ARAULLO v AQUINO

FACTS

On Sep 25 2013, Sen. Estrade delivered a privilege speech in the Senate, revealing that some Senators, including
himself, had been alloted P50M each as incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of CJ Corona.

Responding to the revelation, Sec. Abad of the DBM explained that the funds were part of the DAP, a DBM project to
ramp up spending to accelerate economic expansion. It was an on-request funding program that was instituted in 2011 to
speed up the growth of GDP. It takes its funds from unreleased appropriations under Personnel Services, unprogrammed
funds, carry-over appropriations unreleased from the previous year, and budgets for slow-moving items or projects that
had been realigned to support faster-disbursing projects. Later, the DAP website claimed that DAP funds were sourced
from Government savings and unprogrammed funds-- savings were taken from unreleased appropriations, like
unreleased Personnel Services appropriations that lapse at the end of the year, and withdrawal of unobligated allotments.

DAP finds its legal basis under Sec.25 (5) Art. VI [power to augment an item for the Executive in the GAA], Sec. 49 and
Sec. 38 of Chap. 5, Book VI of the RAC [authority to use savings for certain purposes and suspension of expenditure
appropriations], and the GAAs of 2011-2013 [provisions on savings, unprogrammed funds and augmentation]. (savings
and unprogrammed funds)

The revelation brewed up a storm of criticism leading to the present protests. The flagship petition, Araullo, brought to the
Courts attention NBC No. 541, which was issued to implement the DAP, directing the withdrawal of unobligated alotments
as of Jun 30, 2012 of government agencies and offices with low levels of obligations, both for continuing and current
allotments.

(The OSG submitted multiple evidence packets on the use of savings, unprogrammed funds, etc.)

PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether or not Rule 65 cpm are proper remedies.

OSG: No actual controversy. No legal standing (no allegation of injury as a result of adoption of DAP and issuance of
NBC 541). Taxpayers suit inapplicable as the DAP was not in exercise of taxation power. Even if there was injury, Rule 65
requires that the resort to it be the only plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law-- the COA or the
TCs are available.

Court: Applied Belgica's standing argumentation:

- incompatibility of views is a conflict between legal rights

- issues are ripe because the DAP was already being implemented, and there are averments of unconstitutionality;; use of
funds also basis for ripeness

- discontinuation of DAP did not make it moot; cited the exceptions to the rule (that were also mentioned in Belgica-- grave
violation of Constitution, exceptional character and paramount public interest, formulation of controlling principles, and
case capable of repetition yet evading review.

- Standing: Treated as taxpayer suit and citizen suit. In addition, transcendental importance.

DISCUSSION: The Court begins by discussing how the Philippine budget and DAP work.

Stages of the Budget Cycle:

a. Preparation

- Budget Call where various agencies are called to prepare and submit their budget proposals.

- Submission of Agency Budget Proposals; departments to partner with civil society organizations and other
citizens in preparation of such proposals.
 - Presentation and Review of Agency BUdget Proposals

- Consolidation of Budgets into the National Expenditure Program and Budget of Expenditures and Sources of
Financing. NEP provides details of spending for each dept. and agency by progra, activity or project. Also includes details
on projects and staff.

- Transmission of NEP and BESF to President for further refinements and re-prioritization

- Preparation of budget documents for Congress deliberation

At this point, there would be data on expenditures and revenues, which would be focal points in the controversy:

- Public expenditures - may be capital expenditures or outlays, and current operating expenditures.

- Capital expenditures - usefulness lasts for a year, and which add to government assets

- Current operating expenditures - purchases of goods and services in current consumption the benefit of which
does not extend beyond the fiscal year (PERSONAL SERVICES, MAINTENANCE AND OTHER OPERATING
EXPENSES).

- may also be economic expenditures, social development expenditures, general government xp, national defense xp, and
public debt. may also be general, special, or bund funds.

