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Modern aircraft
Reliability improvement
of electronics standby display
system of modern aircraft
955
G. Pari
Directorate General of Aeronautical Quality Assurance, Ministry of Defence, Received January 2008
Bangalore, Karnataka, India Accepted February 2008
Santhosh Kumar
Gas Turbine Research Establishment (GTRE), Bangalore, Karnataka, India, and
Vinay Sharma
Department of Production Engineering, Birla Institute of Technology,
Mesra, Ranchi, India

Abstract
Purpose Through this analysis an attempt has been made to improve the reliability of an ESDS
used in the cockpit.
Design/methodology/approach The process used for carrying out FMEA is specified by
MIL-STD-1629A procedure for carrying out failure mode, effects and criticality analysis.
Findings In an increasing demand in avionics sector, particularly in modern defence and civil
aircraft, safety and reliability are the prime concern to complete the mission successfully. This made
technocrats to rethink over the safety of complete system by adding redundancy to the critical
activities or what else not? The electronic stand by display system (ESDS), being an avionics unit and
fitted in the cockpit for displaying very important navigation and engine parameters to pilot whenever
main display unit fail to perform it primary functions. So even standby system need to have high
reliability to serve the purpose by providing important flight parameters for the safe landing of pilot
and crew. Failure modes and effect analysis (FMEA) is one of the effective reliability assessment tool,
which evaluate systematically and document the potential failure modes of a system or equipment and
their causes. It helps in grading the severity of all potential failure modes and useful in carrying out the
changes in early phase of design. The analysis starts with the potential failure of a smallest component
at the final indenture and goes up to the initial indenture level.
Originality/value The paper adds insight into the reliability improvement of electronics standby
display systems of modern aircraft.
Keywords Aircraft, Failure modes and effects analysis, Navigation, Product reliability
Paper type Research paper

Introduction
The electronic stand by display system (ESDS) is presently under development for the
usage in Military Aircraft. The ESDS displays the important parameters like, calibrated
airspeed and vertical speed, Mach number, angle of attack, rotor speed, turbine International Journal of Quality &
discharge temperature, variable nozzle area, fuel flow rate, etc. Further as ESDS being Reliability Management
Vol. 25 No. 9, 2008
airborne equipment, its reliability should be very high. All measures have been taken pp. 955-967
during design and development of the unit by means of selecting right materials, q Emerald Group Publishing Limited
0265-671X
processes, components, planning and various tests for conforming to the requirements, DOI 10.1108/02656710810908106
IJQRM involving various agencies like quality assurance/quality control to increase confidence
25,9 level of the equipment function. The equipment (ESDS) shares the load of main display
units, i.e. multi function display (MFDs). In case of the failure of main display units, ESDS
will provide vital flight information to the pilot to navigate the aircraft safely to the base.
In normal mode, the flight performance information, which requires to be continuously
monitored for the safety of the flying, can be also displayed by this unit and MFDs can be
956 programmed to display other mission related parameters. The ESDS is stand alone color
display unit of size 3 3 inches. ESDS generates and displays page information as
predefined pages based on the parameters received through its various interfaces. Two
units of ESDS are envisaged for one cockpit. One ESDS is to be located on left main
instrumental panel and other on the right hand main instrumental panel.

Methodology
The process used for carrying out FMEA is specified by MIL-STD-1629A procedure
for carrying out failure mode, effects and criticality analysis.

Analysis approach
Based on the design complexity and available data there are two primary approaches
one which lists individual hardware items and analysis their possible failure modes.
The other is a functional approach, which recognizes that every item is designed to
perform a number of functions that can be classified as output. The outputs are listed
and their failure modes where analyzed. In this case, there are few modules and sub
modules like ICs, DC-DC converters, AMLCD, etc. which are procured as finished
components therefore designed details are not available for these modules/components.
Further the ESDS being a complex system, combination of both the approaches, i.e.
hardware as well as functional approaches was considered for carrying out failure
modes and effect analysis (FMEA, www.admin@fmea.com; www.omnicongroup.com
(Department of Defense, 1980; Stamatis, 1995)[1]).

