Keohane, Kieran Petersen, Anders A Genealogy of Social Violence Founding Murder, Rawlsian Fairness, and The Future of The Family

A Genealogy of Social Violence
Classical and Contemporary

Social Theory
Series Editor: Stjepan G. Mestrovic, Texas A&M University, USA
Classical and Contemporary Social Theory publishes rigorous scholarly work that
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Also in the series
The Social Pathologies of Contemporary Civilization

Edited by Kieran Keohane and Anders Petersen
ISBN 978-1-4094-4505-0
Utopia: Social Theory and the Future

Edited by Michael Hviid Jacobsen and Keith Tester
ISBN 978-1-4094-0699-0
Fallgirls
Gender and the Framing of Torture at Abu Ghraib
Ryan Ashley Caldwell
ISBN 978-1-4094-2969-2
Torture, Intelligence and Sousveillance in the War on Terror

Agenda-Building Struggles
Vian Bakir
ISBN 978-1-4094-2255-6
A Genealogy of Social Violence
Founding Murder, Rawlsian Fairness,
and the Future of the Family
Clint Jones
University of Kentucky, USA
Clint Jones 2013
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval
system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying,
recording or otherwise without the prior permission of the publisher.
Clint Jones has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be
identified as the author of this work.
Published by
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British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Jones, Clint.
A genealogy of social violence : founding murder, Rawlsian fairness, and the future of the
family / by Clint Jones.
pages cm. -- (Classical and contemporary social theory)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-1-4724-1722-0 (hardback) -- ISBN 978-1-4724-1723-7 (ebook) -- ISBN 978-1-
4724-1724-4 (epub) 1. Sociology--Philosophy. 2. Social sciences--Philosophy. 3. Social
structure. 4. Violence--Social aspects. 5. Families. I. Title.
HM585.J66 2014
301.01--dc23
2013020299
ISBN 9781472417220 (hbk)
ISBN 9781472417237 (ebk PDF)
ISBN 9781472417244 (ebk ePUB)
III
To my Mother, Father, Sister, and Wife,
without whom this book would not have been possible:
May Isabella, Gabrielle and Tristan find a tomorrow better than today.
This page has been left blank intentionally
Contents
List of Figures ix
Acknowledgments xi
1 Framework 1
2 Historical and Philosophical Context 7
3 Girardian Mimetic Theory: Objections and Responses 51
4 Justice as Unfairness: The Social Contracts of Girard and Rawls87
5 Mythologies of the Future: Justice, Mimesis, and Idyllic Hope 121
6 Utopian Undercurrents:
Undoing Mimesis in the Social Imagination 153
7 Squaring the Triangle:

Correcting the Girardian Theory of Mimesis 193
Bibliography 219
Index 225
List of Figures
2.1 The Girardian Standard Triangle 40

3.1 Modified Electra Triangle 61
3.2 The Modified Oedipal Triangle 63
3.3 The Modified Girardian Standard Triangle 64
3.4 The Weak Alternative Triangle 70
3.5 The Strong Alternative Triangle 72
3.6 Modified Weak Alternative Triangle 75
Acknowledgments
A project of this magnitude does not become a reality through the efforts of a
single person. To that end, I would like to take this opportunity to thank a number
of people that helped me achieve this goal through their assistance in compiling
research, organizing my thoughts, and motivating me to complete this book.
While some peoples influence on the text will be readily recognizable, others
will not be, but this does not detract from the value that I have derived from their
assistance, friendship, and support. First, then, I would like to thank my family for
making this entire endeavor possible. Were it not for their love and support, and
willingness to allow me the time and space necessary to pursue this goal, I would
not have been able to complete this book. They have made the headaches easier to
bear, the victories, however small, sweeter, and they have been a constant source
of inspiration. In particular, my wife, Misty, who bore the burden of playing the
roles of one and a half parents, and my mother, Charlotte, without whom I could
not have achieved even half of what this book represents. There are no words.
I would like to thank my dear friend Dr. Josh Horn for his uncompromising
friendship. Were it not for Joshs steadfastness when it came to telling me the
trutheven when the truth was brutaland his commitment to my success, I may
not have finished this book, or, I would have and it would have been noticeably
worse for not having his input as a philosopher and friend. The same is true of
Gary Deaton, Leigh Ann Jordan, Raven and Katrina Mineo, Brian Powell, and
numerous others on the Transylvania University Forensics Team for allowing
me to test out arguments and respond to challenges on many a long commute
between competitions, never flagging in their interest in the project or their desire
to see me succeed. Similarly, I would like to thank Dr. Scott Whiddon whose
timely and heartfelt encouragement did more to spur me on to finish than anything
else. Additionally, I owe a debt of gratitude to my colleagues at the University of
Kentucky who tolerated innumerable long discussions about the most mundane
minutiae; were it not for them I may have given up a number of times.
Lastly, I would like to express my deepest regards and immense gratitude to a
number of people that have been intimately involved in this project, and without
whom I may never have taken it on. Dr. Natalie Nenadic was instrumental in
helping me understand so much of Hegels philosophy and how to piece it together
with Girards theory that utilizing Hegels thought was much easier than it would
have been otherwise. This, coupled with her guidance on the feminist critique
of Girard, made her invaluable to me during the writing of this text. Dr. Stefan
Bird-Pollans input was valuable both because he helped me to grasp Rawlsian
philosophy and because of his challenges to my project that forced me to refine and
xii A Genealogy of Social Violence
polish the arguments. Additionally, I owe a debt of gratitude to Dr. Dan Breazeale
who unhesitatingly aided me at the most unexpected of times allowing me to finish
this project in a timely fashion. The person to whom I am most grateful, however,
is Dr. Arnold Farr. Dr. Farr has been both a mentor and a friend to me during the
writing of this book, and his excitement about this project, his commitment to my
success, and his contributions both in commentary and conversation have helped to
shape and define this project from its inception. His ability to anticipate problems,
suggest sources for clarification, and point out ideas I had not yet hit upon moved
this project steadily forward without requiring thatI sacrifice creativity or quality.
While I am indebted to all of these people, and, without a doubt, many others
whom space prevents me from mentioning by name, I should point out that, in
spite of everything, the arguments in this book are mine and, as such, so are the
failings. I readily share the successes of this project with all those that made it
possible and take full responsibility for its shortcomings.
Finally, I would like to thank the editorial team at Ashgate for making this
entire process as painless as possible. With their assistance and through their
diligence this book is better than it would have been otherwise.
Chapter 1
Framework
Overview
Peoples lives are full of contradictions and, thus, so are the narratives that we, as
individuals, construct to put our lives into perspective. One of the most permeable
contradictions, and certainly one of the most dominant, is centered on the idea
of fairness. We live in a world that allows us to demand fair treatment while
simultaneously cowing us with the constant reminder that life is, quite simply, not
fair. People are always striving to achieve fairness in an unfair world. At a personal
level our natural endowments seem unfair when compared to others, socially and
economically we begin our lives in unfair conditions, and on a macro level analysis
even governments and nations do not deal with each other fairly. Yet, fairness is
the basic guideline for justice in most of our dealings with each other. As long as
we do not acquire our advantages over others through ill-begotten means, these
advantages, whatever they may be, are simply explained away by claiming that life
is not always fair. Those that suffer the inequality bred by unfairness are left to cope
in an unfair world their only comfort being that justice was served. The story, then,
that we are expected to frame our lives with, is a glaring contradiction in terms.
Because the idea of fairness is so important to a socially functional concept of
justice, the focus of my project is a philosophical genealogy aimed at developing
a critique of the socio-cultural roots of justice as a foundational idea for human
social interactions and institutions. The dominant theories of justice today often
operate according to a model of justice where the primary goal of, and the basis
for determining the success of a system of justice is, a principle of fairness. Hence,
the primary impetus for this critique is John Rawls and his notion of fairness, and
especially its relationship to, and within, the family. The main premises of this
critique will develop out of a re-envisioning of Ren Girards triangular model
of mimetic rivalry and will, in addition to developing a stronger mimetic model,
propose utopian conceptions of society as an alternative to Girards rigid focus
on religion and mythology as the primary basis for evidence of the rise of justice
in human communities. Girards themes will be brought into direct contact with
Rawlss own theories to demonstrate both how a Girardian reading of Justice
strengthens Rawlss own arguments and how a different understanding of fairness
might alter the necessity of grounding justice in this concept.
I choose Girard as my starting point because I am persuaded that mimetic desire,
as he proposes it, offers us a better explanation of our social and political condition
than any other theory available. Girards mimetic theory is designed to explain why
violence permeates our society. He formulates his explanation by examining the
2 A Genealogy of Social Violence
intimate relationship of father and son, and arguing for a cataclysmic breakdown
in that relationship ultimately leading to violence and death. The sons desire for
the mother, modeled on the fathers own desires, provides the emotional fuel the
son needs to overthrow his father. Accordingly, this act creates instability in the
human social order and in the ensuing upheaval social institutions are formed to
both control the impulse in others and prevent repeat occurrences of the violence.
However, while my project will modify Girards work, I do not intend
to make an engagement with Girard the sole focus of my thesis. Rather, after
offering a standard interpretation of Girardian mimesis, I will address what I see
as the primary problems of Girards theory in order to position mimetic theory
as a better way to understand the social and political construction of society. As
such, I will place mimetic desire in opposition to theories of justice, especially
contractual theories, which purport to motivate our moral obligations through the
re-envisioning of our choices as a means to attain a more perfect society, like, for
instance, the original position of John Rawls.
John Rawlss original position, the necessary component for effectively
employing his theory of justice, is insufficient because he requires individuals
behind the veil which presumes too much regarding the socially constructed
psyche of those individuals. For Rawls, a morally acceptable social choice is one
that each person would agree to if all people were stripped of self-knowledge and
placed behind a veil of ignorance. These people wouldnt know who or what they
would become in life and, the theory goes, because of this they would always
select the fairest principles and institutions. This is Rawlss notion of justice as
fairness at work, if a person might become a crippled, minority, female in the
world beyond the veil, then before they cross over into the world they would only
agree to social institutions which ensured that, as that individual, they could be
successful. As such justice as fairness is unattainable because one cannot place
themselves behind the veil of ignoranceindividuals do not make social decisions
privately or uninformed of social circumstancesand, therefore, Rawlss notion
is impractical for explaining how social mechanisms work never mind how they
develop. This criticism of Rawls is not new or unique, but my arguments for why
individuals behind the veil undermines the justice as fairness project of Rawls
will deviate significantly from others that have taken this position.
Mimetic desire does not have this failing because it is an attempt to describe
the original circumstances the earliest humans found themselves in before, during,
and after the establishment of social institutions and hierarchies. A sound theory
based in mimetic desire can be used as a means to discover, that is, uncover,
through an unraveling of the most intimate human relationships what it is that
motivates us, as a society, to cling to unjust institutions and social practices. My
challenge to Rawlss theoryand contract theories that believe an understanding
of the originary human social moment is a fanciful notionis that they cannot
achieve the same level of functional applicability and, therefore, cannot help to
repair what is broken in human societal relationships. To the extent that I think my
mimetic theory is superior to other versions as well as competing explanations of
Framework 3
social justice I develop my mimetic theory so that it lends itself to, in fact, finds its
anchor points in, influential twentieth-century cultural critiquesespecially that
of Herbert Marcuse.
Structure of the Argument
The critique I undertake in this project is built around three primary goals of
differing importance and scope for differing reasons. First, I want to offer a
critique of Rawls that will hopefully create space for a more robust critique of
contract theories generally. Admittedly, this is the most minor of the objectives
I have, but Rawlss theories have held sway for almost four decades and are the
focal point of numerous detractors and supporters. However, this is why I chose
Rawls as my own target. As such, I do not plan to do a sustained study of Rawlss
work, nor do I intend to make Rawls the focal point of my own arguments; rather,
because of the popularity of Rawlss theories as representative of a tradition of
contract theories, I hope to expose the shaky foundation that contract theories rely
upon for their claims about what constitutes justice. Given that social contracts
had to have a starting point, I find it unusual that most contract theorists posit a
fictional state-of-nature rather than try to generate a reasonable account of actual
circumstances from which contracting was necessitatedRousseau being the
unmistakable exception. My intention is to demonstrate how a Girardian theory of
mimetic rivalry can provide that groundwork. However, Girard is not without his
own problems, and rectifying those issues will trump a critique of Rawls both in
scope and magnitude allowing me to propose an alternative, and stronger, mimetic
theory that moves a Girardian analysis forward.
The second goal of my project will be to correct for the problems inherent in
Girards work to render it not only more feasible in its application to concerns
of justice, but also in broadening its scope beyond religion and myth. The most
pernicious problem I want to correct is the misguided notion in Girards work
that the female is a passive object. According to Girards mimetic theory the
fatherson relationship devolves into violence because of the mother, but the
mothers only role in a Girardian framework seems to be passive desirability. That
is, the purpose of the female in Girards theory is merely to be desired. To the issue
of feasibility in applying Girards theory I will offer a corrective critique focusing
on Girards adherence to a parricidal model and offer a more coherent siblicidal
model based on the same evidence.
To do this, I will develop an argument against Girards position that the female
object in the mimetic triangle is passive and show how an active female corrupts
Girards analysis. A further critique of Girard will be developed against his use
of religion and myth as the grounds of justification for his claims about mimesis
and will extend my counterclaims about the role of women at the same time. I do
not intend to argue that his analysis of religion and myth are wholly incorrect or
somehow misguided, but rather I will push his analysis into an equally old form
of human imaginingutopic dreamingand show how a Girardian model can

be used to explain the standard tropes that occur in utopias across cultures and
generations. One of the major advantages of extending the boundaries of Girards
applicability is that utopias offer equal opportunity in both social construction
and critique, as such feminine agency can be brought into equal standing with
its masculine counterpart and greater clarity in mimetic theory can be achieved.
Correcting for these two problems in Girards work will strengthen Girards
mimetic claims as well as endow his theory of mimesis with a greater social and
philosophical use value.
The final main goal of the project stems directly from the critique of Girard
I plan to offer. In Girards mimetic model the primary crisis occurs between the
father and son as a result of desire focused on the mother. One of the problems I
have with this account of the mimetic crisis is the disregard that Girards model has
for the rest of the familynot just the mother. Trying to account for an additional
sibling in Girards framework is difficult and unconvincing. Supposing even one
more son, erodes the credibility of Girards model substantially. Given this, I will
offer a counter model that accounts for the possibility of additional children as
well as a counterbalancing force in the form of an active feminine agent.
Doing this however, along with my primary concern of developing a narrative
about justice that is sufficient to bring about a genuine understanding of why justice
leads to a contradictory commitment to fairness, I will need to argue for a radical
re-envisioning, or the total abolishment, of the core nucleus of the familythat
is, the components that comprise the triangular relationships. Given that Girards
construction of the mimetic triangle succeeds only because he uses the simplest
formation of the concept family his model cannot be corrected to bring about
the necessary social change to alleviate the violence mimetic rivalry has made
endemic to human society. Once Girards theory is extended to the family more
broadly construed it becomes clear that the triangular construction of desire will
only be abolished when a suitable multifaceted alternative is developed out of the
existing structure. Therefore, I do not intend to merely argue for abandoning the
core structure of the family, but rather, replacing it with a different approach to
structuring the familya new nucleus, if you will.
To achieve this level of critique, in Chapter 2 I will outline and explain Girards
mimetic model enumerating and highlighting the problematic points of interest
that I take issue with it along the way. This will allow me to both introduce Girard
to those unfamiliar with his work while simultaneously establishing the need for,
and purpose of, my critique. In this chapter, I will provide a brief survey of the
ideas that provide the foundation for Girards mimetic project. I will examine
both Girards Hegelian and Nietzschean roots, as well as his reliance upon and
critique of Freud, before turning to Girard himself. In the final section of this
chapter, I will explain Girards theory of mimetic rivalry and his construction
of the mimetic triangle explaining in-depth how mimesis, according to Girard,
leads to violence that ultimately ushers in a new age of social institutions.
Framework 5
In Chapter 3 I will offer my critique of Girards mimetic model. I will use

this chapter to explain my three critiques of the fundamental issues that Girards
model cannot adequately handle. First, I will challenge the passivity of the female
object in Girard. By doing this I will show how my model empowers the female
agent, not only by removing the stigma of objectification, but also by equalizing
the power claim within the family between mother and father. Equalizing the
parentss influence in terms of power neutralizes the need for a dependence upon
the patricidal model Girard favors. Second, I will examine and refute the idea that
the violence inherent to mimetic rivalries stems from the relationship between
father and son. In place of Girards patricidal model I will propose a fratricidal
model and establish the reasons for preferring my counter model. Finally, I will
offer a critique of the motivations espoused by Girard for the development of social
institutions and the incentives human communities have for desiring them. Here I
do not intend to jettison Girards work on religion and myth, but rather I propose
that even if these social phenomena are developments of mimetic rivalry, then they
are not the most important, which is why Girards work does not carry broader
appeal and applicability which I believe his insights should garner. Following from
this I will also establish Girards theory as the best basis for contractual theories
with the intent of demonstrating why Girards work ought to be paramount to, and
prominent in, contract theories (e.g. the work of Rawls and his contemporaries).
Since I will conclude Chapter 3 with a strong critique of the development of
social institutions the focus of Chapter 4 will be my critique of the idea of fairness
via John Rawls. In this chapter I will argue that the very idea of fairness is inherent
in the relationships between parents and their children and only after rivalry
embeds itself in these relationships does the idea of fairness begin to fracture.
Using Rawlss argumentation as an exemplar, I will argue that fairness is the basis
for justice (i.e. the claim that everyone wants to be treated fairly) but that justice
as a social institution is meant to uphold, is in fact based upon, unfairness (i.e.
the contradictory social position that life is not fair). My critique of Rawls and
Girard will show how mimetic rivalry leads to violence because of a violation of
an expectation of fairness and the result is the social institutionalization of justice.
In Chapter 5 I put mimetic theory and Rawlsian justice into a utopian context
in order to show how a mimetic reading of justice allows us to use utopian thought
to reveal key insights about the nature and design of human communities. I will
examine Girards use of religion and myth and explain why these two social
phenomena are not sufficient to explain the rise of justice as one of the core
concerns of human social relations. At issue here is my attempt to push Girards
theory beyond the confines of his own concentrated efforts to establish mimesis
as a viable theory. While religion may be useful for examining the rituals societies
use to recreate the initial mimetic violence and, according to Girard, offer some
release from the tensions that exist in society, religion does little to help us
understand how to improve our understanding of justice and its application in
society. The same is true of myth, which may be valuable as a tool for explaining
how the founding violence came to pass or how societies of old determined the
resolution of the originary violent moment, but it fails to give us leverage for
correcting our present condition.
Building upon the religion and mythological examples Girard relies upon I
will argue for a mimetic reading of utopian schemes. In Chapter 6 I will argue
that utopias represent a better opportunity for applying my revised Girardian
methodology to highlight what problems are endemic to society and a possible
means of understanding what has to change to resolve the mimetic crisis we
perpetually find ourselves in. Above all, I will propose that utopias tend to solve
for these problems in the same ways and by tracking these solvency trends we
can develop a means to rectify what went wrong in the aftermath of the originary
violence that developed from mimetic rivalry at the dawn of human civilization.
Moreover, I will show that religion and myth, as Girard uses them, have a tendency
to demean or ignore the feminine, but that utopias tend to do just the opposite,
which I will argue illustrates not only the non-passive nature of the female as actor
in the human saga, but also the power struggle that ensues from the interaction of
the male and female in my revised mimetic triangle.
The use of utopian dreaming will establish the need for me to argue in Chapter7
in favor of a non-triangular model of mimetic rivalry. Or, at least not the ascetic
and paltry triangle that Girard depends upon. At a minimum, I hope to have
established the need for equalizing the sexes in the mimetic model regardless of
which alternative is favored by the reader. I will use this position to advance my
argument for the re-conceptualization of the family and its structure. I will argue
that the nucleic family is the epicenter of the social ills that have plagued human
communities through the ages and continue to do so today. That is, I will advance
here a Marcusean argument that the reason progress is so slow to develop in
the areas of human social interaction and institutions is because the problems are
rooted in the structure of the family, and without radical change to that structure real
change will not be possible, but will remain in the domain of utopian hopes. One
of the key components to the Marcusean approach I offer is an examination of how
technology might help us overcome the social problems generated by the traditional
mimetic approach to the family as we try to achieve an eros-based society.
Finally, I will conclude the chapter with a strong argument for why a radical
change in the family structure will have positive impacts on ideas about justice
and how I believe this will be beneficial to society writ largeagain following
Marcuses lead regarding the nature of our societal relationships understood both
institutionally and interpersonally. Re-conceiving justice and the abolishment of
the nuclear familyunderstood not only in its modern context but also as the core
of the family whether the family is cast as extended or traditional in its twentieth-
century contextare the main targets of this project. Having reached those goals
in the preceding chapters, Chapter 7 will be primarily a small chapter centering
on revisiting, reiterating, and tying together the various conclusions of the project
as a whole. Revising Girard in order to offer a critique of Rawls provides the
framework for understanding the richness, and importance, of a Marcusean
inspired reconceptualization of society.
Chapter 2
Historical and Philosophical Context
The Historical Situation
Because what I aim to accomplish with my critique of Girard is not just a greater
understanding of the import of his philosophical project but also to advance that
project beyond the limits Girard has, for so long, been comfortably operating
within. It will be imperative to begin my analysis by situating Girards project in
its proper philosophical and historical circumstances. Girard has locked horns with
several philosophical heavyweights and though his body of work is philosophical
in nature the examples he uses to demonstrate the veracity of his argumentative
conclusions are often based in illustrations drawn from the literary world. As a
result, Girard has long been seen as doing literary criticism and his work has, until
fairly recently, not garnered the attention of the philosophers. This is surprising
given that the core intuitions of Girards theories are dependent upon the insights
of three authors: Hegel, and more crucially Sigmund Freud, and Friedrich
Nietzsche.1 To make the most, then, of a Girardian interpretation of socially
constructed relationships it will be beneficial to understand both the philosophical
inheritances and disputations Girards theories rely upon with respect to each of
these philosophers.
It is important to keep in mind that while each of these thinkers bears some
responsibility for shaping Girards thoughts about the human condition, it is
especially important to note that their impacts differ in both degree and kind
and also that these individual thinkers are not working together to create a long
term narrative, but rather that they are also in tension with each other and this
is especially true of Nietzsche and Hegel. So, while Girard draws his various
inspirations and insights from these thinkers, it is also true, as is usually the
case, that the combination of these competing theories often produces some
tenuous conclusions in light of the fact that using similar arguments they derived
conclusions that were at times similar and at other times wildly divergent. Girards
theories are no different in this respect.
For my own approach to this historical overview I will present these individuals
chronologically rather than in ascending or descending order with respect to their
relative importance to Girards long term efforts. In dealing with each thinker I
will highlight why each is important to understanding Girards work, how Girard
uses them, and in what important ways Girard deviates from their assumptions
or conclusions. Additionally, as a means of establishing the grounds for my own
1 Michael Kirwan, Discovering Girard, New York: Cowley Publications, 2005: 8.

subsequent claims critiquing Girard in the next chapter I will indicate where I also
disagree with these authors and Girards interpretation of them. This will, hopefully,
make it easier for me to support my conclusions as I interrogate the methodology
Girard uses to construct the core of his theory and offer some suggestions and
possible alternative conclusions for his theory that I believe strengthen mimetic
theories about the origins of violence in society and the introduction of socially
regulating institutions.
Hegel: The Necessity of Social Evolution2
It is often argued that Hegel is the first social theorist and, as such, it makes sense
that his philosophy would resonate with someone committed to decoding the
nature of human social existence. Hegels elucidation of the historical processes
that shape and influence human reality parallel nicely with the way that Girard
understands the ever-shifting social landscape and Hegels dialectical methodology
finds an unlikely counterpart in the mimetic crisis Girard proposes. Nevertheless,
it is difficult sometimes to see clearly the connections that exist between Hegelian
philosophy and Girards own project, especially when Hegel does not feature as
prominently in Girards works as Nietzsche and Freud. However, When Girard
was crafting his early mimetic theories he was reading Hegel, or, more accurately,
Girard was reading Alexandre Kojves lectures on Hegel while he was writing
Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, and this had a profound effect on the shape and
definition of Girards mimetic project. However, unearthing, completely, the Hegel
of Girard would take us too far afield and require too much analysis that would
prove more distracting than helpful. As such, my interaction with Hegel will center
on the few aspects of his philosophy that underscore or intersect in important ways
those aspects of Girardian thought pertinent to the focus of this project. This is
not to diminish the importance of Hegels thought to Girards project, but rather
to bring to light the philosophical distance that exists between the conclusions I
intend to draw and Hegels own as Girard understands and employs them.
Of primary interest for these present investigations into the origin of human
culture, justice, and the future of society is Hegels philosophical anthropology,
especially as he understands the content and context of human social interactions
2 Because Hegel is not the focus of the argument I am advancing against Girard I
have focused almost exclusively on the account of recognition offered by Hegel in the
Phenomenology of Spirit. I recognize that a longer engagement with Hegelian thought
on this issue, as well as others, is necessary both as a requirement for understanding the
concept in Hegels larger project and also for a more robust account of Hegels influence on
Girards thought. However, for my purposes here it is more important that Hegels influence
be understood as contributing to Girards development of mimesis, and for that I have taken
only a small sliver of Hegels work as representative of the core concepts necessary to link
Hegel and Girard philosophically.
Historical and Philosophical Context 9
in the teleological development of history he proposes. To take into account

the historical project of Hegels philosophy in a manner consistent with an
understanding and critique of Girards mimetic project requires that Hegels
notions about recognition will be equally important. Also, Hegels articulation of
the standards and development of the ethical life with particular attention being
paid to the familysince the role of the family in the organization, progression,
and maintenance of the cultural life of a community is the fundamental focus of
this project. Fitting Hegel and Girard together can prove difficult at times because
the language used by both men is often inconsistent even when they are expressing
a similar idea. Hence, talking about a Girardian concept that develops out of a
Hegelian one sometimes requires a measure of flexibility not necessary with other
thinkersincluding Nietzsche and Freudbecause Hegel is, literally in many
respects, a background force in the Girardian scheme of things rather than a target
for direct engagement in the Girardian corpus. Nevertheless, working through
these aspects of Hegels thought will prove beneficial to show both Girards
philosophical inheritance and also his continuity with a philosophical tradition
that begins with Hegel.
Hegels concept of history is best understood from the point of view of his
theory of recognition. Recognition of and by the other is the first act necessary to
establish human society because it is necessary to establish the self-consciousness,
in the form of desire, of the individual. Put differently, the context for humanity
is generated by recognizing an other and desiring to be recognized as another in
turn. The Hegelian position requires that in order to be able to say I, a subject
must have desire, and this has to be a desire for a non-natural object the only
possible candidate for such an object is the desire of another. This means, to be
recognized by the other person, [is] to place oneself as the object of someone elses
desire.3 Our desire to be recognized and recognizing that desire in someone else
is, for Hegel, the moment when the first persons were able to achieve human-ness,
that is, to rise above their animal natures.
The moment of recognition provides a type of simultaneity to the establishment
of the self-consciousness of the I and also to the other as an independently
existing being. In the moment when the two desires encounter each other there is
a doubling of desire and the desires are directed at the same thing: a recognition
of ones self-consciousness. For Hegel, when the two meet the other is equally
independent and self-contained, and this moment creates the need to be
recognized as equal, but the first does not have the object before it merely as
it exists primarily for desire, but as something that has an independent existence
of its own, which, therefore, it cannot utilize for its own purposes thus, the
movement is simply the double movement of the two self-consciousnesses.4
This doubling of the movements between the two interacting self-consciousnesses
results in a duplicating of self-consciousness in its oneness, that is, they
3Kirwan, Discovering Girard, 31.

4 G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller, Oxford: OUP, 1977: 112.
recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another.5 Yet, in this mutuality

what appears to the self-consciousness is an inequality between the two because
they do not recognize each other as recognizers but rather as opposed to one
another, one being only recognized, the other only recognizing.6
Girards mimesis clearly bears the marks of Hegels theory of recognition.
This is particularly true where the independent Hegelian self-consciousnesses
become enmeshed in a rivalry for the recognition of the other. In Girards mimetic
framework the son strives for legitimacy relative to his father once the son has
developed the capacity for desiring as his father does. This struggle between
father and son has, for Girard, violent consequences, but, the same is true of the
Hegelian story. However, where the two differ is in how the conflict brought on
by the crisis of recognition is resolved. For Hegel recognition leads to conflict
because the pure abstraction of self-consciousness consists in showing itself as
the pure negation of its objective mode, or in showing that it is not attached to
any specific existence, not to the individuality common to existence as such, that
it is not attached to life.7 Hence, when the two individuals confront one another
as others demanding to be recognized they enter into a struggle that each hopes
will negate their existence as pure abstraction but to do so they must undertake
an action that will put them at risk of annihilation. As such, Hegel argues that the
presentation of one self-consciousness to another is a twofold action,
Action on the part of the other, and action on its own part. In so far as it is the
action of the other, each seeks the death of the other. But in doing so, the second
kind of action, action on its own part, is also involved; for the former involves
the staking of its own life. Thus the relation of the two self-conscious individuals
is such that they prove themselves and each other through a life-and-death
struggle. They must engage in this struggle, for they must raise their certainty
of being for themselves to truth, both in the case of the other and in their own
case. And it is only through staking ones life that freedom is won; only thus is
it proved that for self-consciousness, its essential being is not [just] being, not
the immediate form in which it appears, not its submergence in the expanse of
life, but rather that there is nothing present in it which could not be regarded as
a vanishing moment, that it is only pure being-for-itself. The individual who has
not risked his life may well be recognized as a person, but he has not attained
to the truth of this recognition as an independent self-consciousness. Similarly,
just as each stakes his own life, so each must seek the others death, for it values
the other no more than itself; its essential being is present to it in the form of an
other, it is outside of itself and must rid itself of its externality.8
5Hegel, Phenomenology, 112. Emphasis in original.

For Hegel, then, desire to be recognized leads the individual self-

consciousnesses into a struggle to legitimize them, that is, each fights for
recognition so that their existence will be more than merely pure abstraction.
A critical distinction between Girard and Hegel is necessary on this point
precisely because Hegelian desire and Girardian desire are not understood to
interact in similar ways. For Hegel desire is a desire to be recognized by the
other and, as such, the desire between the two self-consciounesses is the same
each desires the other to recognize them. For Girard, the two individuals are in a
struggle because their desires are directed at the same thing, for the same reasons,
that is, one of the individuals desires something because the other does. Their
desires draw them closer and closer in likeness until they cannot differentiate
themselves and then their inability to distinguish each other results in them
necessarily competing for the object of their desire. For Hegel and Girard the act
of desiring plays essentially the same role, but, contrary to Hegel, Girards desire
is already directed toward an externality that legitimizes the I and the other
because one of them, and eventually both of them, are desiring the thing in the
world because of, and in the same way as, their counterpart self-consciousness.
Moreover, according to Michael Kirwan, Girard also expresses misgivings about
the necessary relation in Hegel between desire and destruction or negation. Hegel
places violence at the centre [sic] of his system, and in effect sacralises [sic] it, so
he is unable to offer a way out of the problematic of violence.9
Presented in such a manner it is not unfair to say that, for Hegel, human
existence begins, in fact, is not even possible, without a first bloody fight. Perhaps
more accurately, human existence, that is, all of human history, begins in slaughter.
The life-and-death struggle Hegel posits is necessary to achieve his critique of
humanitys climb to self-consciousness because violencehuman violence
and the ability to endure ones exposure to violence lie at the foundation of
mans ascent to the level of self-consciousness.10 The same is true of Girards
anthropological project, but, since the reason for the violence is different given
the divergent understanding of the nature and role of desire, so the fight itself is
different. More importantly, not just the nature of the fight is different, but the
resolution of the conflict is different as well. According to Hegel the opponents put
their lives at risk in order to be recognized by the other, but eventually one of the
fighters, fearing death, surrenders. For Hegel, this capitulation upsets, in particular
ways, the balance of powerunderstood simply as pre-fight equalitybecause
the fight is, first and foremost, a struggle to subjugate through negation, but no one
is prepared for the aftermath of the struggle when it ends in the actual subjugation
of the other. As Alexandre Kojve points out,
9 Kirwan, 33. Girards misgivings about Hegels inability to offer a way out of the
problematic of violence are equally applicable to Girard though he does not realize it, or, if
he does, does not address it. I will address this in greater detail below in Chapters 3 and 5.
10 Piotr Hoffman, Violence in Modern Philosophy, Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1989: 71.
If, on the one handas Hegel saysself-consciousness and man in general

are, finally, nothing but desire that tries to be satisfied by being recognized by
another desire in its exclusive right to satisfaction, it is obvious that man can be
fully realized and revealedthat is, be definitively satisfiedonly by realizing
a universal recognition. Now ifon the other handthere is a multiplicity of
these desires for universal recognition, it is obvious that the action that is born
of these desires canat least in the beginningbe nothing but a life and death
fight. A fight, since each will want to subjugate the other, all the others, by a
negating, destroying action. A life-and-death fight because desire that is directed
toward a desire directed toward a desire goes beyond the biological given, so
that action carried out for the sake of this desire is not limited by this given. In
other words, man will risk his biological life to satisfy his nonbiological desire.
And Hegel says that the being that is incapable of putting its life in danger in
order to attain ends that are not immediately vitalthat is, the being that cannot
risk its life in a fight for recognition, in a fight for pure prestigeis not a truly
human being.11
Once the conflict engendered by recognition is resolved as one of the combatants

surrenders a social hierarchy is created. This social hierarchy is the basis for the
teleological historical narrative that Hegel identifies in the socio-historical record
of humankind. Because the victorious combatant assumes the role of Lord and the
vanquished is relegated to the status of Bondsman the two become oppositional
but not necessarily antagonistic since the defeated person still fears the looming
possibility of his death. The concepts represented by the slavishness of the loser
and the mastery of the victor are not necessarily encapsulated in the physical
ownership of one person by another but rather it is the dominance of the spirit of
the beaten man as he is put to work in the service of the victor. The vanquished
has subordinated his human desire for recognition to the biological desire to
preserve his life: this is what determines and reveals his inferiority. The victor
has risked his life for a nonvital end: and this is what determines and reveals
his superiority over biological life and, consequently, over the vanquished.12 The
existence of master and slave establishes, by their very existence, the differences
between them and their relationshipwho is capable of domination and who is
to be dominated. In the aftermath of the fight, once the recognized identities are
established, the vanquished is put to work by the victor completing the victors
domination over nature.
The victor, by virtue of not having to work, enjoys a sense of freedom that is
falsified by the fact that his recognitionthe recognition that bestows humanity
is dependent upon the slave whose ability to recognize the desires of the master
11 Alexandre Kojve, Desire and Work in the Master and Slave, Hegels Dialectic
of Desire and Recognition: Texts and Commentary ed. John ONeill, Albany, NY: State
University of New York, 1996: 51.
12 Kojve, Desire and Work, 52.
negates the humanity of the master since there is a lack of reciprocity between
the two. That is, once the initial battle concludes the combatants are no longer
equals capable of recognizing in each other the desire to be recognized. Once that
equality is lost the resulting social arrangement cannot provide, except in a false
sense, the requisite recognition to sustain the humanity of the master. For the
slave, however, their work allows them to change the world, literally, by acting
upon it. In the actions they carry out to serve the master they simultaneously
produce a self-awareness, a self-recognition, that they are capable of negating
and through that negation find recognition. The slaves recognition comes not
from fighting, but from struggling nonetheless, as a worker for the master, but
by acting, he negates, he transforms the given, nature, his nature, and he does
it in relation to an idea, to what does not exist in the biological sense of the
word, in relation to the idea of a masterthat is, to an essentially social, human,
historical notion.13 In the final analysis, then, it is the slave that is responsible for
revealing the true human ideal and becoming a citizen in the socio-political sense.
In this way the slave overcomes his subjugation and equalizes, once again, the
relationship between himself and the master creating between them the conditions
for recognition that does not require the violence of their first encounter.
Encapsulated in the particular struggle between the master and the slave is the
story of the larger, universal narrative, of humanitys socio-historical existence.
Each person represents a particular historical stage in the development of human
society. The first epoch is dominated by the master since it is the existence of
the master that determines the parameters for post-violence existence. During
this time the slave is incapable of garnering the recognition he needs to transcend
his given (biological) nature and is also incapable of recognizing that his work
provides him the context to overcome his subjugation on his own, independent
of the masters recognition. Once the slave achieves the necessary self-awareness
to pursue, through his work, the transcendence of the abstraction of his self-
consciousness the second era of human existence begins. Finally, the end of history
is the synthesis of mastery and slavery and the understanding of that synthesis,
these two periods must be followed by a third, during which human existence, in
some sense neutralized, synthetic, reveals itself to itself by actively realizing its
own possibilities.14 The period of the master would be the second longest of the
three epochs followed by the slavish period which would be the shortest and most
tumultuous. Lastly, the synthesis period would be the longest because it is the end
of historythat is, in some sense, eternaland, though it is the product of the slave
struggling to overcome his subjugation, that is, born of his desire to be recognized,
the synthesis that results need not be the product of a conscious effort on the part of
the slave beyond his desire to have his own desires gratified. Hegel claims, This
relationship between the subjective consciousness and the universal substance is
such that the actions of human beings in the history of the world produce an effect

altogether different from what they themselves intend and accomplish, from what
they immediately recognize and desire. Their own interest is gratified; but at the
same time, they accomplish a further purpose, a purpose which was indeed implicit
in their own actions but was not part of their conscious interactions.15
Hegels dialectical concept of history factors substantially in how he understands
the human condition. To bring about the necessary synthesis the slave must become
willing to risk his life. Hegels dialectic, then, is about the unfolding of a discernible
socio-historical narrative which is driven by the ever-changing, shifting reality of
the slave in relation to the master. This dialectic is teleological and depends upon
the slave raising his self-consciousness to the level of a willingness to risk his
life for a master-like recognition. The masters existence is incapable of driving
historical change because the master, who has already risked his life, does not do
any work and, therefore, does not change, and remains always what he already
is. But, the risk of life is the same at all times and in all places. The risk itself is
what counts, and it does not matter whether a stone axe or a machine gun is being
used. Accordingly, it is not the fight as such, the risk of life, but work that one day
produces a machine gun, and no longer an axe. The purely warlike attitude of the
master does not vary throughout the centuries, and therefore it cannot engender a
historical change. Without the slaves work, the first fight would be reproduced
indefinitely: nothing would change in it, it would change nothing in the master;
hence nothing would change in man, through man, for man, the world would
remain identical to itself, it would be nature and not a human, historical world.16
The slaves consciousness develops independently of the master and strives
to reconcile his abstract sense of freedom with his objective slavish condition.
The slave, encountering the contradictions of his existence, tries to appropriate
ideologies that will explain, or justify, his condition.17 This is done repeatedly as
each contradiction explained away gives way to new contradictions. Reconciling
or undoing these contradictions is the engine that drives the Hegelian historical
dialectic. Girard, however, rejects this dialectical model for his own dialectic
structure. Girard contrasts the Hegelian dialectic with the novelistic dialectic,
he traces through the enlightenment and post-Napoleonic literature of Proust,
Dostoevsky, and others, but even though Hegel and Girard look as if they are
talking about similar states of alienation there is a real difference between them.
Hegels Promethean philosophy celebrates the subjects optimistic drive out of
alienation and towards self-fulfillment, while the novelistic imagination has seen
through this dream and no longer believes it.18
15 G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, trans. H.B. Nisbet,
New York: Cambridge UP, 1975: 75.
17 These ideologies are Stoicism, Scepticism, and the Hegelian unhappy
consciousness but the slaves progression through these is not of direct relevance to the
current discussion so I omit a detailed discussion of it here.
18Kirwan, Discovering Girard, 33.
In the world historical narrative of Hegel the epoch of the master is not a
peaceful time, but the idea that the slave is slowly climbing out his subjugation
overlooks the fact that the master dominates the slave. This domination is active
and the Girardian process of scapegoating is the mechanism best suited to explain
how the master continually appropriates the work of the slave to keep him in
bondage. That is, Hegel believes the master is complacent because he does not
have to work, because his nature is already transcendent, but this misses the
crucial Girardian insight that the mimetic relationship between the two antagonists
is on-going. One does not endure slavery unless one is continually enslaved. So,
when Hegel questions the reasoning that structures the world, when he attempts
to decipher from the history of humankind a rational plan for the unfolding of
the human narrative he necessarily looks toward the universal, an absolute world
spirit, God. But Girard apprehends the problem differently to come to a similar
conclusion. For Girard,
The Hegelian dialectic is situated in a violent past. It exhausts its last force
with the appearance of the nineteenth century and of democracy. The novelistic
dialectic on the contrary appears in the post-Napoleonic universe. For Stendhal
as for Hegel the reign of individual violence is over; it must make way for
something else. Hegel relied on logic and historical reflection to determine
the something else. When violence and the arbitrary no longer control human
relationships, the Befriedigung, reconciliation, must necessarily succeed them.
The reign of spirit must begin But the novelist mistrusts logical deductions.
He looks around him and within him. He finds nothing to indicate that the
famous reconciliation is just around the corner.19
For Girard, then, the Hegelian dialectic is incomplete in the vision Hegel has for it
as the Battle of Jena rages outside his window, but more importantly, the Hegelian
dialectic does not reveal the real mechanism driving the unfolding of humanitys
socio-historical narrative. It is in the subterranean consciousnesses explored by
novelists that the greatest existential and social truths are discovered because
they expose the regions of existence where spiritual energy has taken refuge
only the novelist, precisely to the extent to which he is capable of recognizing
his own servitude, gropes toward the concretetoward that hostile dialogue
between Self and Other which parodies the Hegelian struggle for recognition.20
Indeed, the function of the novelist plays a pivotal role in consciousness raising
because the novelist, regardless of whether he is a Christian, sees in the
so-called modern humanism a subterranean metaphysics which is incapable of
recognizing its own nature.21 Here there is a clear break with Hegels thought
19 Ren Girard, Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, trans. Yvonne Freccero, Baltimore,
MD: Johns Hopkins UP, 1976: 110.
20Girard, Deceit, 111.
which posits a completed version of the historical process, because Girard finds,
in the novelists, the myths, and the rituals of society, an on-going repetitious
process which humanity cannot free itself from until the socially constructed self
gives way to the recognition of the true nature of desire and our relation to it.
Girard argues, The victims of metaphysical desire always choose their political,
philosophical, and religious ideas to fit their hatred; thought is no more than a
weapon for an affronted consciousness. Never has it seemed so important, yet in
actual fact it no longer has any importance at all. It is completely dominated by
metaphysical rivalry.22
The rivalry, between master and slave for recognition, between father and
son for supremacy and fulfillment, between the need for transcendence and the
struggle for existence in the context of an emerging humanity is not, for Girard, a
process with a logical end. The rules of the game can be learned, but this creates
more than an opportunity to transcend, it creates fear and hatred and scapegoats.
The slave and the son want vengeance, the former for having been beaten and
subdued, the latter for having been denied that which he desires, a denial that is
itself a form of dominance and subjugation, however, the struggle for vengeance
is not merely one of equalization but of elimination. The slave wants to overcome
and the son wants to destroy, but Girard understands the emotive context of these
lives differently than Hegel does, or can given his philosophical commitments.
As a result of his divergent understanding Girard rejects the Hegelian notion of
synthesis as a positive, compromising force driving world historical development.
Instead, Girard favors an understanding of synthesis as a convergence of desire
that creates the monstrosity of duplication which rends the social fabric until the
violence has been expunged. Understood this way, synthesis certainly entails a
movement forward, but mistaking that for a particular type of historical revelation
is illusory and deceitful. Examining this very process in Hamlet Girard claims,
No difference remains between scandal and convention, between revolt and
conformity. Contraries merge, not in some glorious Hegelian synthesis, but in
unnamable monstrosities. The salt of the earth does not even know it has lost its
savor and the most pungent demystification, the most sophisticated deconstruction,
turns into the platitudes of a Polonius.23

