Type of Date of Time of

Timestamp Occurrence Occurrence Occurrence Type of Flight

7/23/2013 10:40 magic 1/1/2013
7/23/2013 10:41 kjsf;kdj 1/3/2012 4:08:00 Dual
7/23/2013 10:42 Door ajar 7/16/2013 11:00:00 Dual

Dual, Local,
7/23/2013 10:42 Weather incident 7/18/2013 18:00:00
Day

7/23/2013 10:42 Mags left on 7/23/2013 Solo

7/23/2013 10:42 runway incursion Dual

Dual, Local,
7/23/2013 10:43 Near-Miss 7/18/2013 10:00:00
Day

7/23/2013 10:44 Mosquitos 7/16/2013 22:00:00 Dual

Dual, Local,
7/23/2013 10:49 Gear up Landing 5/30/2013 13:00:00
Day, VFR

Lack of Yellow
Slip/Notification
8/20/2013 13:26 8/19/2013 10:30:00 Dual, Local, IFR
of Flight To
Dispatch

Aircraft
8/28/2013 15:41 8/28/2013 15:15:00
Unsecured

Aircraft
8/28/2013 15:46 8/28/2013 15:20:00
Unsecured

Vandalism (sort
8/31/2013 15:01 8/31/2013
of)

Aircraft
9/1/2013 9:58 9/1/2013 7:00:00
unsecured
9/11/2013 9:27 Flat Tire 9/10/2013 10:00:00 Dual, Day, VFR

Error in
Communication
9/2/2013 16:11 9/1/2013 15:45:00 Dual, Day, IFR
and Chart
Symbology

Control wheel
9/14/2013 11:43 9/14/2013 11:30:00
lock left off

Baggage door
9/14/2013 11:47 9/14/2013 6:30:00
unlocked again

Weight & Dual, Local,

9/14/2013 12:36 9/14/2013 10:30:00
Balance Day, VFR

Dual, Local,
9/17/2013 10:02 9/16/2013 17:00:00
Day, VFR
9/22/2013 10:07 mid-air collision 9/18/2013 9:30:00 Dual, XC

Dual, XC, Day,

9/30/2013 18:50 Broken FAR 9/29/2013 21:00:00
Night, IFR

Procedure/Checkl
10/4/2013 8:50 10/1/2013 11:00:00 Dual, XC, Day
ist

Near empty fuel

10/5/2013 11:51 10/5/2013 10:30:00 Solo
tank

Dual, Local,
10/8/2013 23:03 10/8/2013 20:00:00
Night, VFR

Dual, Local,
10/9/2013 19:12 turbulence 10/9/2013 17:00:00
Day, VFR
 Dual, Local,
10/17/2013 10:06 unsecure fuel cap 10/15/2013 7:30:00
Day, VFR

Dual, Local,
11/1/2013 17:03 airplane damage 10/31/2013 15:15:00
Day, VFR

Dual, Local,
11/7/2013 15:03 Fuel Starvation 10/12/2013 9:00:00
Day, VFR

Aircraft Not
11/8/2013 7:11 11/8/2013 6:30:00
Secured

Wrong
11/23/2013 14:15 11/23/2013 12:00:00 Solo, Dual
Tailnumber

Runway Solo, Local,

12/12/2013 11:27 11/18/2013 9:00:00
Occurrence Day, VFR
1/7/2014 16:18 Fod incedent 1/6/2014 13:00:00 Dual

Dual, Local,
1/8/2014 7:30 1/7/2014 14:30:00
Day, VFR

1/16/2014 12:48 plane left in qt 1/15/2014

Oil containers
1/16/2014 12:53 piled by the 1/16/2014
aircraft

2/7/2014 18:29 Postflight 2/7/2014 Dual

Dual, Local,
2/10/2014 13:24 Near Miss 2/6/2014 12:00:00
VFR
 Dual, Local,
3/4/2014 11:17 Near-Miss 2/24/2014 10:15:00
Day, VFR

3/10/2014 13:39 Gust Lock 3/10/2014 10:30:00 Dual, Local

3/19/2014 14:14 Injury 3/6/2014 10:00:00

Dual, Local,
4/8/2014 7:42 Bravo Bust 4/4/2014 13:30:00
Day, VFR

Dual, Local,
4/17/2014 13:47 unlocked aircraft 4/17/2014 13:00:00
Day, VFR

4/30/2014 11:51 Injury 4/25/2014 14:45:00

5/5/2014 8:07 Squawk 4/30/2014 10:00:00 VFR

 Dual, Local,
5/8/2014 20:42 Engine Failure 5/8/2014 11:00:00
Day, VFR

potiential midair Dual, Local,

6/7/2014 15:42 6/7/2014 12:45:00
collision Day, VFR

Dual, XC, Night,

6/9/2014 13:46 Bravo Bust 6/9/2014 1:00:00
VFR

Dual, XC, Day,

6/26/2014 12:54 91.155 6/10/2014 9:00:00
VFR

Gust Lock Not In

7/16/2014 7:19 7/16/2014 6:45:00
Place

7/16/2014 7:27 Tie downs left off 7/11/2014 6:45:00

 Dual, Local,
8/31/2014 15:24 Low Oil 8/31/2014
Day, VFR

Dual, Local,
9/8/2014 19:40 9/7/2014
Day, VFR

Dual, XC, Day,

9/15/2014 15:55 Preflight 9/12/2014 10:30:00
VFR, IFR

Planes not
9/17/2014 16:35 9/17/2014 16:00:00
properly secured

Dual, Local,
9/20/2014 18:58 Near Miss 9/19/2014 11:18:00
Day, VFR

near mid air Solo, XC, Day,

9/21/2014 11:47 9/19/2014 18:45:00
collision VFR

10/3/2014 18:25 Fuel Planning 10/3/2014 4:30:00

10/9/2014 10:14 fuel mastake Dual

10/9/2014 13:01 Poor planning XC, Night, VFR

Dual, Local,
10/15/2014 9:23 Mags left on 10/13/2014 13:30:00
Day, VFR

Dual, Local,
10/29/2014 15:15 wrong plane 10/29/2014 10:00:00
Day, VFR

Incomplete Dual, Local,

11/8/2014 18:59 11/8/2014 11:00:00
checklist usage Day, VFR

Planes not
properly
11/9/2014 16:21 secured/Not 11/9/2014 16:00:00
Following
Checklist

11/17/2014 19:28 collision 11/18/2014 19:00:00 Night

Dual, Local,
11/29/2014 19:55 Bird Strike 11/29/2014 18:45:00
Night, VFR
12/2/2014 19:56 Tire Pop 12/2/2014 12:00:00 Dual

Dual, Local,
1/24/2015 7:25 Flight 1/23/2015 17:30:00
Night

1/29/2015 11:31 FOD/keys 1/29/2015 11:29:00 Dual

2/7/2015 11:42 2/6/2015 13:00:00 Day

Dual, XC, Night,

2/11/2015 18:04 2/4/2015 19:00:00
VFR

2/25/2015 11:22 I'M SAFE 2/23/2015 4:00:00

Carbon Monoxide Solo, XC, Day,

3/23/2015 16:41 3/21/2015 10:00:00
Detector Tripped VFR
 Fuel caps flew off Local, Night,
3/30/2015 14:53 1/24/2015 21:30:00
in flight VFR

Dual, Local,
4/12/2015 18:35
Day, VFR

Dual, Local,
4/13/2015 16:56 4/1/2015 13:00:00
Day, VFR

Dual, Local,
4/16/2015 8:46 Fuel 4/13/2015
Day, VFR

Aircraft left in
4/18/2015 16:02 4/18/2015 15:45:00
quick turn

Dual, XC, Day,

4/22/2015 16:45 Landing 4/22/2015 16:00:00
VFR

4/23/2015 17:53 Brake Fire 4/23/2015 11:00:00 Solo

Gust locks not on

5/27/2015 20:17 5/27/2015 20:00:00
aircraft

6/12/2015 11:36 Impact with Post 6/12/2015 11:15:00 AM Solo

 Dual, Local,
6/23/2015 9:21
Day, VFR

Dual, Local,
6/23/2015 22:09 Near Miss 6/22/2015 11:20:00 AM
Day, VFR

6/24/2015 21:55 Unlocked aircraft 6/20/2015 9:00:00 PM Dual, Night

Dual, Local,
7/2/2015 12:52 Taxiway incursion 6/30/2015 11:00:00 AM
Day, VFR

Attempted
Landing @ U14
7/3/2015 21:18 6/27/2015 12:00:00 PM Dual, XC, Day
NOTAMed
Closed

Loss of
Situational Dual, Local,
7/3/2015 21:27 7/1/2015 11:00:00 AM
Awareness while Day
Taxiing

Simulated
Dual, Local,
7/10/2015 14:20 Emergency 7/10/2015 11:00:00 AM
Day
Procedure

Test Demo for

7/15/2015 14:05 7/15/2015 2:00:00 PM Dual
Early Start
 Runway Dual, Local,
7/17/2015 18:14 7/17/2015
Obstruction Day, VFR

7/20/2015 13:22 Fueling 7/20/2015 11:05:00 AM Dual

Dual, Local,
9/20/2015 20:20 Minimum Fuel 9/17/2015 3:00:00 PM
Day, VFR

Oil dipstick left Solo, Local,

9/30/2015 8:54 9/30/2015 8:00:00 AM
unscrewed VFR

Near Mid-Air Solo, Local,

10/4/2015 13:39 10/4/2015 11:45:00 AM
Collision Day, VFR

Wildlife on Dual, XC, Day,

10/13/2015 12:45 10/13/2015 9:45:00 AM
Runway VFR

landed at closed
11/17/2015 17:24 11/17/2015 1:00:00 PM Solo, XC, VFR
airport
 I took the wrong
Solo, XC, Day,
11/23/2015 12:50 airplane on a 6.1 11/21/2015 7:30:00 AM
VFR
hour solo.

Other traffic
Solo, Local,
12/8/2015 0:03 entering pattern 12/6/2015 2:30:00 PM
Day
incorrectly
 Dual, Local,
12/21/2015 11:05 Bird Strike 12/4/2015 8:30:00 PM
Night, VFR

Dual, Local,
1/21/2016 15:25 Weather 1/19/2016 7:30:00 PM
Night, VFR

Dual, Local,
1/25/2016 12:46 Flap Overspeed 1/18/2016
Night, VFR

1/27/2016 17:01 Improper starting 1/27/2016 4:00:00 PM Dual

Runway Dual, XC, Day,

2/2/2016 14:17 2/2/2016 12:50:00 PM
Incursion/ATC VFR

Gust lock
2/3/2016 18:33 2/3/2016 4:00:00 PM
unsecured
2/5/2016 16:03 Taxi Incident 2/5/2016 2:45:00 PM Local, Day, VFR

Near Runway Dual, XC, Night,

2/9/2016 12:53 2/8/2016 9:30:00 PM
Incursion VFR

Safety Dual, XC, Night,

2/24/2016 23:04 2/24/2016 8:00:00 PM
Compromised VFR

Slip & Fall + A/C

3/12/2016 10:53 3/12/2016 10:30:00 AM Dual, XC, Day
Damagw

Near Stall leading

4/14/2016 13:47 Dual
to aborted TO

Hard nose-
4/21/2016 19:21 gear/3-point 4/19/2016 3:00:00 PM Solo, XC, VFR
landing
 Potential Mid-Air Dual, Local,
5/2/2016 10:18:13 4/18/2016 2:00:00 PM
Collision Day, VFR

Dual, XC, Day,

5/2/2016 15:17 Near Collision 5/2/2016 1:00:00 PM
VFR, IFR

Bravo clearance Dual, Local,

5/9/2016 23:17 5/9/2016 12:30:00 PM
confusion Day, VFR

8/23/2016 14:52 Overflown AD 8/5/2016 10:30:00 AM Dual

Dual, Local,
8/29/2016 12:25 Near Miss 8/26/2016 2:00:00 PM
Day, VFR
 Low Altitude Dual, Local,
8/30/2016 10:35 8/29/2016 11:00:00 AM
Event Day, VFR

Dual, Local,
9/2/2016 11:55 Riding the brakes 9/1/2016
Day, VFR

9/9/2016 11:28 9/8/2016 4:00:00 PM Dual, XC, IFR

Dual, Local,
9/13/2016 10:54 9/11/2016
VFR

Dual, Local,
9/13/2016 14:37 Wrong Airplane 9/13/2016
Day, VFR

9/18/2016 16:17 Safety Equipment 9/1/2016 1:00:00 AM Dual, VFR

Dual, Local,
9/21/2016 16:51 Unsafe Altitudes
Day, VFR

Dual, Local,
9/25/2016 22:43 9/25/2016 2:30:00 PM
Day, VFR
 Taking wrong
9/26/2016 12:05 9/26/2016 11:30:00 AM Dual, Day, VFR
plane

Overspeeding
9/27/2016 22:18 9/27/2016 12:00:00 PM Dual
Flaps

Dual, Local,
9/28/2016 9:04 Close Call 9/28/2016
Day, VFR

9/30/2016 13:48

10/11/2016 20:25 runway incursion 10/8/2016 11:30:00 AM Solo

Post Flight
10/12/2016 8:12 10/4/2016
Procedures

Runway/Taxiway
10/12/2016 10:00 10/7/2016 11:15:00 AM Dual, XC, IFR
Incursion

Dual, Local,
10/20/2016 18:22 Flap overspeed 10/7/2016
Day

Dual, Local,
10/22/2016 7:51 10/14/2016 8:30:00 AM
Day, VFR

Dual, XC, Day,

10/24/2016 8:25 Take off 10/22/2016 1:03:00 PM
IFR
11/3/2016 8:53 Near Mid Air 10/21/2016 5:00:00 PM Dual, Local

Dual, Local,
11/8/2016 14:38 Near Miss Mid Air 10/27/2016 11:00:00 AM
Day, VFR

Dual, XC, Local,

Unnecessary
11/17/2016 9:38 Day, Night,
Distractions
VFR, IFR

Dual, Local,
12/7/2016 10:01 Near Bravo Bust 12/7/2016 8:00:00 AM
Day, VFR

Stuck aircraft
12/9/2016 14:46 12/2/2016 Solo
door
 Dual, Local,
1/13/2017 6:17 Taxi Conflight 1/6/2017
Day, VFR

Dual, Local,
2/10/2017 9:59 2/9/2017 10:00:00 AM
Day, VFR

2/20/2017 23:39

Runway Incursion Dual, Local,

2/21/2017 15:17 2/13/2017 12:00:00 PM
by other aircraft Day

2/26/2017 0:19 light icing 2/25/2017 2:30:00 PM Dual, XC, IFR

Left the towbar

2/27/2017 16:50 2/26/2017 Dual, Day, VFR
on the ramp
 Dual, Local,
2/27/2017 17:34 Delta Bust 2/26/2017 5:30:00 PM
Day, VFR