Severity classification
Severity of failure effects where categorized as per military standards and are
summarized below (Department of Defense, 1980):
.
Catastrophic A failure which may cause inadvertent release of stores or
damage to aircraft or crew.
.
Critical A failure which may cause major system damage which will result in
mission loss.
.
Marginal A failure which may cause minor system damage which will result
in delay or loss of redundancy or mission degradation.
.
Minor A failure not serious enough to cause system damage, but which results
in unscheduled maintenance or repairs.
.
For improving the system and future expansion.

Procedure
Each single item failure was considered to be the only failure in the system, while
analyzing its effects, when a single item failure was not detectible, the analysis was
extended to determine the effects of a second failure, which in combination with the first
undetectable failure could result in a catastrophic or critical failure condition. Passive Modern aircraft
and multiple failures, which may result in catastrophic or critical conditions, were also
identified. When Safety, redundant, or back-up items exist, failure assumption
was broadened to include the failure condition. Design changes or special control
measures were identified and defined for all catastrophic and critical failure modes.
All single failure points identified during the analyses were uniquely identified on the
FMEA worksheets to maintain visibility of these failure modes (Department of Defense, 957
1980; Stamatis, 1995; Kara-Zaitri et al., 1991; Bednarz and Marriott, 1988).

Failure mode and effects of ESDS (based on Ishikawa diagram)

The FMEA was initiated at the lowest indenture level and was preceded through
increasing indenture level (bottom-up approach), up to the main unit level until the
FMEA for the entire system was complete. Figure 1 shows the various indenture levels
of the system in an order. At the lowest indenture levels, the failure modes were based
on the functions of the complete unit. Similarly at the higher indenture levels the failure
modes were based on the functions of that module or section or subsection. In case if
the highest indenture level fails, it will be actual failure mode of the component, with
the exception to the integrated circuits are bought out finished modules for which
design/constructional details were not available.
Further for the FMEA only the functional modules and its components are
considered. There are non-functional component like enclosures, gaskets, fixing screw,
etc. are not considered for FMEA analysis. The failure due to workmanship defects,
handling during transportation and maintenance was also not considered. Only the
potential failures which were the outcome of the design and component selection were
only used for the analysis.

Levels of ESDS
In this case, FMEA was introduced at the lowest indenture level and preceded
through increasing indenture levels, up to the main unit level and for the entire
system. Figure 1 shows the various indenture levels of system. At the lowest

Figure 1.
FMEA at various
indenture levels
IJQRM indenture level, the failure modes were based on the functions of the complete unit.
25,9 Similarly at the higher indenture levels the failure modes were based on the
functions of the module or sub section. For analysis purpose ESDS was divided into
four major modules viz:
(1) Graphic interface module.
(2) Input/output modules two numbers.
958
(3) Power supply module.
(4) Back plane and rear I/O two numbers.
Further each module was divided into number of sections and subsections to make
analysis simpler. In this paper, only power supply module analysis was summarized
due to length constraint.
The critical failures of components in various subsections, sections of the power
supply card are shown in Figure 2.
The critical failures in this section are caused by:
.
02 cases of resistor and 01 case of inductor failing in open mode;
.
02 cases of resistor and 01 cases of transistor failing short mode;
.
06 cases of integrated circuits failing functionally; and
.
01 cases of MOSFET, 01 case of regulator and 01 cases of rectifier failing in
short/open mode.

Failure effects of ESDS and other modules

As shown in the Figure 3 reliability diagram of ESDS, the failure of any of its module
will cause the system failure, i.e. absence of display parameter. As for failure effects
concern, it is a series system. In the diagram IO 1 and IO 2 are shown in the single
block, but practically they are parallel. Only in case of both the card failure, the system
will fail; else some of the parameter will not be displayed.

Figure 2.
Cause and effect analysis
for failure of power supply
card
Failure effects of power supply module Modern aircraft
Power supply module provides the voltage required by the GIU, IO module, LCD
module, Bezel and other external services like magnetometer, etc. Failure of this
module will cause the failure of complete system. The reliability diagram of power
supply module is shown in Figure 4.