23 Ren Girard, A Theater of Envy: William Shakespeare, South Bend, IN:
St.Augustines Press, 2004: 286. Steven Marcus, in his investigations of Charles Dickens
novels, comes to the same conclusions about Hegels relationship to novelists. He states,
What Hegel in his prodigious austerity is saying is that freedom can only come about,
can only be realized, in and through its negation. A truly human freedom, that freedom
which is the one goal worthy of being the destination of men as the human species, can
only be achieved through the most profound historical experience of negativity. It is
no accident that Dickens installed that negativity at the dramatic center of his first and
freest novel, at the very moment when he was sustaining himself with a freedom that was
virtually unexampled in the history of the novel. The consequences that such a creative act
of courage had are known to us allthey are nothing less than Dickens long and arduous
While Girard and Hegel overlap in interesting ways, there is one area where I
find myself at odds with both projectsthe social role of the family. My reasons
for abandoning the Girardian analysis of the family will be discussed in greater
detail in Chapters 6 and 7, but Hegels reliance on the family as the ethical
institution undergirding society provides important clues to why Girards analysis
should be abandoned also. According to Hegel the servants subjection to an
alien will is a preparation for the self-discipline of a rational life and membership
in a community of free persons. The servants self-consciousness labors off its
particular will and its self-will, supersedes the inner immediacy of desire, and,
in this alienation and fear of the lordthe beginning of wisdomit makes the
transition to universal self-consciousness.24 Hegels turn toward the family as an
ethical institution, the building block of ethical behavior, is built upon this notion
of the universal self-consciousness. As Allen Wood argues, Universal self-
consciousness means more for Hegel than the mutual relation of persons having
abstract rights. He insists that it forms the substance of ethical life generally,
and is the form of consciousness of the substance of every essential spirituality,
whether of family, fatherland, state, or of all virtueslove, friendship, courage,
honor, fame.25
Using this idea of the universal self-consciousness as the substance of
ethical life Hegel connects the master-slave relation, as the social order out
of which thetransition phase between natural human existence and the truly
ethical condition develops, to the ethical life.26 The family is the unity of
individuationa theme that parallels nicely with Girards mimetic rivalry
but, for Hegel, it is the relationship of marriage that is the immediate ethical
relationship.27 Marriage, according to Hegel, is more than a sexual relationship,
which prevents its other determining aspects from becoming accessible, marriage
is more than a contract, which renders the relationship arbitrary, and marriage
is more than an expression of love, which renders the relationship contingent.28
More than marriage, however, is included in the Hegelian notion of the family as
an ethical institution. Hegel argues that marriage is essentially monogamy, and
as such is one of the absolute principles on which the ethical life of a community
is based; the institution of marriage is therefore included as one of the moments
subsequent development, a development that as the later novels make increasingly clear is
in fact a search for a wider, a more general, and a truly human freedom. Language into
Structure, Myth, Symbol, and Culture ed. Clifford Geertz, New York: W.W. Norton & Co.,
1971: 201.
24 Allen W. Wood, Hegels Ethical Thought, New York: Cambridge UP, 1990: 88.
The internal quotation of Hegel is taken from Hegels Philosophy of Mind 435.
25Wood, Hegels Ethical Thought, 89. The internal quotation of Hegel is taken from
Hegels Philosophy of Mind 436, A.
26 G.W.F. Hegel, Elements of the Philosophy of Right, trans. H.B. Nisbet, ed. Allen
Wood, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991: 88.
27Hegel, Elements, 200. Emphasis in the original.
28 See Hegels Philosophy of Right 160A for a discussion of these points.
in the foundation of states by gods or heroes.29 This position is surprisingly

Girardian in its articulation, but more importantly for my project, Hegels focus
on monogamy is the biggest obstacle to the establishment of an ethical community
life filtered through the family.
Hegels family includes the traditional patriarchal structure with the father
as the head of the household, responsible for managing the resources of the
family. Though he picks up on the need to prohibit incest his anthropology fails
to discover, as Freud does, the deeper social roots of the prohibition. However,
in spite of the differences between Girard and Hegel, Hegel does offer some
arguments that closely relate to the mimetic construction Girard develops. For
instance, discussing the nature of needs relative to the resources available, Hegel
argues, the arbitrary moment of the particular need of the single individual
is transformed, along with the selfishness of desire, into care and acquisition for
a communal purpose.30 More important for a connection to Girard, Hegel goes
on to assert, The introduction of permanent property appears, in conjunction
with the institution of marriage, in the legends of the founding of states, or
at least of civilized social life. But the precise nature of these resources and
the true method of consolidating them become apparent within the sphere of
civil society.31
Even as Hegel flirts with the realization that the family has a pivotal and
undeniable role to play in the founding, development, sustainment, and
maintenance of civic, that is, cultural, life, again his anthropological project
fails. For Girard, human society does not begin with the fear of the slave for
the master as Hegel claims, but with religion.32 In Girards rejection of
Hegels insights regarding social origins, where Girard is quick to accuse Hegel
of privileging violence and fear over religion, there are stronger parallels with
Nietzsches priest and the ressentiment of the herd than with Hegels ethical origin
story. This is because for Girard the origin of violence is the family rather than
the first meeting of independent self-consciousnesses, and the family provides the
framework for the repetition of the violence in society because the same person
is authority and criminal so that, as Slavoj iek points out, staging a battle with
himself in a proto-Hegelian way, the external threat the community is fighting
is its own inherent essence.33 Hegels misunderstanding of the role the family
plays in the organic life of a community causes him to miss the crucial Girardian
insight about the nature of violence in society. Girard argues, In the evolution
from ritual to secular institutions men gradually draw away from violence and
eventually lose sight of it; but an actual break with violence never takes place.
29Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 207.

32 Ren Girard, Violence and the Sacred, trans. Patrick Gregory, Baltimore, MD:
Johns Hopkins UP, 1977: 3067.
33 Slavoj iek, Violence: Six Sideways Reflections, New York: Picador, 2008: 27.
That is why violence can always stage a stunning, catastrophic comeback.34 If

there can be no actual break with violence, then there can be no end of history.
I believe Girard is right in his criticism of Hegel; however, as I will argue
throughout the remainder of this project, I believe Girard is also wrong that we
cannot break with violence.
The distance between Girard and Hegel, as I have already indicated, is greater
than the intellectual distance between Girard and either Nietzsche or Freud. While
Hegels thoughts have clearly influenced the mimetic philosophy of Girard, they
have also, in varying degrees, been rejected by Girard for, ostensibly, sound
reasons, that is, for dissonances between their respective anthropologies. Girard
is, nonetheless, indebted to Hegel, but in the thought of Nietzschea philosopher
that resisted the dominance Hegel exerted on the nineteenth century in his own
thoughtwe see an intellect that more closely approximates the ideas that Girard
is seeking to articulate and a life in which Girard sees the truth of his ideas
expressed. Nietzsche is important to the Girardian backstory, however, because
his philosophy provides the formulation of the second fundamental intuition
necessary to a successful mimetic narrativeressentiment.
Nietzsche: Genealogy, Dionysus, and the Crucified
Nietzsche contributes the necessary component of ressentiment35 to the

Girardian mimetic narrative, but Nietzsches understanding of the term is not
an inherited concept and his own process for formulating the concept leaves
recognizable marks upon the mimesis of Girard. Nietzsches move away from
Hegel, or, perhaps, more precisely, his move away from the ideas of the young
Hegelians, pushes Nietzsches philosophy in interesting directions and many
of his conclusions resonate within the framework of a Girardian constructed
mimesis. However, Girard, while he incorporates aspects of Nietzschean
thought positively into his own theories, he does not offer a supportive reading
of Nietzsche because the two are at odds over the role and value of Christianity
to not only contemporary culture, but the future of human existence. One of
the major themes in Nietzsches thought is that our attitude toward the future is
propelled by our attitude toward the past; and only one who creates the future
can judge the past. It is this thematic commitment on Nietzsches part that will,
ultimately, develop into his philosophy about history and time. In his concepts
of historical processes and the importance of history to the present Nietzsche
34Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 307. Emphasis added.

35 Nietzsche uses the French ressentiment because the word was never successfully
translated into German. That is, there wasnt a quality German equivalent though something
like rancor probably comes closest in meaning. Nietzsche uses the French because he
wants to capture a sense of resentment with hostilitya need for, a desire for, revenge
rather than just convey a feeling of dejection or envy.
breaks with Hegel, specifically, on the linear nature of time with a teleological
trajectory.36
Rethinking time contrary to Hegel is minor in the scheme of this project, but
the reconceptualization of time and history has profound importance in Nietzsches
philosophy. More relevant to my project is that Nietzsche inverts the moral punch
line of Hegels master-slave dialectic, and, again, he does this quite early in his
career. That he does so is important because, as has already been argued, Girard
also rejects the Hegelian dialectic. For Nietzsche, Human nature finds it harder
to endure a victory than a defeat.37 Nietzsches suffering victor is the motif
that concerns us most because, among the many threads of Nietzsches thought
that intrigued an inquiring Freud, this is the one that Freud picks up on to lay the
foundation for his psychoanalytic beliefs that would come to inspire Girard. There
are differences, of course, between Nietzsche and Freud; for instance, Nietzsche
posits mankind as completely malleable and dynamic whereas Freud posits human
nature as having more static elements. Freuds fondness for Nietzsche made
Nietzsche accessible because, unlike the Nazis that would mutilate his thought,
Freud was interested in Nietzsche for very different reasons and Nietzsches ideas
are quite prevalent throughout the work of Freud. These two theorists provide the
axis along which Girards thoughts and theories can best be plotted.
The problems, however, that exist in Freuds work for Girards project are not
similar to the problems found in Nietzsches philosophy because, for instance,
while Nietzsche recognizes the collective murder of god, he never actually
investigates why the god was murderedat least not directly. Because Nietzsche
and Freud present different challenges, and because the two are so intertwined in
Freuds work it is important to note that, following Girard, any effort to make
Nietzsches insanity intelligible will have to focus on those triangular relationships
that are at the core of Freuds psychoanalytical theory [but] this does not mean that
we have to be Freudian.38 So, while Girard understands the complications that
Nietzsche presents for his theory differently than he does the problems inherent
in Freud, and because he deconstructs Nietzsche along Freudian fault lines, it is
important to reconstruct, in some limited way, the building blocks of ressentiment
that influenced Freuds work and, eventually, attracted Girard.
36 Nietzsche works out his early ideas about history and our relationship to it in terms
of past to present in his second meditation On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for
Life. See Friedrich Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, trans. R.J. Hollingdale, ed. Daniel
Breazeale, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997. Here Nietzsche argues That life is in need of
the services of history, however, must be grasped as firmly as must the proposition that
an excess of history is harmful to the living man, p. 67. Eventually Nietzsche will propose
the concept of the Eternal Return as the highwater mark of his philosophy about history,
but this comes much later in his literary life and has less bearing on the break with Hegel.
37Nietzsche, Untimely Meditations, David Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer, 1.
38 Ren Girard, Strategies of Madness, in To Double Business Bound, Baltimore,
MD: Johns Hopkins UP, 1988: 61. This is the beginning sentence in Girards critical
analysis of Nietzsches well known and long analyzed relationship with Wagner.
For these reasons, I seem to find my project is most at odds with Nietzsches
work on points concerning the individual, especially the individual striving to be or
become an Ubermensch, and this is particularly important for a critique of Nietzsche
that posits the individual as overcoming the group. Primarily, my concern is that
the ubermensch cannot be realized because we cannot overcome our bodies, that is,
our embodiment. But, because of the dynamism Nietzsche sees in human nature I
believe that it may be possible to recast our natures so that we might more closely
approximate the ideal of the ubermensch. To fully appreciate how I intend to
incorporate a functional idea of the overman into a reformulated Girardian mimesis
it will be necessary to also address the problematic areas of Nietzsches claims in
support of the affirmative spirit of the Dionysian which is a problem for a Girardian
reading of the monstrous double and, finally, the transvaluation of values. Each
of these component parts will help to make intelligible the ressentiment that will
become central to both the Freudian and Girardian stories.
The transvaluation of values is linked in important ways with the problem of
the individual and not just because Nietzsche develops these ideas alongside one
another in his On the Genealogy of Morals. The transvaluation of values occurs
when a group overcomes the individual. It is not unimportant here that the group
is comprised of nominally weaker individuals and the individual they seek to
overcome is stronger. Already we have a motif that is important to a mimetic
interpretation of Nietzsche. It is always instructive to keep in mind that Nietzsches
target is Pauline Christianity specifically not Christianity generally, or, more to the
point, not the Christianity comprised of the teachings of Christ himself.39 This is
a clear nod to the fact that values exist regardless of the institutions that enforce
them to some extent. That is, Nietzsche understands that there have to be values
in order to successfully complete a transvaluation of themsomething that tends
to get lost in Freud and Girard.40 But more importantly, for those values to lead to
right morality they must be the goal for all human beings and be self-imposed.41
Rarely, if at all, has all of humanity shared the goal of attaining a particular, self-
imposed morality, and the unifying forces of Christianity attempting to establish
that singular focus is why Nietzsche so violently attacks the Christian lifestyle.
39 Nietzsche often casts Jesus in the role of an individual capable of bringing about
a transvaluation of values contrary to what the Priestly class perpetuated against the
dominant individuals early in human history. However, Nietzsche also keeps Jesus at arms
length recognizing that Jesus, the historical person, is often lost amidst the platitudes of
pontificating Pauline Christians. For instance, Nietzsche claims, Jesus may be described as
a visionary who would in our day hardly escape the madhouse, the story of the resurrection
may be called a piece of world-historical humbug. See, Untimely Meditations, David
Strauss, the Confessor and the Writer, 7.
40In Twilight of the Idols Nietzsche argues that life itself forces us to posit values;
life itself values through us when we posit values, 5.
41 See Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak: Thoughts on the Prejudices of Morality, trans.
R.J. Hollingdale, ed. Maudemarie Clark and Brian Leiter, Cambridge: Cambridge UP,
1997: 108.
The biggest point of contention between Girard and Nietzsche is the role of
Christianity in human culture. For Nietzsche, the problem of Christianity is that
it turns the human experience into a form or type of punishment. Under a set of
Christian values we are guilty of living on earth, endowed with sin from birth,
guilty of being embodied sexual beings, and we are guilty of not having enough
compassion for others. In the Christian milieu of his day Nietzsche recognized this
guilt as the source of the Christian yearning for cleansing punishment. He argues,
A strange thing, our kind of punishment! It does not cleanse the offender, it is no
expiation: on the contrary, it defiles more than the offence itself.42 Developing
this line of critique further, Nietzsche finds fault in the morality of suffering people
claiming,
It is through errors as to its origin, its uniqueness, its destiny, and through the
demands that have been advanced on the basis of these errors, that mankind
has raised itself on high and again and again excelled itself: but through
these same errors an unspeakable amount of suffering, mutual persecution,
suspicion, misunderstanding, and even greater misery for the individual in and
for himself, have come into the world. Men have become suffering creatures as
a consequence of their moralities: what they have purchased with them is, all in
all, a feeling that at bottom they are too good and too significant for the earth and
are paying it only a passing visit.43
For Nietzsche, though, not all sufferers are created equal and that is why some
sufferers, like Jesus, as chronicled by Pauline Christianity, are able to create
values, that is, new values, as a result of their suffering. In The Gay Science
Nietzsche argues that Magnificent characters suffer very differently from what
their admirers imagine As long as Prometheus feels pity for men and sacrifices
himself for them, he is happy and great; but when he becomes envious of Zeus
and the homage paid to him by mortals, then he suffers.44 Of all the values that
Nietzsche scorns the most in the transvaluation carried out by Pauline Christianity
pity is at the top of the list. Pity leaves us broken by the world, and while some,
like Schopenhauer, see pity as a way to identify with the Other, Nietzsche rejects
pity as the virtue of prostitutes.45
Pity is, then, one of those emotions that connects us to others and creates the
type of community response around which new values can be inculcated. In no
small way pity is, for Nietzsche, the foundation of a Christian conscience. Gil
Bailie elucidates this point asserting, Nietzsche understood that violence and
sacrificial bloodletting had always been a part of humanitys cultural existence.
42Nietzsche, Daybreak, 236. Emphasis in original.

43Nietzsche, Daybreak, 425. Emphasis in original.
44 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Gay Science, trans. Walter Kaufman, New York: Vintage
Books, 1974: 251.
45Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 13.
It was his realization that the world no longer had myths capable of endowing
these bloody rituals with moral respectability that led him to oppose the
conscience that harbored the moral misgivings, and to castigate Christianity for
bringing this conscience into being.46 Nietzsche, it should come as no surprise,
believesthat the values generated by a coming together of pitiful peoplepitiers
and the pitiedproduces the kinds of values that reduce us to suffering creatures.
We are to be pitied because we are human, weak, and sinful. What is worse, in
Nietzschean terms, is that our pity can become, and too often is, self-pity. Self-
pity is the state of being most closely akin to the slave mentality prior to the slave
revolt in morality. That is, self-pity is the spark that ignites the fire of ressentiment.
Where I break with Nietzsche is not necessarily in how this comes about,
although I think his construction of this can at times be rather shallow in its
reach, but rather in his positing of a group identity that derives from the desire
to overthrow the stronger individual. Clearly, the parallels to Freud and Girard
are that the stronger individual is the father while the groupexemplified in the
archetype of the Priestis the son. In a Girardian genealogy, we might understand
the Priest in Nietzsche as the first person to cry out What have we done! over
the dead fathers body. Nietzsche, however, explains this overthrow through fear
and ressentiment rather than through an understanding of desire. Ressentiment
is given its fullest treatment by Max Scheler who picks the notion up in its
Nietzschean context and attempts to understand the idea as Nietzsche uses it.
Schelers interpretation of ressentiment is the best, and most representative, for
the usage of the word in post-Nietzschean scholarshipincluding its subsequent
development by Girard. For Nietzsche the slave revolt in morality begins when
ressentiment itself becomes creative and gives birth to values.47 Scheler says that
ressentiment is a self-poisoning of the mind which has quite definite causes and
consequences. It is a lasting mental attitude, caused by the systematic repression
of certain emotions and affects which, as such, are normal components of human
nature [it lends itself to a] tendency toward certain kinds of value delusions
[and] thirst for revenge is the most important source of ressentiment.48
Girards usage of ressentiment pulls away from Scheler even as he appropriates
it from Nietzsche because he is convinced that Scheler did not understand the
imitative nature of desire and for this reason never succeeded in distinguishing
ressentiment from Christian religious feeling. He did not dare to put the two
phenomena side by side in order to distinguish them more clearly and thus remained
within the Nietzschean confusion he was trying to dispel.49 Freud, too, is quick to
pick up on the importance of ressentiment and incorporates the idea of ressentiment
46 Gil Bailie, Violence Unveiled: Humanity at the Crossroads, New York: The
Crossroad Publishing Company, 1999: 27.
47 Nietzsche, First Essay, On the Genealogy of Morals, 9.
48 Max Scheler, Ressentiment, trans. William Holdheim, New York: Schocken
Books, 1961, pp. 456.
into his own theories as the underlying reason for the guilt that comes after the
patricide and prompts the sons to enact the taboos. Girard contends, Nietzsche
was less blind to the role of vengeance in human culture than most people
but nevertheless there was blindness in him. He analyzed ressentiment and all its
works with tremendous power. He did not see that the evil he was fighting was
a relatively minor evil.50 Ressentiment plays a central role in the philosophical
theories of Nietzsche, Freud, and Girard, but the key difference is that Nietzsche is
content to recognize the murder carried out as a result of the feelings engendered
by ressentiment. Moreover, one could argue that Nietzsches murdered god is not
only not murdered for a good reason but, ostensibly, not for any reason at all. When
Nietzsches madman first leaps into the morning market crowd crying whither is
God? he answers his own question by announcing that we have killed himyou
and I. All of us are his murderers. But how did we do this.51
Given Nietzsches phrasing of the exclamation, it seems obvious that central to
Nietzsches realization of the death of godin his frameworkis the question of
how such a thing is possible, as opposed to the question of why something of
this magnitude is possible. The madman goes on to chastise his audience by crying
out God is dead. God remains dead. And we have killed him. How shall we
comfort ourselves, the murderers of all murderers? What was holiest and mightiest
of all that the world has yet owned has bled to death under our knives There
has never been a greater deed; and whoever is born after usfor the sake of this
deed he will belong to a higher history than all history hitherto.52 This presents a
fairly large obstacle for a Nietzschean analysis of community construction post-
murder, especially at the level of values, because he goes from this happened
to how did we do it to how will we atone overlooking the critical question
that Freud and Girard seek to develop, namely, why did this event come about
in our history in the first place. Although, to be fair, Girard acknowledges that
because Nietzsche shared this comparative insight regarding collective murder
and sacrifice, he refrained from the habitual conclusion [that it is just a story or
fable]. The only other thinker who also did was Freud.53
Yet, it is the very heart of community construction that is important in my
divergence from a Nietzschean story that leads to my critique of an individual
that overcomes. In Nietzsches rendering of the solution to the problem of the
transvaluation of values Nietzsche pins his hopes on the individual exercising his
or her will to power. However, where such an analysis fails is that the individual
cannot overcome the group. This is not to say that the individual suffers from
a numerical disadvantageIve seen enough Chuck Norris movies to know
that numbers do not necessarily matter. What is at stake is that the value system
governing the social livelihood of a community is dependent on the group.
50 Girard, Dionysus and the Crucified, 825.

53 Girard, Dionysus and the Crucified, 821.
The groupss ressentiment hides behind an outraged sense of justice its slave
morality becomes institutionalized in the egalitarian institutions of modern
democracies.54 On my analysis of Girards mimesis the survivors of the mimetic
violence form social institutions to govern their social relationships after the
patricidal event and no single individual could ultimately restructure the value
systemnot even, I would argue, an ubermensch.55
The problem for a Nietzschean inspired value shift is that it requires more than
a hostile psychological state and a murder; it requires the breakdown of culture
at the level of a deity. So, Nietzsche sees the ritual killing of Dionysus, or the
sacrificial killing of Christ, as sufficient to explain the social ills that persist in
human cultures because the move away from the former and toward the latter is the
trajectory of the most significant transvaluation of values in history. Yet, because
he overlooked, or chose to avoid, the question of why a group of individuals,
addled by ressentiment, becomes hostile, Nietzsche cannot provide the crucial
insights regarding the rise of taboos and institutions and their relationship to the
process of enculturation. That is, by asking how we killed god instead of why
we killed god, Nietzsche can accurately place the blame on the murderers, but
he cannot accurately explain why they are to blame. A neutral, or open-minded,
reading of Freud leaves room for us to ask why not blame godwas hethe
father figurenot ultimately responsible? The answer is simple, because the blame
belongs to the survivorsindeed, the sacrificers. A similar reading of Nietzsche
is more difficult because he sees in Dionysus both the destructive impulse and the
redemptive aspect of the ritual unmitigated by cultural institutions. The move from
murdered godhead to ritualized redemptive acts takes a longer road for Freud, and,
subsequently, Girard.
That Nietzsche misses the theoretical move that Freud and Girard utilize to
ground their work does not condemn the importance of the conclusions Nietzsche
draws from his own theories. That is, though Nietzsches project may be, in some
ways, incomplete, he was approaching the problem of values creation from the
right perspective because, in his schema, the process of creation contains its own
critique as well. So, if we were to approach religion sans the spirit of gravity it
would be nothing more than a collection of myths and tales that might be able to
show us a different way of looking at the world. Comparing religion to art, which
Nietzsche does think can help us see and understand truths about ourselves,
Nietzsche says religion made men see the sinfulness of every single individual
through a magnifying glass, turning the sinner into a great, immortal criminal.
By surrounding him with eternal perspectives, it taught man to see himself from
a distance and as something past and whole.56 To destroy the world, however, is
54 Girard, Strategies of Madness, in To Double Business Bound, 70.

55 What would be needed is an analysis of the revaluation of all values at the level of
the family and this is very similar to my critique of Rawlss reliance on the individual in the
original position that I will address in Chapter 4.
to create a new one, which means only that we create new values. Girard reads
religion in a similar fashion, and both Nietzsche and Girard view the death of the
god in question, for Girard, Jesus, and for Nietzsche, Dionysus, as a moment of
tremendous chaos and power. Chaos generates in us a perception of order that we
impose upon the world. The imposition of that order is the moment values are
created.
Nietzsche contends that the transvaluation of values occurs the moment the
herd, the weaker individuals, cowed in fear and awe of the stronger, rise up and
mute the values of those individuals capable of bending the world to their will.
There are clear parallels with the story Hegel articulates about the master and
slave, but there are stronger ties to the mimetic story of Girard. Nietzsche thinks
that the herd, who possess none of the good traits needed to survive, to exist
in the world, despises those individuals that do.57 So the weaker band together
and demonize the good traits of the strong individual depicting those traits as
evil and their own slave traits as the new good. As their strength is magnified
and manifested by their numerical superiority right and wrong become customs
and evil becomes individuality. The individual is shunned by the group and either
rehabilitated or destroyed, but through ritual, custom, taboo, law, and cultural
practices and beliefs the new ideas of justice, goodness, right and wrong are taught
and transmitted between generations. Freud tells a similar story in the aftermath of
the founding murder. Freuds murderous sons find themselves lost amid the chaos
of the act itself, unsure of themselves, but aware of their victory, they impose a
new order on the world; they create the values that will allow them to have what
they want and protect them from those that would take it. Hence, the ritualization
of the death of god, as both a reminder and warning of the consequences of
shifting our values, of losing our values, and the strict rigidity of the institutions
that enforceor coerceour compliance. In Nietzsches philosophy, too, we are
terrified not of the death of god, but of the consequences of his death. We wonder
at the consequences of our atheism in a secular age, that is, in the absence of god
what must happen to values?
We must take consequences seriously, and as guilt is our inheritance from the
destruction of god, the question for Nietzsche is, Must we become gods to be
worthy of the deed?58 Rather than focus on the we that is often conjured by a
focus on groups, especially where the identity of those groups is, like a Hegelian
trope, artificial in its designation, Nietzsche focuses on the I of culture that is
achievable in the Dionysian moment of identity erasure. Dionysus is redemptive for
Nietzsche, indeed the Dionysian festival is directly opposed to ritual and custom in
Nietzsches thought, precisely because of this need to share in the identity of an I
rather than a we. As Nietzsche says, even the most rational man from time to
time needs to recover nature, that is to say his illogical original relationship with
57 See, for instance, Nietzsches position in Human, All Too Human, trans.
R.J.Hollingdale, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996: 45.
58Nietzsche, The Gay Science, 125 (emphasis in original).
all things.59 The illogic of the relationship that Nietzsche seeks is existence
which does not need a reason. In the aftermath of the transvaluation of values
reasons were needed to explain why certain things were to be valued and others
were to be understood as evil. Prior to the slave revolt what made men good, and
good members of their communities, was that they could recognize equitability
in each othereven their enemiesbecause of their ability for requital.60 But
because the weaker, pitiful, slaves cannot engage in requital they undermine the
established hierarchy of good versus bad and instantiate their own values where
the good of the dominant, master caste becomes evil and traits, characteristics,
and values for which the weaker are rightly pitied become the good. It is this
untenable and illogical inversion of primeval human social composition that
requires the reasoned explanation and artificial cultural infrastructures that follow
the development of the new values.
Of course, the transvaluation of values is not a singular moment in history
against which we are struggling, but rather, a continual process required by the
constant tug-o-war between the recognition that the values of the weak are
undesirable and a desire to keep the values of the strong from resurging. Nietzsche
makes this point quite clear in Human, All Too Human arguing, the two greatest
judicial murders in world history are, not to mince words, disguised and well
disguised [sic] suicides. In both cases the victim wanted to die; in both cases he
employed the hand of human injustice to drive the sword into his own breast.61
In some sense it matters little if the support for the cultural values are covered
in the blood of a butchered Dionysus or a crucified Christ because those deaths
only herald the coming of many more victimsscapegoatswhose sacrifices
will impart meaning and truth to the values created by those first victims in those
moments.62 New values always require a sacrifice.
The suffering of the victims sacrificed to establish the new values, those who
must suffer to bring about the transvaluation, is necessary, for Nietzsche, to keep
the fiction alive. The longer a particular set of values persist the more powerful
59Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, 31.

60 See, for instance, Human, All Too Human, 45.
61Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, vol. II 95. Emphasis in the original. While
Nietzsche does not explicitly say so, it is clear that he expects his readers to recognize
Socrates and Jesus in this passage. I highlight this here because, while I am arguing that
the process of continual revival in the transvaluation of values is true for Nietzsche, he
certainly does not require a veiled suicide to accomplish it. For Nietzsche the scapegoat can
be murdered through more conventional means such as, say, the murder of Julius Caesar.
62 This sentiment is made explicit in an unpublished fragment relating to aphorism
1052 in The Will to Power which Girard focus on in his work and argues, in part, The
Christian man denies even the happiest state on earth; he is weak, poor, disinherited enough
to suffer, no matter what the condition of life The God on the Cross is a curse upon life,
a hint as to how one can save oneself from it. Dionysus, cut into pieces, is a promise of Life:
it will be reborn eternally and return from annihilation. Quoted in Kirwan, Discovering
Girard, 85.
and convincing they become in a culture. Hence, only those that suffer for truth
suffer greatly and at all costscan create values, but that alone will not sustain
them. Such a notion has obvious implications for why both Nietzsche and Girard
are able to find the way to the truth about humanity through the destruction of a
God. This helps explain why, in the mimetic account of Girard, when a scapegoat
is sought and sacrificed its death allows the community to unify around a shared
set of values that were under attack. In some instances, the scapegoat can allow
the sacrificers to create new values and when that has occurred historically it
creates the kind of hallmark moments of murder that remain at the fore of our
historical memorythe primal father, Socrates, Caesar, Jesus, and, perhaps, in our
own time Martin Luther King, Jr. The critical difference between Nietzsche and
Girard is that for Girard the scapegoat is a victim for values, but in Nietzsche the
scapegoat is a victim of values, and this makes all the difference between the two
philosophical anthropologies. As Nietzsche claims, When a man does the best he
can, those who wish him well but are not adequate to his deed promptly seek out
a goat so as to slaughter it, believing it to be the scapegoatbut it is in fact the
scapegoat, not of sin, but of virtue.63
This is where Nietzsche and I start to come together and Girard moves farther
away from center. Nietzsche has, essentially, two projects that bear the burden of
his philosophical insights: one is a de-constructive genealogy and Girard parallels
this aspect closely; the other, however, is a constructive re-education of mankind
toward something new. On this point Girard and Nietzsche diverge sharply. For
Girard the redemptive element of mimesis is found in Christ and his self-sacrifice,
but Nietzsche rejects the idea that Christ, again, more precisely, Christianity, is
redemptive, preferring instead the unifying force of Dionysian revelry. Girard and
Nietzsche lock horns over this point, but Nietzsches argument for eschewing the
example of Christ is better than Girards for following it.64 Christs crucifixion is
a punishment and, thus, seeking to mimic the lessons of his immolation is to self-
impose the guilt associated with it, and requisite punishment, upon oneself. That
is, only by believing that Christs sacrifice was done to absolve our sinssins
for which we were already convinced of our guiltcould we ever believe that
Christian values could save us from ourselves and deliver us into a better lifethe
Kingdom of God, if you will.
In an aphorism titled Towards the re-education of the human race Nietzsche
urges men of application and goodwill to root out the concept of punishment
and destroy it as one would a noxious weed. He argues that punishment has not
only been implanted into the consequences of our actions but they have gone
63Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, vol. II 328.

64 Girard acknowledges as much saying Nietzsche was the first philosopher
to understand that the collective violence of myths and rituals (everything he named
Dionysus) is of the same type as the violence of the Passion. The difference between
them is not in the facts, which are the same in both cases, but in the interpretation. I See
Satan Fall Like Lightning, Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2004: 171.
further and, through this infamous mode of interpretation with the aid of the
concept of punishment, robbed of its innocence the whole purely chance character
of events. Indeed, they have gone so far in their madness as to demand that we
feel our very existence to be a punishmentit is as though the education of the
human race had hitherto been directed by the fantasies of jailers and hangmen!65
Nietzsche, however, sees the lack of the Dionysian element in society as a problem
that could be rectified easily. That is, by reverting to more classical usages of
festivals as opposed to mere rituals we could achieve communal inclusiveness,
a wholeness that heals by erasing differences. To elevate the Dionysian need not
entail the eradication of the Apollonian, as some believe, but rather, the Apollonian
dominance of the Dionysian, according to Nietzsche, must be reduced and brought
back into a balance one with the other. Girard and Nietzsche, not surprisingly, are
also at odds on this point because Girard reads the eradication of differences as the
primary cause for the violent action against the father.
Girards monstrous double motif is the opposite of Dionysian festivities
because Girard believes that the Disciple and the Model become monstrous
doubles when they lose the ability to distinguish themselves. This is particularly
bad for the Disciple because the inability to distinguish himself from the Model is
what leads him to think that he has, or should have, the same rights to the Object
as the Model and, hence, violence becomes inevitable. Nietzsche, on the other
hand, finds that when distinctions are lost and we lose our identity along with
the others in the community we become closer and more intimate. The danger
of the dissolution of identity that Girard highlights is true of Nietzsche but only
because the Dionysian moment of redemption occurs in the context of an always
already constructed mimetic culture. A change in the culture at the level of desire
would render the Dionysian harmless by Girardian standards while exacerbating
the benefits to society at large. Along these lines I think that Nietzsche is targeting
the right conclusion, but without a systematic investigation into the nature of
society qua family his conclusions are not solvent because after the festivities
things must revert back to normal. That is, Nietzsche is seeking a temporary
reprieve from the stresses of social life rather than a permanent restructuring of
society so that those stresses are eradicated. Or, if he is seeking a fundamental
and permanent restructuring of society through the Dionysian he failed to see the
mechanism in society that would make such a thing possible. Freud identified
the mechanism, and my critique of Girard will articulate how to achieve what
Nietzsche believed necessary.66
While I think that Girards philosophical handling of this issue is fraught with
more problems than Nietzsches, and knowing that my project diverges from
both, if I had to save one I would work to save Nietzsches because I think that
what, ultimately, could be achieved with the Dionysian conception of wholeness
is the ideal of what a familial restructuring would be attempting to accomplish.
65Nietzsche, Daybreak, 13.

66 See Chapter 7.
That is, the Disciple, male or female, cannot learn to desire in appropriate ways
in a household with a linear structure whose familial success depends not only on
a top-down hierarchy but also on partner submission. The promise of Nietzsche
then, for my project especially, is that a Dionysian idea of wholeness that affirms
both the good and the badin Nietzschean terms says yea to life!might
result from a Disciple that desires with an awareness of differences. Such a
person may possibly lead to a transvaluation of justice through a rejection of god
thereby rescuing it from its institutionalized use as a tool to preserve inequality.
As Nietzsche observes, the concept God has been the greatest objection to
existence hitherto We deny God, we deny responsibility in God: thus alone do
we save the world.67 Hence, what we need is an understanding of the Dionysian
not as a metaphysical dualism qua the Birth of Tragedy, but a deep wisdom that
incorporates the Apollonian and embraces becoming. In this way we might begin
to shed the Christian values that so troubled Nietzsche, namely, that Christianity
is, ultimately, hostile to lifea point Girard refuses to acknowledge or accept in
large part because he believes the Dionysian is the supreme expression of the
mob in its most brutal and its most stupid tendencies.68
By the time Nietzsche writes Twilight of the Idols in 1888 the realization
that the Dionysian is not opposed to the Apollonian, but rather to Christianity, is
becoming increasingly clear to him. Dionysus is no longer opposed to Apollo as
a mere Art God oppositionally paired as a partnership to make a whole life, but
rather, Dionysus is opposed to Christianity as a lifestyle. So, as Christ points out
the way to a better life he fails to point out how to fix this life and that is precisely
what is wrong with a Girardian mimetic understanding of human society. We are
demythologized men, according to Nietzsche, we need new myths not because
we no longer believe the old ones, but because we no longer believe in mythwe
have replaced it with the fantasy of heaven. Nietzsche argues, The images of
myth must be the unnoticed but omnipresent, daemonic guardians under whose
tutelage the young soul grows up and by whose signs the grown man interprets his
life and his struggles; even the state knows of no more powerful unwritten laws
than the mythical fundament which guarantees its connection with religion and its
emergence from mythical representations.69 The question that hinders a resurgent
Nietzschean positionlike the one I am endorsingis not is this true? but
rather Can we overcome this? That is, can we invent our own myths and then
believe them if we do? And if not, ought we to try to create the conditions of a
demythologized life that allows us to exist in a better state of being?
Freuds interpretation of Nietzsches philosophy is, in many ways, an attempt
to answer this very question. Where Nietzsche relies primarily on the genealogical
method, Freud turns to an anthropological approach to discover what Nietzsche
67Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, 32.