3/8/2017 18:10 Pre-flight 3/7/2017 1:03:00 PM Dual, Day, VFR

Solo, Dual, XC,

3/13/2017 11:34 3/12/2017 3:00:00 PM
Day, Night, VFR

Dual, XC, Day,

3/21/2017 21:02 Sleeping
Night, VFR, IFR

Dual, XC, Day,

3/22/2017 12:20 Bravo Bust 3/22/2017 12:00:00 PM
VFR, IFR

Dual, Local,
3/24/2017 10:01 Radio Silence 3/14/2017
Day, VFR

3/24/2017 18:19 Unsafe Taxi 3/24/2017 6:00:00 PM Dual, Day

 Flying Time - Flying Time - Flying Time -
Phase of Flight Aircraft Pilot Last 90 Days Type Location
Ground
ground PA 28-181
Taxi PA 28-181

Flight PA 28-181 1100 100 800 kslc

Ground PA 28-181 215 20 100 kslc

Flight PA 28R-201 tvy

flight PA 28R-201 300 10 50 VPGFS - 6500

Ground at Row
Ground PA 44-180 980 60 80
9 Space 11

Ground PA 28R-201 300 Run-up on K1

ground PA 28-181

Ground PA 28-181 Shade Hangar

ground PA 28-181

Ground

Ground
 KSLC, RWY 17,
Taxi PA 28R-201 258 10 50
TWY K5

aprox 5mi south

Flight PA 28-181 195 3.8 100+ MLD VOR at
10500'

Ground C 172

Ground

N4046'37.56"
ground PA 44-180 330 70 5 W11157'17.73"
@ 4,232 ft MSL

6000-5500msl
Flight PA 28-181 1070 100+ 700
over KTVY
 Traffic pattern
flight PA 28-181 431.6 43.9 185 mid field down
wind at 5500

cross country
flight from kslc
flight PA 28-181 400 65 385
to khnd back to
kslc

Flight PA 28-181 some 60 779 VPPTM

flight PA 28-181

ground PA 28-181 on the ramp

Parn Transition
flight PA 28-181 1100 100+ 700+ form KOGD
6000-6500
 Taxi PA 28-181 1000+ 100+ 700+ KSLC

ground PA 28-181 476.1 33.3 373.9 shade hanger

KTVY - Final
approach to
flight PA 28-181
RWY 17 -
4,700' MSL

Ground PA 28-181 Shade Hangars

Ground PA 28-181 32 32 32 ground

Taxi PA 28-181 30 hrs 10 hrs 30 hrs Tooele Airport

Ground PA 28-181

Shade Hangar
Ground PA 28-181 0 0 0
at SLC

ground PA 28-181

ground

ground PA 28-181

KOGD Practice
flight C 172 3400
area
 8500 over the
flight C 172 500+ 50+ 100+ OM for LDA 19
@ SGU

ground C 172 ~130 Hours ~25-30 Hours ~40-45 Ground

Ground PA 28-181

TCH 330 @
flight PA 28-181 550 30 500
10NM

ground PA 28-181 560 20 500 quick turn area

gound PA 28-181

ground PA 28-181 248.8

 Final Approach/
flight PA 44-180 258.8 23.6 23.2
5,500 MSL

Departure 400ft
flight PA 28-181 150 approx. less than 30 80 approx.
agl

11,500 shelf
flight PA 28-181 700 30 500
above OGD

KSLC - U14 -
flight PA 28-181 150
KSLC

ground C 172 Ground, 4227

ground C 172
ground PA 28-181 KSLC

flight PA 28-181

ground PA 28-181 1500 100 KSLC

KSLC Shade
ground PA 28-181 ~260 ~15 PA28R-201
Hangars

flight C 172 850 100 100+ FFU

Entering Tooele
Valley from
flight C 172 68.3 8.1 8.1
Skull Valley
9,500

ground PA 28-181 Shade Hangars

flight PA 28-181 15hr

flight PA 28-181 350 50 100+ KLGU

ground PA 28-181 Quick turn area

fround PA 28-181 150 30 150 slc

Taxiway Kilo
taxi PA 28-181 45.5 45.5 45.5
near Kilo 2

KSLC Shade
ground PA 28-181 ~260 ~15 ~180
Hangars

ground PA 28-181 shade hangers

Base to Final
flight PA 28-181
about 4800 msl
 KTVY runway,
flight PA 28-181 400 100 200
on the ground

KOGD Practice
flight C 172
Area

ground PA 28-181

ground C 172 KSLC

flight PA 28-181 400 30 330 East of SLC 115

ground

Approximately 3
About 140 NM Northwest
flight PA 28-181
hours of Burley, ID
(KBYI)
flight C 172

flight PA 28R-201

ground C 172 shade hangers

ground PA 28-181 Shade Hanger

Ramp/ Quick
gound PA 28-181
turn

flight C 172 1200 200 400 KSLC

Holding short
taxi C 172 84 hhours 25 8
RWY 17

ground C 172 Shade hangars

ground PA 28-181 Shade hangars

ground PA 28-181

On Final @
flight PA 44-180 1100 125 100 KTVY approx.
200ft AGL

ground C 172 Shade hanger

kslc/ground
taxi C 172 1100 150 1000
level

flight PA 28-181 300 20 U14

taxi PA 28-181 300 20 ~150 KSLC

5500 feet West

flight PA 28R-201 210 25 30 of Bountiful
Airport

flight PA 28-181 10 10 10 KSLC

flight PA 28R-201

ground PA 28-181 Shade Hangers

flight PA 44-180

ground PA 28-181

flight PA 28-181 ~350 ~27 ~250 KTVY @ TPA

4V0 (On takeoff

flight PA 28-181 370 A lot A lot
roll)

flight PA 28-181 40 20 30 KMLF

 On the ground,
and for entire
route of flight,
flight PA 28-181 152.5 54.3 57.5
highest altitude
was 13,500
feet.

flight PA 28-181 370-ish 25-ish 200-ish KTVY @ TPA

 Final approach
flight PA 28-181 800 100 600
ILS 17 Ktvy

upwind, runway
flight PA 28-181 950 12 500
17, KSLC

flight PA 28-181

ground PA 28R-201

Final Approach
flight PA 28-181 160 20 110
4700MSL

flight C 172 Shade hangars

 taxi C 172 4000 20 100 Taxiway K

On the ground
taxi PA 28-181 150 35 100
in KMLF

ground PA 28-181 28 and 400

ground PA 28-181 KSLC

flight PA 28-181

Runway 32 @
flight C 172 KSLC, 0 feet
agl
 Tooele Valley
flight PA 28-181 35 20 35
Airport

150(student) 25(student) 140(student) 10NM north of

flight C 172
1050(instructor) 150(instructor) 350(instructor) U14 7500MSL

Just north of the

flight PA 28R-201 Garfield Stack,
6,000' MSL

ground PA 28-181 160 60 100

I80&I15
flight PA 28R-201 1500 200 300 interchange at
5900
flight PA 28R-201 400 60 60 42U

flight PA 28R-201

Hangar 10 Row
ground C 172 110
9

flight PA 28-181 KTVY

ground PA 28-181

ground C 172 20 20 1 Tooele

flight

4 North East of
flight PA 28-181 garfield stack,
5,500MSL
ground PA 28-181 300 KSLC

KTVY
flight PA 28-181 22 hour 22 hours 22 hours
downwind

flight PA 28-181 Garfield Stack

ground

taxi PA 28-181 35 hrs KSLC

ground PA 44-180

On taxiway C
taxi C 172 120 20-35 20-35 heading
NorthWest

flight PA 44-180

KSLC 5500-
flight PA 28R-201 280 20 40
6500

a lot but unsure

flight PA 28-181 around 230 hrs unsure the actual on runway 34 r
number
 South Valley
flight PA 28R-201 170 45 2
Traffic Pattern

TVY 45 entry to
flight PA 28R-201 220 and 850 15 and +300 30 and +400 downwind to
runway 17

flight 1600 Everywhere

flight PA 28-181

ground PA 28-181 40
 taxi C 172 350 40 100

Over Oquirrh
flight PA 28-181
Mountains

taxi PA 44-180

flight PA 28-181 ~500 ~75 ~350 ~300 feet

North of
flight PA 28R-201 210 33 11 Promintory
Point 12000

ground PA 28-181 10+400 KSLC

flight PA 28-181

taxi PA 44-180 320 30 6.5 KSLC; 4227

ground PA 28-181 250 20 30 KSGU

flight PA 28-181 ~700 ~150 ~500 High

flight PA 28-181 700ish 150ish 500ish ILS 17 KTVY

flight PA 28-181

Spott 33 to
taxi PA 28-181 N/A N/A N/A
Shade Hangars
 Description of Event/Occurrence
left chocks in airplane
someone left mags on in quick turn
Forgot to lock the top latch on the door before takeoff

marker burst outflow caused extreme crosswind during landing

mags left on

went around because another aircraft was not past the hold short line and was technically on the runway

Returning to Salt Lake City from the Tooele valley after contacting approach and receiving the Bravo clearance at 6500 ft,
there was a traffic advisory for oncoming traffic at 300 ft below our altitude, and climbing towards us. ATC requested 20
degrees left turn for spacing, but traffic was sighted headed for a collision course for that intercept, and instead corrective
action was taken with a sharp right climbing turn to avoid collision. The aircraft appeared to be a Cessna 172 from South Valley
Regional.

Eaten alive, both student and instructor

During the run-up, a twin engine airplane came in on short final. I happened to look up and see that his gear was not down. My
instructor immediately jumped on tower frequency and said "aircraft on final, your gear is not down!". The aircraft commenced
a go-around just shortly after starting the landing flair. I estimate he was 4-6 ft. off of the ground.

Michael Alley went out on his Checkride flight with Scott Taylor and never informed the dispatch desk that he was going out on
the flight. He neglected to show his weight and balance and yellow slip to the desk. Scott T. went out the front door without a
word so, I assumed that he was going to lunch. Michael never came by the desk. The first time we knew that he was out on the
flight is when they called down at the end of the flight. When asked about it Michael stated "my bad".

Dispatch had no idea that the plane was out and flying. If something had occurred we would not have been in the loop
information wise.

N968WC was left with its cockpit door unlocked

N971WC had the baggage door unlocked and did not have the control restraints on the yolks. I noticed this when I was making
sure the aircraft were secured during a storm. I also noticed that the wind had begun to move the ailerons as I approached the
plane.

There is an Aztec on the line that has been sitting there for several months. Over this time period the plane has built up a large
layer of dirt on its surface. The plane has Westminster archers on either side parked behind it. It seems some of our students
have taken to writing messages and drawing male phallic symbols (Wieners) on the tail of the plane, which is right next to 71
and 63WC. I figured someone might like to know about this before the school gets in trouble.

Two rear baggage door were left unsecured on 70 and 68 overnight. The storm window on the Seminole was also left open.
 Landing in KSLC, I we didn't initially notice anything was wrong with any of the tires. Everything seemed normal. No side-
loading, hard impact, or skidding occurred and the landing was a soft-field. We slowed very gradually as we approached K5 on
RWY 17, and I noticed as we got within 200 ft of K5 entrance that it felt as though my instructor had jammed on the brakes, but
more so on the right side. I noticed that I had been having to use quite a bit of left rudder input to keep the airplane going
straight down the center line at that point, and initially thought that I just had a lot of right trim in due to the amount of landing
and takeoff practice we had done out at tooele. I began neutralizing the trim, but as we rolled off the runway onto K5 I noticed
that the trim was now actually trimming the aircraft left. I thought that was odd, but at that point we had stopped clear of the
runway and began our after landing checklist. Once completed we obtained clearance from ground to taxi, but upon throttling
up, even to almost 2K RPM, the airplane wouldn't move. At this point we realized that the right wing was a good foot lower than
the left wing, and decided to call ground, base, and TAC AIR to start the aircraft recovery procedure. Luckily we were in SLC,
off the active runway, and no blowout occurred.

While on an IFR XC, we were approaching the MLD VOR at 10000 ft, my instructor asked what the crossing altitude was at the
VOR. I stated " I believe it's 10000 ft." After a second my Instructor responded "Are you sure, It looks like 11000." Since I had
not flow in a while and this was my first IFR flight since this past winter, I did not question him an began a climb to 11000 ft.
After a while I realized I should have informed ATC that I began a climb. I told them that we'd be crossing MLD at 11000. The
reply was less than pleased. I was informed to descend immediately and that the crossing altitude was not for that airway. I
returned to 10000 and was told that I should always ask to leave an altitude during IFR flight. ATC was upset but said to not let
it happen again. The flight continued with out further incident.

After the first block 227's control wheel lock was left off when it was parked in the quick turn area.

The baggage door of N968WC was left unlocked overnight.

Student dispatchers told plane washers to top off the Seminole. I planned on 30 gallons per side with my weight and balance.
When I found that the plane had been topped off I recalculated the weight and balance to find that the cg was too far forward
and with only 20 pounds of useful load remaining. There was no way to move around weight or add weight to get the airplane
within limits. This is a reminder to check with the pilot on how much fuel can be taken especially with Cessna's and Seminole.
Also this is a reminder to not assume the weight and balance is good if it's not fueled to the level that you planned.

when practicing an engine failure with a FoF student we set up lo land on Rwy 17 at KTVY. we made radio calls that we were
practicing emergency procedures and we were on a right base for Rwy 17. no other traffic had made a radio call in the traffic
pattern for about 15 min. upon turning onto final i looked down and saw a white Cherokee on final. i requested a radio call from
him and received no response. we announced a go around, and side stepped the runway. the Cherokee then took off below
us. we turned cross wind above the traffic and remained in the pattern. the Cherokee also remained in the pattern and did not
make any radio calls the entire time it was in the area
 As we were preparing for the descent to land RWY 35, another aircraft was entering the downwind leg on a 45 degree angle.
The other aircraft gave a position report reporting he was right where we were and when I spotted him he was only about 100
ft above us and descending. I gave an immediate position report and he started making a right 360 for "spacing." I advised him
to discontinue the 360 and climb while i descended to avoid a collision. After landing, we departed the traffic pattern while
another pilot in the pattern rudely thanked us for leaving.

the total duration of the dual flight from kslc - khnd - kmlf - kdta - u14 - kslc was 8.1. On our way back to kslc we elected to do
night currency and when we departed from our last stop-and-go we were told to hold over the city in the race track pattern for .
2 then we were cleared to land after that. This was not apart of the students flight plan and therefore made it so we exceeded
the 8.0 dual given regulation. This instance breaks Title 14 CFR 61.195 which states under paragraph a) Hours of training. In
any 24-consecutive-hour period, a flight instructor may not conduct more than 8 hours of flight training. This causes a hazard
to safety because pilot fatigue on long flight becomes an issue which, does not help if there is an issue that arises during the
flight if the student can not handle the situation.

