions of respondent was based merely on
the allegations of petitioner in her complaint and registration
documents of various corporations which respondent insisted are
owned not by him but his parents and siblings, the CA reduced the
amount of support pendente lite to P115,000.00, which ruling was
no longer questioned by both parties.
Controversy between the parties resurfaced when respondents
compliance with the final CA decision indicated that he deducted
from the total amount in arrears (P2,645,000.00) the sum
of P2,482,348.16, representing the value of the two cars for the
children, their cost of maintenance and advances given to
petitioner and his children. Respondent explained that the
deductions were made consistent with the fallo of the CA Decision
in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 ordering him to pay support pendente lite
in arrears less the amount supposedly given by him to petitioner as
her and their two childrens monthly support.
The following is a summary of the subject deductions under
Compliance dated June 28, 2005, duly supported by receipts 22:
Car purchases for Angelli Suzanne - Php1,350,000.00
and Daniel Ryan - 613,472.86
Car Maintenance fees of Angelli - 51,232.50

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Persons 4th Exam Cases

Suzanne Judicial determination of support pendente lite in cases of legal

separation and petitions for declaration of nullity or annulment of
Credit card statements of Daniel Ryan - 348,682.28 marriage are guided by the following provisions of the Rule on
Car Maintenance fees of Daniel Ryan - 118,960.52 Provisional Orders24
Sec. 2. Spousal Support.In determining support for the spouses,
the court may be guided by the following rules:
Php2,482,348.16 (a) In the absence of adequate provisions in a written
After the trial court disallowed the foregoing deductions, agreement between the spouses, the spouses may be
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration further asserting that supported from the properties of the absolute community
the following amounts, likewise with supporting receipts, be or the conjugal partnership.
considered as additional advances given to petitioner and the (b) The court may award support to either spouse in such
children23: amount and for such period of time as the court may deem
just and reasonable based on their standard of living
Medical expenses of Susan Lim-Lua Php 42,450.71
during the marriage.
Dental Expenses of Daniel Ryan 11,500.00 (c) The court may likewise consider the following factors:
(1) whether the spouse seeking support is the custodian of
Travel expenses of Susan Lim-Lua 14,611.15
a child whose circumstances make it appropriate for that
Credit card purchases of Angelli 408,891.08 spouse not to seek outside employment; (2) the time
Suzanne necessary to acquire sufficient education and training to
enable the spouse seeking support to find appropriate
Salon and travel expenses of Angelli 87,112.70
employment, and that spouses future earning capacity; (3)
Suzanne
the duration of the marriage; (4) the comparative financial
School expenses of Daniel Ryan Lua 260,900.00 resources of the spouses, including their comparative
earning abilities in the labor market; (5) the needs and
Cash given to Daniel and Angelli 121,000.00
obligations of each spouse; (6) the contribution of each
spouse to the marriage, including services rendered in
TOTAL - Php 946,465.64 home-making, child care, education, and career building of
the other spouse; (7) the age and health of the spouses;
(8) the physical and emotional conditions of the spouses;
GRAND TOTAL - Php 3,428,813.80 (9) the ability of the supporting spouse to give support,
The CA, in ruling for the respondent said that all the foregoing taking into account that spouses earning capacity, earned
expenses already incurred by the respondent should, in equity, be and unearned income, assets, and standard of living; and
considered advances which may be properly deducted from the (10) any other factor the court may deem just and
support in arrears due to the petitioner and the two children. Said equitable.
court also noted the absence of petitioners contribution to the (d) The Family Court may direct the deduction of the
joint obligation of support for their children. provisional support from the salary of the spouse.
We reverse in part the decision of the CA.

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
Sec. 3. Child Support.The common children of the spouses shall
be supported from the properties of the absolute community or the
conjugal partnership.
Subject to the sound discretion of the court, either parent or both
may be ordered to give an amount necessary for the support,
maintenance, and education of the child. It shall be in proportion to
the resources or means of the giver and to the necessities of the
recipient.
In determining the amount of provisional support, the court may
likewise consider the following factors: (1) the financial resources
of the custodial and non-custodial parent and those of the child; (2)
the physical and emotional health of the child and his or her
special needs and aptitudes; (3) the standard of living the child has
been accustomed to; (4) the non-monetary contributions that the
parents will make toward the care and well-being of the child.
The Family Court may direct the deduction of the provisional
support from the salary of the parent.
Since the amount of monthly support pendente lite as fixed by the
CA was not appealed by either party, there is no controversy as to
its sufficiency and reasonableness. The dispute concerns the
deductions made by respondent in settling the support in arrears.
On the issue of crediting of money payments or expenses against
accrued support, we find as relevant the following rulings by US
courts.
In Bradford v. Futrell,25 appellant sought review of the decision of
the Circuit Court which found him in arrears with his child support
payments and entered a decree in favor of appellee wife. He
complained that in determining the arrearage figure, he should
have been allowed full credit for all money and items of personal
property given by him to the children themselves, even though he
referred to them as gifts. The Court of Appeals of Maryland ruled
that in the suit to determine amount of arrears due the divorced
wife under decree for support of minor children, the husband
(appellant) was not entitled to credit for checks which he had
clearly designated as gifts, nor was he entitled to credit for an
automobile given to the oldest son or a television set given to the
children. Thus, if the children remain in the custody of the mother,
the father is not entitled to credit for money paid directly to the
children if such was paid without any relation to the decree.
In the absence of some finding of consent by the mother, most
courts refuse to allow a husband to dictate how he will meet the
requirements for support payments when the mode of payment is
fixed by a decree of court. Thus he will not be credited for
payments made when he unnecessarily interposed himself as a
volunteer and made payments direct to the children of his own
accord. Wills v. Baker, 214 S. W. 2d 748 (Mo. 1948); Openshaw v.
Openshaw, 42 P. 2d 191 (Utah 1935). In the latter case the court
said in part: "The payments to the children themselves do not
appear to have been made as payments upon alimony, but were
rather the result of his fatherly interest in the welfare of those
children. We do not believe he should be permitted to charge them
to plaintiff. By so doing he would be determining for Mrs.
Openshaw the manner in which she should expend her allowances.
It is a very easy thing for children to say their mother will not give
them money, especially as they may realize that such a plea is
effective in attaining their ends. If she is not treating them right the
courts are open to the father for redress."26
In Martin, Jr. v. Martin, 27 the Supreme Court of Washington held that
a father, who is required by a divorce decree to make child support
payments directly to the mother, cannot claim credit for payments
voluntarily made directly to the children. However, special
considerations of an equitable nature may justify a court in
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
crediting such payments on his indebtedness to the mother, when
such can be done without injustice to her.
The general rule is to the effect that when a father is required by a
divorce decree to pay to the mother money for the support of their
dependent children and the unpaid and accrued installments
become judgments in her favor, he cannot, as a matter of law,
claim credit on account of payments voluntarily made directly to
the children. Koon v. Koon, supra; Briggs v. Briggs, supra. However,
special considerations of an equitable nature may justify a court in
crediting such payments on his indebtedness to the mother, when
that can be done without injustice to her. Briggs v. Briggs, supra.
The courts are justifiably reluctant to lay down any general rules as
to when such credits may be allowed.28 (Emphasis supplied.)
Here, the CA should not have allowed all the expenses incurred by
respondent to be credited against the accrued support pendente
lite. As earlier mentioned, the monthly support pendente lite
granted by the trial court was intended primarily for food,
household expenses such as salaries of drivers and house helpers,
and also petitioners scoliosis therapy sessions. Hence, the value of
two expensive cars bought by respondent for his children plus their
maintenance cost, travel expenses of petitioner and Angelli,
purchases through credit card of items other than groceries and
dry goods (clothing) should have been disallowed, as these bear no
relation to the judgment awarding support pendente lite. While it is
true that the dispositive portion of the executory decision in CA-
G.R. SP No. 84740 ordered herein respondent to pay the support in
arrears "less than the amount supposedly given by petitioner to
the private respondent as her and their two (2) children monthly
support," the deductions should be limited to those basic needs
and expenses considered by the trial and appellate courts. The
assailed ruling of the CA allowing huge deductions from the
accrued monthly support of petitioner and her children, while
correct insofar as it commends the generosity of the respondent to
his children, is clearly inconsistent with the executory decision in
CA-G.R. SP No. 84740. More important, it completely ignores the
unfair consequences to petitioner whose sustenance and well-
being, was given due regard by the trial and appellate courts. This
is evident from the March 31, 2004 Order granting support
pendente lite to petitioner and her children, when the trial court
observed:
While there is evidence to the effect that defendant is giving some
forms of financial assistance to his two (2) children via their credit
cards and paying for their school expenses, the same is, however,
devoid of any form of spousal support to the plaintiff, for, at this
point in time, while the action for nullity of marriage is still to be
heard, it is incumbent upon the defendant, considering the
physical and financial condition of the plaintiff and the
overwhelming capacity of defendant, to extend support unto the
latter. x x x29
On appeal, while the Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 84740 reduced the
amount of monthly support fixed by the trial court, it nevertheless
held that considering respondents financial resources, it is but fair
and just that he give a monthly support for the sustenance and
basic necessities of petitioner and his children. This would imply
that any amount respondent seeks to be credited as monthly
support should only cover those incurred for sustenance and
household expenses.1avvphi1
In the case at bar, records clearly show and in fact has been
admitted by petitioner that aside from paying the expenses of their
two (2) childrens schooling, he gave his two (2) children two (2)
cars and credit cards of which the expenses for various items
namely: clothes, grocery items and repairs of their cars were
chargeable to him which totaled an amount of more than One
Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) for each of them and considering
that as testified by the private respondent that she needs the total
amount of P113,000.00 for the maintenance of the household and
other miscellaneous expenses and considering further that
petitioner can afford to buy cars for his two (2) children, and to pay
the expenses incurred by them which are chargeable to him
through the credit cards he provided them in the amount
of P100,000.00 each, it is but fair and just that the monthly support
pendente lite for his wife, herein private respondent, be fixed as of
the present in the amount of P115,000.00 which would be
sufficient enough to take care of the household and other needs.
This monthly support pendente lite to private respondent in the
amount of P115,000.00 excludes the amount of One Hundred
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
ThirtyFive (P135,000.00) Thousand Pesos for medical attendance
expenses needed by private respondent for the operation of both
her eyes which is demandable upon the conduct of such operation.
Likewise, this monthly support ofP115,000.00 is without prejudice
to any increase or decrease thereof that the trial court may grant
private respondent as the circumstances may warrant i.e.
depending on the proof submitted by the parties during the
proceedings for the main action for support.
The amounts already extended to the two (2) children, being a
commendable act of petitioner, should be continued by him
considering the vast financial resources at his disposal. 30 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Accordingly, only the following expenses of respondent may be
allowed as deductions from the accrued support pendente lite for
petitioner and her children:
1wphi1
Medical expenses of Susan Lim-Lua Php 42,450.71
Dental Expenses of Daniel Ryan 11,500.00
Credit card purchases of Angelli 365,282.20
(Groceries and Dry Goods) 228,869.38
Credit Card purchases of Daniel Ryan
TOTAL Php 648,102.29
As to the contempt charge, we sustain the CA in holding that
respondent is not guilty of indirect contempt.
Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the court by
acting in opposition to its authority, justice, and dignity. It signifies
not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the courts order, but
such conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and
the administration of law into disrepute or, in some manner, to
impede the due administration of justice. 31 To constitute contempt,
the act must be done willfully and for an illegitimate or improper
purpose.32 The good faith, or lack of it, of the alleged contemnor
should be considered.33
Respondent admittedly ceased or suspended the giving of monthly
support pendente lite granted by the trial court, which is
immediately executory. However, we agree with the CA that
respondents act was not contumacious considering that he had
not been remiss in actually providing for the needs of his children.
It is a matter of record that respondent continued shouldering the
full cost of their education and even beyond their basic necessities
in keeping with the familys social status. Moreover, respondent
believed in good faith that the trial and appellate courts, upon
equitable grounds, would allow him to offset the substantial
amounts he had spent or paid directly to his children.
Respondent complains that petitioner is very much capacitated to
generate income on her own because she presently maintains a
boutique at the Ayala Center Mall in Cebu City and at the same
time engages in the business of lending money. He also claims that
the two children have finished their education and are now
employed in the family business earning their own salaries.
Suffice it to state that the matter of increase or reduction of
support should be submitted to the trial court in which the action
for declaration for nullity of marriage was filed, as this Court is not
a trier of facts. The amount of support may be reduced or
increased proportionately according to the reduction or increase of
the necessities of the recipient and the resources or means of the
person obliged to support.34 As we held in Advincula v. Advincula35
Judgment for support does not become final. The right to support
is of such nature that its allowance is essentially provisional; for
during the entire period that a needy party is entitled to support,
his or her alimony may be modified or altered, in accordance with
his increased or decreased needs, and with the means of the giver.
It cannot be regarded as subject to final determination. 36
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated
April 20, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 01154
and 01315 is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:
a) DISMISSING, for lack of merit, the case of Petition for
Contempt of Court with Damages filed by Susan Lim Lua
against Danilo Y. Lua with docket no. SP. CA-G.R. No. 01154;
b) GRANTING IN PART Danilo Y. Lua's Petition for Certiorari
docketed as SP. CA-G.R. No. 01315. Consequently, the
assailed Orders dated 27 September 2005 and 25
November 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14,
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

Cebu City issued in Civil Case No. CEB-29346 entitled

"Susan Lim Lua versus Danilo Y. Lua, are hereby NULLIFIED
and SET ASIDE, and instead a new one is entered:
i. ORDERING the deduction of the amount of Php
648,102.29 from the support pendente lite in
arrears of Danilo Y. Lua to his wife, Susan Lim Lua
and their two (2) children;
ii. ORDERING Danilo Y. Lua to resume payment of
his monthly support of PhP115,000.00 pesos
starting from the time payment of this amount was
deferred by him subject to the deduction
aforementioned.
iii. DIRECTING the immediate execution of this
judgment.
SO ORDERED."
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
G.R. No. 193225, February 09, 2015
BBB,*Petitioner, v. AAA,*Respondent.
RESOLUTION
REYES, J.:
Petitioner BBB is now before this Court with a Petition for Review
on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to assail
the Decision2 dated November 6, 2009 and Resolution3 dated
August 3, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No.
89581, which affirmed with modification the issuance against him
on August 14, 2007 of a Permanent Protection Order (PPO) 4 by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 162, in favor of his
wife, herein respondent AAA.
Antecedent Facts
The CA aptly summarized as follows the facts of the case until the
RTCs issuance of the PPO against BBB:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Both [BBB] and [AAA] allege that they first met in 1991 but started
to date seriously only in 1996. [AAA] was then a medical student
and was raising her first child borne from a previous relationship, a
boy named [CCC], with the help of her parents.
During the relationship with [BBB], [AAA] bore two more children
namely, [DDD] (born on December 11, 1997) and [EEE] (born on
October 19, 2000).
To legalize their relationship, [BBB] and [AAA] married in civil rights
on October 10, 2002 and thereafter, the birth certificates of the
children, including [CCCs], was amended to change their civil
status to legitimated by virtue of the said marriage.
The relationship, both admit, was far from ideal and has had its
share of happy moments and heated arguments. The two however
have contradicting statements as to the cause of their present
situation.
[BBB] alleges that [AAAs] irrational jealousy has caused their
frequent arguments. According to [BBB], [AAA] has been suspicious
of [BBB] and his relationship with his female co-workers, which
[BBB] alleges, contrary to [AAAs] suspicion, are purely
professional. According to [BBB], because of their repeated fights,
he was forced to leave the family home to prevent the brewing
animosity between him and his wife. Soon after [BBB] left, [AAA]
herself decided to leave the family home and brought the children
with her, which made it difficult for [BBB] to see their kids regularly.
This has also caused the family expense to double, making it even
more difficult for [BBB] to fulfill his financial obligations.
[AAA], on the other hand, alleges that their heated arguments
were often due to [BBBs] incessant womanizing. When confronted
about it, [BBB], instead of denying the same, would even curse
[AAA].
The breaking point for [AAA] came when, [BBBs] alleged mistress,
a woman by the name of [FFF], insulted and humiliated [AAA] in
public, in the presence of [BBB] himself, who, according to [AAA],
did nothing to stop the same. Extremely hurt, [AAA] decided to
leave the conjugal home with the children and lived temporarily at
a friends house. She however went back to the conjugal home
with [DDD] and [EEE] after some time, leaving her son [CCC] at her
friends house.
What made matters worse, according to [AAA], was the apparent
biases of [BBB] in favor of [DDD] and [EEE]. That despite his
promise to treat [CCC] as his own, [BBB] would still treat the latter
differently from the two kids, putting [CCC] at a disadvantage.
[AAA], cites as example the instances when, [BBB] would buy food
and toys for [DDD] and [EEE] only, buying nothing for [CCC].
While living separately from [BBB], [AAA] discovered that [BBB]
was not paying the rentals due on the condominium unit they were
occupying, forcing [AAA] to move out. [AAA] was likewise
compelled to find work to support the family, after [BBB] has
started to be remiss in his financial obligations to the family.
According to [AAA], the amounts given by [BBB] were not sufficient
to cover the family expenses, forcing her to request for loans from
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
friends.
[AAA] likewise feels threatened after discovering [that BBB] was
stalking her and/or their children. [AAA] alleges that she found out
that [BBB] has sought the help of one [GGG], a friend of [BBB] who
lives within the same compound where [AAA] lives, to go through
the guards logbook to monitor their every move, i.e., who visits
them, what time [AAA] leaves and returns back home, etc.
Citing the foregoing as constituting economic and psychological
abuse, [AAA] filed an application for the issuance of a Temporary
Protection Order with a request to make the same permanent after
due hearing, before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City.
Finding good ground in [AAAs] application, the court a quo issued
a Temporary Protection Order (TPO). The TPO was thereafter, made
permanent by virtue of a Decision of the RTC dated August [14,
2007], the dispositive portion of which orders:
x x x x
Prohibiting [BBB], directly and indirectly, from stalking, harassing,
annoying, or otherwise verbally abusing [AAA], directly or
indirectly, to refrain from insulting her, cursing her and shouting
invectives at her;
Prohibiting [BBB] from committing or threatening to commit any
act that may cause mental and emotional anguish to [AAA], i.e.
publicly displaying her extramarital relations with his mistress
[FFF] and anyone else for that matter;
Prohibiting [BBB] from exposing the minor children to immoral and
illicit environment, specifically prohibiting him to allow her (sic)
mistress [FFF] and anyone else to be with them in instances where
he would be allowed by this Court to see their children;
Allowing [BBB] ALONE to see and visit his children once a month
(for a total of 12 visits per year) at the latters residence for a
maximum period of 2 years [sic] each visit, subject to further
orders from this Court. For this purpose, [BBBs every visit] shall be
accompanied by the Court Sheriff, who shall coordinate with [AAA]
as to the availability of time and date of children for such visit, at
the expense of [BBB]. For every visit, the Court Sheriff is directed
to submit his report within 5 days from the date [BBB] visited the
children;
Directing [BBB] to allow [AAA] to continue to have lawful use and
possession of the motor vehicle more particularly described as
follows:
One (1) Hyundai Starex Van
1997 Model
Plate Number: WJP 902
Chassis Number:
Serial Number KMJWH7HPXU158443
Granting [AAA] permanent sole custody over their common
children until further orders from this Court;
Ordering [BBB] to provide support in the amount of Php 62,918.97
per month (not Php 81,650.00 being prayed by [AAA]) to [AAA] as
monthly support, inclusive of educational expenses, groceries,
medicines, medical bills, and insurance premiums, starting from
the month of January 2007 to be given within the first five (5) days
of the month through the Court Sheriff, who shall coordinate with
[AAA] in receiving such support;
Requiring [BBB] to stay away from the offended party and any
designated family or household member at a distance of 100
meters;
Requiring [BBB] to stay away from the residence, school, place of
employment or any specified place frequented regularly by the
offended party and children and any designated family or
household member;
Ordering [BBB] to post bond of Php 300,000.00 to keep peace
Page | 251
Persons 4th Exam Cases
pursuant to Section 23 of RA 9262 with the undertaking that [BBB]
will not commit the violence sought to be prevented and that in
case such violence is committed[,] he will pay the amount
determined by the Court in its judgment;
Ordering [BBB] to pay the sum of Php 100,000.00 (not Php
200,000.00 being prayed by [AAA]) representing both reasonable
attorneys fees and cost of litigation, including cost of suit.
x x x x.5
Ruling of the CA
BBB filed before the CA an appeal6 to challenge the RTC Decision
dated August 14, 2007. BBB alleged that the RTCs (a) issuance of
the PPO against him, (b) award to AAA of the sole custody over
their children, (c) directives for him to pay attorneys fees and
costs of litigation and to post an excessive amount of bond, and (d)
declaration that he had an abusive character lack factual bases.
On November 6, 2009, the CA rendered the assailed decision
affirming the factual findings and dispositions of the RTC, but
ordering the remand of the case for the latter to determine in the
proper proceedings who shall be awarded custody of the children.
Like the RTC, the CA found that under the provisions of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9262,7 BBB had subjected AAA and their children to
psychological, emotional and economic abuses. BBB displayed acts
of marital infidelity which exposed AAA to public ridicule causing
her emotional and psychological distress. While BBB alleged that
FFF was only a professional colleague, he continued to have public
appearances with her which did not help to dispel AAAs accusation
that the two had an extra-marital relation. Further, BBB verbally
abused AAA either in person or through text messages. The CA
likewise did not favorably consider BBBs claim that he cannot
provide financial support to AAA and the children in the amount
required by the RTC as his income merely depended on contractual
hosting and events management assignments. The CA emphasized
that AAA was in the position to know the sources of BBBs income.
Citing Section 288 of R.A. No. 9262 and Article 2139 of the Family
Code, the CA, however, ordered the RTC to determine who shall be
entitled to exercise custody over the children, who at that time
were already older than seven years of age.
The CA denied BBBs Motion for Partial Reconsideration10 by way of
the Resolution11 dated August 3, 2010 which is likewise assailed in
the instant petition.
Issues
Undaunted, BBB now comes before this Court raising the following
issues:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE [CA] COMMITTED ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE
RTCS DECISION TO MAKE THE [TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
(TPO)] PERMANENT.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE [CA] COMMITTED ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE
RTCS AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES AND COST OF LITIGATION IN
FAVOR OF [AAA].
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE [CA] COMMITTED ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE
RTCS ORDER REQUIRING [BBB] TO POST AN EXCESSIVE AMOUNT
OF BOND TO KEEP THE PEACE.12cralawlawlibrary
IV
WHETHER OR NOT THE CA AND THE RTC CORRECTLY ADMITTED
INTO EVIDENCE THE UNAUTHENTICATED TEXT MESSAGES
ADDUCED BY AAA.13cralawlawlibrary
V
WHETHER OR NOT THE AWARD OF SUPPORT SHOULD BE DELETED
AS THE SPOUSES COMMON BIOLOGICAL CHILDREN, DDD AND EEE,
ARE ALREADY UNDER BBBS ACTUAL CARE AND CUSTODY SINCE
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
AUGUST 2010 WHEN AAA LEFT TO WORK AS A NURSE IN THE
UNITED STATES.14
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In support of the instant petition, BBB merely reiterates his factual
claims in the proceedings below relative to his financial position
and AAAs supposedly baseless accusations and demands from
him. In addition, he posits that the text messages offered by AAA
as evidence were unauthenticated; hence, doubt exists as to their
admissibility. Further, he points out that due to the current
whereabouts and circumstances of the parties, the PPO issued
against him is rendered moot. He now has actual care and custody
of DDD and EEE, while CCC, who is not his biological son, resides in
a college dormitory. BBB and AAA barely get in touch with each
other except when the latter initiates the same.
In her Comment15 to the petition, AAA counters that BBB
erroneously raises factual issues which are subjects beyond the
contemplation of a petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. Further, BBB continuously violates the PPO, which under
the provisions of R.A. No. 9262, is supposed to be immediately
executory upon its issuance by the RTC. AAA claims that BBB still
verbally abuses her. BBB has not posted the P300,000.00 bond
required from him. He likewise has not paid the attorneys fees and
costs of litigation awarded to AAA. He does not provide support for
CCC, who, in the eyes of the law, is also among his legitimated
children. AAA further alleges that in 2010, she left DDD and EEE
under the care of BBB only because the circumstances then
obtaining forced her to do so. Three years had then lapsed from
the time she filed an application for a protection order and still, no
execution of the PPO ensued. She could not depend for financial
support from BBB. She was thus left with no choice but to yield
custody over DDD and EEE even if the set-up exposed the children
to BBBs illicit affairs. AAA points out that since their children are
all older than seven years of age, they are already capable of
choosing for themselves whom they want to exercise custody over
them.
Pending the Courts deliberation of the instant case, BBB filed a
Manifestation and Motion to Render Judgment Based on a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA).16 BBB alleges that on July 29,
2013, he and AAA had entered into a compromise anent the
custody, exercise of parental authority over, and support of DDD
and EEE.17cralawlawlibrary
AAAs counsel, Atty. Shielah Elbinias-Uyboco (Atty. Uyboco), filed a
Comment to the MOA18 pointing out that AAA signed the MOA while
emotionally distressed and sans the formers advice and guidance.
Atty. Uyboco likewise emphasizes that BBBs illicit relationship with
FFF continues in violation of the PPO issued by the RTC.
In BBBs Reply,19 he counters that AAA should be presumed to have
acted with due care and full knowledge of the contents of the MOA
which she signed. Further, BBBs alleged involvement with FFF is
an issue which need not be resolved in a judgment based on
compromise.
Disquisition of the Court
The instant petition is not a proper
subject of a compromise agreement.
The Court cannot take the simplest course of finally writing finis to
the instant petition by rendering a judgment merely based on
compromise as prayed for by BBB due to reasons discussed below.
Alleging psychological violence and economic abuse, AAA
anchored her application for the issuance of a TPO and a PPO on
the basis of the provisions of R.A. No. 9262. In the instant petition,
what is essentially being assailed is the PPO issued by the RTC and
which was affirmed by the CA. The rules, however, intend that
cases filed under the provisions of R.A. No. 9262 be not subjects of
compromise agreements.
It bears stressing that Section 23(d) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-
SC20 explicitly prohibits compromise on any act constituting the
crime of violence against women. Thus, in Garcia v. Drilon,21 the
Court declared that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
Violence, however, is not a subject for compromise. A process
which involves parties mediating the issue of violence implies that
the victim is somehow at fault. x x x.22(Emphasis deleted)
AM No. 10-4-16-SC,23 on the other hand, directs the referral to
mediation of all issues under the Family Code and other laws in
relation to support, custody, visitation, property relations and
guardianship of minor children, excepting therefrom those covered
by R.A. No. 9262.
While AAA filed her application for a TPO and a PPO as
an independent action and not as an incidental relief prayed for in
a criminal suit, the instant petition cannot be taken outside the
ambit of cases falling under the provisions of R.A. No. 9262.
Perforce, the prohibition against subjecting the instant petition to
compromise applies.
The courts a quo committed no
error in issuing a PPO against BBB.
Anent the main issues raised in the instant petition, the Court finds
no error in the CAs ruling that the RTC properly issued a PPO
against BBB and that a remanding of the case to the trial court is
necessary to determine who shall exercise custody over CCC, DDD
and EEE. However, the choices of the children as with whom they
would prefer to stay would alter the effects of the PPO. Hence, this
Court affirms the herein assailed PPO except items (d), (f), (g), (h)
and (i)24 thereof relative to who shall be granted custody over the
three children, how the spouses shall exercise visitation rights, and
the amount and manner of providing financial support, which are
matters the RTC is now directed to determine with dispatch.
The Court notes BBBs manifestation that he and AAA had arrived
at an amicable settlement as regards the issues of custody,
exercise of parental authority over, and support of DDD and EEE.
While these matters can be lawful subjects of compromise, AAAs
vacillation, as expressed by her counsel, compels the Court to
exercise prudence by directing the RTC to resolve with finality the
aforesaid issues. The parties are, however, not precluded from
entering into a compromise as regards the aforesaid issues, but the
Court now requires the RTCs direct supervision lest the parties
muddle the issues anew and fail to put an end to their bickering.
No grounds exist which compel this
Court to resolve the first three issues
raised by BBB since they are merely
factual in character.
In Padalhin v. Lavia,25 the Court declared
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Primarily, Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court categorically
states that the petition filed shall raise only questions of law, which
must be distinctly set forth. A question of law arises when there is
doubt as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there
is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to the truth or falsity
of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same
must not involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The resolution
of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given
set of circumstances. Once it is clear that the issue invites a review
of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of
fact.cralawred
x x x [T]he substantive issue of whether or not the petitioners are
entitled to moral and exemplary damages as well as attorneys
fees is a factual issue which is beyond the province of a petition for
review on certiorari. x x x
In the case at bar, the petitioner spouses present to us issues
with an intent to subject to review the uniform factual
findings of the RTC and the CA. Specifically, the instant petition
challenges the existence of clear and substantial evidence
warranting the award of damages and attorneys fees in Lavias
favor. Further, the instant petition prays for the grant of the
Spouses Padalhins counterclaims on the supposed showing that
the complaint filed by Lavia before the RTC was groundless. It
bears stressing that we are not a trier of facts. Undoubtedly,
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
the questions now raised before us are factual and not legal in
character, hence, beyond the contemplation of a petition filed
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.26 (Italics in the
original and emphasis ours)
In BBBs case, he avers that the RTC and the CAs (a) issuance of
the PPO, (b) award of attorneys fees and costs of litigation in
AAAs favor, and (c) directive for him to post a bond in the amount
of P300,000.00 all lack factual bases. The first three issues
presented unmistakably call for a re-calibration of evidence. While
the general rule that only legal issues can be resolved in a petition
filed under Rule 45 recognizes exceptions,27 BBBs case does not
fall in the latter category. The RTC and the CA are in accord with
each other as to their factual findings, which are supported by
substantial evidence, thus, binding upon this Court.
The doubt raised by BBB anent the
admissibility of the text messages as
evidence is not genuinely a legal issue.
In the case of Justice Vidallon-Magtolis v. Salud, 28 it is stated that
any question as to the admissibility of text messages as evidence
is rendered moot and academic if the party raising such issue
admits authorship of the subject messages.29cralawlawlibrary
BBB argues that the RTC and the CA erred in admitting as evidence
the text messages which were sent by him and FFF to AAA since
they were unauthenticated. However, BBB himself effectively
admitted in the pleadings filed with this Court and the CA that he
indeed sent the text messages attributed to him by AAA. The
Appellants Brief30 filed before the CA stated in part
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[AAA] conveniently chose to leave out the initiatory messages to
which [BBB] replied to. It is totally obvious that the alleged
messages from [BBB] are only messages that are in response to an
ongoing verbal or virtual tussle and the adamant refusal of [AAA]
to bring the children home despite the entreaties of [BBB]. Be it
noted that [BBB], for the past several months leading up to their
separation, and up to the time that the instant case has been filed,
continuously endured the extreme mood swings, malicious
accusations, haranguing, curses, insults, and even violence from
[AAA].31 (Emphasis and underscoring in the original and italics
ours)
Further, in the instant petition, BBB repleads
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[I]t is utterly apparent that the alleged messages from [BBB] are
only messages that are in response to an ongoing verbal or virtual
tussle between the parties.32
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In the above-quoted portions of the pleadings, BBB attempted to
justify why he sent the messages to AAA. However, in doing so, he,
in effect, admitted authorship of the messages which AAA adduced
as evidence. It is likewise noted that BBB did not deny ownership of
the cellphone number from which the text messages were sent.
Hence, while at first glance, it would seem that the issue of
admissibility of the text messages requires an interpretation of the
rules of evidence, this Court does not find the same to be
necessary. While BBB had admitted authorship of the text
messages, he pleads for this Court to consider those messages as
inadmissible for allegedly being unauthenticated. BBBs arguments
are unbearably self-contradictory and he cannot be allowed to take
refuge under technical rules of procedure to assail what is already
apparent.
The deletion from the PPO of the
directive of the RTC and the CA relative
to the award of support is not warranted.
While CCC is not BBBs biological son,
he was legitimated under the latters name.
Like DDD and EEE, CCC is entitled to
receive support from BBB.
BBB claims that DDD and EEE are now under his sole care and
custody, which allegedly renders moot the provision in the PPO
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
relative to support. BBB points out that CCC is not his biological
son. Impliedly then, BBB justifies why CCC is not entitled to receive
support from him.
This Court is not persuaded.
Article 177 of the Family Code provides that [o]nly children
conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time
of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other may be legitimated. Article 178
states that [l]egitimation shall take place by a subsequent valid
marriage between parents.
In the case at bar, the parties do not dispute the fact that BBB is
not CCCs biological father. Such being the case, it was improper to
have CCC legitimated after the celebration of BBB and AAAs
marriage. Clearly then, the legal process of legitimation was trifled
with. BBB voluntarily but falsely acknowledged CCC as his son.
Article 1431 of the New Civil Code pertinently
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is
rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be
denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon.
At least for the purpose of resolving the instant petition, the
principle of estoppel finds application and it now bars BBB from
making an assertion contrary to his previous representations. He
should not be allowed to evade a responsibility arising from his
own misrepresentations. He is bound by the effects of the
legitimation process. CCC remains to be BBBs son, and pursuant
to Article 179 of the Family Code, the former is entitled to the same
rights as those of a legitimate child, including the receipt of his
fathers support.
Notwithstanding the above, there is no absolute preclusion for BBB
from raising before the proper court the issue of CCCs status and
filiation. However, BBB cannot do the same in the instant petition
before this Court now. In Tison v. CA,33 the Court held that the civil
status [of a child] cannot be attacked collaterally. The childs
legitimacy cannot be contested by way of defense or as a
collateral issue in another action for a different purpose. 34 The
instant petition sprang out of AAAs application for a PPO before
the RTC. Hence, BBBs claim that CCC is not his biological son is a
collateral issue, which this Court has no authority to resolve now.
All told, the Court finds no merit in BBBs petition, but there exists
a necessity to remand the case for the RTC to resolve matters
relative to who shall be granted custody over the three children,
how the spouses shall exercise visitation rights, and the amount
and manner of providing financial support.
The RTC and the CA found substantial evidence and did not commit
reversible errors when they issued the PPO against BBB. Events,
which took place after the issuance of the PPO, do not erase the
fact that psychological, emotional and economic abuses were
committed by BBB against AAA. Hence, BBBs claim that he now
has actual sole care of DDD and EEE does not necessarily call for
this Courts revocation of the PPO and the award to him of custody
over the children.
This Court, thus, affirms the CAs order to remand the case for the
RTC to resolve the question of custody. Since the children are now
all older than seven years of age, they can choose for themselves
whom they want to stay with. If all the three children would
manifest to the RTC their choice to stay with AAA, then the PPO
issued by RTC shall continue to be executed in its entirety.
However, if any of the three children would choose to be under
BBBs care, necessarily, the PPO issued against BBB relative to
them is to be modified. The PPO, in its entirety, would remain
effective only as to AAA and any of the children who opt to stay
with her. Consequently, the RTC may accordingly alter the manner
and amount of financial support BBB should give depending on
who shall finally be awarded custody over the children. Pursuant to
Articles 201 and 202 of the Family Code, BBBs resources and
means and the necessities of AAA and the children are the
essential factors in determining the amount of support, and the
Page | 256
Persons 4th Exam Cases

same can be reduced or increased proportionately. The RTC is
reminded to be circumspect in resolving the matter of support,
which is a mutual responsibility of the spouses. The parties do not
dispute that AAA is now employed as well, thus, the RTC should
consider the same with the end in mind of promoting the best
interests of the children.
A final note on the effectivity and
violation of a PPO
The Court reminds the parties that the application for the issuance
of a PPO is not a process to be trifled with. It is only granted after
notice and hearing. Once issued, violation of its provisions shall be
punishable with a fine ranging from Five Thousand Pesos
(P5,000.00) to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) and/or
imprisonment of six (6) months.35cralawlawlibrary
Section 16 of R.A. No. 9262, on the other hand, provides that [a]
PPO shall be effective until revoked by a court upon application of
the person in whose favor the order was issued.
2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 89581
are AFFIRMED. The Permanent Protection Order, dated August
14, 2007, issued against BBB by the Regional Trial Court of Pasig
City, Branch 162 STANDS except items (d), (f), (g), (h) and
(i)36 thereof. The case is hereby remanded to the trial court for it to
accordingly modify the aforecited items after determining with
dispatch the following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) who between BBB and AAA shall exercise custody over the
three children;
(2) how the parties shall exercise their respective visitation rights;
and
(3) the amount and manner of providing financial support.
The Reply and Manifestation dated November 10, 2014 and
December 4, 2014, respectively, areNOTED.
SO ORDERED.