68Girard, I See Satan Fall, 173.
69 Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy, trans. Ronald Speirs, Cambridge:
Cambridge UP, 1999: 23.
missed and he endeavors to give an account of the process for the human creation
of institutions and values according to Nietzschean psychology. Fortunately,
rather than just restate the Nietzschean position and build upon it, Freud begins at
ground zero and reconstructs the argument filling in the gaps Nietzsche left behind
as he goes. Hence, the Freudian account of the collective murder, its motivations,
and the aftermath of it are supplemented by, rather than based upon, Nietzschean
philosophy. Because of this the problems Girard has forcing a separation with
Nietzsche over the role and purpose of Christianity does not plague his reliance
upon Freud. To be sure Girard does not whole-heartedly agree with Freud, that is,
Girard is not picking up where Freud left off, but, as he does with Nietzsche, Girard
picks up the themes that require more thought, analysis, critique and interpretation
to develop his own mimetic theory supplemented by, but not dependent upon,
Nietzsche and Freud. Slavoj iek states the intertwining of Nietzsche and Freud
succinctly stating that what they share,
is the idea that justice as equality is founded on envyon the envy of the Other
who has what we do not have, and who enjoys it. The demand for justice is
thus ultimately the demand that the excessive enjoyment of the Other should
be curtailed so that everyones access to jouissance is equal Since it is not
possible to impose equal jouissance, what is imposed instead to be equally
shared is prohibition Nietzsche wasnt simply urging life-assertion against
asceticism: he was well aware that a certain asceticism is the obverse of a
decadent excessive sensuality.70
Where there is a large philosophical distance between Girard and Hegel, there
is a much smaller one between Girard and Nietzsche, and, considering Freuds
deep interest in Nietzsche, there is an even smaller one between Girard and Freud.
Perhaps the biggest difference between Girard and Freud and either Hegel or
Nietzsche is that Girard finds less in Freud to reject or oppose and more with which
to align himself. Girard sees in the history of humanity exactly what Nietzsche
saw, and recognizing the dangerousness of not understanding the historical
narrative of culture, Girard shares with Nietzsche the conviction that we must face
up to the threat and diffuse it. But contrary to Nietzsche, whose response was to
expel the Gospels and try to revive the sacrificial structures they vitiated, Girard
recognized the anthropological and moral significance of what was happening. He
realized that, as trivialized as it so often is, the empathy for victims is driven by the
most irrepressible cultural forces in the world todaythe revelation of the Cross.
70 iek, Violence, 8990. My critique of Rawlss notion of justice as fairness takes

on much of the coloring of ieks insight about justice as equality and the role envy plays
in undermining that sense of shared justice we invoke today. In fact, iek argues Rawls
thus proposes a terrifying model of society in which hierarchy is directly legitimised [sic]
in natural properties, p. 88. In Chapter 4, using Girards mimesis and a principle similar to
this, I critique the notion of justice that Rawls advances.
The moral by-product of that revelation is the Christian conscience that

Nietzsche so loathed. However poorly Christians may have lived up to the dictates
of that conscience, the world would be an infinitely more brutal place without it.71
Freud is the first to articulate this problem in anthropo-mimetic terms and in doing
so sets the stage for Girardhence, it is to Freud that we now turn.
Freud: Girards Mimetic Precursor
My approach to differentiating myself from Freud will focus narrowly on his

influence on Girard and Girards critique of Freuds own handling of mimetic
theory. My primary reason for tackling Freud this way is that I believe that Girard is
correct in his assessment of Freuds philosophical interpretation of the problem of
mimesis in individualss lives. Not least among the criticisms that could be levied
against Freud is his insistence that the desire inherent in mimesis is generated by
the individual as a product of his or her rawest primitive desires qua the Id. In
forming his critique of Freud, Girard argues,
all Freuds formulations return in different ways to the same basic inability
to recognize that the principle of the model and that of the obstacle are one
and the sameand that this identity has nothing paternal about it. The real
principle is and must be a mimetic one. But to notice it, you must do away with
the standard definitions of imitation, which evacuate its potential for rivalry.
Freud circled around this secret all his life without ever coming to terms with
its deceptive simplicity. That is why he falls back on mythological concepts.
These concepts are examples of false differentiation and reflect once again his
incapacity to detect that the fundamental mechanism of human conflict resides
in a mimesis that precedes representation and exists on the level of animal
appetite. This origin does not, of course, prevent mimesis from eventually
becoming extremely elaborate and including in its operation the most refined
forms of representation.72
However, because I think that Girard also has some problemsand some of the
same problems he alleges of Freudthe way that I differentiate myself from
Freud is dependent upon how I differentiate myself from Girard. Hence, in
presenting Freuds contributions and my critique of them, I will follow Girard
closely while pointing out where I think that Girard as gone astray as well; keeping
in mind that Girard does not consider himself to be a Freudian as noted above in
Girards investigations of Nietzsche. I believe that Girard is right to begin with
Freud because I am also convinced of the importance of Freud to a satisfactory
71Bailie, Violence Unveiled, 31.

72 Ren Girard, Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World, trans. Stephen
Bann and Michael Metteer, Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1987: 357.
understanding of the problem of violence and mimesis, but I also believe that
Girard is correct in his criticisms of Freud. Freud claims, the primitive form of
human society was that of a horde ruled over despotically by a powerful male
[and] the fortunes of this horde have left indestructible traces upon the history
of human descent; and, especially, that the development of totemism, which
comprises in itself the beginnings of religion, morality, and social organisation
[sic], is connected with the killing of the chief by violence and the transformation
of the paternal horde into a community of brothers.73 While the father does have
an important role to play in the mimetic model it is difficult to conceive of the
father as the principal agent in moving from mimesis to rivalry to violence to, as
Girard and Freud do, religion.
The father in Freudian thought plays a central role in his mimetic theory because
the father is foil for the childs identification. Because identification is extremely
important for the mimetic process any analysis of mimesis should be derived from
Freuds own understanding of the term as the earliest expression of an emotional
tie with another person.74 This emotional tie between father and son manifests as
a desire, on behalf of the son, to be like the father. Once an individual comes
under the influence of only a single person whom has become enormously
important to him that person begins the process of entering into a mimetic
relationship.75 When we factor in the object as the target of the models affection,
the disciple, through the mimetic process, learns to desire the object as well for the
same reasons. This is, for Freud, the basis of the Oedipus complex. But, as Girard
notes in Things Hidden, The Oedipus complex is what Freud invented to explain
triangular rivalries, when he failed to discover the remarkable possibilities of the
principle of imitation, precisely in connection with issues of desire and rivalry.76
Freud, however, is not merely inventing the triangular relationships that
comprise the Oedipal complex, but, rather, he is attempting to explain the internal
mechanisms of the familial relationships as he understands them. Guy Lefort
presents just such an argument, that, in fact, Freuds Oedipus complex is meant
to explain all triangles. He argues, according to the complex, in its authentically
Freudian form, the triangle reproduces the familial triangle. The loved woman
always takes the place of the mother, the rival that of the father.77 Once the
disciple begins to desire the object it is but a short step to understanding how
thedisciple and the model come into conflictfamilial or otherwise. Considering
the construction of Freuds Oedipus complex, where the mimetic process between
child and parent functions to create an identity for the child, the emotional structure
upon which Freud depends for the success of his theory is quite advanced.
73 Sigmund Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego. London: The
Hogarth Press, 90. See also Totem and Taboo, p. 136.
74Freud, Group Psychology, 60.
76Girard, Things Hidden, 353.
Leforts challenge is salient, then, but does not rescue Freud from Girards
critique. Leforts position on Freud is a fair reading of the mimetic process as
Freud articulates it, but it also takes the process of learning desire out of its
context. We might say, in strictly familial terms, the child learns to desire in an
Oedipal situation but after the desires, or, more specifically, the structure of the
desires, become fixed the mimetic rivalry can manifest without being reducible
to the Oedipal complex as Lefort asserts. So, for Freud, the child mimes the
parent and the little boy soon notices that his father stands in his way with his
mother. His identification with his father then takes on a hostile colouring [sic]
and becomes identical with the wish to replace his father in regard to his mother
as well.78 The son, through his mimetic discipleship, learns to love the mother
because his father does and, for Freud, soon notices that his affections are blocked
by his fathers existence. The rivalry inherent in desire learned in the Oedipal
family context produces a structure that replicates outside of the family and, as
such, every mimetic conflict is, ultimately, reducible to familial terms for Freud.
However, I argue that the modeldisciple relationship prevents the son from
undertaking actions to remove the father and therefore his emotions are repressed.
The ability to repress the desire to do harm to his father is not instinctual, but
counter-instinctual, that is, the child develops restraint in direct to proportion to his
feelings of love and devotion directed at the model. Once repressed, his energies,
frustrated for the moment, are re-directed elsewhere; as Freud says, sublimation
of instinct is an especially conspicuous feature of cultural development; it is what
makes it possible for higher psychical activities, scientific, artistic or ideological,
to play such an important part in civilized life.79 The desire to repress these
emotions, which are, I believe, the first desires that arise in the disciple that are not
learned through mimesis, is made possible by the disciples belief that one day he
will replace the father. This analysis is in direct conflict with Freuds and Girards
analyses where the model is killed and replaced by the disciple who yearns to
possess the object.
Yet, my interpretation makes the post-murder Freudian story more palatable
because the disciple is already endowed with the repressive mechanism. Once the
founding violence occurs, however, the disciple cannot consummate the sexual
relationship with the object because of guilt and instead prohibitions are instituted
in the family and, extrapolating to a larger setting, the community at large. This
moment in history is the replacement of the pleasure principle with the reality
principle and is the great traumatic event in the development of man According
to Freud, this event is not unique but recurs throughout the history of mankind and
of every individual.80 The prohibitions that develop in the immediate aftermath
of the violence are against murder and incest and these two prohibitions become

79 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, trans. James Strachey, New
York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1961: 51.
80 Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, London: Routledge, 1987: 15.
the guiding principles of the new social institution of religion, which follows from
the deification of the father.
What makes Freuds hypothesis problematic is that it follows the all too easy
route made possible by the assumption of only one son in the mimetic triangle
with the fathera problem that will arise in Girards theory as well. When
multiple sons are introduced into the equation it becomes more difficult to apply
Freuds analysis to the problem of founding violence. Freud, cautions his readers
not to forget that the demand for equality in a group applies only to its members
and not to the leader.81 Hence, what makes it possible for the disciples to repress
their desires with respect to the objects desired by the model is that there is no
expectation of, or sense of entitlement to, a right of possession with respect to
the object. This ceases to be the case when the model is gone and replaced by
someone that is, and has always been, in a relationship of equal standing. The loss
of equality among the brothers is the source of the jealousy that ultimately leads
to violence not the desire to replace the father spurred on by impatience or sexual
frustrations.
In a group the individual sacrifices his own identity so as to more fully
integrate into the larger group mentality. Where Freud is convinced patricide is the
locus of founding violence Girard is more sympathetic to my own reading of the
problem of founding murder, even though he, too, wants to create his own mimetic
triangle with the father as model, mother as object and son as disciple. Girard
does not want to abandon Freuds construction of the origins of violence and the
mimetic relationships that produce the founding murder; rather, he wants to follow
possibilities that Freud himself, according to Girard, did not want to pursue which
led Freud to argue correctly, albeit incompletely, because he does not carry his
arguments to the fullest explanatory extremes. Freuds important discovery was
that he understood all rites and rituals were the performance of an actual event but
he failed to perceive that [sacrifice] takes the place of an act that nobody under
normal cultural conditions would dare or even desire to commit.82
According to Girard, Freuds intuition that the origins of rites and rituals could
be traced back to an originary act of violence was correct but because he did
not follow it (his intuition) to the end [Freud lost] all sense of the function of the
rite.83 Thus, what makes Girards mimetic theory different is that he recognizes
what Freud failed to see in his own theory that in order to reconcile function with
origin and illuminate one by means of the other [one needs] a tool that [Freud]
failed to unearth: the surrogate victim.84 Girard does not accept Freuds thesis
part and parcel but the changes he makes do not affect his keeping the father as the
victim of originary violence at the hands of his son. This is a conclusion I reject in
both Freud and Girard. Girards focus on the surrogate victim in rituals is equally

82Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 201.
83Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 201. Emphasis in the original.
problematic because the surrogate is supposed to be standing in for the object of

the intended violence. This is why Girard is of the opinion that Freuds Oedipus
story failed to establish the true identity of the object being suppressed: not
the desire for patricide or incest but the violence that lurked behind these all-too-
visible motifs, the menace of total destruction that was diverted and concealed by
means of the surrogate victim.85
Hence Girard believes that Freud was incapable of giving a more robust
account of the mimetic impulse because Freud failed to comprehend that
todesire through the mediation of a model is to desire through the mediation
of a rival [and] in the absence of the victimage mechanism, [mimetic rivalry]
cannot lead anywhere but to more and more destruction and death.86 The death
instinct entailed by Freuds mimetic account is repetitive without stop because
there are no mechanisms for its prevention or control except exhaustion.
But, according to Girard, the victimage mechanism is restorative, that is, the
victimage mechanism intervenes, hampers, curtails, and cuts off the violence
of the triangular desire. Without the victimage mechanism of the scapegoat
desire proceeds in the direction of dissociation, decomposition, and death until
it consumes everyone within its influence.87 In the end, then, Freud is guilty,
primarily, of not understanding his need of a victimage mechanism to undergird
his psychoanalytic social theory. As Girard points out,
in light of the mimetic theory, the Freudian distinction between Oedipal and
object-directed desire on the one hand, narcissistic regression on the other, simply
does not hold up; it is rooted in Freuds particularly strong tendency to segregate
worthy desires from unworthy ones and to activate victimage mechanisms
that psychoanalysis cannot criticize because it is wedded to thembecause they
remain fundamental to it in the sense in which victimage mechanisms remain
fundamental to any kind of mythology.88
In the Freudian tale of mimesis the son desires to kill the father because he desires
the mother and from these desires for incest and patricide the son brings violence
into the established familial relations. I am unconvinced that Girards critique is
correct except to say that Freud was wrong in his conclusions. However, Freud
does utilize insights the import of which both Freud and Girard ignore bringing
both of them to incorrect suppositions about the role and relationship of incest to
foundational violence. More importantly, contrary to Girards analysis, Freud is
right to locate the incest taboo as coming after the murder even if it was the chief
motive for the murder itself. Like Freud, Girard believes that religion follows the
founding murder and the desire to quell the violence requires that the violence be

redirected toward another acceptable victim. This is the role that religion plays
in the lives of those that survive the initial violence. The victim can be human
or animal so long as it is outside of the community because the sacrifice must
be equally relevant to all community members without being connected, directly
or indirectly, to any group. Sacrifice mediated through religion, which is an
institution to mediate the destruction of the original victim, is meant to reinforce
the hierarchies and forced semblances of equality in society to prevent further
violence from erupting within the community itself.
So, following Girard, the purpose of the sacrifice is to restore harmony to the
community, to reinforce the social fabric.89 We might think of religion as the first
social institution to form as a result of mimetic rivalry. The rituals and rites that
follow are not merely linked together because they share the same source instead
violence and the sacred are inseparable the covert appropriation by sacrifice
of certain properties of violenceparticularly the ability of violence to move
from one object to anotheris hidden from sight by the awesome machinery of
ritual.90 What is key in Girards formulation of the surrogate victim mechanism
is that he sees this problem as a problem of the rivalry between brothers in relation
to the father not in relation to a brother separated from the horde. The need to
preserve social stability is the purpose, according to Freud, that totemism develops
alongside religion. However, having rejected Freuds totemic explanation Girard
needs the surrogate victim analysis in order to maintain the centrality of the father
to the mimetic model that generates the violence upon which society is founded.
This, unfortunately, presents a problem for Girards thesis because he focuses
on the rivalry between brothers while in the mimetic relationship with the father
rather than the disintegration of the equality that rivalry maintained. Girards
contribution to the mimetic crisis is not just having turned the Oedipal complex
into a sacrificial crisis but also to have determined the origin of violence to be
derived from rivalry rather than simply from desirethis is his extension of
Freuds arguments that he claims Freud did not pursue even though the evidence
for it is clearly present in his works. For his part Girard argues that we must take
care to identify the rival and recognize that rivalry does not arise because of
the fortuitous convergence of two desires on a single object; rather, the subject
desires the object because the rival desires it.91 iek explains this phenomenon
thus, [imagine the] scene of a sibling envying his brother who is suckling at
the mothers breast. The subject does not envy the Others possession of the
prized object as such, but rather the way the Other is able to enjoy this object,
which is why it is not enough for him simply to steal and thus gain possession
of the object. His true aim is to destroy the Others ability/capacity to enjoy
the object.92

92 iek, Violence, 90. Emphasis in the original.
ieks formulation of the problem of desire and rivalry highlights the

significant problem I have with Girards analysis of Freud and his subsequent
handling of Freudian themes in his own work. It seems that Girard, like Freud,
has taken a substantial body of evidence and a remarkable insight into the
problem of violence and argued to the wrong conclusion. The only relationship
capable of generating the necessary violence both Freud and Girard seek is filial
in nature. Therefore, even conceding Girards premises regarding rivalry, the
rival has to be a brotheran equal before the model. This, I believe, follows
because it is only through the relationship with the brother that the rival as rival
could come into contact with the model desire that alerts the two rivals to the
others awareness of the desirability of the object. Once they are both aware of
their competition they are locked in and their rivalry begins to escalate toward
violencean eruption of which is inevitable the moment one of the brothers is
chosen to take the place of the father.
By embedding the rivalry requirement in the fraternal relationship the
sacrificial crisis meets the requirements that violence stems from desire, is
acted out by a group, that the victim be capable of generating remorse among
the victors, and that the victors be properly motivated to venerate both the
deceased father model who ultimately caused the violence and the deceased
son whose death brings peace. Unlike Girards erroneous conclusion this
fashioning of the mimetic rivalry and founding violence actually strengthens
his critique of Freud and, appropriately altered, his own argument as well.
Girard argues that, the sacrificial crisis can be defined as a crisis of
distinctionsthat is, a crisis affecting the cultural order. This cultural order is
nothing more than a regulated system of distinctions in which the differences
among individuals are used to establish their identity and their mutual
relationships and, moreover, order, peace, and fecundity depend on cultural
distinctions; it is not these distinctions but the loss of the them that gives birth
to fierce rivalries and sets of members of the same family or social group at
one anothers throats.93 Given this position it is difficult to determine why the
model makes more sense than a rival disciple for bringing about the violence
of mimetic relationships. To further examine the problem it will be best to
consult Girards work directly.
Girard: The Mimetic Narrative and the Triangular Construction of Mimesis
Before delving farther into the difficulties of a Freudian or Girardian theory

of mimetic desire, and my critiques of their theories, a closer examination of
the mimetic relationship will be imperative, in order to appropriately ground
the Freudian and Girardian theories of mimesis in a broader narrative. The
primary concern of this final section, then, will be to establish both how Girard

conceptualizes the mimetic triangle and to illuminate how the relationships

between the component persons creates the conditions of desire that lead to
violencestrictly as Girard understands it. The current explication of Girards
understanding of the triangular mimetic model is meant to recreate the mimetic
model as he employs it in order to familiarize the reader with the theoretical
ground upon which I will be working, and from which I hope to advance, later,
in Chapter 3, a new, reconstructed, theory of mimetic desire and violence.
Girard describes his mimetic model as a triangle (hereafter this will be referred
to as the Girardian Standard Triangle or GST, see Figure 2.1). At the apex of
the triangle is the Model, which in a Girardian analysis is typically the father.94
Directly beneath the Model is the Disciple, which is typically representative of
the son, and, to complete the triangulation, the third point is the Object or mother.
To be fair to Girard he often explains this mimetic triangle without relying on the
familial labels I use here. This is not to say Girard doesnt think that the family
is at the heart of the matter, so to speak, for his analysis, but he often utilizes
examples from literature and other genres to demonstrate how permeated society
is with the mimetic model.
For instance, in Deceit, Desire, and the Novel Girard explores Triangular
Desire by using the words of Don Quixote when he says to Sancho, I reckon
that whoever imitates him best will come closest to perfect chivalry.95 Here
the him is the great knight Amadis, whom Quixote takes on as his Model.
However, if Quixote is the Disciple and Perfect Chivalry is the Object, then one
can see here the parallels with Girards familial reading of what will become the
parricide narrative in his analysis. Girard argues, Don Quixote has surrendered
to Amadis the individuals fundamental prerogative: he no longer chooses the
objects of his own desireAmadis must choose for him.96 The surrendering
of desire is of critical importance for a mimetic theory of desire because the
individuals fundamental prerogative is to choose that which will be the object of
desire. Once an individual surrenders his prerogative of choice to the Model, they
are locked into an escalating rivalry that is the necessary outcome of triangular
mimetic relationships.
94 Because the use of the word model in the language needed to describe the
structure of Girardian rivalry can become confusing between model as structure and model
as component I will refer to the structure as a triangle when I mean the mimetic model
and will refer to the apex figure, the model, when speaking about a component part of the
structure.
96 Ibid., 1.
Figure 2.1 The Girardian Standard Triangle97
Since my project deals with the familial nature of mimesis and mimetic rivalry
I will utilize familial terms almost exclusively. From this model, Girard describes
the rationale for human social and cultural relationships. The primary function of
this model is to provide a structure out of which an explanation can be provided for
the ineradicable existence of violence in society. This is not a concern primarily
with small acts of violence, though it could be adapted to those instances as well.
Rather, Girards model is meant to help explain social structural violence as it
exists in the various institutions that humans use to perpetually reproduce society,
in spite of scientific, technological, educational, and other social advances that
have coevolved with humanity.98 That is, according to this model, if it is accurate,
we can begin to deconstruct our social structures to expose the truth of why
social structures are the way they are and, in fact, why these particular social
structures exist in place of others. Girard is keen to point out that it is certainly
astonishing that all human activities, and even the course of nature itself, are
subordinated to the metamorphosis of violence taking place at the heart of the
97 For this and all subsequent triangles the same conventions will be followed to
allow for quick reference between the different variations and interpretations that follow.
In each triangle the Model will hold the apex position and be speckled, the Disciple(s)
will be positioned directly under the Model and will be colored different shades of gray to
differentiate different claimants, and the Object will always appear to the right of the rivalric
relationship and will be striped. Additionally, the lines in the triangle will be indicative
of particular facets of the triangular relationships. Solid arrows pointing in one direction
demonstrate the direction of the relationships in question. The dashed arrow indicates the
direction and recipient of the violence. Finally, the double arrow highlights the incestuous
relationship or, at least, the direction of the incestuous desires. Hence, the Model and
Disciple each have an arrow indicating the direction of their relationship because theirs is a
rivalrous, not an incestuous relationship.
98 Depending on how ingrained one is disposed to believe the mimetic mechanism
is in our social structures it is possible to read the mimetic crisis in political, religious,
economic, and educational organization. As these develop they are continually rewritten
along mimetic lines because even as we reshape our cultural situation we do not alter the
foundation of our social arrangement.
community.99 This deconstructive project, according to Girards interpretation,

brings us closer to a meaningful and substantive understanding of why human
society is the way that it is.
The motivation for social institutions that stems from Girards employment of
this model is one that derives from this violent act, which arises from the structure
of the triangle as such. Burton Mack, describing Girards theory, argues that
All systems that give structure to human society have been generated from it
[mimetic violence]: language, kinship systems, taboos, codes of etiquette, patterns
of exchange, rites, and civil institutions. Thus a theory of sacrifice has produced
a comprehensive account of human social formation, religion, and culture.100
Girard, among others, refers to this violent act as the founding murder and,
consequently, he argues throughout his work that, not only is the triangular
formula embedded in our social arrangements, but it is also re-created or re-lived
at a social level through ritualized mimetic acts. Following the founding murder,
religious practices and social taboos were created to prevent further or future
acts from occurring. Alternatively put, religious practices and taboos were used
to regain control of a society plunged into violent disorder and chaos, as well
as to help prevent similar violent disruptions in society. It is Girards project to
show how this founding violence is manifest across human social experiences
in order to get at why violence is so prevalent in human cultures. After all, as
Mark Anspach notes in his introduction to Oedipus Unbound, Culturally specific
beliefs cannot account for behavior which is not culturally specific, which is why
Girard employs such a broad range of examples in his investigations.101
In a Girardian analysis of mimetic rivalry, based on the standard triangle, the
mimetic relationship that Girard is concerned with develops on the line connecting
the model and disciple. What begins as a relationship that develops from the
childs desire to mimic the father morphs into the child taking on the desires of
the father so that the mimetic act is no longer strictly miming. Where the child,
through mimesis, might learn, say, how to shape arrowheads or how to clean a
game animal, the child also learns to desire more abstractly. The simple version
of this type of desire formation is the disciple miming preferences for clothing,
or particular foodstuffs or domestic animals. However, amidst all of this mimicry
the child also learns to desire the object in the triangle and to do so not only in the
same way, but also, ostensibly, for the same reasons.
It is important to mark out here the significance of learning to desirethis is
true of both the Freudian and Girardian mimetic storiesbecause desiring is not
considered to be a natural inclination except in its most general and universal form.
So, we might talk of desiring food when we are hungry, but this is substantially
different than learning to desire specific foods that will sate ones hunger. For
example, when a young lion mimics its parents on the hunt to satisfy their hunger,
99 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 94.

100 Burton Mack, Violent Origins, 7.
101 Mark Anspach, Oedipus Unbound, xv.
we are not inclined to believe that the cub is taught that zebras are more desirable
than gazelles. It is exactly this type of object specific desire, which is learned and
developed, in the mimetic modeling of Girard and Freud. In fact, with respect to
lions, or any other animal, when their rivalries are put into a GST interpretation
of their desires an interesting break with humans is exposed. Animals possess
individual braking mechanisms to insure that combats between them seldom result
in the actual death of the vanquished it would perhaps not be inappropriate to
term them instinctive. To use the same term in connection with mans lack of such
a braking device, however, would be absurd.102 Simply put, people are perfectly
willing to engage in the total destruction of their competitors, while the same is
not true of our animal cousins.
The Object need not necessarily be the mother, though the use of the mother
archetype does make the explanation simpler in some ways for Girards overall
story. It is equally important, perhaps, to develop one of the other examples more
fully to give a better account of the role of the object and to help explain why
the relationship is one grounded in rivalry. So, I will briefly revisit the domestic
animal strain of thought. Consider that the child is learning how to determine
which horse is best according to his father. The father would teach him things
about how to recognize a good horse: a fast runner by its gait, a strong horse by
its musculature, a healthy horse by its teeth, and so on. By explaining to his son
how these traits combine to make a desirable horse the son is learning to desire
a particular thing for particular reasons and the Model is the mediator of these
desires. Now, imagine that the community gathers for the annual horse round up
where all the fathers and sons will be selecting horses from the wild horses caught.
On a GST interpretation, the father and son would be rivals for the same horses
because they each desire particular horses for the same particular reasons. Hence,
they are mimetic rivals.
Once the father and son are locked into a mimetic relationship that has developed
into a rivalry, it is fair to say that they are on a necessarily self-destructive path, on
a GST understanding of mimesis. The primary reason for an inevitable conflict is
the fact that there are only so many horses which combine all the traits that both
father and son would find desirable. More importantly, recognizing this fact, and
recognizing that the son is pursuing the same horses for his own herd, the father
must become the rival of his son so that the two become rivals of each other, rather
than model and imitator where the rivalry only runs one way. Keep in mind Freuds
conception of primal society where the father rules despotically over his family,
which includes, presumably, his harem of women, one can see the same story start
to unfold when one substitutes woman for horse and women for herd.
The son, having learned to desire from his father, would have learned to desire
the objects for the same reasons and in the same ways leading to the development
of desire for the same type of woman, as the mother token, who would be one
of many similar woman, collected by the father in his harem. Perhaps the key

difference I would highlight is that when talking about horses and mimetic rivalry,
most people are not predisposed to automatically assume the father and son will
come to blows over a horse. In fact, it seems more natural to picture the father as
proud or pleased that his son has developed the right preferences. That there
is, at a minimum, commonsense grounds for believing that the father does not
necessarily enter into a rivalry will help explain later why we should reject the GST.
The recognition on the part of the father that the son is his rival, converting him
into a rival of his son, is the crucial moment in the mimetic narrative for Girard.
As Girard points out in an interesting passage from Violence and the Sacred, the
way the Model and Disciple come into conflict, learn of the fact that they are in
conflict, and resolve the conflict by violence is
by a strange but inexplicable consequence of their relationship, neither the

model nor the disciple is disposed to acknowledge the inevitable rivalry. The
model, even when he has openly encouraged imitation, is surprised to find
himself engaged in competition. He concludes that the disciple has betrayed
his confidence by following in his footsteps. As for the disciple, he feels both
rejected and humiliated, judged unworthy by his model of participating in the
superior existence the model himself enjoys.103
This rivalry, grounded in a set of desires that cannot be altered at this point,
and already well underway by the time it is recognized, will escalate to violence
as both Model and Disciple struggle to fulfill their desires, the one by protecting
his women and the other by attempting to overthrow his father. There is, of
course, no reason to assume that the rivalry has to become violent, immediately
or openly. In fact, it is safe to assume that the father would best the son early in
the rivalry, possibly chastising, humiliating, or, as Freud thinks, expelling him
from the group. If the reason for the intensification of the rivalry is the limited
availability of women who can satisfy the desires of Model and Discipleas
there would be a limited number of satisfactory horsesthen the reason for the
turn to violence would be, not only the sons early defeats at the hands of his
father, but also, his inability to sate his desire. At this point, the son will turn to
violence as the only means to rid himself of his father, as obstacle. The son kills
his father in order to possess his mother or, more broadly in scope, to possess the
women of the harem. This is the originary crime of society, the founding murder,
from which all social institutions develop. Before turning to the aftermath of the
founding murder it will be important to detour through Girards understanding
of what the recognition of the rivalry entails for a post-murder society. If the
founding murder is the origin of society then everything that happens in the
aftermath of that murder is, not only a consequence of that murder, but also, a
direct response to it.
103Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 146. Emphasis added.

It may seem on the surface that the rivalry produces violence merely because of
a lack of women for the father and son to copulate with, but a far more complicated
explanation lies beneath the surface. Girard posits, as a way of explaining the
recognition of the rivalry, a concept of the monstrous double. This relationship
of doubles in a Girardian framework is best understood as the Model becoming
more interested in the object he designated to the Disciple, thereby imitating the
Disciples desire for the object.
In fact, he imitates his own desire, through the intermediary of the Disciple. The
Disciple thus becomes Model to his own Model, and the Model, reciprocally,
becomes Disciple of his own Disciple. In the last resort, there are no genuine
differences left between the two, or, to put it more precisely, between their
desires; it is not satisfactory to think merely in terms of differences being
exchanged, displaced, diverted. These vanishing differences are nothing more
than interruptions in reciprocity, and they always involve an element of the
arbitrary, since they are rooted in the victimage mechanisms and in mimetic
rivalry; they dissolve in the face of violence, which makes everything return to
a pure state of reciprocity.104
The monstrous double concept highlights, for Girard, the loss of distinctions
between the Model and Disciple; he grounds this interpretation on the primitive,
cross-cultural fear of twins. The fear of twins permeates numerous primitive
cultures and inspire[s] a particular terror. It is not unusual for one of the twins,
and often both, to be put to death. The origin of this terror has long puzzled
ethnologists.105 Girard believes that the fear of twins stems from their lack of
distinction. As twins they are identical, at least in all the relevant mimetic ways;
they are in a sense reinforced brothers whose final objective difference, that of
age, has been removed; it is virtually impossible to distinguish between them.106
Becoming identical is one of the products of the mimetic relationship between
Model and Disciple. When the two recognize the rivalry between them, it is not as
father and son, but rather as equals, competing for the same things. The equality
between them is the fuel driving the mimetic motor toward violence.107 Still, the
fear of doubles that develops out of violent mimesis gets translated into cultural
customs as a fear of twins, because they come into the world already lacking
distinctions making it inevitable that they will come to violence. It is for this
reason that certain primitive peoples abort one of the twins at birth.108 This notion

107 There is good reason to question the notion of equality in the monstrous double as
Girard frames the problem, but I will postpone dealing with that until Chapter 3.
108 Girard surveys several examples of the cultural stigmatisms surrounding twins,
but his best example is that of the Trobriands. See Violence and the Sacred, 5960.
of distinctions and monstrous doubles will be critical to understanding my critique

of Girard, but first, let me continue the Girardian mimetic narrative, by showing
how cultural norms and social institutions result from the murder of the father.
The two obvious norms, or taboos, to develop from mimetic violence are those
against patricide and incest. On the one hand, if the father is the social equivalent
of the chief, then the willingness to murder the one will lead to a willingness to
kill the other. Since no one would want to be king in a culture where familial and
social interactions might become murderous, it makes sense to structure society so
that such behavior is not merely frowned upon but actively discouraged. Similarly,
the incest taboo is deemed necessary because the desire to possess the mother is
thought of as the primary motivation for the murder in the first place. However,
since Girards mimetic theory does not require a female object, the role of incest
is regulated to a secondary role and primacy is given to the murderous act as
the primary cause for instantiating social institutions to quell future violence and
render society orderly.
Having these taboos in place is not enough to maintain order in society because
of several factors that do not come into play until after the murder. First, there is,
according to both Girard and Freud, guilt associated with the murder of the father.
The guilt transforms the mourners into more than just murderous children and it
transforms the murdered father into more than just a vanquished rival. Because the
guilt is associated with an act that is understood as wrong only in the aftermath
of the violence, and not necessarily by the perpetrator of the murder, the need
to expunge the guilt becomes the basis for religion. For Freud, the murderers
undid their deed [patricide] by declaring that the killing of the father substitute,
the totem, was not allowed, and renounced the fruits of their deed by denying
themselves the liberated women. Thus they created the two fundamental taboos
of totemism out of the sense of guilt of the son.109 Religion begins when the son,
now in possession of the women, and by extension the family, realizes that he
has committed a grave transgression. The transgression need not be thought of as
a sin at this point because sinfulness develops after the instantiation of religious
principles. However, the transgression can only be recognized in the context of the
violence and its outcome, and perhaps, only in the body of the deceased father, so
that the concept of religion grows out of a need for reverence.
To revere the father and eliminate the guilt, religion requires both the elevation
of the father to status of god and that the guilty conspirator(s) not forget the
heinousness of their action. To elevate the father is easy enough given that his
status in the relationship with the son was that of the Model. To remember and
rebuke, simultaneously, requires a different sort of practice, a re-enactment, one
that enables the survivors to remain in touch with the violence and also to provide
for themselves a means of releasing the violent impulse in a way that is not
109 Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo, 211. See also, Girard, Violence and the Sacred,
Chapter 8 for an interesting analysis of Freuds use of guilt, which Girard parallels in his
own theory.
socially destructive. To satisfactorily achieve this level of utility in the immediate

aftermath required the spilling of blood; but not haphazardly, as that would allow
for too much control by the individuals in society over when and how that should
be done. Individuals endowed with the ability to determine when and how these
ritual practices would be carried out enables them, individually, too much freedom
in the social setting; subjected to this kind of individual control society would
lose social cohesion and the religious principles would not function to prevent
future acts of violence. Hence, religions developed from and around the need for
a sacrificial victim, or scapegoat.
The victimage mechanism in a mimetically produced society functions by
allowing the social group to destroy a life without having to destroy themselves or
their society. As a crowd whose members imitate each others behavior, the group
derives an important benefit from the unanimousthat is, mimetically induced
hatred for the victim: this hatred unifies the members and creates the community.
As surrogate, therefore, the victim is simultaneously the symptom of a groups
fundamental lack of cohesionits fundamental nonidentity with itself.110 The
victim may be either a totemic animal (on a Freudian interpretation) or human,
at least in some instances (on a Girardian interpretation). The reason for the
surrogates dual identity as member and outsideras symptom and curestems
from the need for the victim to resemble the group without belonging to the group.
This need is precisely why a totemic animal serves the function for Freud. The
totemic animal is already revered and its destruction carries with it the requisite
feelings of remorse and guilt, but also the recognition that the animal is not a full
member of the group either, because it stands outside the group or because it is,
at a very basic level, merely an animal instantiation of a deity and not the deity
proper. Of course, on occasion human victims work just as well, especially when
those to be sacrificed are othered in any one of a number of ways.111
110 Chow, Rey. Sacrifice, Mimesis, and the Theorizing of Victimhood (ASpeculative
Essay). Chow further defends this position by citing Girards arguments about victimization
in The Book of Job, In a world controlled by mimetic desire the appetite for violence
may grow and may be ultimately satisfied at that moment when the global tendency to
uniformity focuses the mimetic substitutions and polarizations on some victim or other, or
perhaps not so randomly but on a victim who is more vulnerable because of his visibility,
one who is somehow predestined by the exceptional position he holds in the community
someone like Job. Op. cit. Job: The Victim of His People, trans. Yvonne Freccero. Stanford
UP, 1987, 65. This notion of victimizing someone because of the special position they hold
in society parallels Girards arguments elsewhere about the reasons kings and queens (or,
more generally, political figures) are targeted as the reason social conditions are terrible
and, then, summarily punished.
111 How othering, or differentiating people in a community, has developed to
keep pace with social evolution has followed increasingly complex means. However, the
methodologies have not been that different from earliest times to the present. Colonialism,
racism, and sexism have all played important and central roles is the process of othering
especially between citizen and foreigner (one might recall Aristotles arguments in the
The victim may be an actual outsider holding no legitimate claim to social

standing within the group or an ostracized individual from within the group. These
individuals might be prisoners of war, non-citizens (i.e. slaves or convicts), or
persons selected by a special process to be the subject of the sacrificial process.112
This last condition may seem especially curious given the nature of the sacrifice,
but there is a good reason for such practices that stems from the originary violence,
namely, the victim has to be somebody whom, in the role of sacrificial victim,
can be quietly honored, following the sacrifice. If the point of scapegoating is to
re-enact the sacrificial process and rebuke the participants, then the victim has
to have some similarity with the group or the violence would be casual and
meaningless to the group. The founding murder was not wanton and the victim of
the originary act of violence was also revered, so, the sacrificial victim has to be
able to command the same sort of reverence or the sacrifice is wasted. If reverence
for the victim is necessary, lest the sacrifice be wasted, then few things would
approximate the necessary closeness like a former member of the group.
As the ritual practices associated with religion become more refined, the
principles of religion become more complex. The point of religion is to stave off
violence, so religious principles become a mask for the actual purpose of the rituals.
In this way religion becomes a founding idea of society, a directed purpose whose
function is to alleviate the violent impulses and keep the members of the group
tethered to the responsibility they share for the founding murder. As Girardian
critic and feminist theorist Susan Nowak argues, when participants are allowed to
distance themselves from the violence that underlies religious ritualization, they also
abdicate responsibility for that violence.113 Of course, as society grows, evolves, and
develops so must the religious stories used to conceal the true intentions of religious
practices lest they fail in their purpose and plunge society back into violence. The
religious mythos is intimately linked to the cultural myths that are designed to
accomplish the same things. But we should not, as a result of these mythological
underpinnings, eschew the historical importance of these claims because the fixed,
static, immutable nature of human reality is incapable of dealing with the murder-
crisis event as a historical event. It thwarts thoroughgoing critiques of a cultures
social structures because it endows these social structures with an ontological status.
The ontologization of constructed social structures makes them appear as if they
were natural Historicity as a central category of analysis is lost.114
Politics Bks. 3, 4 and 7) allowing for scapegoating and victimization to occur. For an
interesting study of how racism has been continually used to achieve these ends see Charles
Mills, The Racial Contract.
112 For instance, the Greek Pharmakos who was ceremoniously, and often violently,
driven out of town to purge the community of evil.
113Nowak, Susan. The Girardian Theory and Feminism: Critique and
Appropriation. Contagion: Journal of Violence, Mimesis, and Culture vol. 1 (Spring
1994): 21. I will revisit this issue in Chapter 3, Section 4.
114 Ibid., 23.
It is no coincidence, according to Girard, that the most ancient myths tell a