On climb on a dual cross-country I noticed that the fuel pressure dropped to near zero. This was during an extended climb to
cruise altitude. The students did not notice. I continued to monitor and was waiting to see of the students would catch it all the
while ready for a possible failure and ready to turn the boost pump on.

Reviewing the POH in the aircraft showed that the climb procedure is inaccurate on the checklist. Our checklist says
Climb+1000 ...fuel pump off. The poh says fuel pump off at desired altitude, which implies that it stays on throughout the climb.

When the plane washers went to fuel the planes for the 10:30AM block it was discovered that the previous solo pilot had
forgotten to switch tanks in N966WC. The plane was returned after the 7:30AM block with the right tank COMPLETELY full and
the left with no visible fuel in it. When the fueler filled it up it took on 21.6 gallons in that tank only, indicating there was 2.5
gallons usable remaining for the previous pilots flight. Had the pilot received holding instructions or went on a slightly longer
flight he probably would have lost power to his engine unless he corrected the problem.

We were going out for a night flight. During pre-flight we noticed a plane parked in the quick turn area. There was only one
other flight going out and after verifying that it was not the plane they were taking we parked it under the shade hangers.

while trying to get around a storm back to kslc form kogd we requested the barn transition. the precipitation in the area looked
mild. we started to get turbulence at 6500 msl, so i told the student to reduce the throttle and get back with in maneuvering
speed. as he grabbed the throttle we hit one severe bump that dropped us 500 ft. stuff fell off my lap, my flight bag turned over
and we both hit our heads on the ceiling. we i took controls, reduced power and maintained attitude
when doing the before takeoff check we noticed that the pilot side fuel cap was missing, i think i was the last to check the fuel
on that side, and i thought i had secured the cap properly but i must not have. we requested to taxi back to the hangars to look
for it and we spotted it on taxiway kilo on our way back. I told ground that i was going to get out of the plane and grab it, then i
secured it properly and we continued the flight.

Being the 7th flight my student had been on, I thought it would be a good time to show the student how to put away the
airplane. As we were putting it in the shade hanger, I noticed that the airplane was too far left, in an attempt to "straighten up," I
instructed the student on how to pull it out so as not to hit the side posts of the hanger. (The airplane was positioned as such
that pulling it straight out would have caused the plane to hit the plane on the same post). The plane went the wrong way and
hit the post. Whistles were and were not used. My student has no whistle but my whistle wasn't blown because I screamed
instead.

We had just entered the traffic pattern on left downwind for 17 at TVY and the student started completing his BCGUMPS
almost abeam the numbers of 17. He was a little rushed because he was about to be at his spot to pull the power and start the
descent. Nonetheless, the checklist was completed. We continued flying the pattern and as we turned final, he seemed a little
high so he pulled back power until he got back on his proper glidepath. As he did, he went to put power back in and the engine
didn't respond. He looked at me and said "I think the engine quit..." and I sort of laughed and bumped up the throttle myself,
thinking he was joking. I quickly realized he was serious and so I took the controls and immediately pitched for 76 and
completed the engine failure checklist and had him switch the fuel tanks for me. I flew the plane down to the runway and
landed safely. As I was touching down, the engine came back on. I pulled off the runway and was going to head to parking
when the student looked at me and said "I think I turned off the fuel on downwind when I did BCGUMPS". After discussing that
chain of events, we confirmed that he had indeed turned off the fuel selector and then switched it back on after the engine
failed and I had instructed him to do so. Because of this, I decided that it wasn't necessary to stop and shut down or squawk
the plane, and we ended the lesson there and headed back to KSLC.

N977WC and N971WC both had their baggage doors unlocked overnight.

My morning started the morning by not having my logbook/endorsements when I showed up to the airport, I for some reason
removed it from my flight bag prior to leaving my house. I had gone home to get my logbook and came back to the airport to
complete the flight, I was rushing to get to the plane. On walking out to aircraft I was watching my instructor who was helping
another instructor pre-flight another aircraft. I was not paying attention and walked to row 12 instead of row 11 and started
preflight on the wrong aircraft. Neither one of us noticed that the tail number didn't match the tail number on the binder. It was
not until we were making a radio call using tail number instead of the griffin callsign when we realized the mistake. We
immediately contacted base and informed them that we had taken the wrong plane and made sure the aircraft still had time.

The winds were calm and the skies were clear. After landing on runway 17, I then began to apply the brakes to slow for an exit
onto the taxiway. I failed to retract the flaps, leaving extra lift off the wheels. When the left brake was applied, it locked the
wheel, causing a skid off the runway. A runway edge light was hit, resulting in a dent to the stabilizer.
The tow bar was left beside the nose gear during pre-flight and subsequently left on the ground near the quick turn area for the
duration of the flight.

I was teaching a new foundations student how to preflight the Archer, during that time we were sumping the fuel. I then told the
student to pour the fuel back into the fuel tank. During this process I forgot to tell them that the sump actuator has the potential
to fall out if not held by a finger. The actuator part on the top then fell into the fuel tank. We completed the rest of the pre-flight
lesson then called Frank and notified dispatch of the issue. The top of the strainer has been recovered from the fuel tank.

AM dispatcher was informed that 967WC was left out in the QT area all night and was frosted over.

A pile of empty oil containers was left out by the aircraft rather than being placed in the bin. We do not know if this was a
student looking for full oil containers or if they were left by the plane washers.

Aircraft was not tied down properly. One of the tie downs was not even on. Control wheel lock was not on. This was significant
because it was quite windy and a storm was moving through.

We were maneuvering just outside of Ogden class D airspace. We were on with Approach control. They had been issuing
traffic calls, but we were unable to locate the traffic. Approach then gave us a traffic alert. On our TIS, it also gave us an alert
and showed -100 feet. We then saw the traffic and it looked like they took evasive maneuver. We were within close to 100 feet
of the traffic.
 On a dual Intermediate flight introducing LOC holding procedures, we were holding south of the OM on the localizer course.
We were holding at 8500 to allow traffic inbound on the LDA approach from the north to pass below crossing the OM at 6300
on GS. In the hold we heard a small twin reporting inbound from the north to SGU at our altitude. Both aircraft were operating
in class E airspace without receiving radar services or positive control from ATC. We responded with a position report. Prior to
the near miss, we each made another position report, but never intentionally communicated directly with each other. While we
were in our right turn back to the south after crossing the OM, the twin crossed just east and high of us, but close enough to
see detail on the underside of the airplane. By the time we gained visual contact, had we been at the exact altitude and
position, there would not have been time for us to take action to avoid a collision due to the high closure rate.

The gust lock was left off of N227WC when I went out to prefl;ight this morning in high winds. The last time it was flown was
two days ago.

Stood up too soon after checking the underside of the airplane. Tore shirt and scraped back on fuel vent on the bottom of the
left wing.

Went into Bravo airspace without a clearance. Could have caused a collision. We were out at the west practice area near
KOGD doing a few maneuvers. While we were still in contact with SLC approach and radar, we went out of Bravo as we
maneuvered. Coming back to SLC, we made our way to VPLGN, got ATIS and called approach. I made the mistake of thinking
we still had our clearance.

When my student went out to the aircraft, he went to unlock the cabin door and the baggage door but they were both
unlocked. Also, no chock was placed and the parking brake was no set. The aircraft had not been secured at all.

Injury Report: Bumped head on door getting out of airplane. Slight cut above right eye brow

While pre flighting the aircraft, I first noticed that the left tank was extremely low on the fuel gauges. Continuing the preflight
and arriving to the left wing I noticed the fuel cap was missing.
While on a simulated single-engine ILS at KTVY, the left engine was failed shortly after the final approach fix and the examiner
began having trouble setting zero thrust. The winds were favoring a straight in approach for 17. After touchdown, the throttles
were advanced for a touch and go and the aircraft began to pull rapidly to the left. The throttles were closed, and brakes were
applied to slow the aircraft down. There was confusion between the student and the examiner, and the throttles were once
again placed at full throttle. The plane pulled again to the left, and then it was determined that the left engine had died. The
plane was taxied off the runway using the right engine, and after crossing the hold short line, fuel was noticed coming out of
the bottom of the left cowling. The left fuel selector was shut off, left boost pump turned off, and the left mixture cut.

Student and instructor were analyzing the previous touchdown during pattern work on the departure leg, TVY 35. The instructor
heard the PC-12 radio call at the IAF for ILS 17 TVY during the previous pattern. While climbing out the instructor noticed the
PC-12 was on a head on collision course of converging altitudes and 1nm horizontal distance. The instructor then turned the
aircraft to the right and the student then gained visual contact during the turn. The student seemed unaware of the PC-12
inbound. The PC-12 pilots did not make a position report at the FAF. The PC-12 did make a position report just prior to
initiating circling to land and had the archer in sight (instructor called departure leg), this was at the same time the instructor
noticed the PC-12 and initiated there turn. The PC-12 position report was missed by the archer from analyzing previous
landing.

It was night XC and we were returning back to KSLC from the North, Once clearing the mountainous terrain near KMLD, we
decided we would do the required maneuvers for the lesson and then call approach. The GPS unit was on the NAV Chapter,
PG 1 indicating needle deflection and ETE to KSLC. We were using the TRK as our heading for the maneuvers while coming
back to KSLC. As we finished the maneuvers and talking about how they went, the instructor realized we were starting to get
close and by switching back to the map page realized we were in the bravo shelf (9000-12000) north of KOGD. We then
immediately turned around and called approach in the process for a clearance. Approach cleared us Straight in to 17. The
instructor then apologized to approach before switching to tower. The approach controller said no bravo airspace was violated
and nothing came up again.

The weather briefing I got included airmets for turbulence, mountain obscuration and icing, and low freezing level and low
clouds would be along the entire route of flight and that VFR flight was not recommended. After talking with my instructor and
expressing my concerns and desire to cancel the flight for weather, the instructor insisted that we would be fine and we would
alter the route if necessary. After taking off of 17 and turning towards I15, we immediately entered a cloud. We requested a
climb after breaking out so that we would be free of the cloud. After leaving Bravo we remained clear of clouds but we were not
in accordance with VFR weather minimums for the majority of the flight. Coming back to Salt Lake we had to request three
descents to remain out of the clouds. The majority of our time coming back to Salt Lake over I15 we were at 5,000 ft MSL.

The gust lock was left off of N20WC, this was discovered when the plane washers went out to fuel the plane. It was left off
overnight at the least.

Two of the tie downs on N970WC were left off. The only one on was on the left wing. I am reporting this a few days after the
fact but I am fairly positive that this is the correct airplane.
 Aircraft N964WC was found with only 4QT of oil in it,

The pilot became distracted before entering a ground reference maneuver and did not pick a desired altitude to level off at to
start the maneuver. Improper planning led to sinking below 500' AGL

On preflight we noticed hat the oil dip stick was not propeller secured and there was oil all over the inside of the cowl. It looked
like the plane flew with the dipstick unsecured. it also seemed like there was no post flight done on the previous flight.

Spotted by Plane Washer: These were noticed when I went in to grab the GPS cards for updating.
The gust locks were not on in N967WC.
The Mags were left on as well as the Radio Master Switch in N971WC
The door was not locked in N966WC

I was climbing west from kpvu to ffu. Was still on kpvu tower frequency but not in delta airspace. another skyhawk cross from
left to right heading north to salt lake. i don't believe they were on with approach yet. it was an exact collision path with an
approximate 500ft altitude difference. the TIS on the Cessna alarmed after the traffic already crossed the aircraft flight path. i
think it was delayed from radar line of sight

I was on the return leg of my XC when the TIS informed me that there was an aircraft directly behind me but 2,000 feet above.
I was not concerned at the time because the aircraft was flying a lot faster than I was, I assumed he would pass above me. I
decided I would monitor his position and I was scanning outside the aircraft but the sunset behind me didn't assist in making
visual contact. I saw the TIS displaying that the aircraft was descending and rapidly and still had not passed me. The traffic
annunciator sounded and I cut power and made a quick descending left turn, as I did this and rolled wings level I saw a Beech
99 speed past at the same altitude I was at and maybe 1/2 mile away (looked like a whole lot less at the time)

When fueling N967WC it was noticed that the right tank was topped off and the left was nearly empty (~5gal). The previous
pilot had not switched tanks during his/her flight.

when i have been switching tanks i have been pushing the release button. i went to switch from the right tank to the left i turn
the selector to far with out noticing and turned the fuel off. almost killed the engine on approach.
For a night XC with a Foundations student to Logan we checked NOTAMS and saw that runway 17/35 was closed and the ALS
was OTS. However both student and instructor that the other runway was lighted and OK at. Upon reaching Logan we tried to
turn the airport lights on and was unable to do so. As we approached the airport at 8,500' we saw the airport and saw that the
light were not on. So we decided to divert to Preston. While flying out to Preston the Instructor looked at the AF/D and saw the
airport that 2,000' shorter runway distance than runway 10/28 at Logan, the instructor was unfamiliar with the airport and had
never landed there before, as well was unable to see airport lights from 10 miles out. So we decided to head back to Logan
and get the cross country by landing at Logan with no airport lights. After flying back to Logan and flying over the field we
entered the traffic pattern and landed runway 10, taxied down and took off runway 28. then went back to SLC. Upon reaching
SLC we looked closer at the information and the instructor saw that 10/28 was only allowed in the daylight hours.

Magnetos were left and airplane was left unlocked in quick turn area.

went to 68WC instead of 64wc. was focusing on parking space and went to the wrong plane. instructor saw student in front of
64wc from a distance but he was really in front of 68wc. the fuel truck was waiting so he hurried over to it and did nor realize
we were in front of the wrong plane

During preflight I failed to complete the checklist and unwittingly left the baggage door open. If another Westminster plane had
not have called us on base frequency, I would not have noticed until after takeoff. This could have ripped the door off the hinge
possibly causing damage to the tail.

Both plane washers were out fueling the planes and noticed that the magnetos on N971WC were left on right before we pulled
it out.

As the plane was being fuel, one of us noticed that there was oil streaks on the side of the cowl that was coming out of and on
the oil door. He opened it and noticed that the oil dipstick wasn't screw in. Since there were oil streaks going down the side of
the plane, it was left unscrewed when it went flying. We checked and it still had more than 6 quarts left.

1 aricraft was being fuelled for a night flight and another returend, the aircraft being refueled was being pulled out crooked and
the other aircraft was being pushed back into its spot when the wingtips collided - A stobe light and landing light were
damaged.