Pending the resolution of the instant petition, BBB claims that he

and AAA had executed a MOA, upon which basis a judgment by
compromise is sought to be rendered. Atty. Uyboco, on her part,
pointed out AAAs vacillation anent the MOAs execution. With the
foregoing circumstances, the parties, wittingly or unwittingly, have
imposed upon this Court the undue burden of speculating whether
or not AAAs half-hearted acquiescence to the MOA is tantamount
to an application for the revocation of the PPO. The Court, however,
refuses to indulge the whims of either parties. The questions raised
in the instant petition for the Court to dispose of revolve around
the propriety of the PPOs issuance. The Court resolves that
principal query in the affirmative. The PPO thus stands unless AAA,
categorically and without any equivocation, files an application for
its revocation.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The

Decision dated November 6, 2009 and Resolution dated August 3,

Page | 257
Persons 4th Exam Cases
SCHOOL OF THE HOLY SPIRIT OF QUEZON
CITY and/or SR.CRISPINA A. TOLENTINO,
S.Sp.S.,
Petitioners,
- versus -
CORAZON P. TAGUIAM,
Respondent.
This petition assails the Decision[1] dated June 7, 2004 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 81480, which reversed the
Resolution[2] dated September 20, 2002 of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR CA No. 031627-02. The
NLRC had affirmed the Decision [3] dated March 26, 2002 of the
Labor Arbiter dismissing respondents complaint for illegal
dismissal. This petition likewise assails the
Resolution[4] dated September 30, 2004 of the Court of Appeals
denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Respondent Corazon P. Taguiam was the Class Adviser of Grade 5-
Esmeralda of the petitioner, School of the Holy Spirit of Quezon
City. On March 10, 2000, the class president, wrote a letter [5] to the
grade school principal requesting permission to hold a year-end
celebration at the school grounds. The principal authorized the
activity and allowed the pupils to use the swimming pool. In this
connection, respondent distributed the parents/guardians permit
forms to the pupils.
Respondent admitted that Chiara Mae Federicos permit
form[6] was unsigned. Nevertheless, she concluded that Chiara Mae
was allowed by her mother to join the activity since her mother
personally brought her to the school with her packed lunch and
swimsuit.
Before the activity started, respondent warned the pupils who did
not know how to swim to avoid the deeper area. However, while
the pupils were swimming, two of them sneaked out. Respondent
went after them to verify where they were going.
Unfortunately, while respondent was away, Chiara Mae
drowned. When respondent returned, the maintenance man was
already administering cardiopulmonary resuscitation
on Chiara Mae. She was still alive when respondent rushed her to
theGeneral Malvar Hospital where she was pronounced dead on
arrival.
On May 23, 2000, petitioners issued a Notice of Administrative
Charge[7] to respondent for alleged gross negligence and required
her to submit her written explanation. Thereafter, petitioners
conducted a clarificatory hearing which respondent attended.
Respondent also submitted her Affidavit of Explanation.[8]
On July 31, 2000, petitioners dismissed respondent on the ground
of gross negligence resulting to loss of trust and confidence.
[9]
Meanwhile, Chiara Maes parents filed a P7 Million damage suit
against petitioners and respondent, among others. They also filed
against respondent a criminal complaint for reckless imprudence
resulting in homicide.
On July 25, 2001, respondent in turn filed a complaint [10] against
the school and/or Sr. Crispina Tolentino for illegal dismissal, with a
prayer for reinstatement with full backwages and other money
claims, damages and attorneys fees.
In dismissing the complaint, the Labor Arbiter declared that
respondent was validly terminated for gross neglect of duty. He
opined that Chiara Mae drowned because respondent had left the
pupils without any adult supervision. He also noted that the
absence of adequate facilities should have alerted respondent
before allowing the pupils to use the swimming pool. The Labor
Arbiter further concluded that although respondents negligence
was not habitual, the same warranted her dismissal since death
resulted therefrom.
Respondent appealed to the NLRC which, however,
affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.
Aggrieved, respondent instituted a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, which ruled in her
favor. The appellate court observed that there was insufficient
proof that respondents negligence was both gross and
habitual. The Court of Appeals disposed, thus:
WHEREFORE, the Court
hereby GRANTS the petition. The assailed
September 20, 2002 Resolution of the National
Labor Relations Commission entitled Corazon
Taguiam vs. School of the Holy Spirit and/or Sister
Page | 258
Persons 4th Exam Cases
Crispina Tolentino[,] NLRC NCR Case No. 00-07-
03877-01[,] NLRC NCR CA No. 031627-02 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a new
one is hereby ENTERED directing the private
respondent the School of the Holy Spirit to:
(1) Pay the petitioner full backwages, plus
all other benefits, bonuses and general
increases to which she would have
been normally entitled, had she not
been dismissed and had she not been
forced to stop working computed up to
the finality of this decision;
(2) Pay the petitioner separation pay
equivalent to one (1) month for every
year of service in addition to full
backwages;
(3) Pay the petitioner an amount
equivalent to 10% of the judgment
award as attorneys fees;
(4) Pay the cost of this suit.
SO ORDERED.[11]
In this petition, petitioners contend that the Court of
Appeals erred in:
REVERSING AND SETTING ASIDE THE DECISION
AND RESOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION AFFIRMING THE DECISION
OF THE LABOR ARBITER DISMISSING THE
COMPLAINT FOR LACK OF MERIT.[12]
Simply stated, the sole issue presented for our resolution is
whether respondents dismissal on the ground of gross negligence
resulting to loss of trust and confidence was valid.
The issue of whether a party is negligent is a question of
fact. As a rule, the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts and this
applies with greater force in labor cases. [13] However, where the
issue is shrouded by a conflict of factual perception, we are
constrained to review the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals. In this case, the findings of facts of the appellate court
contradict those of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC.[14]
Under Article 282[15] of the Labor Code, gross and habitual
neglect of duties is a valid ground for an employer to terminate an
employee. Gross negligence implies a want or absence of or a
failure to exercise slight care or diligence, or the entire absence of
care. It evinces a thoughtless disregard of consequences without
exerting any effort to avoid them. [16] Habitual neglect implies
repeated failure to perform ones duties for a period of time,
depending upon the circumstances.[17]
Our perusal of the records leads us to conclude that
respondent had been grossly negligent. First, it is undisputed
that Chiara Maes permit form was unsigned. Yet, respondent
allowed her to join the activity because she assumed
that Chiara Maes mother has allowed her to join it by personally
bringing her to the school with her packed lunch and swimsuit.
The purpose of a permit form is precisely to ensure that the
parents have allowed their child to join the school activity
involved. Respondent cannot simply ignore this by resorting to
assumptions. Respondent admitted that she was around
whenChiara Mae and her mother arrived. She could have
requested the mother to sign the permit form before she left the
school or at least called her up to obtain her conformity.
Second, it was respondents responsibility as Class Adviser
to supervise her class in all activities sanctioned by the school.
[18]
Thus, she should have coordinated with the school to ensure
that proper safeguards, such as adequate first aid and sufficient
adult personnel, were present during their activity. She should have
been mindful of the fact that with the number of pupils involved, it
would be impossible for her by herself alone to keep an eye on
each one of them.
As it turned out, since respondent was the only adult
present, majority of the pupils were left unsupervised when she
followed the two pupils who sneaked out. In the light of the odds
involved, respondent should have considered that those who
sneaked out could not have left the school premises since there
were guards manning the gates. The guards would not have
allowed them to go out in their swimsuits and without any adult
accompanying them. But those who stayed at the pool were put at
greater risk, when she left them unattended by an adult.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
Notably, respondents negligence, although gross, was not
habitual. In view of the considerable resultant damage, however, we
are in agreement that the cause is sufficient to dismiss
respondent. This is not the first time that we have departed from the
requirements laid down by the law that neglect of duties must be
both gross and habitual. In Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. NLRC,[19] we
ruled that Philippine Airlines (PAL) cannot be legally compelled to
continue with the employment of a person admittedly guilty of gross
negligence in the performance of his duties although it was his first
offense. In that case, we noted that a mere delay on PALs flight
schedule due to aircraft damage entails problems like hotel
accommodations for its passengers, re-booking, the possibility of law
suits, and payment of special landing fees not to mention the
soaring costs of replacing aircraft parts.[20] In another case, Fuentes
v. National Labor Relations Commission,[21] we held that it would be
unfair to compel Philippine Banking Corporation to continue
employing its bank teller. In that case, we observed that although
the tellers infraction was not habitual, a substantial amount of
money was lost. The deposit slip had already been validated prior to
its loss and the amount reflected thereon is already considered as
current liabilities in the banks balance sheet.[22] Indeed, the
sufficiency of the evidence as well as the resultant damage to the
employer should be considered in the dismissal of the employee. In
this case, the damage went as far as claiming the life of a child.
As a result of gross negligence in the present case,
petitioners lost its trust and confidence in respondent. Loss of trust
and confidence to be a valid ground for dismissal must be based
on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly established
facts. A breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and
purposely, without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act
done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently.
[23]
Otherwise stated, it must rest on substantial grounds and not
on the employers arbitrariness, whims, caprices or suspicion;
otherwise, the employee would eternally remain at the mercy of
the employer. It should be genuine and not simulated; nor should it
appear as a mere afterthought to justify earlier action taken in bad
faith or a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or
unjustified. It has never been intended to afford an occasion for
abuse because of its subjective nature. There must, therefore, be
an actual breach of duty committed by the employee which must
be established by substantial evidence.[24]
As a teacher who stands in loco parentis to her pupils,
respondent should have made sure that the children were
protected from all harm while in her company. [25] Respondent
should have known that leaving the pupils in the swimming pool
area all by themselves may result in an accident. A simple
reminder not to go to the deepest part of the pool [26] was
insufficient to cast away all the serious dangers that the situation
presented to the children, especially when respondent knew
that ChiaraMae cannot swim.[27] Dismally, respondent created an
unsafe situation which exposed the lives of all the pupils concerned
to real danger. This is a clear violation not only of the trust and
confidence reposed on her by the parents of the pupils but of the
school itself.
Finally, we note that based on the criminal complaint filed
by Chiara Maes parents, the Assistant City Prosecutor found
probable cause to indict respondent for the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide. The Assistant City Prosecutor held
that respondent should have foreseen the danger lurking in the
waters. By leaving her pupils in the swimming pool, respondent
displayed an inexcusable lack of foresight and precaution. [28] While
this finding is not controlling for purposes of the instant case, this
only supports our conclusion that respondent has indeed been
grossly negligent.
All told, there being a clear showing that respondent was
culpable for gross negligence resulting to loss of trust and
confidence, her dismissal was valid and legal. It was error for the
Court of Appeals to reverse and set aside the resolution of the
NLRC.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated June 7, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 81480 is SET ASIDE. The Resolution dated September 20,
2002 of the National Labor Relations Commission in NLRC NCR CA
No. 031627-02 is REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Page | 260
Persons 4th Exam Cases
G.R. No. 115640 March 15, 1995
REYNALDO ESPIRITU and GUILLERMA LAYUG, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and TERESITA MASAUDING, respondents.
MELO, J.:
This case concerns a seemingly void marriage and a relationship
which went sour. The innocent victims are two children horn out of
the same union. Upon this Court now falls the not too welcome
task of deciding the issue of who, between the father and mother,
is more suitable and better qualified in helping the children to grow
into responsible, well-adjusted, and happy young adulthood.
Petitioner Reynaldo Espiritu and respondent Teresita Masauding
first met sometime in 1976 in Iligan City where Reynaldo was
employed by the National Steel Corporation and Teresita was
employed as a nurse in a local hospital. In 1977, Teresita left for
Los Angeles, California to work as a nurse. She was able to acquire
immigrant status sometime later. In 1984, Reynaldo was sent by
his employer, the National Steel Corporation, to Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania as its liaison officer and Reynaldo and Teresita then
began to maintain a common law relationship of husband and wife.
On August 16, 1986, their daughter, Rosalind Therese, was born.
On October 7, 1987, while they were on a brief vacation in the
Philippines, Reynaldo and Teresita got married, and upon their
return to the United States, their second child, a son, this time, and
given the name Reginald Vince, was born on January 12, 1988.
The relationship of the couple deteriorated until they decided to
separate sometime in 1990. Teresita blamed Reynaldo for the
break-up, stating he was always nagging her about money
matters. Reynaldo, on the other hand, contended that Teresita was
a spendthrift, buying expensive jewelry and antique furniture
instead of attending to household expenses.
Instead of giving their marriage a second chance as allegedly
pleaded by Reynaldo, Teresita left Reynaldo and the children and
went back to California. She claims, however, that she spent a lot
of money on long distance telephone calls to keep in constant
touch with her children.
Reynaldo brought his children home to the Philippines, but because
his assignment in Pittsburgh was not yet completed, he was sent
back by his company to Pittsburgh. He had to leave his children
with his sister, co-petitioner Guillerma Layug and her family.
Teresita claims that she did not immediately follow her children
because Reynaldo filed a criminal case for bigamy against her and
she was afraid of being arrested. The judgment of conviction in the
bigamy case was actually rendered only on September 29, 1994.
(Per Judge Harriet O. Demetriou, Branch 70, RTC, Pasig, pp. 210-
222,Rollo). Teresita, meanwhile, decided to return to the Philippines
and on December 8, 1992 and filed the petition for a writ
of habeas corpus against herein two petitioners to gain custody
over the children, thus starting the whole proceedings now
reaching this Court.
On June 30, 1993, the trial court dismissed the petition for habeas
corpus. It suspended Teresita's parental authority over Rosalind
and Reginald and declared Reynaldo to have sole parental
authority over them but with rights of visitation to be agreed upon
by the parties and to be approved by the Court.
On February 16, 1994, the Court of Appeals per Justice Isnani, with
Justices de Pano and Ibay-Somera concurring, reversed the trial
court's decision. It gave custody to Teresita and visitation rights on
weekends to Reynaldo.
Petitioners now come to this Court on a petition for review, in the
main contending that the Court of Appeals disregarded the factual
findings of the trial court; that the Court of Appeals further
engaged in speculations and conjectures, resulting in its erroneous
conclusion that custody of the children should be given to
respondent Teresita.
We believe that respondent court resolved the question of custody
over the children through an automatic and blind application of the
age proviso of Article 363 of the Civil Code which reads:
Art. 363. In all questions on the care, custody,
education and property of the children, the latter's
welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be
separated from her child under seven years of age,
unless the court finds compelling reasons for such
measure.
Page | 261
Persons 4th Exam Cases
and of Article 213 of the Family Code which in turn
provides:
Art. 213. In case of separation of the parents
parental authority shall be exercised by the parent
designated by the Court. The Court shall take into
account all relevant considerations, especially the
choice of the child over seven years of age unless
the parent chosen is unfit.
The decision under review is based on the report of the Code
Commission which drafted Article 213 that a child below seven
years still needs the loving, tender care that only a mother can
give and which, presumably, a father cannot give in equal
measure. The commentaries of a member of the Code Commission,
former Court of Appeals Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy, in a textbook on
the Family Code, were also taken into account. Justice Diy believes
that a child below seven years should still be awarded to her
mother even if the latter is a prostitute or is unfaithful to her
husband. This is on the theory that moral dereliction has no effect
on a baby unable to understand such action. (Handbook on the
Family Code of the Philippines, 1988 Ed., p. 297.)
The Court of Appeals was unduly swayed by an abstract
presumption of law rather than an appreciation of relevant facts
and the law which should apply to those facts. The task of choosing
the parent to whom custody shall be awarded is not a ministerial
function to be determined by a simple determination of the age of
a minor child. Whether a child is under or over seven years of age,
the paramount criterion must always be the child's interests.
Discretion is given to the court to decide who can best assure the
welfare of the child, and award the custody on the basis of that
consideration. In Unson III vs. Navarro (101 SCRA 183 [1980]), we
laid down the rule that "in all controversies regarding the custody
of minors, the sole and foremost consideration is the physical,
education, social and moral welfare of the child concerned, taking
into account the respective resources and social and moral
situations of the contending parents", and in Medina
vs. Makabali (27 SCRA 502 [1969]), where custody of the minor
was given to a non-relative as against the mother, then the
country's leading civilist, Justice J.B.L. Reyes, explained its basis in
this manner:
. . . While our law recognizes the right of a parent
to the custody of her child, Courts must not lose
sight of the basic principle that "in all questions on
the care, custody, education and property of
children, the latter's welfare shall be paramount"
(Civil Code of the Philippines. Art. 363), and that for
compelling reasons, even a child under seven may
be ordered separated from the mother (do). This is
as it should be, for in the continual evolution of
legal institutions, the patria potestas has been
transformed from the jus vitae ac necis (right of life
and death) of the Roman law, under which the
offspring was virtually a chattel of his parents into
a radically different institution, due to the influence
of Christian faith and doctrines. The obligational
aspect is now supreme. As pointed out by Puig
Pena, now "there is no power, but a task; no
complex of rights (of parents) but a sum of duties;
Page | 262
Persons 4th Exam Cases
no sovereignty, but a sacred trust for the welfare of
the minor."
As a result, the right of parents to the company
and custody of their children is but ancillary to the
proper discharge of parental duties to provide the
children with adequate support, education, moral,
intellectual and civic training and development
(Civil Code, Art. 356).
(pp. 504-505.)
In ascertaining the welfare and best interests of the child, courts
are mandated by the Family Code to take into account all relevant
considerations. If a child is under seven years of age, the law
presumes that the mother is the best custodian. The presumption
is strong but it is not conclusive. It can be overcome by
"compelling reasons". If a child is over seven, his choice is
paramount but, again, the court is not bound by that choice. In its
discretion, the court may find the chosen parent unfit and award
custody to the other parent, or even to a third party as it deems fit
under the circumstances.
In the present case, both Rosalind and Reginald are now over
seven years of age. Rosalind celebrated her seventh birthday on
August 16, 1993 while Reginald reached the same age on January
12, 1995. Both are studying in reputable schools and appear to be
fairly intelligent children, quite capable of thoughtfully determining
the parent with whom they would want to live. Once the choice has
been made, the burden returns to the court to investigate if the
parent thus chosen is unfit to assume parental authority and
custodial responsibility.
Herein lies the error of the Court of Appeals. Instead of scrutinizing
the records to discover the choice of the children and rather than
verifying whether that parent is fit or unfit, respondent court simply
followed statutory presumptions and general propositions
applicable to ordinary or common situations. The seven-year age
limit was mechanically treated as an arbitrary cut off period and
not a guide based on a strong presumption.
A scrutiny of the pleadings in this case indicates that Teresita, or at
least, her counsel are more intent on emphasizing the "torture and
agony" of a mother separated from her children and the
humiliation she suffered as a result of her character being made a
key issue in court rather than the feelings and future, the best
interests and welfare of her children. While the bonds between a
mother and her small child are special in nature, either parent,
whether father or mother, is bound to suffer agony and pain if
deprived of custody. One cannot say that his or her suffering is
greater than that of the other parent. It is not so much the
suffering, pride, and other feelings of either parent but the welfare
of the child which is the paramount consideration.
We are inclined to sustain the findings and conclusions of the
regional trial court because it gave greater attention to the choice
of Rosalind and considered in detail all the relevant factors bearing
on the issue of custody.
When she was a little over 5 years old, Rosalind was referred to a
child psychologist, Rita Flores Macabulos, to determine the effects
of uprooting her from the Assumption College where she was
studying. Four different tests were administered. The results of the
tests are quite revealing. The responses of Rosalind about her
mother were very negative causing the psychologist to delve
deeper into the child's anxiety. Among the things revealed by
Rosalind was an incident where she saw her mother hugging and
kissing a "bad" man who lived in their house and worked for her
father. Rosalind refused to talk to her mother even on the
telephone. She tended to be emotionally emblazed because of
constant fears that she may have to leave school and her aunt's
family to go back to the United States to live with her mother. The
5-1/2 page report deals at length with feelings of insecurity and
anxiety arising from strong conflict with the mother. The child tried
to compensate by having fantasy activities. All of the 8
recommendations of the child psychologist show that Rosalind
chooses petitioners over the private respondent and that her
welfare will be best served by staying with them (pp. 199-
205, Rollo).
At about the same time, a social welfare case study was conducted
for the purpose of securing the travel clearance required before
minors may go abroad. Social Welfare Officer Emma D. Estrada
Lopez, stated that the child Rosalind refused to go back to the
United States and be reunited with her mother. She felt unloved
Page | 263
Persons 4th Exam Cases
and uncared for. Rosalind was more attached to her Yaya who did
everything for her and Reginald. The child was found suffering from
emotional shock caused by her mother's infidelity. The application
for travel clearance was recommended for denial (pp. 206-
209, Rollo).
Respondent Teresita, for her part, argues that the 7-year age
reference in the law applies to the date when the petition for a writ
of habeas corpus is filed, not to the date when a decision is
rendered. This argument is flawed. Considerations involving the
choice made by a child must be ascertained at the time that either
parent is given custody over the child. The matter of custody is not
permanent and unalterable. If the parent who was given custody
suffers a future character change and becomes unfit, the matter of
custody can always be re-examined and adjusted (Unson III v.
Navarro, supra, at p. 189). To be sure, the welfare, the best
interests, the benefit, and the good of the child must be
determined as of the time that either parent is chosen to be the
custodian. At the present time, both children are over 7 years of
age and are thus perfectly capable of making a fairly intelligent
choice.
According to respondent Teresita, she and her children had tearful
reunion in the trial court, with the children crying, grabbing, and
embracing her to prevent the father from taking them away from
her. We are more inclined to believe the father's contention that
the children ignored Teresita in court because such an emotional
display as described by Teresita in her pleadings could not have
been missed by the trial court. Unlike the Justices of the Court of
Appeals Fourth Division, Judge Lucas P. Bersamin personally
observed the children and their mother in the courtroom. What the
Judge found is diametrically opposed to the contentions of
respondent Teresita. The Judge had this to say on the matter.
And, lastly, the Court cannot look at petitioner
[Teresita] in similar light, or with more
understanding, especially as her conduct and
demeanor in the courtroom (during most of the
proceedings) or elsewhere (but in the presence of
the undersigned presiding judge) demonstrated her
ebulent temper that tended to corroborate the
alleged violence of her physical punishment of the
children (even if only for ordinary disciplinary
purposes) and emotional instability, typified by her
failure (or refusal?) to show deference and respect
to the Court and the other parties (pp. 12-13, RTC
Decision)
Respondent Teresita also questions the competence and
impartiality of the expert witnesses. Respondent court, in turn,
states that the trial court should have considered the fact that
Reynaldo and his sister, herein petitioner Guillerma Layug, hired
the two expert witnesses. Actually, this was taken into account by
the trial court which stated that the allegations of bias and
unfairness made by Teresita against the psychologist and social
worker were not substantiated.
The trial court stated that the professional integrity and
competence of the expert witnesses and the objectivity of the
interviews were unshaken and unimpeached. We might add that
their testimony remain uncontroverted. We also note that the
examinations made by the experts were conducted in late 1991,
well over a year before the filing by Teresita of the habeas
corpus petition in December, 1992. Thus, the examinations were at
that time not intended to support petitioners' position in litigation,
because there was then not even an impending possibility of one.
That they were subsequently utilized in the case a quo when it did
materialize does not change the tenor in which they were first
obtained.
Furthermore, such examinations, when presented to the court must
be construed to have been presented not to sway the court in favor
of any of the parties, but to assist the court in the determination of
the issue before it. The persons who effected such examinations
were presented in the capacity of expert witnesses testifying on
matters within their respective knowledge and expertise. On this
matter, this Court had occasion to rule in the case of Sali
vs. Abukakar, et al. (17 SCRA 988 [1966]).
The fact that, in a particular litigation, an NBI
expert examines certain contested documents, at
the request, not of a public officer or agency of the
Government, but of a private litigant, does not
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
necessarily nullify the examination thus made. Its
purpose, presumably, to assist the court having
jurisdiction over said litigation, in the performance
of its duty to settle correctly the issues relative to
said documents. Even a non-expert private
individual may examine the same, if there are facts
within his knowledge which may help, the court in
the determination of said issue. Such examination,
which may properly be undertaken by a non-expert
private individual, does not, certainly become null
and void when the examiner is an expert and/or an
officer of the NBI.
(pp. 991-992.)
In regard to testimony of expert witnesses it was held in Salomon,
et al. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al. (185 SCRA 352
[1990]):
. . . Although courts are not ordinarily bound by
expert testimonies, they may place whatever
weight they choose upon such testimonies in
accordance with the facts of the case. The relative
weight and sufficiency of expert testimony is
peculiarly within the province of the trial court to
decide, considering the ability and character of the
witness, his actions upon the witness stand, the
weight and process of the reasoning by which he
has supported his opinion, his possible bias in favor
of the side for whom he testifies, the fact that he is
a paid witness, the relative opportunities for study
and observation of the matters about which he
testifies, and any other matters which reserve to
illuminate his statements. The opinion of the
expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be
considered by the court in view of all the facts and
circumstances in the case and when common
knowledge utterly fails, the expert opinion may be
given controlling effect (20 Am. Jur., 1056-1058).
The problem of the credibility of the expert witness
and the evaluation of his testimony is left to the
discretion of the trial court whose ruling thereupon
is not reviewable in the absence of an abuse of
that discretion.
(p. 359)
It was in the exercise of this discretion, coupled with the
opportunity to assess the witnesses' character and to observe their
respective demeanor that the trial court opted to rely on their
testimony, and we believe that the trial court was correct in its
action.
Under direct examination an February 4, 1993, Social Worker Lopez
stated that Rosalind and her aunt were about to board a plane
when they were off-loaded because there was no required
clearance. They were referred to her office, at which time Reginald
was also brought along and interviewed. One of the regular duties
of Social Worker Lopez in her job appears to be the interview of
minors who leave for abroad with their parents or other persons.
The interview was for purposes of foreign travel by a 5-year old
child and had nothing to do with any pending litigation. On cross-
examination, Social Worker Lopez stated that her assessment of
the minor's hatred for her mother was based on the disclosures of
the minor. It is inconceivable, much less presumable that Ms. Lopez
would compromise her position, ethics, and the public trust
reposed on a person of her position in the course of doing her job
by falsely testifying just to support the position of any litigant.
The psychologist, Ms. Macabulos, is a B.S. magna cum laude
graduate in Psychology and an M.A. degree holder also in
Psychology with her thesis graded "Excellent". She was a candidate
for a doctoral degree at the time of the interview. Petitioner
Reynaldo may have shouldered the cost of the interview but Ms.
Macabulos services were secured because Assumption College
wanted an examination of the child for school purposes and not
because of any litigation. She may have been paid to examine the
child and to render a finding based on her examination, but she
was not paid to fabricate such findings in favor of the party who
retained her services. In this instance it was not even petitioner
Reynaldo but the school authorities who initiated the same. It
cannot be presumed that a professional of her potential and
stature would compromise her professional standing.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
Teresita questions the findings of the trial court that:
1. Her morality is questionable as shown by her
marrying Reynaldo at the time she had a subsisting
marriage with another man.
2. She is guilty of grave indiscretion in carrying on
a love affair with one of the Reynaldo's fellow NSC
employees.
3. She is incapable of providing the children with
necessities and conveniences commensurate to
their social standing because she does not even
own any home in the Philippines.
4. She is emotionally unstable with ebullient
temper.
It is contended that the above findings do not constitute the
compelling reasons under the law which would justify depriving her
of custody over the children; worse, she claims, these findings are
non-existent and have not been proved by clear and convincing
evidence.
Public and private respondents give undue weight to the matter of
a child under 7 years of age not to be separated from the mother,
without considering what the law itself denominates as compelling
reasons or relevant considerations to otherwise decree. In
the Unson III case, earlier mentioned, this Court stated that it
found no difficulty in not awarding custody to the mother, it being
in the best interest of the child "to be freed from the obviously
unwholesome, not
to say immoral influence, that the situation where [the mother] had
placed herself . . . might create in the moral and social outlook of
[the child] who was in her formative and most impressionable
stage . . ."
Then too, it must be noted that both Rosalind and Reginald are now
over 7 years of age. They understand the difference between right
and wrong, ethical behavior and deviant immorality. Their best
interests would be better served in an environment characterized
by emotional stability and a certain degree of material sufficiency.
There is nothing in the records to show that Reynaldo is an "unfit"
person under Article 213 of the Family Code. In fact, he has been
trying his best to give the children the kind of attention and care
which the mother is not in a position to extend.
The argument that the charges against the mother are false is not
supported by the records. The findings of the trial court are based
on evidence.
Teresita does not deny that she was legally married to Roberto
Lustado on December 17, 1984 in California (p. 13, Respondent's
Memorandum; p. 238, Rollo; pp. 11, RTC Decision). Less than a
year later, she had already driven across the continental United
States to commence living with another man, petitioner Reynaldo,
in Pittsburgh. The two were married on October 7, 1987. Of course,
to dilute this disadvantage on her part, this matter of her having
contracted a bigamous marriage later with Reynaldo, Teresita tried
to picture Reynaldo as a rapist, alleging further that she told
Reynaldo about her marriage to Lustado on the occasion when she
was raped by Reynaldo. Expectedly, Judge Harriet Demetriou of the
Pasig RTC lent no weight to such tale. And even if this story were
given credence, it adds to and not subtracts from the conviction of
this Court about Teresita's values. Rape is an insidious crime
against privacy. Confiding to one's potential rapist about a prior
marriage is not a very convincing indication that the potential
victim is averse to the act. The implication created is that the act
would be acceptable if not for the prior marriage.
More likely is Reynaldo's story that he learned of the prior marriage
only much later. In fact, the rape incident itself is unlikely against a
woman who had driven three days and three nights from California,
who went straight to the house of Reynaldo in Pittsburgh and upon
arriving went to bed and, who immediately thereafter started to
live with him in a relationship which is marital in nature if not in
fact.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

Judge Bersamin of the court a quo believed the testimony of the The law is more than satisfied by the judgment of the trial court.
various witnesses that while married to Reynaldo, Teresita entered The children are now both over seven years old. Their choice of the
into an illicit relationship with Perdencio Gonzales right there in the parent with whom they prefer to stay is clear from the record. From
house of petitioner Reynaldo and respondent Teresita. Perdencio all indications, Reynaldo is a fit person, thus meeting the two
had been assigned by the National Steel Corporation to assist in requirements found in the first paragraph of Article 213 of the
the project in Pittsburgh and was staying with Reynaldo, his co- Family Code. The presumption under the second paragraph of said
employee, in the latter's house. The record shows that the article no longer applies as the children are over seven years.
daughter Rosalind suffered emotional disturbance caused by the Assuming that the presumption should have persuasive value for
traumatic effect of seeing her mother hugging and kissing a children only one or two years beyond the age of seven years
boarder in their house. The record also shows that it was Teresita mentioned in the statute, there are compelling reasons and
who left the conjugal home and the children, bound for California. relevant considerations not to grant custody to the mother. The
When Perdencio Gonzales was reassigned to the Philippines, children understand the unfortunate shortcomings of their mother
Teresita followed him and was seen in his company in a Cebu hotel, and have been affected in their emotional growth by her behavior.
staying in one room and taking breakfast together. More significant WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the
is that letters and written messages from Teresita to Perdencio Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside, and the decision of
were submitted in evidence (p.12, RTC Decision). Branch 96 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial
The argument that moral laxity or the habit of flirting from one Region stationed in Quezon City and presided over by the
man to another does not fall under "compelling reasons" is neither Honorable Lucas P. Bersamin in its Civil Case No. Q-92-14206
meritorious nor applicable in this case. Not only are the children awarding custody of the minors Rosalind and Reginald Espiritu to
over seven years old and their clear choice is the father, but the their father, Reynaldo Espiritu, is reinstated. No special
illicit or immoral activities of the mother had already caused pronouncement is made as to costs.
emotional disturbances, personality conflicts, and exposure to SO ORDERED.
conflicting moral values, at least in Rosalind. This is not to mention
her conviction for the crime of bigamy, which from the records
appears to have become final (pp. 210-222, Rollo).
Respondent court's finding that the father could not very well
perform the role of a sole parent and substitute mother because
his job is in the United States while the children will be left behind
with their aunt in the Philippines is misplaced. The assignment of
Reynaldo in Pittsburgh is or was a temporary one. He was sent
there to oversee the purchase of a steel mill component and
various equipment needed by the National Steel Corporation in the
Philippines. Once the purchases are completed, there is nothing to
keep him there anymore. In fact, in a letter dated January 30,
1995, Reynaldo informs this Court of the completion of his
assignment abroad and of his permanent return to the Philippines
(ff.
p. 263, Rollo).