frightening story about patricide and incest. These stories are not told for the
benefit of the non-believer, but began as part and parcel of the religious narrative
being built around the hope to avoid further future violence. Herodotuss Theogeny
rehearses the story of the founding murder in great detail. Plato desires to keep the
poets tales out of the Republic because they relate stories of the overthrow of
authority embodied in the father. And, of course, for Girard, the story of Christ
is both a religious tale and a necessary cultural mythology meant to expiate our
original sin. He also thinks the Christ story serves as the final indictment of the
mimetic crisis narrative such that his final analysis of Christ is as the actual savior,
but in the reified sense of the sacrificial victim which implodes the mimetic crisis,
by exposing it and taking on all of our sins and forgiving them.115
Alongside the need for religion to direct and control our violent impulses,
another institution arose from the ashes of the founding murder. Following from
the incest taboo, social order had to become arranged differently to make mimetic
rivalry less threatening to the survivors society. Since it was thought that women
were, or, on Girards model, a particular woman, the mother, was to blame, at
least indirectly, for inciting the violence given that the motivation for the sons
ousting of the father was to possess the females, the incest taboo was designed to
constrain the sexual impulses of the group. Freuds rendering of the incest taboo
is of special interest here because I think he, not Girard, has the better reading
of the incest taboos function. Freud argues persuasively that if the incest taboo
were the result of the sons sexual interest in the mother, or at most, the wife and
daughters of his father, then it would cover the immediate family only, but this is
not the case.116
The incest taboo in primitive cultures extends beyond the confines of the family
proper to all of the women under the sway of a particular totem. So, whereas the
murder taboo has an obvious target in the parents, or more generally, in the Model,
whoever that may be, the incest taboo is applied generally to a rather large and
seemingly disparate group of people, in this case women. Why should the incest
taboo cover a large section of society which share no blood ties to the son? For
Freud, the conception of primal society is that of a horde, and within that horde the
115 For further analysis on this point see Girard, Things Hidden, 32 and his book
The Scapegoat. David Frankfurter argues along similar lines claiming, for Girard
the image of primal orgiastic violence also serves the cause of religious orthodoxy. He
suggests that such violenceespecially as represented in the frenzied murder of the
scapegoatwas integral to society up to the point of the Hebrew Bible and, even more,
the Gospels and Christian Revelation, which then exposed such rites as futile and showed
more sublimated routes to peace and social harmony than murder. Girard thus renders
Freuds primal violence episode as preparatio evangelium: a division of history into
stages of necessary violence and unnecessary violence exposed by the church in Ritual
as Accusation and Atrocity, 375.
116 See Freud, Totem and Taboo, 45.
despotic father possess a harem, the members of which would have been obtained,
presumably through a variety of means: marriage, theft, conquest, purchase, etc.
The one thing the women in the harem really have in common is that they are all in
possession of the traits and characteristics that the father finds desirable. However,
in a more superficial sense, what they all have in common is that they belong to
the same manthe murdered father. Since the son murdered his father to possess
someone in the harem, it only makes sense to make all of the fathers holdings
off limits via the incest taboo. This would mean that all the womenmothers,
aunts, sistersin the harem were off limits and this broad blanket outlawing of the
fathers women is the best explanation for why the incest taboo extends beyond the
boundaries of the immediate family. This far reaching incest taboo will come to
have minor variations depending on how immediate family comes to be defined
in a particular society, but the principle does not get altered: certain women are off
limits to certain men.
Because such a system has the potential to get out of hand quickly, especially
if there is no enforcement mechanism to regulate it and punish breaches of the
code, the establishment of a judicial system must parallel the organization of
religion in post-murder society. The legal system provides both a way to codify
the laws and a way to rectify wrongdoing, while simultaneously taking away
from the individual the ability to do just that on his own. Understood in this way,
as primarily preventative and punitive, the legal system is designed to achieve the
same thing as religion. Penance and retribution are doled out in public squares
and courts by kings and magistrates, providing a venue to realize the ends of
mimetic violence, without the violence embroiling the whole community, thereby
keeping the peace. The incest taboo, articulated as a totemic system, also breeds
social division, and a class structure develops which converts the primal horde
into a community governed by a moral code. Along these same lines, our moral
codes might be conceived of as more than a mere social convention, but rather
as a social arrangement whereby we are able to manage the problems of mimesis
rather than correct them.
The account offered here represents the standard, and for Girard, the most
acceptable, formulation of the mimetic narrative. Girard believes that this
mimetic narrative is embedded in all of our cultural and social institutions. As
society progresses from one age to the next, it carries with it the same structural
framework, even if it makes them over periodically to keep the mask in good
working order. However, as I have already claimed, Girards mimetic story is not
without its faults. Girard has, in some ways, committed blunders similar to the
mistake he charges Freud with, namely, Girard draws the wrong conclusions in
spite of the evidence available to him. I have no desire to speculate why Girard
would fail to draw the conclusions, I think, should follow from his analysis, but,
nevertheless, I intend to offer my own correctives to his story. In the next chapter
I critique Girard with the aim of improving his mimetic theory, because I think
it is more right than wrong, and understanding it is the best chance we have for
improving the human social condition.
It is important to point out that while Girards focus is primarily on the

religious and mythological aspects of society, to include how these forms of
trans-generational communication perpetuate taboos and the crisis resolution
necessary to ensure the on-going survival of human societies, this does not preclude
him, or others, from developing similar stories about other recognized social
institutions. It is my position that Girards analysis cannot only be broadened to
include additional institutionalized cultural tropes and narratives, beyond the work
he has already done, but that it must to be as effective as possible in developing a
robust philosophical anthropology.117
117 I will deal more substantially with these ideas in Chapters 4 and 5.
Chapter 3
Girardian Mimetic Theory:
Objections and Responses
Prelude to a Critique of Girardian Mimetic Theory
I believe that mimetic theory, properly understood, provides society with an

important tool for making substantive social changes for the betterment of
everyone. As I alluded at the close of Chapter 2, two areas where I think Mimesis
can help us make valuable changes are the realms of political thought and
practice, as well as, understanding, not only what a different future would look
like, but what it would mean to live in a world not governed by the principle fears
of a cultural arrangement sparked by mimetic violence. These are lofty goals,
to be sure, but a robust mimetic account of our social structures and values can
provide critical insights into what needs to be done to accomplish significant
social change. Once I have addressed the relationship and importance of mimesis
to political philosophy and idyllic hopethat is, utopian dreamingI will revisit
this issue and offer what I think are the logical conclusions of a mimetic account
designed to reveal the violent origins of society. However, before turning to these
concerns, first, it is necessary to redress some problems inherent in the Girardian
mimetic narrative. There are three serious problems with the standard Girardian
mimetic narrative identified and outlined above: the passivity of the Object, the
father as the target of the violence, and the creation and formulation of social
institutions as repercussions of the violence. By correcting these problems I will
not only demonstrate how I can preserve the most important insights of Girards
mimetic theory, but I will also present a newly constituted and viable alternative
to Girards theory.
Mimesis, Violence, and Critique
Violence seems to be an inherent and inescapable condition of life; this seems

especially true for human societies from the earliest recorded histories to the
present day. While it may not be axiomatic, there is enough anthropological
evidence to suggest that violence is as old as human civilization, and older if we
adhere to a theory of human evolution. Therefore, any serious attempt to achieve
a coherent theory about the origins of societal violence can only by accomplished
through a close examination of our earliest primal relationships. In fact, the
idea that society began with an originary crime dates back, philosophically, to
Anaximander who, in an existing fragment, says, that the unity of the world was
destroyed by a primordial crime.1 Regardless of whether or not one is inclined
to read Anaximander literally or figuratively, it seems that the best evidence
available for anything approaching an historical framing and underpinning of such
a bold claim is to be found in religious and cultural mythology. Freuds analysis
of Anaximanders claim is situated within a reference to the Titans and Orpheus
where he claims that in these myths we are disturbed by the variation
according to which a youthful god was murdered.2 It is interesting that in this
analysis the adjective used to describe the murdered god is youthful, a clue
which will certainly help us unravel the mystery surrounding who was the victim
of the originary crime, the founding violence, which reified and codified social
rituals, morals, prohibitions, and hierarchiesin a word all the institutions that
conceal the origins of societys violent beginnings.
Debates about the origin and persistence of violence in society have long been
entrenched in evidence centering on nature versus nurture, with theories ranging
across a broad ideological spectrum, placing responsibility on everything from
evolution and genetics, to parental upbringing and cultural molding, or, in the most
recent and popular contributions to the debate, a mixture of the two. In 1932 the
American Psychological Association declared violence was the result of nurture
rather than nature but the issue of violence in society is difficult to explain,
and its role in human culture hard to assess dispassionately.3 My purpose is not
to speculate about which theories are best or which side of this particular debate
has the upper hand, because the literature is vast and often complex with neither
side offering anything remotely approaching a definitive answer. Rather, my aim
is to attempt to locate the genesis of violence in society, focusing specifically on
how originary violence led to the rise of social institutions which govern social
relationships, which will require, at least, a sympathetic reading of the nurture
side of the argument. However, to be fair, and to limit myself to the parameters
of this project, I will not deal directly with questions which attempt to parse out
how much we are predisposed to behave in certain ways or how much nurturing
impacts our development, at least for now.4
1 The use of this fragment is in Sigmund Freud Totem and Taboo, New York: Barnes
and Nobel Press, 2005, 135. Freud cites as his source for the fragment J.G. Frazer, 4 vols,
1910: Une sorte de peche proethnique, 1. c., 76. Ren Girard also uses Anaximander for
his own theory in Violence and the Sacred, Baltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press,
1979, 308. The reference that Girard uses is also a reference to Heideggers analysis of
fragments attributed to Anaximander though Girard thinks that Heideggers interpretation
is faulty. Op. cit, Martin Heidegger Early Greek Thinking, trans. David Farrell Krell and
Frank Capuzzi, (New York, 1975).
2Freud, Totem and Taboo, 135.
3 Qtd. in Hamerton-Kelly, Robert. Violent Origins, vi.
4 This question will come up again in the last chapter where I will, in attempting to
offer some solutions to the problem of violence in society, have to make certain claims
about the structure of the family. However, it is still possible that the problem of nature
Girardian Mimetic Theory: Objections and Responses 53
I am interested in attempting to find out when and how violence was introduced
into our social relationships and became a permanent condition of life, because it is
only with an understanding of violence that we might one day gain admittance into
a genuinely more peaceful way of life. It is not my intention to attempt a derivation
of an explanation supporting violence as a genetic problem or one that developed
from external exposure to things like hunting,5 but rather to attempt an explanation
conceiving how violence was introduced into human affairs as a problem of social
relations. However, following Freud, [it] must not be forgotten that primitive
races are not young races but really are as old as the most civilized, and that we
have no right to expect that they have preserved their original ideas and institutions
for our information without any evolution or distortion To establish the original
conditions, therefore, always remains a matter of construction.6 Since probing the
questions surrounding social violence can be done primarily theoretically it will
only be possible if we consider mythological, religious, ritualistic, and fictional
narratives alongside the existent empirical evidence that tell us where we came
from and why we believe and behave the way we do in social settings.
Reconstructing the moment when violence was introduced into the
relationships between people is difficult, not only because we have no permanent,
written, archived historical record of it, but also because the historical oral
record we do have has been eroded by generation after generation of distortion,
manipulation, and forgetting. Nevertheless, if the problems society faces today are
problems of violence, then the founding moment must have been a violent one.
Our longstanding preoccupation with violenceour unparalleled willingness to
resort to violence and our intense need to continually redefine and legislate human
social relations in terms of our responses to violencesuggests that the societys
founding moment had to have been a moment of violence coupled, as I will argue,
with intense anger and possibly hatred. But anger is never without antecedents;
it is always preceded and determined by an initial outburst. Even that initial anger
is never truly the original anger. In the domain of impure violence, any search for
origins leads back to myth.7 While myths are one way to reach back into human
history to find clues to the violence that plagues civilization there is another venue
versus nurture will continue to rage in spite of my conclusions. Nevertheless, I think my

own proposals will offer some insights into that argument ex post facto.
5 This is the explanatory ground used by Walter Burkert to ground his own theory
regarding the origins of violence in primeval human cultures. In his text Burkert advances
his claims along the lines of hunting and ritual respect paid to certain animals in various
cultures. This will parallel Freuds own analysis regarding the totemic animal of socio-
religious institutions. Unlike Girard, Burkert offers an ethological and functional account
of the violence that is the basic experience of the sacred, however, hunting and sacrifice
will not prove sufficient to explain why family members would turn on each other. For more
see, Homo Necans: The Anthropology of Ancient Greek Sacrificial Ritual and Myth, trans.
Peter Bing, Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1983, especially section 2.
6Freud, Totem and Taboo, chapter 4, endnote 4.
equally endowed with the ability to tell us much about our current state of being
religion. Religion and myth are born of the same need to rectify a violent action
and that need is met through rituals and prohibitions and in this regard religion and
myth are essentially two sides of the same performative coin.
The most compelling means for excavating truth from mythology, religious
principles, and sacred social rituals is Ren Girards theory of mimetic desire.8
Girards mimetic theory is by far the most sustained and systematic attempt to
unveil the truth of our violent beginnings. By developing the story the way that he
does Girard is able to tell a persuasive story about societys founding, grounded
in an historical narrative consistent with the development and maintenance of
human cultures. Girard is right to begin his own investigations into this question
with Freud and, also, to criticize Freud the ways that he does. Girard argues that
Freud recognized the problem of mimesis in his own works, but that he did not
follow his arguments to their logical conclusions. Girard speculates that Freud had
his own reasons for turning away from the seemingly apparent conclusion of his
arguments; Girard sees his own undertakings as completing the Freudian task of
pursuing those conclusions to their logical end. Like Girard, I am also convinced of
the importance of Freud to a satisfactory understanding of the problem of violence
and mimesis, and for similar reasons, but the importance of Freuds contributions
is, like Nietzsches, to be found in the interpretation of the idea they developed
about the development of social institutions and beliefs; that is, I see my project
doing for Girard what he claims his own work has done for Freud.
Rather than provide a tedious outline of how humans came to coexist in
recognizable social relations couched in evolutionary terms, it will be much
simpler to begin with a Freudian concept of the primal horde and assume
simplistic divisions therein by which a functional or self-sustaining primitive
society was formed.9 The most basic unit that needs to be assumed is that of the
basic, core family. Freud claims, and I find no reason, at this point, to balk at the
formulation, that the primitive form of human society was that of a horde ruled
over despotically by a powerful male [and] the fortunes of this horde have
left indestructible traces upon the history of human descent; and, especially, that
the development of totemism, which comprises in itself the beginnings of religion,
morality, and social organisation [sic], is connected with the killing of the chief
8 While I certainly think that this is true Girards theory has not gained a broad
readership or a widespread acceptance. As Rey Chow points out, Girards two-pronged
formulation of mimesisas both nature (constant, primal antagonism among human beings)
and culture (collective, artificial ritual)whose violence must be understood dialectically,
as both internal and external, both pernicious and beneficialmay be the reason his thesis
has not exactly been taken up with popular enthusiasm in the more liberalist-leaning
varieties of contemporary cultural criticism. For more on this issue see Chows Sacrifice,
Mimesis, and the Theorizing of Victimhood and Michael Kirwans Discovering Girard.
9 This approach is widely popular both among theorists of social evolution as well as
political theorists like Rousseau, which I will address below in section 5.
by violence and the transformation of the paternal horde into a community of

brothers.10 What I am attempting to reveal is why that violence was needed, how
that violence was justified, and how the formation of a community of brothers
endowed with equality came into being.
By focusing on the family, I ought to make clear that any claims about the
origins of violence will situate that genesis in a familial social context. Familial
relationships are where both Freud and Girard begin, and it is on the basis of these
relations that both thinkers build their respective theories of mimesis. My own
ideas about the genesis of violence are also located in the familial relationships that
develop into social institutions, but I differ with Girard about the actual relationship
that introduces violence into human relationships and social institutions. If the
primal horde is the beginning of social relationships, then the family is the most
basic instantiation of the primal horde. Just as the Freudian paternal horde has
a leader or chief, so the primitive husband or father may be thought to rule the
family.11 As such, as Girard points out, The act of regicide is the exact equivalent,
vis--vis the polis, of the act of patricide vis--vis the family and for this reason
any investigations into the origins of founding violence may proceed from an
investigation of the family or the community and draw conclusions for both from
a study of either.12 According to such an interpretation family and community
are interchangeable in respect to the way that violence is introduced into social
relations the only difference being scale. The father figure has long been the focus
of mimetic theories and, naturally, that focus has led theorists to believe that the
father is the integral part of the theory. I disagree. While the father does have an
important role to play in the mimetic model it is difficult to conceive of the father
as the principal agent in moving the socio-cultural narrative from mimesis to
rivalry to violence to, as Girard and Freud do, religion and other social institutions.
If this linear formulation is a bit too easy to be convincing, it is simply because
there are several arguments that weaken the claim for founding violence as a
form of parricide. Strongest among those claims is the idea that humans have
10 Freud, Sigmund. Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego. See also Totem
and Taboo, p. 136.
11 I should note here that a feminist reading of this position would recognize that it
ignores the fact that this conception of the family has already embedded inferiority in the
female. By acknowledging the dominance of the father in the family as its absolute and
despotic ruler the mother, even if she shares in the adjudication of the home, is secondary to
the father. I will challenge this notion further below but for now the assumption must hold
in order to make the story coherent, as it is told by Freud and Girard, as well as making the
later critique viable.
12Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 74. Here we may recall that in the Republic
Socrates makes essentially the same claim when he tells his interlocutors that discovering
justice in the individual may be easier if, first, they find justice in the city. That is, by looking
at something larger, the city, they may find evidence for it in the smaller, the individual, if
they are held to be somewhat synonymous. See Plato, Republic, 369A.
an innate aversion to both parricide and infanticide.13 Because the relationship

between the parent and child is easily understood as an innate quality among most
animals generally, and especially mammals, it only makes sense that humans, as
mammals, have survived precisely because they care for their young and have a
tendency toward strong child to parent relationships. However, there is a shocking
level of tolerance for, or at least disinterest in, and even a seeming expectation of,
sibling rivalry even when it manifests as fratricide or sororicide. Clyde Kluckhohn
argues that one of the significant conclusions to be drawn from generalizing about
the Oedipus myth across cultures is the neglect of rivalry between brothers.
Heexpounds further, citing Herskovits and Herskovits,
In analyzing the motivating forces underlying the myth clusters that fall into
the Oedipus category, we must take into account not only the sons jealousy
of the father, but also the fathers fear of being displaced by his son. Parent-
child hostilities, that is, are not unidirectional These tensions, moreover,
begin in infancy in the situation of rivalry between children of the same parents
for a single goal, the attention of the mother. This rivalry sets up patterns of
interaction that throughout life give rise to attitudes held toward the siblings or
sibling substitutes with whom the individual was in competition during infancy,
and it is our hypothesis that these attitudes are later projected by the father
upon his offspring. In myth, if the psychological interpretation is to be granted
validity, we must posit that the threat to the father or father-surrogate is to be
seen as a projection of the infantile experience of sibling hostility upon the son.14
Contrary to Girard, sibling rivalry is where I believe we are most apt to find
evidence of founding violence and the best motivation for founding murder.
13 It is important to make a critical distinction at this juncture. The focus of this

chapter will be embedded in masculine terms because I will be styling my usage after
those whose theories I am working with. Hence, from this point on in the chapter the word
patricide will be used in place of parricide only to maintain coherence within the
structure of the theories and the critiques. However, I am not at this moment convinced
that foundational violence is the sole domain of males in a primitive society. Therefore,
this chapter could be completely rewritten substituting the words matricide and
sororicide without any loss of cogency to the arguments. With a few exceptions, then,
the masculine convention will be employed but not to herald the primacy of male violence
or the inability of females to commit violence. A popular approach for achieving this with
respect to Girard is positionalism which seeks to undermine cultural and poststructuralist
perspectives which rely on a false sense of oppositionalism and binary worldviews. For
an interesting study of this point see Jennifer Rike The Cycle of Violence and feminist
Constructions of Selfhood.
14 Kluckhohn, Clyde, Recurrent Themes in Myths and Mythmaking, p. 55. Myth
and Mythmaking ed. Henry Murray, Boston: Beacon Press, 1959. Op. cit. Herskovits,
M.J. and F.S. Herskovits, Dahomean Narrative. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University
Press, 1958. Emphasis added.
First, though, it will be important to establish why the father has for so long been
the acknowledged target of mimetic violence.
The father, in Freudian thought, plays a central role in his mimetic theory
because the father is foil for the childs, or in this current investigation, the
sons, identification. Because identification is extremely important for the
mimetic process and because we are constructing our analysis from Freudian
concepts, our understanding of identification should be derived from Freuds
own understanding of the term as the earliest expression of an emotional tie
with another person.15 This emotional tie between father and son manifests as
a desire, on behalf of the son, to be like the father. Once an individual comes
under the influence of only a single person, or of a very small number of persons,
each one of whom has become enormously important to him that person begins
the process of entering into a mimetic relationship.16
All throughout the animal kingdom children mime the behaviors of their
parents and others in their group. Indeed, this might be thought of as the basis
for identification both of the individual self and as a member of a larger group.
Within the group, be it family unit or larger, the psychological make-up of the
group is concerned with each individual as a member of a race, of a nation, of
a caste, of a profession, of an institution, or as a component part of a crowd of
people who have been organised [sic] into a group at some particular time for
some definite purpose.17 As a child mimics, the child learns what is acceptable
and unacceptable, what is good and bad, what is expected and what is forbidden,
put more succinctly, a child learns to desire. Along with learning to desire
the child learns to control and manifest in appropriate ways the desires that
motivate the childs thoughts and behaviors. Because children are more prone
to mimicking their parents the formulation for mimetic desire is built into that
relationship without any effort or, possibly, awareness on the part of the child.
This becomes the basis for mimetic desire, that is, the parent, in this case the
father, is the model, and the child is the disciple. This mimetic relationship is a
direct link between the desires of the father and those developing in the son and
both of them encourage it and actively participate in the relationship by fulfilling
their roles.
There is a third component to the mimetic model, the object, and the existence
of the object is what completes the mimetic triangle. If desires are learned
through the mimetic relationship of model and disciple, those desires have to be
articulated in relation to some object outside of the mimetic bondsomething
that can be desired. Hence, the mimetic triangle is the three-way relationship
formed when the disciple mimicking the example set by the model desires the
same objects for the same reasons as the model. While this may be harmless in
many cases, there is at least one instance where this relationship is dangerous to

both the model and the object. When the object in question is the object of the
models affection, the disciple, through the mimetic process, learns to desire the
object as well, for the same reasons. Desiring in this way is, for Freud, the basis
of the Oedipus Complex. Once the disciple begins to desire the mother, it is but
a short step to understanding how the disciple and the model come into conflict.
Girards contribution to the mimetic crisis is not just having turned the
Oedipal Complex into a sacrificial crisis, but also to have determined the origin
of violence to be derived from rivalry rather than simply from desire. However,
recall from Chapter 2, Girards position is that we must take care to identify the
rival and not to say, with Freud, that he is [only] the father; or, in the case of the
tragedies, that he is [merely] the brother the rival desires the same object as
the subject, and to assert the primacy of the rival can lead to only one conclusion.
Rivalry does not arise because of the fortuitous convergence of two desires on a
single object; rather, the subject desires the object because the rival desires it.18
Rivalry conceived thus, leaves open the question of not only who could be the
rival, if not the father nor the brother, but how the two, subject and rival, enter
into a rivalry that has the awesome potential to generate reconstituted social
structures that require the deployment of, as we shall see in the next section, a
sacrificial surrogate to maintain social order. Girard clarifies his claims about
this aspect of rivalry in Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World where
he asserts,
As rivalry becomes acute, the rivals are more apt to forget about whatever
objects are, in principle, the cause of the rivalry and instead to become more
fascinated with one another. In effect the rivalry is purified of any external stake
and becomes a matter of pure rivalry and prestige. Each rival becomes for his
counterpart the worshipped and despised model and obstacle, the one who must
be at once beaten and assimilated.19
This articulation of the problem of rivalry highlights the primary motivations I have
for developing the three primary critiques of Girards theory that I think redress
important flaws in his account. It is my contention that Girards handling of the
Object in his mimetic account is not successful, and fundamentally undermines
the ability of mimetic theory to provide a substantive social critique. Second, but
no less important, is my argument that Girards focus on the patricidal overtones
of mimesis has obscured his ability to delve deep enough into the reconstructed
primal familial social setting to offer an account of the founding murder as
consistent as possible with both contemporary analysis and the existent evidence.
Finally, I will argue that if my corrections to Girards theory are acceptable,
then mimetic theory can be made applicable, in ways heretofore impossible, in
the areas of political philosophy to help elucidate a better understanding of our

social experiences. In the following three sections, then, I will thoroughly address
each of these problems in an attempt to expose the two major flaws of Girards
interpretation (Sections 3 and 4) and explore new ground for the application of
mimetic theory.
First Critique: Passive Objects and the Repression of Female Agency
The Object in the GST structure of the mimetic narrative is treated passively
and on Girards model, the Object is passive, that is, in one sense, things like
the horse are objects toward which, and around which, the Model and Disciple
desire, but the Object is not actively engaging either one of them to encourage
or temper their desires. For Girard, then, when we substitute mother for horse,
we get a similar story with the only relevant difference being that the rivalry
escalates into a deadly violence. When the Disciple overthrows the Model,
he does so, presumably, in order to possess the Object, and if Girard is to be
believed, primarily for connubial purposes. This moment, when the overthrow
of the father first occurred in human history, is the founding murder. It is also
a moment of incestuousness between the son and mother. These two crimes
against humanity, as it were, are at the heart of our social arrangements.
Patricide and incest become the underpinnings of social institutions and taboos.
Social institutions are a necessity because once the violence begins it is self-
perpetuating. Without a way to stymie or control the violence, it would get
out of hand and destroy the entire community because, according to Girard,
violence is a contagion precisely because all forms of violence lead back
to violence.20
While this story may be an agreeable account to offer for many, indeed
most, things that could fulfill the role of Object, it most certainly fails when the
motheror another personoccupies the Objects role. My contention is that if
the GST is supposed to give us an accurate account of how social arrangements
develop, then the mother has to be an active part of the story, because the mother
has a relationship not only with her husband, but with her child(ren) as well. As a
participant in the life of the family, the mothers influence cannot be overlooked
to make the analysis simpler if it is only being done for simplicitys sake
and in the story Girard tells, I believe that this is the case to the detriment of
his philosophical project. Whats more, I do not find the standard triangular
analysis to be convincing at the level of the turn to violence where the mother
is concerned.
20Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 58. Elsewhere Girard talks about violence as a
fire that fuels itself with the things meant to smother it. In a passage similar to the one cited
he argues the only thing that can bring an end to violence is more violence which is why
violence is self-propagating. See Violence, 26.
While it certainly seems to follow that rivalry would develop between the
Model and Disciple, Girards analysis is unsatisfactory at explaining why the
Disciple would choose, or even be motivated, to kill his father in order to possess
his mother, but not become equally violent over other things, like the horse. This
is especially true if we were to think of the father as being pleased with his sons
ability to identify a satisfactory horse. Even though the two are rivals, there is
no reason to assume, as a default position, that the son and father would have
to come to blows over the horses. More importantly, there is good reason to
believe that a father might actually by happy for his son, namely, that the father
loves his son. So, a reader of Girards mimesis is left wondering why the father
must become the rival of his son accelerating their relationship toward violence.
However, a partial answer to this question is that Girard takes for granted that
only the Model can mediate the desires of the Disciplehence, with no mediator
the two rivals have nothing to buffer their desires or prevent them from using any
means necessary to satisfy them.
The mediation of desires leaves open some serious concerns about the
influence of the mother over her children. More to the point, it leaves open
questions about the individual agency of the female as object to determine her
own fate. Object agency is particularly problematic because Girards theory
bears the marks of the Western androcentric-patriarchal culture. A primary
indication of this dependence is the lack of gender consciousness throughout
his work.21 To answer the questions surrounding the mediation of desires and the
mothers agency I will propose a number of different interpretations of the GST
that will create space within the Girardian narrative for the female to be more
than a mere passive object included in the story simply so that the men may have
something to glare at and lust over. In fact, a sympathetic reading of Medusa in
mythology produces the great irony that she has become a classic example of the
female object, though the greatest emphasis in the Medusa myth is the terrifying
power of her own gaze.22
Earlier I claimed that the same mimetic story could be told using inverted
labels for the generic positions Model, Disciple, and Object. In order to give the
strongest case for female agency in the GST framework, I will begin by doing
this very thing. However, Girards mimetic narrative has to include the murder
of the father in order to produce the subsequent social narrative in the aftermath
of the founding murder. Girard uses Freuds original theory to construct his own,
and Freud used his theory to construct his Oedipal narrative, so, reaching back to
Freud for inspiration, I will label this alternate rendering of the GST the Modified
Electra Triangle (see Figure 3.1, hereafter, MET).
21 Nowak, The Girardian Theory and Feminism, 24.

22 Bowers, Susan, Medusa and the Female Gaze. NWSA Journal, 2(2) (Spring,
1990): 219.
Figure 3.1 Modified Electra Triangle
On the MET interpretation, the GST is visible along the solid lines. The
key difference between the GST and MET interpretations is that the violence in
theMET occurs between the Disciple and Object. This re-conceptualization of
the GST places the mother in the role of the Model, thereby imbuing her with the
agency inherent in that position, but it also preserves the destruction of the father,
which is necessary to draw the important conclusions of the GST. This construal
of the mimetic story would develop from a matriarchal rendering of the original,
that is pre-violence, family unit. The MET, by placing the father in the position of
Object, conceives of the father not necessarily as a non-authoritative figure in the
family, but most certainly as the objectified parental figure.
Because the father in the MET is the object of the Disciples desires, and, as I
will argue in the next section, Girards theory that the Disciple destroys the Model is
unpersuasive, the MET seems to give us the best of both worlds in the simplest form.
From Girard we can preserve the destruction of the father along the lines of an If I
cant have him, then no one will version and the agent of the destruction is the female
Disciple. For my own construction of the mimetic story the integrity of the Model
is preserved, that is, the mother is not destroyed, but the authority of the matriarch
is undermined as a result of the rivalry. The MET manages to incite the necessary
conflict between the Model and Disciple, but the caveat is that the Objectified
father is the target of the violence. In fact, the violence from both the murder and
the incest are directed at himeven if, in this particular instance, the murderous
violence is real and the incestuous violence is merely symbolic. Nevertheless, one
can easily imagine the loss of the beloved Object requiring an immediate and intense
re-evaluation of the dominant social norms. Thus, there is a founding murder, there
is the creation of the social institutions, and especially religion where the father is
the revered parent (i.e. God the Father), and female agents propel the whole process.
An alternative to this rendering is to assume that the daughter, as Disciple,
follows the GST interpretation and destroys the mother, as Model. There is, at a
minimum, at least one biblical account that would support the MET along these
lines. The story in Genesis of Lot presents us with an account of a destroyed
mother who, and it may be claimed, without stretching the account too far,
was destroyed by violencea violence which just happens to be the destruction

the community. More importantly, in the aftermath of the destruction of Sodom,
Lots two daughters conspire, and carry out a plan, to have incestuous relations
with their father.23 The daughters motivation for the incest in the story is to
preserve his seed and there is no small significance to the fact that both daughters
share in the preservation of his seed by copulating with him. If one is going to
argue that the originary act restructured social relations, then sharing the Object is
of paramount importance on any feasible mimetic account.
While the MET allows us to tell Girards account in such a way that we can
preserve the core elements without sacrificing the mothers agency, it is also the
most likely to be contested on the grounds that a matriarchal arrangement has
never been proven to exist, or because the destruction of the object is not enough
to bring about the radical reorganization of society mimesis entailseven if the
object is regarded as the father.24 So, by tinkering with the elements of the story
we can still smuggle female agency into Girards story and achieve the same
outcomes. Manipulating the MET this way yields a new triangle, which, because
it returns the story back to its Freudian roots, will be identified as the Modified
Oedipal Triangle (see Figure 3.2, hereafter, MOT).
On this rendering of the GST, the spark for the violence again rests with the
mother. Here we might imagine that the son and the father are locked in a rivalry,
which for all intents and purposes they are unaware of, as Girard himself argues.
The mother, as Object, however, has noticed and has taken note of how much
more virulent the son has become, compared to the aging father. Assuming that
the mother is not a passive object treated like chattel property by the father, it is
a safe assumption that at one time there existed reasons why the mother desired
the father. After all, before they became mother and father they had to become
husband and wife. The long or short-term romantic coupling of man and woman,
unquestionably, depends upon a hypothesis of the state of nature as a place in
which men and women engaged in consensual conjugal relationships, rather than
only acts of rape that left the woman with child.25 If one allows that man and
23 Holy Bible, Genesis, chapter 19 see especially verses 2636. It is also of no little
importance to note here that the account of Lot in the Quran omits the incest from the story.
Muslims reject the idea that such an abomination would occur in the Abrahamic tradition
without divine retribution.
24 One might be tempted here to advance a argument about Amazons as a mythical,
if not anthropologically established, matriarchal society. However, what little we actually
know about the Amazons of ancient lore would not be enough to support the strength of
the claims that would be necessary for adherents to an MET interpretation of mimesis. Of
course, there are matrilineal societies, especially in Native American cultures, but these
are not strictly nor purely Matriarchal in the right ways or to the right degrees for them
to substantiate the claims of the MET any better than the Amazon cultures of mythology.
25 In Section 5 below I will address further the question of how men and women
come to cohabitate in a state of nature analysis. For now, I only tentatively assume an
anti-Hobbesian state of nature.
woman become husband and wife by choice, then we might fairly construe the
mother as having desires of her own and, confronted with an aged and ailing
husband, developing a need to keep the son close. Perhaps, it is not unfair to use a
Freudian interpretation here and say that the mother develops feelings for the son
which transcends the natural mother-child relationship. That is, the more virulent
son, who closely resembles his father, becomes the object of the mothers desire
the same way his father was desired by the mother when they first joined together.
Figure 3.2 The Modified Oedipal Triangle
Following from the MOT account of the mimetic narrative the sequence of
events making up the mimetic crisis would begin with the mothers desires for
her son. There are a number of ways to begin this tale, but the safest is that the
mother wants the father removed so that she can possess the son, or at a minimum,
keep the son close at hand to care for her. As Bowers argues, Women empowered
with the erotic, which is born of chaos, are dangerous, and in mythology there
a number of accounts of rape-revenge, so, imagining a women motivated to kill a
lover she may never have wanted in the first place for one she does is not too much
of a stretch.26 Since neither Freud nor Girard give us a good reason for thinking
of the founding murder as anything but violence between a son and his father, it
26Bowers, Medusa, 229. An additional account of the MOT along similar lines,
would be that the daughters, either included or excluded from the mimetic relationships
enjoyed by the sons with the father, rise up and kill the father for revenge for the rape of
their mother or themselves. This preserves the incest and motivates the founding violence
better than the GST while still finding the necessary support in mythological literature.
For instance, Procne in Greek mythology avenges the rape of her sister and Medusa is the
victim of rape at the hands of Poseidon; the former adheres to the alternate account I have
outlined in this footnote, whereas the latter is a story about the punishment of the victim. In
Ovids Metamorphosis (4.781803), Medusa is raped in the temple of Minerva, after which
the goddess punishes her by corrupting her beauty and turning her hair to snakes. This
account of Medusa is relevant to a retelling of MOT because the destruction of Medusas
beauty is emblematic of the pruning of the erotic to mere sensation [whereby] enemies
of women radically diminish female power because they rob them of their psychic and
emotional being. See again, Bowers, 229.
seems equally fair to recast the founding murder as violence between the mother
and father, where the mother kills the father to possess the son.
An analysis along these lines opens up contexts that Girard does not, or
cannot, deal with on the GST framework. One, it creates an understanding of
the relationship between the father and son which, perhaps accidentally and
unbeknownst to all, teaches the mother how to desire the son. Granted, we must
presume that she already had the seeds of this desire built into her relationship
with her husband as I argue above, but learning to redirect that desire would
only occur as a product of her engagement with her son and her desire for
her husband, whom her son mimics. Moreover, the MOT analysis privileges
incest over mimetic violence, which gets us closer to a Freudian beginning
point because the totemic system Freud employs is derivative of the incestuous
nature of mimesis. This inverse privileging of incest over murder alone would
significantly alter the GST narrative, but by accomplishing it this way there is no
need to subvert the agency of the female in the triangle.
There is a third alternative to the GST which acknowledges the agency of
the female in the triangulation, but more closely resembles the narrative of the
GST. This third alternative triangle develops from a sense of collusion between
the mother and son. Any collusion between mother and son is, of course, best
interpreted, for now, as a result of the mutual involvement of both mother and son
in an incestuous relationship. Girard recounts the mimetic narrative as though
the son is the only person beset by the incestuous impulse. Again, as before,
neither Freud nor Girard offers a good reason why this should be so, except,
maybe, for reasons of simplicity or expediency. More problematically, however,
is that both Freud and Girard assume a natural dominance of the male in a
pre-social setting. If we jettison this problematic assumption and choose, instead,
to treat the mother as an active agent, it is possible to derive a triangulation that
comes as close to the GST as possible. I will refer to this alternative triangle as
the Modified Girardian Standard Triangle (see Figure 3.3, hereafter, MGT).
Figure 3.3 The Modified Girardian Standard Triangle

An additional benefit of these alternative interpretations of the GST is

that they can be applied to both the Freudian harem in a primal horde or to a
Girardian family unit. The MGT can also be styled to preclude a necessarily
sexual relationship between the mother and son. Unlike the MET, which requires
that the father object be destroyed for incestuous reasons, and the MOT, which
requires the mother object to see the son as more desirable, the MGT account
could be held at the level of mutual benefit. That is, the mother, or one of the
women in the fathers harem, could be seeking sexual freedom outside of the
harem, while the son could be seeking sexual access to a different woman in
the harem, or just freedom from the historically assumed tyranny of the father.
From the MGT, it is possible to derive a starting point where all the actors in the
triangle have agency, motive, and opportunity to bring about the destruction of
the father thereby entailing all of the post-violence conclusions Girard wants to
draw without the problematic assumption of the female as a mere object.
There is one more alternative to the GST which gives us an account of female
agency in the mimetic triangle, but it requires a bit more groundwork to be made
intelligible. Before examining the last alternative it will be necessary to develop
a critique of Girards notions about the turn to violence. Motivating the detour
through Girards account of what turns the rivalry violent is the idea that if the
agency of the female is accounted for and, thus, alters the nature of the mimetic
narrative, then the violence that ensues might also be questionable and subject to
revision. In the next section I will endeavor to dissect Girards notion of the turn
to violence, to not only demonstrate that revising the account of mimetic violence
is necessary, but that doing so is necessary to correct for the problem of how and
why the social institutions that develop as a consequence of mimetic violence do
so in the particular ways that they do.
Second Critique: Rejection of the Girardian Standard Triangle
Girard argues that born of the violence and chaos of the mimetic crisis are the
social structures which still define humanity to this day. According to the GST and
Girards narrative, when the son overthrows the father, it becomes incumbent upon
the community to find a way to avert a repetitious and vicious cycle from occurring
again. As I have already mentioned, this aversion is achieved on the one hand by
taboos. The taboos are primarily sexual in nature, specifically prohibiting incestuous
relationships. On the other hand, religious ritual and myth are developed to not only
direct the violent impulse into predictable and controllable channels, but also to
reenact the violence in a commemorative way so as to simultaneously mask their
purpose and reinforce the need for ritualized violence. The ritual of violence that
develops in religion is sacrifice. Sacrificial victims are important for two reasons:
they serve as the recipient for the violence, so the community, writ large, can enjoy
stability, and the victim becomes other to the community, providing a way for the
community to join together in their condemnation of the sacrificial victim. The dual
role of the sacrificial victim serves to protect the entire community from its own
violence [the desire to inoculate the community from violence]; prompts the entire
community to choose victims outside itself. The elements of dissension scattered
throughout the community are drawn to the person of the sacrificial victim and
eliminated, at least temporarily, by its sacrifice.27
The taboos on sex are important in their own right, but are, typically, of
secondary importance to the ritualized sacrifice of a surrogate victim. According
to the GST, the community as a whole is more threatened by the murderous
violence of mimetic rivalry; therefore, the founding murder has to be primary
for Girard. However, being of secondary importance is not the same as being of
lesser or no importance and this is why the incest taboos are so central to the story
Girard wants to tell about the standard model of mimesis. Incest is the outcome of
desiring the mother and the actual act of satisfying that desire would, one would
like to think, and especially following the reasoning of Girard, take the form of
rape, which is an act as equally heinous as killing ones father, and for this reason
incest is imbued with its own particular violence. The incest taboo, understood
as such, is one reason why sex is so important to religious ritual as well as being
subject to the most rigid regulation. However, to parallel my earlier critique of the
GST, I would argue that Girards analysis of incest, dealt with in Section 3, is fairly
weak compared to the emphasis he places on mimetic violence and specifically the
founding murderwhich, in his narrative, is hyper-masculine.
The problem with this hyper-masculine aspect of the Girardian patricide
story is that the desire for the mother is supposed to be what ignites the desire to
eliminate the father as rival, and yet, the story of the mother, as victim, is omitted,
or addressed limitedly, to focus on the violenceof the fathers murder and the
mothers rape. The lack of equilibrium between the mother and father is precisely
the problem of a Girardian mimetic theory, because the fathers case is treated
with careful scrutiny regarding both his murder and subsequent deification, but
the mother remains nothing more than a desirable rape victim. Jennifer Rike
problematizes this oversight by pointing out that to deny violence in women by
seeing them simply as its victims is to see them as powerless. This is, in effect,
the heart of the victim mentality, for the victims world is split between a few
safe places and the evil forces lurking everywhere else, forces against whom she
is virtually powerless without special protection.28 It ought to be the case that
if what possesses the son to murder his father is the desire to copulate with his
mother, then the rape-incest should be the focus of substantive critique, along with
the murderous violence perpetrated against the father.
Instead, the mother, as victim, is omitted from the story, presumably because,
unlike the father, she does not die from the violence committed against her.
However, this analysis seems wrong on multiple levels. A successful challenge to
the conception of the mother-object as victim will require that the mother either be