While flying at night in Tooele we are practicing night landings. On the Second landing we are turning base to final without the
bird in sight. The bird flew over the wing, while the wing was coming up during the turn striking the bird. No to much we can do,
it was a overcast night with minimal moon light making it impossible to see bird activity until it was to late.
 While performing a touch and go at KTVY the right main tire tube failed and the tire deflated rapidly before reaching liftoff
speed. The landing was normal and soft, no hard impact. Shortly after the takeoff power was applied the aircraft starting
heading to the right, then the instructor noticed the wing dipping dramatically to the right. The instructor took controls from the
student and applied the brakes to get the aircraft stopped and rudder to attempt to maintain on the runway. When the aircraft
stopped about 20 yards from A4 and two feet from the right side of the runway, the instructor quickly notified Tooele traffic that
the aircraft had a blown tire and was stuck on the runway causing the go around of the aircraft behind them. The aircraft was
not able to move due the tire and had to sit on the runway until maintenance arrived to fix the tire.

Lose of fuel cap. Visual inspection showed that both caps appeared to be seated correctly after the new fueler fueled the
airplane. Later during flight G1000 gave a low fuel warning on the left tank while the right tank showed 20 gallons. We figured
the right tank had a clog in the system and reported immediately back to Salt Lake. Upon reaching the ground we noticed a
fuel cap was missing on the right tank.Upon using the dipstick on the tank it showed less than a gallon remaining on the right
side and maybe 3 remaining on the left.

Jason from CSA brought keys to one of the CFIs on the ramp. They were found in the ramp area and belonged to 971WC.

Upon returning from a flight at 12:00 I noticed that N227WC was in the quick turn area and the winds where gusting to 37
knots. I went inside to grab someone and a key to get the plane over to the parking spot to put into the shade hangers. when
walking back out to get the plane, the aircraft had been blown from its parked spot moved about 5 feet from the original
position and rotated 30 degrees because of the wind. We quickly ran to the plane and brought it over to the parking spot and
tied it down.

I went on a dual XC night to Vernal. prior to flight, we got a weather briefing from the briefer. I checked the approved airport list
and vernal was on the approved list with no comment. the weather condition was great. 10 and clear calm wind at the surface.
at altitude (115 there and 120 back) was about 20kts eastward. no adverse condition, not even a little turbulence. full moon
night so the terrain was clearly visible. Due to the fact that Vernal was on the approved list and the weather condition were
almost perfect. I did not think to check the safety and ops procedure for the night xc restriction. I was not aware that flight east
of Wasatch is not approved at night. the flight was uneventful.

I did not realized that I broke the safety and ops until a week later when I was talking to another instructor about the flight and
he inform me that flying east at night was not approved per the safety and ops. So I went and confirm it... and he was right.

Before my flight I had to do an assignment for my meteorology class that was due at 5 am The assignment is frequently due at
times in the middle of the night or early in the morning. To predict the weather the closer I wait until the time that it is due the
better I will do on the assingment this is conflicting with the I'M SAFE checklist by waking up to do homework in the middle of
the night. I am having to make a choice of being successful academically or being safe for flight. If I choose to wake up and do
the assignment I am no longer fit for flight and potentially sacrifice safety on my flight. If I turn in the assignment several hours
early, my forecast will be worse and I will lose points on the assignment.

.
 The fuel caps flew off in-flight and was not recognized until half way through flight.

Mixture was leaned the wrong direction decreasing power needed for take off significantly. Upon lift off the aircraft continued to
set off stall warning horn and would not climb out. Landing gear was immediately retracted to reduce drag, however aircraft
continued to descend down momentarily touch tail end on the runway before altitude was gained again. Flew straight and level
south over I-80 and industrial area approx. 75ft agl before problem with mixture was discovered and fixed.

Found the oil dipstick unsecured between he cowling and the engine

During preflight I noticed that the fuel selector was on the left tank and the left fuel tank was almost completely empty. The right
tank was perfectly at tabs. I suspect that the previous flight burned fuel from the left tank and never switched it to the right tank.

N960WC was left in the quick turn after dispatch left. It appears that the instructor the aircraft was assigned to cancelled their
flight, and the plane was forgotten after it was assigned to another instructor that switched their lesson to the sim.

Tower gave us planning purposes to expect runway 32 in the downwind and told us to circle to reenter the downwind. Once
reestablished, tower told us 2 aircraft on final for 35. Caution wake, cross between traffic, for runway 32. Then we were told to
contact tower on 118.3 and keep it tight.
Contacting tower on 118.3 we received a clearance to land after in out base leg. The second traffic on final was to close for
comfort and we were fast. The weather called 230/3 on the atis but ended up being a 12 knot gusting 17 tailwind. We landed
long on the runway and fast, Used maximum breaking action and stopped with an uncomfortable amount of runway left for roll
out after the aircraft was stopped.

I pulled the parking brake while getting ATIS and my clearance. The plane started rolling forward so i released the parking
brake and stood on the brakes manually. I taxied down to the end of the runway and when i went to brake, i heard a loud noise
come from the wheels. The pilot in front of me told me that one of the wheels was on fire. I'm guessing that when i released
the parking brake, it didn't disengage all the way so the parking brake was rubbing on the disc all the way down the taxiway.

Both N220WC and N966WC did not have their gust locks on. We were making sure the aircraft were secure prior to a severe
thunderstorm hitting the airport when this was discovered.

We were backing 966WC into its parking space and hit a support pole with the left hand stabilator. The plane was not perfectly
straight and we were attempting to straighten the position of the aircraft. We were curving the tail slightIy to the right when the
impact was made. I was on the right wing and should have blown my whistle sooner. It did not appear that there was enough
space. I assumed that the other person could see the left side of the aircraft. In addition the baggage door was open, which
may have contributed to limited visibility on the left.
During preflight I noticed that there wasn't quite enough oil so I went to the baggage compartment to get the oil to add. The oil
container in the baggage compartment was empty. I had to then walk to the box to get oil, fill up the oil, walk back with the
empty containers and get a new oil container to replace in the baggage compartment.

Practicing single engine traffic pattern work, we were established on short final for 35. We were roughly a 1/2 mile from the
runway at 200ft AGL where we saw Cornerstones Tecnam turning on a short base for runway 35. The Tecnam was on a
collision course with us and came within 100 feet of us. I added power and cleaned up the airplane than immediately deviated
away from the runway. It is important to note that we made position reports on crosswind, downwind, base, and final.

I showed up to do preflight of 220wc for my flight and found the baggage compartment and instructors door unlocked and it
didn't have its pitot tube cover on

As we were taxiing out of spot 33, there was an C-182 coming out of spot 28 (TAC Air) it was clear he wasn't familiar with the
area based on his radio calls. the C-182 was cleared to taxi so he left spot 28 and entered taxiway K. As he was moving north
on K we were cleared to taxi to rwy 17 via K. Ground control then told the C-182 to give way to us. We proceeded to enter K at
K3 when we approached the movement area boundary line the C-182 was making the turn at K3. It was very apparent that he
was not going to stop and give way to us. So we stopped and let him pass even though we were given the right-of-way.

I was at the glider competition on Saturday June 27th. While I was waiting in the car with the person I was going to fly with, I
hear N971WC come on CTAF announcing that they'd come in and land. However, the airport was NOTAMed closed for the
glider competition. If it were not for the other pilots on the ground in the competition that immediately jumped on CTAF to tell
them that it was closed, the instructor and/or student could've violated that NOTAM.

While we begun our taxi, I (the student) had put on my headset to get the weather. The instructor had the controls at the time.
However, I had no idea that he had transferred the controls over to me as he had not realized I had my headset on and he
didn't have it on (so I didn't hear him, since my headset and the ATIS had completely blocked him out). Therefore, as we were
moving, I looked up and noticed that the plane was on a head on collision course with a lamp post. I queried the instructor on
where he was going, and he looked up, had the "deer in the headlights" look for a second and then corrected course away. We
also had an observer (who was also a pilot) sitting in the back who had not noticed.

During the transition out of Bravo airspace northbound over I-15 I was switched over to departure frequency. Right after my
instructor pulled my throttle to simulate an engine failure. This was a high workload simulated emergency situation, but I
decided to go to Bountiful. I told ATC that we were switching over to Bountiful traffic advisory frequency then told Bountiful I
was simulated emergency engine failure. I ran through my checklists off of memory but was more focused on flying the aircraft.
I never double checked with my flows with my checklists so when I was on track to make the runway my instructor said to
initiate a go around. I had forgotten to put my gear down. In the event of this being an actual emergency we would have lived,
but in this high work load simulated emergency I had neglected important key points during the practice.

Multiple and near bird strike

 On short final in Tooele we noticed something on the runway. We continued to descent in a normal approach pattern until we
got a better look at the object. Over the threshold it was discerned that there was some sort of vehicle (later discovered to be a
powered parachute) on the runway. The vehicle had a person in it but was facing the approach end of the runway and was not
moving. We immediately initiated a go around and climbed away from the vehicle. We then communicated over CTAF
frequency to let other pilots know to be aware of the vehicle on the runway. Several other planes in the pattern also did a go
around to avoid the vehicle.

The fueler had arrived after a 45 minute delay and began filling N964WC. After he finished filling the airplane he got in the
truck without disconnecting his grounding wire or removing his chocks. As he pulled away the grounding wire clamp was pulled
off of the landing gear and got caught on the towbar laying next to the plane - It flung the towbar about 20 feet into the taxi way.

We had 2.5 hours of fuel on board the aircraft when we departed Salt Lake. When we returned from the lesson we were
placed in the race track pattern while we waited for a landing clearance from Salt Lake. As other planes were approaching the
airport for landing they were being given priority before us. We stayed in the pattern for almost thirty minutes. We planned to
have enough fuel plus more than what is required for reserves. We got back in less time than we estimated the lesson to take
us but were held over the city for so long that we were approaching our minimum fuel reserves.

Student went to pre-flight for a solo and noticed there was oil all over the cowling. After the proceed to call me I went out to
inspect the problem. Student said that the oil dipstick was unscrewed inside the cowling. Upon some research I found the
plane had flown a night xc the night before. With it being out of maintenance there is typically 7 to 8 quarts of oil there was now
just above 6.

I was flying in the pattern in N967WC at KTVY for NIFA Practice with N968WC in the pattern. We had a tail-drager, N976WC,
N966WC, and the Skydiving "Jump" airplane in the area and in the pattern as well. I was making the appropriate traffic calls,
and while I was on crosswind about to turn downwind for 35, he calls that he's entering the pattern behind "the Archer." I start
looking for him, but I couldn't see him at all while on downwind. I then inquire about the Jump's location and he does not
respond. I see that everything clear (with my scan) and turn my base leg. Then, the CFI in N976WC immediately jumped on
base or CTAF (I couldn't tell) that he was right next to me. I turned my head to the right, saw him and immediately executed a
left-hand turn and added power on the base leg to get away from the threat of a mid air collision. He ended up going ahead of
me and landing and I followed right behind him. I then attempted a couple more landings after that and I noticed that my brain
was in an overload mode and I was making very novice mistakes and I ended up cutting my practice runs short so I can clear
my mind and be safe (as I deemed myself no longer safe to fly). The major risk was the potential mid air collision and the
consequences of one.

At 60 knots during the NAV Event in NIFA, a deer ran onto runway about 2000 feet in front of us. PIC decided to continue
takeoff and cleared the deer with no further incident.

student said he got a weather briefing and did not hear anything about the airport closure. I checked the NOTAM after he took
off and found out that the airport is closed til 1PM. inform the student of the NOTAM, he acknowledged. I told him to practice
maneuvers til 1pm and try again. I check the NOTAM again at 1pm and the airport is still closed but the student has already
landed there. and also there is this whole thing about he went to Beaver airport instead but not really???
 I was dispatched the aircraft N966WC; however I flew N963WC. It was a stupid mistake and one that could have easily been
avoided. I filed my flight plan under N966WC, and a few minutes later I walked out to the plane and quickly glanced at the
binder. I was distracted with helping another student pull her plane out, and then walked over to N963WC. The chain link broke
when I didn't compare the tac times of the binder with the ones in the plane. I did my pre-flight, had help pulling the plane out,
fueled up, and left. The problem could have been avoided again during my run up. I figured I would get flight following, so I
neglected to open my flight plan. If I had opened the flight plan I would have realized that I was in the wrong plane, and would
have been able to taxi home. Instead I took off and requested flight following over VPPTM. I told the controller my call sign,
N963WC, told him my route, and he cleared me to 13,500 ft. By this point the chain link had broken in two places. I flew well,
did all my checklists, I was ahead of the aircraft, saw some incredible scenery (something I will never forget), and truly felt on
top of the world, but I was unknowingly putting myself in a very dangerous situation. I knew how the aircraft was operating, I
used good fuel management, I was clear and concise with my radio calls, and I knew exactly where I was going and how I was
going to get there; nonetheless the chain link of disaster had already broken in two places. On the way back I also used flight
following and had a similarly in-control experience. When I got on the ground (6.1 hours later) and contacted dispatch on
129.95 with the wrong callsign I knew I had made a serious mistake. This scenario has potential to be incredibly dangerous. I
was lucky enough to not have overflown an AD, I was also lucky enough to not have crashed. If I had overflown an AD I would
be in some serious trouble with the FAA. If I had crashed and not shown up on time then people would come looking for a
completely different call sign/aircraft than I was flying. Such a mistake has incredibly negative consequences because if the
rescue team is looking for the wrong plane, and contacting control agencies looking for the wrong call sign, then I would be
wasting valuable time that could make the difference between life and death. I am incredibly lucky that this scenario played out
the way it did, and, as hard as it is to say, I am happy that it happened because I know that I will never do it again.
Complacency like this is what leads to the worst general aviation accidents. I have been so used to the instructor comparing
tac times that I have never done it, and I think that instructors should always make the student compare the two. This
comparison will become exponentially more important as the students become PIC.

A Cessna 206 Stationair was entering the pattern in KTVY, but was doing so incorrectly. They announced that they were going
to fly over midfield from the east then enter a 45 for runway 35. I was performing touch and gos at the time. Another Archer
was in the pattern and the instructor in that airplane noted his improper pattern entry. When I announced that I was on
crosswind, I noticed the airplane was flying parallel to me in the same direction and altitude (So, TPA. I delayed my downwind
turn for a flock of birds. They did not fly 500 ft above TPA for a midfield to 45 entry). They then decided to turn north (inside the
pattern, they were closer to the runway that I was) and told me that they were going to try and follow me in. So, in order to
prevent conflict, I had to widen my pattern out to give that guy enough room to come in and not get too close to that airplane
for comfort as I watched them turn towards me as I flew westbound on crosswind past them. They seemed very clueless on
how to enter the pattern properly.
We hit possibly several birds while we were on short final on the ILS 17 into Tooele. Its was a dark night and we had no chance
of seeing the birds.