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
G.R. No. 113054 March 16, 1995
LEOUEL SANTOS, SR., petitioner-appellant,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and SPOUSES LEOPOLDO and OFELIA
BEDIA, respondents-appellees.
ROMERO, J.:
In this petition for review, we are asked to overturn the decision of
the Court of Appeals 1 granting custody of six-year old Leouel
Santos, Jr. to his maternal grandparents and not to his father,
Santos, Sr. What is sought is a decision which should definitively
settle the matter of the care, custody and control of the boy.
Happily, unlike King Solomon, we need not merely rely on a "wise
and understanding heart," for there is man's law to guide us and
that is, the Family Code.
The antecedent facts giving rise to the case at bench are as
follows:
Petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr., an army lieutenant, and Julia Bedia a
nurse by profession, were married in Iloilo City in 1986. Their union
beget only one child, Leouel Santos, Jr. who was born July 18, 1987.
From the time the boy was released from the hospital until
sometime thereafter, he had been in the care and custody of his
maternal grandparents, private respondents herein, Leopoldo and
Ofelia Bedia.
Petitioner and wife Julia agreed to place Leouel Jr. in the temporary
custody of the latter's parents, the respondent spouses Bedia. The
latter alleged that they paid for all the hospital bills, as well as the
subsequent support of the boy because petitioner could not afford
to do so.
The boy's mother, Julia Bedia-Santos, left for the United States in
May 1988 to work. Petitioner alleged that he is not aware of her
whereabouts and his efforts to locate her in the United States
proved futile. Private respondents claim that although abroad, their
daughter Julia had been sending financial support to them for her
son.
On September 2, 1990, petitioner along with his two brothers,
visited the Bedia household, where three-year old Leouel Jr. was
staying. Private respondents contend that through deceit and false
pretensions, petitioner abducted the boy and clandestinely spirited
him away to his hometown in Bacong, Negros Oriental.
The spouses Bedia then filed a "Petition for Care, Custody and
Control of Minor Ward Leouel Santos Jr.," before the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City, with Santos, Sr. as respondent. 2
After an ex-parte hearing on October 8, 1990, the trial court issued
an order on the same day awarding custody of the child Leouel
Santos, Jr. to his grandparents, Leopoldo and Ofelia Bedia. 3
Petitioner appealed this Order to the Court of Appeals. 4 In its
decision dated April 30, 1992, respondent appellate court affirmed
the trial court's
order. 5 His motion for reconsideration having been
denied, 6 petitioner now brings the instant petition for review for a
reversal of the appellate court's decision.
The Court of Appeals erred, according to petitioner, in awarding
custody of the boy to his grandparents and not to himself. He
contends that since private respondents have failed to show that
petitioner is an unfit and unsuitable father, substitute parental
authority granted to the boy's grandparents under Art. 214 of the
Family Code is inappropriate.
Petitioner adds that the reasons relied upon by the private
respondents in having custody over the boy, are flimsy and
insufficient to deprive him of his natural and legal right to have
custody.
On the other hand, private respondents aver that they can provide
an air-conditioned room for the boy and that petitioner would not
be in a position to take care of his son since he has to be assigned
to different places. They also allege that the petitioner did not give
a single centavo for the boy's support and maintenance. When the
boy was about to be released from the hospital, they were the ones
who paid the fees because their daughter and petitioner had no
money. Besides, Julia Bedia Santos, their daughter, had entrusted
the boy to them before she left for the United States. Furthermore,
petitioner's use of trickery and deceit in abducting the child in
1990, after being hospitably treated by private respondents, does
not speak well of his fitness and suitability as a parent.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
The Bedias argue that although the law recognizes the right of a
parent to his child's custody, ultimately the primary consideration
is what is best for the happiness and welfare of the latter. As
maternal grandparents who have amply demonstrated their love
and affection for the boy since his infancy, they claim to be in the
best position to promote the child's welfare.
The issue to be resolved here boils down to who should properly be
awarded custody of the minor Leouel Santos, Jr.
The right of custody accorded to parents springs from the exercise
of parental authority. Parental authority orpatria potestas in Roman
Law is the juridical institution whereby parents rightfully assume
control and protection of their unemancipated children to the
extent required by the latter' s needs. 7 It is a mass of rights and
obligations which the law grants to parents for the purpose of the
children's physical preservation and development, as well as the
cultivation of their intellect and the education of their heart and
senses. 8 As regards parental authority, "there is no power, but a
task; no complex of rights, but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but
a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor." 9
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not
be transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by
law. 10 The right attached to parental authority, being purely
personal, the law allows a waiver of parental authority only in
cases of adoption, guardianship and surrender to a children's home
or an orphan institution. 11 When a parent entrusts the custody of a
minor to another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a
document, what is given is merely temporary custody and it does
not constitute a renunciation of parental authority. 12 Even if a
definite renunciation is manifest, the law still disallows the same. 13
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of
unemancipated children, are duty-bound and entitled to keep them
in their custody and
company. 14 The child's welfare is always the paramount
consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody. 15
The law vests on the father and mother joint parental authority
over the persons of their common children. 16 In case of absence or
death of either parent, the parent present shall continue exercising
parental authority. 17 Only in case of the parents' death, absence or
unsuitability may substitute parental authority be exercised by the
surviving grandparent. 18The situation obtaining in the case at
bench is one where the mother of the minor Santos, Jr., is working
in the United States while the father, petitioner Santos, Sr., is
present. Not only are they physically apart but are also emotionally
separated. There has been no decree of legal separation and
petitioner's attempt to obtain an annulment of the marriage on the
ground of psychological incapacity of his wife has failed. 19
Petitioner assails the decisions of both the trial court and the
appellate court to award custody of his minor son to his parents-in-
law, the Bedia spouses on the ground that under Art. 214 of the
Family Code, substitute parental authority of the grandparents is
proper only when both parents are dead, absent or unsuitable.
Petitioner's unfitness, according to him, has not been successfully
shown by private respondents.
The Court of Appeals held that although there is no evidence to
show that petitioner (Santos Sr.) is "depraved, a habitual drunkard
or poor, he may nevertheless be considered, as he is in fact so
considered, to be unsuitable to be allowed to have custody of
minor Leouel Santos Jr." 20
The respondent appellate court, in affirming the trial court's order
of October 8, 1990, adopted as its own the latter's observations, to
wit:
From the evidence adduced, this Court is of the
opinion that it is to be (sic) best interest of the
minor Leouel Santos, Jr. that he be placed under
the care, custody, and control of his maternal
grandparents the petitioners herein. The
petitioners have amply demonstrated their love
and devotion to their grandson while the natural
father, respondent herein, has shown little interest
in his welfare as reflected by his conduct in the
past. Moreover the fact that petitioners are well-off
financially, should be carefully considered in
awarding to them the custody of the minor herein,
lest the breaking of such ties with his maternal
grandparents might deprive the boy of an eventual
college education and other material advantages
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
(Consaul vs. Consaul, 63 N.Y.S. 688). Respondent
had never given any previous financial support to
his son, while, upon the other hand, the latter
receives so much bounty from his maternal
grandparents and his mother as well, who is now
gainfully employed in the United States. Moreover,
the fact that respondent, as a military personnel
who has to shuttle from one assignment to
another, and, in these troubled times, may have
pressing and compelling military duties which may
prevent him from attending to his son at times
when the latter needs him most, militates strongly
against said respondent. Additionally, the child is
sickly and asthmatic and needs the loving and
tender care of those who can provide for it. 21
We find the aforementioned considerations insufficient to defeat
petitioner's parental authority and the concomitant right to have
custody over the minor Leouel Santos, Jr., particularly since he has
not been shown to be an unsuitable and unfit parent. Private
respondents' demonstrated love and affection for the boy,
notwithstanding, the legitimate father is still preferred over the
grandparents. 22 The latter's wealth is not a deciding factor,
particularly because there is no proof that at the present time,
petitioner is in no position to support the boy. The fact that he was
unable to provide financial support for his minor son from birth up
to over three years when he took the boy from his in-laws without
permission, should not be sufficient reason to strip him of his
permanent right to the child's custody. While petitioner's previous
inattention is inexcusable and merits only the severest criticism, it
cannot be construed as abandonment. His appeal of the
unfavorable decision against him and his efforts to keep his only
child in his custody may be regarded as serious efforts to rectify his
past misdeeds. To award him custody would help enhance the bond
between parent and son. It would also give the father a chance to
prove his love for his son and for the son to experience the warmth
and support which a father can give.
His being a soldier is likewise no bar to allowing him custody over
the boy. So many men in uniform who are assigned to different
parts of the country in the service of the nation, are still the natural
guardians of their children. It is not just to deprive our soldiers of
authority, care and custody over their children merely because of
the normal consequences of their duties and assignments, such as
temporary separation from their families.
Petitioner's employment of trickery in spiriting away his boy from
his in-laws, though unjustifiable, is likewise not a ground to wrest
custody from him.
Private respondents' attachment to the young boy whom they have
reared for the past three years is understandable. Still and all, the
law considers the natural love of a parent to outweigh that of the
grandparents, such that only when the parent present is shown to
be unfit or unsuitable may the grandparents exercise substitute
parental authority, a fact which has not been proven here.
The strong bonds of love and affection possessed by private
respondents as grandparents should not be seen as incompatible
with petitioner' right to custody over the child as a father.
Moreover, who is to say whether the petitioner's financial standing
may improve in the future?
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals dated April 30, 1992 as well as its
Resolution dated November 13, 1992 are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Custody over the minor Leouel Santos Jr. is awarded to
his legitimate father, herein petitioner Leouel Santos, Sr.
SO ORDERED.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
[G.R. No. 116773. January 16, 1997]
TERESITA SAGALA-ESLAO, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and MARIA PAZ CORDERO-OUYE, respondents.
DECISION
TORRES, JR., J.:
Children begin by loving their parents. After a time they judge
them. Rarely, if ever, do they forgive them. [1] Indeed, parenthood is a
riddle of no mean proportions except for its mission. Thus, a mothers
concern for her childs custody is undying - such is a mothers love.
The right of the mother to the custody of her daughter is the issue
in the case at bar.
In this petition for review, Teresita Sagala-Eslao seeks the reversal
of the Court of Appeals decision[2] dated March 25, 1994, which
affirmed the trial courts judgment granting the petition of Maria Paz
Cordero-Ouye to recover the custody of her minor daughter from her
mother-in-law, Teresita Sagala-Eslao.
As found by the Court of Appeals, the facts of the case are as
follows:
From the evidence, it appears that on June 22, 1984, petitioner Maria
Paz Cordero-Ouye and Reynaldo Eslao were married; [3] after their
marriage, the couple stayed with respondent Teresita Eslao, mother of
the husband, at 1825, Road 14, Fabie Estate, Paco, Manila; that out of
their marriage, two children were begotten, namely, Leslie Eslao who
was born on February 23, 1986 and Angelica Eslao who was born on
April 20, 1987;[4] in the meantime, Leslie was entrusted to the care and
custody of petitioners mother in Sta. Ana, Pampanga, while Angelica
stayed with her parents at respondents house; on August 6, 1990,
petitioners husband Reynaldo Eslao died; [5] petitioner intended to bring
Angelica with her to Pampanga but the respondent prevailed upon her
to entrust the custody of Angelica to her, respondent reasoning out
that her son just died and to assuage her grief therefor, she needed
the company of the child to at least compensate for the loss of her late
son. In the meantime, the petitioner returned to her mothers house in
Pampanga where she stayed with Leslie.
Subsequently, petitioner was introduced by her auntie to Dr. James
Manabu-Ouye, a Japanese-American, who is an orthodontist practicing
in the United States; their acquaintance blossomed into a meaningful
relationship where on March 18, 1992, the petitioner and Dr. James
Ouye decided to get married; less than ten months thereafter, or on
January 15, 1993, the petitioner migrated to San Francisco, California,
USA, to join her new husband. At present, the petitioner is a trainee at
the Union Bank in San Francisco, while her husband is a progressive
practitioner of his profession who owns three cars, a dental clinic and
earns US$5,000 a month. On June 24, 1993, the petitioner returned to
the Philippines to be reunited with her children and bring them to the
United States; the petitioner then informed the respondent about her
desire to take custody of Angelica and explained that her present
husband, Dr. James Ouye, expressed his willingness to adopt Leslie and
Angelica and to provide for their support and education; however,
respondent resisted the idea by way of explaining that the child was
entrusted to her when she was ten days old and accused the petitioner
of having abandoned Angelica. Because of the adamant attitude of the
respondent, the petitioner then sought the assistance of a lawyer, Atty.
Mariano de Joya, Jr., who wrote a letter to the respondent demanding
for the return of the custody of Angelica to her natural mother [6] and
when the demand remain[ed] unheeded, the petitioner instituted the
present action.[7]
After the trial on the merits, the lower court rendered its decision,
the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the Court grants
the same and let the corresponding writ issue. As a corollary,
respondent Teresita Sagala-Eslao or anyone acting under her behalf is
hereby directed to cause the immediate transfer of the custody of the
minor Angelica Cordero Eslao, to her natural mother, petitioner Maria
Paz Cordero-Ouye.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the respondent court affirmed in full the decision of
the trial court.
Hence, the instant petition by the minors paternal grandmother,
contending that the Court of Appeals erred:
I
IN RULING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT MARIA PAZ CORDERO-OUYE,
DID NOT ABANDON MINOR, ANGELICA ESLAO, TO THE CARE AND
CUSTODY OF THE PETITIONER TERESITA SAGALA-ESLAO.
II
IN RULING THAT THERE WAS NO COMPELLING REASON TO SEPARATE
MINOR, ANGELICA ESLAO, FROM PRIVATE RESPONDENT MARIA PAZ
CORDERO-OUYE, IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER TERESITA SAGALA-ESLAO.
III
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
IN NOT FINDING THAT PETITIONER TERESITA SAGALA-ESLAO, IS FIT TO
BE GIVEN THE CUSTODY OF MINOR, ANGELICA ESLAO. the situation, the house has only 2 toilets and 3 faucets.Finally,
The petition is without merit.
Being interrelated, the issues shall be discussed jointly.
Petitioner argues that she would be deserving to take care of
Angelica; that she had managed to raise 12 children of her own
herself; that she has the financial means to carry out her plans for
Angelica; that she maintains a store which earns a net income of about
P500 a day, she gets P900 a month as pension for the death of her
husband, she rents out rooms in her house which she owns, for which
she earns a total of P6,000 a month, and that from her gross income of
roughly P21,000, she spends about P10,000 for the maintenance of her
house. 229 of the Family Code because petitioner failed to resort to such
Despite the foregoing, however, and petitioners genuine desire to
remain with said child, that would qualify her to have custody of
Angelica, the trial courts disquisition, in consonance with the provision
that the childs welfare is always the paramount consideration in all
questions concerning his care and custody [8] convinced this Court to
decide in favor of private respondent, thus:
On the other hand, the side of the petitioner must also be presented
here. In this case, we see a picture of a real and natural mother who is
- birthday, and neither did the former give her cards or gifts, not even a
x x x legitimately, anxiously, and desperately trying to get back her
child in order to fill the void in her heart and existence. She wants to
make up for what she has failed to do for her boy during the period
when she was financially unable to help him and when she could not
have him in her house because of the objection of the father. Now that
she has her own home and is in a better financial condition, she wants
her child back, and we repeat that she has not and has never given
him up definitely or with any idea of permanence. [9]
The petitioner herein is married to an Orthodontist who has a lucrative
practice of his profession in San Francisco, California, USA. The
petitioner and her present husband have a home of their own and they
have three cars. The petitioners husband is willing to adopt the
petitioners children. If the children will be with their mother, the
probability is that they will be afforded a bright future. Contrast this
situation with the one prevailing in the respondents [grandmothers]
house. As admitted by the respondent, four of the rooms in her house
are being rented to other persons with each room occupied by 4 to 5
persons. Added to these persons are the respondents 2 sons, Samuel
and Alfredo, and their respective families (ibid., p. 54) and one can just
visualize the kind of atmosphere pervading thereat. And to aggravate
considering that in all controversies involving the custody of minors,
the foremost criterion is the physical and moral well being of the child
taking into account the respective resources and social and moral
situations of the contending parties (Union III vs. Mariano, 101 SCRA
183), the Court is left with no other recourse but to grant the writ
prayed for.[10]
Petitioner further contends that the respondent court erred in
finding that there was no abandonment committed by the private
respondent; that while judicial declaration of abandonment of the child
in a case filed for the purpose is not here obtaining as mandated in Art.
judicial action, it does not ipso facto follow that there was in fact no
abandonment committed by the private respondent.
Petitioner also argues that it has been amply demonstrated during
the trial that private respondent had indeed abandoned Angelica to the
care and custody of the petitioner; that during all the time that
Angelica stayed with petitioner, there were only three instances or
occasions wherein the private respondent saw Angelica; that private
respondent never visited Angelica on important occasions, such as her
single candy;[11] that while private respondent claims otherwise and
that she visited Angelica "many times" an insists that she visited
Angelica as often as four times a month and gave her remembrances
such as candies and clothes, she would not even remember when the
fourth birthday of Angelica was.
We are not persuaded by such averments.
In Santos, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, 242 SCRA 407,[12] we
stated, viz:
xxx [Parental authority] is a mass of rights and obligations which the
law grants to parents for the purpose of the childrens physical
preservation and development, as well as the cultivation of their
intellect and the education of their heart and senses. [13] As regards
parental authority, there is no power, but a task; no complex of rights,
but a sum of duties; no sovereignty but a sacred trust for the welfare of
the minor.[14]
Parental authority and responsibility are inalienable and may not be
transferred or renounced except in cases authorized by law.[15] The
right attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law
allows a waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption,
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

guardianship and surrender to a childrens home or an orphan

institution.[16] When a parent entrusts the custody of a minor to
another, such as a friend or godfather, even in a document, what is
given is merely temporary custody and it does not constitute a
renunciation of parental authority. [17] Even if a definite renunciation is
manifest, the law still disallows the same.[18]
The father and mother, being the natural guardians of unemancipated
children, are duty-bound and entitled to keep them in their custody and
company.[19]
Thus, in the instant petition, when private respondent entrusted
the custody of her minor child to the petitioner, what she gave to the
latter was merely temporary custody and it did not constitute
abandonment or renunciation of parental authority. For the right
attached to parental authority, being purely personal, the law allows a
waiver of parental authority only in cases of adoption, guardianship
and surrender to a childrens home or an orphan institution which do
not appear in the case at bar.
Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the
courts that the right of parents to the custody of their minor children is
one of the natural rights incident to parenthood, a right supported by
law and sound public policy. The right is an inherent one, which is not
created by the state or decisions of the courts, but derives from the
nature of the parental relationship.[20]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision appealed from dated March 25,
1994 being in accordance with law and the evidence, the same is
hereby AFFIRMED and the petition DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
[G.R. No. 144763. September 3, 2002]
REYMOND B. LAXAMANA, petitioner, vs. MA. LOURDES* D.
LAXAMANA, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is another sad tale of an estranged couples tug-of-war
over the custody of their minor children. Petitioner Reymond B.
Laxamana and respondent Ma. Lourdes D. Laxamana met
sometime in 1983. Petitioner, who came from a well-to-do family,
was a graduate of Bachelor of Laws, while respondent, a holder of
a degree in banking and finance, worked in a bank. After a
whirlwind courtship, petitioner, 31 years old and respondent, 33,
got married on June 6, 1984.[1] Respondent quit her job and
became a full-time housewife. Petitioner, on the other hand,
operated buy and sell, fishpond, and restaurant businesses for a
living. The union was blessed with three children twin brothers
Joseph and Vincent, born on March 15, 1985, and Michael, born on
June 19, 1986.[2]
All went well until petitioner became a drug dependent. In
October 1991, he was confined at the Estrellas Home Care Clinic in
Quezon City. He underwent psychotherapy and
psychopharmacological treatment and was discharged on
November 16, 1991.[3] Upon petition of respondent, the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, ordered petitioners
confinement at the NARCOM-DRC for treatment and rehabilitation.
[4]
Again, on October 30, 1996, the trial court granted petitioners
voluntary confinement for treatment and rehabilitation at the
National Bureau of Investigation-TRC.[5]
On April 25, 1997, the court issued an order declaring
petitioner already drug-free and directing him to report to a certain
Dr. Casimiro for out-patient counseling for 6 months to one (1)
year.[6]
Despite several confinements, respondent claimed petitioner
was not fully rehabilitated. His drug dependence worsened and it
became difficult for respondent and her children to live with
him. Petitioner allegedly became violent and irritable. On some
occasions, he even physically assaulted respondent. Thus, on June
17, 1999, respondent and her 3 children abandoned petitioner and
transferred to the house of her relatives.
On August 31, 1999, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 107, the instant petition for habeas
corpus praying for custody of his three children. [7] Respondent
opposed the petition, citing the drug dependence of petitioner. [8]
Meanwhile, on September 24, 1999, respondent filed a
petition for annulment of marriage with Branch 102 of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City.[9]
On September 27, 1999, petitioner filed in the habeas
corpus case, a motion seeking visitation rights over his children.
[10]
On December 7, 1999, after the parties reached an agreement,
the court issued an order granting visitation rights to petitioner and
directing the parties to undergo psychiatric and psychological
examination by a psychiatrist of their common choice. The parties
further agreed to submit the case for resolution after the trial
courts receipt of the results of their psychiatric examination. The
full text of said order reads:
The parties appeared with their respective lawyers. A conference
was held in open Court and the parties agreed on the following:
Effective this Saturday and every Saturday thereafter until further
order the petitioner shall fetch the children every Saturday and
Sunday at 9:00 oclock in the morning from the house of the sister
of respondent, Mrs. Corazon Soriano and to be returned at 5:00
oclock in the afternoon of the same days.
That the parties agreed to submit themselves to Dr. Teresito
Ocampo for psychiatric/psychological examination. Dr. Ocampo is
hereby advised to go over the records of this case to enable him to
have a thorough background of the problem. He is hereby ordered
to submit his findings directly to this Court without furnishing the
parties copies of his report. And after the receipt of that report,
thereafter, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision. [11]
On January 6, 2000, Dr. Ocampo submitted the results of his
psychiatric evaluation on the parties and their children. Pertinent
portions thereof state:
SINGLY and COLLECTIVELY, the following information was obtained
in the interview of the 3 children:
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
(1) THEY were affected psychologically by the drug-related
behavior of their father:
a. they have a difficult time concentrating on their studies.
b. they are envious of their classmates whose families live in peace
and harmony.
c. once, MICHAEL had to quit school temporarily.
(2) THEY witnessed their father when he was under the influence of
shabu.
(3) THEY think their father had been angry at their paternal
grandmother and this anger was displaced to their mother.
(4) THEY hope their father will completely and permanently recover
from his drug habit; and their criteria of his full recovery include:
a. he will regain his easy-going attitude.
b. he wont be hot-headed anymore and would not drive their van
recklessly.
c. he would not tell unverifiable stories anymore.
d. he would not poke a gun on his own head and ask the
children who they love better, mom or dad.
(5) At one point one of the sons, became very emotional while he
was narrating his story and he cried. I had to stop the interview.
(6) THEIR mother was fearful and terrified when their father
quarreled with her.
(7) THEY hope their visits to their father will not interfere with their
school and academic schedules.
xxxxxxxxx
(3) MARILOU is one of 4 siblings. She graduated from college with a
degree in banking and finance. SHE was a carreer (sic) woman;
worked for a bank for ten years; subsequently quit her job to
devote more time to her family.
(4) REYMOND is one of 5 siblings in a well-to-do family. His father
was a physician. During his developmental years, he recalled how
his mother complained incessantly about how bad the father was;
only to find later that the truth was opposite to the complaints of
his mother; that his father was nice, logical and understanding. He
recalled how he unselfishly served his father --- he opened the door
when he arrived home; he got his portfolio; he brought the days
newspaper; he removed his shoes; he brought his glass of beer or
his shot of whisky. In short, he served him like a servant. His father
died of stroke in 1990.
REYMOND graduated from college with a degree in LAW in 1984;
he did not pass the bar.
His work history is as follows:
a. 1985 to 1989 he operated fishponds.
b. 1976 to 1991 simultaneously, he operated restaurant.
c. 1991 he engaged in the trading of vegetable, cooking oil, and
mangos.
d. HE handled the leasing of a family property to a fast food
company.
The findings on the examination of the MENTAL STATUS and
MENTAL PROCESSES OF MARILOU showed a woman who showed
the psychological effects of the trauma she had in the past. She is
slightly edgy and fidgety with any external noise. SHE answered all
my questions coherently. Her emotional state was stable
throughout the interview. She is of average intelligence. She was
oriented to person, place and date. Her memory for recent and
remote events was intact. She could process sets of figures and
sets of similarities and differences. Her content of thought was
negative for delusions, hallucinations, paranoia, suicidal and
homicidal ideation. She could process abstract ideas and general
information. Her attention span was adequate. There was no
evidence of impaired judgment.
The Rorschach ink blot test gave responses such as man touching
a woman, 2 people on a hi-five , 2 women chatting, beast, stuffed
animal, etc. Her past reflected on her psyche. There is no creative
process. There were no bizarre ideas.
The ZUNG anxiety/depression test highlighted I get tired for no
reason; I feel that I am useful and needed (re, son). There is
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
moderate depression. However, she could still make competent
decisions.
The Social Adaptation Scale scored well in her capacity to adapt to
her situation. There is no evidence of losing control.
The findings on the examination of the MENTAL STATUS and
MENTAL PROCESSES of REYMOND showed an individual who
presented himself in the best situation he could possibly be. He is
cool, calm and collected. He answered all my questions
coherently. He is of average intelligence. He was oriented to
person, place and date. His memory for recent and remote events
was intace (sic). His content of thought was negative for delusions,
hallucinations, paranoia, suicidal and homicidal ideation. His
attention span was adequate. He could process abstract ideas, sets
of figures, and general information.
The Rorschach ink blot test gave responses such as distorted chest
, butterfly with scattered color, cat ran over by a car, nothing 2
people, monster etc. There is no central theme in his
responses. There were no bizarre ideas.
The Zung anxiety/depression test: My mind is as clear as it used to
be (most of the time). There was no evidence of brain
damage. There is no significant affective response that would
affect his rationality.
The Social Adaptive Scale scored well in his capacity to adapt to his
situation. He reached out well to others. He is in very good control
of his emotions.
BASED ON MY FINDINGS I MADE THE FOLLOWING COMMENTS AND
CONCLUSIONS:
I. The CRITERIA for cure in drug addiction consist of:
1. 5-years and 10-years intervals of drug-free periods.
2. change for the better of the maladaptive behaviors of
the addict consisting of telling lies, manipulative
behavior, melodramatic and hysterical actions.
3. constructive and reproductive outlets for the mental
and physical energies of the addict.
4. behavior oriented towards spiritual values and other
things.
II BASED on such scientific and observable criteria, I do not
yet consider REYMOND LAXAMANA completely cured even
though his drug urine test at Medical City for shabu was
negative. (Emphasis supplied)
III I DO NOT DETECT any evidence that the paternal visits of the
sons would be harmful or they would be in any danger. The
academic schedules of the sons has be taken into account in
determining the length and frequency of their visits.
x x x x x x x x x.[12]
On January 14, 2000, the trial court rendered the assailed
decision awarding the custody of the three children to respondent
and giving visitation rights to petitioner. The dispositive portion
thereof states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered:
1. The children, Joseph, Michael and Vincent all surnamed
Laxamana are hereby ordered to remain under the custody of the
respondent.
2. The visitation arrangement as per Order of December 7, 1999 is
hereby incorporated and forms part of this Decision. The parties
are enjoined to comply with the terms stated therein.
3. The petitioner is hereby ordered to undergo urine drug screen
for shabu for three times (3x) per month every ten (10) days, with
the Dangerous Drugs Board. The said Board is hereby ordered to
submit the results of all tests immediately as directed to this Court.
4. The petitioner is hereby referred to undergo regular counseling
at the Free-Clinic at the East Avenue Medical Center, Department
of Health Out Patient Psychiatry Department until further order. For
this purpose, it is suggested that he should see Dr. Teresito P.
Ocampo to make arrangements for said counseling.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Dangerous Drugs Board
and the Free-Clinic, Out Patient Psychiatry Department, East
Avenue Medical Center, Department of Health for their information
and guidance.
SO ORDERED.[13]
Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, based on the
following:
I
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
THE COURT A QUO HAS DEPARTED FROM THE ACCEPTED AND
USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS WHEN IT RESOLVED
THE ISSUE OF CUSTODY WITHOUT CONDUCTING A TRIAL TO
DETERMINE FACTUAL ISSUES.
II
THE COURT A QUO HAS RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF CUSTODY IN A
MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT WHEN IT
RESOLVED THE ISSUE OF CUSTODY WITHOUT CONSIDERING THE
PARAMOUNT INTEREST AND WELFARE OF HEREIN PARTIES THREE
(3) MINOR CHILDREN.
III
THE ASSAILED DECISION IS NULL AND VOID AS IT DOES NOT
COMPLY WITH SECTION 14 ARTICLE VIII OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.[14]
The core issue for resolution in the instant petition is whether
or not the trial court considered the paramount interest and
welfare of the children in awarding their custody to respondent.
In controversies involving the care, custody and control of
their minor children, the contending parents stand on equal footing
before the court who shall make the selection according to the best
interest of the child. The child if over seven years of age may be
permitted to choose which parent he/she prefers to live with, but
the court is not bound by such choice if the parent so chosen is
unfit. In all cases, the sole and foremost consideration is the
physical, educational, social and moral welfare of the child
concerned, taking into account the respective resources as well as
social and moral situations of the opposing parents. [15]
In Medina v. Makabali,[16] we stressed that this is as it should
be, for in the continual evolution of legal institutions, the patria
potestas has been transformed from the jus vitae ac necis (right of
life and death) of the Roman law, under which the offspring was
virtually a chattel of his parents, into a radically different
institution, due to the influence of Christian faith and doctrines.
The obligational aspect is now supreme. There is no power, but a
task; no complex rights of parents but a sum of duties; no
sovereignty, but a sacred trust for the welfare of the minor.
Mindful of the nature of the case at bar, the court a
quo should have conducted a trial notwithstanding the agreement
of the parties to submit the case for resolution on the basis, inter
alia, of the psychiatric report of Dr. Teresito. Thus, petitioner is not
estopped from questioning the absence of a trial considering that
said psychiatric report, which was the courts primary basis in
awarding custody to respondent, is insufficient to justify the
decision. The fundamental policy of the State to promote and
protect the welfare of children shall not be disregarded by mere
technicality in resolving disputes which involve the family and the
youth.[17] While petitioner may have a history of drug dependence,
the records are inadequate as to his moral, financial and social
well-being. The results of the psychiatric evaluation showing that
he is not yet completely cured may render him unfit to take
custody of the children, but there is no evidence to show that
respondent is unfit to provide the children with adequate support,
education, as well as moral and intellectual training and
development. Moreover, the children in this case were 14 and 15
years old at the time of the promulgation of the decision, yet the
court did not ascertain their choice as to which parent they want to
live with. In its September 8, 1999 order, the trial court merely
stated that: The children were asked as to whether they would like
to be with petitioner but there are indications that they entertain
fears in their hearts and want to be sure that their father is no
longer a drug dependent.[18] There is no showing that the court
ascertained the categorical choice of the children. These
inadequacies could have been remedied by an exhaustive trial
probing into the accuracy of Dr. Ocampos report and the capacity
of both parties to raise their children. The trial court was remiss in
the fulfillment of its duties when it approved the agreement of the
parties to submit the case for decision on the basis of sketchy
findings of facts.
In Lacson v. Lacson,[19] the case was remanded to the trial
court with respect to the issue of custody. In the said case, the
court a quo resolved the question of the childrens custody based
on the amicable settlement of the spouses. Stressing the need for
presentation of evidence and a thorough proceedings, we
explained
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

It is clear that every child [has] rights which are not and should not
be dependent solely on the wishes, much less the whims and
caprices, of his parents. His welfare should not be subject to the
parents' say-so or mutual agreement alone. Where, as in this case,
the parents are already separated in fact, the courts must step in
to determine in whose custody the child can better be assured the
rights granted to him by law. The need, therefore, to present
evidence regarding this matter, becomes imperative. A careful
scrutiny of the records reveals that no such evidence was
introduced in the CFI. This latter court relied merely on the mutual
agreement of the spouses-parents. To be sure, this was not
sufficient basis to determine the fitness of each parent to be the
custodian of the children.
Besides, at least one of the children Enrique, the eldest is now
eleven years of age and should be given the choice of the parent
he wishes to live with. x x x.
In the instant case, the proceedings before the trial court
leave much to be desired. While a remand of this case would mean
further delay, the childrens paramount interest demand that
further proceedings be conducted to determine the fitness of both
petitioner and respondent to assume custody of their minor
children.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant case is
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 107,
for the purpose of receiving evidence to determine the fitness of
petitioner and respondent to take custody of their children.Pending
the final disposition of this case, custody shall remain with
respondent but subject to petitioners visitation rights in
accordance with the December 7, 1999 order of the trial court.
SO ORDERED.