28 Rike, Jennifer, The Cycle of Violence and Feminist Construction of Selfhood.
thought of as complicit in, rather than a victim of, the violence, or that the mimetic
narrative be recast to include a resultant reverencing of the mother. Since the latter
is implausible within the context of a mimetic anthropology I contend that the
former presents the best opportunity to reconfigure the GST into a more plausible
and socially beneficial story. Further, I am convinced that rejecting the trope of
the victimized mother to generate a better mimetic theory is another reason why
the Object cannot be taken as passive, especially given that in some of the stories
Girard relies on for his claims about mimetic violence, the mother is directly
complicit in the actions against the father, but this is often ignored.29
Additionally, the surrogate victim is chosen because of its30 similarity to the
community and for its otherness so that it may fulfill the dual role of resemblance
and foreignness. It is important for the surrogate victim to be similar, either
totemically, in the case of animals, or ontologically, in the case of humans, because
similarity allows the community to band together in the ritual act of killing. It is also
vital that the surrogate victim be outside the community otherwise the violence of
the murder is likely to spread. The othering of the surrogate victim is important
because it creates the lines along which human culture divides itself, in order that
there be victims in a time of crisis. Obviously, the crisis that Girard intends is
the crisis of mimetic rivalry and the ritual sacrifice is meant to be a release valve
which prevents the crisis from escalating to the point of intra-communal violence.
In one of his best attempts to develop this argument Girard uses the story of the
trial of Jesus. Quoting Caiaphas, Girard points out that it is better for one man
to die for his people than for the whole nation to be destroyed.31 Throughout his
29 Here the Biblical story of Jacob and Esau is instructive but due to limited space
wont be explicated here but will be addressed more fully below. However, there are
numerous examples which could also be elucidated: the triangle of Hera, Zeus, and
Semele in Greek mythology (see Ovid Metamorphoses 3.253315); Samson, Adam,
and others in the Judeo-Islamic-Christian traditions; and any number of examples from
non-western culture, but especially from the oldest mythologies of Mesopotamia. Of particular
importance here would be the creation myths of the Mesopotamian region generally, where
different cities developed their own versions of the creation myths that grounded their beliefs.
The Theogony of Dunnu, dating back to the early second millennium, is the creation myth
of the once great city of Dunnu, and is characterized by, according to Stephanie Dalley,
recurrent themes of incest, patricide, and matricide which can be paralleled to some extent
in Hittite myths about early generations of gods, and contrast strongly with the gentlemanly
conduct shown by almost all the deities in the Epic of Creation [from the same time period].
The monthly schedule of family violence seems to lead up to a change of habits at the new
year, which may indicate a connection between the recital of Creation and the New Years
Festival. However, any conclusive comparisons are lacking because of the degraded state of
the artifacts in question. Dalley, Stephanie, Myths from Mesopotamia: Creation, The Flood,
Gilgamesh, and Others, Oxford UP, 1989 [reissued 2008], 278.
30 I use the obscure pronoun it because the victim may be either human or animal
in both Girards and Freuds account.
31Girard, Scapegoat, 112. See also, Holy Bible, John chapter 11.
career, Girard has been keen to point out in numerous, and quite varied, settings
how the justification for sacrificing one victim for the community is replicated and
portrayed throughout history, but the Christian tale is his crown jewel because,
the Bible distinguishes itself from all other mythologies by being the record
of the slow disclosure of the God beyond all difference who supports all
difference, the God who sides with the victim. This revelation climaxes in Jesus
of Nazareth whose life and death disclose the scapegoat mechanism for what
it isthe condemnation of an innocent victim by those unwilling to face their
own violence and guilt. Christianity, at least in principle, puts an end to all
scapegoating. By exposing the lie behind scapegoatingby disclosing that the
community and not the scapegoat is guiltyit diffuses and disperses the force
of the violence behind scapegoating. Then a good mode of mimesis emerges out
of the bad: following Christ means giving up mimetic desire and becoming
nonviolent like Christ was.32
Nonetheless, while I think that Girards analysis is compelling, I find that it has
two primary shortcomings, which my project aims to correct. One shortcoming,
mentioned above, is that I do not believe Girards project is broad enough to offer
significant guidance for how to overcome a set of institutions based on violence,
in order to usher in a less violent social arrangement. This is to say, it does not
seem likely to me that merely unveiling religions relevance to maintaining social
stability is enougheven when coupled with the recounting of the project in socially
important myths. For mimetic theory to be a guide to a better future society the force
of the idea has to be to not merely restructure the prevailing social contract, but
overcome it, by instantiating a new contract altogether which seems necessary.33
The second shortcoming is the actual construction of the mimetic model and
the explanation for socially embedded violence that follows from it. I believe I can
tell a more persuasive story while still deriving the same conclusions as Girard.
At the same time, I think my story is more inclusive, by positing an active Object,
thereby positing a more human story than the one Girard tells. Furthermore, if
my modeling is better for the mimetic story I think we should be telling about
human social arrangements, then my model also allows me to convey an equitable
description of justice in society which is instructive of how to remake the social
contract so as to achieve a less violent, or in positive terms, a more peaceful, set
of social circumstances. Shifting the focus away from patricide and looking at
the more fertile fratricidal overtones of mimesis can address the first drawback to
Girards model. The second limitation can be addressed by extending the mimetic
explanation of social institutions into the realm of socio-political philosophic
discourse about justice.
32Rike, The Cycle of Violence, 256. Op. Cit. Ren Girard, Things Hidden, 431.
33 This is obviously a foreshadowing of why Rawls is important to the critique of
Girard I intend to offer. See Chapter 4.
First, to address the model structure, I will propose two alternatives that
better resemble both the reality of familial relationships, and offer more robust
accounts of how mimetic rivalry becomes volatile. Before introducing the
models, however, I should stress that my account is not a rejection of Girard,
fundamentally. Girard often points to the problem of struggles between brothers
and endorses Clyde Kluckhohns position that the most common of all mythical
conflicts is the struggle between brothers, which generally ends in fratricide.34
Girard also acknowledges the existence of multiple children and he has given
accounts of children, especially the mystification of twins, to expound on his idea
of the monstrous double, which is the label he uses to identify people who have
lost the distinctions necessary to maintain non-violent relationships. That is, as
rivalry erases our distinctions we are more inclined to become violent in order to
lay claim to those objects of our desires. The loss of distinctions is particularly
true of mimetic relationships because as the Disciple mimes the Model, the
Disciple comes to identify with the Model in more and more specific ways, until
the one thing the Model has, which the Disciple does not, is the Object. It is
this line of reasoning that I want to reject, that the violence which leads to the
founding murder is an outgrowth of rivalry between the father and son, but also,
it is important to make clear that, by redirecting the focus onto the relationships
between siblings, I am not doing something at this point in my analysis that
Girard is not sensitive tomy claim is that he should be more so.
As a result of shifting the focus away from the father-son relationship I propose
another alternative to the standard triangle. On this alternate triangle I preserve
the GST narrative sans the violent removal of the father, yet, still, a removal of
the father, say, from old age. Also, this variation includes the recognition of more
than one Disciple in a mimetic relationship with the father. The Object is still the
mother, to preserve coherence with the GST, for now, but I posit the mother as
having a strong relationship with her sons, which is not grounded in mimesis, that
is, not necessarily incestuous. Because the mothers relationship is not grounded in
mimesis I call this the Weak Alternative Triangle (see Figure 3.4, hereafter WAT).
For an analysis based on the WAT interpretation the Disciples need not be gendered,
but for the sake of continuity with the GST, I will assume they are sons.35
34 For Girards support of this position see Violence and the Sacred, 61. For the
position as it is laid out in Kluckhohn see Recurrent Themes in Myths and Mythmaking,
in Myth and Mythmaking, ed. Henry Murray, Boston, 1968. The most popular examples of
this are Cain and Abel and Romulus and Remus in Roman mythology, the boys raised by a
she-wolf that found the great city of Rome.
35 In Chapter 5 I will examine more fully an account with both male and female
siblings and show that the gender of the children is irrelevant to the outcome of a mimetic
model locked into a patriarchal form. For instance, both King Arthur and his sister Morgan
believe they should be entitled to their deceased fathers crown for different reasons. This
myth has significant implications for my reading of Girard to be drawn out laterespecially
the fact that the survival of Camelot, a utopia, is at stake in resolving this sibling quarrel.
The darkened line between Object and Disciples represents both that the sons
share a learned desire for the object but also that the Object, has influence over the
boys. This bi-directional relationship is important because of stories following the
narrative trajectory of the Biblical account of Jacob and Esau, which Girard uses
as an example in support of the standard model. One of the core components of the
biblical account of Jacob and Esau is the involvement of their mother, Rebekah,
in assisting her favored son, Jacob, in tricking their ailing father and cheating the
elder son, Esau, the rightful heir, out of his inheritance.
Even in his most systematic treatment of the story of these two brothers,
Girard glosses Rebekahs involvement almost dismissively. While Girard may find
Rebekahs role in the story to be unimportant or a mere embellishment to make the
story intelligible, I think that her actions ought to be more central to mimetic theory.36
My concern is that the father need not show favoritism for one son over another, or
at least need not do so in front of the children as it were, nor need his preference for
one son over the others be anything but arbitrary, such as the order of birth; in fact,
the WAT variation presupposes a natural hierarchy in which the eldest son is the
anticipated heir. The mother, in contrast, is free to dote however she pleases.
Figure 3.4 The Weak Alternative Triangle
36 Girards use of this story is contained in Violence and the Sacred where he references
it several times. See page 5 for his gloss on Rebekahs involvement. In the biblical story
Rebekah assists her younger son in stealing his elder brothers inheritance. Not only is
this done at her behest but it would have been unsuccessful without her assistance both in
formulating the deception and carrying it out. See Genesis 27 for the full account. However,
it should be noted that in verse 41 Esau, now dispossessed of his inheritance and birthright
says in his heart The days of mourning for my father are at hand; then I will slay my brother
Jacob. His anger and resentment find their target in his brother not in his father who, in spite
of the treachery of his wife and son, is responsible for passing Esaus birthright unto to Jacob.
In the WAT structure, the mimetic relationships develop the same as on the
GST. The difference being the sons need not overthrow the father in an attempt to
possess the Object. Rather, after the fathers removal from the structure vis--vis
natural death, combat, or accident, one of the children is elevated to the level of
the Model proper, to take over the responsibilities of the deceased father. The turn
away from Girards analysis is that the elevation of a son-brother actually presents
a genuine probable cause for mimetic violence. Prior to the fathers demise, the
sons enter into a relationship with the Model and, therefore, into a rivalry with one
another. There is no good reason to believe that the sons, or a single child, would
want to overthrow their father, since the ModelDisciple relationship is, on the
most charitable reading, instructive and nurturing in its conception.37 However,
the relationship between the brothers, one would surmise, is naturally more
competitive. Hence, as a result of the sons mimetic relationships with their father,
the brothers would attempt to overthrow each other to establish their primacy in
relation to their father, all the while their attempts to do so are mediated or stymied
by the Model. With no Model to arbitrate the desire to overthrow their brothers,
the Disciples are already on the brink of unmediated violence.
Each son in the WAT believes he is capable of replacing the father and this belief
is a product of the mimetic relationship, understood on the GST. However, because
the rigidly patriarchal structure of the familial model entails only one Model, it is
certain that only one son can be elevated to that station after the fathers removal. If
the sons understood themselves to be equal before the Model, even if they thought
otherwise about each other, then the promotion of one son would upset the notion
of equality embedded in the mimetic model; that is, one can easily imagine a
disenfranchised brother complaining why you and not me? Even holding the
Object as a static participant in the way Girard does, it seems clear my account
already proposes a better argument for why the mimetic rivalry leads to violence.
Unfortunately, there is no good reason to believe the Object is static, so we are free
to assume that the Object has a vested interest in which son takes over the reins
again, the story of Jacob and Esau is instructive on this point. Sons that once
thought they were equal in the eyes of the father find out they are not, and notions
of inequality become instances of betrayal at the hands of the father andjealousy
toward the brothers. What is more, the promoted brotherwho need not be the
eldestis also now in possession of that which was formerly off limits and we
introduce not only a recognition of inequality, but also of disenfranchisement
both producing emotional states capable of spawning violence.
The disenfranchised brothers now have the necessary identity to act as a group,
with the singular goal of destroying that which embodies their inequality.38 For the
37 Recall above my analysis regarding the cheerful father losing his favored horse
to his son.
38 It is helpful here to think of group identities on Freuds model as he outlines them
in chapters 1 and 2 of Group Psychology and the Ego and, specifically, his use of Le Bons
explanation of a group mind in chapter 2.
brother assassins the elevated brother has lost his essential distinctions by being
both the Model (father) and brother. Because the brothers are angry at their father
for passing them over, their actions can be seen as misdirected when they target their
brother for vengeance. However, because the murdered brother has assumed the
fathers role of Model, he is both the father and, as a brother, a surrogate victim for
the father simultaneously. What makes my victimized brother interpretation more
functional than Girards is that I can still preserve the monstrous double analysis
and use Girards explanation for the need for a surrogate victim in the rituals while
offering a better motivation point for the violence. That is, where Girards account
struggles to provide a convincing argument for why a son would kill his father, my
account makes it clear that the violence, understood as occurring between brothers,
is much more likely to be accurate at the level of intra-familial murder.
The manifestation of violence from fratricide is just as unsettling, if not more
so, than patricide, so I can still lay claim to all of the conclusions Girard draws,
but fratricide also allows for a move into socio-political philosophy that Girards
model does not. Namely, in the ensuing upheaval of the norm, and in the
absence of both the father and his successor, in a chaotic environment dominated
by a sense of inequality, it seems more than likely the surviving brothers would
implement preventative measures designed to limit, if not prevent, further acts of
violence. Those measurestaboos on murder and incest, the codification of laws,
etc.would have to entail the institutionalization of inequality to explain why
some people in the social structure are better off than others. At this point, then,
the concept of othering becomes paramount in a post-violence social setting.
There is a second, stronger, alternative triangle, which is more tenuous and
difficult to handle in some respects, but I think it is worth investigating because
it has its roots in Girards own first attempts to work out evidence of mimesis in
literature, especially Don Quixote. However, being more tenuous than the WAT
does not detract from the fact that this alternative also possibly offers a more
robust mimetic account, so I will describe it as the Strong Alternative Triangle (see
Figure 3.5, hereafter SAT).
Figure 3.5 The Strong Alternative Triangle

On the SAT the GST is apparent to the right and a subsequent triangle,
embedded in the structure, understood to have more than one child, is drawn out
along the dotted lines. The SAT provides a second fratricidal explanation, but
the key difference is that the GST on the right generates the desires while the
embedded triangle, GST Prime, begets the violence. The standard triangle links
the Model to the Disciple, who may be thought of as either the eldest child, or
first-born son, in keeping with the GST interpretation, and this child, through the
mimetic relationship with the father as Model, is linked to the standard Object.
In the GST Prime, the standard Disciple becomes the prime Model to a younger
sibling as Disciple and the father becomes the Object for the younger son. Again,
once the father dies, the standard disciple is elevated, thereby becoming the Object
and Model for the prime Disciple.
In this instance of the brother being elevated the standard Disciple is taking
possession of the prime Object, which hitherto had been unattainable because
the father was alive. Once the father dies, the chosen successor possesses
both Objectsthe station of the father as prime Object and the mother as the
standard Object. Even though the standard Disciple is now the standard Model
because of his elevation to the position of father figure, he is also in possession
of the standard Object, the mother, by virtue of the same; however, he is also in
possession of the prime Objectthe station of the fatherand the prime Disciple
is disenfranchised. Another way to conceive of this narrative is to imagine the
SAT structure collapsing in on itself after the fathers death. That is, the fatherson
relationship that held the two triangles apart is dissolved as a result of the fathers
demise, and the two mimetic triangles collapse into one, the GST, in the aftermath
of the fathers death. The Prime Disciple remains a Disciple to the elder sibling,
but also comes to recognize his disenfranchisement as he loses both Objectsone
to death and one to the elevated brother. The SAT Disciples disenfranchisement
takes on the same forms of jealously and inequality generated by the WAT and
results in violence against the brother as father. Afterward, the same, or at least a
very similar, narrative unfolds.
The SAT is, obviously, more dubious than its WAT counterpart, if no other
reason than by dint of being, perhaps, overly complicated. In spite of that
seeming failure, it introduces, and brings into sharper focus, two characteristics
of a mimetic model which are important for establishing what I think is the
best way to conceive of the mimetic triangle. First, the SAT makes explicit the
problem of a natural hierarchy among the brothers. If my mimetic interpretation
is going to be functional, contrary to Girards, then there has to be a good, that is,
persuasive, reason why someone would commit violence, which neither Freud
nor Girard provide in their theories. It is my position that a persuasive reason
is only possible if a mimetic theory develops an account of either a breakdown
in the concept of equality, which the WAT provides, or, an account of radical
disenfranchisement, which the SAT provides. Second, the SAT creates levels
of desire development. On a Girardian interpretation of the mimetic story, the
desires which cause the violence are learned. As such, there must be a learning
process. With an appropriate number of sons and daughters, as Disciples, one

can easily come to see how a sibling might take on an older brother or sister as a
Model, given that there would be a sibling sufficiently far along in the mimetic
process to have achieved similarity, if not parity, with the Model. More
importantly, the SAT model could be further encumbered by triangles within
triangles, creating a more chaotic founding murder moment. If only one more
triangle is added to the SAT, however, one to the right of the GST, which was
made out of daughters in mimetic rivalry, then the SAT might start to generate
a picture of society that was forming in an historical, pre-social, yet genuinely,
Girardian way.
The complication of a second embedded triangle emphasizes the key
problems with a SAT interpretation of mimesis. First, and perhaps most
damning, the SAT seems to require a level of complexity which might already
be beyond the pre-violent stage of learned desire. Second, the SAT model also
requires the static objectification of the Mother. As such, the SAT would have
to adopt one of the alternatives addressed in Section Three to make an SAT
motivated mimetic story coherent. However, advocating for the agency of the
Mother in the standard Object position necessarily entails that the story told by
the SAT shift to accommodate her agency. More to the point, if one were to try
to tack just one additional embedded triangle on to the Object side of the GST
in the SAT conception, the mothers agency would create a sort of equality
with the father, which is absolutely missing between the mother and father on
both Freudian and Girardian approaches to mimetic theory. I will address the
importance of inequality for mimetic theory in the next chapter, but the point
is still salient now to indicate why a SAT model is ultimately dysfunctional.
That is, any attempt to tell a mimetic story with the tools and theories provided
by Freud and Girard is nearly impossible if one assumes equality between
the parents in the family unit, or, more mundanely, multiple mediators of the
childrens desires.
Given the complications inherent in a GST understanding of both the murder
and the mimetic triangle, the best approach to figuring out what should be going
on in a mimetic interpretation of the social ordering of human relationships is
a Modified Weak Alternative Triangle (hereafter, MWA, see Figure 3.6). The
move toward the MWA is that it allows for a story about female agency in the
Object position and a natural hierarchy among disciples, sons or daughters, and
does so without the strict necessity of incest. That is, what makes the MWA
superior to the GST, or any of the previous attempts to correct the GST account,
is that according to the MWA incest may be a part of the story, but it need not be,
which puts the primary focus of the females agency squarely on the female agent
not on the sexual nature of the desires surrounding the Object. Downplaying
the need for an incestuous element and imbuing the Object with agency seem
to be desirable changes to the mimetic narratives and great advantages over
the alternatives.
Figure 3.6 Modified Weak Alternative Triangle
Because of the nature of the MWA, a few features of the triangular protocols
used previously are modified as well. First, the Disciples are arranged hierarchically
to represent the natural hierarchy imposed by order of birth. A natural hierarchy
need not mean, however, that the children are far enough apart in age that they
are incapable of viewing themselves as equals. This is particularly true of an
interpretation like Freuds wherein the father keeps a harem and the children might
actually be close in age, or the same age, due to having different mothers, but for my
purposes the assumption will be a single mother for all the Disciples and a natural
hierarchy. Second, Disciple 1 is indicated with a spotted arrow as the brother to be
elevated to the fathers position. His elevation could be the result of his being the
eldest or the most mimetically impressive to the father, it is unimportant which.
However, on an interpretation grounded in the latter, the reason for the
fathers choosing any son to succeed him could be based on how well the son
exemplifies the traits valued by the father. In Mario Puzos mafia classic,
The Godfather, Don Vito Corleone passing over his son Michael, in favor of his
son Santino, is a striking example of a father choosing a son to succeed him based
on mimetic equivalence rather than, say, good business sense. Sonny, in spite of
his hot-headedness, is being groomed to replace the ailing Don as head of the
family because he has the mind of a mobster, as it were; he has been fully invested
in the lifestyle. Meanwhile, Michael has been enlisted in the army, and off at
college, and his father pushes him to seek political office, or, at least, a more
honest way of life, to better himself and the family namethis is done primarily
because the aging Don no longer thinks of his son as a candidate for successor.
However, when one considers how much like his father Michael ultimately is as
the family Don, it becomes clear that his father was making a poor choicea
would be decision rectified only by the untimely death of Michaels brother Sonny.
If Michaels father had not wanted better for him, or, more importantly, if his
father had been able to see him in the family it is clear that, like the familys
other wiseguys, the old Don would have seen the value of choosing Michael to
head the family instead of any of his brothers.39
39 Mario Puzo, The Godfather, New York: G.P. Putnams Sons, 1969.
The third difference is that the mother, having agency and influence within
the triangle, has a relationship with each disciple. Note that the line connecting
her with Disciple 3 is the standard double arrow indicating the incestuous
relationship. However, the MWA need not make such a strong claim about the
relationship between the Object and the Disciple, though doing so would not
subvert the interpretation. However, while there could be any number of reasons
why the mother would prefer a different son to be elevated than the one the father
has dubbed his successor, this incestuous relationship may take one of two
paths and still be solvent for the incest taboo. On the one hand, the mother may
actually want her favored son to take the reins for positive reasons, like love.
On the traditional mimetic account, the mother is merely an object with no say in
the act of incest. In fact, most theorists posit the possession of the mother, after
the fathers murder, as being a violent rape, and, while rape is certainly plausible,
plausibility does not offer a good reason to automatically assume that the mother
is not actively engaged in carrying on the relationship; more to the point, there is
no reason to assume the mother is not the instigator of the relationship, and one
can think of many reasons why this might be soa lack of attention or affection
from her husband easily topping the list. On the MWA as I propose it the mother-
son relationship can certainly be incestuous, but it could also be more platonic, or
more motherly, but certainly exhibiting agency on the mothers part.
Contrarily, the mother might prefer a different son for negative reasons, like
fear of the fathers chosen progeny. Approaching the incestuous relationship
from this angle, the mothers relationship with the son would be manipulative, but
not necessarily, nor maliciously so, but the act would be done in collusion with
the son. The value of a rendering like this one is that the mother could also desire
to have a daughter instead of the fathers chosen son elevated to the position of
power and we no longer have a need to gender the Disciples; but the benefit of
de-gendering the Disciples can be achieved without the additional burden of the
second embedded triangle in the SAT. Historically speaking, in a game of thrones,
among princes and princesses ascension to the throne often involves sabotaging
a sibling, or stepsibling, with a better claim. After all, the idea that you win or
you die is not merely conjecture. Regardless of how we choose to interpret the
mothers agency, the critical element of the MWA is that the mother has agency
and can choose to act from a number of reasons. She may act within the mimetic
structure to disinherit or destroy the favored Disciple openly or clandestinely
for positive or negative reasons depending on how the relationship is conceived
between her and the Disciples.
The role of Disciple 2 is less straight forward than those fulfilled by Disciples 1
and 3. To keep faith with Freud, the child holding the position of Disciple 2 is
most certainly a participant in, that is, partnered with Disciple 3, in the violence
against the chosen elevated brother, having been disinherited as well. What is
equally true is that Disciple 2 is most likely collateral damage in the chaos of
the founding murder. While one could speculate wildly about the motives for
killing the middle child, the odd man out as it were, the key insight is that the
disenfranchised siblings act as a group against the elevated brother and generate
enough violence to spark the taboos and social structure deemed necessary after
the founding murder. Besides being a rival with the other siblings, Disciple 2 has
the more legitimate claim, based solely on the hierarchical structure employed by
the MWA, hence, the need for his or her removal.
It is possible to shift the double arrow connecting the mother to Disciple 3,
placing it instead on Disciple 2, and possibly avoid the additional murder of
Disciple 3 on the grounds that Disciple 3 has the weaker claim in relation to
Disciple 2. There is an easy and obvious challenge to this restructuring of the
MWA from proponents of the GST interpretation. That is, Girards supporters
would be correct in pointing out that Disciple 3 would just become the standard
Disciple on a GST interpretation. That would be true, and it is the reason why the
mother, if she is an active agent, must support a child that has a less legitimate
claim to take over the fathers role as the head of the family. The ultimate, and
untimely, destruction of the children during the course of the founding murder
and its immediate aftermath is the reason why the taboos and social institutions
develop in just the way that they do to institutionalize inequality. However, I do
not think that it matters which child the mother aligns with so long as the child
she supports is not the one the father chose.
The sons, dispossessed of their birthright, the paternal inheritance each
assumed would be his, acting as a group, against their brother, motivated by
feelings of anger and jealousy, and achieving their goal of destroying the fathers
successor, are confronted with the repercussions of their actions, which they could
not apprehend prior to the violence, are led toward a particular social construction
designed to prevent future manifestations of fraternal violence. What is interesting
about Girardian, and to some extent Freudian, mimetic stories is that there has
been decidedly little work done to understand these stories as anthropological
re-castings of the philosophical and political accounts of social contract. However,
if my reformulation of the GST is acceptable, then, I contend, there are good
reasons to believe that mimetic theory can offer a better account of the actual
historical move into civilized society than the typical run-of-the-mill state of
nature accounts generally found in political philosophy.
Third Critique: Mimetic Contracting after the Founding Murder
From all of the viable variations of the GST mimetic structurethe MET,
MOT, WAT, SAT, and the MWAit is possible to develop a narrative about the
introduction of violence into human social relations, as well as an idea about how
cultural institutions developed as regulative and preventative measures in the
aftermath of the founding murder. The ability to develop the mimetic narrative
beyond a mere account of the origins of violence is where I object to the limited
scope of Girards project, because I think that by expanding the implications of
mimetic theory, using my proposed re-conceptualization of mimetic triangulation,
we can develop not only a better theory of justice, but also begin to articulate ways
which justice, in the form of an egalitarian non-violent society, could be achieved.
The model of justice I would propose is one motivated by what justice looks
like after the founding murder occurs. While Girard is content to examine religion
and myth for evidence of an occurrence of founding murder, he does not push his
analysis beyond an effort to establish the credibility of his own beliefs about the
truth of mimesis to produce social institutions. In some ways Girards approach
is useful because it offers an insightful and informative way to read religious
and mythical narratives, such that we gain a better understanding of the social
beginnings of human culture. However, the problem with Girards approach is that
it does not really help us to change the narrative, to break the cycle of repetition
through the ritual and symbolic re-creation of the event in question (the founding
murder and its aftermath).
My primary claim is that the institutionalized arrangements established after the
founding murder were grounded in notions of inequality which mirrored the family
structure prior to the founding violence (perhaps because it was the most familiar to
the survivors) and the ensuing inequality reinforces the pre-violence modeling. So,
the family structure, while it may have been largely egalitarian or, at a minimum,
responsive to the needs of the family and broader community, it was (most likely)
patriarchal and linear. Once the violence occurred, the social institutions instantiated
to prevent future violence mimed the family structure because it provided stability
similar to what was experienced before the violent upheaval. Allowing for a
pre-violence modeling of social institutions supports my later claims, in Chapter
5, that utopian narratives begin at about the same time or from the same action
(the founding murder) because the pre-violence stability would be something that
the survivors could not revert to given that the outcome of such an arrangement is
the violence which required the institution of the inequality of people in the first
place. Put differently, pre-mimetic violence society was not desirable precisely
because it led to violence; however, because preventing further violence was the
intention of the social arrangements, rather than rectifying what was wrong with the
pre-mimetic violence familial structure, we end up with a society perpetually trying
to stave off violence with violence. As such, there is a schism between the wish to
go back to the way things were and the rationalization that the way things were
led to this and the golden age is born.
It is not unfair to assert that violence and incestunderstood as occurring as
the founding murder and taking place as a violent raperesemble something like
the chaos of a Hobbesian state of nature. As such, there is no reason not to read the
mimetic story in the same vein as other political philosophies that assume the same
starting point for their portrayal of a social contract theory of society. Historically,
social contracts have been posited as nothing other than useful, if often hypothetical,
thought experiments designed to help people sort out why society is the way that it
is or what kind of society they would like to live inthat is, how and why we have
these laws and sanctions instead of others. Moreover, social contracts tend to help
us identify how to redress or alter problems in the status quo which result from
a particular conception of the contract. In fact, in parsing out juridical, cultural,

and social rules, social contract theorists often generate arguments for why we
chose just those that we hypothetically did. All of these theories begin in a state
of nature, often posited as a fictional existence, and though the assumed state of
nature leads to differing social contracts, the one consistent theme is the creation
of socially practical rules by which we justify and explain how and why society is
the way that is.
For instance, the Hobbesian account of social contract probably comes closest
to mirroring what I am describing as the standard treatment of the moment of
mimetic violence and its aftermath. For Hobbes, people start in a state of nature he
describes as a war of all against all.40 Hobbes postulates that the lives of earliest
pre-social man and woman are solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.41 Hobbes
understands the state of nature to possess exactly those qualities that would, during
and immediately after the founding murder, make a social contract necessary.
He argues that during this chaotic, pre-social time nothing can be unjust. The
notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have there no place. Where there
is no common power, there is no law: where there no law, no injustice Justice
and injustice are qualities, that relate to men in society, not in solitude.42 My
claim is that the first recognition of inequality among the brothers introduced a
claim to injustice. Before that claim could be fully articulated or understood, the
violence was already upon the family-as-community. The judicial structure that
followed was intended to establish the parameters in which similar future claims
could be arbitrated.
Striving to live in a world that is, at any moment, capable of destroying ones
life, Hobbes imagines people forming confederacies based on a sense of mutual
aid, even if the motivation for doing so is fear and a sense of self-preservation,
rather than concern for their fellow persons. There is, in the joining of the
confederacy, a tacit recognition, according to Hobbes, which makes the move out
of a state of nature desirable. He contends, The desires, and other passions of
man, are in themselves no sin. No more are the actions, that proceed from those
40 Hobbes is clear about the hypothetical standing of the state of nature claiming, in
Chapter 13 of Leviathan, there was never such a time, nor condition of war as this; and I
believe it was never generally so, over all the world: but there are many places, where they
live so now such as the savage people of America. Here the emphasis is mine.
41Hobbes, Leviathan, Pt. 1 Ch. 13. One might wonder at the depiction of the state
of nature as such but each claim has its place in a Hobbesian framework. Life is solitary
because the state of nature is composed of individuals, poor because possessing anything
would make you a greater target, nasty because bathing, in a stream perhaps, makes you
vulnerable, brutish because such living is no different than animals, and short because it is a
war. Applying these directly to a mimetic contract model would be tenuous at best, however,
it is important to understand the depiction as explaining why the state of nature is undesirable.
For my purposes, it is salient to pick out how a war of all against all is something individuals
would desire to avoid, especially if they have experienced it, even briefly.
42Hobbes, Leviathan, Pt. 1 Ch. 13.
passions, till they know a law that forbids them: which till laws be made they
cannot know: nor can any law be made, till they have agreed upon the person that
shall make it.43 Once the savage individuals have coalesced into a group, they
generate a social contract designed to codify the rules by which they will coexist.
This codification is necessary to understanding the role of a social contract in the
more contemporary sense. For Hobbes, there is no way to know what the real
conditions were that led to the creation of the compact between these individuals.
However, because of the way our society is structured, Hobbes believes we can
know certain things about the content of the compact.
One of the key elements in the Hobbesian story is that one of the members of
the confederacy, and also, potentially, a small group of individuals, is chosen to
be the sovereign of the confederacy responsible for the governance of the united
collective. The individuals must surrender to the sovereign their own ability to
determine themselves outside of the group, that is, they surrender, or lay aside,
their claims to a natural right of self-determination. Following the establishment
of the sovereign, the contract binds all the individuals to obey the sovereign, and
to subject themselves to his judgment. More strongly still, the contract creates
civil bonds by which men are bound, and obliged: bonds, that have their strength,
not from their own nature but from fear of some evil consequence upon the
rupture.44 While certain mimetic elements appear in the subtext of a Hobbesian
narrativethe war of all against all sounds eerily similar to the chaotic moment of
the founding murder, when all brothers were against each other, the surrendering
of self autonomy echoes the disciples surrendering the ability to choose the object
of their own desires, and the fear of evil consequences upon a rupture corresponds
with a fear of revisiting the violence of the mimetic crisisthe major problem
with a Hobbesian account is that it begins with individuals. There is no good
reason to assume that individuals exist autonomously in the state of nature, that is,
outside of a family structure.
If there were strictly individual persons in the Hobbesian state of nature, none
of them would have a reason to produce offspring, and if that is true, then there
would have been no perpetuation of the human race, since individuals could,
presumably, survive on their own, even if doing so meant that life was terrible.
To reject the idea of individuals as contractors is to leave the family as the only
viable replacement for their contracting actions. The Hobbesian story is less
coherent when one assumes families in a war of all against all, because the factions
involved would necessarily already need in place some sort of agreement about
the provision for, and protection of, the young. Thus, the Hobbesian story is not
as persuasive as it could be, but the mimetic story I am telling can still preserve
43Hobbes, Leviathan, Pt. 1 Ch. 13. Moreover, the condition of war in a state of
nature leaves each man to be governed by his own reason and in such a condition every
man has a right to every thing; even to one anothers body. In that statement we see the
subtextual remnants of the incest narrative. See, Leviathan, Pt. 1 Ch. 14.
44Hobbes, Leviathan, Pt. 1 Ch. 14.
the most intriguing aspects of Hobbess ideas, while skirting the problem of the
interpersonal relationships of individuals in the state of nature.
Contrary to Hobbes, John Locke conjures up a state of nature wherein
the individuals are more like cattle than wolves, and assumes that the basis
for human social contracting is economic in nature. The focus is still on the
well-being and welfare of the individuals, but the appeal of a social contract for
Locke is to promote the establishment and protection of private property, defined
as life, liberty, and possessions. However, far from a state of nature like Hobbes,
rooted in an idea of individuals in a perpetual state of tumult, Locke argues the
first society was between man and wife, which gave beginning to that between
parents and children; to which, in time, that between master and servant came
to be added.45 This originary society, the union of man and woman as husband
and wife, began voluntarily and for the specific purpose of procreation, or more
generally, and perhaps realistically, for conjugal access and pleasure. Still, if we
were to find ourselves in a Lockean state of nature, we would have to be so as
families, since the compacts between husbands and wives are directed toward the
care of the young who have a right to be nourished and maintained by them, till
they are able to provide for themselves.46
Locke, by presenting societal development in this way, subverts the Hobbesian
notion of the individual by affirming the existence of the family as the first society,
along the same lines I argue above. Lockes kinder, gentler version of the state
of nature, however, is not without its own parallels to a mimetic contract theory.
Locke defines the state of nature, as the state all people are naturally in, a state
of perfect freedom to order their actions, and dispose of their possessions and
persons, as they think fit, within the bounds of the law of nature a state also of
equality, wherein all the power and jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more
than another.47 In Lockes notion of perfect equality, one ought to hear echoes
of my retooling of Girards GST story regarding the state the brothers imagine
themselves to be in with respect to the father. Drawing this parallel does not
conflict with Lockes later claim that people in the state of nature are equal only to
the extent that they have no superior above them, because he qualifies the familial
relationship as excluded from such concerns on the grounds that the family is not
properly political.
A properly political social arrangement is one imbued with political power. For
Locke, political power is the right of making laws and penalties of death, and
consequently all less penalties for the regulating and preserving of property, and
of employing the force of the community, in the execution of such laws, and in the
defence [sic] of the commonwealth from foreign injury; and all this only for the
public good.48 The possession of political power then, which would be necessary
45 John Locke, Second Treatise of Government, Chapter 7.

46Locke, Second Treatise, Ch. 7.
to create inequality, does not exist in the state of nature, nor does it exist in the
family. So, the father can be held as superior to the sons on my modeling of the
mimetic crisis, without having to explain why the sons would not recognize the
familial structure as a political arrangement. However, for Locke, the recognized
superiority of the father is not enough to constitute a political arrangement. He goes
on to claim,
No political society can be, nor subsist, without having in itself the power to
preserve property, and, in order thereunto, punish the offences of all those of that
society; there and there only is political society, where every one of the members
hath quitted his natural power, resigned it up into the hands of the community
in all cases that excludes him not from appealing for protections to the laws
established by it Those who are united into one body, and have a common
established law and judicature to appeal to, with authority to decide controversies
between them, and punish offenders, are in civil society one with another: but
those who have no such common appeal are still in the state of nature.49
For Locke, the motivation for moving out of the state of nature has as much to
do with property as it does punishment. In fact, in spite of all of his talk about
the equality of individuals in civil society with respect to life, health, liberty, and
possessions, his primary reason for the creation of a system of adjudication is that in
the state of nature every man hath a right to punish the offender, and be executioner
of the law of nature.50 Obviously, Locke intends his move into civil society to offer
a better way of handling what is already encoded in the law of nature. That is, if
Lockes emphasis on property were understood as possessing an object, and that
object was substituted for the mother in a mimetic narrative, then one could easily
read Locke as telling a quasi-mimetic story were arbitration of disputes, arising
from conflicts about who gets to possess whom in the aftermath of the founding
murder, is necessary to prevent everyone from deciding the fate of their fellow
citizensthat is, taking it upon themselves to resort to additional acts of mimetic
violence. Unfortunately, just like Hobbes, Lockes approach both fails to properly
understand the motivation for contract, as arising from the first contractors, the
family, and it is missing key elements even as it gets other aspects right.
Rousseau offers a slightly different account of the origins of society, stemming
from a state of nature. Rousseau offers a view comparable to the Lockeian version
of docile people milling about, perhaps not aimlessly, with a herd mentality, who
can, in some instances, count on the aid of their fellow humans, and on other, rarer,
occasions, learn to distrust them. For Rousseau, the first Industrial Revolution
occurred when people began to use tools for defense and development of their
person and habitat. These revolutionary activities led to the building of lodgings,
which in turn led to the cohabitation of men and women, or possibly, on a Freudian
49Locke, Second Treatise, Ch. 7. Emphasis in the original.