After checking weather we decided we would have enough time to complete night currency remaining in the traffic pattern.
there was a storm expected to move in later in the evening. The metar was reporting10 knot winds and occasional light
precipitation. After taking off and starting the climb, we noticed significant precipitation and stronger winds than expected. We
both quickly agreed to land full stop and discontinue the remaining landings. We were able to land and taxi back without any
problems. Even though we had to reschedule an additional night currency flight, we were comfortable with our decision to play
it safe.

On downwind abeam the landing point the power was reduced and flaps were extended. The airspeed was still above the
white arc. No call out identifying appropriate flap extension speed was made. The airplane was promptly slowed down after the
error was detected.

I witnessed a student and instructor attempt to improperly start 76WC. They cranked the starter for about 30 seconds on each
attempt and gave the plane about 10 seconds of rest between each attempt. I observed this for about 3 minutes and then left
the area. About half an hour later they had drained the battery and were forced to cancel their lesson.

On our return from a dual XC we were cleared to land runway 35 at SLC. I had full flaps and had slowed for landing. I noticed
a truck on the numbers for runway 35 and immediately applied full power, cleaned up the aircraft and announced a go-around
to the tower. The controller responded whoops I forgot that runway 35 was closed.

Plane washers discovered 220WC and 68WC's gust locks were left off after their last flights.
 While conducting introductory flight taxi operations, I turned he wrong direction on taxiway K. I had a clearance to taxi to
runway 17 and was distracted and turned toward runway 35. I taxied about 100 yards in the wrong direction and conducted
runup in the runup area. I did not enter the runway or leave the parallel taxiway. I then realized my mistake and continued on
my original taxi clearance to runway 17. There were no other aircraft in the vicinity. When I arrived at the 17 runup area I called
ready for takeoff and was told to copy down a phone number for a "possible deviation." After the flight, I called the number and
was told that ground was attempting to contact me while I taxied from 35 to 17. I did not hear the calls during the taxi. I
attribute this to being busy talking to the passenger. I had turned the volume down on the radio I was listening to ground
control on because I was unable to talk with my passenger over the chatter of other traffic on the other side of the airfield. I
thought the volume was loud enough to hear any call for me but hindsight reveals this was not the case. I should have reduced
distractions and left the volume louder to prevent this taxi error.

I was taxiing too fast at an unfamiliar airport at night and expected to be able to identify the end of the runway in sufficient time
to allow me to slow down safely. Instead, I had to use excessive braking force to avoid taxiing off the end of the runway. I
should never have been taxiing that fast and should have looked on the runway surface for more indications of the end of the
runway coming up (thousand footers, etc).

While moving the aircraft out of the shade hanger we discovered that the magnetos were left in the on position. The baggage
door was also left unlocked.
Someone can easily walk up to the aircraft and move the propeller without checking the magneto switches before.

According to CFI, student was on the wing and was getting off and slipped. CFI tried to catch student and the student's foot hit
the flap and bent it. Student did not step on the extended flaps.

We were departing the runway after a touch and go. After leaving ground effect the student continued to pitch back to climb
because our climb rate decreased. I felt the pitch increase and took the controls when I realized the airspeed was dropping
and the stall horn began to sound. We began descending and I pitched forward to reduce the angle of attack. There was about
2500-3000 feet of runway left and decided to land straight ahead and stop. Had I continued the take off, we may have not
been able to climb over obstacles at the end of the runway

It was a warmer day and we had full fuel tanks. This would reduce our climb performance during takeoff and it would take us
longer to accelerator. We decided to practice landings on a shorter runway and this lead to increased risk.

Fast approach, jet blast, hard landing, porpoise.....didn't do a go around because didn't know the status of nose gear.
 We were in the pattern for runway 35 at Tooele. We had been doing touch and gos. We were making radio calls during each
leg of the traffic pattern. We had heard a call of someone who was about 5 miles out on the ILS for runway 17. That was the
only radio call he made. We were at 4,600 ft, climbing to pattern altitude, intending to stay in the pattern. We sighted the other
aircraft. We were on the upwind leg and he appeared to be coming straight in for 17. A head on collision was likely if we had
not sighted him. We diverted to the right and made a call to let others know of the potential collision. The other airplane
apologized for not letting us know of his intentions and entered the downwind for runway 35.

We decided to divert to Nephi on our way to delta due to WX. During our diversion, we lost GPS due to the government
jamming the system. We then cancelled IFR and continued VFR to Nephi. The GPS then started working again, so we decided
to shoot a practice RNAV approach for runway 17. We made a radio call stating we were 12NM north of Nephi establishing
ourselves on the final approach course for the RNAV 17 straight in. I took the controls from the student to allow him to set up
for the approach properly (we were behind, so I decided to utilize CRM). As I start to intercept the final approach course, I
notice something out of the corner of my eye. There was a white Centurion with a blue tail number/pin striping, and a
retractable gear that was at the same altitude as us, and was close enough for me to identify all of these details. This moment
really shocked me because it was the same feeling one would get right before you get in a car wreck (this is going to happen, I
am doing everything I can to stop this, but we are going to collide with this aircraft). I felt helpless. This was one of the scariest
moments I've ever had while flying. I promptly turned back to the left and forced the nose down to descend. Even with those
corrections, I knew we were on a collision course. The other plane was not making any corrections (he did not see us), until the
very last minute. He banked to the left. That was what saved us. I don't recall hearing this aircraft making any radio calls. The
only radio calls I remember hearing we're from a helicopter in the pattern in Nephi.

My instructor and I were returning to land at KSLC from a local flight in the Tooele Valley. We called Salt Lake Approach on
120.9, and they gave us a squawk code. After a couple minutes, they told us to reduce speed 20kts and contact tower on
118.3. We tuned in the tower frequency and noticed we were about to cross the Bravo surface shelf north of the Garfield stack
without a clearance. We started circling to remain outside of Bravo and contacted tower. They asked what we were doing and
we said we did not have a clearance. They told us to contact approach first. We told them we did and were instructed to
contact the tower. Evenually tower gave us clearance over I-80 and we everything worked out.

Overflew a date AD, it was labeled as July 2016, and I flew the plane in August 2016. On the yellow sign out sheet, I was
always taught to just check the tach times on both the AD and Event. I normally glaze over the dates associated with other
inspections. The stabilator could have fallen off the plane, since the AD stated a mechanic needed to inspect the stabilator and
replace any worn parts, so that didn't happen which was sweet. After learning we overflew the AD, I wasn't as concerned with
my safety as I was with how this would affect my career moving forward. I was preparing to explain this to every potential
employer from here on out.

Turing outbound on the I80 transition ATC gave us a traffic report "12 o'clock and 1 mile primary target only possible birds use
caution". I looked out of the left seat windshield and noticed that there was a helicopter about 500 to 700 below us. We were
over I15 about to turn on I80 inside the bravo airspace. I informed ATC that it was a helicopter and gave a description of what it
looked like (color and size) and ATC made contact with them later for an airspace violation.
 Landing runway 3 at 42U, pilot in training determined that he would not make his short field landing spot and executed a go
around. On second attempt he was successful and we decided to taxi back to the departure end of the runway. We both
decided that since we were well clear of terrain during the go-around we could takeoff runway 3. We looked at performance
data, but we were not aware of the up slope runway and the terrain risks. We did a short field takeoff, partially though the roll I
considered aborting the takeoff, but decided we were too fast and it would be safer to continue. We ended up having to fly up
the canyon for approx 10 nm before we could make a turn to clear terrain.

When we took off the airplane was slow to accelerate and the ground roll took longer than usual. It was a short field takeoff.
When the airspeed was finally high enough to rotate, the student rotated and the airplane lunged forward abruptly. When I
looked at the student's feet, they were on the brakes as well as the rudders. This is not good for the brakes and also resulted
in us being closer to the ground and to the end of the runway when we were finally airborne.

I was pre-flighting and when waiting for fuel i pulled the plane out of the hangar as a single person. No damage was brought to
the plane but the risk of trying to pull out the plane without being able to see all of the sections of the plane raises the
possibility to hit part of the hangar with the plane

Jump 10 cut in front of one of a Westminster Archer who was on downwind leaving approx. 1/4 mile between Jump 10 and the
WC. Jump 10 also entered the pattern 300-400 feet below pattern altitude.

Preflighted and started the wrong aircraft, saw that the fuel pressure was abnormally low. We decided not to go and when
writing down the times for when we had the engine running, noticed that the times were nothing alike. We then realized that we
had started the wrong plane.

Parachute use by Westminster during spin flights is not useful. Exit from a spinning aircraft would be difficult enough, and
striking the aircraft upon emergency exit would be likely, possibly knocking a pilot/ passenger unconscious. A single parachute
system is not likely to fail if it is deployed, but no AAD in the event of being knocked unconscious or injured and no backup
parachute does not provide really any margin of safety during advanced maneuvers. While I do 110% believe in the operating
skills of the Westminster flight instructors, the use of a safety system that isn't actually safe doesn't make all that much sense
to me.

Taking off of 32 at Salt Lake, ATC told us to turn east toward i15 when able. We started the turn as soon as ATC said that even
though we turned over the military place and we were only like 200 feet above the ground. When we were flying over the
numbers on the transition to tooele we saw that another plane was also turning really low to the ground - maybe even less than
200 ft.

The oil door flew open during flight

During pre-flight weight and balance calculations, the airplane assigned to me was switched so that a student going on a solo
XC could have a plane with more time remaining.

I then filled out a weight and balance form and a yellow slip for the newly assigned airplane, but mistakenly pre-flighted, fueled,
and got in the airplane I was assigned first.

Luckily, the student flying the plane I was assigned first noticed that the plane they were supposed to be in was gone, and we
were notified that we had taken the wrong plane while we were in the run-up area.

We were able to taxi back to the shade hangars and give the solo XC student their airplane so they could complete their
lesson.

The first notch of flaps were put in too early, marginally outside of the white arc, but was immediately corrected by the
instructor.

We were heading back to Salt Lake after our lesson and another Griffin was also heading back at the same time. We were
making radio calls and realized that we were going in the same direction and we would be in the same place at the same time.
We started talking over base to coordinate altitudes and gave more descriptions of our locations so that we could scan and
find and avoid each other. We got on with Salt Lake as soon as possible so that they could help us stay apart.

I misunderstood a clearance and had to request that the controlled clarify.

Runway incursion by going over the hold short line for runway 17/35

When we went out to the Seminole we noticed that the chalk was not in place and was still in the baggage compartment. This
presents a risk because the Seminole hanger is sloped towards the door. There have been many times that we have pushed
the plane in and it started rolling out. Without the chalk set the plane could roll forward into the closed door and damage the
nose.

We cleared the active runway 17 at Delta and got off at the only taxiway at the end, stopped and did the after landing checklist
and discussed some other topics. There was no one on the radios the entire time we were in the area so we assumed no one
was at the airport. All of the sudden we look down at the end of the taxiway we are on and a plane is coming straight at us with
takeoff power. The plane lifts off and passes about 100-200 feet over us. The pilot never made a single radio call.

Was practicing instrument approaches into TVY under the hood. About 2 miles before the FAF I added a notch of flaps and
lowered the gear. I neglected to make a power change at the FAF when I started descending, and ended up overspeeding the
flaps.

We took off with the top door latch undone, and flew with it for the flight until we discovered it on the transition back to KSLC.
We could hear more noise in the cockpit which was not identifiable until we noticed the door.

I was preforming a short field take off and forgot to break. I then proceeded to hit the breaks, but forgot/didn't think about it, full
power was in.
When setting up for a 45 to downwind at South Valley, one landing gear light was not illuminated. This distraction caused me to
be about 200 feet low for traffic pattern, and caused my instructor and I to neglect our traffic scan. Proper radio calls were
being made, but there was someone departing who was not making radio calls. My instructor and I looked up just as a Cessna
was passing us at approximately the same altitude and the opposite direction. We must have been 200 feet or less horizontally
and very close to the same altitude.

While decending to 5300 for TPA 45 entry to runway 17 in TVY a near miss occured with a Cornerstone cessna aircraft ending
tail number "AB". We made no less than 3 radio calls from entering the valley to position where near miss happened. While
turning to the 45 degree entry for runway 17 with my student I caught the absolute collision of a Cessna from our 11 o'clock at
same altitude of 5300. I immediately took controls in a decending right turn to avoid the situation. I immediately called out the
cessna and what they were doing. They made a normal radio call saying they were maneuvering ground reference 2 miles
east of the airfield. At no time did they ever make a radio call, understand that traffic was coming into the pattern, or realizing
doing ground reference maneuvers in the same place as the approach path to 45 for 17 was a giant hazard.

In recent months I have noticed a degradation of professionalism over the base radio frequency. It is incredibly distracting to
the point were the only way to avoid the nonsense is by turning the frequency off. It may be funny for instructors and students
to use base as a means to joke around during the flight with others that are out flying but its incredibly rude to the other people
out flying. I have noticed the horseplay on base multiple times while conducting stage checks and during critical phases of
flight (T/O & Landing). For example having students and or instructors say "potato" over and over on base is not acceptable.

Our flight was planned to go to Tooele, however, due to weather, we diverted to South Valley, we requested own navigation to
South Valley from ATC, they granted us own navigation. Flying south from the KSL antenna to south valley, the instructor
started advising the student on procedures at south valley, as we were within 2NM of South Valley, the instructor advised the
student of the Class Bravo airspace above at 6000, and the traffic pattern altitude at 5600. We were climbing to 5800 to cross
over the traffic pattern, and accidentally did not level off and continued to climb up to 6000. The instructor noticed as we barely
reached 6000 and pushed the controls forward to descend. We were on U42 frequency, so no advisory was given and
returning back to Salt Lake later there was no warnings given by ATC.

Student reported that one of our Archers has a door that cannot be opened from inside. Has not reported it to Dispatch or
Maintenance--only shared with flight instructor.

I'm concerned to hear that a student experienced a potential maintenance problem and did not write it up. If anyone
experiences a problem with an airplane, they need to report it and write it up so others aren't put at risk.
 After landing on RWY 35, tower advised us to switch to ground once off the runway. After exiting the runway, the pilot flying
switched to ground while the pilot not flying completed the after landing checklist. At that time, Ground made initial contact with
us and cleared us "taxi kilo to parking". We read back the clearance in full. We began our taxi down to spot 26, as we were
approaching spot 28, we noticed a PC-12 who we did not hear talking to ground approaching the taxiway boundary line. As we
passed in front of them, the passed the taxiway hold short line. Shortly after, they asked ground if there had been in give
way/hold short instructions given to the Cessna that passed in front of them (us). It turns out, they had received their taxi
clearance before we had switched frequencies so we did not hear them. In addition, the controller assumed that we were
taxiing to spot 33 instead of 26 when giving us the "taxi to parking" clearance. The controller seemed confused by this
question, then, presumably after noticing the two aircraft on the ground radar, apologized to the Pilatus pilot.