EMI Filter 959

The function of EMI Filter is to filter the line ripples and harmonic present in the power
supply input line. Since this section is in series with the input power supply the failure
of this section will cut off the input power to the DC-DC converters and other module of
ESDS and causes failure of ESDS. The reliability diagram of this section is shown in
Figure 5.

DC-DC converter
This section generates various supply voltage required by the ESDS system to
function. The reliability block diagram of DC-DC converter is shown in Figure 6.

Figure 3.
Reliabilty diagram
of ESDS

Figure 4.
Reliability diagram
of power supply module

Figure 5.
Reliability diagram EMI
filter

Figure 6.
Reliability diagram
of DC-DC converters
IJQRM There are five DC-DC converters which are used in this section viz., 3.3, 5, 30, 12
25,9 and 2 12 V. A 30 V DC-DC generator is configured to supply 15 and 2 15 V and the
12 and 2 12 V DC-DC converters are cascade to give 24 V power. The entire DC-DC
converter is to function for the smooth operation of the ESDS. Failure of one or other
DC-DC converter will fail the system.
The switching circuit switches on the power supply 3.3, 5 and 15 V
960 simultaneously through MOSFETS. Failure of this circuit will lead to the power failure
to the ESDS. Regulator was used for regulating 2.5 V from 3.3 V power supply
required for the bezel lighting. Failure of the regulator will cause the failure of the bezel
lighting.
Pi-filter was used for filtering line ripples generated in the DC-DC converters. Each
output of the DC-DC converter had individual filters. Since the filter was in series with
the power supply line, failure of the Pi-filter will cause the power failure and failure of
the system.
Filter and logic circuit feeds power to the LCD heater and lamp heater. In case of the
failure of this section, ESDS cannot be switched on when the external temperature was
below 158C.

Magnetometer power supply

Power supply to the magnetometer 15 and 2 15 V were fed through the Pi-filter and
switching circuit which switches ON the power 15 and 2 15 V through output
coupler for magnetometers. Failure of this section will cause the power failure to the
magnetometer in turn the correction factor for the flight parameters. The reliability
diagram of magnetometer power supply is shown in Figure 7.

FMEA work sheet

The functions and failure were analyzed at the component level and the work sheet
was prepared as per the military standard. Each module of the ESDS was divided into
section and subsection (Individual levels) as done in previous sections and the
component of the particular indenture were grouped, listed, analyzed and presented in
the work sheet.
The indication number (ID no.) of the component with the same part number,
remains same with in the section/subsection. In nomenclature column of the worksheet,
the circuit reference number was given along with the nomenclature of the component.
This was done to facilitate, tracing the component in the master drawing index and to
identify its function in the circuit. The function of the individual component in that
circuit was reflected in the Function column of the work sheet. In few cases of micro
circuits, where it was not possible to ascertain the failure mode, the mode of the failure
was reflected as functional failure.
The ESDS, being an avionics (aviation electronics) module have only few
electromechanical components like connectors and flexi card. The remaining electronic

Figure 7.
Reliability diagram
of magnetometer power
supply converters
components fail at random due to electrical over stress (EOS). From the analysis it was Modern aircraft
seen that supervisory circuits, which maintain the voltage to the threshold limit,
is likely to deteriorate the other component when it fails. The deteriorated component
may fail at later date, where the cause was EOS again due to failure of supervisory
circuit. Therefore, the column probable cause of failure in the work sheet was filled
mostly with EOS.
The failure of the system means there is no display by ESDS, which can be seen 961
visually. But to identify the failure at subsystem level (module level/section
level/subsection level), the power on self-test (POST) of continuous built in test (CBIT)
was used. When the failure at the section/subsection level is identified, it becomes easy
to identify the failed components. The column Failure detection method/warning is
filled with POST and CBIT mostly. FMEA of power supply module is summarized in
Tables I and II for DC-DC converter.

Summary of critical failures

FMEA has been carried out on ESDS, which was used in modern civil and military
aircraft, it may be seen from the worksheet, most of the failures categorized as critical
severity class II are pertaining to power supply related components and functional
ICs. A summary of the critical failure are tabulated and given in the Table III as per
Mil-Std-1629A.