50Locke, Second Treatise, Ch. 2. Emphasis in the original.
reading of Rousseau, a man and his women; which led to the sweetest sentiment
known to men: conjugal love and paternal love. Each family became a little
society.51 This little society is quite insidious, given the chronology Rousseau
employs to explain human social development, which is, I might add, eerily akin
to Girards mimetic account. For Girard, as the son learns to desire the mother
he and his father enter into a rivalry which will, eventually, turn violent. For
Rousseau, as men and women begin to cohabitate and enjoy leisure together, they,
too, and especially the men, start to develop feelings of jealousy and succumb to
competition amongst themselves to gain the favor of those they desire. Rousseau
goes on to say of the family and herd propensity of people,
Having previously wandered about the forests and having assumed a more fixed
situation, men slowly came together and united into different bands, eventually
forming in each country a particular nation, united by mores and characteristic
features, not by regulations and laws, but by the same kind of life and foods
and by the common influence of the climate. Eventually a permanent proximity
cannot fail to engender some intercourse [communication] among different
families. Young people of different sexes live in neighboring huts; the passing
intercourse demanded by nature soon leads to another, through frequent contact
with one another, no less sweet and permanent. People become accustomed to
consider different objects and to make comparisons. Imperceptibly they acquire
the ideas of merit and beauty which produce feelings of preference. By dint of
seeing one another, they can no longer get along without seeing one another
again. A sweet and tender feeling insinuates itself into the soul and at the least
opposition becomes an impetuous fury. Jealousy awakens with love; discord
triumphs, and the sweetest passion receives sacrifices of human blood.52
Following from these beliefs, Rousseaus claims in The Social Contract about
the unnatural basis of the social order make more sense. He asserts that, social
order is a sacred right which is the basis of all other rights. Nevertheless, this right
does not come from nature, and must therefore be founded on conventions.53
The motivation for the contract is primitive peoples finding themselves at odds
with the forces of a state of nature, which they cannot, by themselves, continue to
resist. And, since people are incapable of producing more or additional forces by
51Rousseau, Discourse on the Origins of Inequality, Pt. 2. Without going into the
great detail that Rousseau does it is important to note how important this move into the
family-as-society model is for his understanding of human development. In the family,
according to Rousseau, language was formed and this gave rise not only to the ability to
formulate complex concepts and communicate them, but the family also allowed people to
become sedentary and reflective thereby making them soft and weak, in turn making them
susceptible to inequalities and power divisions.
52Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, Pt. 2. Emphasis added.
53Rousseau, Social Contract, Bk. 1 Ch. 1.
themselves, they are forced to unite and direct existing ones, they have no other
means of preserving themselves than the formation, by aggregation, of a sum of
forces great enough to overcome the resistance. These they have to bring into play
by a single motive power, and cause to act in concert.54
Unfortunately, Rousseau never fully addresses what in the state of nature
becomes so overpowering that it necessarily redirects human social existence. He
merely offers that there are obstacles to be overcome. I would contend that his
withholding of an analysis is not the product of him not knowing what he was
looking for, but rather, that he did not know where to look, even as he focused on
the family. Still, Rousseau recognizes, and articulates more unambiguously than
his contemporaries in the Enlightenment, the fundamental insight of a contract
theory. Namely, the passage from the state of nature to the civil state produces a
very remarkable change in man, by substituting justice for instinct in his conduct,
and giving his actions the morality they had formerly lacked. Then only does
man find that he is forced to act on different principles, and to consult his
reason before listening to his inclinations.55 He comes close to hitting upon the
heart of the matter in his Discourse on the Origin of Inequality by arguing what
effects reason has upon the commiserating animal, that is, the person who has
moved away from the state of nature. Reason is what engenders egocentrism, and
reflection strengthens it. Reason is what turns man in upon himself. Reason is what
separates him from all that troubles him, Rousseau argues. He continues,
No longer can anything but danger to the entire society trouble the tranquil
slumber of the philosopher and yank him from his bed. His fellow man can be
killed with impunity underneath his window. He has merely to place his hands
over his ears and argue with himself a little in order to prevent nature, which
rebels within him, from identifying with the man being assassinated. Savage
man does not have this admirable talent, and for the lack of wisdom and reason
he is always seen thoughtlessly giving in to the first sentiment of humanity. When
there is a riot or a street brawl, the populace gathers together; the prudent man
withdraws from the scene. It is the rabble, the women of the marketplace, who
separate the combatants and prevent decent people from killing one another.56
The idea of the savages inability to avoid joining in a fight underscores Freuds
claims that the primal brothers would have been easy to coerce into action
against either the father or, on my reading of mimetic theory, the elevated brother.
Rousseaus argument about the impacts of civil reasoning ring truer still when we
54 Rousseau, Bk. 1 Ch. 6. Rousseau claims earlier that given the changing state of
nature there comes a point where the primitive condition can then subsist no longer; and
the human race would perish unless it changed its manner of existence. See the same for
this quotation.
55 Rousseau, Bk. 1 Ch. 8.
56Rousseau, Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, Pt. 1.
consider what the social contract is supposed to accomplish for those who adhere
to it. The contract is supposed to provide a means of arbitration for citizens; it
is supposed to establish the proper protocols and channels through which slights
should be addressed; in short, the contract makes it possible to ignore the plight
of ones neighbor, even as they are slaughtered beneath ones window. This
dissonance, however, is not a necessary byproduct of contracting; rather it is the
product of a particular contract designed for particular reasons, to achieve specific
particular goals, namely, the preservation of society, by creating appropriate means
for expressing violence. Transgressions of the norms established by the contract
will be punished appropriately; hence, the prudent man withdraws, rather than
intervenes, so as not to be indicted by association. As such, the philosopher in a
post-mimetic violence society learns, through reflection and genuflection, to behave
in ways which avoid inappropriate displays of aggression per the mimetic contract.
I offer these brief examinations merely to highlight the mimetic threads
permeating the contract tradition. The list is neither comprehensive in its handling
of these authors, nor is their inclusion representative of an exhaustive list of
thinkers whose work could be used. However, as popular examples of what
might be fairly labeled traditional accounts of social contract, their accounts
are necessary and sufficient to ground my claims that mimetic theory can provide
a coherent contract account. While few commentators treat mimetic theory as
a form of social contract, my broader claim is that we should do so, precisely
because mimesis joins the relevant threads of each account into a coherent
narrative, thereby giving us a deeper and more robust account of how and why
society is just the way that it is. Furthermore, I need not jettison the contributions
of these thinkers, or too harshly critique them, because their use of the contract
hypothesis is different than mine. I advocate nothing more stringent than a critique
of their philosophies as either too narrowly focused on their immediate goals,
such as justifying the domination of society by a sovereign as Hobbes does, or,
using the state of nature as a purely hypothetical thought experiment, grounding
their ideas in Enlightenment discourse, all too ready to believe that their lived
experiences could be affected by anything that may have happened before the age
we affectionately refer to as ancient history.
I think that there are good reasons to prefer the mimetic contract to the standard
or traditional versions of the contract theory. If one is inclined to believe that
the mimetic story is an acceptable retelling of the archaic instantiations of social
relations, then the natural conclusion is that the violence erupting from mimetic
rivalry was brought to an end, not by the absolute destruction of the warring
factions, but by some sort of truce. The peace established by this initial handshake
would set the stage for the creation of the religious and mythological narratives,
along with the practical institutions of social life, which would follow once the
dust had settledagain, following a Girardian or Freudian chronology. Hence,
according to my breakdown of the mimetic aftermath the socially recognized
inequality which led to the violence was incorporated into the political life
(the enfranchised vs. the disenfranchised), the religious life (those whom god
favors vs. those who are damned), the juridical life (laws created to protect some,
hinder others, and regulate all), and the cultural life more broadly construed, so
that certain taboos are placed on desirable things and actions that are decidedly
capable of instigating violence.
Consequently, by approaching mimetic theory as I propose, it becomes possible
to open up a dialectic about justice that both explains why a notion like John
Rawlss justice as fairness is such a seductive concept and, at the same time,
expose why Rawls was unable to use such an idea to generate a fully functional
theory of justice that helps us find practical solutions to social problems. The
problem with justice in a Girardian framework is that the injustice in the GST
is located in violence done to the father. However, on my model, the sense of
equality the brothers derive from their relationship with the father before his
death becomes farce postmortem, leading to the codification of inequality as a
preventative measure. Understood this way, the seeds of injustice are located in the
family structure before violence erupts. It is the inability to articulate inequality
which leads to the violence against the elevated brother, but in the aftermath of the
founding murder the corrective chosen is to prevent violence by redirecting it, not
to restructure the family to weed out injusticeprobably because the core familial
structure was not identified as the primary culprit in the heat of the moment. So,
conceiving of post-mimetic violence society as turning to a social contract
model of societal arrangement, and, specifically, one designed to ensure fairness,
then we should turn to the social contract of John Rawls to see how mimetic theory
can help us better understand our social and cultural institutions.
Chapter 4
Justice as Unfairness:
The Social Contracts of Girard and Rawls
An Introduction to the Terms of the Contract
In Chapter 3 I examined, in an abbreviated way, the relationship that mimetic

theory has to the social contract tradition, broadly construed. However, as Rawls
understands his theory to be a continuation, if not a culmination of that tradition,
it will be beneficial to investigate how Rawls and his theory of justice fit into
the nexus of contract theories. More than just Rawlss own interpretation of
his position, however, will be necessary, especially because Rawls was trying
to create a comprehensive response to the problem of an unjust society. The
reason why I choose Rawls as the epicenter of my critique of social justice is
specifically because of the structure of his theory. He wants to generate a theory
of justice that will help to strengthen our societal structureto be precise, by
our I clearly mean, as does Rawls, our liberal western societyby mitigating
the damages of natural inequalities which are often exacerbated by artificial
social constructs. Still, I would claim that his focus, while aimed in the right
direction and targeting admirable goals, is not the best way to achieve his ends.
John Rawls spent his career, or a large part of it, developing an idea about
justice that he thought, in its social contract theory context, ought to function
as a guideline for the way we govern our social relationships. His theory is
predicated largely on a notion of fairness. Ren Girard has spent his scholarly
career developing an idea about the origins of social relationships as a product of
desire and violence. One might think of his approach as being predicated largely
upon a notion that life is not fair at all. In this chapter, I aim to demonstrate
both why a modified Girardian account of the origin of social justice is better
for helping us determine how to best re-conceptualize our social relationships,
as well as, how a mimetic theory based on the MWA undermines the notion
of fairness that is central to the success of a Rawlsian social contract theory
of justice as fairness. In order to make the analysis I am offering function as a
critique, there is a crucial caveat to point out, explicitly, that while I am targeting
Rawlss philosophy as the dominant viewpoint in contemporary political
philosophy, Rawls is not to be held to the standard of having produced the final
word on justice generally or that his theory, as he outlines it, is supposed to be
applicable to all societies. As Andrew Levine notes, it is plain that Rawlss
intent is and perhaps always has been to articulate the sense of justice that people
living in modern, liberal societies share. A Theory of Justice is about our sense
of fairness.1
Engaging Rawls with a Girardian inspired mimetic theory produces some
interesting entanglements as a result of this caveat, but, most importantly, it
is imperative to keep in mind that the focus is our sense of fairness and how
it developed. Mimesis, and, especially, my modifications to Girards theory, can
provide an account of that critical social development rendering justice more
comprehensible. The caveat will provide the necessary framework from which
to maintain a critique of Rawls. First, Girard believes that his mimetic theory has
left marks and traces upon all societies, so in one sense it may not be judicious
to single out one instantiation of justiceand particularly a liberal western
versionto highlight the importance of mimesis as a social contract. Secondly,
even if Girards account successfully undermines a Rawlsian notion of justice as
fairness, one might be left to account for the proverbial So, What?
As such my first inclination is to suggest that if an account of justice as robust
as Rawlss can be undermined by taking seriously how social arrangements
developed, then it would take very little effort to make the account applicable to
either formidable alternatives or less stalwart interpretations of justiceincluding
accounts stemming from both western or non-western societies, or, perhaps, rigidly
theological accounts of justice. Secondly, I am persuaded that the So, What?
question can be written off by stressing that my project is not intended to destroy
a fairness based interpretation of justice. Rather, it is my hope that an account of
justice grounded in a mimetic understanding of human social relationships will
produce a theory of justice that is stronger and more practical for answering the
needs of modern societiesliberal and non-liberalstriving to create more just
communities. After all, as Brian Barry notes, questions of justice arise only where
there is conflict of interest.2 So, it seems to make sense that justice would need
to develop out of conflict and a theory of justice that did not take that into account
should be considered as lacking an important narrative element.
Now that the problems inherent in a Girardian account of mimetic theory have
been addressed, e.g. Chapter 3, it is possible to turn toward investigating how a
revised Girardian mimesis can help us understand the concept of justice more
holistically than do competing theories of justice. However, because a sustained
engagement with the concept of justice would be a book length project in its own
right, I will focus on the social contract notion of justice advanced by John Rawls.
Rawls is my primary target because his theory of justice has been the dominant
view of social and political theory since the publication of A Theory of Justice
four decades ago. However, most theorists approach Rawls by taking for granted,
as Rawls does, that the state of nature is a purely hypothetical exercise, a thought
experiment, and then arguing the details of Rawlss theory. This appears to overlook
the important fact that human society had a starting point and something, an event,
1 Andrew Levine, Engaging Political Philosophy, 184. Emphasis in the original.

2 Brian Barry, Liberal Theory of Justice, 15.
Justice as Unfairness: The Social Contracts of Girard and Rawls 89
a thought, an action, sparked the need for greater levels of social organization and
complexity. As Carole Pateman notes, Contract theory is concerned with more
than fictions of original agreements; contract theorists claim to show how major
political institutions should properly be understood. Citizenship, employment, and
marriage are all contractual, but since they are seen through the lens of a drastically
truncated theoryindeed a theory that has been emasculatedthe social contract
[is] systematically misrepresented and the marriage contract is usually ignored.3
Formulating a Rawlsian theory with an honest attempt at establishing what that
crucial contracting moment was for early humans fundamentally alters Rawlss
theory in important ways. However, this supposition is also an important juncture
for noting, for clarities sake, one additional caveat, that,
Rawlss thinking is not entirely in the vein established by Hobbes, Rousseau, and
Locke. After devoting decades to elaborating a theory of justice and developing
an account of political legitimacy, Rawls broached the prospect of going beyond
the conceptual horizons of those who, centuries earlier, sought to make sense of
the emerging state form of political organization. In a masterful coda to his main
work, Rawls suggested that what he calls the law of peoples should substitute for
the traditional, modern conception of sovereignty or supreme authority.4
The result of this caveat is that it would be impolitic to treat Rawls as merely another
contract theorist. Unlike his contract predecessors, Rawls is not merely trying to
articulate how a particular form of political organization came into existence.
Rather, Rawls is attempting to motivate socio-political discourse in the direction
of how to create a better, that is, practically more just society presently and in the
future. On this point he differs from those who came centuries before because he
is not trying to justify a particular political arrangement or simply critique one,
but to provide an ideal frame of reference to improve the political organization
of societyand, specifically, liberal western societies. While the employment
of the utopian model will be addressed more fully below in Chapter 5, I want
to bracket the seemingly superficial nature of this difference between Rawls and
his predecessors. More plainly, that Rawls should overreach the limits previously
established matters little for my critique; what is important is that Rawls uses a
3 Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract, Stanford: Stanford UP, 1988, x.

4 Andrew Levine, Engaging Political Philosophy, 182. Rawls understands A Theory
of Justice to deal primarily with justice between individuals in a particular society. He
does not take it to be a concept meant to guide the justice that adheres between different
societies. The problem of justice between different societies is the focus of his later work
The Law of Peoples. For this reason I will make A Theory of Justice the primary target of
my mimetic criticisms of Rawls, but Girard, like Rawls eventually does, sees the scope
of his project as penetrating all societies. That a mimetic formulation of justice should
find footing then in all societies will be taken for granted in this project if the critiques of
Rawlss concept of justice are found to be salient and effective counter-arguments to Rawls.
social contract subtext for his arguments and, by basing his account of justice upon
that subtext, creates space for a mimetic analysis of justice as one of the primary
means that rivalry and violence are perpetuated in social institutions.
For Rawls the concept of justice is grounded in a notion of fairness that a
reasonable and responsible person would endorse if that person were completely
dis-interested and lacked access to certain fundamental bits of self-knowledge like
race, class, and gender, but also, more generally, physical ability, natural talents,
and life-long goals or aspirations. My contention is that this conception of justice
produces an idealized notion of justice that is not only impractical for deployment
in our everyday lives, but that the concept suffers from being derived from a purely
hypothetical, rather than theoretical, perspective. Having a realistic story about
the beginnings of human society is imperative to offering substantial and useful,
philosophically-oriented theories that can be used to change the violent cycle
mimesis enjoins in social groups. This is not to claim that we ought to jettison
Rawlss notion of the ideal society, but rather, that his utopian project suffers by
beginning in fantasy and working toward an idyllic future.5
What Rawls does in his theory of justice is strip the individual of key identities
markers, both psychologically and socially, and then theorizes that they would be
able to make decisions that could only be made by people with access to those
very identity markers. Rawls allows that his original contractors know they do
in fact possess conceptions of the good, values, virtues, and aims, but that their
knowledge of these is limited and vague until they move beyond the veil. This
proves problematic because the individual is not an atomic unit in society, in spite
of what Rawls and Rawlsians have argued. But even if the atomic nature of the
individual is granted, it shall become apparent that the individual, thus construed,
could not make the choices Rawls claims they would precisely because what
would enable them to make those choices is necessarily dependent upon their
ability to function within the social roles proscribed for them. That is, one might
claim with some confidence that what prevented people in a pre-mimetic violence
society from positing justice is that there was not a need for it since the sole basis
of social authority was the dominant male (i.e. Freuds patriarchal father). Once
the pre-violence society was disrupted, the need for a concept of justice, while
paramount in the aftermath of the founding murder, was only articulable in the
context of a social awareness made possible by the destruction of societal stability.
As such, a perpetrators defense of the violence would have originated in claims
of inequality, but the notion of justice developed to answer that inequality would
5 I will deal more substantially with this aspect of my mimetic critique in Chapter 5.
Here, however, it is only important to note that Rawls styles the original position like many
of his predecessors handle the state-of-nature. By presenting the original position as a
hypothetical beginning point, that is, as an imagined ideal setting, Rawls stumbles out of
the gate when it comes to making the theory applicable in practice because he begins in the
ideal and works toward the ideal. As such, detours into the realm of the real are difficult for
a Rawlsian theory as we shall see.
likely have arisen from a social awareness that life cannot always be fair. That is,
justice would have been defined as unfairness.
Defining justice as a way of reckoning with inequality, and the violence
spawned by it, places the need for just social institutions at the fore of social
concerns. It is not unfair to attribute such a position to Rawls. He openly
acknowledges that social institutions are patterns of human conduct defined by
public systems of rules, and the very holding of the offices and positions which
they define normally indicates certain intentions and aims. The justice or injustice
of societys arrangements and [peoples] beliefs about these questions profoundly
influence the social feelings; to a large extent they determine how we regard
anothers accepting or rejecting an institution, or [that persons] attempt to reform
or redefine it.6 The turn away from violence to those social institutions, with a
notion of justice grounded in differentiation as a means of justifying inequality,
is more plausible than the idyllic starting point Rawls crafts as a generic means
to create the desired ends of justice as fairness. This, I believe, is true in spite of
Rawlss claim that,
In order to show that the principles of justice are based in part on envy it
would have to be established that one or more of the conditions of the original
position arise from this propensity. Since the question of stability does not
force a reconsideration of the choice already made, the case for the influence of
envy must be made by reference to the first part of the theory. But each of the
stipulations of the original position has a justification which makes no mention
of envy.7
It appears that Rawlss concern with envy stems from his belief that the social
conditions upon which the individuals behind the veil would have to agree upon
cannot be the occasion for the influence of envy. This conclusion, however, strikes
an unusual chord within the theory generally from a mimetic standpoint because
of the commitment that in order to justify working around envy behind the veil
it would have to be established somehow that the conditions behind the veil arise
from this propensity. A casual reader of Freud, or mimesis generally, might miss,
as Rawls does, that the problem is not that envy would arise from squabbling over
the conditions in society beyond the veil, but rather, envy undergirds the very basis
for finding those conditions desirable.8
However, Rawls creates his own problems by failing to see the benefit of Freud
to his theory on at least two points. First, he only engages with Freuds work on
6 John Rawls, Theory, 431.

8 This problem will become more pronounced below when I address Rawlss
handling of the family. For now, it only matters that it is quite possible to problematize an
important aspect of the conditions behind the veil, namely, the very people Rawls posits as
being behind it.
the role of envy as a special psychology rather than as a legitimate necessary

component of human social nature as I argue above. Second, Rawls uses an
incomplete understanding of Freud to support a rejection of Freudian psychology
as it relates to Rawlss theory. I will discuss this in more detail below, but for now
it is important to understand the relationship between Rawls and Freud, as Rawls
develops that relationship in A Theory of Justice and his subsequent works. Rawls
recognizes that envy, or, perhaps, more generally, moral psychology has been the
basis of numerous attempts to explain the development of justice. Rawls indicates
early on in his attempt to address moral psychologies that most traditional
doctrines hold that to some degree at least human nature is such that we acquire a
desire to act justly when we have lived under and benefitted from just institutions.
To the extent that this is true, a conception of justice is psychologically suited
to human inclinations.9 Rawls then goes on to lump Freud in with a group that
includes many conservative writers who have contended that the tendency to
equality in modern social movements is the expression of envy, Rawls argues that
those thinkers have sought to attribute justice to collectively harmful impulses.10
Rawls understands the tradition of using moral psychology as a continuation
of attempts in the early modern period to settle the conflicts between competing
empiricist and rationalist camps about the stability and continuation of just
societies over time. It is from the disagreements between these early thinkers that
Rawls draws out his own ideas about the formation of moral sentiments that will
inform his later rejection of envy as a viable concern behind the veil. On the one
hand are those whose empiricism demands a social learning theory that is based
upon the idea that over time, and with effective parenting and social conditioning,
we will eventually, via various psychological processes, acquire a desire to do
what is right and an aversion to doing what is wrong.11 Opposing this view is the
rationalist position which advances an outlook on moral development that holds
our moral learning is not so much a matter of supplying missing motives as one of
the free development of our innate intellectual and emotional capacities according
to their natural bent.12 Rawls offers justice as fairness as a rebuff to the saturating
influence of utilitarianism in contemporary society placing himself squarely in the
rationalist tradition. He conceives of the parties in the original position not only
as free and equal moral agents, but as being readily able to recognize the freedom
and equality each person behind the veil is endowed with. This conception of
the individual as free and equal provides the basis for Rawlss claims about the

10 John Rawls, Theory, 471. Oddly enough Rawls includes Marx, Early Writings
153f., and Helmut Schoeck, Envy: A Theory of Social Behavior, trans. Michael Glenny and
Betty Ross, Chapters XIVXV, among those conservative writers.
11 John Rawls, Theory, 401. Included in this tradition are emotivists and utilitarians,
broadly construed, from Hume to Sidgwick.
12 John Rawls, Theory, 402. Included in this tradition are Rousseau and Kant,
sometimes J.S. Mill, and more recently Jean Piaget.
moral personality of the parties involved. Their moral personality is defined

by the moral powers, which are, in effect, the capacities for practical reasoning as
applied to matters of justice.13
Regardless of which side of the argument a reader of Rawls finds themselves
on, he is clear that to some degree moral sentiments are necessary to insure
that the basic structure is stable with respect to justice.14 So, moral sentiments
are necessary to a stable basic structure and a moral personality is included in
the nature of the various parties instantiated in the original position. These two
commitments should entail both that persons are by their nature as moral agents,
free, equal, and rational and in the absence of distorting factors, in a [well-ordered
society], they publicly conceive of themselves in this way and that in doing so the
parties are capable of selecting the appropriate social conditions to produce and
maintain justice as fairness in society.15 The problem with how Rawls uses these
traditions, and, indeed, the whole process of moral development, is that regardless
of the process one favors it is, in the context of A Theory of Justice, an afterthought
to the selection of the guiding social principles chosen behind the veil. In short,
here we find Rawls putting the cart before the horse.
Rawls attempts to move away from this line of questioning by taking for
granted that envy is not a genuine motivating factor in the original position
asserting that it is evident from the nature of the parties in the original position
[that] the conception of justice is chosen under conditions where by hypothesis no
one is moved by rancor and spite. Thus the claims to equality supported by the two
principles [of justice] do not spring from those feelings.16 As such, Rawls wants
to present equality as a notion of justice that is affirming rather than corrective.
This is, again, problematic precisely because envy is not simply some emotive
aspect of human nature that we can hypothetically strip away to achieve a high
level of theoretical or argumentative cogency. Rather, envy is, at least mimetically
speaking, the mental state that triggers a claim for justice. A person encumbered
with envy sees the world through a lens shaded by degrees of injustice, so that,
13 Samuel Freeman, Justice and the Social Contract, New York: OUP, 2007, 160.
15 Samuel Freeman, Justice and the Social Contract, 160.
16 John Rawls, Theory, 472. Rawls stresses this point in Justice as Fairness:
A Restatement, noting what he calls an important modification in the idea of rationality
behind the veil with respect to certain special psychologies. He says, These include a
liability to envy and spite, a peculiarly high aversion to risk and uncertainty, and a strong
will to dominate and exercise power over others. The parties [behind the veil] (in contrast to
persons in society) are not moved by such desires and inclinations. Remember it is up to us,
you and me, who are setting up justice as fairness, to describe the parties (as artificial persons
in our device of representation) as best suits our aims in developing a political conception of
justice. Since envy, for instance, is generally regarded as something to be avoided and feared,
at least when it becomes intense, it seems desirable that, if possible, the choice of principles
should not be influenced by this trait. So we stipulate that the parties are not influenced by
these psychologies as they try to secure the good of those they represent, p. 87.
without it, a functional theory of desire is impossible. Besides, the actual locus
of envy is not in the choices available to the people in the original position, but
in how those individuals come to find those choices desirable. This is exactly
why a theory of desire beyond the typically accepted version of Rawlsian moral
psychology is needed.
Rawls fancies that the parties behind the veil can ignore persons inclinations to
be envious or spiteful, or to have a will to dominate or a tendency to be submissive,
or to be peculiarly averse to uncertainty and risk. This assumption greatly simplifies
the parties reasoning in selecting principles, as is clear in the case of social and
economic inequalities where the role of envy and spite cannot be ignored. Special
attitudes aside, the parties can reason in terms of the fundamental interests of those
they represent.17 Only by making, and committing to, this assumption can Rawls
motivate his notion of justice derivative of the conditions in the original position.
Given this assumption, Rawls continues, these attitudes are important in human
life and must be considered at some point. Here a difficulty arises: there seems to
be no way of knowing in general, apart from considering at least the broad features
of the main institutions of the existing basic structure, how liable people are to
those propensities.18 Rawls believes there is no way of knowing what impacts
envy might have behind the veil, but this strikes me as wrong even given nothing
more than a properly understood Freudian mimetic theory.
Moreover, Rawls goes even more awry when he confidently declares that we
may postpone the discussion of the special psychologies until the principles of
justice are selected on the basis of the fundamental interests of persons as free
and equal citizens. Once that is done those principles, when realized in the basic
structure, provide the institutional background the parties need to estimate how
likely it is that citizens who grow up within that background will be swayed by
destabilizing special attitudes.19 From a mimetic standpoint this position has the
order backwards with respect to how the special psychologies are understood.
Rawls never questions why the parties would need to select the conditions of
society, assuming only that if this were to happen, then we would end up with a
better society. This misses the obvious point that at some point in time people did
have to choose the conditions of society and what was possibly acting as a major
influence upon them were the lingering aftereffects of envy-inspired murder. As
such, not only should envy be given a privileged place in the psychological make-up
of the parties in the original position, but dealing with the consequences of it
should take on paramount importance.
Freuds establishment of the primeval father as the ground for the development
of social justice is, in essence, a pre-theoretical check on Rawlss construction
of justice as fairness. Fortunately, the dependence on the social authority of the
primeval father to constitute justice is not unknown to Rawls. His engagement
17 John Rawls, Restatement, 180.

with Freud late in A Theory of Justice makes it easier to adapt a Rawlsian concept
of justice to a mimetic account, but, more importantly for my critique of Rawls,
his misunderstanding of key elements of the Freudian narrative regarding the
social psychology of primeval humans leaves important clues about justice in the
periphery outside the scope of Rawlss vision. Rawls maintains that a correct
theory of politics in a just constitutional regime presupposes a theory of justice
which explains how moral sentiments influence the conduct of public affairs.20
Because Rawls only wants to reduce the impact of Freuds psychological
construction of envy as a special psychology and reject the Oedipal implications
thereinwhich has the added benefit for Rawls of keeping his focus off of the
familyRawls puts himself in a position to miss the critically helpful insights of
Freud about the rise of justice in human social discourse and the creation of how
one should conduct themselves in public affairs.21
Rawlss concern about the effects of envy on his theory acknowledges at least
a small amount of awareness on his part that envy can beand behind the veil
would bea socially disruptive and destructive force for his own foundational
concept. His limited attempt to grapple with the Freudian construction of personal
psychology provides a natural cleft in the bedrock of justice as fairness. More
importantly, by acknowledging Freuds work, and summarily dismissing it,
and then crowding it under the heading of special psychologies that will be
hypothetically excluded as a rule from existing behind the veil, Rawls creates
his own in-road for the type of mimetic critique that I am constructing here. That
such a critique is useful to a Rawlsian theory of justice is especially true when the
whole Freudian picture is considered and Freuds own mistakes corrected for in a
refined mimetic theory. Envy is the only special psychology that Rawls takes any
time to explore before marginalizing it within the framework of his own theory.
Instead, Rawls should have taken the time to develop the Freudian approach more
fully and he might have seen the mistake of assuming that individuals behind
the veil can make choices free from the concerns of mimetic rivalrythat is,
envy. Rawlss failure to account for Freud holistically combined with Girards
modifications to Freuds work, and my modifications to Girard, e.g. Chapter 3,
make a robust mimetic critique of Rawls possible.
Put differently, if failing to address Freuds mimetic account presents a
damaging oversight in the work of John Rawls, then the lack of engagement
with Girard is a damning oversight precisely because what Girardian mimesis
accomplishes is exactly what justice as fairness is missing as a functional social

21 In Chapter 2 I highlighted where Girard thought Freud had gone wrong by not
following his own arguments to their natural conclusions. Rawls, by assuming Freud had
drawn the right conclusions, essentially commits himself to a similar blunder. That is, by
taking Freud at face value Rawls moves forward and away from the concerns for his theory
raised by a Freudian analysis of social organization. By doing so he leaves his ideal citizen
behind the veil with some very serious defects.
concept. I contend that a starting point developed out of a Girardian-based mimetic

rivalry offers better insights into how the concept of justice arises and how that
concept is used to sustain the social institutions and power structures that make
managing the mimetic crisis easier. A successful critique will undermine fairness
as the anchor of social justice, or, rather, I will argue that fairness has been used
to mask the reality of social development in a post-mimetic violence society by
disguising the importance of inequality in maintaining social order. In order for
a Rawlsian theory of justice to prove functional, especially once it is reframed
in the mimetic trappings of the MWA I proposed in Chapter 3, it will have to be
grounded in a notion of unfairness.
The Problem of Desire and the Rational Self
In A Theory of Justice, John Rawlss insistence that a group of individuals placed

behind a veil of ignorance and rendered appropriately ignorant of their social
existence would come to support an idea of justice predicated on the idea of
fairness exposes, upon closer examination, some seemingly terminal flaws in the
idea of justice as fairness. This idea of fairness is grounded in a firm and quasi-
egalitarian sense of equality and upon this foundation Rawls believes that these
individuals would voluntarily choose social institutions that were to the benefit of
all. Where detrimental the burdens would not fall to one person or group unevenly
except where those most affected had a say in the matter and doing so would
somehow drastically improve society generally. Rawls refers to this situation as
the original position. He moves rather quickly from his discussion of the original
position to the two principles of justice and his elaboration of the egalitarian
benefits derived from such a notion of justice. The original position is easy enough
to understand as a concept, but, I will argue, it is more difficult to accept as a
platform for instantiating a sense of justice as fairness.
There are numerous critiques of Rawlss Theory and most of them skim the idea
of the original position on their way to skewering other, presumably more important,
or flawed, aspects of Rawlss work. In this chapter I will do the opposite, focusing
on the veil of ignorance and the original position to show that the individuals
Rawls posits could not make the choices he claims they would. And, when given
the knowledge they would need the parties in the original position are prone to
act differently than Rawls argues they would. I will refer to this as the problem
of desire and the rational self. Rawls, in his early formulations ofthe A Theory of
Justice, avoids the need to discuss emotional states or states of desire when talking
about the people in the original position behind the veil of ignorance. As I noted
above he only addresses envy, jealousy, and spite toward the very end of Theory
and does so only to bracket the conversation as unnecessary. As I argued above this
creates a very problematic conception of persons behind the veil. The flaws of that
conception are highlighted when one takes a closer look at how persons behind the
veil are expected to desire in the absence of a theory of desire.
For Rawls a rational individual is not subject to envy, at least when the
differences between himself and others are not thought to be the result of injustice
and do not exceed certain limits.22 By constructing the persons in the original
position along such lines Rawls is, clearly unbeknownst to him, giving a nod to
a theory of mimetic rivalry by trying to whitewash the influence of rivalry from
the interpersonal relationships that are necessary behind the veil. I will address
this in more detail below, but for now let me draw attention to two key aspects
of this claim. First, differences are not thought to be the result of injustice when
those differences are not noticeably great. Mimetically speaking, a propensity to
overlook minor differences is exactly what might be expected of the sons in the
WAT model of mimesis I proposed in Chapter 3. The sons would not think of
differences in age or natural ability as the result of injustice since such a concept
would not exist in the interpersonal dealings of the pre-mimetic violence family.
Once the violence takes hold, however, differences once imperceptible, or thought
of as inconsequential, become the basis of claims of injustice. Second, in order
to eliminate the encroachment of envy upon the persons behind the veil Rawls
stipulates that differences, even when they are not conceived of as stemming from
injustice, must still be contained within certain limits. What the acceptable limits
are is hard to say, but Rawls does point out the need to eliminate them because
aconception of justice should not be affected by accidental contingencies.23
Rawlss attempts to exclude envy from the original position are focused
on how the social institutions chosen by the persons in the original position
might be the cause of envy. So, even as he makes an effort to account for envy,
he articulates the problem as he understands it as whether the principles of
justice, and especially the difference principle with fair equality of opportunity,
is likely to engender in practice too much destructive general envy.24 To that
end he carves the notion of envy up into particular expressions of envy. While
it is unnecessary to delve too deeply into each type it will be important to see
how Rawls addresses emulative envyone type of general envy which is,
interestingly for Rawls, different than the particular envy typical of rivalries.
Rawls treats envy as being of two distinct types: general and particular. General
envy is characterized as the envy experienced by the least advantaged towards
those better situated in the sense that they envy the more favored for the
kinds of goods and not for the particular objects they possess.25 To the careful
reader of mimetic rivalry Rawls is, in this definition, articulating the flashpoint
for the violence between the model and disciple. This is especially true where
I have critiqued Girard by arguing that the disciple need not be seeking the
mother as a sexual object specifically, but rather, that he be seeking nothing

more than access to the women in the fathers hordea kind of good the
father alone possesses.
To be distinguished from general envy is particular envy. Particular envy,
Rawls asserts, is typical of rivalry and competition. Those who lose out in the
quest for office and honor, or for the affections of another, are liable to envy the
success of their rivals and to covet the very same thing that they have won.26
In this artificial separation of envy into its microcosmic and macrocosmic scales,
Rawls has articulated the problem at the very heart of mimetic rivalry. However,
his misguided commitment to the idea that such feelings are created by unjust
social institutions rather than probing deeper to realize that the problem of envy,
holistically conceived, as mimetic theory does, is the reason just social institutions
are desirable at all ultimately leads him astray in his conception of justice.
Assuming that he has offered a satisfactory partitioning of envy, Rawls
generalizes, for simplicities sake, that envy may be understood, for his purposes,
as the propensity to view with hostility the greater good of others even though
their being more fortunate than we are does not detract from our advantages.27
I am inclined to grant this definition because it seems to correctly capture the
essence of a post-mimetic violence understanding of how best to hierarchically
divide society. That is, by dividing envy into two parts, jettisoning the need to
discuss one aspect, and assuming the other aspect is only a problem if social
institutions are unjust, Rawls ultimately understands the centrality of envy to
social construction and simultaneously fails to realize the importance of it to his
own theory. Rawls believes that the harmful effects of envy can be mitigated
by making social institutions as responsive as possible to the needs of citizens,
especially those least well off, without realizing that social institutions are meant
to perform the function of mediation once handled by the father as model in the
mimetic triangle. If social institutions are expected to do the mediating, then the
problem of rivalric envy is not solved for no matter how just the institutions
are because the citizens subjected to them are also subjected to the core family
structurereplete with the power dynamics endemic to itthat make them rivals
headed toward violence in the first place.
There is one key difference between a Rawlsian account of envy and a Girardian
mimetic account of envy and that is how it is assumed by Rawls to function to the
detriment of the parties suffering from or subjected to envy. Rawls correctly argues
that envy is equally and collectively disadvantageous to the parties impacted by
it. Following Kant, Rawls argues, the individual who envies another is prepared
to do things that make them both worse off, if only the discrepancy between them
is sufficiently reduced.28 On this account the problem of envy creeps into the
narrative as a function of distance between two identities whereas Girard posits it

28 John Rawls, Theory, 466. Op. Cit. Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals,
pt.II, 36. Trans. M.G. Gregor (New York, Harper and Row, 1964), 127.
as a problem of being two closely related, that is, in lacking distinction. I would
argue that both accounts can be accommodated by a mimetic reading of envy as
rivalry, especially on the WAT model I propose in Chapter 3. It should be clear that
Girard has made a substantial case for the functionality of rivalry and how envy
becomes a problem leading to violence. Rawlss account can also be accounted
for on the WAT model. Taking multiple children as existing it is possible to see
how the youngest sons might consider themselves as permanently disenfranchised
if there are a sufficient number of siblings (brothers) ahead of them. So, while the
problem of rivalry between the brothers relatively close in age is dependent upon
a Girardian contexualization of envy, a Rawlsian context helps explain how the
sons taken as a group can be expected to understand their individual positions
within the group.
It is at this point that Rawls offers an additional division of envy to make a
case that envy is only really dangerous when it transforms into resentment. It bears
quoting a long passage at length in order to demonstrate just how closely Rawls
flirted with recognizing the need to bring envy behind the veil and deal with it
directly. He continues his analysis of envy, by following Kant, stating,
As Kant observes, there are many occasions when we openly speak of the
greater good of others as enviable. Thus we may remark upon the enviable
harmony and happiness of a marriage or a family. Similarly, one might say to
another that one envies his greater opportunities or attainments. In these cases,
those of benign envy as I shall refer to them, there is no ill will intended or
expressed. We do not wish, for example, that the marriage or family should be
less happy or harmonious. By these conventional expressions we are affirming
the value of certain things that others have. We are indicating that, although we
possess no similar good of equal value, they are expected to receive them as a
kind of praise and not as a foretaste of our hostility. A somewhat different case
is that of emulative envy which leads us to try to achieve what others have.
The sight of their greater good moves us to strive in socially beneficial ways
for similar things for ourselves. Thus envy proper, in contrast with benign envy
which we freely express, is a form of rancor that tends to harm both its object
and its subject. It is what emulative envy may become under certain conditions
of defeat and sense of failure.29
In this passage Rawls gives a fairly accurate account of the development of envy
in a mimetic relationship. Of the utmost importance are the final lines of the
passage where Rawls acknowledges the transformative nature of benign envy
and the dangerous nature of emulative envy. Yet, in spite of such recognition,
Rawls continues to believe that the difference principle and just institutions can
quell such behavior failing to recognize that this behavior develops privately not
29 John Rawls, Theory, 467. Emphasis added.

publically in society.30 Rawlss commitment to the idea that envy is generated in

the public sphere by dysfunctional social institutions allows him to erroneously
assert that we must be careful not to conflate envy and resentment If we
resent our having less than others, it must be because we think that their being
better off is the result of unjust institutions, or wrongful conduct on their part.31
At this juncture it appears Rawls is picking the wrong targets. The institution
that would have been blamed in the immediate aftermath of the founding murder
would have been the authority of the despotic father in doling out a preference
for an heir. It is the fathers perceived failings combined with feelings of guilt
and, perhaps, shame that lead to the creation of social institutions as mediators.
Institutions can be modified if they fail, new ones can be developed to counter-
balance existing ones, and institutions can be abolished in ways that do not require
the destruction of the community. But, because the institutions do not address
the root cause of violence and injustice, those institutions are also expected to
provide channels for the management of envy in society as a product of mimetic
rivalry held over by assumptions like Rawlss that the family is a basic and just
institution.
Before addressing the family, there is another problem of the rational individual
behind the veil of ignorance that needs to be addressed. That is the problem
that arises when Rawls removes all superfluous knowledge of the self from the
individual. This is problematic because the way one thinks about the world is
dependent upon that very knowledge and how it relates to the social structure.32
As Robert Paul Wolff explains, the problem is one of Rawls trying to more closely
connect his project with Kant, Rawlss explicit attempt to connect his moral
theory to the philosophy of Kant is [his] interpretation of the original position in
its mature, or veil-of-ignorance, form. [The] veil of ignorance is supposed to have
30 I offer this distinction here specifically to set up the critique of Rawls on the family
to follow. There is a long tradition in political philosophy of separating the public from
the private and then focusing solely on the public sphere as the site for political discourse
abandoning the private to its fate, whatever that may be. Rawls is no different in this
respect, treating the public as though it commands a dominant position in political dialogue.
It may very well be his uncritical commitment to this traditional splicing of human political
relationships that blinds him to the importance of envy and a theory of desire to his theory
of justice as fairness.
32 Uma Narayan provides a thorough analysis of this problematic epistemic
commitment in her work critiquing feminist epistemologies. While her critique is not
grounded in a Rawlsian analysis or critique her post-colonial deconstruction of feminist
epistemology is demonstrative of how I think this critique of Rawls functions. For more
on this see Narayans The Project of Feminist Epistemology: Perspectives from a
Non-Western Feminist, in Gender/Body/Knowledge, ed. Alison Jagger and Susan Bordo.
Rutgers UP, 1989. For a general but thorough and compelling examination of female
sexuality and multiplicity relevant to this issue see Luce Irigaray, This Sex Which Is Not
One, trans. Catherine Porter. Ithaca: Cornell UP, 1985. Esp. Chs. 2 and 11.
the effect of limiting the parties in the original position to the rational deliberations
they would engage in as noumenal agents rather than as phenomenal creatures.33
That is, one might say, rationality is a prerequisite for decision making according
to the two principles of justice, but rationality is dependent on knowledge of those
developmental experiences that Rawls wants to forbid behind the veil.
So, as Rawls strips away knowledge of the social self, he also reduces the
capacity for rational discourse behind the veil. This allows Rawls to link into
the Kantian moral system and avoid the utilitarian conclusions he purports to
be combatting in a way similar to how Kant managed to avoid having to draw
Aristotelian or Humean conclusions. That is, Kant did not want to allow that
moral precepts might be contingent upon the type of person or being we are
and, similarly, Rawls does not want his parties behind the veil to choose their
institutions based on benefits derivative of emotional states like envy. As such, by
purposefully excluding the concerns of a theory of desire, even when it is clearly
necessitated by the fact that Rawls obligates the persons behind the veil to make
choices, Rawls can claim that his noumenal persons would make a rational choice
about the best institutions to govern a just society in exactly the same way that
Kant claims noumenal persons can rationally choose ends analytically.34
Additionally, since rational discourse is predicated on a social superstructure
that allows for and fosters the possibility of rational discourse, those in the original
position require at least an understanding of the social structure preferable to
the discourse necessary to discuss and adopt the principles of justice. This, I
would argue, entails that the people in the original position cannot be devoid of
personal knowledge of their social self. Of course, the more knowledge about
themselves people have, or even the society they are dealing with, the less likely
they are to be disinterested which is also paramount for the success of Rawlss
subjects behind the veil. This is especially evident in Rawlss desire to have the
individuals behind the veil exist free of envy. So, we must pay attention to not
only what an individual behind the veil can know, but also how that individual
33 Robert Paul Wolff, Understanding Rawls, 106.