Tried to climb over the Oquirrhs to get into Tooele Valley form U42. Winds were much stronger than forecast and there was
moderate turbulence. Going into the mountains perpetuated the turbulence and created a hazardous situation with fluctuating
airspeed and difficulty controlling aircraft. Stall warning horn went off.

Not thoroughly going through the before takeoff checklist. Forgot to switch the fuel selector to the on position, instead, took off
in crossfeed.

We were practicing landings at Heber (36U) and was on short final when a Citation decided to taxi onto the runway to back taxi
for runway 22. The pilots in that airplane weren't paying attention to both the radios (we were making radio calls) or scanning
for traffic. We then called a go around and they acknowledged and apologized over the radio.

In cruise there were a few clouds at our altitude, it was about 15-20 degrees below zero and the clouds weren't very thick. one
cloud we went through was thicker than it looked and we ended up being in it longer than expected. At first indication of ice we
requested a climb for higher and climbed out of it.

Left towbar behind the nose wheel during fueling operations to act as a chalk. Forgot to put the towbar back in the cargo bin.
Started up, taxied away, flew, returned. Noticed towbar laying on ramp, shutdown well short of the towbar.
 After doing multiple stop and gos in KOGD, we were planning on returning south bound back to Salt Lake, so OGD tower told
us fly I-15 Southbound, from previous experiences, I expected OGD tower to switch us over to Hill Tower. When I did not
receive a frequency change from OGD tower, we figured that we were cleared to fly I-15 South and Hill already knew we were
coming. We did not ask them whether or not we should switch to Hill because we were already yelled at by OGD previously in
the flight and didn't want to be yelled at again. We flew from I-15 on the south side of Ogden to Lagoon. At this point, we finally
asked Ogden for a frequency switch, and they told us that when we are not in their airspace we no longer need to talk to them!
So we switched frequencies and talked to Salt Lake City Approach to come back into land at Salt Lake.

During the pre-flight, I had forgotten to remove the chocks from the aircraft, which made taxiing an issue. The hazard being
that we could have run over the chocks and potentially damage the nose gear if we attempted to power over the chock.

Attempting to sump fuel but unable to safely inspect fuel quality/condition because of old fuels trainer jars. They were all
scratched and full of sediment already that made it nearly impossible to safely identify fuel condition.

I've dozed off several times on longer xc's when the workload is lower. At first it was just for short spells but has gotten worse.
This seems to happen at higher altitudes where hypoxia might be a factor because it becomes more pronounced with altitude.
During the de-breif or when generally talking about these naps, instructors and students seem to not think it is a big deal and
that it is a common occurance at our program.

Coming back from an IFR XC from Wendover we cancelled IFR and to shoot a practice ILS approach into KTVY as a
diversion. Simulating ATC the instructor cleared the student to WEGET and hold at 8100 as per the approach. The student
was slightly behind the aircraft and kept hitting clear on the G430 taking away the airspace from the moving map. we entered
the hold parallel and were in the 7800 shelf of bravo for about a mile and a half. Noticed we did this after the fact and was not
contacted by ATC luckily. We were squawking 1200 and on the Tooele CTAF

We departed out of KSGU, all the while during our taxi, run up, and takeoff without hearing anything on the radios. After doing
one touch and go on the runway, we noticed another aircraft who was not talking, then a WC departed without talking, it took
all the way through one loop in the pattern to realize that the volume on our #1 radio was turned all the way down from the
previous flight.

While picking up a flight instructor and student on the line I noticed an archer taxiing extremely fast while turning into the shade
hangar area. I found this very unsafe as had someone been closer to the end of the shade hangar line an incident may have
occurred. It was more interesting that the two occupants of the Archer were very high time flight instructors. This should not be
a thing with two instructors. Instructors need to be careful with the culture they give off as it can develop into habits that we as
students should not follow.
 Risk Assessment Risk Assessment
Matrix_Likelihood Matrix_Severity (1=Negligible
(1=Improbable - 4=Probable) - 4=Catastrophic)
4 1
2 3
3 1

2 3

2 2

4 1

3 3

4 1

3 3

3 3

3 1

3 2

3 2

4 1
3 1

2 3

4 2

4 1

2 4

2 3
4 4

3 2

4 3

3 3

3 2

2 2
3 1

3 2

3 4

4 1

3 3

3 2
3 2

3 3

4 2

3 3

2 2

3 4
2 4

4 2

3 2

3 4

4 3

4 2

2 2
2 2

2 4

3 2

3 3

4 2

3 2
3 2

2 3

2 1

3 3

2 4

2 4

3 3

2 3
1 3

2 3

3 3

2 2

2 3

3 2

3 3
3 3

3 3

3 3

4 3

1 1

4 3

1 3
2 3

3 3

2 4

4 2

2 2

2 2

1 1

4 2

3 2
4 1

4 4

3 3

3 3

2 2

3 3

1 3

2 2
3 3

3 2

3 2

3 3

4 4

2 3

2 1
2 4

4 2
3 2

3 3

3 1

3 1

2 3

4 1
1 1

3 2

3 3

3 2

3 3

2 3
3 4

2 4

2 1

1 1

2 3
3 3

3 2

1 2

2 4

3 2

1 4

4 1

2 2
3 2

1 1

4 2

4 1

3 2

4 2

2 4

2 2

2 1

2 2
3 4

3 4

3 3

2 1

4 2
3 2

3 3

2 1

4 2

3 2

2 2
2 1

2 2

4 3

4 2

3 2

2 3

2 2
 Lessons Learned
Forgot to pull chocks
always use checklist
Double check both latches before takeoff.

try to maintain 20 miles from all convection, not just major

don't leave mags on after flight

read markings and signs, and keep a heads up for those who are unfamiliar with airport

Do not always take ATC advisories for their word: always keep a sharp eye out for traffic.

Bring replant!!!!

The pilot did not make sure the gear was down and locked. Remember to always make the
gear down calls prior to landing. Use the checklist at all times!

The instructor being tested needs to pay closer attention to procedure. Dispatch needs to
check with the check ride examiners when the leave the building.

Somebody forgot to lock the door, probably a new FOF student.

I would guess that a student forgot to finish his checklist and left those items unsecured.

I think the fact that there are college kids around a dirty plane was tempting enough to draw
"things".

People forget and there are some new folk on the line learnin' the ropes.
 I guess the best thing to take away from this experience is to always fly the aircraft first, no
matter what happens. You fly the aircraft until it is parked and the engine is off, and always be
aware of what it is doing, and whether any changes in its handling characteristics have
occurred. If this had been a blowout we very well could have ended up in the dirt, so it's always
good to keep vigilant until the airplane has been parked. This was an internal tube failure,
which is very difficult to predict. Probably nothing could have necessarily been done to prevent
it, but just be aware that it can happen.

This incident was caused by my instructor and myself not being familiar with NACO chart
symbol and by me, when I did not voice my opinion about the crossing altitude better. The main
reason I trusted my Instructors instructions was because I had not flown IFR in a while and
though I had a different opinion I did not voice it. A student and Instructor should always work
together and a student should never be afraid to question an instructor's reasoning, they are
human to and will make mistakes. Also all pilots should be sure to know the difference in IFR
and VFR rules when changing altitudes.

Someone might've been in a rush or new to the program.

Someone might be new to the program or in a rush and forgot to lock the baggage door.

Mis-communications between dispatchers, line techs, and pilots.

Always look for traffic and keep in mind that radio calls are not required but are very
appreciated. when you do not know what other traffic is doing, keep them in sight.
 I honestly believe the pilot was not paying attention to radio calls and position reports being
made by other pilots. The pilot of WC made a radio call when turning onto every leg in the
pattern but the other pilot still failed to look out for and spot WC when he was on the 45 (and
rudely said WC should be making more radio calls).

I learned that on long duration flights it is extremely important that the instructor monitors the
total time so that instructional periods are not exceeded.

Recently the Seminole POH was updated to require the fuel pumps on in climbs. This appears
to be a Piper issue across all aircraft. I noticed it on all flights this week.

I think that whoever flew it simply forgot to monitor their fuel tanks and never noticed the
problem.

Whoever flew the plane last may have been told by dispatch to quick turn the plane thinking
that someone would be using it after. Dispatch should make note of the planes that are quick
turned and if the flight after cancels, an instructor should park the aircraft.

even though we were far from the majority of the storm there can still be severe effects of the
storm. reduce throttle quicker when in a turbulent area
 I usually take another walk around the airplane before hopping in, on this day I did not. this
reinforces the importance of doing so. I also should have told Ground that i was missing a fuel
cap so that they could warn other aircraft on the taxiway to look out for it.

If the airplane looks like it is at a funny angle when going into the shade hanger, stop, pull it out
the same way as it pushed in so it doesn't hit anything, and try again.

The tab on the fuel selector is supposed to help prevent pilots from turning off the fuel selector
in flight. However, because our checklists have us turn off the fuel selector after every flight,
students develop a muscle memory to quickly turn off the selector. If students are for some
reason rushed in flight and/or distracted, that same muscle memory can come into play at that
time. Luckily we were on final approach to a runway at the time, but this could have happened
anywhere at any time a student decides to switch tanks, so it could have ended very differently
had we not been at an airport.

Proper procedures after landing should be followed.

Always check the tail number and match it to the binder assigned by dispatch. We were lucky
that the aircraft still had time on it. We could have inadvertently overflown an AD or other
mandatory maintenance. I will check the tail number on both the A/C and the binder before
every flight.

If I would have retracted the flaps after landing and applied even brake pressure, the situation
could have been avoided.
 The student and instructor did not complete a final walk around before boarding the aircraft.
The pre-flight inspection could have been more thorough by doing one last walk around before
boarding the aircraft. When locking the baggage door, always check that everything is in place
including the tow bar.

Inexperience for the student and the instructor not reminding the student that this can happen.
Always remind students to place a finger on the top of the fuel tester actuator so that it does
not fall into the fuel tank.

Better communication between dispatch and students/instructors. Instructors with students on

check rides need to be better about moving aircraft and being at flight ops to check their
students in and out.

Unsure who initially caused the problem. Could have been a large problem as they could be
seen as FOD. We need to make sure that the plane washers and students are being careful as
to where they are placing the empty containers.

Do walk around after every flight.

My student was under the hood, I should have had him look up sooner and help me locate the
traffic. It was a cloudy and day and difficult to see traffic. I think also, ATC should have given us
an update sooner about the traffic or we should have asked sooner.
After the experience, we discussed the situation with the other crew in the twin on the ground.
They were also aware of us, scanning, and trying to gain visual contact as they were inbound.
They saw us at the last second and were able to quickly pull up, recognizing the dangerous
situation we were able to avoid.

Although we were both aware and making appropriate position reports, I think the real problem
was that neither of us took the additional step of reaching out on the radio to specifically
communicate with the aircraft we were looking for. Both crews recognized the need to visually
identify the location of the other aircraft, but we relied simply on our visual scanning based on
the information given in the back and forth position reporting.

To correct this situation in the future, I think it is valuable to reach out in addition to the position
report, and attempt to open a direct dialogue with potential conflicting traffic. Attempting to do
so will allow both aircraft to gain additional information to aid in visual separation, but also allow
for sequencing and planning as necessary to make sure both aircraft are taking steps to put
themselves in a position to avoid the potential conflict situation.

Also, the student in our aircraft was under the hood, and we continued with the holding
procedure assuming that the other crew would recognize where we were positioned and
continue inbound passing below us inbound to the airport. I think it also would have been
valuable for the instructor to not be hesitant to discontinue with the hold, take the student out of
simulated instrument conditions, and allow another set of eyes to be looking outside, rather
than assume that the conflict would resolve itself, or the other airplane would recognize our
position and avoid us, or the instructor would see them in time.

I think that someone forgot to put the gust lock on the plane after they pushed it back into the
shade hangars after their flight. I think that they didn't follow their checklist correctly.

I wasn't paying close enough attention to where we were exactly which placed us closer to the
Bravo shelf. Better situational awareness is needed to prevent another bust as well as paying
closer attention to clearances and advisories to prevent confusion. When in doubt, ask.

I believe the student was running late getting the plane back and just forgot to lock and chock
the plane.

None listed

As a general rule the fuel caps should always be locked to prevent theft. Also they consistently
checked during preflight and before take off check to insure that they were placed back on the
aircraft properly during preflight and fueling. If these are both properly done then the fuel caps
will always be on the aircraft for flight.
 The cause of the engine failure was determined to be the carburetor. Once the throttle was
closed to simulate loss of the engine, it was to believed to have died. One lesson learned was
to be prepared for the event of an engine failure at anytime and to properly react. In addition, it
is very important to have communication between student and instructor. The student believed
that the instructor had purposely failed the engine to simulated an engine failure on takeoff roll,
and the instructor believed that the student had locked the brakes causing it to pull to the left.
Other lesson learned was that while in SLC, the engine had been running slightly rough, but
eventually smoothed out prior to takeoff. If there is any indication that something could possibly
be wrong, it should be looked into prior to flight. I believe the only thing that can be done to
prevent a recurrence would be to make sure the aircraft is running properly prior to flight.

PC-12 not calling inbound at ILS FAF, Archer missing the PC-12's last minute radio call before
initiating circling approach. Archer perspective - Scanning was the source of aircraft recognition
and instructor awareness of PC-12 radio call during archer's previous traffic pattern

We were lucky it was late in kslc and there was no traffic anywhere. The controller was in a
very good mood probably do to the light workload on his behalf. It resulted in No Harm, No
Foul. Even so this was not taken lightly by the instructor nor the student and an extensive post
flight brief was taken after discussing things both the student and instructor could have done
better. Don't let the lesson distract from situational awareness, especially at night when visual
references are diminished

The issue here was not a lack of preparation, both the instructor and myself were aware of the
weather and the possible hazards associated with the flight. After expressing my desire not to
go on the flight, the instructor made it very clear that the decision was not up to me and that we
would be going on the flight. The problem here was that the instructor was not the one that
received the briefing, did not believe the information I told him, and the decision to go was not
made by the student. In this case a decision to err on the side of safety should have been
made, and it simply was not. If a student does not wish to do the flight and does not feel
comfortable, the decision should ultimately be up to them.

This happens fairly frequently, emphasis should be put on post flight procedures.

Instructor and/or student negligence is probably what caused the problem. Reminding
students/instructors that tie downs are necessary is probably the best way to prevent a
recurrence.
 Do a proper pre flight and post flight

Always brief maneuvers before you execute them. Go through a checklist and determine a
proper altitude and airspeed before beginning. Ensure these are reached before executing the
maneuver.

make sure you always do a good preflight, cant trust the person before you.