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
[G.R. No. 154994. June 28, 2005]
JOYCELYN PABLO-GUALBERTO, petitioner, vs. CRISANTO
RAFAELITO GUALBERTO V, respondent.
[G.R. No. 156254. June 28, 2005]
CRISANTO RAFAELITO G. GUALBERTO V, petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS; Hon. HELEN B.
RICAFORT, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court Paraaque City, Branch 260; and JOYCELYN D.
PABLO-GUALBERTO,respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When love is lost between spouses and the marriage
inevitably results in separation, the bitterest tussle is often over
the custody of their children. The Court is now tasked to settle the
opposing claims of the parents for custody pendente lite of their
child who is less than seven years of age. There being no sufficient
proof of any compelling reason to separate the minor from his
mother, custody should remain with her.
The Case
Before us are two consolidated petitions. The first is a Petition
for Review[1] filed by Joycelyn Pablo-Gualberto under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, assailing the August 30, 2002 Decision [2] of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR SP No. 70878. The assailed
Decision disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Certiorari is
hereby GRANTED. The assailed Order of May 17, 2002 is
hereby SET ASIDE and ANNULLED. The custody of the child is
hereby ordered returned to [Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V].
The [respondent] court/Judge is hereby directed to consider, hear
and resolve [petitioners] motion to lift the award of
custody pendente lite of the child to [respondent].[3]
The second is a Petition for Certiorari[4] filed by Crisanto
Rafaelito Gualberto V under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, charging
the appellate court with grave abuse of discretion for denying his
Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the August 30, 2002 Decision.
The denial was contained in the CAs November 27, 2002
Resolution, which we quote:
We could not find any cogent reason why the [last part of the
dispositive portion of our Decision of August 30, 2002] should be
deleted, hence, subject motion is hereby DENIED. [5]
The Facts
The CA narrated the antecedents as follows:
x x x [O]n March 12, 2002, [Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V] filed
before [the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City] a petition for
declaration of nullity of his marriage to x x x Joycelyn D. Pablo
Gualberto, with an ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of
their almost 4-year-old son, minor Rafaello (the child, for brevity),
whom [Joycelyn] allegedly took away with her from the conjugal
home and his school (Infant Toddlers Discovery Center in Paraaque
City) when [she] decided to abandon [Crisanto] sometime in early
February 2002[.] x x x [O]n April 2, 2002, [RTC Judge Helen B.
Ricafort] heard the ancillary prayer of [Crisanto] for
custody pendente lite. x x x [B]ecause [Joycelyn] allegedly failed to
appear despite notice, [Crisanto], a certain Col. Renato Santos, and
Ms. Cherry Batistel, testified before the x x x Judge; x x x
documentary evidence [was] also presented[.] x x x [O]n April 3,
2002, x x x [the] Judge awarded custody pendente lite of the child
to [Crisanto.] [T]he Order partly read x x x:
x x x Crisanto Rafaelito Gualberto V testified. He stated that
[Joycelyn] took their minor child with her to Caminawit, San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro. At that time, the minor was enrolled at B.F.
Homes, Paraaque City. Despite effort[s] exerted by him, he has
failed to see his child. [Joycelyn] and the child are at present
staying with the formers step-father at the latters [residence] at
Caminawit, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro.
Renato Santos, President of United Security Logistic testified that
he was commissioned by [Crisanto] to conduct surveillance on
[Joycelyn] and came up with the conclusion that [she] is having
lesbian relations with one Noreen Gay Cuidadano in Cebu City.
The findings of Renato Santos [were] corroborated by Cherry
Batistel, a house helper of the spouses who stated that [the
mother] does not care for the child as she very often goes out of
the house and on one occasion, she saw [Joycelyn] slapping the
child.
Art. 211 of the Family Code provides as follows:
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority
over the persons of their children. In the case of disagreement, the
fathers decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to the
contrary.
The authority of the father and mother over their children is
exercised jointly. This recognition, however, does not place her in
exactly the same place as the father; her authority is subordinated
to that of the father.
In all controversies regarding the custody of minors, the sole and
foremost consideration is the physical, educational, social and
moral welfare of the child, taking into account the respective
resources and social and moral situations of the contending
parties.
The Court believes that [Joycelyn] had no reason to take the child
with her. Moreover, per Sheriff returns, she is not with him at
Caminawit, San Jose, Occidental Mindoro.
WHEREFORE, pendente lite, the Court hereby awards custody of
the minor, Crisanto Rafaello P. Gualberto X to his father, Crisanto
Rafaelito G. Gualberto V.
x x x [O]n April 16, 2002, the hearing of [Joycelyns] motion to lift
the award of custody pendente lite of the child to [Crisanto] was
set but the former did not allegedly present any evidence to
support her motion. However, on May 17, 2002, [the] Judge
allegedly issued the assailed Order reversing her Order of April 3,
2002 and this time awarding custody of the child to [Joycelyn].
[T]he entire text of the Order [is] herein reproduced, to wit:
Submitted is [Crisantos] Motion to Resolve Prayer for
Custody Pendente Lite and [Joycelyns] Motion to Dismiss and the
respective Oppositions thereto.
[Joycelyn], in her Motion to Dismiss, makes issue of the fact that
the person referred to in the caption of the Petition is one JOCELYN
Pablo Gualberto and not Joycelyn Pablo Gualberto. [Joycelyn] knows
she is the person referred to in the Complaint. As a matter of fact,
the body of the Complaint states her name correct[ly]. The law is
intended to facilitate and promote the administration of justice, not
to hinder or delay it. Litigation should be practicable and
convenient. The error in the name of Joycelyn does not involve
public policy and has not prejudiced [her].
This case was filed on March 12, 2002. Several attempts were
made to serve summons on [Joycelyn] as shown by the Sheriffs
returns. It appears that on the 4th attempt on March 21, 2002, both
Ma. Daisy and x x x Ronnie Nolasco, [Joycelyns mother and
stepfather, respectively,] read the contents of the documents
presented after which they returned the same.
The Court believes that on that day, summons was duly served and
this Court acquired jurisdiction over [Joycelyn].
The filing of [Joycelyns annulment] case on March 26, 2002 was an
after thought, perforce the Motion to [D]ismiss should be denied.
The child subject of this Petition, Crisanto Rafaello P. Gualberto is
barely four years old. Under Article 213 of the Family Code, he shall
not be separated from his mother unless the Court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise. The Court finds the reason
stated by [Crisanto] not [to] be compelling reasons. The father
should however be entitled to spend time with the minor. These do
not appear compelling reasons to deprive him of the company of
his child.
When [Joycelyn] appeared before this Court, she stated that she
has no objection to the father visiting the child even everyday
provided it is in Mindoro.
The Court hereby grants the mother, [Joycelyn], the custody of
Crisanto Rafaello P. Gualberto, with [the] right of [Crisanto] to have
the child with him every other weekend.
WHEREFORE:
1. The [M]otion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED;
2. Custody pendente lite is hereby given to the
mother Joycelyn Pablo Gualberto with
the right of the father, x x x [Crisanto],
to have him every other week-end.
3. Parties are admonished not to use any other
agencies of the government like the
CIDG to interfere in this case and to
harass the parties.[6]
In a Petition for Certiorari[7] before the CA, Crisanto charged
the Regional Trial Court (Branch 260) of Paraaque City with grave
abuse of discretion for issuing its aforequoted May 17, 2002 Order.
He alleged that this Order superseded, without any factual or legal
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
basis, the still valid and subsisting April 3, 2002 Order awarding
him custody pendente lite of his minor son; and that it violated
Section 14 of Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Partly in Crisantos favor, the CA ruled that grave abuse of
discretion had been committed by the trial court in reversing the
latter courts previous Order dated April 3, 2002, by issuing the
assailed May 17, 2002 Order. The appellate court explained that
the only incident to resolve was Joycelyns Motion to Dismiss, not
the issuance of the earlier Order. According to the CA, the prior
Order awarding provisional custody to the father should prevail,
not only because it was issued after a hearing, but also because
the trial court did not resolve the correct incident in the later Order.
Nonetheless, the CA stressed that the trial court judge was not
precluded from considering and resolving Joycelyns Motion to lift
the award of custody pendente lite to Crisanto, as that Motion had
yet to be properly considered and ruled upon. However, it directed
that the child be turned over to him until the issue was resolved.
Hence, these Petitions.[8]
Issues
In GR No. 154994, Petitioner Joycelyn submits these issues for
our consideration:
1. Whether or not the Respondent Court of Appeals, when it
awarded the custody of the child to the father, violated Art. 213 of
the Family Code, which mandates that no child under seven years
of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise.
2. Is it Article 213 or Article 211 which applies in this case involving
four-year old Rafaello?[9]
On the other hand, Crisanto raises the following issues:
A. Did Respondent Court commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to or in excess of jurisdiction when, in its August 30,
2002 Decision, it ordered respondent court/Judge to consider, hear
and resolve the motion to lift award of custody pendente lite of the
child to petitioner and x x x denied the motion for reconsideration
thereof in its November 27, 2002 Resolution, considering that: (1)
there is no such motion ever, then or now pending, with the court a
quo; (2) the November 27, 2002 Resolution is unconstitutional; and
(3) the April 3, 2002 Order of respondent Judge, the validity of
which has been upheld in the August 30, 2002 Decision of the
respondent Court, has become final and executory; and
B. Ought not the ancillary remedies [o]f habeas corpus, because
the whereabouts, physical and mental condition of the illegally
detained Minor Rafaello is now unknown to petitioner and
preliminary mandatory injunction with urgent prayer for immediate
issuance of preliminary [injunction], petitioner having a clear and
settled right to custody of Minor Rafaello which has been violated
and still is being continuously violated by [petitioner Joycelyn], be
granted by this Honorable Court?[10]
Being interrelated, the procedural challenges and the
substantive issues in the two Petitions will be addressed jointly.
The Courts Ruling
There is merit in the Petition in GR No. 154994, but not in GR
No. 156254.
Preliminary Issue:
The Alleged Prematurity
of the Petition in GR No. 154994
Before going into the merits of the present controversy, the
Court shall first dispose of a threshold issue. In GR No. 154994,
therein Respondent Crisanto contends that the Petition for Review
was filed beyond the deadline (October 24, 2002) allowed by the
Rules of Court and by this Court. He claims that Registry Bill No. 88
shows that the Petition was sent by speed mail, only on November
4, 2002. Furthermore, he assails the Petition for its prematurity,
since his Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the August 30, 2002
CA Decision was still pending before the appellate court. Thus, he
argues that the Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over Joycelyns
Petition.
Timeliness of the Petition
The manner of filing and service Joycelyns Petition by mail is
governed by Sections 3 and 7 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court,
which we quote:
SEC. 3. Manner of filing. The filing of pleadings, appearances,
motions, notices, orders, judgments and all other papers shall be
made by presenting the original copies thereof, plainly indicated as
such personally to the clerk of court or by sending them by
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
registered mail. xxx In the second case, the date of mailing of
motions, pleadings and other papers or payments or deposits, as
shown by the post office stamp on the envelope or the registry
receipt, shall be considered as the date of their filing, payment, or
deposit in court. The envelope shall be attached to the records of
the case.
xxxxxxxxx
SEC. 7. Service by mail. Service by registered mail shall be made
by depositing the copy in the office, in a sealed envelope, plainly
addressed to the party or his counsel at his office, if known,
otherwise at his residence, if known, with postage fully pre-paid,
and with instructions to the postmaster to return the mail to the
sender after ten (10) days if undelivered. If no registry service is
available in the locality of either the sender of the addressee,
service may be done by ordinary mail. (Italics supplied)
The records disclose that Joycelyn received the CAs August 30,
2002 Decision on September 9, 2002. On September 17, she filed
before this Court a Motion for a 30-day extension of time to file a
petition for review on certiorari. This Motion was granted, [11] and
the deadline was thus extended until October 24, 2002.
A further perusal of the records reveals that copies of the
Petition were sent to this Court and to the parties by registered
mail[12] at the Bian, Laguna Post Office on October 24, 2002. This is
the date clearly stamped on the face of the envelope [13] and
attested to in the Affidavit of Service[14] accompanying the Petition.
Petitioner Joycelyn explained that the filing and the service had
been made by registered mail due to the volume of delivery
assignments and the lack of a regular messenger.[15]
The Petition is, therefore, considered to have been filed on
October 24, 2002, its mailing date as shown by the post office
stamp on the envelope. The last sentence of Section 3 of Rule 13 of
the Rules provides that the date of filing may be shown either by
the post office stamp on the envelope or by the registry receipt.
Proof of its filing, on the other hand, is shown by the existence of
the petition in the record, pursuant to Section 12 of Rule 13. [16]
The postmaster satisfactorily clarifies that Registry Bill No. 88,
which shows the date November 2, 2002, merely discloses when
the mail matters received by the Bian Post Office on October 24,
2002, were dispatched or sent to the Central Mail Exchange for
distribution to their final destinations. [17] The Registry Bill does not
reflect the actual mailing date. Instead, it is the postal Registration
Book[18] that shows the list of mail matters that have been
registered for mailing on a particular day, along with the names of
the senders and the addressees. That book shows that Registry
Receipt Nos. 2832-A and 2832-B, pertaining to the mailed matters
for the Supreme Court, were issued on October 24, 2002.
Prematurity of the Petition
As to the alleged prematurity of the Petition of Joycelyn,
Crisanto points out that his Urgent Motion for Partial
Reconsideration[19] was still awaiting resolution by the CA when she
filed her Petition before this Court on October 24, 2002. The CA
ruled on the Motion only on November 27, 2002.
The records show, however, that the Motion of Crisanto
was mailed only on September 12, 2002. Thus, on September 17,
2002, when Joycelyn filed her Motion for Extension of Time to file
her Petition for Review, she might have still been unaware that he
had moved for a partial reconsideration of the August 20, 2002 CA
Decision. Nevertheless, upon being notified of the filing of his
Motion, she should have manifested that fact to this Court.
With the CAs final denial of Crisantos Motion for
Reconsideration, Joycelyns lapse may be excused in the interest of
resolving the substantive issues raised by the parties.
First Issue:
Grave Abuse of Discretion
In GR No. 156254, Crisanto submits that the CA gravely
abused its discretion when it ordered the trial court judge to
consider, hear and resolve the motion to lift the award of
custody pendente lite without any proper motion by Joycelyn and
after the April 3, 2002 Order of the trial court had become final and
executory. The CA is also charged with grave abuse of discretion
for denying his Motion for Partial Reconsideration without stating
the reasons for the denial, allegedly in contravention of Section 1
of Rule 36 of the Rules of Court.
The Order to Hear the Motion
to Lift the Award of Custody
Pendente Lite Proper
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
To begin with, grave abuse of discretion is committed when an
act is 1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or
jurisprudence;[20] or 2) executed whimsically or arbitrarily in a
manner so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty, or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.
[21]
What constitutes grave abuse of discretion is such capricious
and arbitrary exercise of judgment as that which is equivalent, in
the eyes of the law, to lack of jurisdiction.[22]
On the basis of these criteria, we hold that the CA did not
commit grave abuse of discretion.
First, there can be no question that a court of competent
jurisdiction is vested with the authority to resolve even unassigned
issues. It can do so when such a step is indispensable or necessary
to a just resolution of issues raised in a particular pleading or when
the unassigned issues are inextricably linked or germane to those
that have been pleaded.[23] This truism applies with more force
when the relief granted has been specifically prayed for, as in this
case.
Explicit in the Motion to Dismiss [24] filed by Joycelyn before the
RTC is her ancillary prayer for the court to lift and set aside its April
3, 2002 Order awarding to Crisanto custody pendente lite of their
minor son. Indeed, the necessary consequence of granting her
Motion to Dismiss would have been the setting aside of the Order
awarding Crisanto provisional custody of the child. Besides, even if
the Motion to Dismiss was denied -- as indeed it was -- the trial
court, in its discretion and if warranted, could still have granted the
ancillary prayer as an alternative relief.
Parenthetically, Joycelyns Motion need not have been verified
because of the provisional nature of the April 3, 2002 Order. Under
Rule 38[25] of the Rules of Court, verification is required only when
relief is sought from a final and executory Order. Accordingly, the
court may set aside its own orders even without a proper motion,
whenever such action is warranted by the Rules and to prevent a
miscarriage of justice.[26]
Denial of the Motion for
Reconsideration Proper
Second, the requirement in Section 1 of Rule 36 (for judges to
state clearly and distinctly the reasons for their dispositions) refers
only to decisions and final orders on the merits, not to those
resolving incidental matters.[27] The provision reads:
SECTION 1. Rendition of judgments and final orders. A judgment or
final order determining the merits of the case shall be in writing
personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him,
and filed with the clerk of court. (Italics supplied)
Here, the declaration of the nullity of marriage is the subject
of the main case, in which the issue of custody pendente lite is an
incident. That custody and support of common children may be
ruled upon by the court while the action is pending is provided in
Article 49 of the Family Code, which we quote :
Art. 49. During the pendency of the action[28] and in the absence of
adequate provisions in a written agreement between the spouses,
the Court shall provide for the support of the spouses and the
custody and support of their common children. x x x.
Clearly then, the requirement cited by Crisanto is inapplicable.
In any event, in its questioned Resolution, the CA clearly stated
that it could not find any cogent reason to reconsider and set aside
the assailed portion of its August 30, 2002 Decision.
The April 3, 2002 Order Not
Final and Executory
Third, the award of temporary custody, as the term implies, is
provisional and subject to change as circumstances may warrant.
In this connection, there is no need for a lengthy discussion of the
alleged finality of the April 3, 2002 RTC Order granting Crisanto
temporary custody of his son. For that matter, even the award of
child custody after a judgment on a marriage annulment is not
permanent; it may be reexamined and adjusted if and when the
parent who was given custody becomes unfit.[29]
Second Issue:
Custody of a Minor Child
When love is lost between spouses and the marriage
inevitably results in separation, the bitterest tussle is often over
the custody of their children. The Court is now tasked to settle the
opposing claims of the parents for custody pendente lite of their
child who is less than seven years old. [30] On the one hand, the
mother insists that, based on Article 213 of the Family Code, her
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minor child cannot be separated from her. On the other hand, the
father argues that she is unfit to take care of their son; hence, for
compelling reasons, he must be awarded custody of the child.
Article 213 of the Family Code[31] provides:
ART. 213. In case of separation of the parents, parental authority
shall be exercised by the parent designated by the court. The court
shall take into account all relevant considerations, especially the
choice of the child over seven years of age, unless the parent
chosen is unfit.
No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the
mother, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise.
This Court has held that when the parents are separated,
legally or otherwise, the foregoing provision governs the custody of
their child.[32] Article 213 takes its bearing from Article 363 of the
Civil Code, which reads:
Art. 363. In all questions on the care, custody, education and
property of children, the latters welfare shall be paramount. No
mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of
age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure.
(Italics supplied)
The general rule that children under seven years of age shall
not be separated from their mother finds its raison detre in the
basic need of minor children for their mothers loving care. [33] In
explaining the rationale for Article 363 of the Civil Code, the Code
Commission stressed thus:
The general rule is recommended in order to avoid a tragedy
where a mother has seen her baby torn away from her. No man can
sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is deprived of her child of
tender age. The exception allowed by the rule has to be for
compelling reasons for the good of the child: those cases must
indeed be rare, if the mothers heart is not to be unduly hurt. If she
has erred, as in cases of adultery, the penalty of imprisonment and
the (relative) divorce decree will ordinarily be sufficient punishment
for her. Moreover, her moral dereliction will not have any effect
upon the baby who is as yet unable to understand the situation.
(Report of the Code Commission, p. 12)
A similar provision is embodied in Article 8 of the Child and
Youth Welfare Code (Presidential Decree No. 603). [34] Article 17 of
the same Code is even more explicit in providing for the childs
custody under various circumstances, specifically in case the
parents are separated. It clearly mandates that no child under five
years of age shall be separated from his mother, unless the court
finds compelling reasons to do so. The provision is reproduced in
its entirety as follows:
Art. 17. Joint Parental Authority. The father and the mother shall
exercise jointly just and reasonable parental authority and
responsibility over their legitimate or adopted children. In case of
disagreement, the fathers decision shall prevail unless there is a
judicial order to the contrary.
In case of the absence or death of either parent, the present or
surviving parent shall continue to exercise parental authority over
such children, unless in case of the surviving parents remarriage,
the court for justifiable reasons, appoints another person as
guardian.
In case of separation of his parents, no child under five years of
age shall be separated from his mother, unless the court finds
compelling reasons to do so. (Italics supplied)
The above mandates reverberate in Articles 211, 212 and 213
of the Family Code. It is unmistakable from the language of these
provisions that Article 211[35] was derived from the first sentence of
the aforequoted Article 17; Article 212,[36] from the second
sentence; and Article 213,[37] save for a few additions, from the
third sentence. It should be noted that the Family Code has
reverted to the Civil Code provision mandating that a child
below seven years should not be separated from the mother. [38]
Mandatory Character
of Article 213 of the Family Code
In Lacson v. San Jose-Lacson,[39] the Court held that the use of
shall in Article 363 of the Civil Code and the observations made by
the Code Commission underscore the mandatory character of the
word.[40] Holding in that case that it was a mistake to deprive the
mother of custody of her two children, both then below the age of
seven, the Court stressed:
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
[Article 363] prohibits in no uncertain terms the separation of a
mother and her child below seven years, unless such a separation
is grounded upon compelling reasons as determined by a court. [41]
In like manner, the word shall in Article 213 of the Family Code
and Section 6[42] of Rule 99 of the Rules of Court has been held to
connote a mandatory character.[43] Article 213 and Rule 99 similarly
contemplate a situation in which the parents of the minor are
married to each other, but are separated by virtue of either a
decree of legal separation or a de facto separation. [44] In the
present case, the parents are living separately as a matter of fact.
The Best Interest of the Child
a Primary Consideration
The Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that [i]n all
actions concerning children, whether undertaken by public or
private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative
authorities or legislative bodies, the best interests of the child shall
be a primary consideration.[45]
The principle of best interest of the child pervades Philippine
cases involving adoption, guardianship, support, personal status,
minors in conflict with the law, and child custody. In these cases, it
has long been recognized that in choosing the parent to whom
custody is given, the welfare of the minors should always be the
paramount consideration.[46] Courts are mandated to take into
account all relevant circumstances that would have a bearing on
the childrens well-being and development. Aside from the material
resources and the moral and social situations of each parent, other
factors may also be considered to ascertain which one has the
capability to attend to the physical, educational, social and moral
welfare of the children.[47] Among these factors are the previous
care and devotion shown by each of the parents; their religious
background, moral uprightness, home environment and time
availability; as well as the childrens emotional and educational
needs
Tender-Age
Presumption
As pointed out earlier, there is express statutory recognition
that, as a general rule, a mother is to be preferred in awarding
custody of children under the age of seven. The caveat in Article
213 of the Family Code cannot be ignored, except when the court
finds cause to order otherwise.[48]
The so-called tender-age presumption under Article 213 of the
Family Code may be overcome only by compelling evidence of the
mothers unfitness. The mother has been declared unsuitable to
have custody of her children in one or more of the following
instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality,
habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child,
insanity or affliction with a communicable disease. [49]
Here, Crisanto cites immorality due to alleged lesbian
relations as the compelling reason to deprive Joycelyn of custody. It
has indeed been held that under certain circumstances, the
mothers immoral conduct may constitute a compelling reason to
deprive her of custody.[50]
But sexual preference or moral laxity alone does not prove
parental neglect or incompetence. Not even the fact that a mother
is a prostitute or has been unfaithful to her husband would render
her unfit to have custody of her minor child. [51] To deprive the wife
of custody, the husband must clearly establish that her moral
lapses have had an adverse effect on the welfare of the child or
have distracted the offending spouse from exercising proper
parental care.[52]
To this effect did the Court rule in Unson III v. Navarro,
[53]
wherein the mother was openly living with her brother-in-law,
the childs uncle. Under that circumstance, the Court deemed it in
the nine-year-old childs best interest to free her from the obviously
unwholesome, not to say immoral influence, that the situation in
which the mother ha[d] placed herself might create in [the childs]
moral and social outlook.[54]
In Espiritu v. CA,[55] the Court took into account psychological
and case study reports on the child, whose feelings of insecurity
and anxiety had been traced to strong conflicts with the mother. To
the psychologist the child revealed, among other things, that the
latter was disturbed upon seeing her mother hugging and kissing a
bad man who lived in their house and worked for her father. The
Court held that the illicit or immoral activities of the mother had
already caused the child emotional disturbances, personality
conflicts, and exposure to conflicting moral values x x x.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

Based on the above jurisprudence, it is therefore not enough WHEREFORE, the Petition in GR No. 154994 is GRANTED. The
for Crisanto to show merely that Joycelyn was a lesbian. He must assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and
also demonstrate that she carried on her purported relationship the May 17, 2002 Regional Trial Court Order REINSTATED. The
with a person of the same sex in the presence of their son or under Petition in GR No. 156254 is DISMISSED. Costs against Petitioner
circumstances not conducive to the childs proper moral Crisanto Rafaelito Gualberto V.
development. Such a fact has not been shown here. There is no SO ORDERED.
evidence that the son was exposed to the mothers alleged sexual
proclivities or that his proper moral and psychological development
suffered as a result.
Moreover, it is worthy to note that the trial court judge, Helen
Bautista-Ricafort, ruled in her May 17, 2002 Order that she had
found the reason stated by [Crisanto] not to be compelling [56] as to
suffice as a ground for separating the child from his mother. The
judge made this conclusion after personally observing the two of
them, both in the courtroom and in her chambers on April 16,
2002, and after a chance to talk to the boy and to observe him
firsthand. This assessment, based on her unique opportunity to
witness the childs behavior in the presence of each parent, should
carry more weight than a mere reliance on the records. All told, no
compelling reason has been adduced to wrench the child from the
mothers custody.
No Grant of Habeas Corpus
and Preliminary Injunction
As we have ruled that Joycelyn has the right to keep her minor
son in her custody, the writ of habeas corpus and the preliminary
mandatory injunction prayed for by Crisanto have no leg to stand
on. A writ of habeas corpus may be issued only when the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto,
[57]
a situation that does not apply here.
On the other hand, the ancillary remedy of preliminary
mandatory injunction cannot be granted, because Crisantos right
to custody has not been proven to be clear and unmistakable.
[58]
Unlike an ordinary preliminary injunction, the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction is more cautiously regarded, since the latter
requires the performance of a particular act that tends to go
beyond the maintenance of the status quo. [59] Besides, such an
injunction would serve no purpose, now that the case has been
decided on its merits.[60]

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Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes, Orlando

MARIE ANTONETTE ABIGAIL B. Salientes and Rosario C. Salientes are hereby
C. SALIENTES, ORLANDO B. directed to produce and bring before this Court the
SALIENTES, and ROSARIO body of minor Lorenzo
C. SALIENTES, EmmanuelSalientes Abanilla on January 31, 2003
Petitioners, at 1:00 oclock in the afternoon and to show cause
- versus - why the said child should not be discharged from
LORAN S.D. ABANILLA, restraint.
HONORABLE JUDGE PEDRO Let this Writ be served by the Sheriff or any
SABUNDAYO, JR., authorized representative of this Court, who is
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, directed to immediately make a return.
BRANCH SO ORDERED.[4]
203,MUNTINLUPA CITY, Petitioners moved for reconsideration which the
Respondents. court denied.

The instant petition assails the Decision [1] dated November
10, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 75680, which
dismissed the petition for certiorari against the orders of the
Regional Trial Court in Special Proceedings No. 03-004.Likewise
assailed is the Court of Appeals Resolution [2] dated March 19,
2004 denying reconsideration.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Private respondent Loran S.D. Abanilla and petitioner
Marie Antonette Abigail C. Salientes are the parents of the minor
Lorenzo Emmanuel S. Abanilla. They lived with
Marie Antonettes parents, petitioners Orlando B. Salientes and
Rosario C.Salientes. Due to in-laws problems, private respondent
suggested to his wife that they transfer to their own house, but
Marie Antonette refused. So, he alone left the house of
the Salientes. Thereafter, he was prevented from seeing his son.
Later, Loran S.D. Abanilla in his personal capacity and as
the representative of his son, filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus and
Custody,[3] docketed as Special Proceedings No. 03-004 before
the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. OnJanuary 23, 2003, the
trial court issued the following order:
Upon verified Petition for a Writ of Habeas
Corpus by Petitioners, the Respondents
Consequently, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals, but the same was dismissed on November
10, 2003. The appellate court affirmed the February 24, 2003
Order of the trial court holding that its January 23, 2003 Order did
not award the custody of the 2-year-old child to any one but was
simply the standard order issued for the production of restrained
persons. The appellate court held that the trial court was still about
to conduct a full inquiry, in a summary proceeding, on the cause of
the minors detention and the matter of his custody. The Court of
Appeals ruled thus:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[5]
Petitioners moved for reconsideration, which was denied
on March 19, 2004.
Hence, petitioners interposed this appeal by certiorari
anchored on the following grounds:
1. The Court of Appeals erred in not
pronouncing the respondent judge gravely
abused his discretion, amounting to lack or
in excess of jurisdiction in issuing an order
for the petitioner-mother to first show

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cause why her own three-year old child in
her custody should not be discharged from
a so-called restraint despite no evidence at
all of restraint and no evidence of
compelling reasons of maternal unfitness
to deprive the petitioner-mother of her
minor son of tender years. The assailed
orders, resolutions and decisions of the
lower court and the Court of Appeals are
clearly void;
2. The Court of Appeals erred in not
pronouncing that the respondent judge
gravely abused his discretion in issuing a
writ of habeas corpus which clearly is not
warranted considering that there is no
unlawful restraint by the mother and
considering further that the law presumes
the fitness of the mother, thereby negating
any notion of such mother illegally
restraining or confining her very own son of
tender years. The petition is not even
sufficient in substance to warrant the
writ. The assailed orders are clearly void.
3. Contrary to the Court of Appeals
decision, the Sombong vs. CA case
supports rather than negates the position
of the petitioners.
4. Contrary to the Court of Appeals
decision, summary proceeding does
violence to the tender-years-rule
5. The Court of Appeals failed to
consider that the private respondent failed
to present prima facie proof of any
compelling reason of the unfitness of the
petitioner-mother;
6. The Court of Appeals failed to see that
the New Rules on Custody SUFFICES AS
REMEDY.[6]
Plainly put, the issue is: Did the Court of Appeals err when
it dismissed the petition for certiorari against the trial courts orders
dated January 23, 2003 and February 24, 2003?
Petitioners contend that the order is contrary to Article
213[7] of the Family Code, which provides that no child under seven
years of age shall be separated from the mother unless the court
finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. They maintain that
herein respondent Loran had the burden of showing any
compelling reason but failed to present even a prima facie proof
thereof.
Petitioners posit that even assuming that there were
compelling reasons, the proper remedy for private respondent was
simply an action for custody, but not habeas corpus. Petitioners
assert that habeas corpus is unavailable against the mother who,
under the law, has the right of custody of the minor. They insist
there was no illegal or involuntary restraint of the minor by his own
mother. There was no need for the mother to show cause and
explain the custody of her very own child.
Private respondent counters that petitioners argument
based on Article 213 of the Family Code applies only to the second
part of his petition regarding the custody of his son. It does not
address the first part, which pertains to his right as the father to
see his son. He asserts that the writ of habeas corpus is available
against any person who restrains the minors right to see his father
and vice versa. He avers that the instant petition is merely filed for
delay, for had petitioners really intended to bring the child before
the court in accordance with the new rules on custody of minors,
they would have done so on the dates specified in the January 23,
2003 and the February 24, 2003 orders of the trial court.
Private respondent maintains that, under the law, he and
petitioner Marie Antonette have shared custody and parental
authority over their son. He alleges that at times when petitioner
Marie Antonette is out of the country as required of her job as an
international flight stewardess, he, the father, should have custody
of their son and not the maternal grandparents.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, the
assailed January 23, 2003 Order of the trial court did not grant
custody of the minor to any of the parties but merely directed
petitioners to produce the minor in court and explain why they are
restraining his liberty. The assailed order was an interlocutory order
precedent to the trial courts full inquiry into the issue of custody,
which was still pending before it.
Under Rule 41, Section 1 [8] of the Rules of Court, an
interlocutory order is not appealable but the aggrieved party may
file an appropriate special action under Rule 65. The aggrieved
party must show that the court gravely abused its discretion in
issuing the interlocutory order. In the present case, it is incumbent
upon petitioners to show that the trial court gravely abused its
discretion in issuing the order.
Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful
custody is withheld from a person entitled thereto. [9] Under Article
211[10] of the Family Code, respondent Loran and petitioner
Marie Antonette have joint parental authority over their son and
consequently joint custody. Further, although the couple is
separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated
by the court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one
parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of their
child. In the present case, private respondents cause of action is
the deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged in his
petition.[11] Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available to
him.
In a petition for habeas corpus, the childs welfare is the
supreme consideration. The Child and Youth Welfare
Code[12] unequivocally provides that in all questions regarding the
care and custody, among others, of the child, his welfare shall be
the paramount consideration.[13]
Again, it bears stressing that the order did not grant
custody of the minor to any of the parties but merely directed
petitioners to produce the minor in court and explain why private
respondent is prevented from seeing his child. This is in line with
the directive in Section 9[14] of A.M. 03-04-04-SC[15] that within
fifteen days after the filing of the answer or the expiration of the
period to file answer, the court shall issue an order requiring the
respondent (herein petitioners) to present the minor before the
court. This was exactly what the court did.
Moreover, Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the
judicial adjudication of custody and serves as a guideline for the
proper award of custody by the court. Petitioners can raise it as a
counter argument for private respondents petition for custody. But
it is not a basis for preventing the father to see his own
child. Nothing in the said provision disallows a father from seeing
or visiting his child under seven years of age.
In sum, the trial court did not err in issuing the orders
dated January 23, 2003 and February 24, 2003. Hence, the Court of
Appeals properly dismissed the petition for certiorari against the
said orders of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the petition
is DENIED. The Decision dated November 10, 2003 and the
Resolution dated March 19, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 75680 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

AGNES GAMBOA-HIRSCH G.R. No. 174485
Petitioner,
Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
- versus - CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS Promulgated:
and FRANKLIN HARVEY HIRSCH,
Respondents. July 11, 2007
This is a petition for certiorari[1] under Rule 65 which seeks to set
aside the June 8, 2006 Decision [2] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 94329, which granted private respondent Franklin
Harvey Hirsch (Franklin) joint custody with petitioner Agnes
Gamboa-Hirsch (Agnes) of their minor daughter Simone Noelle
Hirsch (Simone); and the August 3, 2006 CA Resolution [3] denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. Petitioner
also prays for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order/injunction preventing the execution and implementation of
the assailed June 8, 2006 CA Decision.
Franklin and Agnes were married on December 23, 2000 in the City
of Bacolod, and established their conjugal dwelling in
Diniwid, Boracay Island, Malay, Aklan. On December 21, 2002, a
child was born to them and was named Simone. In 2005, the
couple started to have marital problems as Agnes wanted to stay
in Makati City, while Franklin insisted that they stay
in Boracay Island. On March 23, 2006, Agnes came to their
conjugal home in Boracay, and asked for money and for Franklins
permission for her to bring their daughter to Makati City for a brief
vacation. Franklin readily agreed, but soon thereafter discovered
that neither Agnes nor their daughter Simone would be coming
back to Boracay.
Franklin then filed a petition for habeas corpus before the CA for
Agnes to produce Simone in court. On May 19, 2006, the CA issued
a Resolution which ordered that a writ of habeas corpus be issued
ordering that Simone be brought before said court on May 26,
2006. After a series of hearings and presentation of evidence, the
CA, on June 8, 2006, promulgated the assailed Decision
granting Franklin joint custody with Agnes of their minor child.
Agnes filed a Motion for Reconsideration of this Decision, which
was denied in the CAs August 3, 2006 Resolution for lack of merit.
Petitioner now comes before this Court praying that we set aside
the June 8, 2006 Decision and August 3, 2006 Resolution of the CA,
and that we issue a temporary restraining order/injunction on the
execution and implementation of the assailed rulings of the CA
based on the following grounds:
(A)
The Court of Appeals seriously erred and acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it ruled upon, granted,
and decided the matter of custody x x x during the
May 26, 2006 hearing conducted on the petition for
writ of habeas corpus in relation to and with
custody of a minor under A.M. No. 03-03-04-SC,
C.A.-GR SP. No. 94329, as no reception of evidence
to support said decision was had thereon, and the
honorable court merely based its decision on mere
conjectures and presumptions.
(B)
The Court of Appeals seriously erred and acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by [petitioner Agnes] and only
made addendums thereon appertaining to the
custody aspect in its Decision that the same is
deemed necessary for the protection of the interest

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Persons 4th Exam Cases

of the child and a mere temporary arrangement
while the case involving the herein parties are
pending before the Regional Trial Court x x x quite
contrary to its pronouncements during the May 26,
2006 hearing when the matter of custody was
insisted upon by [respondent Franklin].
(C)
The Court of Appeals seriously erred and acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it granted joint custody
in utter disregard of the provisions of the Family
Code, as to minors seven (7) years of age and
below, in relation to the jurisprudence and
pronouncements laid down by the Honorable
Supreme Court on the matter of the said provision.
[4]
Acting on the petition, this Court issued its October 2,
2006 Resolution denying petitioners prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order. Petitioner then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of this Resolution, and on April 11, 2007, this Court
granted petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, issued a temporary
restraining order, and awarded the sole custody of the minor,
Simone, to petitioner.
consideration (emphasis supplied).[5] The Child and Youth Welfare
Code, in the same way, unequivocally provides that in all questions
regarding the care and custody, among others, of the child, his/her
welfare shall be the paramount consideration. [6]
The so-called tender-age presumption under Article 213 of
the Family Code may be overcome only by compelling evidence of
the mothers unfitness. The mother is declared unsuitable to
have custody of her children in one or more of the following
instances: neglect, abandonment, unemployment, immorality,
habitual drunkenness, drug addiction, maltreatment of the child,
insanity, or affliction with a communicable disease. [7] Here, the
mother was not shown to be unsuitable or grossly incapable of
caring for her minor child. All told, no compelling reason has been
adduced to wrench the child from the mothers custody.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GIVEN
DUE COURSE. The June 8, 2006 Decision and August 3,
2006 Resolution of the CA are hereby SET ASIDE. Sole custody
over Simone Noelle Hirsch is hereby AWARDED to the mother,
petitioner Agnes Gamboa-Hirsch.
SO ORDERED.