34 For this criticism I closely follow Wolff recognizing, as Wolff does, that many of
his claims about Kant are contentious. I am willing to bite the necessary bullets regarding
Wolffs interpretation of Kant to get this conclusion about Rawls because I think this critique
is an accurate depiction of the Rawlsian use of Kantian morality as a background for justice
as fairness. For more see Wolff, Understanding Rawls, Chapters XXII. However, Michael
Sandel offers a cautionary sentiment in Liberalism and the Limits of Justice regarding such
a reading of Rawls and Kant. Sandel points out, Rawls project looks much like Kants.
But notwithstanding their roughly common agenda and deontological affinities, Rawlss
proposed solution departs radically from Kants. The difference reflects Rawlss concern to
establish the required deontological prioritiesincluding the priority of the selfwithout
recourse to a transcendent or otherwise disembodied subject, p. 23. Of course, one is
tempted at least to consider that given his intent to strip the parties behind the veil of their
special psychologies, which are products of embodiment, Rawlss departure from Kant is
not as radical as Sandel and other commentators might believe.
comes to know those things in society. That is, more directly, how a disinterested
individual motivated by a desire for justice, learns to have such a desire and how
that constitutes their social self.
To sort out this concern, Rawls wants to adopt a standard idea of rationality as
it is employed generally in social theory. This entails that the individuals behind
the veil naturally assume that they normally prefer more primary social goods
rather than less [and that] even though the parties are deprived of information
about their particular ends, they have enough knowledge to rank the alternatives.
They know that in general they must try to protect their liberties, widen their
opportunities, and enlarge their means for promoting their aims whatever these
are.35 Of course, Rawls stipulates the important exception that the parties, as
rational actors, be devoid of envy, and possibly shame and humiliation as well. It
is difficult to not notice that of all the special psychologies Rawls is concerned
with the ones that keep popping up as explicit examples are those that are most
readily linked with the emotional states of mimetic rivalry and the aftermath of the
founding murder.
Rawls insists that by alleviating the parties in the original position of the
burdens of these toxic emotions they will have a coherent set of preferences
with respect to the options made available to them and they will rank their options
according to how well they further ones purposes.36 It is hard to conceive of a
person devoid of personal knowledge, ignorant of their specific long-term life
goals, and incapable of formulating a clear picture of society beyond the veil
choosing differently than their counterparts. This is exactly what Rawls expects,
however, and he further expects that in addition to making possibly different
choices, each person will do so according to a coherent set of preferences specific
to them. So, in relevant ways Rawls appears to want a standard of appraisal
neither compromised by existing standards not arbitrarily given, and [also] an
account of the self as neither radically situated and therefore indistinguishable
from its surroundings nor radically disembodied and therefore purely formal.37
But by choosing to remove envy and other emotional states from the individuals
behind the veil, Rawls fails to motivate the need for a theory of how those
preferences would be coherent and meaningful.
Moreover, he expects the individuals, similarly stripped down, to not only
recognize each other as free and equal, but to make possibly different choices
behind the veil. While holding this position is not representative of any kind of
deep contradiction in Rawlss theory it does highlight the problematic nature of
the persons in the original position and why a Girardian view can provide a more
sound account of Rawlss concept. Paul Voice understands the problem of the
imagined parties as being fundamentally different than previous contract theories
because instead of arguing that the properties [Rawls] assigns to the contractors

37 Michael Sandel, Liberalism, 23.
constitute their (and our) nature he claims that we share a self-understanding.38

This is perfectly suited to Rawlss contract construction because he offers his
contractors as examples of how we, the citizens of a liberal democratic state,
understand ourselves in our essential characteristics.39 What mimesis brings to
the discussion is the ability to articulate how people came to populate determined
historical communities. That is, Rawls can only be concerned about the institutions
governing the citizens of liberal, democratic societies after he postulates how those
societies came into being.40
Rawls states that we need an Archimedean point from which we can assess
the basic structure of society. He believes that the original position provides that
vantage point to socio-political theory, but as has been seen, this is a problematic
assumption on Rawlss part. The original position as Rawls conceives of it is
unsatisfactory because if the principles of justice are derived from the values or
conceptions of the current good in society, there is no assurance that the critical
standpoint they provide is any more valid than the conceptions they would
regulate, since, as a product of those values, justice would be subject to the same
contingencies. The alternative would seem a standard somehow external to the
values and interests prevailing in society. But if our experience were disqualified
entirely as the source of such principles the alternative would seem to be reliance
on a priori assumptions whose credentials would appear entirely suspect.41 As
such, even if Rawlss ideal pre-social citizen could make choices about the type
of society they would want to inhabit, it stands to reason they would be choosing
those institutions which embody the social arrangements they would choose left to
their own devices behind the veil. If this is true, then it is an acceptable conclusion
of Rawlss theory that social institutions are, by their nature, just when they are
established in conjunction with the appropriate socially constructed interpersonal
relationships and individual life goals. Yet the possibilities available to those behind
the veil are empty options because there would be no genuine understanding of
how those institutions would differently affect their lives.
38 Paul Voice, Rawls Explained, 14.

40 Short of accomplishing this Rawls is under siege from criticisms that argue he cannot
legitimately expect people to adopt the qualities of the individuals behind the veileven if
doing so would be to the mutual advantage of everyone in the futurebecause individuals
employ the standards of the veil differently. Problems for Rawls in this vein are explored by
Charles Mills who anticipates problems for Rawls in the deconstruction of classist and racist
power structures by those individuals that have legitimate claims to reparations from society
in order to bring everyone to the table as free and equal. For more see Charles W.Mills, From
Class to Race: Essays in White Marxism and Black Radicalism, New York: Rowman and
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2003. I am also indebted to Dr. Mills for his helpful comments
during a public lecture he delivered at the University of Kentucky in 2009 and also for
insights he shared during a seminar at the University of Pennsylvania in 2011.
41 Michael Sandel, Liberalism, 17.
So, we might begin a critique of Rawls and his just social institutions by asking
from whence came the idea that social institutions embody the virtue of justice?
Yet, we, especially in the modern West, tend to begin our arguments about justice as
though this were a settled or unimportant question. John Rawls, for instance, begins
his largest sustained work on the issue of justice by asserting, Justice is the first
virtue of social institutions.42 The primary problem with Rawlss position is that he
attempts to achieve justice by arguing for a system that prioritizes the individual.
He claims, Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the
welfare of society as a whole cannot override.43 He goes on to argue that justice
properly conceived will not abide the loss of freedom for some to the benefit of
others, but the concern for justice that develops from a theory of mimetic rivalry, as
I understand it, is that just institutions are designed to achieve exactly that.
What Rawls is trying to do with his project, I contend, is find a way to
make social institutions more palatable by making our inherited commitment to
inequality less glaringly obvious. This is certainly laudable and I do not think that
Rawlss interpretation of justice should be completely scuttled. In fact, I think
Rawls, in his own way, was targeting the right aspects of justice, but he failed,
in a sense, to see the forest for the trees. Early in his project he argues that the
basic structures of institutions ought to be the primary subject of justice because
its effects are so profound and present from the start [because] this structure
contains various social positions and that men born into different positions have
different expectations of life determined by [their] political economic and
social circumstances These are especially deep inequalities [and] it is these
inequalities, presumably inevitable in the basic structure of any society, to which
the principles of social justice must in the first instance apply.44
Rawls is right to concede the inevitability of inequalities in society, but this is
indicative of the very heart of problematic social institutions, taboos, and mores on
a mimetic rendering of society. Namely, the institutions are designed to perpetuate
and propagate inequalities as justificatory for social stability. Understood this way,
Rawls is taking the right approach by trying to limit those inequalities, but the
bigger picture is that Rawls is forced to acknowledge that he can only limit them
in particular ways and within certain limits, neither of which is acceptable outside
of his theory of justice as fairness. Put another way, Rawls recognizes that he can
only do so much to limit inequalities. The same is true generally of any society
spawned by mimetic violence. As such, the best way to overcome the expected
limitations imposed by inherent inequalities is to root out the actual cause of them
which comes before the instantiation of social institutions.
The key to my critique of a Rawlsian approach to justice is that where he fails
is not in what he is trying to do but in failing to recognize the soil where the root of
these inevitable inequalities is buried. Rawls wants to locate the need for radical

change at the level of the individual but this is untenable because individuals are
not atomic units in societyeven though this has often been the guiding truth of
most of western culture. The problem, as I see it, is that individuals are always
already embedded in social relationships from which notions of justice arise.
If our goal is to erect a better society around a concept of justice, then we ought
to start at the level of those social relationships not larger social institutions,
especially if the latter is potentially a product of problems in the former. Rawls
acknowledges as much when he declares, the various conceptions of justice are
the outgrowth of different notions of society against the background of opposing
views of natural necessities and opportunities of human life. Fully to understand a
conception of justice we must make explicit the conception of social cooperation
from which it derives.45
If the individual is taken to be a product of a group, then it stands to reason
that the individuals would be products of the social dynamics inherent in those
groups. For the problem of justice as Rawls understands it, then, treating the
people in the original position as atomic is problematic specifically because as
adults they did not just spring into existence, nor could they have. To assume
that their hypothetical and ideal nature explains away the need to address their
upbringing is incredibly short-sighted. So, if a Rawlsian account of justice is
going to be made to account for the construction of desire and individual choice,
then it is necessary, at a minimum, to include an analysis of the family. Rawls
bypasses the need to address the family by asserting that the family is also, like
his individuals behind the veil, understood as a just institution, ideally constituted
to serve the needs of society. An assumption of this magnitude is indicative of
a very narrow idea of the social and interpersonal relationships that develop in
the family. Addressing the Rawlsian family and the importance of the family to a
theory of desire is the subject to which I will next turn.
The Rawlsian Theory of the Family
Treating justice in a non-individualized context is problematic for Rawls because

he eschews the family in his discussion of justice as fairness. In spite of the fact that
Rawls loosely links the family with the basic structure of society, he never deals with
it squarely as a foundational social institution in A Theory of Justice. The family
is largely ignored throughout the bulk of the work and his replies to his critics. In
fact, apart from passing references, the family appears in only three contexts:
as the link between generations as an obstacle to fair equality of opportunity
[accounting for inequality between families not within families] and as the first
school of moral development. It is in the third of these contexts that Rawls first
mentions the family as a just institutionnot, however, to consider whether the

family in some form is a just institution but to assume it. 46 Yet, I would contend
that the family is ground zero for any discussion of justice and without a systematic
appraisal of the importance of the family structure Rawls cannot achieve voluntary
assent and acceptance of the principles of justice behind the veil.
Given that the family is where one learns morality, and as such, where one
learns what justice is, it is paramount that those behind the veil know more
than just the basic features of family life in a society. Indeed, they would have
to know the family in its social context. Beyond his scant arguments in Theory,
Rawls addresses the family with an acknowledgement of this principle in mind in
The Law of Peoples under the heading The Idea of Public Reason Revisited
where he tries to give an account of the family as part of the basic structure, but
also maintaining his forward looking approach when explaining the role of the
family. He states,
The family is part of the basic structure, since one of its main roles is to be the
basis of the orderly production and reproduction of society and its culture from
one generation to the next. Political society is always regarded as a scheme
of social cooperation over time indefinitely; the idea of a future time when its
affairs are to be concluded and society disbanded is foreign to the conception of
political society. Thus, reproductive labor is socially necessary labor. Accepting
this, a central role of the family is to arrange in a reasonable and effective way
the raising of and caring for children, ensuring their moral development and
education into the wider culture. Citizens must have a sense of justice and the
political virtues that support political and social institutions. The family must
ensure the nurturing and development of such citizens in appropriate numbers to
maintain an enduring society.47
Even here, however, Rawls assumes that the family is a token element of the
basic structure, one that each member of the original position readily accepts, and
that the importance of the family lies in its ability to create in children a sense
of justice and political virtues to uphold political and social institutions. This
expectation is placed upon the family without consideration of the mechanisms
that produce that sense of justice. Instead, Rawls sidesteps the issue by cheaply
asserting the family is subject to the principles of justice but only so far as those
principles churn out good citizens. His primary line of reasoning in defense of
this reading of the family is that the principles of political justice are to apply
directly to this structure [the basic structure], but are not to apply directly to the
46 Susan M. Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family, Basic Books, 1999, 94. The first
part of the bracketed claim is a paraphrase of a longer claim made by Okin, but I add,
with emphasis, the second half about the inequality within families otherwise the emphasis
exists in the original. See also, Rawls, Theory, 463, 490.
47 Rawls, John. The Law of Peoples, 157. Emphasis added.
internal life of the many associations within it, the family among them.48 He
likens this to an ecclesiastical analogy. Rawls argues that the principles of justice
do not require the doctrines governing a church to be democratic, the governing
agents need not be elected, and the benefits of the church need not satisfy specified
distributive principles or the difference principle. Yet, churches may not engage
in intolerance or publicly destructive practices since the principles of justice
protect the rights and liberties of their members by the constraints to which all
churches and associations are subject.49
By comparison, the family is subject only to similar constraints. Political
principles do not apply directly to its internal life, but they do impose essential
constraints on the family as an institution and so guarantee the basic rights and
liberties, and the freedom and opportunities, of all its members.50 If the analogy
holds, Rawls believes he has offered an adequate response to the feminist
challenges to his work, and specifically Susan Okin. However, this is not the case,
at least not wholly. Following Joshua Cohen, Rawls reaffirms that his position
distinguishes between the point of view of people as citizens and their point of
view as members of families and of other associations.51 So, there is a sense,
given Cohens superb argumentation contra Okin, that Rawls has responded to the
gender assignments within families, similar to religious structures, whereby one
might consistently hold that so long as families abide by the general overarching
precepts of the concept of justice in the basic structure, that is, with respect to their
public implications, the internal workings are, essentially, up to the members to
decide voluntarily. However, this does not get Rawls off the hook for the role of the
family concerning the choice of justice behind the veil. In fact, the very idea that
the family as part of the basic structure exists prior to being populated by actual
family members is still problematic. The family in a Rawlsian schematic is the site
where justice is first learned and because of this there needs to be an account of
how the familys configuration as part of the basic structure is understood.
Rawls believes differently, deprioritizing the family claiming that the family is
bound by constraints arising from the principles of justices [which] arise indirectly
from just background institutions.52 This inverts the ordering of the governing
social structure because it puts social institutions first making the family tangential
to the larger concerns of society. This, again, seems like putting the cart before the
horse, since it would be more natural to conceive of families coming together to
derive broader social institutions vis--vis Rousseau. Confusingly, approaching
the problem of justice with families as an assumed background entity seems to
48 John Rawls, Peoples, 158.

49 John Rawls, Peoples, 159. Rawls analogy to the church structure is included in
the same 1589.
50 John Rawls, Peoples, 159.
51 John Rawls, Peoples, 159. Op. Cit. Joshua Cohen, Okin on Justice, Gender, and
Family. Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 22 (1992): 278.
52 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 10.
accurately sum up Rawlss own thinking to some degree because he posits the
individuals behind the veil as heads of households.53 However, if the people
behind the veil are heads of households instead of merely being individuals, then
we are forced to make some serious, and possibly damning, assumptions about the
structure of the family in society because wives or whichever adult members of a
family are not its head go completely unrepresented in the original position.54
Furthermore, since people come to the veil already as heads of households we must
assume that they have some knowledge of familial structure and its social context.
Or, if they do not, then one might still be able to conceive of these individuals
as understanding that the family structure exists as a necessary part of the basic
social structure whatever that may be, but then the troublesome assumption is that
everyone behind the veil would have to choose, unproblematically, to inhabit that
singular family structure which Rawls never elucidates. This seems true at face
value since different family models ought to produce very different citizens which
in turn will produce very different notions of justice.
In order for Rawls to take seriously the role of the family behind the veil
he must begin with a richer notion of the family than the simple its an aspect
of the basic structure position he holds. Developing that concept necessitates
recourse to a theory of desire that starts not only with the origins of desire but
also with the origins of the family. Mimetic theory provides such a starting point.
As I have already hinted above, the problem with omitting a recognition of the
family as necessary is that it removes the need to address the relationships between
members of the family. Minimally, this ought to include, in a Rawlsian account,
an examination of the relationship between the mother and father. I emphasize
at a minimum because Rawls is so adamant that individuals behind the veil
are to recognize each other as free and equal beings. If we want to grant that the
contractors in the original position are not all male, then it stands to reason that
the men and women behind the veil see each other as free and equal. If this is true,
and the contracting parties know next to nothing of the family structures they are
going to inhabit, then they would be obligated to define just sexual relations. This
critique finds its roots in Okins forward looking complaint of gender rules, roles
and assignments, but Pateman makes the point more explicitly.
Pateman argues, the original contract is a sexual-social pact the story of the
sexual contract is about the genesis of political right, and explains why exercise
of the right is legitimatebut this story is about political right as patriarchal
right or sex right, the power that men exercise over women.55 Pateman locates
the problem of contract theories generally and articulates it succinctly. Dividing
contract theories into two camps, not necessarily opposed, but approaching the
problem of justice from different vantage points, she ultimately finds fault with
both of them. The first approach is the traditional approach which posits a group
53 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 111.

54 Susan Okin, Justice, Gender, and the Family, 94.
55 Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract, 1.
of free individuals milling about in a state of nature finally figuring out they can
better protect themselves and their liberties by agreeing to a contractthis would
be characterized by Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, and Rawls. The alternative
approach is the mimetic approach where a son or group of sons overthrow the
paternal rule of the father and contractually establish a new social orderthis
is, for Patemans handling of contract critique, dominated by Freuds view of the
problem, but it should be clear that Girard is in this camp as well.
This latter approach is problematized by Pateman as being exemplary of the
shift away from the father but not toward a contract that makes society better.
Rather, the original contract takes place after the political defeat of the father
and creates modern fraternal patriarchy.56 The content of the original contract,
stemming as it does from the desire to possess the fathers object, might shift the
social dominance from the individual possession of one alpha male, but it does not,
strictly speaking, shift the goal of the contract. Recall, the point of overthrowing
the father or the father surrogate was to possess the object, not to liberate the
mother or women in the horde. The contract that followed in the aftermath of
thefounding murder was oriented toward securing sexual access for each son with
the goal of eliminating the social violence manufactured by the fathers system.
Since each surviving son would want sexual access the best way to secure it would
be to give each a wife or wives. Hence, the marriage contract is part of the social
contract to the extent that figuring out who can have who and in what ways depends
on the proclivities of the surviving sons and we have little reason to believe that
the objects in the triangle had any say whatsoever. Freuds totemic system clearly
has legitimate purchase on an understanding of mimesis along these lines if the
totemic system includes the incest taboo.
It is here that the division between the public and the private spheres of
life become paramount to any account of justice. However, recall that Rawls,
in traditionalist fashion, chooses not to deal equally with the private sphere
evidenced by his reluctance to give anything but a superficial account of the role
of the family. Pateman underscores the obstacle created by a position like Rawlss
pointing out that the story of the social contract is treated as an account of the
creation of the public sphere of civil freedom. The other, private, sphere is not
seen as politically relevant. Marriage and the marriage contract are, therefore, also
deemed politically irrelevant. To ignore the marriage contract is to ignore half the
original contract.57 Rawls is guilty of ignoring the marriage aspect of the family
structure in just this way. By choosing to prioritize the public he is able to make
his arguments that the family, like the church, is free to devise whatever internal
workings that fit the private model they favor, so long as their public dealings with
outsiders is coherent in the framework of the principles of justice endorsed by the
basic structure of society. There is a critical failure here to realize and understand
the difference between domination and subordination.

Domination is usually linked with problems in the public sphere. While it is

often manifested as the oppression of others, Rawls would probably liken the
idea to his least advantaged in society and whether or not societys decisions
were beneficial to them in the right way. A society that exhibits high levels of
public domination most likely suffers from a good deal of misuse or disuse of the
principles of justice. In such a society there would be a social class of individuals
that were maximally exploited and there would likely be a group so well off that
their position in society was the primary cause of social unrest. Rawls clearly
thinks that the original position and the two principles of justice can correct for
such problems. However, correcting the social structures that enable domination
is only half of the problem and, in my critique of Rawls, it is not the most
important aspect of it. Domination requires subordination and the first place that
the relationship between domination and subordination is learned is the family.
The father subordinates the sons and the women in the harem to his paternal and
patriarchal rule. At his overthrow, or when the disenfranchised sons mutiny against
their elevated brother as a father-surrogate, the sons are already conditioned to the
regulating value of subordination. Only in the aftermath of the founding murder
the sons have positioned themselves to shrug off the burden of being subordinate,
they are not, however, as Pateman makes clear, ready to relinquish the benefits of
subordinating others. So, the women are still subordinated in the social contract
via the means and methods used to restructure the sexual access of the group.
A truly just society, one that seeks to maximize equality and eliminate the fear
of violence, would by necessity have to deal with the social mechanisms that
produce subordination. This means dealing with the family which Rawls does
not do sufficiently, but more importantly, it means dealing substantially with the
family as the first social institution and one that pre-dates notions of justice until
overwhelmed by violence.
Born of this violence and chaos are the social structures that defined human
social relationships and continue to do so today. According to Girards model,
when the son overthrows the father it becomes incumbent upon the community
to find a way to avert a repetitious vicious cycle from happening again. As I
have already mentioned, this is achieved on the one hand by taboos. The taboos
are primarily sexual in nature, specifically prohibiting incestuous relationships.
On the other hand, religious ritual and myth are developed not only to direct the
violent impulse into controllable channels but also to re-enact the violence in a
commemorative way so as to simultaneously mask and reinforce the need for the
ritualized violence. The fear of perpetual violence stems from the fact that the
family is a social unit, and, as such, the whole unity of the community is threatened,
especially if there is more than one disciple. I have already addressed Girards
position on multiple children above, and specifically, his accounts of twins as a
means of articulating the mimetic condition of the monstrous double which
is the label he uses to identify people who have lost the distinctions necessary
to maintain non-violent relationships. That is, as we erase our distinctions, we
are more inclined to become violent in situations where perceived inequality
persists. This is particularly true of mimetic relationships in the GST because, as

the disciple mimes the model, the disciple comes to identify with the model in
more and more specific ways until the one thing the model has that the disciple
does not is the object, in spite of the fact that they are otherwise similar. However,
I will argue below that the rivalry Girard imagines to exist between model and
disciple is not as noteworthy as he believes for producing the monstrous double
as the inevitable rivalry between disciples.
The Problem of Choice and Desire behind the Veil
It should be clear by now that the fundamental problem in Rawlss writings is the
lack of a theory of desire. Still, it might be tempting to ask why the two theories
have to be contrary to one another rather than complementary. At first blush, the
initial response would be that whereas Rawls grounds his formulation of justice in
a notion of fairness, he also grounds it in pure theorythat is, it is a hypothetical
understanding of human social relationships. Girard, conversely, is attempting to
provide us with an anthropology of violence and justice which ought to incline us
toward his modeling of the problem. This is because individuals are members of
systems and groups and this is why the mimetic modeling of violence and justice
provides us with a better understanding of what is necessary for radical paradigm
shifts in society. However, adjusting Rawlss theory to accommodate a robust
theory of desire formation shifts the ground of his theory in essential ways so that
even where the theories are complimentary they are also conflicting such that one
must be altered to actually adjust to the other.
Rawls argues that people desire justice and that desire is commonplace.
However, desiring is not something we come into the world hardwired to do beyond
the basic stimuli of our bodily needs. When one thirsts they desire something to
quench their thirstto suggest that they desire one beverage over another is to flirt
with absurdity. Yet, we know that people do this very thing, preferring one type
of drink to another. The point here is that preferences are learned and learning to
desire something, to privilege one thing over some other thing, is learned in society,
and more specifically, in the basic unit of societythe family. On this point Rawls
would have benefited from reading Girard. Girard advocates for a theory of desire
grounded in a triangulated mimetic rivalry. On his theory a modelfor Girard,
the fatherteaches a disciplea child, for Girard a sonhow to desire things in
the world both directly by passing on knowledge and indirectly by example. The
model also teaches the disciple how to manage their desires by actively mediating
them. There are obvious parallels between the models mediation of the disciples
desires and the Freudian psychoanalytic concept of the superego, ego, and id.
While the id represents the innermost desires of the persons self the ego is
the conscious recognition of those desires and the active means of controlling
how those desires are expressed or repressed. The superego is the social structure
of the individuals constitution. The superego imposes upon the ego what is and
is not acceptable and in what ways desires may become manifestthat is, the
superego mediates for the ego how the desires will be controlled. This clearly, for
Freud, parallels the means by which a model articulates what is appropriate for
the disciple in a mimetic relationship to do, say, think, act, and feel. As the model
helps the disciple understand their desires and teaches the disciple how to control
those desires the model is also connecting the disciple to the superego construct
so that as the disciple ages he or she will be able to mediate their own desires. The
superego is a social entity in the nexus of individual identity construction and its
existence is not arbitrary. The superego becomes the framework for the rational
understanding and expression of individual desires, which includes identifying
those desires that are socially harmful and separating them from desires that are
socially useful.58
In this way the disciple learns to desire specific things for specific reasons and
we might say that our desires are rational to the extent that we can respond to them
in appropriate ways. If this is so, our desires are rational to the extent that they
are properly mediated in accord with the social norms and mores governing our
social circumstances. Where we learn to desire and first find our desires mediated
is in the family, according to Girards mimetic triangle, by our model. If we take
the family as the first social institution and also the locus of our knowledge of
what and how to desire certain things, then behind the veil people would have
to know their family in order to know what justice they would consent to be
governed by or to be responsive to critiques of their notions of justice. At a bare
minimum, those behind the veil, acting, as they are assumed to be, as heads-of-
households, would have to already bear the psychological marks of being reared
in a family. If the parties behind the veil are only presumed to be the originary
primeval fathers, then Rawls is guilty of a number of assumptions that are socially
and psychically destructive to all members of society not included amongst their
number. If, alternatively, the parties are thought to be ideal citizens, as well as a
mixture of fathers, sons, brothers, sisters, mothers, daughters, aunts, uncles, etc.,
then it is a safe assumption that they enter the original position already endowed
with the scars of desire. Either way, Rawlss theory is endangered by the mimetic
critique I am advancing based on the MWA structure.
We might, in an abbreviated way, state the Rawlsian problematic as being a
simple reliance upon individual choice. For Rawls, individuals behind the veil
of ignorance are stripped of arbitrary physical characteristics and socialization
aspects, and yet, they are still expected to be in possession of their cognitive
faculties at least to the extent that they are able to understand these categories
and make competent choices relative to and derivative of that understanding.
However, for Rawlss theory to be functional these veiled individuals must be
capable of choosing (according to Rawls) the right set of social circumstances
58 Recall here Rawlss commitment to the rationalist interpretation of justice

formation in society and it ought to be clear why incorporating a mimetic analysis into
Rawls foundation will require radical paradigm shifts in a Rawlsian narrative of justice.
that would produce justice as an idea of fairness as Rawls proposes it. However,
for a veiled individual to choose he or she must be thought of as being able to
prefer, or develop a preference for, one particular, in this instance a Rawlsian, set
of social conditions in relation to any others available. Because preference for
is representative of, if not predicated upon, desire, Rawls ought to begin with a
theory of desire.59 Surprisingly, or, perhaps not, he merely asserts a preference
for fairness, but this begs an important question, namely, why prefer fairness?
A Girardian based mimetic model such as mine provides the best corrective to
Rawlss oversight of desire in his theory of justice. However, for such a corrective
theory to be helpfully applicable to a theory of justice as fairness we must
reconceive of justice as a consequence not of individual choice but of individual
desire, and to that end, our social understanding of justice must be one of justice
as something other than fairness. As I have advocated thus far, justice must be
understood within the scope of the violent reprisals generated by the discipless
recognition of unfairness.
A Girardian Account of Just Institutions
Since the family clearly plays an important role in a Rawlsian society, both as an
institution of the basic structure and also as the breeding ground for just individuals,
it is necessary to offer an account for the role of the family in the context of a
Girardian critique of Rawls as the breeding ground of desire. To correct Rawlss
seeming inconsistency regarding the family let the family be axiomatic to any
discussion of justice or just institutions. That is, let the fundamental assumption
be that the family comes first and that the family structure plays an important role
in the development of the social structures that will govern the communityhere
one might choose to follow the organic rise of the family outlined by Rousseau.
This is the same narrative beginning Girard uses to establish his own theory and
it seems likely that Rawls was thinking this way early in his own conception of
justice as fairness. The benefit of appraising justice as fairness through the lens of
mimetic theory is that we can open up a complex dialectic about justice that both
explains why justice as fairness is such a seductive concept and at the same
time expose why John Rawls was unable to use such an idea to generate a fully
functional, that is optimally applicable, theory of justice.
The problem with justice in a Girardian framework is that injustices in the
mimetic model are located in violence done to the father. As the disciple learns
59 This should be interpreted as different than Rawlss claims about envy and other
special psychological predilections that he argues against in his later works, and specifically,
Justice As Fairness: A Restatement. On page 88 Rawls claims that individuals behind the
veil use [t]heir reasoning [to aim] at selecting the principles of justice that best secure
those persons good, their fundamental interests, ignoring any inclinations that might arise
from envy, or a special aversion to uncertainty, and the like.
to desire, the child also enters into competition with the model for the things that
are desired. This rivalry leads to violencethat is, the son ultimately murdering
the fatherand this founding murder becomes the impetus for instantiating
social institutions to define, administer, enforce, and re-enforce justice in society.
Hence, the seeds of injustice are in the family structure before violence erupts. Put
differently, justice and injustice are determined by the social relationships of the
family irrespective of whatever extra-social judgments and obligations one may
commit to, as an individual behind the veil of ignorance, before crossing through
the veil.
So, in this way, Girards account helps underscore why Rawls is wrong to
bracket any thorough investigation of envy in Theory, or his subsequent works.
Yet, I have already indicated that there are some plausible misconceptions in
Girards mimetic account. Nevertheless, before delving straight into my version
and how it explains the problem of justice as unfairness, it might prove beneficial
to first rehearse how the Girardian story maps onto a Rawlsian framework. Girards
account follows Freuds analysis and, when necessary by Girards standards,
develops strands of Freudian thought to their most likely natural conclusions. For
Girards part, he makes no apologies for Freuds unwillingness to pursue those
conclusions. Nevertheless, while Girard does make the more substantial case, he,
too, stumbles at the finish by adhering to the Freudian line of violence against the
father. So, in a certain tense, the Girardian narrative contra Rawls is the Freudian
account Rawls could haveand should havemade much better use of in his
own account of justice as fairness. Because a detailed account of Girards mimetic
tale has been provided in Chapters 2 and 3, I will only briefly summarize them
here before focusing on the aftermath of the mimetic rivalry where I think the
Rawlsian account should have picked up the narrative.
For Girard, the son and father lock horns in a battle over the mother as mimetic
object. Since both men cannot have her they are rivals for her. In the primeval
sense this should not carry too many affectionate overtones especially given that
both Freud and Girard treat the mother as a static object in the mimetic triangle,
that is, as a possession. Presumably, the rivalry becomes heated and the son
kills the father. While there is certainly a possibility that the father comes out
victorious in the battle, such an outcome would not motivate the mimetic account
of societal origins. On the one hand, the primeval father is conceived of as a
tyrannical and dominant head of the family so destroying ones own progeny most
likely would not have been enough to reshape the social landscape of the earliest
human communities.60 On the other hand, the destruction of one son would not
60 Here it might be helpful to think of the early Roman concept of the pater
familias. The pater familias was the head of household, in generic terms the father, but
not always, since the designation extended beyond the limits of the family proper to
cover extended family, especially women and children, freedmen, and slaves. In addition
to being responsible for the decision making of the family estate the pater familias was
also endowed with the ability to end a family members life. While exercising this right
necessarily have prevented further attempts by future sons especially if we grant

the minimalist GST interpretation where there is only one son. Future sons would
not be aware of the destruction of their brother and even should they find out the
lesson would be mitigated by temporal dissonance. So, the obvious route to social
origins is the son victorious over the father.
For both Freud and Girard after the murder of the father certain taboos and
social practices are put into effect to prevent the reoccurrence of the rivalric
violence. However, to whom would the concerns of the violence be addressed?
Since the primeval father was the locus of justice and he has just met his untimely
demise, where would the survivors turn? The obvious answer, on the GST, is the son
who has just overthrown his father. However, if there is only one son the concern
would be centered on his own protection from his own progeny, but that would not
concern him in the immediate aftermath of the founding violence since he would
not need protection from them immediately since, it may be safely supposed, he
has none. Moreover, on this account, why would the victorious son choose to
limit his own access to the women of the horde that his father had collected and
placed off-limits? It is hard to find a motivating factor that would lead to the actual
instantiation of the taboos and social institutions that are supposed to follow. To
be sure, Freud does not rely on the simple triangular construction Girard does
opting instead for a group of sons expelled by the father who exact their revenge
by destroying him. At least in the Freudian account there exists a motivation for
the development of the taboos and institutions that arise in the aftermath of the
murder, namely, equal sharing.
This interpretation does seem to closely parallel the Rawlsian account of justice
as grounded in fairness. After all, what is fairer than an equal share? Especially
given that these primeval Freudian sons have just emerged from their despotic
fathers rule where none was allowed anything, or, at least no access to the thing they
most desired. If Freud gets closer than Girard regarding how such a compromise
would come about there is a glaring problem with this conclusion. Why would the
sons choose to instantiate the taboos and social institutions that they do? Would
they not be better served by selecting or developing taboos and institutions that
would greatly increase their access to the object(s) of their desire? There is no
reason to assume that they would not do so, especially in light of the fact that
was usually reserved for extreme circumstances doing so would not have caused too much
of a stir in the community. However, had a child, spouse, or chattel household member
struck down the head of the estate that would have caused quite the scandal. While Roman
civilization comes into existence, possibly, thousands of years after the founding murder, it
is instructive to try to imagine what it would have been like when the first violence erupted
in the first family where the father held an extreme version of such a position as the pater
familias which was not formally coded into societys structure. On a related note, consider
that the pater familias is tensed irregularly in Latin demonstrating the possessive nature of
the relationship. For a more in-depth look at the concept and cultural importance of pater
familias see E. Bund in der Kleine Pauly s.v. pater familias IV.546-7.
Freud posits the sons as strategically and premeditatively plotting, planning, and
executing the assassination of the despotic father. If the primitive sons are capable
of successfully removing their father through such complex means, one is left to
wonder why they are not at least as capable of devising a new social structure that
is beneficially maximally permissive rather than neutrally equitably restrictive.
For these reasons it is clear that both the Freudian and Girardian mimetic accounts
are wanting in important ways. My revised Girardian model, the MWA discussed
in Chapter 3, does not have these failings while also providing a plausible account
of why these taboos and institutions instead of others.
In Chapter 3 I argued that a properly motivated mimetic account would have
to include the removal of the model from the triangular structure. Given this
requirement there are two interpretive ways to achieve the necessary removal of
the father that preserves the violence at the core of the primeval social origins of
humanity. One way, the Freudian and Girardian way, is to posit the destruction
of the father at the hands of a son-disciple or group of son-disciples. The other
possibility, the one I advance in Chapter 3 as more plausible, is to assume the
death of the father through some other means besides the disciples hand. Here
the important aspect is not that the father dies from disease, or wounds received in
combat, or old age, but merely that the father dies from something other than his
kinfolks daggers. And, more importantly, the fathers death leaves a vacancy in
the familial power structure which can only be filled by one of the disciples.
It is my contention that the elevation of a son to the position of authority allows
for the creation of a volatile set of interpersonal relationships. I move away from
Girards account here because I hold that the volatility of those interpersonal
relationships is necessary to adequately account for why the mimetic rivalry
ultimately becomes violent. There is no presumption of equality between father
and son. By the time the son had grown and developed enough to be competitive
with the father, the father would have aged substantially and become uncompetitive
with the son. Moreover, even on the GST the father and son, as rivals, can be
undermined by simply accepting the premise that watching his son become a
man would be enough to offset the sense of competition between them since the
father would undoubtedly find this pleasing. This is not the case for the group of
disciples. Each disciple attempts to mimic the model and through the on-going
mirroring of the model comes to see themselves as sufficiently capable of being
the model. However, they would also be embroiled in a heated rivalry with one
another. This rivalry would include competition for favor from the model and
would, as a result, modify the nature of the mimetic rivalry of the disciples into
a competition between people who saw themselves as equals in the eyes of the
model, but not as equals in the eyes of each other.
If each disciple thought of him or herself as being the best imitator, then,
following the death of the father, the elevation of one disciple over the others
to the position of authority would create the kind of jealousy necessary to spark
the violence of mimesis. I am arguing that this set of social circumstances better
encapsulates the notions needed to bring about the societal taboos and institutions
that Freud and Girard derive from their respective mimetic accounts. The disciples
passed over plot against their elevated sibling and carry out the assassination of
that person. However, their act is a two-fold act: rage at the father for their being
passed over and also one of envy directed toward their sibling for having been
chosen as the heir to the position of authoritywhich includes all the perks of
being at the head of the family. On this point Rawlsians might object that this
is exactly the type of envy that Rawls sought to eliminate from behind the veil.
However, in response, I would argue that by following the genealogy of taboos
and myths this seems to be the most likely origin of those social institutions that
Rawls is so concerned with. As such, if Rawls wants to posit citizens behind the
veilideal or otherwisehe has to account for why they would desire whatever
they desire and how that desire would impact them in the original position.
Before the assassinated disciple is elevated, each disciple was engaged in a
rivalry as equals so that the elevation of the chosen son delineates a fault line of
inequality in the group of disciples. That is, when the chosen son moves up to
the position of model the other disciples are forced to recognize a hierarchy in
the group predicated upon something other than arbitrary distinctions, like age
or order of birth, because the resulting hierarchy was one of preferencethe
desire for one son in particular to succeed the father after his death. As such, by
murdering the elevated disciple the remaining disciples are killing a father stand-in,
a placeholder, or, in Girardian terms, a scapegoat for the person at whom they
are actually angry. Additionally, because they have killed, without justification,
their sibling kin there is adequate ground to introduce the notion of guilt which
motivates the choice of these particular social institutions. The likeliest reason the
surviving disciples choose these taboos and institutions is not to protect themselves
from their progeny, but to protect themselves from each other. However, because
the survivors identified what they desiredthe female objectsas the root of the
violence rather than why they desired the things they did, they could not have
instantiated the social institutions that would have eradicated the problem. Instead,
they could only hope to manage the problem.
Management of the problem entailed designing institutions that would foster
neutrally equitable sharing, but only to the extent that inequalities were recognized.
It would not have made sense, in the aftermath of the mimetic violence, to assume
the actual equality of the disciples because their inequality was made apparent
to them prior to the violence; in fact, realizing their inequalitiesnatural and
otherwiseas something more than trivial, in the way Rawls treats them above,
is the spark that touches off the violence. The social institutions that develop are
those that best help the survivors cope with the emotional turmoil of guilt at having
murdered their sibling, anger at their father whose absence makes resolution
impossible, inequality and difference which, prior to the violence, had no social
expression, and, finally, envy, which, in spite of everything, was now firmly rooted
in the development of desire. It is for these reasons that a Girardian critique of
Rawlss social institutions is relevant to a theory of justice. Rawls attempts to
smooth out the wrinkles in a society that is built upon managing inequality which
is why Rawls leaves room in his theory for inequality. He has to do so because the
social institutions he is trying to polish and perfect are designed to separate the
herd, as it were.
A Girardian inspired mimetic reading of social institutions finds the origins
of those institutions rooted in the aftermath of the violence inherent in the
founding murder. This seems appropriate because it begins the investigation into
social institutions generally by asking not only why these institutions instead
of others? but also what is the purpose of these institutions for the success of
society? This is contrary to Rawls who begins with a society conceived as a self-
sufficient association of persons [presumably individuals] who in their relations
to one another recognize certain rules of conduct as binding and who for the most
part act in accordance with them.61 For Rawls, then, the question of why is
equally important but it is followed with how might we improve them? which is
a question he cannot answer fully because he does not begin with the family. As
Susan Moller Okin insightfully claims, Rawlss failure to subject the structure of
the family to his principles of justice is particularly serious in the light of his belief
that a theory of justice must take account of how [individuals] get to be what they
are and cannot take their final aims and interests, their attitudes to themselves
and their life, as given.62
For Girard, we might think of justice as being at the core of the many social
institutions that develop in the aftermath of the founding murder. Chief among
these is Royal Power situated at the very heart of society. Girard argues that it
demands observance of the most fundamental rules; its purview extends to the
most intimate and secret aspects of human existence, such as sexual and familial
life.63 The problem with justice as fairness is that it targets the individual in
exactly the way that the post-founding murder institutions do, but that it is not
capable, as a theory, of adjudicating the cyclical nature of injustice in society,
especially violence, because Rawls fails to construct a functional theory of desire
and a robust account of individuals as products of their familial circumstances.
Rawls stresses that in a just society the question of equal citizenship is taken as
settled but this simply is not true under the sway of modern social institutions,
except perhaps in theory.64 We might argue that saying we cant all be equal
is a way to redress claims of Thats not fair and this is precisely why, from
the position of mimetic rivalry, we are in need of institutions that can regulate,
develop, and enforce, the positions of inequality that have developed as a result of
our attempts to quell mimetic violence.
Put differently, pre-mimetic violence society was not desirable precisely
because it led to violence; however, because preventing further violence was the
intention of the social institutions rather than rectifying what was wrong with the