Follow checklists and post flight procedures in securing the aircraft for parking. Mags should
have been be turned off as part of the engine shutdown checklist as well as the radio master
switch.

Frequencies should be adjusted once out of delta airspace, contact slc approach even to
manuever near ffu

I was monitoring TVY and made a position report just prior to this occurring, the aircraft was
one of the Ameriflight planes I don't know what he was monitoring or transmitting on but I'm
pretty sure it wasn't the same frequency as me. Sometimes the TIS doesn't sound or sounds
after a potential issue, but in this case I feel as though monitoring that at the same time I was
doing a visual scan is the only reason we didn't collide. I wasn't aware he was around until he
popped up on the MFD and the PFD inset.
I don't think he ever saw me

This has happened a couple times in the past, I believe it is due to negligence/ failure to follow
proper procedures and checklists.

the lesson learned is to not use the button when switching tanks.
 Always checked the AF/D and ensure that the airport has the equipment and is approved for
the type of operation that you wish to conduct. Even though it is a airport that we have been to
many times before, it only a little complacency to get yourself into trouble. It is the job of
Student and Instructor no matter what skill or knowledge that are at to ensure the flight can be
completed before walking out to the aircraft.

Someone must have been in a hurry to get inside, maybe a solo student? We don't know who
quick turned the plane.

lack of attention and distractions

What caused the problem was failure to complete checklists and also a failure to communicate
between me and my instructor.

Not properly following the checklists of screwing the oil dipstick back on after checking/filling
the oil for the preflight checklist and turning off the magnetos on the engine shut down
checklist.

Night time - People not paying attention - moving faster than is necessary for night operations -
not having flashlights

I believe the overcast night caused the problem. I think it was a matter of being in the wrong
place at the wrong time. lucky it was over the top of the wing and not directly against the
leading edge or prop.
Learned how important it is to know your responsibility in the emergency response plan. Even
though this was a minor incident it shows how important it is to review and know the response
plan and each person role in it.

Not to just visually inspect the cap on the Cessna's but to climb up and actually double check.

Need to be more aware when returning binders-both the pilots and the dispatcher.

The plane was quick turned for the next flight, however it most likely the next flight was
cancelled due to wind. Dispatch should ensure that the actions are taken to put the plane away
and get it tied down in windy conditions, and perhaps not use the quick turn area in gusty
condition.

To always check safety and ops + approved airport list

The assignment is forcing either a sacrifice in academic success or safety of my flight. The
assignment should be changed so that I don't have to make this choise.

I had the cabin heat turned on, and it had been on for about an hour and a half to warm the
cabin up.
Losing the fuel cap in-flight could have been catastrophic if the cap would have hit the elevator
it could have made the airplane crash and also the fuel indicator does not read accurately so
the pilot would not know how much fuel the plane has

Pay very close attention during mixture leaning process and be sure to have a confident
understanding of the mixture leaning process.

Make sure you do a preflight either with your student or when you get to the airplane.

During the cruise checklist and the BCGUMPS make sure to actually go through each item and
not just say the items.

There was some sort of miscommunication or lack of communication between the instructors
and dispatchers involved.

An impulsive decision by the instructor to take the landing without a full assessment of all
factors. The 2nd traffic on final was closer than expected forcing a tighter pattern than originally
planned and we had already accepted and committed to the landing. The unreported tailwind
kept our speed to high for full flaps.

Next time i will check twice to make sure that the parking brake is fully disengaged before
taxiing.

Make sure that the proper post flight procedure is followed after landing.

Poor Communication and not establishing what the lines of sight were at the beginning. I
should have blown my whistle when I thought we were too close, rather than assuming the
other person was aware of the aircraft position. I spoke with Frank and he gave me pointers on
verifying that the plane is lined up properly in the stall before backing in.
 If while on a long cross country I had to add oil and there was none, and I was at an airport
without services, this could have been an issue. It also added time to my preflight having to
make two trips.

What cause the problem is both instructors and students not listening to position reports while
training. Additionally, there was a lack of scanning for traffic. I have noticed that scanning for
traffic both in the practice area and in the pattern has diminished greatly. Paying attention to
detail and making position reports consistently will help in this.

Keep aircraft locked triple check it

Just because another pilot has read back an instruction it doesn't mean that they will comply
with it. The result may have been different if the pilot was familiar with the area.

Check the NOTAMS carefully prior to the flight. Also, be aware of what dispatch has
announced already. This was not a new thing, as the instructors and students were notified of
the closure way in advance.

Ensure a positive exchange of flight controls and make sure you get a response ("Your
controls. My controls. Your controls.). Also, maintain situational awareness around you which
should include all the features of the ramp and airport surface such as lamp posts, poles, other
aircraft, walls etc.

Checklists are an important part of any phase in flight. But during an emergency it will aid in
missed items and help with the stress. Granted this situation was an extremely high in stress,
but knowing this on lower stress simulated emergencies will make it easier.

Watch for birds they will usually dive

Keep your eyes open when on final. Make sure to scan the entire length of the runway on final.
Initiate a go-around if necessary!

The fueler was distracted. In the future we can keep a closer eye on them to make sure they
disconnect and remove their chocks (even though it's their job).

Don't count on being able to immediately being cleared to land upon returning to Salt Lake.
Plan to have extra fuel in the event that the controllers aren't able sequence you into the traffic
flow. Also, do not be hesitant to declare minimum fuel or warn the controllers that you are
approaching your minimum fuel.

Instructors always check your students pre flight especially when things get removed to be
checked. This could have been a much bigger problem for the student and instructor who when
on that fight.

I believe that the SkyDiver aircraft was the cause of the problem. I could not see the aircraft as
he was probably right on top of me and I cannot see through the ceiling. Since the jump plane
was not doing a proper traffic pattern at TPA, it was impossible for me to see him right above
me. All we can do is make proper traffic calls in the pattern, fly the appropriate traffic pattern
procedures, maintain situational awareness and keep our scan up. But, if the only way to see
them is to look up and/or behind, that's not going to work.

Maintain scan down runway and situational awareness. If you have a safety pilot/another
person in the airplane, have them scan as well.

Tell the student to listen to the briefer better and also double check with the FAA.gov even
though it is not an official source but he could of use it as a secondary source. I should double
check the student getting NOTAM and briefing prior to letting them go.
If I had compared the Tac times right when I opened the door to that aircraft then none of this
could have happened. I now know that I will always compare the tac and hobs times with the
binder, and check the binder to reassure that I am in the aircraft that dispatched gave to me.

There's not much we can do to prevent a recurrence as the variables here lie with the other
aircraft. But, we can maintain our situational awareness and remember that not all aircraft are
going to follow the proper procedures in the traffic pattern and act accordingly.
 I have noticed flocks of small birds that fly around Tooele at dusk and after dark. I know of at
least one other bird strike at night under the same circumstances. It is difficult and sometimes
impossible to spot birds at night. But everyone should be aware that they are out there.

We could have assessed the weather with greater depth, regardless the expectation to remain
in the pattern. Continue to make prompt decisions to maintain safety.

Without a call out no measure was taken to identify the appropriate flap speed. Students and
instructors are becoming complacent and are omitting the call outs for the flaps or they are not
being taught to do these call outs. Likely this is a partial contributor to the failure to make gear
call outs in the retractable gear planes.

I believe that the pilots were either unaware of the proper starting procedure or chose not to
follow it. According to the PIM/Frank the starter should be engaged for 5-10 second at a time
and should be allowed to rest for minutes after repeatedly failing to start.

When ATC clears you for a landing, you need to keep situational awareness and understand
that there could be hazards on the runway.

Students forget to use the gust lock after flight, instructors don't double check that it is secure.
Both parties should be reminded to follow post flight checklist properly.
 Maintain sterile cockpit while taxiing. Avoid distraction on the ground.

My unfamiliarity of the airport, coupled with relatively low experience at night, caused this
problem. Connected with this was also my lack of monitoring my speed while taxiing and my
loss of situational awareness as to my position on the runway. To correct for this, extreme
vigilance during night operations, as well as slower taxi speed to remain safe should be utilized,
especially when unfamiliar with the environment.

Always check the magnetos before moving the propeller.

Make sure you maintain your balance while on the wing of the airplane. However, this is not the
easiest to prevent, but just to keep in mind.

Pay attention to airspeed during any takeoff and landing to prevent low level stalls. Pay special
attention to density altitude and how that will effect takeoff and climb performance. If you are
on the back side of the power curve, you will need to reduce angle of attack and increase
airspeed before a climb can continue. This is important to remember especially when you have
a short runway and obstacles to clear.

I believe that the stress of the flight (turbulence) got to me and the wind (crosswind) was
picking up so I got anxious to get the airplane to the ground before the situation got any worse.
I learned It is always safer to be patient and make sure to land in a situation safe for small
aircraft. 757 jet blast can be very problematic and should not be messed with. Also, I learned
that doing multiple go arounds is not a bad thing.
Always scan! Make sure to scan and be extra vigilant near the airport. Don't rely on radio calls
to identify other traffic in the area.

Being behind on the aircraft, and not hearing radio calls from this aircraft

Salt Lake Approach was very busy and most likely forgot to give us a clearance before handing
us off to tower. Although nothing bad happened and most likely we could have continued
inbound and tower would not have noticed we did not officially have a clearance, and everyone
knows it is still important to make sure you have clearance before entering Bravo airspace.

I believe the lack of emphasis placed on checking AD and inspection dates was most of the
problem. The problem is now corrected with the new W&B sheets, which include all above
information to check before each flight.

Even if you are in the bravo airspace it is possible for others to lose situational awareness and
violate the airspace and if the traffic is not talking to ATC it may become dangers.
 I looked in the ops manual and saw that 42 U was approved for dual commercial flights and
looked at the runway lengths and determined it was safe. I missed the up sloping terrain and
up slope runway. Even though it is a local airport, we still need to take the same pre-flight
planning that we would as if we were going to a new airport far away.

Make sure that your heels are on the floor and only toes are on the rudders. In a short field
takeoff when the pilot is braking before starting the roll it is more likely for them to forget to slide
their feet down.

I believe the situation was caused by impatience and that while trying to be ready to go as soon
as possible is good it is better to play it safe and not cause a situation which can lead to
damage to the plane or yourself

Take caution when operating around KTVY and sky diving operations are in effect.

Check that the tail number on the binder matches the actual airplane tail number. Check the
tach and hobbs time during the preflight so you don't accidentally take the wrong plane.

I believe this problem is caused by overconfidence in aircraft and pilot capabilities and the lack
of understanding aircraft exit procedures and parachute use.

Make sure to just parallel 34R after taking off 32 until you are at a safe altitude to turn out. If
your engine dies you might be in a sketchy situation. And dont fly over the military place
because you aren't supposed to. Just fly a little more north and climb more.

To make sure you are always doing one last walk around and checking the aircraft before flight
I believe that primacy played a factor in my confusion about which plane to take. I pictured the
first plane I was assigned in my head, and that image stuck until I walked out to the shade
hangars and went to that plane.

Although I did the weight and balance and filled out a yellow slip for the second plane I was
assigned, I did not properly update that information in my head. I should have done something
to help myself remember which plane I was supposed to take, and I should have verified the
plane, Griffin #, and tach and hobbs times during my preflight. I should have also verified the
correct plane with my instructor so that both of us knew we were in the right plane.

I will remember now to verify these three things and confirm the plane with my instructor when I
begin future pre-flights.

Always double check indicated airspeed before inserting flaps

Since we are all flying during the same flight blocks and we all go to the same place it is likely
to be on the transitions right at the same time. Make sure you are communicating and scanning
for traffic.

more effective task management

Just pay closer attention.

There have been numerous times that the plane has not been locked or the gust lock is not in
place in the Seminole. I think people are getting complacent with the Seminole in particular
because it is in the hanger, not the shade hangar so they think they don't have to do all the
parking procedures.

Try not to keep your head inside the plane while on the ground. Be aware and keep your head
on a swivel. Nothing we could have done at that point besides veer off the taxiway and try to
get the tail number but it was too hard to see and we couldn't.

I should have reduced power when I started descending, and verified the airspeed indicator
more often to make sure I stayed in the appropriate airspeed range.

i think trying to rush on the ground when finishing up the before takeoff checklist allowed a
moment where we thought we had it complete and did not notice the door. To correct the
situation, slowing down and taking the time to make sure all the items of the checklist are done
properly will prevent an occurrence like this from occurring again.

Stress, and a misstep on my part.

Not everyone makes radio calls, and it is vital to stay outside the plane and scan for traffic at all
times, especially when close to an airport. I believe our lack of attention outside of the aircraft
lead to this close call, and it could have been avoided if I was more accurate with my altitude
while troubleshooting the issue.

The Cornerstone Cessna was a dual instruction flight. The instructor choose poorly to not listen
to incoming traffic into his maneuvering sector, and to not make regular radio calls. Also not
realizing he was maneuvering at a high volume traffic area. The only thing that kept us alive
was "See and Avoid" scanning techniques. I have also been able to talk with the other
instructor involved with the near miss. It would seam that he lost orientation of what "Whiskey
Charlie" was where. He thought my student was another instructor somewhere else already in
the valley. I also brought up the fact mauvering at TPA in that area is not safe or responsible.
Having this conversation was extreamly educational for him but unfortunately will not bring
change to the situation from happening again. Since this occurred more situations in the same
area have happened. Not with our schools A/C but with the GA flying public and the same flight
school. Nothing as close but still close enough to happen again.

There isn't any facet of aviation that doesn't value professionalism. Therefore instructors need
to reinforce professionalism, and there is not better place to start than on the base frequency.
Ask yourself, how would you feel if you were on a check and all you could hear over ATC was
the word "potato"?

I learned that you need to keep a close eye on your altitude so that you are not to high or low.
Especially when you are at an airport like South Valley and don't have that much room to go
up.

Not feeling confident about own assessment of potential maintenance issue. Instructors, too,
need to be encouraged to follow up on things that students report to them.
It is easy to get complacent, especially after you have landed and are preparing to wrap up for
the day. We should ensure we pilot the aircraft and maintain situational awareness all the way
until shutdown.

Unforecast weather, bad judgement trying to take a shortcut, and little room to climb to an
higher altitude to escape winds (Bravo shelf, restricted airspace, and mountains). Next time,
just go around the mountains or try to get a bravo clearance to climb through airspace.

Feeling like I was in a rush. I know better, in the future I will make sure to run through and verify
checklist items.

You can do everything that you can do to prevent a runway incursion. But, you also have to
keep an eye out for other aircraft that might not be so vigilant. So, be vigilant of other aircraft
that may stray onto the runway when you are trying to land or takeoff.