Conclusion
From the table it may be seen that there are 22 cases of capacitor failure and 15 cases of
resistor failure which are categories as critical. But from the selection criteria of these
components and the data sheets, the failure rate is below 0.001 per cent per 1,000 h.
Similarly 13 cases of electromechanical components (connectors) are categorized under
critical where they fail due to mechanical stress. The reliability of these components
under mechanical stress is proved by subjecting the unit to vibration (sine and random)
and shock as a part of qualification testing. The remaining failure of 24 cases of ICs,
Transistors MOSFETs, optocoupler and regulators which are consider as critical, is a
causes for concern for reliability of the units.
Improving the reliability of a system by adding compensating mechanism or
redundancy adds weights. But the weight is critical factor for any fighter aircraft.
In case of ESDS, which is cockpit instrument, apart from weight there is space
constraint also. At the same time one should not loose the reliability of a system, which
is very important for any airborne equipment. Therefore, compromise between
reliability of a system and weight at some point is necessary.
In the design feature, it has been brought out that the unit is subjected to
environmental stress screening at various level like, component level, card (PCB) level
and unit level. Further at unit level thermo shock is also being planned. These
measures are likely to bring out the inherent failure in the unit and weed out the infant
mortality. Burn-in and endurance testing of the unit is also proposed to carryout on the
unit. The reliability measure is included as design feature. If the development of the
unit is considered to be satisfactory then no further compensating mechanism to cater
for the critical failure is suggested at this stage.
 25,9

962

module
Table I.
IJQRM

Failure mode and effect

analysis of power supply
System: ESDS Part no. A1KII 1210-000-000
Part no.
Module: power supply card SD-1210-150-000
Section: EMI filter Function: reduce the input line reflected ripple current of the ATR DC-DC converter
Failure effect on:
Probability a. Components Failure
Failure cause b. Sub-systems detection
ID no. Item/functional ID Function mode of failure c. Systems method Severity Remarks

3.1.1.1 Schottky rectifier Reverse Short EOS a. U10 becomes serviceable Nil IV Provided for safety,
(U 10) polarity redundancy provided
protection b. No reverse polarity
protection For open mode
c. No effects on the system
Open a. U10 becomes serviceable Visual (no II
power
b. No power supply to
DC-DC convertor
c. System failure
3.1.1.2 Choke L1 & L4 Act as part of Broken Mechanical a. Failure of the component Visual III
(ferrite bead type) RLC filter stress b. Presence of line ripples in
the power supply
c. System will have noise
3.1.1.2 Choke L5 Act as part of Open EOS a. Failure of the component Visual (no II
RLC filter power
b. No power supply to
DC-DC convertor
c. System failure
3.1.1.2 Capacitor C9 or Act as part of Open EOS a. Failure of the component POST or III
C10 or C12 or C13 RLC filter Short b. Power supply to DC-DC CBIT
converter. Will have no
interface
(continued)
System: ESDS Part no. A1KII 1210-000-000
Part no.
Module: power supply card SD-1210-150-000
Section: EMI filter Function: reduce the input line reflected ripple current of the ATR DC-DC converter
Failure effect on:
Probability a. Components Failure
Failure cause b. Sub-systems detection
ID no. Item/functional ID Function mode of failure c. Systems method Severity Remarks

c. System may have noise in

display
3.1.1.2 Resistor R1 or R2 Act as part of Open EOS a. Failure of the component POST or III
or or R4 or R6 RLC filter CBIT
Change b. Interface in the power
in value supply to DC-DC
converter
3.1.1.2 Capacitors C3 or Suppressor for Open EOS a. Failure of the component POST or II
C8 power Supply CBIT or
b. Power supply will have Visual
interface
c. System may have noise in
display
Short a. Failure of the component
b. No power supply to
DC-DC convertor
c. System failure
Sources: Department of Defense (1980); Stamatis (1995); SSDU Critical Review Document Version 1.2
Modern aircraft