This petition has merit.

The CA committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted joint

custody of the minor child to both parents.

The Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that in

all actions concerning children, whether undertaken by
public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law,
administrative authorities or legislative bodies, the best
interests of the child shall be a primary

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
HERALD BLACK DACASIN, G.R. No. 168785
Petitioner,
Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
BRION,
- versus - DEL CASTILLO,
ABAD, and
PEREZ, JJ.
SHARON DEL MUNDO DACASIN, Promulgated:
Respondent. February 5, 2010
The Case
For review[1]is a dismissal[2]of a suit to enforce a post-foreign
divorce child custody agreement for lack of jurisdiction.
The Facts
Petitioner Herald Dacasin (petitioner), American, and respondent
Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin (respondent), Filipino, were married in
Manila in April 1994. They have one daughter, Stephanie, born on
21 September 1995. In June 1999, respondent sought and obtained
from the Circuit Court, 19th Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois
(Illinois court) a divorce decree against petitioner. [3] In its ruling, the
Illinois court dissolved the marriage of petitioner and respondent,
awarded to respondent sole custody of Stephanie and retained
jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes.
On 28 January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila
a contract (Agreement[4]) for the joint custody of Stephanie. The
parties chose Philippine courts as exclusive forum to adjudicate
disputes arising from the Agreement. Respondent undertook to
obtain from the Illinois court an order relinquishing jurisdiction to
Philippine courts.
In 2004, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 60 (trial court) to enforce the Agreement.
Petitioner alleged that in violation of the Agreement, respondent
exercised sole custody over Stephanie.
Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint for, among
others, lack of jurisdiction because of the Illinois courts retention of
jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
In its Order dated 1 March 2005, the trial court sustained
respondents motion and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.
The trial court held that: (1) it is precluded from taking cognizance
over the suit considering the Illinois courts retention of jurisdiction
to enforce its divorce decree, including its order awarding sole
custody of Stephanie to respondent; (2) the divorce decree is
binding on petitioner following the nationality rule prevailing in this
jurisdiction;[5]and (3) the Agreement is void for contravening Article
2035, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code [6]prohibiting compromise
agreements on jurisdiction.[7]
Petitioner sought reconsideration, raising the new argument that
the divorce decree obtained by respondent is void. Thus, the
divorce decree is no bar to the trial courts exercise of jurisdiction
over the case.
In its Order dated 23 June 2005, the trial court denied
reconsideration, holding that unlike in the case of respondent, the
divorce decree is binding on petitioner under the laws of his
nationality.
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner submits the following alternative theories for the validity
of the Agreement to justify its enforcement by the trial court: (1)
the Agreement novated the valid divorce decree, modifying the
terms of child custody from sole (maternal) to joint; [8]or (2) the
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
Agreement is independent of the divorce decree obtained by
respondent.
The Issue
The question is whether the trial court has jurisdiction to take
cognizance of petitioners suit and enforce the Agreement on the
joint custody of the parties child.
The Ruling of the Court
The trial court has jurisdiction to entertain petitioners suit but not
to enforce the Agreement which is void. However, factual and
equity considerations militate against the dismissal of petitioners
suit and call for the remand of the case to settle the question of
Stephanies custody.
Regional Trial Courts Vested With Jurisdiction
to Enforce Contracts
Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time
petitioner filed his suit in the trial court, statutory law vests on
Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions
incapable of pecuniary estimation. [9]An action for specific
performance, such as petitioners suit to enforce the Agreement on
joint child custody, belongs to this species of actions. [10]Thus,
jurisdiction-wise, petitioner went to the right court.
Indeed, the trial courts refusal to entertain petitioners suit
was grounded not on its lack of power to do so but on its thinking
that the Illinois courts divorce decree stripped it of jurisdiction. This
conclusion is unfounded. What the Illinois court retained was
jurisdiction x x x for the purpose of enforcing all and sundry the
various provisions of [its] Judgment for Dissolution.
[11]
Petitioners suit seeks the enforcement not of the various
provisions of the divorce decree but of the post-divorce Agreement
on joint child custody. Thus, the action lies beyond the zone of the
Illinois courts so-called retained jurisdiction.
Petitioners Suit Lacks Cause of Action
The foregoing notwithstanding, the trial court cannot enforce the
Agreement which is contrary to law.
In this jurisdiction, parties to a contract are free to stipulate
the terms of agreement subject to the minimum ban on
stipulations contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or
public policy.[12]Otherwise, the contract is denied legal existence,
deemed inexistent and void from the beginning. [13]For lack of
relevant stipulation in the Agreement, these and other ancillary
Philippine substantive law serve as default parameters to test the
validity of the Agreements joint child custody stipulations. [14]
At the time the parties executed the Agreement on 28 January
2002, two facts are undisputed: (1) Stephanie was under seven
years old (having been born on 21 September 1995); and (2)
petitioner and respondent were no longer married under the laws
of the United States because of the divorce decree. The relevant
Philippine law on child custody for spouses separated in fact or in
law[15] (under the second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family
Code) is also undisputed: no child under seven years of age shall
be separated from the mother x x x. [16] (This statutory awarding of
sole parental custody[17]to the mother is mandatory, [18]grounded on
sound policy consideration,[19]subject only to a narrow exception
not alleged to obtain here.[20]) Clearly then, the Agreements object
to establish a post-divorce joint custody regime between
respondent and petitioner over their child under seven years old
contravenes Philippine law.
The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being contrary
to law, it has also been repudiated by the mother when she refused
to allow joint custody by the father. The Agreement would be valid
if the spouses have not divorced or separated because the law
provides for joint parental authority when spouses live together.
[21]
However, upon separation of the spouses, the mother takes sole
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
custody under the law if the child is below seven years old and any
agreement to the contrary is void.Thus, the law suspends the joint
custody regime for (1) children under seven of (2) separated or
divorced spouses. Simply put, for a child within this age bracket
(and for commonsensical reasons), the law decides for the
separated or divorced parents how best to take care of the child
and that is to give custody to the separated mother. Indeed, the
separated parents cannot contract away the provision in the Family
Code on the maternal custody of children below seven years
anymore than they can privately agree that a mother who
is unemployed, immoral, habitually drunk, drug addict, insane or
afflicted with a communicable disease will have sole custody of a
child under seven as these are reasons deemed compelling
to preclude the application of the exclusive maternal custody
regime under the second paragraph of Article 213.[22]
It will not do to argue that the second paragraph of Article
213 of the Family Code applies only to judicial custodial
agreements based on its text that No child under seven years of
age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds
compelling reasons to order otherwise. To limit this provisions
enforceability to court sanctioned agreements while placing private
agreements beyond its reach is to sanction a double standard in
custody regulation of children under seven years old of separated
parents. This effectively empowers separated parents, by the
simple expedient of avoiding the courts, to subvert a legislative
policy vesting to the separated mother sole custody of her children
under seven years of age to avoid a tragedy where a mother has
seen her baby torn away from her.[23]This ignores the legislative
basis that [n]o man can sound the deep sorrows of a mother who is
deprived of her child of tender age.[24]
It could very well be that Article 213s bias favoring one
separated parent (mother) over the other (father) encourages
paternal neglect, presumes incapacity for joint parental custody,
robs the parents of custodial options, or hijacks decision-making
between the separated parents.[25]However, these are objections
which question the laws wisdom not its validity or uniform
enforceability. The forum to air and remedy these grievances is the
legislature, not this Court. At any rate, the rules seeming harshness
or undesirability is tempered by ancillary agreements the
separated parents may wish to enter such as granting the father
visitation and other privileges. These arrangements are not
inconsistent with the regime of sole maternal custody under the
second paragraph of Article 213 which merely grants to the
mother final authority on the care and custody of the minor under
seven years of age, in case of disagreements.
Further, the imposed custodial regime under the second paragraph
of Article 213 is limited in duration, lasting only until the childs
seventh year. From the eighth year until the childs emancipation,
the law gives the separated parents freedom, subject to the usual
contractual limitations, to agree on custody regimes they see fit to
adopt. Lastly, even supposing that petitioner and respondent are
not barred from entering into the Agreement for the joint custody
of Stephanie, respondent repudiated the Agreement by asserting
sole custody over Stephanie. Respondents act effectively brought
the parties back to ambit of the default custodial regime in the
second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code vesting on
respondent sole custody of Stephanie.
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decrees alleged
invalidity - not because the Illinois court lacked jurisdiction or that
the divorce decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce
was obtained by his Filipino spouse [26]- to support the Agreements
enforceability. The argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are
not bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dorn v.
Romillo[27]settled the matter by holding that an alien spouse of a
Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad. [28]There, we
dismissed the alien divorcees Philippine suit for accounting of
alleged post-divorce conjugal property and rejected his submission
that the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not
valid in this jurisdiction in this wise:
There can be no question as to the
validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
States of the United States. The decree is
binding on private respondent as an
American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband,
in any State of the Union. What he is contending
in this case is that the divorce is not valid
and binding in this jurisdiction, the same
being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article
15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the
policy against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However,
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in
Nevada released private respondent from the marriage
from the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage.
xxxx
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer
the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the
case below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own countrys
Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the
alleged conjugal property. (Emphasis supplied)
We reiterated Van Dorn in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera[29]to dismiss
criminal complaints for adultery filed by the alien divorcee (who
obtained the foreign divorce decree) against his former Filipino
spouse because he no longer qualified as offended spouse entitled
to file the complaints under Philippine procedural rules. Thus, it
should be clear by now that a foreign divorce decree carries as
much validity against the alien divorcee in this jurisdiction as it
does in the jurisdiction of the aliens nationality, irrespective of who
obtained the divorce.
The Facts of the Case and Nature of Proceeding
Justify Remand
Instead of ordering the dismissal of petitioners suit, the logical end
to its lack of cause of action, we remand the case for the trial court
to settle the question of Stephanies custody. Stephanie is now
nearly 15 years old, thus removing the case outside of the ambit of
the mandatory maternal custody regime under Article 213 and
bringing it within coverage of the default standard on child custody
proceedings the best interest of the child. [30]As the question of
custody is already before the trial court and the childs parents, by
executing the Agreement, initially showed inclination to share
custody, it is in the interest of swift and efficient rendition of
justice to allow the parties to take advantage of the courts
jurisdiction, submit evidence on the custodial arrangement best
serving Stephanies interest, and let the trial court render
judgment. This disposition is consistent with the settled doctrine
that in child custody proceedings, equity may be invoked to serve
the childs best interest.[31]
WHEREFORE, we REVERSE the Orders dated 1 March 2005 and
23 June 2005 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60.
The case is REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with
this ruling.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

SO ORDERED.

Page | 296
Persons 4th Exam Cases
G.R. No. 163604 May 6, 2005
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS (Twentieth Division), HON.
PRESIDING JUDGE FORTUNITO L. MADRONA, RTC-BR. 35 and
APOLINARIA MALINAO JOMOC, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
In "In the Matter of Declaration of Presumptive Death of Absentee
Spouse Clemente P. Jomoc, Apolinaria Malinao Jomoc, petitioner,"
the Ormoc City, Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, by Order of
September 29, 1999,1 granted the petition on the basis of the
Commissioners Report2 and accordingly declared the absentee
spouse, who had left his petitioner-wife nine years earlier,
presumptively dead.
In granting the petition, the trial judge, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona,
cited Article 41, par. 2 of the Family Code. Said article provides
that for the purpose of contracting a valid subsequent
marriage during the subsistence of a previous marriage where the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years, the
spouse present must institute summary proceedings for the
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee spouse, without
prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absent spouse.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General, sought to
appeal the trial courts order by filing a Notice of Appeal. 3
By Order of November 22, 1999s,4 the trial court, noting that no
record of appeal was filed and served "as required by and pursuant
to Sec. 2(a), Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the
present case being a special proceeding," disapproved the Notice
of Appeal.
The Republics Motion for Reconsideration of the trial courts order
of disapproval having been denied by Order of January 13, 2000,5 it
filed a Petition for Certiorari6 before the Court of Appeals, it
contending that the declaration of presumptive death of a person
under Article 41 of the Family Code is not a special proceeding or a
case of multiple or separate appeals requiring a record on appeal.
By Decision of May 5, 2004, 7 the Court of Appeals denied the
Republics petition on procedural and substantive grounds in this
wise:
At the outset, it must be stressed that the petition is not
sufficient in form. It failed to attach to its petition a
certified true copy of the assailed Order dated January 13,
2000 [denying its Motion for Reconsideration of the
November 22, 1999 Order disapproving its Notice of
Appeal]. Moreover, the petition questioned the [trial
courts] Order dated August 15, 1999, which declared
Clemente Jomoc presumptively dead, likewise for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction, yet, not even a copy could be found in
the records. On this score alone, the petition should have
been dismissed outright in accordance with Sec. 3, Rule 46
of the Rules of Court.
However, despite the procedural lapses, the Court resolves
to delve deeper into the substantive issue of the
validity/nullity of the assailed order.
The principal issue in this case is whether a petition
for declaration of the presumptive death of a person
is in the nature of a special proceeding. If it is, the
period to appeal is 30 days and the party appealing must,
in addition to a notice of appeal, file with the trial court a
record on appeal to perfect its appeal. Otherwise, if the
petition is an ordinary action, the period to appeal is 15
days from notice or decision or final order appealed from
and the appeal is perfected by filing a notice of appeal
(Section 3, Rule 41, Rules of Court).
As defined in Section 3(a), Rule 1 of the Rules of Court, "a
civil action is one by which a party sues another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the prevention of
redress of a wrong" while a special proceeding under
Section 3(c) of the same rule is defined as "a remedy by
which a party seeks to establish a status, a right or a
particular fact (Heirs of Yaptinchay, et al. v. Del Rosario, et
al., G.R. No. 124320, March 2, 1999).
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
Considering the aforementioned distinction, this Court finds
that the instant petition is in the nature of a special
proceeding and not an ordinary action. The petition
merely seeks for a declaration by the trial court of the
presumptive death of absentee spouse Clemente Jomoc. It
does not seek the enforcement or protection of a right or
the prevention or redress of a wrong. Neither does it
involve a demand of right or a cause of action that can be
enforced against any person.
On the basis of the foregoing discussion, the subject Order
dated January 13, 2000 denying OSGs Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order dated November 22, 1999
disapproving its Notice of Appeal was correctly issued. The
instant petition, being in the nature of a special
proceeding, OSG should have filed, in addition to its
Notice of Appeal, a record on appeal in accordance
with Section 19 of the Interim Rules and Guidelines to
Implement BP Blg. 129 and Section 2(a), Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court . . . (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Republic (petitioner) insists that the declaration of
presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is not a
special proceeding involving multiple or separate appeals where a
record on appeal shall be filed and served in like manner.
Petitioner cites Rule 109 of the Revised Rules of Court which
enumerates the cases wherein multiple appeals are allowed and a
record on appeal is required for an appeal to be perfected. The
petition for the declaration of presumptive death of an absent
spouse not being included in the enumeration, petitioner contends
that a mere notice of appeal suffices.
By Resolution of December 15, 2004, 8 this Court, noting that copy
of the September 27, 2004 Resolution9requiring respondent to file
her comment on the petition was returned unserved with
postmasters notation "Party refused," Resolved to consider that
copy deemed served upon her.
The pertinent provisions on the General Provisions on Special
Proceedings, Part II of the Revised Rules of Court entitled SPECIAL
PROCEEDINGS, read:
RULE 72
SUBJECT MATTER AND APPLICABILITY
OF GENERAL RULES
Section 1. Subject matter of special proceedings. Rules of
special proceedings are provided for in the following:
(a) Settlement of estate of deceased persons;
(b) Escheat;
(c) Guardianship and custody of children;
(d) Trustees;
(e) Adoption;
(f) Rescission and revocation of adoption;
(g) Hospitalization of insane persons;
(h) Habeas corpus;
(i) Change of name;
(j) Voluntary dissolution of corporations;
(k) Judicial approval of voluntary recognition of
minor natural children;
(l) Constitution of family home;
(m) Declaration of absence and death;
(n) Cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry.
Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. In the
absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in
ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable
in special proceedings. (Underscoring supplied)
The pertinent provision of the Civil Code on presumption of death
provides:
Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being
unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall
be presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of
succession.
x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Upon the other hand, Article 41 of the Family Code, upon which the
trial court anchored its grant of the petition for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absent spouse, provides:
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage,
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
the prior spouses had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief
that the absent spouses was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of
the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be
sufficient.
For the purpose pf contracting the subsequent marriage
under the preceding paragraph, the spouses present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this
Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, without prejudice to the effect of a reappearance
of the absent spouse. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Rule 41, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Court, on Modes of
Appeal, invoked by the trial court in disapproving petitioners
Notice of Appeal, provides:
Sec. 2. Modes of appeal. -
(a) Ordinary appeal. - The appeal to the Court of Appeals in
cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of
its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of
appeal with the court which rendered the judgment or final
order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the
adverse party. No record on appeal shall be required except
in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or
separate appeals where the law or these Rules so
require. In such cases, the record on appeal shall be filed
and served in like manner. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
xxx
By the trial courts citation of Article 41 of the Family Code, it is
gathered that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc to have her absent
spouse declared presumptively dead had for its purpose her desire
to contract a valid subsequent marriage. Ergo, the petition for that
purpose is a "summary proceeding," following above-quoted Art.
41, paragraph 2 of the Family Code.
Since Title XI of the Family Code, entitled SUMMARY JUDICIAL
PROCEEDING IN THE FAMILY LAW, contains the following
provision, inter alia:
xxx
Art. 238. Unless modified by the Supreme Court, the
procedural rules in this Title shall apply in all
casesprovided for in this Codes requiring summary court
proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an
expeditious manner without regard to technical
rules. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
x x x,
there is no doubt that the petition of Apolinaria Jomoc required,
and is, therefore, a summary proceeding under the Family
Code, not a special proceeding under the Revised Rules of Court
appeal for which calls for the filing of a Record on Appeal. It being a
summary ordinary proceeding, the filing of a Notice of Appeal from
the trial courts order sufficed.
That the Family Code provision on repeal, Art. 254, provides as
follows:
Art. 254. Titles III, IV, V, VI, VII, VIII, IX, XI and XV of Book I
of Republic Act No. 386, otherwise known as the Civil Code
of the Philippines, as amended, and Articles 17, 18, 19, 27,
28, 29, 30, 31, 39, 40, 41 and 42 of Presidential Decree No.
603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code,
as amended, and alllaws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations rules and regulations, or parts
thereof, inconsistent therewith are
hereby repealed, (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),
seals the case in petitioners favor.
Finally, on the alleged procedural flaw in petitioners petition
before the appellate court. Petitioners failure to attach to his
petition before the appellate court a copy of the trial courts order
denying its motion for reconsideration of the disapproval of its
Notice of Appeal is not necessarily fatal, for the rules of procedure
are not to be applied in a technical sense. Given the issue raised
before it by petitioner, what the appellate court should have done
was to direct petitioner to comply with the rule.
Page | 299
Persons 4th Exam Cases

As for petitioners failure to submit copy of the trial courts order

granting the petition for declaration of presumptive death, contrary
to the appellate courts observation that petitioner was also
assailing it, petitioners 8-page petition 10 filed in said court does
not so reflect, it merely having assailed the order disapproving the
Notice of Appeal.
WHEREFORE, the assailed May 5, 2004 Decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the case be
REMANDED to it for appropriate action in light of the foregoing
discussion.
SO ORDERED.

Page | 300
Persons 4th Exam Cases
[G.R. No. 160258. January 19, 2005]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. GLORIA
BERMUDEZ-LORINO, respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Via this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), seeks the reversal and setting
aside of the decision dated September 23, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 73884, which affirmed on appeal an earlier
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at San Mateo, Rizal in a
summary judicial proceeding thereat commenced by the herein
respondent Gloria Bermudez-Lorino for the declaration of the
presumptive death of her absent spouse, Francisco Lorino, Jr., based on
the provisions of Article 41 of the Family Code, for purposes of
remarriage.
The facts may be summarized, as follows:
Respondent Gloria Bermudez-Lorino (Gloria for brevity), and her
husband were married on June 12, 1987. Out of this marriage, she
begot three (3) children, namely: Francis Jeno, Fria Lou and Fatima.
Before they got married in 1987, Gloria was unaware that her
husband was a habitual drinker, possessed with violent
character/attitude, and had the propensity to go out with friends to the
extent of being unable to engage in any gainful work.
Because of her husbands violent character, Gloria found it safer to
leave him behind and decided to go back to her parents together with
her three (3) children. In order to support the children, Gloria was
compelled to work abroad.
From the time of her physical separation from her husband in
1991, Gloria has not heard of him at all. She had absolutely no
communications with him, or with any of his relatives.
On August 14, 2000, nine (9) years after she left her husband,
Gloria filed a verified petition with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at San
Mateo, Rizal under the rules on Summary Judicial Proceedings in the
Family Law provided for in the Family Code, which petition was
docketed in the same court as Special Proceeding No. 325-00 SM.
On August 28, 2000, the RTC issued an order directing, inter alia,
the publication of the petition in a newspaper of general circulation,
thus:
A verified petition was filed by herein petitioner through counsel
alleging that she married Francisco Lorino, Jr. on June 12, 1987 but
because of the violent character of his husband, she decided to go
back to her parents and lived separately from her husband. After nine
(9) years, there was absolutely no news about him and she believes
that he is already dead and is now seeking through this petition for a
Court declaration that her husband is judicially presumed dead for the
purpose of remarriage.
Finding the said petition to be sufficient in form and substance, the
same is hereby set for hearing before this Court on September 18,
2000 at 8:30 oclock in the morning at which place, date and time, any
or all persons who may claim any interest thereto may appear and
show cause why the same should not be granted.
Let a copy of this Order be published in a newspaper of general
circulation in this province once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks
and be posted in the bulletin boards of the Hall of Justice and the
Municipal Hall, San Mateo, Rizal, all at the expense of the petitioner.
Furnish the Office of the Solicitor General a copy of this Order together
with a copy of the petition. Further, send a copy of this Order to the
last known address of Francisco Lorino, Jr. at 719 Burgos St., Sta. Elena,
Marikina City.
SO ORDERED[1]
The evidence in support of the summary judicial proceeding are:
the order of publication dated August 28, 2000 (Exhibit A); affidavit of
publication dated September 16, 2000 (Exhibit B) [2]; copies of the
newspapers where the order appeared (Exhibits C to E-1) [3]; a
deposition dated September 4, 2000 of Gloria taken in Hong Kong
(Exhibit G)[4]; Glorias affidavit dated October 21, 1999, also executed in
Hong Kong (Exhibit G-1)[5]; and a certification by Department of Foreign
Affairs Authentication Officer, Catalina C. Gonzalez, dated November 3,
1999, therein certifying that the signature of Vice Consul Adriane
Bernie C. Candolada, appearing below the jurat in Glorias affidavit of
October 21, 1999, is authentic (Exhibit G-2)[6].
In a decision dated November 7, 2001, the RTC, finding merit in
the summary petition, rendered judgment granting the same, to wit:
WHEREFORE, this Court in view of the facts and circumstances
obtaining, finds the petition with merit and hereby grants its
imprimatur to the petition. Judgment is hereby rendered declaring the
presumptive death/absence of Francisco Lorino, Jr. pursuant to Art. 41
of the New Family Code but subject to all restrictions and conditions
provided therein.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
SO ORDERED.[7]
Despite the judgment being immediately final and executory
under the provisions of Article 247 of the Family Code, thus:
Art. 247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and
executory,
the Office of the Solicitor General, for the Republic of the Philippines,
nevertheless filed a Notice of Appeal. [8] Acting thereon, the RTC had the
records elevated to the Court of Appeals which docketed the case as
CA-G.R. CV No. 73884.
In a decision dated September 23, 2003, the Court of Appeals,
treating the case as an ordinary appealed case under Rule 41 of the
Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, denied the Republics appeal and
accordingly affirmed the appealed RTC decision:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the instant appeal
is DENIED. Accordingly, the appealed November 7, 2001 Decision of
the Regional Trial Court of San Mateo, Rizal in Spec. Proc. No. 325-00
SM is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Without filing any motion for reconsideration, petitioner Republic
directly went to this Court via the instant recourse under Rule 45,
maintaining that the petition raises a pure question of law that does
not require prior filing of a motion for reconsideration.
The foregoing factual antecedents present to this Court the
following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS DULY ACQUIRED
JURISDICTION OVER THE APPEAL ON A FINAL AND EXECUTORY
JUDGMENT OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT; and
WHETHER OR NOT THE FACTUAL AND LEGAL BASES FOR A
JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH UNDER ARTICLE
41 OF THE FAMILY CODE WERE DULY ESTABLISHED IN THIS CASE.
The Court rules against petitioner Republic.
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL
PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, sets the tenor for cases covered by
these rules, to wit:
Art. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in
this Title shall apply in all cases provided for in this Code requiring
summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be decided in an
expeditious manner without regard to technical rules.
Judge Elizabeth Balquin-Reyes of RTC, Branch 75, San Mateo, Rizal
duly complied with the above-cited provision by expeditiously
rendering judgment within ninety (90) days after the formal offer of
evidence by therein petitioner, Gloria Bermudez-Lorino.
The problem came about when the judge gave due course to the
Republics appeal upon the filing of a Notice of Appeal, and had the
entire records of the case elevated to the Court of Appeals, stating in
her order of December 18, 2001, as follows:
Notice of Appeal having been filed through registered mail on
November 22, 2001 by the Office of the Solicitor General who received
a copy of the Decision in this case on November 14, 2001, within the
reglementary period fixed by the Rules, let the entire records of this
case be transmitted to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.[10]
In Summary Judicial Proceedings under the Family Code, there is
no reglementary period within which to perfect an appeal, precisely
because judgments rendered thereunder, by express provision of
Section 247, Family Code, supra, are immediately final and executory.
It was erroneous, therefore, on the part of the RTC to give due course
to the Republics appeal and order the transmittal of the entire records
of the case to the Court of Appeals.
An appellate court acquires no jurisdiction to review a judgment
which, by express provision of law, is immediately final and executory.
As we have said in Veloria vs. Comelec, [11] the right to appeal is not a
natural right nor is it a part of due process, for it is merely a statutory
privilege. Since, by express mandate of Article 247 of the Family Code,
all judgments rendered in summary judicial proceedings in Family Law
are immediately final and executory, the right to appeal was not
granted to any of the parties therein. The Republic of the Philippines,
as oppositor in the petition for declaration of presumptive death,
should not be treated differently. It had no right to appeal the RTC
decision of November 7, 2001.
It was fortunate, though, that the Court of Appeals, acting through
its Special Fourth Division, with Justice Elvi John S. Asuncion as Acting
Chairman and ponente, denied the Republics appeal and affirmed
without modification the final and executory judgment of the lower
court. For, as we have held in Nacuray vs. NLRC:[12]
Nothing is more settled in law than that when a judgment becomes
final and executory it becomes immutable and unalterable. The same
may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is
meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of
fact or law, and whether made by the highest court of the land
Page | 302
Persons 4th Exam Cases