- Public revenues - cover all income or receipts used to support government expenditures. Derived from taxes, capital,
grants, extraordinary income, and public borrowings. (see p 31 for specific list of revenues)

b. Legislation - Congress receives the budget, and begins deliberations on it. After the deliberations, it prepares what is
now the General Appropriations Bill and transmits it to the President, where he may veto/conditionally implement budget
items. Failure to pass the GAB means re-enactment of previous GAA.

c. Execution - DBM issues programs and guidelines for the release of funds, prepares an Allotment and Cash Release
Program, releases allotments, and issues disbursement authorities.

- Allotments based on Execution Documents submitted by the agencies. DBM prepares an Allotment Release
program, Cash Release Program, and SAROs. These can be used to incur obligations.

d. Accountability - assessment of agency performance to see if funds were properly utilized. Means by which an
agency's accountability can be examined include performance targets and outcomes, budget accountability reports,
reviews of agency performance, and audits conducted by the COA.
AND NOW, DAP:

The DAP was a stimulus package intend to speed up spending and push growth by investing on high-impact PAPs to be
funded from savings and unprogrammed funds. It was meant to streamline implementation of projects, and frontload due
projects. The World Bank noted this to be a fairly successful project, and had some trickle-down effect in that it resulted in
several projects that directly benefited the poor.

The DBP presented several issuances showing where the DAP's funding would come from: savings derived from pooling
unobligated allotments and withdrawing unreleased appropriations, releasing unprogrammed funds, and applying the
savings and unprogrammed funds to augment existing PAPs or to support other priority PAPs.

--

I: Whether or not DAP was an appropriation measure that required an actual law authorizing it.

- Petitioners: Congress did not enact a law establishing DAP, or authorizing the release of funds to implement the DAP.
There was nothing in the 2011-2013 GAAs to show this. Since it was an appropriation that set aside public funds for
public use, an enabling law is required. Otherwise, this would be circumventing the GAAs. All this, in violation of Sec.
29.1, Art. VI.

- OSG: No law necessary. DAP is neither a fund nor appropriation, as it was a program of prioritizing spending. This is
based on the faithful execution clause.

- Court: Agreed with OSG. The DAP is placed under the Budget Execution Stage, within the President's power. Funds
were already designated at this point; the President, under the faithful execution clause, had sufficient discretion to adapt
the budget to changes in the economic situation.

--

I: Whether or not unreleased appropriations and withdrawn unobligated allotments under the DAP were savings. Whether
the use of such appropriations contravened Sec. 25(5), Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution.

- Congress has traditionally allowed much flexibility to the President in allocating funds pursuant to the GAAs, particularly
when the funds are grouped to form lump sump amounts. Broader items allow more flexibility, which is the point of the
DAP-- taking advantage of that flexibility. Otherwise, the fiscal system would not be sound-- deficits and overspending
may occur in all the wrong areas.

- The President's power to transfer funds has emanated from law itself. It is, however, subject to control from the
Congress, as in Nazareth v Villar. Accordingly, the interpretation of Sec. 25 (5) should be in the context of limitation on
President's discretion over the approriations during the Budget Execution Phase.
A valid transfer of appropriated funds requires the following:

1. Law authorizing the transfer

2. Funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their respective offices

3. Purpose of transfer is to augment an item in the GAA for their respective offices

Requisite 1: Authorization of transfer

- The law authorizing the transfer is more than likely the GAA of a previous year. Hence, the GAA should expressly
authorize the transfer of funds.

- The related provisions in the 2011 and 2012 GAAs allowed for augmentation of any item in the GAA, which contravenes
the Constituional limitation-- augmentation is confined to the respective offices. This was however rectified in the 2013
GAA.

- Effect: The 2011 and 2012 transfer of funds provisions are unconstitutional from this point alone, as there is no law
authorizing those.

Requisite 2: Savings

- Petitioners: The funds used were not actual savings within the context of Sec. 25(5), supra, and the relevant GAA
provisions.