963

Table I.
 25,9

964

converter
Table II.
IJQRM

analysis of DC-DC
Failure mode and effect
System: ESDS Part no. A1KII 1210-000-000
Module: power supply card Part no. SD-1210-150-000
Section: DC-DC converter Function: provides various ripple free power supplies to the system
Sub section: DC-DC converter Function: provides 3.3, 5, 15, 2 15and; 24 V supplies

3.2.1.1 3.3 V DC-DC converter Provides 3.3 V DC Output EOS a. Failure of the Visual (no II Has over voltage and
(U4) from 28 V open component power) short circuit protection
Output b. Failure of 3.3 V DC
short power supply
c. System failure
3.2.1.2 ^ 15 V DC-DC converter Provides ^15 V from Output Mech. a. Failure of the Visual (No II Has over voltage and
(U5) 28 V open Stress component power) short circuit protection

Output b. Failure of ^ 15 V DC
short power supply
c. System failure
3.2.1.3 24 V DC DC converter Provides 24 V DC Output EOS a. Failure of the Visual (no II Has over voltage and
(U1 and U2 in series) from 28 V open component power short circuit protection
Output b. Failure of 24 V DC
short power supply
c. System failure
3.2.1.4 5 V DC-DC converter(U3) Provides 5 V DC from No EOS a. Failure of the Visual, II Has over voltage and
28 V output component POST or short circuit protection
(open) CBIT
Output b. Failure of 5 V DC
short power supply
c. System failure
3.2.1.5 Capacitor C2 Common mode noise Open EOS a. Failure of the POST or IV
for 5 V DC line component CBIT
short b. Noise in the input to
DC-DC converter U3
c. No immediate effect
 Modern aircraft
Section Sub section Component ID Component Failure mode

EMI filter 3.1.1.1 Schhotty rectifier Short/open

Choke
3.1.1.2 Capacitor Open
3.1.1.3 Short
DC-DC converter DC-DC Converter 3.2.1.1 DC-DC Functional 965
3.2.1.2 Converter
3.2.1.3
3.2.1.4
DC-DC converters 2.5 V regulator 3.2.2.1 Regulator Open/short
3.2.2.2 Capacitor Short
Switching 3.2.3.1 Transistor Short
3.2.3.2 MOSFET Open
3.2.3.3 Resistor Open Table III.
Switching 15 and 215 V 3.2.4.4 AND gate Functional Summary of the critical
3.2.4.5 Inverter Functional failure are tabulated and
3.2.4.7 Resistor Open/change given as per
in volume Mil-Std-1629A

If necessary the selection of the components, which are likely to cause the critical
failures may be reviewed. Further any failure or the discrepancies noted during the
qualification testing and life/endurance testing should be considered in view of the
outcome of FMEA for improving the reliability.

Note
1. Reliability and Maintainability for Experiment Flight Equipments (ISS Pressurised
Modules) Project Specific Annex GPQ-010-PSA-108 Issue 1.

References
Bednarz, S. and Marriott, D. (1988), Efficient analysis of FMEA, Proceedings of the 1988 IEEE
Annual Reliability and Maintainability Symposium.
Department of Defense (1980), Procedure for Performing a Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality
Analysis, Mil-Std 1629A.
Kara-Zaitri, C., Keller, A.Z. and Fleming, P.V. (1991), An Improved FMEA Methodology, Bradford
University, Bradford.
Stamatis, D.H. (1995), Failure Modes and Effects Analysis FMEA from Theory to Execution, ASQ
Quality Press, Milwaukee, WI.