(citing Nunal v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 94005, 6 April 1993, 221
SCRA 26).
But, if only to set the records straight and for the future guidance
of the bench and the bar, let it be stated that the RTCs decision dated
November 7, 2001, was immediately final and executory upon notice to
the parties. It was erroneous for the OSG to file a notice of appeal, and
for the RTC to give due course thereto. The Court of Appeals acquired
no jurisdiction over the case, and should have dismissed the appeal
outright on that ground.
This judgment of denial was elevated to this Court via a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45. Although the result of the Court
of Appeals denial of the appeal would apparently be the same, there is
a big difference between having the supposed appeal dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction by virtue of the fact that the RTC decision sought to
be appealed is immediately final and executory, and the denial of the
appeal for lack of merit. In the former, the supposed appellee can
immediately ask for the issuance of an Entry of Judgment in the RTC,
whereas, in the latter, the appellant can still raise the matter to this
Court on petition for review and the RTC judgment cannot be executed
until this Court makes the final pronouncement.
The Court, therefore, finds in this case grave error on the part of
both the RTC and the Court of Appeals. To stress, the Court of Appeals
should have dismissed the appeal on ground of lack of jurisdiction, and
reiterated the fact that the RTC decision of November 7, 2001 was
immediately final and executory. As it were, the Court of Appeals
committed grave reversible error when it failed to dismiss the
erroneous appeal of the Republic on ground of lack of jurisdiction
because, by express provision of law, the judgment was not
appealable.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Page | 303
Persons 4th Exam Cases
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
- versus -
FERVENTINO U. TANGO,
Respondent.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision[1] dated November 28, 2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 76387 which denied the Republics appeal from the
Order[2] dated July 23, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Ligao City, Branch 11 in Special Proceeding No. 357. The trial
court had declared the wife of respondent Ferventino U. Tango
(Ferventino), Maria Jose Villarba (Maria), presumptively dead under
Article 41[3] of the Family Code.
The present controversy arose from the following facts:
On March 9, 1987, Ferventino and Maria were married[4] in
civil rites before then Mayor Ignacio Bunye of Muntinlupa City. None of
Marias relatives witnessed the ceremony as they were opposed to her
relationship with Ferventino. The two had only spent a night together
and had been intimate once when Maria told Ferventino that she and
her family will soon be leaving for the United States of America
(USA). Maria assured Ferventino, however, that she will file a petition
so he can live with her in theUSA. In the event that said petition is
denied, she promised to return to the Philippines to live with him.
On March 13, 1987, Maria and her family flew to Seattle, USA.
Ferventino alleges that Maria kept in touch for a year
before she stopped responding to his letters. Out of resentment, he
burned all the letters Maria wrote him. He claims to have forgotten
her address since.
Ferventino recounts the efforts he made to find
Maria. Upon inquiry from the latters uncle, Antonio Ledesma, in Las
Pias, Ferventino learned that even Marias relatives were unaware
of her whereabouts. He also solicited the assistance of a friend
in Texas, Capt. Luis Aris of the U.S. Air Force, but to no
avail. Finally, he sought the aid of his parents Antonio and Eusebia
in Los Angeles, and his aunt Anita Castro-Mayor in Seattle. Like,
Ledesma though, their attempts to find Maria proved fruitless. The
next 14 years went by without any news of Maria.
On the belief that his wife had died, Ferventino filed a
verified petition[5] dated October 1, 2001 before the Ligao City RTC
for the declaration of presumptive death of Maria within the
contemplation of Article 41 of the Family Code.
When the case was called for initial hearing on January 8,
2002, nobody entered any opposition. On July 22, 2002, Ferventino
presented evidence ex parte and testified in court about the details
of his search. On July 23, 2002, Branch 11 of the Ligao City RTC
issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered, declaring MARIA JOSE V. VILLARBA, wife
of FERVENTINO U. TANGO, presumptively dead
within the meaning of Article 41 of the Family
Code.
SO ORDERED. [6]
This prompted the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), for
the Republic, to file a Notice of Appeal.[7] Acting thereon, Presiding
Judge Romulo SG. Villanueva of the Ligao City RTC had the records
of the case transmitted to the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals, treating the case as an ordinary
appealed case under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, affirmed the
RTCs Order. It held that Marias absence for 14 years without
information about her location despite diligent search by
Ferventino was sufficient to support a well-founded belief of her
death. The appellate court observed that neither the OSG nor the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor objected to the evidence which
Ferventino presented on trial. It noted, in particular, that the OSG
did not dispute the adequacy of Ferventinos basis to engender a
well-founded belief that Maria is dead. Hence, in a Decision
dated November 28, 2003, the Court of Appeals denied the
Republics appeal in this tenor:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is
hereby DENIED. Accordingly, the July 23,
2002 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Ligao City,
Branch 11 in Spec. Proc. No. 357 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.[8]
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
Before us, petitioner anchors this petition for review on
certiorari on the following two grounds:
I.
THE TESTIMONY OF RESPONDENT ON THE
ALLEGED EFFORTS MADE BY HIS FRIEND AND
RELATIVES IN LOCATING HIS MISSING WIFE IN
SEATTLE, UNITED STATES, IS HEARSAY AND DEVOID
OF PROBATIVE VALUE[; AND]
II.
EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE AFORESAID TESTIMONY
MAY BE CONSIDERED IN EVIDENCE, THE ALLEGED
EFFORTS OF RESPONDENTS FRIEND AND
RELATIVES IN LOCATING HIS MISSING WIFE IN
SEATTLE, UNITED STATES, DO NOT SUFFICIENTLY
SUPPORT A WELL-FOUNDED BELIEF THAT
RESPONDENTS ABSENT SPOUSE IS PROBABLY
DEAD.[9]
Unadorned, the issues for our determination are: (1)
whether the testimony of respondent Ferventino is hearsay; and
(2) whether respondent Ferventino has established a basis to form
a well-founded belief that his absent spouse is already dead.
The Republic, through the OSG, contests the appellate
courts holding that the absence of respondents wife Maria for 14
years provides sufficient basis to entertain a well-founded belief
that she is dead. The OSG discounts respondents testimony, on the
steps he took to find Maria, as hearsay because none of the
persons who purportedly helped in his search testified in
court. Notably, the OSG observes that only Capt. Aris gave a
detailed account of his efforts to track down Maria. According to
Capt. Aris, he went over the Seattle phone directory for Marias
name and inquired about her from the registrars office in Seattle,
but both efforts proved to be in vain.
The OSG belittles its failure to object to the admissibility of
respondents testimony during trial. Instead, it invokes
Constitutional provisions that advocate the state policy of
preserving marital institutions.
On March 16, 2007, respondents counsel, Atty. Richie R.
Regala, manifested to this Court his intent to withdraw as counsel
for respondent. According to Atty. Regala, he received a letter by
which respondent expressed a desire to withdraw from the
proceeding.[10] In view of this, the Court issued a
Resolution[11] on April 21, 2008 which deemed as waived the filing
of respondents comment on the petition. Previously, the Court of
Appeals had also issued a Resolution [12] dated October 15,
2003 submitting the case for decision and ordering its re-raffling
for respondents failure to file an appellees brief. In other words,
apart from the verified petition for the declaration of presumptive
death of Maria dated October 1, 2001, which respondent filed
before the Ligao City RTC, he has not submitted any other pleading
in connection with the petition.
Respondents apparent lack of desire to pursue the
proceedings notwithstanding, the Court is inclined to rule against
the Republic.
This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule
on appeal of judgments rendered in summary proceedings under
the Family Code and accordingly, refine our previous decisions
thereon.
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY
JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules
that govern summary court proceedings in the Family Code:
ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme
Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply
in all cases provided for in this Code requiring
summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be
decided in an expeditious manner without regard
to technical rules.
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases
covered by the rules in chapters two and three of the same title. It
states:
ART. 253. The foregoing rules in
Chapters 2 and 3 hereof shall likewise
govern summary proceedings filed under
Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as
they are applicable. (Emphasis supplied.)
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title
reads:
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
ART 247. The judgment of the court shall
be immediately final and executory.
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a
summary proceeding shall be immediately final and executory. As a
matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of the trial
courts judgment in a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of an absent spouse under Article 41 of the
Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an aggrieved
party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the
Court of Appeals in accordance with the Doctrine of Hierarchy of
Courts. To be sure, even if the Courts original jurisdiction to issue a
writ of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of
Appeals in certain cases, such concurrence does not sanction an
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.[13] From the decision
of the Court of Appeals, the losing party may then file a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with the
Supreme Court.This is because the errors which the court may
commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment
which are the proper subject of an appeal.[14]
In the case before us, petitioner committed a serious
procedural lapse when it filed a notice of appeal in the Court of
Appeals instead of a petition for certiorari. The RTC equally erred in
giving due course to said appeal and ordering the transmittal of
the records of the case to the appellate court. By no means did the
Court of Appeals acquire jurisdiction to review the judgment of the
RTC which, by express provision of law, was immediately final and
executory.
Adding to the confusion, the Court of Appeals entertained
the appeal and treated the same as an ordinary appeal under Rule
41 of the Rules of Court. As it were, the Court of Appeals
committed grave reversible error when it failed to dismiss the
erroneous appeal of the Republic on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction because, by express provision of the law, the judgment
was not appealable.[15]
Before us, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. But, even if petitioner used the
correct mode of appeal at this level, the hands of the Court are
tied. Without a doubt, the decision of the trial court had long
become final.
Deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence is the principle that a
decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable. As such, it may no longer be modified in any respect
even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of
fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or
by the highest court of the land.[16] In light of the foregoing, it would
be unnecessary, if not useless, to discuss the issues raised by
petitioner.
The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on the
fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that, at
the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award
of quasi-judicial agencies must become final on some definite date
fixed by law. The only exceptions to the general rule are the
correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries
which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and
whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision
which render its execution unjust and inequitable. [17] None of the
exceptions obtains here to merit the review sought.
WHEREFORE the instant petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
G.R. No. 88202 December 14, 1998
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CYNTHIA VICENCIO, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is an interposed by the Republic of the Philippines as represented
by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), assailing the decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals promulgated on April 28, 1989, which affirmed the
decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 52, dated August
31, 1987. The appealed decision granted private respondent Cynthia
Vicencio's petition for change of surname, from "Vicencio" to "Yu".
As found by the trial court, hereunder are the facts and circumstances
of the case:
Petitioner's evidence is to the effect that she was born
on 19 January 1971 at the Capitol Medical Center,
Quezon City, to the spouses Pablo Castro Vicencio and
Fe Esperanza de Vega Leabres (Exh. C, also marked
Annex A of Petition); that on 10 January 1972, after a
marital spat, Pablo Vicencio left their conjugal abode
then situated at Meycauayan, Bulacan; that since then
Pablo Vicencio never reappeared nor sent support to
his family and it was Ernesto Yu who had come to the
aid of Fe Esperanza Labres (sic) and her children; that
on 29 June 1976, Fe Esperanza Leabres filed a petition
in the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Manila for dissolution of their conjugal partnership,
Civil Case No. E-02009, which was granted in a
decision rendered by the Hon. Regina C. Ordoez
Benitez on 11 July 1977 (Exhs. D, D-1 to D-3); that
sometime in 1983, petitioner's mother filed another
petition for change of name, Sp. Proc No. 83-16346,
that is to drop the surname of her husband therefrom,
and after hearing a decision was rendered on 5 July
1983 by the Hon. Emeterio C. Cui of Branch XXV of
this Court approving the petition (Exh. E); that in
1984, petitioner's mother again filed another petition
with this Court, Sp. Proc. No. 84-22605, for the
declaration of Pablo Vicencio as an absentee, and
which petition was granted on 26 April 1984 in a
decision rendered by the Hon. Corona Ibay-Somera
(Exh. F & F-1); that on 15 April 1986, petitioner's
mother and Ernesto Yu were joined in matrimony in a
ceremony solemnized by Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos of
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila (Exh. G.).
It was also established that even (sic) since her
childhood, petitioner had not known mush less
remembered her real father Pablo Vicencio, and her
known father had been and still is Ernesto Yu; that
despite of which she had been using the family name
"Vicencio" in her school and other related activities
therein; that in view of such situation, confusion arose
as to her parentage and she had been subjected to
inquiries why she is using Vicencio as her family
name, both by her classmates and their neighbors,
causing her extreme embarrassment; that on two (2)
occassions when she ran as a beauty contestant in a
Lions Club affair and in Manila Red Cross pageant, her
name was entered as Cynthia L. Yu; that her step-
father had been priorly consulted about this petition
and had given his consent thereto; that in fact Ernesto
Yu testified for petitioner and confirmed his consent to
the petition as he had always treated petitioner as his
own daughter ever since. 3
At the hearing of the petition for change of name by the trial court, the
OSG manifested that it was opposing the petition. It participated in the
proceedings by cross-examining the private respondent Cynthia
Vicencio, (petitionera quo) and her witnesses.
Disregarding the OSG's contention, the trial court ruled that there is no
valid cause for denying the petition. Further, the trial court stated that
it could not compel private respondent's step-father to adopt her, as
adoption is a voluntary act; but failure to resort to adoption should not
be a cause for disallowing private respondent to legally change her
name. 4 Hence, it granted the change of surname of private respondent
from Vicencio to Yu.
The decision of the trial court was affirmed by the appellate court,
which held that it is for the best interest of petitioner that her surname
be changed. The appellate court took into account the testimonies of
private respondent and her witnesses that allowing the change of
surname would "give her an opportunity to improve her personality
and welfare." 5 It likewise noted that the discrepancy between her
Page | 307
Persons 4th Exam Cases
original surname, taken from her biological father; and the surname of
her step-father, who has been socially recognized as her father, caused
her embarrassment and inferiority complex. 6
The main issue before us is whether the appellate court erred in
affirming the trial court's decision allowing the change of private
respondent's surname to that of her step-father's surname.
In Republic vs. Hernandez 7, we have recognized inter alia, the
following as sufficient grounds to warrant a change name: (a) when the
name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce, (b) when the change is a legal consequence of legitimation
or adoption; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one
has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino
name and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) when the change is
based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of
former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudice to anybody;
and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no
showing that the desired change of name was far a fraudulent purpose,
or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
Private respondent asserts that her case falls under one of the
justifiable grounds aforecited. She says that confusion has arisen as to
her parentage because ever since childhood, Ernesto Yu has acted as
her father, assuming duties of rearing, caring and supporting her. Since
she is known in society as the daughter of Ernesto Yu, she claims that
she been subjected to inquiries regarding her use of a different
surname, causing her much humiliation and embarrassment. However,
it is not denied that private respondent has used Vicencio as her
surname in her school records and related documents. But she had
used the surname of her step-father, Yu, when she participated in
public functions, such as entering beauty contests, namely, with the
Lion's Club and the Manila Red Cross, and when she celebrated her
debut at the Manila Hotel. 8
The Solicitor General however argues that there is no proper and
reasonable cause to warrant private respondent's change of surname.
Such change might even cause confusion and give rise to legal
complications due to the fact that private respondent's step-father has
two (2) children with her mother. In the event of her step-father's
death, it is possible that private respondent may even claim
inheritance rights as a "legitimate" daughter. In his memorandum, the
Solicitor General opines that "Ernesto Yu has no intention of making
Cynthia as an heir because despite the suggestion made before the
petition for change of name was heard by the trial court that the
change of family name to Yu could very easily be achieved by
adoption, he has not opted for such a remedy." 9
We find merit in the Solicitor General's contention.
"The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there
be "proper and reasonable cause" for which the change is
sought." 10 The assailed decision as affirmed by the appellate court
does not persuade us to depart from the applicability of the general
rule on the use of surnames 11, specifically the law which requires that
legitimate children shall principally use the surname of their father 12.
Private respondent Cynthia Vicencio is the legitimate offspring of Fe
Leabres and Pablo Vicencio. As previously stated, a legitimate child
generally bears the surname of his or her father. It must be stressed
that a change of name is a privilege, not a matter of right, addressed
to the sound discretion of the court, which has the duty to consider
carefully the consequences of a change of name and to deny the same
unless weighty reasons are shown. 13
Confusion indeed might arise with regard to private respondent's
parentage because of her surname. But even, more confusion with
grave legal consequences could arise if we allow private respondent to
bear her step-father's surname, even if she is not legally adopted by
him. While previous decisions have allowed children to bear the
surname of their respective step-fathers even without the benefit of
adoption, these instances should be distinguished from the present
case. In Calderon vs. Republic, 14 and Llaneta vs. Agrava, 15 this Court
allowed the concerned child to adopt the surname of the step-father,
but unlike the situation in the present case where private respondent is
a legitimate child, in those cases the children were not of legitimate
parentage. In Moore vs.
Republic, 16 where the circumstances appears to be similar to the
present case before us, the Court upheld the Republic's position:
We find tenable this observation of government's
counsel. Indeed, if a child born out of a lawful wedlock
be allowed to bear the surname of the second
husband of the mother, should the first husband die or
be separated by a decree of divorce, there may result
a confusion as to his real paternity. In the long run the
change may redound to the prejudice of the child in
the community.
While the purpose which may have animated
petitioner is plausible and may run along the feeling of
cordiality and spiritual relationship that pervades
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
among the members of the Moore family, our hand is
deferred by a legal barrier which we cannot at present
overlook or brush aside. 17
Similarly in Padilla vs. Republic, 18 the Court ruled that:
To allow said minors to adopt the surname of their
mother's second husband, who is not their father,
could result in confusion in their paternity It could also
create the suspicion that said minors, who were born
during the coverture of their mother with her first
husband, were in fact sired by Edward Padilla, thus
bringing their legitimate status into discredit. 19
Private respondent might sincerely wish to be in a position similar to
that of her step-father's legitimate children, a plausible reason the
petition for change of name was filed in the first place. Moreover, it is
laudable that Ernesto Yu has treated Cynthia as his very own daughter,
providing for all her needs as a father would his own flesh and blood.
However, legal constraints lead us to reject private respondent's desire
to use her stepfather's surname. Further, there is no assurance the end
result would not be even more detrimental to her person, for instead of
bringing a stop to questions, the very change of name, if granted,
could trigger much deeper inquiries regarding her parentage.
Lastly, when this case was decided by the appellate court, private
respondent was already 18 years old but still considered a minor
because Republic Act 6809, 20 lowering the age of majority, was then in
effect. However, regardless of private respondent's age, our conclusion
remains considering the circumstances before us and the lack of any
legally justifiable cause for allowing the change of her surname.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE; and the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. So ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 159966. March 30, 2005]
IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR
CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL
REGISTRY OF JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG also
known as JULIAN LIN WANG, to be
amended/corrected as JULIAN LIN WANG, JULIAN LIN
WANG, duly represented by his mother ANNA LISA
WANG, petitioner, vs. CEBU CITY CIVIL REGISTRAR,
duly represented by the Registrar OSCAR B.
MOLO, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
I will not blot out his name out of the book of life.
Revelation 3:5
On 22 September 2002, petitioner Julian Lin Carulasan Wang,
a minor, represented by his mother Anna Lisa Wang, filed a petition
dated 19 September 2002 for change of name and/or
correction/cancellation of entry in the Civil Registry of Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang. Petitioner sought to drop his middle name and
have his registered name changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang
to Julian Lin Wang.
The petition was docketed as Special Proceedings Case No.
11458 CEB and raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu
City, Branch 57.
The RTC established the following facts:
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang was born in Cebu City on February 20,
1998 to parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then
not yet married to each other. When his parents subsequently got
married on September 22, 1998, ...they executed a deed of
legitimation of their son so that the childs name was changed from
Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.
The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore
for a long time because they will let him study there together with
his sister named Wang Mei Jasmine who was born in Singapore.
Since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the
mother are not carried in a persons name, they anticipate that
Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against because of
his current registered name which carries a middle name. Julian
and his sister might also be asking whether they are brother and
sister since they have different surnames. Carulasan sounds funny
in Singapores Mandarin language since they do not have the letter
R but if there is, they pronounce it as L. It is for these reasons that
the name of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed
to Julian Lin Wang.[1]
On 30 April 2003, the RTC rendered a decision denying the
petition.[2] The trial court found that the reason given for the
change of name sought in the petitionthat is, that petitioner Julian
may be discriminated against when studies in Singapore because
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
of his middle namedid not fall within the grounds recognized by
law. The trial court ruled that the change sought is merely for the
convenience of the child. Since the State has an interest in the
name of a person, names cannot be changed to suit the
convenience of the bearers. Under Article 174 of the Family Code,
legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of the
father and the mother, and there is no reason why this right should
now be taken from petitioner Julian, considering that he is still a
minor. The trial court added that when petitioner Julian reaches the
age of majority, he could then decide whether he will change his
name by dropping his middle name.[3]
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision but
this was denied in a resolution dated 20 May 2004. [4] The trial court
maintained that the Singaporean practice of not carrying a middle
name does not justify the dropping of the middle name of a
legitimate Filipino child who intends to study there. The dropping of
the middle name would be tantamount to giving due recognition to
or application of the laws of Singapore instead of Philippine law
which is controlling. That the change of name would not prejudice
public interest or would not be for a fraudulent purpose would not
suffice to grant the petition if the reason for the change of name is
itself not reasonable.[5]
Petitioner then filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari
(Under Rule 45)[6] arguing that the trial court has decided a
question of substance not theretofore determined by the Court,
that is: whether or not dropping the middle name of a minor child
is contrary to Article 174 [7] of the Family Code. Petitioner contends
that [W]ith globalization and mixed marriages, there is a need for
the Supreme Court to rule on the matter of dropping of family
name for a child to adjust to his new environment, for consistency
and harmony among siblings, taking into consideration the best
interest of the child.[8] It is argued that convenience of the child is a
valid reason for changing the name as long as it will not prejudice
the State and others. Petitioner points out that the middle name
Carulasan will cause him undue embarrassment and the difficulty
in writing or pronouncing it will be an obstacle to his social
acceptance and integration in the Singaporean community.
Petitioner also alleges that it is error for the trial court to have
denied the petition for change of name until he had reached the
age of majority for him to decide the name to use, contrary to
previous cases[9] decided by this Court that allowed a minor to
petition for change of name.[10]
The Court required the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to
comment on the petition. The OSG filed its Comment[11] positing
that the trial court correctly denied the petition for change of
name. The OSG argues that under Article 174 of the Family Code,
legitimate children have the right to bear the surnames of their
father and mother, and such right cannot be denied by the mere
expedient of dropping the same. According to the OSG, there is
also no showing that the dropping of the middle name Carulasan is
in the best interest of petitioner, since mere convenience is not
sufficient to support a petition for change of name and/or
cancellation of entry.[12] The OSG also adds that the petitioner has
not shown any compelling reason to justify the change of name or
the dropping of the middle name, for that matter. Petitioners
allegation that the continued use of the middle name may result in
confusion and difficulty is allegedly more imaginary than real. The
OSG reiterates its argument raised before the trial court that the
dropping of the childs middle name could only trigger much deeper
inquiries regarding the true parentage of petitioner. Hence, while
petitioner Julian has a sister named Jasmine Wei Wang, there is no
confusion since both use the surname of their father, Wang. Even
assuming that it is customary in Singapore to drop the middle
name, it has also not been shown that the use of such middle
name is actually proscribed by Singaporean law.[13]
We affirm the decision of the trial court. The petition should be
denied.
The Court has had occasion to express the view that the State
has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for
purposes of identification, and that a change of name is a privilege
and not a right, so that before a person can be authorized to
change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil
registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any
compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the
request should be denied.[14]
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there
be proper and reasonable cause for which the change is sought.
[15]
To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show
not only some proper or compelling reason therefore but also that
he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name.
Among the grounds for change of name which have been held
valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change
results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the
change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used
and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was
unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino
name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and
without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes
embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of
name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name
would prejudice public interest.[16]
In granting or denying petitions for change of name, the
question of proper and reasonable cause is left to the sound
discretion of the court. The evidence presented need only be
satisfactory to the court and not all the best evidence available.
What is involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance
of the request, but a judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and
propriety of the justifications advanced in support thereof, mindful
of the consequent results in the event of its grant and with the sole
prerogative for making such determination being lodged in the
courts.[17]
The petition before us is unlike other petitions for change of
name, as it does not simply seek to change the name of the minor
petitioner and adopt another, but instead seeks to drop the middle
name altogether. Decided cases in this jurisdiction involving
petitions for change of name usually deal with requests for change
of surname. There are only a handful of cases involving requests
for change of the given name [18] and none on requests for changing
or dropping of the middle name. Does the law allow one to drop
the middle name from his registered name? We have to answer in
the negative.
A discussion on the legal significance of a persons name is
relevant at this point. We quote, thus:
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the
designation by which he is known and called in the community in
which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or
combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other
individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for
the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in
speaking of or dealing with him. Names are used merely as one
method of indicating the identity of persons; they are descriptive of
persons for identification, since, the identity is the essential thing
and it has frequently been held that, when identity is certain, a
variance in, or misspelling of, the name is immaterial.
The names of individuals usually have two parts: the given name
or proper name, and the surname or family name. The given or
proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or
baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The name or
family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs
and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be
freely selected by the parents for the child; but the surname to
which the child is entitled is fixed by law.
A name is said to have the following characteristics: (1) It is
absolute, intended to protect the individual from being confused
with others. (2) It is obligatory in certain respects, for nobody can
be without a name. (3) It is fixed, unchangeable, or immutable, at
least at the start, and may be changed only for good cause and by
judicial proceedings. (4) It is outside the commerce of man, and,
therefore, inalienable and intransmissible by act inter vivos or
mortis causa. (5) It is imprescriptible.[19]
This citation does not make any reference to middle names,
but this does not mean that middle names have no practical or
legal significance. Middle names serve to identify the maternal
lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him
from others who may have the same given name and surname as
he has.
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and
legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
[20]
The Family Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
surnames of the father and the mother, [21] while illegitimate
children shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father
recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the fathers
surname.[22]
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not
recognized by the father bears only a given name and his mothers
surname, and does not have a middle name. The name of the
unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is
only when the illegitimate child is legitimated by the subsequent
marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public
document or private handwritten instrument that he bears both his
mothers surname as his middle name and his fathers surname as
his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an
acknowledged illegitimate child.
Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of
such individuals requires that the middle name be indicated in the
certificate. The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and
recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given or proper name,
a middle name, and a surname.
Petitioner theorizes that it would be for his best interest to
drop his middle name as this would help him to adjust more easily
to and integrate himself into Singaporean society. In support, he
cites Oshita v. Republic[23] and Calderon v. Republic,[24] which,
however, are not apropos both.
In Oshita, the petitioner therein, a legitimate daughter of a
Filipino mother, Buena Bartolome, and a Japanese father,
Kishimatsu Oshita, sought to change her name from Antonina B.
Oshita to Antonina Bartolome. The Court granted her petition
based on the following considerations: she had elected Philippine
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; her other siblings
who had also elected Philippine citizenship have been using their
mothers surname; she was embarrassed to bear a Japanese
surname there still being ill feeling against the Japanese due to the
last World War; and there was no showing that the change of name
was motivated by a fraudulent purpose or that it will prejudice
public interest.
In Calderon, the Court allowed petitioner Gertrudes Josefina
del Prado, an illegitimate minor child acting through her mother
who filed the petition in her behalf, to change her name to
Gertudes Josefina Calderon, taking the surname of her stepfather,
Romeo C. Calderon, her mothers husband. The Court held that a
petition for change of name of an infant should be granted where
to do is clearly for the best interest of the child. The Court took into
consideration the opportunity provided for the minor petitioner to
eliminate the stigma of illegitimacy which she would carry if she
continued to use the surname of her illegitimate father. The Court
pronounced that justice dictates that every person be allowed to
avail of any opportunity to improve his social standing as long as
doing so he does not cause prejudice or injury to the interests of
the State or of other people.
Petitioner cites Alfon v. Republic,[25] in arguing that although
Article 174 of the Family Code gives the legitimate child the right
to use the surnames of the father and the mother, it is not
mandatory such that the child could use only one family name,
even the family name of the mother. In Alfon, the petitioner
therein, the legitimate daughter of Filomeno Duterte and Estrella
Alfon, sought to change her name from Maria Estrella Veronica
Primitiva Duterte (her name as registered in the Local Civil
Registry) to Estrella S. Alfon (the name she had been using since
childhood, in her school records and in her voters registration). The
trial court denied her petition but this Court overturned the denial,
ruling that while Article 364 of the Civil Code states that she, as a
legitimate child, should principally use the surname of her father,
there is no legal obstacle for her to choose to use the surname of
herm other to which she is entitled. In addition, the Court found
that there was ample justification to grant her petition, i.e., to
avoid confusion.
Weighing petitioners reason of convenience for the change of
his name against the standards set in the cases he cites to support
his contention would show that his justification is amorphous, to
say the least, and could not warrant favorable action on his
petition.
The factual antecedents and unique circumstances of the
cited cases are not at all analogous to the case at bar. The instant
case is clearly distinguishable from the cases of Oshita and Alfon,
where the petitioners were already of age when they filed their
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

petitions for change of name. Being of age, they are considered to

have exercised their discretion and judgment, fully knowing the
effects of their decision to change their surnames. It can also be
unmistakably observed that the reason for the grant of the
petitions for change of name in these two cases was the presence
of reasonable or compelling grounds therefore. The Court,
in Oshita, recognized the tangible animosity most Filipinos had
during that time against the Japanese as a result of World War II, in
addition to the fact of therein petitioners election of Philippine
citizenship. In Alfon, the Court granted the petition since the
petitioner had been known since childhood by a name different
from her registered name and she had not used her registered
name in her school records and voters registration records; thus,
denying the petition would only result to confusion.
Calderon, on the other hand, granted the petition for change
of name filed by a mother in behalf of her illegitimate minor child.
Petitioner cites this case to buttress his argument that he does not
have to reach the age of majority to petition for change of name.
However, it is manifest in Calderon that the Court, in granting the
petition for change of name, gave paramount consideration to the
best interests of the minor petitioner therein.
In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for
the dropping his middle name is convenience. However, how such
change of name would make his integration into Singaporean
society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the
continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and
difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop
it from his registered complete name.
In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the
nebulous foundation on which his petition for change of name is
based, it is best that the matter of change of his name be left to his
judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority. [26] As
he is of tender age, he may not yet understand and appreciate the
value of the change of his name and granting of the same at this
point may just prejudice him in his rights under our laws.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for
Review on Certiorari is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
[G.R. No. 148311. March 31, 2005]
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF STEPHANIE NATHY
ASTORGA GARCIA
HONORATO B. CATINDIG, petitioner.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
May an illegitimate child, upon adoption by her natural
father, use the surname of her natural mother as her middle
name? This is the issue raised in the instant case.
The facts are undisputed.
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein
petitioner, filed a petition [1] to adopt his minor illegitimate
child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged therein,
among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994; [2] that
her mother is Gemma Astorga Garcia; that Stephanie has been
using her mothers middle name and surname; and that he is now a
widower and qualified to be her adopting parent. He prayed that
Stephanies middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia, her
mothers surname, and that her surname Garcia be changed
to Catindig, his surname.
On March 23, 2001,[3] the trial court rendered the assailed
Decision granting the adoption, thus:
After a careful consideration of the evidence presented by the
petitioner, and in the absence of any opposition to the petition, this
Court finds that the petitioner possesses all the qualifications and
none of the disqualification provided for by law as an adoptive
parent, and that as such he is qualified to maintain, care for and
educate the child to be adopted; that the grant of this petition
would redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor
Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. The Court further holds that the
petitioners care and custody of the child since her birth up to the
present constitute more than enough compliance with the
requirement of Article 35 of Presidential Decree No. 603.
WHEREFORE, finding the petition to be meritorious, the same
is GRANTED. Henceforth, Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia is
hereby freed from all obligations of obedience and maintenance
with respect to her natural mother, and for civil purposes, shall
henceforth be the petitioners legitimate child and legal heir.
Pursuant to Article 189 of the Family Code of the Philippines, the
minor shall be known as STEPHANIE NATHY CATINDIG.
Upon finality of this Decision, let the same be entered in the Local
Civil Registrar concerned pursuant to Rule 99 of the Rules of Court.
Let copy of this Decision be furnished the National Statistics Office
for record purposes.
SO ORDERED.[4]
On April 20, 2001, petitioner filed a motion for clarification
and/or reconsideration[5] praying that Stephanie should be allowed
to use the surname of her natural mother (GARCIA) as her middle
name.
On May 28, 2001,[6] the trial court denied petitioners motion
for reconsideration holding that there is no law or jurisprudence
allowing an adopted child to use the surname of his biological
mother as his middle name.
Hence, the present petition raising the issue of whether an
illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother as her middle
name when she is subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Petitioner submits that the trial court erred in depriving
Stephanie of a middle name as a consequence of adoption
because: (1) there is no law prohibiting an adopted child from
having a middle name in case there is only one adopting parent;
(2) it is customary for every Filipino to have as middle name the
surname of the mother; (3) the middle name or initial is a part of
the name of a person; (4) adoption is for the benefit and best
interest of the adopted child, hence, her right to bear a proper
name should not be violated; (5) permitting Stephanie to use the
middle name Garcia (her mothers surname) avoids the stigma of
her illegitimacy; and; (6) her continued use of Garcia as her middle
name is not opposed by either the Catindig or Garcia families.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), agrees with petitioner that Stephanie should be permitted
to use, as her middle name, the surname of her natural mother for
the following reasons:
First, it is necessary to preserve and maintain Stephanies
filiation with her natural mother because under Article 189 of the
Family Code, she remains to be an intestate heir of the latter. Thus,
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
to prevent any confusion and needless hardship in the future, her
relationship or proof of that relationship with her natural mother
should be maintained.
Second, there is no law expressly prohibiting Stephanie to use
the surname of her natural mother as her middle name. What the
law does not prohibit, it allows.
Last, it is customary for every Filipino to have a middle name,
which is ordinarily the surname of the mother. This custom has
been recognized by the Civil Code and Family Code. In fact, the
Family Law Committees agreed that the initial or surname of the
mother should immediately precede the surname of the father so
that the second name, if any, will be before the surname of the
mother.[7]
We find merit in the petition.
Use Of Surname Is Fixed By Law
For all practical and legal purposes, a man's name is the
designation by which he is known and called in the community in
which he lives and is best known. It is defined as the word or
combination of words by which a person is distinguished from other
individuals and, also, as the label or appellation which he bears for
the convenience of the world at large addressing him, or in
speaking of or dealing with him. [8] It is both of personal as well as
public interest that every person must have a name.
The name of an individual has two parts: (1) the given or
proper name and (2) the surname or family name. The given
or proper name is that which is given to the individual at birth or at
baptism, to distinguish him from other individuals. The surname or
family name is that which identifies the family to which he belongs
and is continued from parent to child. The given name may be
freely selected by the parents for the child, but the surname to
which the child is entitled is fixed by law.[9]
Thus, Articles 364 to 380 of the Civil Code provides the
substantive rules which regulate the use of surname [10] of an
individual whatever may be his status in life, i.e., whether he may
be legitimate or illegitimate, an adopted child, a married woman or
a previously married woman, or a widow, thus:
Art. 364. Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use
the surname of the father.
Art. 365. An adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter.
xxx
Art. 369. Children conceived before the decree annulling a voidable
marriage shall principally use the surname of the father.
Art. 370. A married woman may use:
(1) Her maiden first name and surname and add her husband's
surname, or
(2) Her maiden first name and her husband's surname or
(3) Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating that
she is his wife, such as Mrs.
Art. 371. In case of annulment of marriage, and the wife is the
guilty party, she shall resume her maiden name and surname. If
she is the innocent spouse, she may resume her maiden name and
surname. However, she may choose to continue employing her
former husband's surname, unless:
(1) The court decrees otherwise, or
(2) She or the former husband is married again to another person.
Art. 372. When legal separation has been granted, the wife shall
continue using her name and surname employed before the legal
separation.
Art. 373. A widow may use the deceased husband's surname as
though he were still living, in accordance with Article 370.
Art. 374. In case of identity of names and surnames, the younger
person shall be obliged to use such additional name or surname as
will avoid confusion.
Art. 375. In case of identity of names and surnames between
ascendants and descendants, the word Junior can be used only by
a son. Grandsons and other direct male descendants shall either:
(1) Add a middle name or the mother's surname,
(2) Add the Roman numerals II, III, and so on.
xxx
Law Is Silent As To The Use Of
Middle Name
As correctly submitted by both parties, there is no law
regulating the use of a middle name. Even Article 176 [11] of the
Family Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 9255, otherwise
known as An Act Allowing Illegitimate Children To Use The
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
Surname Of Their Father, is silent as to what middle name a child
may use.
The middle name or the mothers surname is only considered
in Article 375(1), quoted above, in case there is identity of names
and surnames between ascendants and descendants, in which
case, the middle name or the mothers surname shall be added.
Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle
name an adoptee may use. Article 365 of the Civil Code merely
provides that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the
adopter. Also, Article 189 of the Family Code, enumerating the
legal effects of adoption, is likewise silent on the matter, thus:
"(1) For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be
a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall acquire the
reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the relationship of
parent and child, including the right of the adopted to use the
surname of the adopters;
xxx
However, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, the members of
the Civil Code and Family Law Committees that drafted the Family
Code recognized the Filipino custom of adding the surname
of the childs mother as his middle name. In the Minutes of the
Joint Meeting of the Civil Code and Family Law Committees, the
members approved the suggestion that the initial or surname of
the mother should immediately precede the surname of the
father, thus
Justice Caguioa commented that there is a difference between the
use by the wife of the surname and that of the child because the
fathers surname indicates the family to which he belongs,
for which reason he would insist on the use of the fathers
surname by the child but that, if he wants to, the child may
also use the surname of the mother.
Justice Puno posed the question: If the child chooses to use the
surname of the mother, how will his name be written? Justice
Caguioa replied that it is up to him but that his point is that it
should be mandatory that the child uses the surname of
the father and permissive in the case of the surname of the
mother.
Prof. Baviera remarked that Justice Caguioas point is covered by
the present Article 364, which reads:
Legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the
surname of the father.
Justice Puno pointed out that many names change through no
choice of the person himself precisely because of this
misunderstanding. He then cited the following example: Alfonso
Ponce Enriles correct surname is Ponce since the mothers surname
is Enrile but everybody calls him Atty. Enrile. Justice Jose Gutierrez
Davids family name is Gutierrez and his mothers surname is David
but they all call him Justice David.
Justice Caguioa suggested that the proposed Article (12) be
modified to the effect that it shall be mandatory on the
child to use the surname of the father but he may use the
surname of the mother by way of an initial or a middle
name. Prof. Balane stated that they take note of this for inclusion
in the Chapter on Use of Surnames since in the proposed Article
(10) they are just enumerating the rights of legitimate children so
that the details can be covered in the appropriate chapter.
xxx
Justice Puno remarked that there is logic in the simplification
suggested by Justice Caguioa that the surname of the father should
always be last because there are so many traditions like the
American tradition where they like to use their second given name
and the Latin tradition, which is also followed by the Chinese
wherein they even include the Clan name.
xxx
Justice Puno suggested that they agree in principle that in
the Chapter on the Use of Surnames, they should say that
initial or surname of the mother should immediately
precede the surname of the father so that the second
name, if any, will be before the surname of the mother.
Prof. Balane added that this is really the Filipino way. The
Committee approved the suggestion.[12] (Emphasis supplied)
In the case of an adopted child, the law provides that the
adopted shall bear the surname of the adopters. [13] Again, it is
silent whether he can use a middle name. What it only expressly
allows, as a matter of right and obligation, is for the adoptee to
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
bear the surname of the adopter, upon issuance of the decree of
adoption.[14]
The Underlying Intent of
Adoption Is In Favor of the
Adopted Child
Adoption is defined as the process of making a child, whether
related or not to the adopter, possess in general, the rights
accorded to a legitimate child. [15] It is a juridical act, a proceeding
in rem which creates between two persons a relationship similar to
that which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. [16] The
modern trend is to consider adoption not merely as an act to
establish a relationship of paternity and filiation, but also as an act
which endows the child with a legitimate status.[17] This was,
indeed, confirmed in 1989, when the Philippines, as a State
Party to the Convention of the Rights of the Child initiated
by the United Nations, accepted the principle that adoption
is impressed with social and moral responsibility, and that
its underlying intent is geared to favor the adopted child.
[18]
Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998,[19] secures these rights and privileges for the
adopted.[20]
One of the effects of adoption is that the adopted is deemed
to be a legitimate child of the adopter for all intents and purposes
pursuant to Article 189[21] of the Family Code and Section
17[22] Article V of RA 8552.[23]
Being a legitimate child by virtue of her adoption, it
follows that Stephanie is entitled to all the rights provided
by law to a legitimate child without discrimination of any
kind, including the right to bear the surname of her father
and her mother, as discussed above. This is consistent with the
intention of the members of the Civil Code and Family Law
Committees as earlier discussed. In fact, it is a Filipino custom that
the initial or surname of the mother should immediately precede
the surname of the father.
Additionally, as aptly stated by both parties, Stephanies
continued use of her mothers surname (Garcia) as her middle
name will maintain her maternal lineage. It is to be noted that
Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18 [24], Article V of RA
8552 (law on adoption) provide that the adoptee remains an
intestate heir of his/her biological parent. Hence, Stephanie can
well assert or claim her hereditary rights from her natural mother
in the future.
Moreover, records show that Stephanie and her mother are
living together in the house built by petitioner for them at 390
Tumana, San Jose, Baliuag, Bulacan. Petitioner provides for all their
needs. Stephanie is closely attached to both her mother and father.
She calls them Mama and Papa. Indeed, they are one normal happy
family. Hence, to allow Stephanie to use her mothers surname as
her middle name will not only sustain her continued loving
relationship with her mother but will also eliminate the stigma of
her illegitimacy.
Liberal Construction of
Adoption Statutes In Favor Of
Adoption
It is a settled rule that adoption statutes, being humane and
salutary, should be liberally construed to carry out the beneficent
purposes of adoption.[25] The interests and welfare of the adopted
child are of primary and paramount consideration, [26] hence, every
reasonable intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill
these noble and compassionate objectives of the law. [27]
Lastly, Art. 10 of the New Civil Code provides that:
In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is
presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail.
This provision, according to the Code Commission, is
necessary so that it may tip the scales in favor of right and justice
when the law is doubtful or obscure. It will strengthen the
determination of the courts to avoid an injustice which may
apparently be authorized by some way of interpreting the law. [28]
Hence, since there is no law prohibiting an illegitimate
child adopted by her natural father, like Stephanie, to use, as
middle name her mothers surname, we find no reason why she
should not be allowed to do so.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision
is partly MODIFIED in the sense that Stephanie should be allowed
to use her mothers surname GARCIA as her middle name.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

Let the corresponding entry of her correct and complete name

be entered in the decree of adoption.
SO ORDERED.