- Savings should refer to excess money after the items that needed to be funded have been funded/paid->paid.
Thus, it requires actual implementation or discontinuation of items. Hence, savings could only be realized in the end of the
year.

- OSG: Savings were appropriations balances-- differences between authorized appropriation and actual amount. The
GAA definition only set the parameters for determining when savings occurredd- it was the President who could actually
determine the existence of savings because these were determinable during the execution stage. Hence, the unobligated
allotments were savings inasmuch as they were clearly portions or balances of any programmed appropriate, free from
obligations or encumberances.

- Court: Certain principles should be borne in mind: Congress wields the power of the purse, the Executive faithfully
executes the laws, flexibility is recognized in execution, and finally: savings should be actual-- real and existing.

The definition of savings in the GAAs reflect this interpretation. It refers to balances which are : (i) still available after the
completion or final discontinuance or abandonment of the work, activity or purpose for which the appropriation is
authorized; (ii) from appropriations balances arising from unpaid compensation and related costs pertaining to vacant
positions and leaves of absence without pay; and (iii) from appropriations balances realized from the
implementation of measures resulting in improved systems and efficiencies and thus enabled agencies to meet and
deliver the required or planned targets, programs and services approved in this Act at a lesser cost.

- Interpretation: Savings could be generated only upon the purpose of the appropriation being fulfilled, or upon the
need for the appropriation being no longer existent.

- Free from obligation or encumberance: implies actual release of the appropriation.

DBM: The savings came from pooling of unreleased appropriations of unreleased appropriations of lapsing appropriations
and slow moving/discontinued projects.

- Court: Not legal basis for the treatment of unreleased or unallocated appropriations are savings. It is only a
declaration of status. The recknoning point here would be the issuance of either an ABM or SARO.

- To consider these unreleased appropriations as savings, unless the GAA provided for their definition as savings,
would be to undercut the power of the purse. The lone exception here would be unfilled positions in an agency's plantilla,
and did not receive an allotment for such vacancies-- the unreleased appropriates may be considered savings under (ii).

- Unobligated allotments, on the other hand, fall under the definition under the GAA, but qualified by (i)-(iii). There
has to be determination of the existence of any of three qualifiers. A unilateral withdrawal of unobligated allotments would
disregard the definition of savings under the GAAs.

- Carpio noticed that MOOE appropriations are deemed dividied into 12 monthly allocations within the year;
savings could be generated monthly. However, MOOE for future months cannot be transferred.

- The DBM memorandum that became the basis of NBC 541 emphasizes that the allotments to be withdrawn will
be based on the list of slow moving projects evaluated by the DBM. However, NBC 5431 did not set in clear terms the
criteria of their withdrawal. The way it works (p 61), the withdrawals disregarded the 2-year period of availability for
appropriations under the GAA.

- EFFECT: The DAP's source of savings were not savings to begin with in the contemplation of the law.

In addition, the DAP and relevant issuances shortened the period of availability of appropriations for MOOE and capital
outlays.

- Congress provided for a one-year period of availability of funds in the GAA, but the DBP wanted authority to
fund the DAP on a quarterly basis.

Petitioners: The respondents forced the generation of savings in order to have a larger funds available for discretionary
spending. This was in effect a deprivation of funding for PAPs with existing appropriations.

OSG: Unobligated allotments were being withdrawn upon the instance of the implementing agencies based on their own
assessment that they could not obligate those allotments pursuant to Presidential directive to speed up appropriations.

Court: NBC 541 shows that the withdrawals were upon the initiative of the DBM itself (p 64).

Further: petitioners assert that no law had authorized the withdrawal and transfer of unobligated allotments and the
pooling of unreleased appropriations. These withdrawals were akin to impoundment allowed only in case of
unmanageable national government budget deficits.