About the authors

G. Pari has obtained his master degree from Birla institute of technology, Mesra, Ranchi in
Quality Engineering and Management. He has also completed his master of business
administration in operations management from IGNOU. He has completed short-term courses in
electromagnetic interferance and electromagnetic compatibility, maintenance of An-32 and
IJQRM Canberra aircrafts, reliability techniques, tactical air navigation system. He has served in Indian
air force for 15 years in the maintenance of aircrafts and Related ground based support
25,9 equipment. Later he has joined directorate general of aeronautical quality assurance (DGAQA)
as senior scientific officer under ministry of defence, Government of India and serving in the
same department for the last 15 years. In this department, he is involved in the quality assurance
related functions like inspection and testing, lifing a reliability study, defect investigation,
salvaging, modification and indenization of avionic modules pertaining to Mig-27 and Jaguar
966 aircrafts. He has attended more than 600 defect investigations of avionic modules and suggested
for modification/improvement. He has also independently carried out studies on failure of flight
programming panel, failure of k-52 (liquid tantalum) capacitors of Russian origin in the
navigation and attack system modules of Mig-27 aircraft and suggested for improvement. He has
proposed and got implemented life extension servicing schedule (less) for Mig-27 avionics, which
has prevented over servicing/unwanted servicing of avionic modules. He was involved in the
preparation of overhaul schedule of Mig-27 avionics. He was involved and provided quality
assurance support in the development of cockpit display units of light combat aircraft, futuristic
data handling system used in air defence. As a member of aeronautical standardisation sub
committee working group (battery panel), he has actively involved and prepared joint service
specifications for airborne batteries of lead acid, nickle cadmium and silver zinc types for various
aircrafts and helicopters. He is also life member of Institution of Engineers, India and
Aeronautical Society of Engineers, India. He has also published papers related to quality
function deployment, environmental stress screening, highly accelerated life testing a highly
accelerate stress screening (halt a hass) in the departmental journals. His field of interest is
reliability study a qualification/environmental testing of avionics modules and software quality
assurance.
Santosh Kumar has completed his Bachelor of Engineering in Mechanical Engineering
with distinction result and presently doing. Master of Engineering in Quality Engineering and
Management at BIT, Mesra. Presently he is pursuing his Master (in Quality Engineering and
Management) thesis at BIT, Mesra in the field of failure modes and effects analysis of rotor
support system of aircraft engine. He has been sponsored for the course by Gas Turbine
Research Establishment (GTRE), Bangalore where he is working as Scientist C. In GTRE, he
is responsible for Quality Assurance & Development of aircraft 8s marine engine components
and assemblies since last 6 years. He is involved in wide variety of quality activities such as,
implementation SQC techniques in shop floor, online and off line quality control techniques,
developing quality plan for engine component and assemblies, implementation vendor quality
rating, and ISO 9001-2000 certified auditor by Lloyds, Germany. He is also a life member of
Aeronautical Society of India, Bangalore and Life member of National Institute of Quality and
Reliability (NIQR). He is well conversant with quality engineering techniques like
Continuously FMECA[4], QFD, Taguchis techniqe, Jurans trilogy, Demings approach,
PDCA/PDSA cycle, and CWQC/CWQM activities. He has completed several course in the field
of quality.
Vinay Sharma has obtained his master degree from Sambalpur University, Orissa and has
completed his doctoral Research in Water Jet Cutting, from Birla Institute of Technology,
Mesra Ranchi. He has joined DRDO as senior research fellow and successfully completed a
number of projects. For his excellent work in DRDO, he got DRDO award. He joined the
Department of Production Engineering, Birla Institute of Technology, Mesra, Ranchi, India in
February 1999 as lecturer, he became Reader in the same department in 2005 and Associate
Professor in 2007. He has published about 20 research papers in journals and proceedings of
International seminar/conferences and has been awarded certificate of merit for some of his
research papers. He has guided 15 students in ME levels and two students are pursuing their
doctoral research work under his guidance. He is a six sigms black belt holder given by NCQM.
He has organized 11 conference of national and international level. He has delivered a number of
professional lecturers in the field of precision manufacturing and quality engineering in various
workshops and summer school. He is Assistant Editor of Manufacturing Technology and Modern aircraft
Research an International Journal and has edited two books. He is life member of American
Society of Mechanical Engineering (ASME), Indian Society for Technical Education (ISTE),
Institution of Engineers (India) (IEI)and National Centre for Quality Management (NCQM).
He is a co-principle Investigator in Nationally coordinated Project Sponsored by AICTE, the title
of the Project is Deformation and Fracturing Behavior of Metallic Foams. His field of interest is
precision manufacturing and quality engineering. Currently, he is working in the field of
production of metal foam. Vinay Sharma is the corresponding author and can be contacted at: 967
vinay@bitmesra.ac.in

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