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
G.R. No. 157043 February 2, 2007
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
TRINIDAD R.A. CAPOTE, Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari 1 seeks to set aside the Court of
Appeals (CA) decision2 dated January 13, 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No.
66128, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 23 of San Juan, Southern Leyte dated September 14,
1999 granting a petition for change of name.
Respondent Trinidad R. A. Capote filed a petition for change of
name of her ward from Giovanni N. Gallamaso toGiovanni
Nadores on September 9, 1998. In Special Proceeding No. R-
481,3 Capote as Giovannis guardian ad litem averred:
xxx xxx xxx
1. [Respondent] is a Filipino citizen, of legal age, married,
while minor GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO, is also a Filipino
citizen, sixteen (16) years old and both are residents of San
Juan, Southern Leyte where they can be served with
summons and other court processes;
2. [Respondent] was appointed guardian [ad litem] of
minor Giovanni N. Gallamaso by virtue of a court order in
Special [Proc.] No. R-459, dated [August 18, 1998] xxx xxx
authorizing her to file in court a petition for change of
name of said minor in accordance with the desire of his
mother [who is residing and working abroad];
3. Both [respondent] and minor have permanently resided
in San Juan, Southern Leyte, Philippines for more than
fifteen (15) years prior to the filing of this instant petition,
the former since 1970 while the latter since his birth [in
1982];
4. The minor was left under the care of [respondent] since
he was yet nine (9) years old up to the present;
5. Minor GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO is the illegitimate
natural child of Corazon P. Nadores and Diosdado
Gallamaso. [He] was born on July 9, 1982 [,] prior to the
effectivity of the New Family Code and as such, his mother
used the surname of the natural father despite the
absence of marriage between them; and [Giovanni] has
been known by that name since birth [as per his birth
certificate registered at the Local Civil Register of San Juan,
Southern Leyte];
6. The father, Diosdado Gallamaso, from the time
[Giovanni] was born and up to the present, failed to take
up his responsibilities [to him] on matters of financial,
physical, emotional and spiritual concerns. [Giovannis
pleas] for attention along that line [fell] on deaf ears xxx
xxx xxx;
7. [Giovanni] is now fully aware of how he stands with his
father and he desires to have his surname changed to that
of his mothers surname;
8. [Giovannis] mother might eventually petition [him] to
join her in the United States and [his] continued use of the
surname Gallamaso, the surname of his natural father,
may complicate [his] status as natural child; and
9. The change of name [from] GIOVANNI N. GALLAMASO to
GIOVANNI NADORES will be for the benefit of the minor.
xxx xxx xxx4
Respondent prayed for an order directing the local civil registrar to
effect the change of name on Giovannis birth certificate. Having
found respondents petition sufficient in form and substance, the
trial court gave due course to the petition. 5 Publication of the
petition in a newspaper of general circulation in the province of
Southern Leyte once a week for three consecutive weeks was
likewise ordered.6 The trial court also directed that the local civil
registrar be notified and that the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) be sent a copy of the petition and order.7
Since there was no opposition to the petition, respondent moved
for leave of court to present her evidence ex parte before a court-
appointed commissioner. The OSG, acting through the Provincial
Prosecutor, did not object; hence, the lower court granted the
motion.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
After the reception of evidence, the trial court rendered a decision
ordering the change of name from Giovanni N. Gallamaso to
Giovanni Nadores.8
From this decision, petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through
the OSG, filed an appeal with a lone assignment of error: the
court a quo erred in granting the petition in a summary
proceeding.
Ruling that the proceedings were sufficiently adversarial in nature
as required, the CA affirmed the RTC decision ordering the change
of name.9
In this petition, the Republic contends that the CA erred in
affirming the trial courts decision which granted the petition for
change of name despite the non-joinder of indispensable
parties.10 Petitioner cites Republic of the Philippines v.
Labrador11 and claims that the purported parents and all other
persons who may be adversely affected by the childs change of
name should have been made respondents to make the proceeding
adversarial.12
We deny the petition.
"The subject of rights must have a fixed symbol for
individualization which serves to distinguish him from all others;
this symbol is his name."13 Understandably, therefore, no person
can change his name or surname without judicial authority. 14 This is
a reasonable requirement for those seeking such change because
a persons name necessarily affects his identity, interests and
interactions. The State must be involved in the process and
decision to change the name of any of its citizens.
The Rules of Court provides the requirements and procedure for
change of name. Here, the appropriate remedy is covered by Rule
103,15 a separate and distinct proceeding from Rule 108 on mere
cancellation and correction of entries in the civil registry (usually
dealing only with innocuous or clerical errors thereon).16
The issue of non-joinder of alleged indispensable parties in the
action before the court a quo is intertwined with the nature of the
proceedings there. The point is whether the proceedings were
sufficiently adversarial.
Summary proceedings do not extensively address the issues of a
case since the reason for their conduct is expediency. This,
according to petitioner, is not sufficient to deal with substantial or
contentious issues allegedly resulting from a change of name,
meaning, legitimacy as well as successional rights. 17 Such issues
are ventilated only in adversarial proceedings wherein all
interested parties are impleaded and due process is observed. 18
When Giovanni was born in 1982 (prior to the enactment and
effectivity of the Family Code of the Philippines), 19the pertinent
provision of the Civil Code then as regards his use of a surname,
read:
Art. 366. A natural child acknowledged by both parents shall
principally use the surname of the father. If recognized by only one
of the parents, a natural child shall employ the surname of
the recognizing parent. (emphasis ours)
Based on this provision, Giovanni should have carried his mothers
surname from birth. The records do not reveal any act or intention
on the part of Giovannis putative father to actually recognize him.
Meanwhile, according to the Family Code which repealed, among
others, Article 366 of the Civil Code:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall
be under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be
entitled to support in conformity with this Code. xxx xxx xxx
(emphasis ours)
Our ruling in the recent case of In Re: Petition for Change of Name
and/or Correction/Cancellation of Entry in Civil Registry of Julian Lin
Carulasan Wang20 is enlightening:
Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and
legitimated children shall principally use the surname of the father.
The Family Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the
surnames of the father and the mother, while illegitimate children
shall use the surname of their mother, unless their father
recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the fathers
surname.
Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is
not recognized by the father bears only a given name and
his mother surname, and does not have a middle
name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child
therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate
child is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
acknowledged by the father in a public document or private
handwritten instrument that he bears both his mothers surname
as his middle name and his fathers surname as his surname,
reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged
child.1awphi1.net21
The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a
persons name to his identity, his status in relation to his parents
and his successional rights as a legitimate or illegitimate child. For
sure, these matters should not be taken lightly as to deprive those
who may, in any way, be affected by the right to present evidence
in favor of or against such change.
The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovannis petition.
Giovanni availed of the proper remedy, a petition for change of
name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with all
the procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court found
(and the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence presented
during the hearing of Giovannis petition sufficiently established
that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to
change his name as he was never recognized by his father while
his mother has always recognized him as her child. A change of
name will erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his
father. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his mothers
intended petition to have him join her in the United States. This
Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and
son.
Moreover, it is noteworthy that the cases cited by petitioner 22 in
support of its position deal with cancellation or correction of entries
in the civil registry, a proceeding separate and distinct from the
special proceedings for change of name. Those cases deal with the
application and interpretation of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court
while this case was correctly filed under Rule 103. Thus, the cases
cited by petitioner are irrelevant and have no bearing on
respondents case. While the OSG is correct in its stance that the
proceedings for change of name should be adversarial, the OSG
cannot void the proceedings in the trial court on account of its own
failure to participate therein. As the CA correctly ruled:
The OSG is correct in stating that a petition for change of name
must be heard in an adversarial proceeding. Unlike petitions for the
cancellation or correction of clerical errors in entries in the civil
registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, a petition for change
of name under Rule 103 cannot be decided through a summary
proceeding. There is no doubt that this petition does not fall under
Rule 108 for it is not alleged that the entry in the civil registry
suffers from clerical or typographical errors. The relief sought
clearly goes beyond correcting erroneous entries in the civil
registry, although by granting the petition, the result is the same in
that a corresponding change in the entry is also required to reflect
the change in name. In this regard, [appellee] Capote
complied with the requirement for an adversarial
proceeding by posting in a newspaper of general
circulation notice of the filing of the petition. The lower
court also furnished the OSG a copy thereof. Despite the
notice, no one came forward to oppose the petition
including the OSG. The fact that no one opposed the
petition did not deprive the court of its jurisdiction to hear
the same nor does it make the proceeding less adversarial
in nature. The lower court is still expected to exercise its
judgment to determine whether the petition is meritorious or not
and not merely accept as true the arguments propounded.
Considering that the OSG neither opposed the petition nor the
motion to present its evidence ex parte when it had the
opportunity to do so, it cannot now complain that the proceedings
in the lower court were not adversarial enough. 23 (emphasis
supplied)
A proceeding is adversarial where the party seeking relief has
given legal warning to the other party and afforded the latter an
opportunity to contest it.24 Respondent gave notice of the petition
through publication as required by the rules. 25 With this, all
interested parties were deemed notified and the whole world
considered bound by the judgment therein. In addition, the trial
court gave due notice to the OSG by serving a copy of the petition
on it. Thus, all the requirements to make a proceeding adversarial
were satisfied when all interested parties, including petitioner as
represented by the OSG, were afforded the opportunity to contest
the petition.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the January 13,

2003 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
66128 AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

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Persons 4th Exam Cases

MARIA VIRGINIA V. REMO, G.R. No. 169202

Petitioner, The Facts

Present:

Petitioner Maria Virginia V. Remo is a married Filipino citizen whose

Philippine passport was then expiring on 27 October 2000. Petitioner
CARPIO, J., Chairperson, being married to Francisco R. Rallonza, the following entries appear in
her passport: Rallonza as her surname, Maria Virginia as her given
name, and Remo as her middle name. Prior to the expiry of the validity
-versus- BRION,
of her passport, petitioner, whose marriage still subsists, applied for
the renewal of her passport with the Department of Foreign Affairs
DEL CASTILLO, (DFA) office in Chicago, Illinois, U.S.A., with a request to revert to her
maiden name and surname in the replacement passport.
ABAD, and

PEREZ, JJ.
Petitioners request having been denied, Atty. Manuel Joseph R. Bretana
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY III, representing petitioner, wrote then Secretary of Foreign Affairs
Domingo Siason expressing a similar request.
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Promulgated:

Respondent. March 5, 2010

On 28 August 2000, the DFA, through Assistant Secretary Belen F.
Anota, denied the request, stating thus:

The Case

This has reference to your letter dated 17 August

2000 regarding one Ms. Maria Virginia V. Remo who is
applying for renewal of her passport using her maiden
Before the Court is a petition for review [1] of the 27 May 2005
name.
Decision[2] and 2 August 2005 Resolution [3] of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 87710. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the Office of the President, which in turn affirmed the decision of the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs denying petitioners request to revert to the
use of her maiden name in her replacement passport.

Page | 323
Persons 4th Exam Cases

This Office is cognizant of the provision in the law that it is not Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for review under
obligatory for a married woman to use her husbands name. Use of Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
maiden name is allowed in passport application only if the
married name has not been used in previous application. The
Implementing Rules and Regulations for Philippine Passport Act of 1996
clearly defines the conditions when a woman applicant may revert to
In its Decision of 27 May 2005, the Court of Appeals denied the petition
her maiden name, that is, only in cases of annulment of marriage,
and affirmed the ruling of the Office of the President. The dispositive
divorce and death of the husband. Ms. Remos case does not meet any
portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:
of these conditions.[4] (Emphasis supplied)

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is

DENIED, and the resolution dated July 27, 2004, and
the order dated October 28, 2004 of the Office of the
Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the above-letter resolution President in O.P. Case No. 001-A-9344 are hereby
was denied in a letter dated 13 October 2000. [5] AFFIRMED.

On 15 November 2000, petitioner filed an appeal with the Office of the

President.
SO ORDERED.[8]

On 27 July 2004, the Office of the President dismissed the appeal [6] and
ruled that Section 5(d) of Republic Act No. 8239 (RA 8239) or
the Philippine Passport Act of 1996 offers no leeway for any other
interpretation than that only in case of divorce, annulment, or
declaration [of nullity] of marriage may a married woman revert to her Petitioner moved for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied
maiden name for passport purposes. The Office of the President further in its Resolution dated 2 August 2005.
held that in case of conflict between a general and special law, the
latter will control the former regardless of the respective dates of
passage. Since the Civil Code is a general law, it should yield to RA
8239. Hence, this petition.

On 28 October 2004, the Office of the President denied the motion for The Court of Appeals Ruling
reconsideration.[7]

Page | 324
Persons 4th Exam Cases

The Court of Appeals found no conflict between Article 370 of the Civil
Code[9] and Section 5(d) of RA 8239. [10] The Court of Appeals held that
for passport application and issuance purposes, RA 8239 limits the ART. 370. A married woman may use:
instances when a married woman applicant may exercise the option to
revert to the use of her maiden name such as in a case of a divorce
decree, annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage. Since there
was no showing that petitioner's marriage to Francisco Rallonza has
been annulled, declared void or a divorce decree has been granted to (1) HER MAIDEN FIRST NAME AND SURNAME AND ADD
them, petitioner cannot simply revert to her maiden name in the HER HUSBANDS SURNAME, OR
replacement passport after she had adopted her husbands surname in
her old passport. Hence, according to the Court of Appeals, respondent (2) HER MAIDEN FIRST NAME AND HER HUSBAND'S
was justified in refusing the request of petitioner to revert to her SURNAME, OR
maiden name in the replacement passport.
(3) HER HUSBANDS FULL NAME, BUT
PREFIXING A WORD INDICATING THAT SHE
IS HIS WIFE, SUCH AS MRS.
The Issue

The sole issue in this case is whether petitioner, who originally used
her husbands surname in her expired passport, can revert to the use of
her maiden name in the replacement passport, despite the subsistence
of her marriage.
We agree with petitioner that the use of the word may in the above
provision indicates that the use of the husbands surname by the wife is
permissive rather than obligatory. This has been settled in the case
of Yasin v. Honorable Judge Sharia District Court.[11]

The Ruling of the Court

In Yasin,[12] petitioner therein filed with the Sharia District Court a
Petition to resume the use of maiden name in view of the dissolution of
her marriage by divorce under the Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the
Philippines, and after marriage of her former husband to another
The petition lacks merit.
woman. In ruling in favor of petitioner therein, the Court explained
that:

Title XIII of the Civil Code governs the use of surnames. In the
case of a married woman, Article 370 of the Civil Code
When a woman marries a man, she need not
provides:
apply and/or seek judicial authority to use her

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Persons 4th Exam Cases

husbands name by prefixing the word Mrs. in point with this case. Unlike in Yasin, which involved a Muslim
before her husbands full name or by adding her divorcee whose former husband is already married to another woman,
husbands surname to her maiden first name. petitioners marriage remains subsisting. Another point, Yasin did not
The law grants her such right (Art. 370, Civil involve a request to resume ones maiden name in a replacement
Code). Similarly, when the marriage ties passport, but a petition to resume ones maiden name in view of the
or vinculum no longer exists as in the case of dissolution of ones marriage.
death of the husband or divorce as authorized
by the Muslim Code, the widow or divorcee need
not seek judicial confirmation of the change in
her civil status in order to revert to her maiden
The law governing passport issuance is RA 8239 and the applicable
name as use of her former husbands is optional
provision in this case is Section 5(d), which states:
and not obligatory for her (Tolentino, Civil Code,
p. 725, 1983 ed.; Art. 373, Civil Code). When
petitioner married her husband, she did not
change her but only her civil status. Neither
was she required to secure judicial authority to Sec. 5. Requirements for the Issuance of Passport. No
use the surname of her husband after the passport shall be issued to an applicant unless the
marriage as no law requires it. (Emphasis Secretary or his duly authorized representative is
supplied) satisfied that the applicant is a Filipino citizen who has
complied with the following requirements: x x x

(D) IN CASE OF A WOMAN WHO IS MARRIED,

Clearly, a married woman has an option, but not a duty, to use the SEPARATED, DIVORCED OR WIDOWED OR
surname of the husband in any of the ways provided by Article 370 of WHOSE MARRIAGE HAS BEEN ANNULLED
the Civil Code.[13] She is therefore allowed to use not only any of the OR DECLARED BY COURT AS VOID, A
three names provided in Article 370, but also her maiden name upon COPY OF THE CERTIFICATE OF MARRIAGE,
marriage. She is not prohibited from continuously using her maiden COURT DECREE OF SEPARATION,
name once she is married because when a woman marries, she does DIVORCE OR ANNULMENT OR
not change her name but only her civil status. Further, this CERTIFICATE OF DEATH OF THE
interpretation is in consonance with the principle that surnames DECEASED SPOUSE DULY ISSUED AND
indicate descent.[14] AUTHENTICATED BY THE OFFICE OF THE
CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL: PROVIDED,
THAT IN CASE OF A DIVORCE DECREE,
ANNULMENT OR DECLARATION OF
MARRIAGE AS VOID, THE WOMAN
In the present case, petitioner, whose marriage is still subsisting and
APPLICANT MAY REVERT TO THE USE OF
who opted to use her husbands surname in her old passport, requested
HER MAIDEN NAME: PROVIDED, FURTHER,
to resume her maiden name in the replacement passport arguing that
THAT SUCH DIVORCE IS RECOGNIZED
no law prohibits her from using her maiden name. Petitioner
UNDER EXISTING LAWS OF THE
cites Yasin as the applicable precedent. However, Yasin is not squarely
PHILIPPINES; X X X (EMPHASIS SUPPLIED)

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on behalf of the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, argues that the highlighted proviso in Section 5(d) of
RA 8239 limits the instances when a married woman may be allowed to
revert to the use of her maiden name in her passport. These instances
are death of husband, divorce decree, annulment or nullity of marriage.
Significantly, Section 1, Article 12 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of RA 8239 provides:
The passport can be amended only in the following
cases:
A) AMENDMENT OF WOMANS NAME DUE TO MARRIAGE;
B) AMENDMENT OF WOMANS NAME DUE TO DEATH OF SPOUSE,
ANNULMENT OF MARRIAGE OR DIVORCE INITIATED BY A FOREIGN
SPOUSE; OR
C) CHANGE OF SURNAME OF A CHILD WHO IS
LEGITIMATED BY VIRTUE OF A SUBSEQUENT
MARRIAGE OF HIS PARENTS.
Since petitioners marriage to her husband subsists, placing her case
outside of the purview of Section 5(d) of RA 8239 (as to the instances
when a married woman may revert to the use of her maiden name),
she may not resume her maiden name in the replacement passport.
[15]
This prohibition, according to petitioner, conflicts with and, thus,
operates as an implied repeal of Article 370 of the Civil Code.
PETITIONER IS MISTAKEN. THE CONFLICT BETWEEN ARTICLE 370 OF
THE CIVIL CODE AND SECTION 5(D) OF RA 8239 IS MORE IMAGINED
THAN REAL. RA 8239, INCLUDING ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND
REGULATIONS, DOES NOT PROHIBIT A MARRIED WOMAN FROM USING
HER MAIDEN NAME IN HER PASSPORT. IN FACT, IN RECOGNITION OF
THIS RIGHT, THE DFA ALLOWS A MARRIED WOMAN WHO APPLIES FOR
A PASSPORT FOR THE FIRST TIME TO USE HER MAIDEN NAME. SUCH AN
APPLICANT IS NOT REQUIRED TO ADOPT HER HUSBAND'S SURNAME. [16]
In the case of renewal of passport, a married woman may either adopt
her husbands surname or continuously use her maiden name. If she
chooses to adopt her husbands surname in her new passport, the DFA
additionally requires the submission of an authenticated copy of the
marriage certificate. Otherwise, if she prefers to continue using her
maiden name, she may still do so. The DFA will not prohibit her from
continuously using her maiden name. [17]
HOWEVER, ONCE A MARRIED WOMAN OPTED TO ADOPT HER
HUSBANDS SURNAME IN HER PASSPORT, SHE MAY NOT REVERT TO THE
USE OF HER MAIDEN NAME, EXCEPT IN THE CASES ENUMERATED IN
SECTION 5(D) OF RA 8239. THESE INSTANCES ARE: (1) DEATH OF
HUSBAND, (2) DIVORCE, (3) ANNULMENT, OR (4) NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE. SINCE PETITIONERS MARRIAGE TO HER HUSBAND
SUBSISTS, SHE MAY NOT RESUME HER MAIDEN NAME IN THE
REPLACEMENT PASSPORT. OTHERWISE STATED, A MARRIED WOMAN'S
REVERSION TO THE USE OF HER MAIDEN NAME MUST BE BASED ONLY
ON THE SEVERANCE OF THE MARRIAGE.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
EVEN ASSUMING RA 8239 CONFLICTS WITH THE CIVIL CODE, THE
PROVISIONS OF RA 8239 WHICH IS A SPECIAL LAW SPECIFICALLY
DEALING WITH PASSPORT ISSUANCE MUST PREVAIL OVER THE
PROVISIONS OF TITLE XIII OF THE CIVIL CODE WHICH IS THE GENERAL
LAW ON THE USE OF SURNAMES. A BASIC TENET IN STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION IS THAT A SPECIAL LAW PREVAILS OVER A GENERAL
LAW,[18] THUS:
[I]t is a familiar rule of statutory construction that
to the extent of any necessary repugnancy
between a general and a special law or provision,
the latter will control the former without regard to
the respective dates of passage.[19]
Moreover, petitioners theory of implied repeal must fail. Well-
entrenched is the rule that an implied repeal is disfavored. T he
apparently conflicting provisions of a law or two laws should be
harmonized as much as possible, so that each shall be effective. [20] For
a law to operate to repeal another law, the two laws must actually be
inconsistent. The former must be so repugnant as to be irreconcilable
with the latter act.[21] This petitioner failed to establish.
The Court notes that petitioner would not have encountered any
problems in the replacement passport had she opted to continuously
and consistently use her maiden name from the moment she was
married and from the time she first applied for a Philippine passport.
However, petitioner consciously chose to use her husbands surname
before, in her previous passport application, and now desires to resume
her maiden name. If we allow petitioners present request, definitely
nothing prevents her in the future from requesting to revert to the use
of her husbands surname. Such unjustified changes in one's name
and identity in a passport, which is considered superior to all other
official documents,[22] cannot be countenanced. Otherwise, undue
confusion and inconsistency in the records of passport holders will
arise. Thus, for passport issuance purposes, a married woman, such as
petitioner, whose marriage subsists, may not change her family name
at will.
THE ACQUISITION OF A PHILIPPINE PASSPORT IS A PRIVILEGE. THE LAW
RECOGNIZES THE PASSPORT APPLICANTS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
TRAVEL. HOWEVER, THE STATE IS ALSO MANDATED TO PROTECT AND
MAINTAIN THE INTEGRITY AND CREDIBILITY OF THE PASSPORT AND
TRAVEL DOCUMENTS PROCEEDING FROM IT [23] AS A PHILIPPINE
PASSPORT REMAINS AT ALL TIMES THE PROPERTY OF THE
GOVERNMENT. THE HOLDER IS MERELY A POSSESSOR OF THE
PASSPORT AS LONG AS IT IS VALID AND THE SAME MAY NOT BE
SURRENDERED TO ANY PERSON OR ENTITY OTHER THAN THE
GOVERNMENT OR ITS REPRESENTATIVE.[24]
As the OSG correctly pointed out:
[T]he issuance of passports is impressed with public
interest. A passport is an official document of
identity and nationality issued to a person intending
to travel or sojourn in foreign countries. It is issued
by the Philippine government to its citizens
requesting other governments to allow its holder to
pass safely and freely, and in case of need, to give
him/her aid and protection. x x x
Viewed in the light of the foregoing, it is within respondents
competence to regulate any amendments intended to be made
therein, including the denial of unreasonable and whimsical requests
for amendments such as in the instant case.[25]
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 27 May 2005
Decision and 2 August 2005 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 87710.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

SO ORDERED.

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
G.R. No. 206248 February 18, 2014
GRACE M. GRANDE, Petitioner,
vs.
PATRICIO T. ANTONIO, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45, assailing the July 24, 2012 Decision 1 and March 5, 2013
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 96406.
As culled from the records, the facts of this case are:
Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio
(Antonio) for a period of time lived together as husband and wife,
although Antonio was at that time already married to someone
else.3 Out of this illicit relationship, two sons were born: Andre
Lewis (on February 8, 1998) and Jerard Patrick (on October 13,
1999).4The children were not expressly recognized by respondent
as his own in the Record of Births of the children in the Civil
Registry. The parties relationship, however, eventually turned sour,
and Grande left for the United States with her two children in May
2007. This prompted respondent Antonio to file a Petition for
Judicial Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental
Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change of
Surname of Minors and for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Injunction before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri,
Cagayan (RTC), appending a notarized Deed of Voluntary
Recognition of Paternity of the children.5
On September 28, 2010, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of
herein respondent Antonio, ruling that "[t]he evidence at hand is
overwhelming that the best interest of the children can be
promoted if they are under the sole parental authority and physical
custody of [respondent Antonio]."6 Thus, the court a quo decreed
the following:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court hereby
grants [Antonios] prayer for recognition and the same is hereby
judicially approved. x x x Consequently, the Court forthwith issues
the following Order granting the other reliefs sought in the Petition,
to wit:
a. Ordering the Office of the City Registrar of the City of
Makati to cause the entry of the name of [Antonio] as the
father of the aforementioned minors in their respective
Certificate of Live Birth and causing the correction/change
and/or annotation of the surnames of said minors in their
Certificate of Live Birth from Grande to Antonio;
b. Granting [Antonio] the right to jointly exercise Parental
Authority with [Grande] over the persons of their minor
children, Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick Grande;
c. Granting [Antonio] primary right and immediate custody
over the parties minor children Andre Lewis Grandre and
Jerard Patrick Grande who shall stay with [Antonios]
residence in the Philippines from Monday until Friday
evening and to [Grandes] custody from Saturday to
Sunday evening;
d. Ordering [Grande] to immediately surrender the persons
and custody of minors Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard
Patrick Grande unto [Antonio] for the days covered by the
Order;
e. Ordering parties to cease and desist from bringing the
aforenamed minors outside of the country, without the
written consent of the other and permission from the court.
f. Ordering parties to give and share the support of the
minor children Andre Lewis Grande and Jerard Patrick
Grande in the amount of P30,000 per month at the rate of
70% for [Antonio] and 30% for [Grande]. 7(Emphasis
supplied.)
Aggrieved, petitioner Grande moved for reconsideration. However,
her motion was denied by the trial court in its Resolution dated
November 22, 20108 for being pro forma and for lack of merit.
Petitioner Grande then filed an appeal with the CA attributing
grave error on the part of the RTC for allegedly ruling contrary to
the law and jurisprudence respecting the grant of sole custody to
the mother over her illegitimate children. 9 In resolving the appeal,
the appellate court modified in part the Decision of the RTC. The
dispositive portion of the CA Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly, the
appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 8, Aparri
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
Cagayan in SP Proc. Case No. 11-4492 is MODIFIED in part and
shall hereinafter read as follows:
a. The Offices of the Civil Registrar General and the City
Civil Registrar of Makati City are DIRECTED to enter the
surname Antonio as the surname of Jerard Patrick and
Andre Lewis, in their respective certificates of live birth,
and record the same in the Register of Births;
b. [Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children
Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis to the custody of their
mother herein appellant, Grace Grande who by virtue
hereof is hereby awarded the full or sole custody of these
minor children;
c. [Antonio] shall have visitorial rights at least twice a
week, and may only take the children out upon the written
consent of [Grande]; and
d. The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of
the minor children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis in the
amount of P30,000.00 per month at the rate of 70% for
[Antonio] and 30% for [Grande]. (Emphasis supplied.)
In ruling thus, the appellate court ratiocinated that notwithstanding
the fathers recognition of his children, the mother cannot be
deprived of her sole parental custody over them absent the most
compelling of reasons.10Since respondent Antonio failed to prove
that petitioner Grande committed any act that adversely affected
the welfare of the children or rendered her unsuitable to raise the
minors, she cannot be deprived of her sole parental custody over
their children.
The appellate court, however, maintained that the legal
consequence of the recognition made by respondent Antonio that
he is the father of the minors, taken in conjunction with the
universally protected "best-interest-of-the-child" clause, compels
the use by the children of the surname "ANTONIO." 11
As to the issue of support, the CA held that the grant is legally in
order considering that not only did Antonio express his willingness
to give support, it is also a consequence of his acknowledging the
paternity of the minor children. 12 Lastly, the CA ruled that there is
no reason to deprive respondent Antonio of his visitorial right
especially in view of the constitutionally inherent and natural right
of parents over their children.13
Not satisfied with the CAs Decision, petitioner Grande interposed a
partial motion for reconsideration, particularly assailing the order
of the CA insofar as it decreed the change of the minors surname
to "Antonio." When her motion was denied, petitioner came to this
Court via the present petition. In it, she posits that Article 176 of
the Family Codeas amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 9255,
couched as it is in permissive languagemay not be invoked by a
father to compel the use by his illegitimate children of his surname
without the consent of their mother.
We find the present petition impressed with merit.
The sole issue at hand is the right of a father to compel the use of
his surname by his illegitimate children upon his recognition of
their filiation. Central to the core issue is the application of Art. 176
of the Family Code, originally phrased as follows:
Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be under the
parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled to support
in conformity with this Code. The legitime of each illegitimate child
shall consist of one-half of the legitime of a legitimate child. Except
for this modification, all other provisions in the Civil Code
governing successional rights shall remain in force.
This provision was later amended on March 19, 2004 by RA
925514 which now reads:
Art. 176. Illegitimate children shall use the surname and shall be
under the parental authority of their mother, and shall be entitled
to support in conformity with this Code. However, illegitimate
children may use the surname of their father if their filiation has
been expressly recognized by their father through the record of
birth appearing in the civil register, or when an admission in a
public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the
father. Provided, the father has the right to institute an action
before the regular courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
The legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist of one-half of
the legitime of a legitimate child. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the general rule is
that an illegitimate child shall use the surname of his or her
mother. The exception provided by RA 9255 is, in case his or her
filiation is expressly recognized by the father through the record of
birth appearing in the civil register or when an admission in a
public document or private handwritten instrument is made by the
father. In such a situation, the illegitimate child may use the
surname of the father.
In the case at bar, respondent filed a petition for judicial approval
of recognition of the filiation of the two children with the prayer for
the correction or change of the surname of the minors from Grande
to Antonio when a public document acknowledged before a notary
public under Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court 15 is enough to
establish the paternity of his children. But he wanted more: a
judicial conferment of parental authority, parental custody, and an
official declaration of his childrens surname as Antonio.
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the
mother; hence, respondents prayer has no legal mooring. Since
parental authority is given to the mother, then custody over the
minor children also goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be
unfit.
Now comes the matter of the change of surname of the illegitimate
children. Is there a legal basis for the court a quo to order the
change of the surname to that of respondent?
Clearly, there is none. Otherwise, the order or ruling will
contravene the explicit and unequivocal provision of Art. 176 of the
Family Code, as amended by RA 9255.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want
to use the surname of their father or not. It is not the father (herein
respondent) or the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by
law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.
Nothing is more settled than that when the law is clear and free
from ambiguity, it must be taken to mean what it says and it must
be given its literal meaning free from any
interpretation.16 Respondents position that the court can order the
minors to use his surname, therefore, has no legal basis.
On its face, Art. 176, as amended, is free from ambiguity. And
where there is no ambiguity, one must abide by its words. The use
of the word "may" in the provision readily shows that an
acknowledged illegitimate child is under no compulsion to use the
surname of his illegitimate father. The word "may" is permissive
and operates to confer discretion17 upon the illegitimate children.
It is best to emphasize once again that the yardstick by which
policies affecting children are to be measured is their best interest.
On the matter of childrens surnames, this Court has, time and
again, rebuffed the idea that the use of the fathers surname
serves the best interest of the minor child. In Alfon v. Republic, 18 for
instance, this Court allowed even a legitimate child to continue
using the surname of her mother rather than that of her legitimate
father as it serves her best interest and there is no legal obstacle
to prevent her from using the surname of her mother to which she
is entitled. In fact, in Calderon v. Republic, 19 this Court, upholding
the best interest of the child concerned, even allowed the use of a
surname different from the surnames of the childs father or
mother. Indeed, the rule regarding the use of a childs surname is
second only to the rule requiring that the child be placed in the
best possible situation considering his circumstances.
In Republic of the Philippines v. Capote, 20 We gave due deference
to the choice of an illegitimate minor to use the surname of his
mother as it would best serve his interest, thus:
The foregoing discussion establishes the significant connection of a
persons name to his identity, his status in relation to his parents
and his successional rights as a legitimate or illegitimate child. For
sure, these matters should not be taken lightly as to deprive those
who may, in any way, be affected by the right to present evidence
in favor of or against such change.
The law and facts obtaining here favor Giovannis petition.
Giovanni availed of the proper remedy, a petition for change of
name under Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, and complied with all
the procedural requirements. After hearing, the trial court found
(and the appellate court affirmed) that the evidence presented
during the hearing of Giovannis petition sufficiently established
that, under Art. 176 of the Civil Code, Giovanni is entitled to
change his name as he was never recognized by his father while
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
his mother has always recognized him as her child. A change of
name will erase the impression that he was ever recognized by his
father. It is also to his best interest as it will facilitate his mothers
intended petition to have him join her in the United States. This
Court will not stand in the way of the reunification of mother and
son. (Emphasis supplied.)
An argument, however, may be advanced advocating the
mandatory use of the fathers surname upon his recognition of his
illegitimate children, citing the Implementing Rules and Regulations
(IRR) of RA 9255,21 which states:
Rule 7. Requirements for the Child to Use the Surname of the
Father
7.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
7.1.1 The illegitimate child shall use the surname of the father if a
public document is executed by the father, either at the back of
the Certificate of Live Birth or in a separate document.
7.1.2 If admission of paternity is made through a private
instrument, the child shall use the surname of the father, provided
the registration is supported by the following documents:
xxxx
7.2. For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the
Mother
7.2.1 If filiation has been expressly recognized by the father, the
child shall use the surname of the father upon the submission of
the accomplished AUSF [Affidavit of Use of the Surname of the
Father].
7.2.2 If filiation has not been expressly recognized by the father,
the child shall use the surname of the father upon submission of a
public document or a private handwritten instrument supported by
the documents listed in Rule 7.1.2.
7.3 Except in Item 7.2.1, the consent of the illegitimate child is
required if he/she has reached the age of majority. The consent
may be contained in a separate instrument duly notarized.
xxxx
Rule 8. Effects of Recognition
8.1 For Births Not Yet Registered
8.1.1 The surname of the father shall be entered as the last name
of the child in the Certificate of Live Birth. The Certificate of Live
Birth shall be recorded in the Register of Births.
xxxx
8.2 For Births Previously Registered under the Surname of the
Mother
8.2.1 If admission of paternity was made either at the back of the
Certificate of Live Birth or in a separate public document or in a
private handwritten document, the public document or AUSF shall
be recorded in the Register of Live Birth and the Register of Births
as follows:
"The surname of the child is hereby changed from (original
surname) to (new surname) pursuant to RA 9255."
The original surname of the child appearing in the Certificate of
Live Birth and Register of Births shall not be changed or deleted.
8.2.2 If filiation was not expressly recognized at the time of
registration, the public document or AUSF shall be recorded in the
Register of Legal Instruments. Proper annotation shall be made in
the Certificate of Live Birth and the Register of Births as follows:
"Acknowledged by (name of father) on (date). The surname of the
child is hereby changed from (original surname) on (date) pursuant
to RA 9255." (Emphasis supplied.)
Nonetheless, the hornbook rule is that an administrative issuance
cannot amend a legislative act. In MCC Industrial Sales Corp. v.
Ssangyong Corporation,22 We held:
After all, the power of administrative officials to promulgate rules in
the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is
found in the legislative enactment itself. The implementing rules
and regulations of a law cannot extend the law or expand its
coverage, as the power to amend or repeal a statute is vested in
the Legislature. Thus, if a discrepancy occurs between the basic
law and an implementing rule or regulation, it is the former that
prevails, because the law cannot be broadened by a mere
administrative issuance an administrative agency certainly
cannot amend an act of Congress.
Thus, We can disregard contemporaneous construction where there
is no ambiguity in law and/or the construction is clearly
erroneous.23 What is more, this Court has the constitutional
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

prerogative and authority to strike down and declare as void the Cagayan in SP Proc. Case No. 11-4492 is MODIFIED in part and
rules of procedure of special courts and quasi- judicial shall hereinafter read as follows:
bodies24 when found contrary to statutes and/or the a. [Antonio] is ORDERED to deliver the minor children
Constitution.25 Section 5(5), Art. VIII of the Constitution provides: Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis to the custody of their
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers: mother herein appellant, Grace Grande who by virtue
xxxx hereof is hereby awarded the full or sole custody of these
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of minor children;
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, b. [Antonio] shall have visitation rights28 at least twice a
the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar, and legal week, and may only take the children out upon the written
assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall provide a consent of [Grande]:
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of c. The parties are DIRECTED to give and share in support of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall the minor children Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis in the
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of amount of P30,000.00 per month at the rate of 70% for
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain [Antonio] and 30% for [Grande]; and
effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court. (Emphasis d. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court,
supplied.) Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan for the sole purpose of
Thus, We exercise this power in voiding the above-quoted determining the surname to be chosen by the children
provisions of the IRR of RA 9255 insofar as it provides the Jerard Patrick and Andre Lewis.
mandatory use by illegitimate children of their fathers surname Rule 7 and Rule 8 of the Office of the Civil Registrar General
upon the latters recognition of his paternity. Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2004 are DISAPPROVED and
To conclude, the use of the word "shall" in the IRR of RA 9255 is of hereby declared NULL and VOID.
no moment. The clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal use of SO ORDERED.
"may" in Art. 176 rendering the use of an illegitimate fathers
surname discretionary controls, and illegitimate children are given
the choice on the surnames by which they will be known.
At this juncture, We take note of the letters submitted by the
children, now aged thirteen (13) and fifteen (15) years old, to this
Court declaring their opposition to have their names changed to
"Antonio."26 However, since these letters were not offered before
and evaluated by the trial court, they do not provide any
evidentiary weight to sway this Court to rule for or against
petitioner.27 A proper inquiry into, and evaluation of the evidence
of, the children's choice of surname by the trial court is necessary.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The July
24, 2012 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96406
is MODIFIED, the dispositive portion of which shall read:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is partly GRANTED. Accordingly. the
appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 8, Aparri