Respondents: NBC 541 was a spending policy to push actual expenditure. It was not impoundment, as impoundment
referred to the decision of the Executive to refuse to spend funds for political or ideological reasons. Withdrawl was made
pursuant to Sec. 38, Ch. 5, Bk VI of the RAC.
Court: The withdrawal and transfer of unobligated allotments and the pooling of unreleased appropriations were
invalid for being bereft of legal support. Nonetheless, such withdrawal of unobligated allotments and the retention of
appropriated funds cannot be considered as impoundment.

- In Philconsa v Enriquez: impoundment refers to a refusal by the President to spend funds made available by
Congress. It may mean the retention or deduction of appropriations.

- 2011-2013 GAAs: Impoundment only in case of UNGBD.

- The withdrawal of unobligated allotments under the DAP should not be regarded as impoundment because it
entailed to transfer of funds, not retention or deduction of appropriations. However, they are still prohibited to be declared
as savings due to Sec. 28, Ch. IV, Bk. IV of the RAC -- they will revert to the General Fund in any case. This should not
be sidestepped.

EFFECT: Not savings.

Requisite 3: Augmentation within respective offices

- The first issue is on the requirements for augmentation. The GAAs set as a condition for augmentation that the
appropriation for the PAP item to be augmented must be deficient.

Petitioners: DAP supported several PAPs not covered with appropriations in the GAAs.

OSG: Via the evidence packets, around 116 DAP-financed PAPs were implemented and had appropriation covers.

Court: Savings pooled under the DAP were allocated to PAPs that were not covered by any appropriations in the pertinent
GAAs. It used several examples:

- DREAM: had an appropriation cover, but through DAP, the cover was exceed by 300%. Several sub-
appropriations were not included in the GAA.

- PCIEETRD: SARO particulars did not match the program specified in the GAA.

OSG: However, there is the faithful execution clause.

Court: Though the Executive is mandated to faithfully execute the laws, it did not translate to unfettered discretion that
would allow the President to substitute his own will for that of Congress. He was in effect making new appropriations.

- The second issue is on cross-border augmentations, which are prohibited under Sec. 25(5), supra.

- During the Jan 2014 oral arguments, Sec. Abad admitted making some cross-border augmentations (e-library,
COMELEC) under the GAA. Certainly, this is a constitutional infirmity.

What of unprogrammed funds? (the previous discussion was on unobligated allocations) The respondents stress that the
funds were brought as separate sources of funds. Sec. 25(5) would be inapplicable.
 - This is true, but they were still subject to restrictions (the GAAs).

Petitioners: Revenue collections must exceed revenue targets; release of unprogrammed funds illegal because such
conditionwas not met.

Respondents: Based on GAA. DBM avers that the

unprogrammed funds could be availed of when any of the following three instances occur, to wit: (1) the revenue
collections exceeded the original revenue targets proposed in the BESFs submitted by the President to Congress; (2)
new revenues were collected or realized from sources not originally considered in the BESFs; or (3) newly-approved
loans for foreignassisted projects were secured, or when conditions were triggered for other sources of funds, such as
perfected loan agreements for foreign-assisted projects.

Court: The BESFs and GAAs only mention two circumstances in which unprogrammed funds could be released (the first
two). This is bolstered in the GAAs. (p 81-82)

The issue here is on the interpretation of the phrase 'revenue collections > targets.' Consider the purpose for which the
funds were incorporated in the GAAs as standy appropriations. The unprogrammed funds were included in the GAAs to
provide cover in case of issues with funding of PAPs. Revenue targets should be considered as a whole. (so again, wait
till the end of the year/period)

--

OTHER ISSUES:

Equal protection (p 83) - No basis. If there is discrimination, only the legislators (the ones who would have been
discriminated) could assail the act.

Checks and balances (p85) - Need not be rediscussed due to the violation of separation of powers.

Accountability - not really. Executive could actually do this.