Ice can occur even close to 20 below, always be aware of it, clouds may be larger than they
appear, be alert and ready for anything, think about the training we have received and do what
we were taught. We were constantly checking for it just in case which was good.

Don't put the towbar behind the aircraft to chalk the airplane.
 ALWAYS talk to Hill before entering their airspace, regardless of what you are expecting,
Ogden is not responsible for anything once you leave their airspace

I believe that rushing through the pre-flight caused me to miss chocks on the Seminole. I know
that doing a final walk around and taking my time and slowing down would have helped with
remembering to get the chock.

The department needs to invest money into buying new fuel strainers/Gats jars to allow for a
safer preflight inspection of fuel.

Not only is this unprofessional but is also dangerous. I think students and instructors are not
getting enough rest and worse are afraid to cancel when they are fatigued and not properly
using IMSAFE. Also understand that just because we live at 4000 ft and fly a lot doesnt mean
we are exempt from the 10,000 ft o2 suggestion in the AIM.

Always be aware of airspace, even though we were simulating IFR flight we were still VFR and
therefore needed to be aware of airspace. Instructors acting as ATC should always double
check that the published instrument approach procedure does not take you through controlled
airspace.

Always check the radios after start up to ensure that the volume knob is in the proper
orientation.

Instructors should set better examples by following SOP and safe practices. Taxing off of Kilo
should be done with vigilance and at a slow pace.
 Recommended Response(s)
pay attentino

don't fly during building convection, wait

for stable improving conditions.

see above

N/A

Have replant available at flight ops

Follow standard operating procedures all

the time. Always use checklists. Make
sure you are actually doing the checklist
as opposed to just saying the words.

see above

Send out an email alerting students that

this behavior is unacceptable, and
wieners belong in the bathroom.

Periodically remind everyone to lock and

secure their aircraft.
 Inform students of the risks of landing
with a flat tire, or what will happen when
a tire goes flat on touchdown or taxi. This
was basically a non-issue, but being
aware of the risks is important.

Continually remind people that this

should be done.

Continually remind people that locking

and securing the aircraft must be done
post flight.

Check with the pilot on how much fuel

can be taken especially with Cessna's
and Seminole.

continue making radio calls, make sure

you clear the area very well before
entering the airport environment.
 Many pilots become complacent after
many hours of flight. Do not let it happen
to you. Forcing oneself to be aware of
one's surroundings, listening to other
pilot's position reports and radio calls as
well as making radio calls can help
prevent another occurrence such as this.
Scanning technique, and scanning for
traffic in general, should always be
practiced. If I had not heard the other
pilots radio call, or if I had spotted him
any later, it is possible we would have
crashed into each other.

I recommend that when doing long cross

countries that are close to 8 hours that
the instructor does not add to the lesson
and fly what the student planned for.

Send out notice (Canvas message, FIF

etc.) of the procedure in POH. When able
update checklists.

I would recommend that a reminder be

sent to student to prevent this from
happening again.

There should be a way for dispatch to

know when they close whether all planes
are parked in the appropriate places.

land and wait out the storm

 always do an extra walk around before
hopping in the airplane to make sure
everything is ok.

I recommend that turning off the fuel

selector after the flight be removed from
the checklist. There isn't a necessity to
do so (not in the Normal Procedures
section of the Archer POH on the
stopping engine checklist) and
eliminating this checklist item will help
break the habit of being able to quickly
turn off the fuel selector. In addition, for
those not in the habit of doing so, I think
that it might be a good idea to start
verifying which fuel tank is selected after
switching tanks to ensure that it was not
unintentionally switched to the OFF
position.

Remind students to secure the aircraft.

Check the tail number on both the A/C

and the binder before every flight.
Situational Awareness, If I didn't allow
myself to be distracted and had instead
focused on the task at hand it could have
broken the chain but the combination of
getthereitis and excitement to go up
today clouded my mind.

Retract all flaps after landing, apply even

pressure on brakes, and don't rush to
make a runway/taxiway exits.
 Watch for Fod and assure all items on
the pre-flight checklists are completed

Always remind students to hold the sump

actuator with a finger while pouring the
fuel back into the fuel tanks.

Utilize the white plane position board

better. Make sure that the QT is updated
and communicated clearly.

The plane washers will be spoken to

about staying on top of the aircraft
supplies and making sure that there is
not a large number of empty containers.

Do a walk around after every flight.

Keep a heads up outside. Don't get

fixated on the automation
Review and share the lessons learned as
appropriate

Reminders?
 Make sure all emergency checklist are
memorized and practiced and be
prepared for an actual emergency. Make
sure there is clear communication
between the student and instructor
should an actual emergency occur.

Don't allow training discussions to

distract from monitoring all radio calls.
Never relax on scanning in VFR
conditions and training environments

Set expectations of standards for the

flight and lesson during pre-flight. Plan
out the maneuvers and location while on
the ground in relation to the XC. Do not
disregard the return trip flight plan once
back in the local area

Place emphasis on post flight checks

Pay closer attention to post flight

procedures
 Always check your oil before and after
flight

encourage a good preflight and post flight

check. as an instructor, always do a quick
walk around and check out the plane
before hopping in the plane

Remind students and

instructors/reinforce (as my guess is that
this was with a current FOF student) the
notion of following the checklists and
ensure that the plane is completely
secured prior to leaving. Maybe take a
peek at the switches and gust lock to
ensure that they're there before closing
the door and locking it.

recognize when the aircraft is out of radar

contact and always always look for traffic.
by the time i spotted the crossing traffic
above us in a high wing it was to late. the
altitude was the only reason we did not
collide

Reiterate the importance of following

proper procedures.

Keep your hand off the button when

switching tanks.
have students read through the AF/D and
remarks as well as Westminster Colleges
remarks to ensure that the flight is
conducted in a matter that follows
guidelines and procedures. Never
assume for any airport no matter how
many times you have been that it has
equipment and is approved. Always
check and confirm with each other.

Instructor should have a discussion with

student on consequences of mags being
left on.

make sure you verify the binder with the

tail number of hobs and tach time

Checklist usage would be help to

manage risks.

Follow checklists. Sometimes we do get

complacent on following them since we
don't them many, many times when we
fly, but we should at least verify your
actions with it prior to moving onto the
next step whether it is going ahead with
the rest of the preflight/flying or pushing
the plane back into the hangar.

Always use flashlights at night - pull

aircraft out straight - make sure both
sides of the planes are being watched
when being pushed back or pulled out
 Go through check lists thoroughly

Set a wind limit for quick turning aircraft.

When flights get cancelled and aircraft
are in the quick area they should be put
back into the parking spot by the
instructor and student who cancelled to
prevent aircraft from being left out after a
cancellation.

make note to the approved airport list

about the east restriction at night. make it
all the same. the fact that some airport
like Alpine and Wendover have a
comment saying that night flight is not
approve and vernal did not have
comment, makes me assume that vernal
was approved.

Raise more awareness to the risk of

Carbon Monoxide poisoning, instead of
just focusing on hypoxia.
 Put in the pre-flight check list to check
fuel caps after getting fuel to make sure
they are secure

Use your checklists.

Always mark a quick turned plane on the

dispatch white board, and the
instructor(s) should ensure that their
aircraft is taken care of before leaving
flight ops.

Stay in the downwind. Don't commit to

the base leg prior to having clearance to
land.

Make sure to check your brakes

Remind students and staff that the

frequent storms this time of year will
cause high winds and having properly
secured aircraft is important to safety.

Communicate prior to moving the aircraft.

Never assume. Be more proactive in
alerting others to potential problems.
Students should be reminded to replace
the oil container once they use the oil.

Make clear concise position reports

frequently, scan for traffic diligently, and
always watch out for the Cornerstoners!

Double it up on parking checklists

Exercise extreme caution while taxiing in

both the movement and non-movement
areas. If there is a suspicion that there is
someone who is unfamiliar with the area
make sure to use extra caution to avoid
any sort of incursion.

Really push for checking NOTAMS and

keeping in mind what others have told
them. I'm not sure if they had gotten a
standard weather briefing that included
NOTAMS, but they need to do that prior
any flight.

Stress to the students and instructors the

positive exchange of flight controls.

Just stress the use of checklists even if it

is a memorized item, because getting in
the habit of verifying with the checklist. It
will make it a natural response during any
situation.
 Maintain and stress situational
awareness (and basically brief the threat
of the jump airplane's "flying style"). Do
everything we can do and control all the
variables that we can control. But, it's the
other variables that can be the issue that
we can't control where we might have to
put our training to the test. I would also
recommending talking to the FSDO about
the pilot, as I've heard that this isn't the
first time it's happened.

If you are operating out of an airport with

a lot of wildlife around it, brief the takeoff
to include anticipated actions in the event
of a runway incursion with wildlife on the
runway.

Don't trust your student, always double

check them...
 I think that flight instructors should
absolutely always make the student
compare the tac/hobs/aircraft ID with the
binder that the college dispatched. It is
also very easy to get distracted on the
ramp with helping other students, trying
to get a fuel truck, and trying to leave on
time. These external pressures can lead
to seriously bad repercussions. It is
important to be a good friend and help
other people, and it is good to leave on
time, but if you are focusing your energy
on accomplishing tasks that aren't
important to the flight then you are not
preflighting properly. Stay focused and
aware of the tasks at hand and really put
thought into every piece of preflight. If
you can make such practices habitual
then the chances of you every breaking
the chain link will decrease exponentially.

Maintain situational awareness with the

aircraft around you by listening vigilantly
on the radios and maintaining you scan
for traffic. Especially if the aircraft in
question is not doing what they said they
were doing and could themselves as well
as you in an uncomfortable situation.
 After the bird strike we returned to Salt
lake and briefed all the possible
outcomes before landing. Our biggest
concern was that it sounded like some of
the birds hit the landing gear. We decided
on a soft field landing and we notified
tower that we had had a bird strike and
may have issues with our landing. They
sent out a airport ops to watch. All went
well and they were interested in our
report. They do a lot of research on bird
strikes they even took splatter samples
so they could identify the bird. Do your
best to avoid birds, if you do hit one brief
the possible outcomes and report it to
Salt lake.

Continue to increase your knowledge of

weather and other aspects of safety.
Don't get fixated on one idea or goal. Be
willing to change the plan and stay
objective about the best course of action.

Make sure instructors are teaching the

call outs at the beginning of training and
ensuring that their students comply with
the call out.

I'd recommended reminding students and

instructors about proper starting
procedures.

Be aware of your surroundings, don't be

afraid to go around if you are
uncomfortable with any portion of the
approach. Scan, Scan, Scan the landing
area!

Remind both parties to follow post flight

checklist.
 Maintain sterile cockpit while taxiing.
Avoid distraction on the ground.

I recommend more familiarity with night

operations in all flight labs and ground
schools, as well as the reinstating of the
15 knot policy while taxiing, or at least
more taxi speed awareness.

Students and Instructors need to

thoroughly complete the shut down and
securing checklists before leaving the
aircraft.

-Never be afraid to tell the controller that

you are unable to except something
-Never be afraid to conduct several go-
arounds
-sit back in the chair and make sure a
good vantage point is achieved
-be careful of wake turbulence, especially
757s, as it can make the airplane difficult
to control
-Be patient, never rush things
 Utilize radios, all the time. Look for
aircraft. Don't talk over other peoples
radio calls. Check GPS notams.

Always make sure you have a clearance

before entering Bravo. Never assume
you have a clearance unless you hear
the words, "cleared into class Bravo
airspace."

Never take off, because there is a lower

chance of crashing.

To stay away from the DANGER Zone

stay vigilant and and always scan for
traffic regardless of what airspace you're
in.
 Have a note in the Ops and safety
manual to takeoff runway 21 at 42
U

Make sure to teach students from the

beginning that unless they are braking
they need to have their heels on the floor.

always wait to have someone else to

watch one side of the aircraft because
having another set of eyes can help
avoid a situation that will ruin your flight
and others as well as damaging a plane

Westminster Aviation Department heads

should contact and advise the owner of
Skydive Utah in Tooele of the dangerous
practices of their pilot.

Add a line item to the preflight checklist

that requires the pilot to check the tach
and hobbs time.

Get new parachute systems and have

them regularly repacked by an FAA
rigger. Also, maybe a quick crash course
on how to use them (pull this handle,
toggles are yellow, pull right to go right,
left to go left, flare near the ground, don't
pull that, etc.)

Make sure all the students know the

procedure for taking off of runway 32,
maybe talk about it during the preflight or
even as part of the before takeoff
briefing.
 continue to promote safety

Make sure you are following the parking

and post flight procedures, regardless of
where the plane is kept.

Again, nothing really to do but veer off

the taxiway and try and get the tail
number.

Study, pay attention to what I am doing.

 Keep the scan alive, and don't expect
everyone to be making radio calls. Also,
South Valley should be one of the last
options for a practice airport.

Bring this situation up in our CFI meeting.

Have all students and CFIs understand
that another flight school will always be
maneuvering on the east bench of TVY
even with the traffic flow of runway 17.
Everyone has to assume while entering
the 45 for 17 that another a/c is in that
area at TPA and not making radio calls.

Use base frequency for what it is

intended for: communication with
dispatch and in some cases during the
VFR strand.

Students and instructors need to be

reminded about how to handle airplane
issues.
 If ground controllers clear us to taxi
before making initial contact, ensure we
read back our specific destination in
addition to the rest of the taxi clearance.

Don't fly in the mountains when it's windy

and/or turbulent! Also, if there are
unforecast conditions while you are
flying, make a PIREP so others are more
informed.

Just keep making radio calls in the traffic

pattern and maintain your situational
awareness, especially in close proximity
of an airport and/or other aircraft.

I don't feel there would have been a

better way to handle it or manage risk.
We knew the clouds didn't go very high
above our altitude and were constantly
checking for any ice and at first indication
took action and got out of it. The only
other risk management would've been to
avoid the clouds completely, but it was
about 20 below zero and there didn't
appear to be any precip from the clouds.
So knowing we could climb on top of it
and be in the sun if need be, we
proceeded and took caution to ensure we
took immediate action at first indication.
 Do a final walk around and always
double check with the checklist

Get enough rest, bring o's, dont be afraid

to call in fatigued (just do it before the
flight) and take active steps in the cockpit
to avoid falling alseep.

pay attention to airspace, especially the

ILS 17 in ktvy since we practice this
approach so often. Always keep the
G430 on the moving map setting that
shows airspace.

If necessary, you can check the volume

by turning the squelch off and then
setting the volume
 Likelihood This chart isn't available in your version of Excel.
Probable 31
Occasional 64 Editing this shape or saving this workbook into a different file format will perm
Remote 47 chart.
Improbable 10

Severity
Catastrophic 20
Critical 49
Marginal 55
Negligible 28

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