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,
- versus -
JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN,
Respondent.
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court raising purely questions of law and seeking a reversal of the
Decision[1] dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, which granted the Petition for
Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B.
Cagandahan and ordered the following changes of entries in
Cagandahans birth certificate: (1) the name Jennifer Cagandahan
changed to Jeff Cagandahan and (2) gender from female to male.
The facts are as follows.
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan
filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate [2] before
the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January
13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live
Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male
characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal
Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted
possess both male and female characteristics. She further alleged
that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early
years and at age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was
discovered that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests
revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has
stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual development.
She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as
in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she
prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender
be changed from female to male and her first name be changed
from Jennifer to Jeff.
The petition was published in a newspaper of general
circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and was posted in
conspicuous places by the sheriff of the court. The Solicitor General
entered his appearance and authorized the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the
testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry,
University of the PhilippinesPhilippine
General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon
issued a medical certificate stating that respondents condition is
known as CAH. He explained that genetically respondent is female
but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs
did not develop normally and she has two sex organs female and
male. He testified that this condition is very rare, that respondents
uterus is not fully developed because of lack of female hormones,
and that she has no monthly period. He further testified that
respondents condition is permanent and recommended the change
of gender because respondent has made up her mind, adjusted to
her chosen role as male, and the gender change would be
advantageous to her.
The RTC granted respondents petition in a Decision
dated January 12, 2005 which reads:
The Court is convinced that petitioner has
satisfactorily shown that he is entitled to the reliefs
prayed [for]. Petitioner has adequately presented
to the Court very clear and convincing proofs for
the granting of his petition. It was medically proven
that petitioners body produces male hormones,
and first his body as well as his action and feelings
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

are that of a male. He has chosen to be male. He is II.

a normal person and wants to be acknowledged
and identified as a male. CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES
NOT ALLOW CHANGE OF SEX OR GENDER IN THE
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the BIRTH CERTIFICATE, WHILE RESPONDENTS MEDICAL
Civil Register of Pakil, Laguna is hereby ordered to CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL
make the following corrections in the birth HYPERPLASIA DOES NOT MAKE HER A MALE.[4]
[c]ertificate of Jennifer Cagandahan upon payment
of the prescribed fees: Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in
ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of
a) By changing the name from respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on
Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF the ground of her medical condition known as CAH, and her name
CAGANDAHAN; and from Jennifer to Jeff, under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.

b) By changing the gender from
female to MALE.
It is likewise ordered that petitioners school
records, voters registry, baptismal certificate, and
other pertinent records are hereby amended to
conform with the foregoing corrected data.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) seeking a reversal of the abovementioned ruling.
The issues raised by petitioner are:
The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally
defective for non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules
of Court because while the local civil registrar is an indispensable
party in a petition for cancellation or correction of entries under
Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, respondents petition
before the court a quo did not implead the local civil registrar.
[5]
The OSG further contends respondents petition is fatally
defective since it failed to state that respondent is a bona
fide resident of the province where the petition was filed for at
least three (3) years prior to the date of such filing as mandated
under Section 2(b), Rule 103 of the Rules of Court. [6] The OSG
argues that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or gender in the
birth certificate and respondents claimed medical condition known
as CAH does not make her a male.[7]

On the other hand, respondent counters that although the

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
PETITION CONSIDERING THAT:
I.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF
THE RULES OF COURT HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLIED
WITH; AND,
THE Local Civil Registrar of Pakil, Laguna was not formally named a
party in the Petition for Correction of Birth Certificate, nonetheless
the Local Civil Registrar was furnished a copy of the Petition, the
Order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or
processes in the course of the proceedings, [8] respondent is
actually a male person and hence his birth certificate has to be
corrected to reflect his true sex/gender,[9]change of sex or gender
is allowed under Rule 108, [10] and respondent substantially

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
complied with the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules
of Court.[11]
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:
Rule 103
CHANGE OF NAME
SECTION 1. Venue. A person desiring to change his
name shall present the petition to the Regional Trial
Court of the province in which he resides, [or, in
the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court].
SEC. 2. Contents of petition. A petition for change
of name shall be signed and verified by the person
desiring his name changed, or some other person
on his behalf, and shall set forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona
fide resident of the province where the
petition is filed for at least three (3) years
prior to the date of such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the
petitioner's name is sought;
(c) The name asked for.
SEC. 3. Order for hearing. If the petition filed is
sufficient in form and substance, the court, by an
order reciting the purpose of the petition, shall fix a
date and place for the hearing thereof, and shall
direct that a copy of the order be published before
the hearing at least once a week for three (3)
successive weeks in some newspaper of general
circulation published in the province, as the court
shall deem best. The date set for the hearing shall
not be within thirty (30) days prior to an election
nor within four (4) months after the last publication
of the notice.
SEC. 4. Hearing. Any interested person may appear
at the hearing and oppose the petition. The
Solicitor General or the proper provincial or city
fiscal shall appear on behalf of the Government of
the Republic.
SEC. 5. Judgment. Upon satisfactory proof in open
court on the date fixed in the order that such order
has been published as directed and that the
allegations of the petition are true, the court shall,
if proper and reasonable cause appears for
changing the name of the petitioner, adjudge that
such name be changed in accordance with the
prayer of the petition.
SEC. 6. Service of judgment. Judgments or orders
rendered in connection with this rule shall be
furnished the civil registrar of the municipality or
city where the court issuing the same is situated,
who shall forthwith enter the same in the civil
register.
Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person
interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has
been recorded in the civil register, may file a
verified petition for the cancellation or correction of
any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial
Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or
correction. Upon good and valid grounds, the
following entries in the civil register may be
cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c)
deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of
annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning; (g)
legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments
of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election,
loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction;
(m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of
an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby shall be
made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of
the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the
time and place for the hearing of the same, and
cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the
persons named in the petition. The court shall also
cause the order to be published once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any
person having or claiming any interest under the
entry whose cancellation or correction is sought
may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
petition, or from the last date of publication of such
notice, file his opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which
the proceedings is brought may make orders
expediting the proceedings, and may also grant
preliminary injunction for the preservation of the
rights of the parties pending such proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either
dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the
cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case,
a certified copy of the judgment shall be served
upon the civil registrar concerned who shall
annotate the same in his record.
The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective
for non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court
because respondents petition did not implead the local civil
registrar. Section 3, Rule 108 provides that the civil registrar and all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected
thereby shall be made parties to the proceedings. Likewise, the
local civil registrar is required to be made a party in a proceeding
for the correction of name in the civil registry. He is an
indispensable party without whom no final determination of the
case can be had.[12] Unless all possible indispensable parties were
duly notified of the proceedings, the same shall be considered as
falling much too short of the requirements of the rules. [13] The
corresponding petition should also implead as respondents the civil
registrar and all other persons who may have or may claim to have
any interest that would be affected thereby.[14] Respondent,
however, invokes Section 6,[15] Rule 1 of the Rules of Court which
states that courts shall construe the Rules liberally to promote their
objectives of securing to the parties a just, speedy and inexpensive
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
disposition of the matters brought before it. We agree that there is
substantial compliance with Rule 108 when respondent furnished a
copy of the petition to the local civil registrar.
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth
certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the statutes.
In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:
ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be
changed or corrected without a judicial order.
Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this provision
was amended by Republic Act No. 9048[17] in so far as clerical or
typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such
matters can now be made through administrative proceedings and
without the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048
removed from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the
correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to substantial
changes and corrections in entries in the civil register. [18]
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry
involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical
error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure
is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.[19]
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and
correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided
in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees
concerning the civil status of persons shall be
recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil
register:
(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal
separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6)
judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9)
acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial
determination of filiation; (15) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of
name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under
Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur after
birth.[20]
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes
the early or inappropriate appearance of male characteristics. A
person, like respondent, with this condition produces too much
androgen, a male hormone. A newborn who has XX chromosomes
coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral
opening at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often appearing more
male than female; (2) normal internal structures of the female
reproductive tract such as the ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes;
as the child grows older, some features start to appear male, such
as deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure to menstruate at
puberty. About 1 in 10,000 to 18,000 children are born with CAH.
CAH is one of many conditions [21] that
involve intersex anatomy. During the twentieth century, medicine
adopted the term intersexuality to apply to human beings who
cannot be classified as either male or female. [22] The term is now of
widespread use. According to Wikipedia, intersexuality is the state
of a living thing of a gonochoristic species whose sex
chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are
determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. An organism
with intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and
female sexes.
Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by
different cultures. In most societies, intersex individuals have been
expected to conform to either a male or female gender role.
[23]
Since the rise of modern medical science in Western societies,
some intersex people with ambiguous external genitalia have had
their genitalia surgically modified to resemble either male or
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
female genitals.[24] More commonly, an intersex individual is
considered as suffering from a disorder which is almost always
recommended to be treated, whether by surgery and/or by taking
lifetime medication in order to mold the individual as neatly as
possible into the category of either male or female.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls
for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations
which should not be subject to outright denial. It has been
suggested that there is some middle ground between the sexes, a
no-mans land for those individuals who are neither truly male nor
truly female.[25] The current state of Philippine statutes apparently
compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female,
but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature
itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification.
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a
female, then there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate
entry for gender. But if we determine, based on medical testimony
and scientific development
showing the respondent to beother than female, then a change in t
he
subjects birth certificate entry is in order.
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed
(neither consistently and categorically female nor consistently and
categorically male) composition. Respondent has female (XX)
chromosomes. However, respondents body system naturally
produces high levels of male hormones (androgen). As a result,
respondent has ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic features
of a male.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is
biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his
gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent,
having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of
his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and
considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones
(androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering
him as being male. Sexual development in cases
ofintersex persons makes the gender classification at birth
inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like
respondent, is fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and
has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he
was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to
that of a male. Respondent could have undergone treatment and
taken steps, like taking lifelong medication, [26] to force his body
into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose not
to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in respondents
development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.
In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not
dictate on respondent concerning a matter so innately private as
ones sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or
not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency
due to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred
in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain
as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo
treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a
female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the
human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with
his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the
pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the
primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path
of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of
evidence that respondent is an incompetent [27] and in the absence
of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will
harm other members of society who are equally entitled to
protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified
the respondents position and his personal judgment of being a
male.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the

diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what
nature has handed out. In other words, we respect respondents
congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is
already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how
respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help make his
life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case.

As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this

Court has held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of
judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons
adduced and the consequences that will follow. [28] The trial courts
grant of respondents change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a
change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the
consequence that respondents change of name merely recognizes
his preferred gender, we find merit in respondents change of
name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in
his birth certificate from female to male.

WHEREFORE, the Republics petition is DENIED. The

Decision dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
33 of Siniloan, Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
costs.

SO ORDERED.

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Persons 4th Exam Cases

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage
as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn
did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized
Petitioner,
letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to
- versus -
Gerberts petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case
herself but was prevented by financial and personal
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The
circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-
SOLICITOR GENERAL,
in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerberts.
Respondents. -- -
In its October 30, 2008 decision,[7] the RTC denied Gerberts
petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert was not the proper party to
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision [1] of the
institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a
as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen.It ruled that only the Filipino
petition for review on certiorari[2] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article
(present petition).
26 of the Family Code, [8] in order for him or her to be able to remarry
under Philippine law.[9] Article 26 of the Family Code reads:
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who
acquired Canadian citizenship through naturalization on November 29,
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside
2000.[3] On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T.
the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.[4] Due to work and other
the country where they were solemnized, and valid
professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the
there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5)
surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having
and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed, Gerbert returned
to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of
Where a marriage between a Filipino
Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerberts petition for divorce
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and
on December 8, 2005. The divorce decree took effect a month later,
a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad
on January 8, 2006.[5]
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
found another Filipina to love. Desirous of marrying his new Filipina
fiance in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent
Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyns
behind the enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an
Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;
official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the [10]
the provision was enacted to avoid the absurd situation where the
marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law;
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree must first be judicially
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. [11]
recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular
No. 4, series of 1982.[6]
THE PETITION

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
From the RTCs ruling,[12] Gerbert filed the present petition.[13]
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially
for declaratory relief, similar to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus,
similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the
rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
he contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the
alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the
doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to
the Filipino spouse an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the
essence of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He
considers himself as a proper party, vested with sufficient legal
interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he might be
prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiance in the Philippines
since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the
Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in
their respective Comments,[14] both support Gerberts position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code extends to aliens
the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURTS RULING
The alien spouse
can claim no right
under the second
paragraph of
Article 26 of the
Family Code as
the substantive
right it
establishes is in
favor of the
Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history
and intent behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages
void[15] and voidable[16] marriages. In both cases, the basis for
the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage
exists before or at the time of the marriage.Divorce, on the other hand,
contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause
arising after the marriage.[17] Our family laws do not recognize absolute
divorce between Filipino citizens. [18]
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in
marriages between a Filipino and an alien, President Corazon C.
Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom
Constitution,[19] enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending
Article 26 of the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside
the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid
there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5)
and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino
citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and
a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad
by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227
effectively incorporated into the law this Courts holding in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.[20] and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.[21] In both cases, the Court
refused to acknowledge the alien spouses assertion of marital rights
after a foreign courts divorce decree between the alien and the
Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had
already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court
reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the
Filipino spouse] has to be considered still
married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to
a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The
Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the
to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse
be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the
property. She should not be discriminated alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.
against in her own country if the ends of justice
are to be served.[22]
The foreign
divorce decree is
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the presumptive
law to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains evidence of a
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer right that clothes
married to the Filipino spouse. [23] The legislative intent is for the benefit the party with
of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling legal interest to
the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second petition for its
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the recognition in this
Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage jurisdiction
to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him
or her to remarry.[24] Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second
the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the foreign decree of paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of
divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose aliens with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not
or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC. In other
to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
mode of severing the marital bond; [25]Article 17 of the Civil Code Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal
provides that the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce
by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The inclusion of the decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and
second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven
exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence
dissolution of the marriage between the Filipino spouse and his or her of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules
alien spouse. of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This
Section states:
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code is not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final
decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien spouse orders.The effect of a judgment or final order of
to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise a tribunal of a foreign country, having
capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, jurisdiction to render the judgment or final
however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other order is as follows:
than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal
capacity are generally governed by his national law.[26] (a) In case of a judgment or final
order upon a specific thing, the
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the judgment or final order is conclusive
purpose of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the upon the title of the thing; and

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
(b) In case of a judgment or final
order against a person, the
judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right
as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order
may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign
judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite interest to
institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign
judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the
divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in
the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her
national law.[27]
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce
judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take judicial
notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as
a rule, no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a
judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country. [28] This means that
the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts
under our rules on evidence, together with the aliens applicable
national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
herself.[29] The recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes
the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the
national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a
divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires
proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the
officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official
records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied
by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in
the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which
the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy
of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates proving its
authenticity,[30] but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on
divorce.[31] Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss
the petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it
more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine whether
the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of
action, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the Filipina
wifes (Daisylyns) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at
the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign
judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive evidence of a right
by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every
precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a
recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall
have the effect of res judicata[32] between the parties, as provided in
Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.[33]
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the
practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between
nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce
serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for
considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as
discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for
the substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code provides.
Considerations
beyond the
recognition of the
foreign divorce
decree
As a matter of housekeeping concern, we note that
the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already recorded the
divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage certificate
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

based on the mere presentation of the decree. [34] We consider (1) Birth and death register;
the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw attention
of the bench and the bar to what had been done. (2) Marriage register, in which shall be
entered not only the marriages
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that [a]cts, events and judicial solemnized but also divorces and
decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the dissolved marriages.
civil register. The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial
decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a persons (3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption,
legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting all his personal qualities change of name and naturalization
and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily register.
terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate,
or his being married or not.[35]

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign

one, affecting a persons legal capacity and status that must be
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil
recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status
registry, the law and the submission of the decree by themselves do
specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil
not ipso facto authorize the decrees registration. The law should be
registry:
read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the
foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the
Sec. 1. Civil Register. A civil register is
context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing
established for recording the civil status of
the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office
persons, in which shall be entered:
acted totally out of turn and without authority of law when it annotated
the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyns marriage
(a) births;
certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by
(b) deaths;
Gerbert.
(c) marriages;
(d) annulments of marriages;
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the
(e) divorces;
requirement of a court recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series
(f) legitimations;
of 1982,[36] and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of
(g) adoptions;
1982[37] both of which required a final order from a competent
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can
(i) naturalization; and
be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the
(j) changes of name.
registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of
the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial recognition is
xxxx
patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.

Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. The local registrars

Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the
shall keep and preserve in their offices the following
recognition that the RTC may extend to the Canadian divorce decree
books, in which they shall, respectively make the
does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil
proper entries concerning the civil status of persons:
registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the

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Persons 4th Exam Cases

proper proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the

cancellation of entries in the civil registry. SO ORDERED.

Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that no entry in a civil

register shall be changed or corrected, without judicial order. The Rules
of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically
providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil
registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules
of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements
that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the
cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry. It also
requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the
RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located;
[38]
that the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest must be made parties to the proceedings; [39] and that the time
and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general
circulation.[40] As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been
met in the present case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed
with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be

construed as requiring two separate proceedings for the registration of
a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry one for recognition of the
foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign
divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the
object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as
the appropriate adversarial proceeding[41] by which the applicability of
the foreign judgment can be measured and tested in terms of
jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari,

and REVERSE the October 30, 2008 decision of
the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as
its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the
trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our ruling
above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar
General. No costs.

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
G.R. No. 204169 September 11, 2013
YASUO IWASAWA, PETITIONER,
vs.
FELISA CUSTODIO GANGAN1 (A.K.A FELISA GANGAN
ARAMBULO, AND FELISA GANGAN IWASAWA) AND THE
LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF PASAY CITY, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the
September 4, 2012 Decision2 and October 16, 2012 Order3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 43, of Manila in Civil Case No.
11-126203. The RTC denied the petition for declaration of nullity of
the marriage of petitioner Yasuo Iwasawa with private respondent
Felisa Custodio Gangan due to insufficient evidence.
The antecedents follow:
Petitioner, a Japanese national, met private respondent sometime
in 2002 in one of his visits to the Philippines. Private respondent
introduced herself as "single" and "has never married before."
Since then, the two became close to each other. Later that year,
petitioner came back to the Philippines and married private
respondent on November 28, 2002 in Pasay City. After the wedding,
the couple resided in Japan.4
In July 2009, petitioner noticed his wife become depressed.
Suspecting that something might have happened in the
Philippines, he confronted his wife about it. To his shock, private
respondent confessed to him that she received news that her
previous husband passed away.5
Petitioner sought to confirm the truth of his wifes confession and
discovered that indeed, she was married to one Raymond
Maglonzo Arambulo and that their marriage took place on June 20,
1994.6 This prompted petitioner to file a petition 7 for the
declaration of his marriage to private respondent as null and void
on the ground that their marriage is a bigamous one, based on
Article 35(4) in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines.
During trial, aside from his testimony, petitioner also offered the
following pieces of documentary evidence issued by the National
Statistics Office (NSO):
(1)
Certificate of Marriage8 between petitioner and private
respondent marked as Exhibit "A" to prove the fact of
marriage between the parties on November 28, 2002;
(2)
Certificate of Marriage9 between private respondent and
Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo marked as Exhibit "B" to
prove the fact of marriage between the parties on June 20,
1994;
(3)
Certificate of Death10 of Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo
marked as Exhibits "C" and "C-1" to prove the fact of the
latters death on July 14, 2009; and
(4)
Certification11 from the NSO to the effect that there are two
entries of marriage recorded by the office pertaining to
private respondent marked as Exhibit "D" to prove that
private respondent in fact contracted two marriages, the
first one was to a Raymond Maglonzo Arambulo on June 20,
1994, and second, to petitioner on November 28, 2002.
The prosecutor appearing on behalf of the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) admitted the authenticity and due execution of the
above documentary exhibits during pre-trial.12
On September 4, 2012, the RTC rendered the assailed decision. It
ruled that there was insufficient evidence to prove private
respondents prior existing valid marriage to another man. It held
that while petitioner offered the certificate of marriage of private
respondent to Arambulo, it was only petitioner who testified about
said marriage. The RTC ruled that petitioners testimony is
unreliable because he has no personal knowledge of private
respondents prior marriage nor of Arambulos death which makes
him a complete stranger to the marriage certificate between
private respondent and Arambulo and the latters death certificate.
It further ruled that petitioners testimony about the NSO
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
certification is likewise unreliable since he is a stranger to the
preparation of said document.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same was
denied by the RTC in an Order dated October 16, 2012.
Hence this petition raising the sole legal issue of whether the
testimony of the NSO records custodian certifying the authenticity
and due execution of the public documents issued by said office
was necessary before they could be accorded evidentiary weight.
Petitioner argues that the documentary evidence he presented are
public documents which are considered self-authenticating and
thus it was unnecessary to call the NSO Records Custodian as
witness. He cites Article 410 of the Civil Code which provides that
books making up the civil register and all documents relating
thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be prima
facie evidence of the facts stated therein. Moreover, the trial
prosecutor himself also admitted the authenticity of said
documents.
The OSG, in its Comment, 13 submits that the findings of the RTC are
not in accord with law and established jurisprudence. It contends
that both Republic Act No. 3753, otherwise known as the Law on
Registry of Civil Status, and the Civil Code elaborated on the
character of documents arising from records and entries made by
the civil registrar and categorically declared them as public
documents. Being public documents, said documents are
admissible in evidence even without further proof of their due
execution and genuineness and consequently, there was no need
for the court to require petitioner to present the records custodian
or officer from the NSO to testify on them. The OSG further
contends that public documents have probative value since they
are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein as provided in
the above-quoted provision of the Civil Code. Thus, the OSG
submits that the public documents presented by petitioner,
considered together, completely establish the facts in issue.
In her letter14 dated March 19, 2013 to this Court, private
respondent indicated that she is not against her husbands petition
to have their marriage declared null and void. She likewise
admitted therein that she contracted marriage with Arambulo on
June 20, 1994 and contracted a second marriage with petitioner on
November 28, 2002. She further admitted that it was due to
poverty and joblessness that she married petitioner without telling
the latter that she was previously married. Private respondent also
confirmed that it was when she found out that Arambulo passed
away on July 14, 2009 that she had the guts to confess to
petitioner about her previous marriage. Thereafter, she and
petitioner have separated.
We grant the petition.
There is no question that the documentary evidence submitted by
petitioner are all public documents.1wphi1 As provided in the Civil
Code:
ART. 410. The books making up the civil register and all documents
relating thereto shall be considered public documents and shall be
prima facie evidence of the facts therein contained.
As public documents, they are admissible in evidence even without
further proof of their due execution and genuineness. 15 Thus, the
RTC erred when it disregarded said documents on the sole ground
that the petitioner did not present the records custodian of the
NSO who issued them to testify on their authenticity and due
execution since proof of authenticity and due execution was not
anymore necessary. Moreover, not only are said documents
admissible, they deserve to be given evidentiary weight because
they constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.
And in the instant case, the facts stated therein remain unrebutted
since neither the private respondent nor the public prosecutor
presented evidence to the contrary.
This Court has consistently held that a judicial declaration of nullity
is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted;
or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage, 16 which is void
from the beginning as provided in Article 35(4) of the Family Code
of the Philippines. And this is what transpired in the instant case.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the documentary exhibits
taken together concretely establish the nullity of the marriage of
petitioner to private respondent on the ground that their marriage
is bigamous. The exhibits directly prove the following facts: (1) that
private respondent married Arambulo on June 20, 1994 in the City
of Manila; (2) that private respondent contracted a second
marriage this time with petitioner on November 28, 2002 in Pasay
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Persons 4th Exam Cases

City; (3) that there was no judicial declaration of nullity of the

marriage of private respondent with Arambulo at the time she
married petitioner; (3) that Arambulo died on July 14, 2009 and
that it was only on said date that private respondents marriage
with Arambulo was deemed to have been dissolved; and (4) that
the second marriage of private respondent to petitioner is
bigamous, hence null and void, since the first marriage was still
valid and subsisting when the second marriage was contracted.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The
September 4, 2012 Decision and October 16, 2012 Order of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil Case No. 11-
126203 are hereby SET ASIDE. The marriage of petitioner Yasuo
Iwasawa and private respondent Felisa Custodio Gangan is
declared NULL and VOID.
The Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City and the National Statistics
Office are hereby ORDERED to make proper entries into the records
of the abovementioned parties in accordance with this Decision.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

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Persons 4th Exam Cases
G.R. No. 189538 February 10, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court are the Regional Trial Court 1(RTC)
Decision2 dated May 5, 2009 and Order3 dated August 25, 2009 in
SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB. The assailed decision granted respondent
Merlinda L. Olaybar's petition for cancellation of entries in the
latter's marriage contract; while the assailed order denied the
motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Republic of the
Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
The facts of the case are as follows:
Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a
Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements
for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt
thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain
Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of Justice. She
denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did
not know the alleged husband; she did not appear before the
solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the
marriage certificate is not hers. 4 She, thus, filed a Petition for
Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract, especially the
entries in the wife portion thereof.5 Respondent impleaded the
Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband,
as parties to the case.
During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that
she could not have appeared before Judge Mamerto Califlores, the
supposed solemnizing officer, at the time the marriage was
allegedly celebrated, because she was then in Makati working as a
medical distributor in Hansao Pharma. She completely denied
having known the supposed husband, but she revealed that she
recognized the named witnesses to the marriage as she had met
them while she was working as a receptionist in Tadels Pension
House. She believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny
Singh, who owned a travel agency, whom she gave her personal
circumstances in order for her to obtain a passport. 6 Respondent
also presented as witness a certain Eufrocina Natinga, an
employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed that the marriage of
Ye Son Sune was indeed celebrated in their office, but claimed that
the alleged wife who appeared was definitely not
respondent.7 Lastly, a document examiner testified that the
signature appearing in the marriage contract was forged.8
On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, the petition is granted
in favor of the petitioner, Merlinda L. Olaybar. The Local Civil
Registrar of Cebu City is directed to cancel all the entries in the
WIFE portion of the alleged marriage contract of the petitioner and
respondent Ye Son Sune.
SO ORDERED.9
Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage
contract was not that of respondent, the court found basis in
granting the latters prayer to straighten her record and rectify the
terrible mistake.10
Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed
Decision on the grounds that: (1) there was no clerical spelling,
typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract
for it to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court;
and (2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife
portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the
marriage void ab initio.11
In an Order dated August 25, 2009, the RTC denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration couched in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby denies the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the Republic of the Philippines. Furnish
copies of this order to the Office of the Solicitor General, the
petitioners counsel, and all concerned government agencies.
SO ORDERED.12
Contrary to petitioners stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction
to take cognizance of cases for correction of entries even on
substantial errors under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court being the
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
appropriate adversary proceeding required. Considering that
respondents identity was used by an unknown person to contract
marriage with a Korean national, it would not be feasible for
respondent to institute an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage since it is not one of the void marriages under Articles 35
and 36 of the Family Code.13
Petitioner now comes before the Court in this Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal
of the assailed RTC Decision and Order based on the following
grounds:
I.
RULE 108 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT APPLIES ONLY WHEN
THERE ARE ERRORS IN THE ENTRIES SOUGHT TO BE CANCELLED
OR CORRECTED.
II.
GRANTING THE CANCELLATION OF "ALL THE ENTRIES IN THE WIFE
PORTION OF THE ALLEGED MARRIAGE CONTRACT," IS IN EFFECT
DECLARING THE MARRIAGE VOID AB INITIO.14
Petitioner claims that there are no errors in the entries sought to be
cancelled or corrected, because the entries made in the certificate
of marriage are the ones provided by the person who appeared
and represented herself as Merlinda L. Olaybar and are, in fact, the
latters personal circumstances.15 In directing the cancellation of
the entries in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage, the
RTC, in effect, declared the marriage null and void ab initio. 16 Thus,
the petition instituted by respondent is actually a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage in the guise of a Rule 108
proceeding.17
We deny the petition.
At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this
Court from the decisions and final orders of the RTC may be taken
where only questions of law are raised or involved. There is a
question of law when the doubt arises as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts, which does not call for the examination of
the probative value of the evidence of the parties. 18 Here, the issue
raised by petitioner is whether or not the cancellation of entries in
the marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the marriage may
be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding. Verily, petitioner raised a
pure question of law.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rules on cancellation
or correction of entries in the civil registry, to wit:
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. Any person
interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has
been recorded in the civil register, may file a
verified petition for the cancellation or correction of
any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial
Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction.
Upon good and valid grounds, the following
entries in the civil register may be cancelled or
corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d)
legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of
marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void
from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h)
adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children;
(j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of
citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial
determination of filiation; (n) voluntary
emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of
an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby shall be
made parties to the proceeding.
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. Upon the filing of
the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the
time and place for the hearing of the same, and
cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the
persons named in the petition. The court shall also
cause the order to be published once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any
person having or claiming any interest under the
entry whose cancellation or correction is sought
may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
petition, or from the last date of publication of such
notice, file his opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in
which the proceedings is brought may make orders
expediting the proceedings, and may also grant
preliminary injunction for the preservation of the
rights of the parties pending such proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either
dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the
cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case,
a certified copy of the judgment shall be served
upon the civil registrar concerned who shall
annotate the same in his record.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The
proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction
is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the
rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a
party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is
adversary. Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia 19 in 1986,
the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial errors in a
civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule
108, with the true facts established and the parties aggrieved by
the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial
proceeding."20 An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one
where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant
facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing
counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite
partys case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed
and considered.21
It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a
hearing may be dispensed with, and the remedy [is] granted upon
mere application or motion. However, a special proceeding is not
always summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a
summary proceeding per se. It requires publication of the petition;
it mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim
interest which would be affected by the cancellation or correction;
it also requires the civil registrar and any person in interest to file
their opposition, if any; and it states that although the court may
make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the
court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the
same. Thus, as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are
followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect
substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register. 22
In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate
of marriage are admittedly the personal circumstances of
respondent. The latter, however, claims that her signature was
forged and she was not the one who contracted marriage with the
purported husband. In other words, she claims that no such
marriage was entered into or if there was, she was not the one who
entered into such contract. It must be recalled that when
respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it appeared
that she was married to a certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought the
cancellation of entries in the wife portion of the marriage
certificate.
In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108,
respondent made the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as well as
her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as parties-respondents. It is
likewise undisputed that the procedural requirements set forth in
Rule 108 were complied with. The Office of the Solicitor General
was likewise notified of the petition which in turn authorized the
Office of the City Prosecutor to participate in the proceedings. More
importantly, trial was conducted where respondent herself, the
stenographer of the court where the alleged marriage was
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Persons 4th Exam Cases
conducted, as well as a document examiner, testified. Several
documents were also considered as evidence. With the testimonies
and other evidence presented, the trial court found that the
signature appearing in the subject marriage certificate was
different from respondents signature appearing in some of her
government issued identification cards. 23 The court thus made a
categorical conclusion that respondents signature in the marriage
certificate was not hers and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was
established that, as she claimed in her petition, no such marriage
was celebrated.
Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of
Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local
Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and the Administrator and Civil
Registrar General of the National Statistics Office24 that:
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in
the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a
marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of
the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the
Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among
these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited
grounds for the dissolution of marriage, support pendente lite of
the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition and distribution
of the properties of the spouses and the investigation of the public
prosecutor to determine collusion. A direct action for declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent
circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the
Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed
in the Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is
located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his
marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage
in the civil registry.
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was
presented to show the existence of marriage.1wphi1Rather,
respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage
was entered into and that she was not even aware of such
existence. The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly
established that the only "evidence" of marriage which is the
marriage certificate was a forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108
cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we
cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the
parties had been given the opportunity to contest the allegations
of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence
of the parties had already been admitted and examined.
Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as
there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record
of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence.
Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject
certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the
trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there
was no marriage to speak of.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack
of merit. The Regional Trial Court Decision dated May 5, 2009 and
Order dated August 25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB, are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
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