--

APPLICATION OF OPERATIVE FACT DOCTRINE: Under Art. 7 NCC, a legislative/executive act that is declared void for
being u/c cannot give rise to any right or obligation. However, the doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of
the law/executive act prior to determination of u/c. The effects can be sustained. However, its use should be resorted to
as a matter of equity. It applies only to extraordinary circumstances.
Court: Applicable. Given how the DAP already resulted in concrete projects. J. Brion interpreted this to mean that
operative fact is only applicable in situations where the nullification of effects of what used to be a valid law would result in
inequity and injustice.

Here: Only for PAPs that can no longer be undone, and whose beneficiaries relied in good faith on the validity of the DAP.
It will not be applied to the authors, proponents, and implementors of the DAP unless there are findings of good faith in
their favor by the proper tribunals determining their liabilities.

--

U/C: withdrawl of unobligated alotments, declaration of withdrawn unob allotments and unrel approprations as savings
prior to end of the fiscal year and without complying the GAA definition of savings, cross-border transfers, fundings of
PAPs not covered in the GAA, unprogrammed funds unless there is certification of RC>RT.

------------------------------------------------------------------

MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BY THE OSG:

Preliminary considerations:

A. IMPROPER CHARACTERIZATION

- First: the main question here is not a constitutional question. It is a statutory question involving the proper reading of
Congress' definition of savings in the GAA.

- Savings may be a constitutional term, but the Constitutional definition is in a non-self-executiong provision-- a
law is required. The issue then is realy the interpretation of the statutory definition of savings.

- Most of the issues revolved around savings except for the cross border transfers. In effect, the Court's
interpretation is not a statement of a constitutional rule but an interpretation of an act of Congress. Therefore, a
declaration of unconstitutionality is completely uncalled for.

- Second, the DBM's interpretation of the GAA is entitled to a presumption of validity, as it is the agency that prepares the
NEP and actually works with Congress to prepare the GAA. (admin agency)

- Third, the Court's interpretation of savings is not a constitutional rule, following the point that what we are actually refer to
is interpretation of a statute. Congress' acts can totally obliterate the effect of the Court's decision.

In effect, the issues are primarily statutory interpretatio on savings, a factual determination of the items, and a
constitutional issue only on cross-border transactions.
B. DBM DID NOT ENGAGE IN SAVINGS ACCUMULATION

- Much of the Court's discussion focused on the intent to generate savings. However, much of what the executive did was
in good faith and meant NOT to merely generate savings.

- If the Administration merely wanted to accumulate savings, all it needed to do was allow the previous budget to be
automatically re-enacted. Under a re-enacted budget, all items representing appropriations for a completed task are
automatically converted into savings and immediately available for use. This accounts for the savings of the Arroyo
administration, as compared to the Aquino administration's savings (almost 2x).

- The budget was being passed on time, year in and year out. To better handle certain projects, it was far more specific
with respect to certain budget categories. This was a mark of good faith, and compliance with the Constitution.

- DAP was a response to a fiscal emergency (under-utilization of public funds). Projects were not moving, and those that
were were poorly funded.

- The use of DAP has been diminishing.

- The mechanisms to realize DAP have existed in one form or another throughout all 1987c administrations. Art. VI, Sec.
25(5) of the Constitution is based on the need to stop the flow of scarce resources from failing projects, and reallocate
them to succeeding projects.

(Why does the Court seem to like assuming malice post facto?)

(Why worry about DAP when there are nastier practices in the previous administrations?)

(Why link DAP to pork-barrel when DAP requests due to a more difficult bureaucratic process?)

- Contrary to the Court's saying that any withdrawals were upon the initiative of the DBM itself, the withdrawal is actually a
declaration by the head of agency. The DBM only called for the agencies to submit their plans for withdrawals.

- Besides, the Constitution does not prevent the pooling of savings. It did not require a 1:1 correspondence between
savings and augmentation. The pooling of savings is merely an accounting of total savings so that the necessary agency
may determine how much savings are available for augmentation purposes.

C. BUDGET IS COMPROMISE BETWEEN THE POLITICAL DEPARTMENTS

- It must be noted that Congress, which is the real party-in-interest, has never objected to the Executive's interpretation of
the GAA. It recognizes the role of the President in budget legislation, through the proposal stage and the line-item veto.

- Each budget then represents a compromise on varied and conflicting priorities. If Congress disagrees with the way the
Executive's implementation, it can always impose more restrictive language in the next budget cycle, and hold legislative
inquiries. It may respond against the appropriation. What Congress is doing is a positive ratification of executive action.

Substatntive arguments:
A. INTERPRETATION OF SAVINGS

- Withdrawn unobligated allotments: These are savings because they are already portions or balances of programmed
appropriations free from any obligation or encumberance, still available after the final discontinuance of the w/a/p for
which the appropriation is authorized. This finds basis on the 'stop further expenditure' provision in the RAC. We cannot
waste money on slow-moving projects.

- This reading harmonizes the RAC and the GAA.

- It is consistent with the role of the President as chief economic manager.

- It is consistent with how savings is ordinarily understood.

- Basis: Faithful execution clause.

The Court's interpretation to have these 'savings' revert to the National Treasury instead of being allowed to augment
violates Congressional authorization to use such savings when deemed proper, and destroys the President's power to
augment [sayang ang oras at pera].

- Nothing requires the savings to be revered to the General Fund. Doing this violates Congress' authorization
under the RAC. This would prevent the President to decide, as economic manager, whether to adopt fiscal austerity or
stimulus measures.

- The lifespan of an appropriation simply represents the maximum period for using Congress authorization to
spend for the w/a/p. It is independent of the authorization to the Executive under Bk 6 Ch 5 S 38 RAC to suspend/stop
further expenditure if the public interest so requires. The latter is an exercise of managerial prerogative.

- Unreleased appropriations

Appropriations need not be actually released before they can be considered savings precisely because certain
approprtions are not released to the agencies until and unless these positions are filled for the proper and optimal use of
public funds and a request is submitted to the DBM. These are already DBMs. CFAG is an exception because of their
fiscally autonomous status.

- It is not the status that makes funds available for use as savings, but the fact that allocations are vacant/unfilled
and therefore unspent.

- Nothing requires the release of appropriations before gneeration of savings.

Conclusion: Withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased appropriations may be used for augmentation.

- Basis: Bk VI Ch 5 S39 RAC authorizes the President to approve the use of savings to cover any deficit in any
other item of the regular appropriations. It is anchored on the President's eeasonable determination of public interest, and
is recognized throughout the legal system.

- The Court impairs the economic framework that has long been established.
B. DAP APPLICATIONS HAVE APPROPRIATION COVER

- First, used only two projects to strike down all the applications. Hasty generalization.

- These were actually correct augmentation exercises given the 'proper' interpretation of items and allotment
classes.

- Second, the Court mixed two distinct concepts: items (details and several parts of the bills) and allotment classes
(expense categories of items). (they interpreted it such that if an allotment class within an item has no appropriation, that
allotment class cannot be augmented)

- Art. VI requires is augmentations by items. The litmus test is then the presence or absence of items in the GAA.
The reason is because the item has the description of the augmentable PAPs. As long as there is a certain sum of money
se apart from the item, it may be augmented regardless of allotment class.

- The lack of specific allotment does not amount to lack of intent to fund the PAP. Congress is only required to
create items, but not allotment classes. All the GAA is required to do is create items to comply with the President's line-
item veto. (Sir: Congress gives everyone P1 funding, see what happens next)

- The Constitution does not limit the amount of augmentation. Nothing limits that amount. This can be found in the
ConCommdeliberations (p.21).

C. CROSS-BORDER TRANSACTIONS

- First, appropriations are different from savings. The former are items in the GAA, the latter are balances. They exist only
when the requirements under the GAA are met. Art. VI, Sec. 25.5 prohibits the transfer of appropriations, but not savings.
However, it prohibits unilateral, inter-departmental augmentations.

Second, the Constitution does not prevent the President from transferring savings of his department to another
department upon the latters request, provided it is the recipient department that uses such funds to augment its own
appropriation. In such a case, the President merely gives the other department access to public funds but he
cannot dictate how they shall be applied by that department whose fiscal autonomy is guaranteed by the
Constitution.

- This is a normal interaction between interdependent departments, grounded in constitutional tradition.

- Evidence packets show years of assistance to other departments through Executive savings.

- Cross-border transfers should be understood under this concept. This is not limited to the Executive-- the
Judiciary has been a recipient of such funds. (it has also sent such funds)

- The changes to the Constitution were made to prevent one department from co-opting the other departments.
Transfer is allowed provided there is acceptance on the part of the recipient. This practice is historically rooted.
D. COLLECTION > TARGET

- The DBM was the one who wrote the item on RC > RT. It is supposedly well-known that RC < RT. The government
would never have created the Unprogrammed Fund it would have never been available by use. The Court effectively
nullifies this fund.

- WRT unprogrammed fund: there was no Constitutional interpretation involved, just an interpretation of the GAA.
More importantly, it was the DBM that actually wrote the item for the fund-- Congress assented to it.

- Clear: Actual RC > Estimated RT. (p30-31)

- As for totality of targets, the special provision should have included the word 'total' or 'original' if it wanted to strictly limit
the application of the provision. As it is, it can refer to individual targets.

- The Court's interpretation is highly impractical as the actual revenue collections cannot be determined before the close
of the fiscal year. The Constitution does not prevent the President from transferring savings of his department to
another department upon the latters

request, provided it is the recipient department that uses such funds to augment its own appropriation. In such a case,
the President merely gives the other department access to public funds but he cannot dictate how they shall be
applied by that department whose fiscal autonomy is guaranteed by the Constitution.

StatCon: Do not interpret to produce an absurd result. Consider legislative intent (32-34)

E. APPLICATION OF OPERATIVE FACT

- The doctrine of operative fact has nothing to do with the

potential liability of persons who acted pursuant to a then-constitutional statute, order, or practice. They are
presumed to have acted in good faith and the court cannot load the dice, so to speak, by disabling possible defenses in
potential suits against so-called authors, proponents and implementors. The mere nullification of an act has no
bearing on individual liability precisely because the doctrine primarily seeks to ensure that acts performed prior
to

nullification are still deemed valid on the theory that judicial nullification is a contingent or unforeseen event.

- The cases before us are about the statutory and constitutional

interpretation of so-called acts and practices under a government program, DAP. These are not civil, administrative,
or criminal actions against the public officials responsible for DAP, and any statement about bad faith may be
unfairly and maliciously exploited for political ends. At the same time, any negation of the presumption of good
faith, which is the unfortunate implication of paragraphs 3 and 4 of page 90 of the Decision,62violates the

constitutional presumption of innocence, and is inconsistent with the Honorable Courts recognition that the
implementation of the DAP yielded undeniably positive results that enhanced the economic welfare of the
country.
(also, why did it limit the non-reversal to those that can't be reverted; can't there be a case-to-case basis? e.g.
scholarships)

Procedural arguments:

A. Actual case or controversy: We're taking the judicial power way too far. We're forgetting the actual case and
controversy rule.

- Incompatible perspective does not lead to a justiciable controversy. We're allowing too many non-Hohfeldian
plaintiffs this way.

B. Injury: We're also taking T-F-I too far.

C. Citizens/taxpayers: Limit the standing rule. Taxpayers re: taxation power.

D. Court did not consider actual applications of the DAP, but merely an abstract consideration of NBC 541. See Southern
Hemisphere.