62 Susan Okin, 97. Okin is citing Rawls, The Basic Structure as Subject, p. 160.
63 Ren Girard, Things Hidden, 54.
pre-mimetic violence social structures, we end up with a society that is perpetually

trying to stave off violence with violence amid struggles to redress issues of
unfairness by altering our social concept of justice. Hence, according to my
breakdown, the socially recognized inequality that led to the founding violence
was incorporated into the political life (the enfranchised vs. the disenfranchised),
the religious life (those whom god favors vs. those who are damned), the juridical
life (laws created to protect some and regulate all), and the cultural life more
broadly construed so that certain taboos are placed on desirable things or things
that are decidedly capable of instigating violence.
It should now be readily apparent why the individual in the original position
needs to know exactly what the superstructure of society isin order to be able to
determine if and how justice can be achieved, not only the basic structure but the
superstructure of society needs to be accessible by the people behind the veil. In
Freudian terms, the individual must have access to the structure of the superego
before they can begin to address the problems of that very same thing. For Rawls,
the individual must be blind to such knowledge, but if that is true, then the
individual could never settle the question of justice because justice as the object of
their desire is the product of their exposure to the superstructure mediated by their
model. It appears then that the individual is caught in a vicious circle of ignorance
and mere chance. Either they have access to the information they need to make
the best commitments behind the veil or they must submit to chance. Obviously,
the former is a breakdown in Rawlss methodology and the latter an undesirable
situation as far as a just society is concerned.
Individuals are members of systems and groups and this is why the mimetic
modeling of violence and justice provides us with a better understanding of what
is necessary for radical paradigm shifts in society. That is, the reason the original
position, the veil of ignorance, and justice as fairness are dysfunctional ideas, even
if they do qualify as among the best attempts to establish justice in an egalitarian
sense, is because they are not compatible with our desired notions of society as the
central aspect of our moral focus. I would still argue that this failure is a failure of
reading individuals as autonomous from the group identity whereas the mimetic
rivalry model begins with the individual instantiated in a communal group
whose relationships dictate not only the grounds upon which morality develops,
but also becomes the basis for the development of justificatory institutions and
social practices that exist today. Hence, no matter what an individual in the
original position would choose, we cannot move society toward a better notion of
justice without an understanding of the mimetic lives of individuals and a radical
shift in the familial structure upon which an egalitarian society can be built and
perpetuated.
Chapter 5
Mythologies of the Future:
Justice, Mimesis, and Idyllic Hope
Just Institutions and the Utopian Turn
Rawls argues for a theory of justice that is grounded in non-utilitarian principles,

yet, still presents a useful way of conceiving of the best society. The scope of
the project is, by his own admission, idealistically utopian and essentially so.1 It
is focused on the ideal, Rawls claims, because ideal theory provides the
only basis for the systematic grasp of the more pressing problems of everyday
life.2 His position takes on a utopian coloring because, according to Rawls, we
should view political philosophy as realistically utopian: that is, as probing
the limits of practicable political possibility.3 While Rawls has come under fire
for the idealism he so easily employs,4 I find the idyllic nature of the project
helpful. However, Rawlss attempt to explicate a realistic utopia, which avoids
an analysis of utopian tropes in concrete attempts to instantiate a perfect society,
parallels Girards omission of an analysis of utopian literature which renders his
mimetic focus too narrowly concerned with the religious and mythological past of
human social development. In this chapter I advance an argument that the scars
of mimesis are also evident in the future focused record of humanity. That is,
I believe theoretical utopian projects, like Rawlss, acting as a regulative social
ideal, can reveal crucial insights into our collective understanding of the need to
overcome the mimetic violence of society and the institutions used to control it.
Utopian literature tends to find its library shelf space alongside the fantastical
in the sci-fi section. However, the importance of utopian literature, as I will
argue, extends beyond literary devices, experimental writing styles, and the
1 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, 6.

2 John Rawls, Theory, 8. These more pressing problems include, but, presumably, are
not limited to, theories of punishment, just war, justifications for opposing unjust regimes,
compensation, and institutional injustice. These problems fall under the heading of
partial compliance whereas Rawls wants to deal only with issues of strict compliance
at least in A Theory of Justice.
3 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: A Restatement, 4.
4 Here I would draw attention back to the critique of Charles Mills that the original
position is dysfunctional precisely because of the ideal beginning point and demands placed
upon the contractors in the original position. See his From Race to Class for more on this
critique.
occasional obvious social critiques. In fact, I would argue that all utopian tracts
function at the level of social critique and in so doing reveal the deep unconscious
desires of a culture. Fantasy fictions, and specifically utopian works, are often
characterized by social critics as one of the first steps in political action.5
Lyman Tower Sargent is more direct in his appraisal of the role of utopian
thought arguing utopias are, The highest expression of mans aspiration or a
deadening artifact inevitably leading to violence the controversy is important.
Utopia is at the root of all radicalism and even much of what we call liberalism.
It is the archetype and harbinger of social changegood, bad, and indifferent.6
If this is so, like mythology, utopias ought to provide important clues about how
to achieve a mimetically oriented Rawlsian account of justice. Without such an
account, Rawlss future justice-based society is perpetually teetering on the edge
of mimetic violence.
That Rawlss project is ideal is evident in his use of the original position and
the veil of ignorance as devices used to create ideal choice makers in his system.
But Rawls also pushes that ideal conception further by arguing for it in relation
to nation-states, conceived of as peoples, and communities integrated in a
global context. Rawls argues that a realistic utopian conception of society is not
merely desirable, but essential to the success of his theory of justice applied to
peoples because if it is realistic it could and may exist. [Citizens would find it]
highly desirable because it joins reasonableness and justice with conditions
enabling citizens to realize their fundamental interests.7 Toward this end,
Rawls has provided an account of utopia that is, unlike most utopias, meant
to be applicable to society writ both small and large. While it is certainly the
case that utopian principles have, in varying degrees, inspired laws, social
actions, and institutional change, for the most part, when someone reads Samuel
Butlers Erewhon8 or H.G. Wellss A Modern Utopia9 their goal is, most likely,
pleasure. The authors themselves might be providing powerful social critiques
either explicitly as George Orwell does so well in his near-future dystopia
5 Sally Gearhart quoted in Feminist Rhetorical Theories eds Karen A. Foss, Sonja
K. Foss and Cindy L. Griffin. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1999, 261. Op. Cit.
Arthur Lazere, Sally Gearhart: Building a Professional Life, New York Native 20 April
1987: 22.
6 Lyman Tower Sargent, Authority and Utopia: Utopianism in Political Thought,
Polity, 14(4) (Summer 1982): 566.
8 Samuel Butlers, Erewhon: Over the Range, 1872. Revised, 1901. Butlers vision of
utopia was originally published as a series of short stories and essays over a period spanning
10 years.
9 H.G. Wells, A Modern Utopia, 1905. Wells, writing in the early twentieth century,
is often considered the end of the utopian age begun, and made popular, in the nineteenth
century because he is still crafting positive accounts of utopian futures. The twentieth
century is often thought of as the beginning of the dystopian era dominated as it is by the
influence of Yvgeni Zamiatin, George Orwell, and Aldous Huxley.
Mythologies of the Future: Justice, Mimesis, and Idyllic Hope 123
Nineteen Eighty-Four,10 or subtextually as Ursula le Guin does in her fantasy

writings such as The Day before the Revolution.11 But, regardless of the
authors intent, these stories are attempts to conceptualize the same type of
future that theorists, or, in this case, Rawls, is trying to envision.12
The difference between the writing of utopias and the consumption of them
as part of the popular culture mindset is that they are often not taken seriously,
or, to the extent that they are, the books do not offer substantive or specific terms
from which society, as it currently exists, might be improved. To put the point
differently, when utopian imaginings find traction they are, generally, taken to be
nothing more than cautionary tales dressed up in fantastical trappings. This is, of
course, only one side of the utopian coin. Rawls is keen to stress that his work is
meant to be representative of a realistic utopia which means that if we are to
be not merely utopians, we must attend to our creaturely limitations.13 Following
this utopian track, there are writers who, like Rawls, have tried to generate social
critiques grounded, at a minimum, in notions of how to achieve a betterread:
more justfuture society. For instance, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries
witnessed a number of attempts by influential social critics to usher in, or at least
offer an explanation for how to achieve, the golden age of the future. Most popular
among these is Karl Marx who, though he denied the charge, is often alleged to
have been utopian in his depictions of a future communist state.14 Yet, influencing
10 George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four, 1949. It should be noted here that Orwell
insisted that the title be written out rather than represented numerically, so unless I am
quoting another author this convention will be followed.
11 Ursula le Guin, The Day before the Revolution, Galaxy, 35(8) (August 1974):
1730. This particular story is the prequel to her more robust novel The Dispossessed which
will be addressed in greater detail below in Chapter 6.
12 There is a distinction to be made here about the literature of the utopian tradition.
I use the term utopian to indicate stories that deal with ideal future societies. So, while it
is often tempting to read Nineteen Eighty-Four as a dystopia and summarily disregard it as a
utopia it must be remember that Orwell presents Oceania as a perfect society. That Winston
Smith does not want to live there, or that the reader of the novel finds Oceania odious does
not alter the fact that the society Orwell presents was supposed to be a utopia. The same
is true of Huxleys World State. The distinction is often lost amidst the average readers
rejection of the society presented as such, based on purely subjective grounds, so, dystopias
tend to be disregarded as part of the positive literature. This distinction will be addressed in
greater detail below in section 3.
14 The misattribution of utopianism to Marx generally stems from the fact that
many readers and critics do not understand the scope of the Marxist project. So, while
Marx does present a concept of the ideal communist state, that vision is the product of
a deep and reflective understanding of the human condition in its social context. Marx
does not merely imagine a future that can be arbitrarily carved out of the current status
quo. Rather, Marxs vision of the idyllic communist future is a necessary development out
of an historical unfolding intimately linked to the economic refinement of society and an
increasing awareness through time of a class consciousness sensitive to the social context
Marxs thought were two French socialists that made utopianism the centerpiece
of their respective intellectual enterprises and commanded the lions share of
attention in the nineteenth century.
Claude Henri de Rouvroy, comte de Saint-Simon, often referred to as Henri de
Saint-Simon, or the Count of St. Simon, was a forward thinking socialist fixated on
the study of human character as a means for altering human social arrangements.
His criticisms of social systems influenced a number of more specialized studies
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, but his work relies heavily
on an assumption that utopian critique provides the framework for intentional
and positive changes to human society.15 Building on this premise, Charles
Fourier went a step further and attempted to make his phalanstries a reality. The
phalanstry was an organized community housed in a specially designed structure
meant to inculcate utopianism in its inhabitants. Fourier was convinced that envy
and dissatisfaction are unknown where there is a fair distribution of reward for
labour [sic] rendered, and compulsory labour [sic] is unnecessary where excessive
hardships have been removed by superior organisation [sic].16
Utopian notions have often provided the backdrop for concerns of social
construction, stability, and change since time immemorial. Rawlss ideal future
is, as we have seen, one of the most recent manifestations in a long line of
similarly inspired thinkers reaching back at least to the sixteenth century. That
Rawlss project is a thoroughgoing utopian project is not as problematic as it may
at first blush seem to his supporters and critics. John Schaar defends the utopian
impulse in Rawlss work as affirming a vision of the future which captures the
deepest yearnings and highest aspirations of the democratic ideal.17 Taking a
contrary position, Robert Paul Wolff condemns the utopian ideal in Rawlss
Theory by placing it squarely in the long tradition of utopian liberal political
economies dating back to the nineteenth century. He disputes Rawlss utopian
impulse arguing,
of our collective lived experiences. One does not have communism without first having
capitalism any more than one can have capitalism without first going through feudalism.
The failure to appreciate this on behalf of his adherents has led to the disastrous historical
attempts to usher in the communist future Marx theorized about, while his critics, in their
own ignorance, have fallen prey to the impulse to accuse him of utopianism, applying the
term in a pejorative way to denigrate Marxist philosophy as fanciful or unrealistic.
15 For more on St. Simon see F.M.H. Markham, Henri Comte De Saint-Simon (1760
1825): Selected Writings, New York: Hyperion Press, 1991. Emil Durkheim, founder of
modern sociology, is one of the direct intellectual descendants of St. Simon.
16 Moritz Kaufman, Utopias: Or, Schemes of Social Improvement from Sir Thomas
More to Karl Marx, London: C. Kegan Paul & Co., 1879, 80. For a more thorough
examination of the phalanstry model see Carl Guarneri, The Utopian Alternative:
Fourierism in Nineteenth Century America, Cornell UP, 1994, esp. Ch. 7.
17 John Schaar, Equality of Opportunity and the Just Society, in John Rawls
Theory of Social Justice eds H. Gene Blocker and Elizabeth H. Smith, Athens, OH: Ohio
UP, 1980, 16284.
One could characterize it briefly, even brusquely, as a philosophical apologia

for an egalitarian brand of liberal welfare-state capitalism. And yet the device
of the bargaining game and the veil of ignorance, while preserving the political,
psychological, and moral presuppositions of such a doctrine, raise the discussion
to so high a level of abstraction that the empirical specificity needed to lend any
plausibility to it are drained away. What remains is ideology, which is to say
prescription masquerading as value-neutral analysis.18
It is my contention that Rawlss utopian coloring is only a hindrance if utopias

are understood purely as providing either a pleasurable distraction or a cautionary
tale about the state of things. However, if we read utopias as a way of exposing
the mimetic disfigurement of society, then projects like Marxs or Rawlss are not
hobbled as easily by the far-fetched nature of idyllic leaningsreal or imagined.
Since Rawls deals with the ideal nature of a socially constructed notion of justice,
reading utopias with his theory in mind ought to help shed some light on what
ideal citizens ought to do. If the parties behind the veil are ideally constituted, then
their behavior and choices should resonate with what other authors have expected
from their own ideal citizens. By investigating how utopian citizens are governed,
it should become clearer that Rawlss necessary condition for utopianism is met
by utopian imagining outside of the theoretical sphere. Rawls sets the standard
for a political conception of justice to be utopian as the use [of] political (moral)
ideals, principles, and concepts to specify a reasonable and just society.19 Such a
conception should help reconcile us to our political and social condition.20 As
I will show in the next chapter, focusing on several utopian examples, utopias do
in fact meet the standard set forth by Rawls; the key question to be answered is
whether or not we can handle the reconciliation they propose.
Intersections of Mimetic Theory and Utopian Dreaming
I have emphasized numerous times that Girard builds his mimetic theory on a
deep and careful reading of both religion and mythology. He recognizes these two
social phenomena as the earliest records of human social understanding, and by
probing their motifs he believes his theoretical anthropology has unearthed the
bones and relics of a bygone age allowing him to build a foundation for his theory.
But Girard has been the subject of much criticism for his attempts to distill from
18 Robert Paul Wolff, Understanding Rawls, 195. Emphasis in original. Wolffs

criticism stems from the fact that Rawls does not provide an analysis of justice between
states in A Theory of Justice. Rawls would not tackle this issue thoroughly until The Law of
Peoples in 1999. Even so, Wolffs criticism might still hold for those that reject the utopian
premise generally.
ritual and myth the truth behind communal sacrifices. For instance, anthropologist
Renato Renaldo challenges Girards methods by contending that imaginative
origin stories could be approached differently. Renaldo states, [imaginative
origin stories] could also be a way of talking about what people performing a
sacrifice imagine to have been the primal incident. So that ones theory could say
that if a certain primal incident exists in the ritual participants imaginations, the
act of sacrifice should be understood in a way that one wouldnt otherwise. Thats
a very different kind of enterprise from conceptual clarification.21 This, of course,
misses the point of Girards crucial insights about ritual and myth, namely, that
the participants no longer know or understand the reasons for their participation.22
This, however, does not mean that a venue for interrogating the deep cultural
unconscious of a society is not possible; it just requires analyzing different texts.
As I argued in Chapter 3, I believe Girard has provided ample proof in support
of his mimetic theory, even if the evidence has, at times, been misinterpreted.
I also believe that his theory is too backward oriented, that is, too focused on
the past, to provide any real help with how to break out of the cycle of mimetic
violence that lurks beneath our societal surface. Asked once how his theory of the
relationship between sacrifice and violence applied to our contemporary situation
Girard responded, in part, The late prophetic and evangelical replacement of
all primitive law by the sole renunciation of violence is no longer a utopian or
arcadian dream. It is the scientific sine qua non of bare survival. It is a mere
coincidence or should we suspect that far from being hopelessly irrelevant to
contemporary problems as the intelligentsia believes, the biblical text is much
more relevant than the Oedipus of Freud or the Dionysos [sic] of Nietzsche?23
I believe that turning mimesis onto utopian literature will help us identify the
spheres of our social configuration that need to be addressed in order to effectively
break the mimetic cycle, providing Girards mimetic understanding with the other
face of Janus necessary to demonstrate how relevant his theory is, and how human
development is the product of a long social evolution attempting to deal with the
mimetic crisis.
Only when we are capable of identifying the dysfunctional aspects of society
that perpetuate mimetic rivalry together with violence in society can we begin
21 Renato Renaldo, Anthropological Commentary, Violent Origins, 240.

22 An analysis of the debate between Protestant and Catholic adherents regarding
transubstantiation would, I think, significantly clarify a mimetic response to Renaldo on
this point. That is, regardless of what people currently believe, the reality of the Eucharist
cannot be denied. Nor can it be denied that there are people who do believe the wafer and
wine become the body and blood of Christ during participation in the sacrament. Girards
argument is not furthered by what people believe about the truth of transubstantiation until
there is an understanding of why it exists in the first place as a ritual in the Christian faith.
23 Ren Girard, An Interview with Ren Girard, conducted for the journal
Diacritics and subsequently published as Diacritics, 8 (1978): 3154. This quotation is
taken from the version included in To Double Business Bound, p. 227. Emphasis added.
to offer programs for change. An even handed and balanced criticism of Girard
on this point, however, demands challenging the fact that he believes he has
offered an account of this process, but he does so by championing Jesus as savior,
as the scapegoat that was not one; this is problematic in at least two important
ways. One, Girard finds religion to be a socially essential means for disguising,
channeling, harnessing, and ordering both the violent contagion of mimesis and
the social organization that it births, especially in early human communities. His
positioning of Christ as the answer to mimesis is troubling because, in a very real
sense, he is suggesting that the symptom can cure the disease. Secondly, given the
necessary way that primeval human societies are interpreted by Girard, religion
as he understands it in its mimetic context comes after the violence. I understand
this to mean that the violence which spawns religion is also responsible for the
construction of the secular institutions which function in conjunction with, and
parallel to, religionreligion being just one of the three major institutions to follow
the founding murder, alongside law and prohibitions (cultural taboos). As such, it
bears asking, how can Jesus free jurisprudence from its mimetic constraints? For
Girard, the answer must surely lie in the fact that Jesus is substituted for Barabbas
while Pilate washes his hands of innocent blood.24 Such a position is too weak to
defend, so it seems unlikely that a theological solution to a problem which is not
inherently theological only solves for a part or portion of the overall problem, if,
in fact, it solves for any of it.
However, if, for Girard, Jesuss death is supposed to signal the ultimate
disclosure of the mimetic mechanisms of society, then it ought to be the case that
Jesus suffers death according to the laws derivative of mimesis in Judaic culture
whose roots, according to Girard, extend back to the founding of society in the
post-Eden era of Adam and Eve. It is true that the gospels make mention of Pilates
recognition of the high priests envy of Jesus and Pilate finds no grounds for the
charges against Jesus which would have to be the case since Jesus is, for Girard,
a voluntary scapegoat. Caiaphas claims that Pilates blessing is necessary for the
execution because the Jews are prohibited from killing anyone, but Jesuss death
does nothing to undermine the laws of either Judaic or Roman society. This is true
because there is no imitation between Pilate and Caiaphas and the Jewish mob. For
Jesuss death to be capable of undermining mimetically generated jurisprudence,
24 Matt. (27:1126) describes Pilate washing his hands of Jesuss blood, Mark
(15:115) does not include a mention of Pilate washing his hands of Jesuss innocent blood,
but it is clear that Pilate is loath to execute Jesus. Luke (22:6623:25) also includes no
direct mention of Pilate washing his hands of Jesuss blood, but it also makes clear that
Pilate has no desire to punish Jesus. More interestingly, Lukes account does include a line
about the reconciliation of Herod and Pilate, who had been enemies until the day they both
interrogated Jesus after which they became friends. John (18:2819:22) describes a much
longer exchange between Pilate and Jesus during the interrogation than the other three
gospels. It is especially clear in Johns account that Pilate wants to distance himself from
the execution of Jesus.
Pilate and Caiaphas would have to become imitators cohering around a desire to
kill Jesus. The truth of this claim is recognized by Girard, but in reference to Peter
and his denials of Jesus, and he never applies the analysis to Jesuss interactions
during his trial and crucifixion.
Peters performative acts during this denial of Christ are a necessary
component of the passion tale, according to Girard, precisely because there,
in the courtyard, the exposure of the mimetic crisis begins. Peters denials are
successful because he imitates the gathering crowd by making a common enemy
of Jesus. Peters denials are not mere dishonesty, rather, they are an attempt to
reject the parity between himself and Jesus inferred by the crowd, a similarity
which could lead to his own identification as a scapegoat. His denials are not
simply attempts to save himself, but to exclaim to the crowd We have the same
enemy and therefore must be friends.25 If Girard is right about Peter, and I believe
he is, then he is wrong about Pilate. He says of Pilate that his political prudence
in yielding to the priest-led mob is one piece of the larger passion picture of
mimetic desire or contagion that finally converge and unite in an unanimous
assent to the crucifixion.26 But there is a clear rejection of the mimetic impulse
in Pilates behavior. Whats more, the link between Herod and Pilate bringing
them together as friends centers on their mutual refusals to find guilt in Jesus.
Hence, we are left to wonder at how Jesus, as scapegoat, can expose the truth
of those additional institutions that spring up from the founding murder. This is
precisely why utopias, which seek to undermine all the institutions associated
with the founding murder, are a better fit with efforts to overcome the mimetic
crisis of society than a strict reliance on Jesus or western prophetic religions.
Turning mimesis onto utopian literature from a Girardian standpoint is difficult
because Girard does not offer a positive account of utopian thought as it applies to
his project or as he understands it. More, unlike Rawls, who embraces the idyllic
nature of his project, Girard does not even provide a sympathetic or conciliatory
tone regarding the idea in his works. In the few places he brings up utopian
concepts, he does so to denigrate the tradition or dismiss it outright as an irrelevant
extreme. For instance, addressing the tendency of primitive cultures to appear at
once superior or utterly inferior to our own, Girard argues,
One factor alone might well be responsible for our oscillation between extremes,
our radical evaluations: the absence in such societies of a judicial system. No one
can assess with certainty the amount of violence present in another individual,
much less another society. We can be sure, however, that in a society lacking
a judicial system the violence will not appear in the same places or take the
same forms as in our own. We generally limit our area of inquiry to the most
25 Ren Girard, Peters Denial and the Question of Mimesis, Notre Dame English
Journal, 14(3) (Summer, 1982): 183.
26 Ren Girard, Peters Denial and the Question of Mimesis, Notre Dame English
Journal, 14(3) (Summer, 1982): 184.
conspicuous and accessible aspects of these societies. Thus, it is not unnatural

that they should seem to us either horribly barbarous or blissfully utopian.27
Girards position here seems to be that utopianism represents a misunderstanding,

a conflation of facts of sorts, about the places and ways that violence is likely
to rear its ugly head. The problem inherent in recognizing utopias as a type of
misrecognition regarding the functions of social institutions, especially as they
pertain to limiting violence, is that by doing so, Girard limits his own ability to see
the benefit of reading utopias mimetically. Girard argues, [people] cannot confront
the naked truth of their own violence without the risk of abandoning themselves
to it entirely. They have never had a very clear idea of this violence, and it is
possible that the survival of all human societies of the past was dependent on this
fundamental lack of understanding.28 This is, strictly speaking, not necessarily the
case. What people have lacked is the ability to clearly articulate their experiences
of the mimetic crisis, its resolution, and, ultimately, their relationship to the power
structures in place to prevent it. This is, I believe, exactly what utopias have been
employed to achieve.
In one of his few, if not only, mentions of utopian literature, Girard complains
that in his book, 1984 [sic], George Orwell portrays directly certain aspects of
[the] historical structure. Orwell clearly understands that the totalitarian structure
is always double. But he does not show the connection between individual desire
and the collective structure. We sometimes get the impression that the system
has been imposed from the outside on the innocent masses.29 This condemnation
of Orwells masterwork is an outgrowth of Girards position that the novelist,
regardless of whether he is a Christian, sees in the so-called modern humanism
a subterranean metaphysics which is incapable of recognizing its own nature.30
Girards position is committed to a belief that humanism is too timid to be completely
self-asserting, but I argue that utopian dreaming is not the result of timidity, but
rather a lack of language, or expressions, necessary to assert the truth of human
society. The inability to characterize the truths of the murderous founding moment
might best be understood as an inability to explain the emotional turmoil engulfing
the survivors. These post-murder moments were, in many respects, genuinely new
to the survivors. As such, it makes sense that in the scramble to establish law and
order finding time for reflection probably did not rank too highly on the to-do list.
The result, however, is a clear public focus on creating the language of taboo, law,
and religious ritual, while the understanding, acceptance, and real overcoming
was repressed into the private, collective social unconscious of the public efforts.
27 Ren Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 19.

28 Ren Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 82.
29 Ren Girard, Deceit, 226. It should be noted here that Orwell insisted that the title
be written out rather than represented numerically.
30 Ren Girard, Deceit, 159.
After the primal assassination of the elevated brother, and the development
of institutions to prevent similar instances, people could only remember the
way things were before the violence of mimesis overran the community. Those
remembrances became the basis for the hope of a future comparable to the golden
age of the past. As such, utopias represent the collective hope of a culture not just
the musings of an individual. That is, if utopias are approached as mythologies of
the future rather than fictional fantasies, then the deeper secrets of utopiasand
an explanation for their persistence through time and existence across cultures31
might be explained using the methodologies employed to decode mythological
stories. Recasting utopias this way places them parallel to myths and Girard
believes myth is [a] glimpse of a structure linked to the genesis of truth. The
archetypes identified by Gilbert Durand are not imaginary since they give us
access to true realism.32 I am arguing that the truths supposedly linked to the
mythological structures are also linked into utopian structures.
That is, utopias may be superficially responsive to the cultural milieu that
produced them, but on a deeper level they represent a cognizance on behalf of
their authors of the same ancient truths myths espouse. Each utopia produced
throughout history is both an account of the social milieu that produced it and a
contribution to a larger aggregate account that carries with it particular tropes,
shared with authors across generations, geography, and culture, placing the
envisioned future squarely in the utopian tradition. The link between truth and
myth is not stronger for being imbued with cultural or religious symbolism; in
fact, the link between truth and utopias is no less tenuous for seeking out similar
ends. If the utopias produced over a long chronological period, representing a
broad range of authors, cutting through a substantial cross-section of humanity
all tend to point toward the same social constructions and arrangements, then
it stands to reason that beneath the surface of the utopias there is a truth about
human society relevant to humanity no less significant than the one generated by
mythology.
31 It is common to encounter arguments that utopias are a western phenomenon,

or predominantly so, and that the existence of utopian thought in non-western cultures
arises from contact with the west through the colonialization of non-western societies. This
position fails to recognize its own inherent commitment to colonialism by reinforcing the
idea that non-western cultures did not, or could not, produce utopian literature. This is,
in fact, false. Perhaps the most well-known counter-example to this idea is Chinas Tao
Chiens Peach Blossom Spring written in 421. While Chiens work is relatively close
in both content and construction to his western European counterparts, many of Chiens
non-western contemporaries wrote their utopias in radically different styles. For more on
the non-western utopian tradition see Zhang Longxi, The Utopian Vision, East and West,
Utopian Studies, 13(1) (2002): 120.
32 Ren Girard, Oedipus Unbound, 12. Gilbert Durand is a French theorist whose
work on imaginary, symbolic anthropology and mythology earned him a worldwide
reputation. His most famous work on the subject is Les Structures anthropologiques de
limaginaire, 1960. Girard cites Dcor Mythique de la Chartreuse de Parme, 1961.
Mythologies are, then, for Girard, coded truths about the origins of society.
Going all the way back to Ovid or Hesiod the origin of everything is chaos. That
chaos can be interpreted in any number of ways matters less than the trajectory
of the story that is born of chaos. As Girard notes, Mythological transformation
moves in only one direction, toward the elimination of any traces of violence.33
So, regardless of whether chaos represents nothing more than a time immemorial for
the most ancient authors or is the coded description for the collective assassination
of the father-surrogate, the myths develop a story about the refinement of culture,
the eradication of violence, but this is not enough to warrant Girards lack of
concern about the relevance of utopian thought. The elimination of any traces of
violence is a movement away from the originary violent act. Utopias, too, move
toward the elimination of any traces of violence, but they also move toward a
deeper understanding of the originary violence, that is, a revealing of the true
meaning and purpose of societal construction.
To render mimesis relevant to utopian literature, as mythologies of the future, a
familiarity with the traditional approaches to utopian thought, and how they have
been deployed in society, will be necessary in order to repurpose them for my
more accommodating mimetic theory rather than the one Girard composes. This
will require an analysis of utopian thought as a regulative ideal and as a concrete,
or actual, social project. The former approach is the approach typically associated
with the novelistic or abstract theoretical uses of utopia. The latter perspective
deals more with the attempts by various people or groups to establish a physical
instantiation of a better society. To avoid unnecessarily muddying the waters
I will focus exclusively on novelistic approaches to utopia in my examples below.
However, I rely on the novelistic style because they maintain an easy coherence
with this particular project and Girards work, and because mimesis can be robustly
or adequately applied to concrete attempts to build a utopian society.34
Re-reading Utopias
The key to re-reading utopian literature in the framework of my mimetically

amended Rawlsian social project is the identification of how each of the principal
proponentsGirard and Rawlsuses the utopian perspective in their respective
works. I take each of them to be engaged in idyllic theorizing, albeit, perhaps,
employing different strategies, with very different goals in mind, but at the end
of the day they both want to achieve the same thing. Both have made errors in
their theories which have been dealt with, so, now, in examining several utopian
33 Ren Girard, The Scapegoat, 94.

34 An analysis delving into both aspects of utopian interpretation and comparing
them mimetically against each other would be a distraction from the major thesis of this
project. However, as I will argue below, I do not think it is so easy to separate one approach
from the other, being bound up as they are, with the same critical enterprise.
archetypes, I am going to show how utopias express the desire to break free of
mimesis and establish a just society. Even so, it is important to indicate just how
limited the scope of these examples are, and furthermore, to indicate how vast
the scope of utopian literature is, especially as it relates to this particular project.
While I will focus almost solely on literary examplesemploying Girards
methodologyI recognize that there are a host of examples that could be utilized
to demonstrate my points in this chapter.
Limiting my focus to literary samples seems to be especially prudent given
that studies of utopian philosophies, stories, and historical movements are
fragmented and largely inconclusive on the point of interrelatedness across genres
and eras because the utopian idea has never been given a systematic analysis
that cuts across scholarly disciplines using a distinct focal point to tie the various
approaches together.35 For instance, historians tend to focus on actual attempts to
build and sustain utopian communities. However, the concept utopian in such
studies tends to reflect a broadly cast net intended to capture as suitable a sample as
necessary, while omitting fictional approachesunless it is clear that a particular
fiction was unequivocally the motivation for the actual attempt at creating a
utopia. Additionally, because of the broadness of the definition of what counts
as a utopia, historians often find themselves confronted with the need to include
historical projects that most people would reject on commonsense grounds like
Adolph Hitlers Third Reich. Scholars of literature tend to treat utopian writings
as a genre that, even when it is treated as socially responsive, is still examined
on the basis of its literary merit. Sociologists often come closest to a thorough
examination of the meanings and uses of utopias,36 but still their handling of the
idea is not categorically oriented but rather focuses on what the utopian concerns
of a particular movement have to say about their own particular time period.37
Mostly, I point out these sensitivities because it is important to note how
widely used the idea is and any use of utopia as a systematic social construction is
inevitably going to be susceptible to legitimate criticisms from varying disciplines,
in varying degrees, precisely because I am not attempting to provide an account
of why my use of utopia is preferable to those mentioned above. However, for
the purposes of my project, I will not limit my use of each of these disciplines to
35 In fact, there is strong resistance among members of utopia-oriented organizations

to acknowledge a canon or particular methodology for systematizing utopian endeavors.
This leaves the field wide open for interpretation which could, no doubt, provide an endless
stream of different legitimate interpretations of the usefulness of utopias.
36 See, for instance, Karl Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia, New York: Harcourt,
Brace, and World, Inc., 1936.
37 I have no intention of attempting to reconcile these traditions or offer a corrective
to the mishandling of the utopian model narrowly or broadly construed at this point in the
project. There is, I think, ample evidence to support my claim that underlying every utopia
is a subconscious recognition of the need to shed our mimetic skin. Tracing that essential
theme is fodder for a different project.
give the most robust socio-theoretical account of the utopian impulse and what it
says about humanity. It is certainly the case that philosophers have not taken the
utopian impulse to be as meaningful as I intend to argue it is, but regardless, the
existence of utopian thought dates back to the earliest known human stories and,
perhaps, even longer.38 As such it is my contention that utopian constructs can be
both morally significant, that is, derivative of an ought, and that this parallels,
and possibly depends upon, a more concrete, that is to say natural, impulse to
strive for an ideal.
The idea of a utopian project as a regulative ideal is, perhaps, best instantiated
in the numerous attempts throughout history to realize a utopian promise in an
actual lived experience by organizing an intentional community around a given
utopian ideal. The ideal, of course, being the product of an individual or small
group of people conferring and agreeing upon what would, in fact, be the idyllic
life rather than dependent upon a given set of universals. The problem of a utopian
regulative ideal is that a utopia is a concrete expression of hope, or, more generally,
of possibility before it becomes the reified task of like-minded individuals. This is
especially pertinent when we consider that utopias tend to flourish in the aftermath
of calamity. This is a point not lost on Lewis Mumford who, in his study of utopias,
claims it is only after our fall into a chasm of disillusion that we are stimulated
to discuss in a thorough way the ultimate goods and basic aims of the good
life.39 My arguments that utopias can be read mimetically are built upon a similar
premise because the very basis of utopian thought derives from the mimetic crisis
and the ensuing founding murder.
The problem of utopia as a regulative ideal is that it is susceptible to the
fallacy of reification. Put differently, the problem is that what is being reified in
the attempt to bring about a utopian setting is precisely a thing, namely a perfect
social framework, which does not exist outside of abstract thoughtthat is, we
can only asymptotically approximate perfection. As such, one might think of
utopias as a concrete expression of a moment of possibility which entails that
they be annihilated in the very process of being enunciated.40 If a utopian ideal
is a concrete expression rather than a merely regulative ideal, if it is a way of
articulating ones hope for the future, and the same utterance is its destruction,
then any concrete action that follows in an attempt to instantiate the ideal is,
presumably, doomed to fail even before the groundbreaking ceremony. Still, the
problem of utopia is precisely that while the foregoing is likely true the hope for
a utopia persists. Seyla Benhabib attempts to illuminate the persistence of utopias
38 While several philosophers have given utopia a sustained treatment, such as

Fredric Jameson, Paul Ricoeur, or Herbert Marcuse most use it as a thought experiment
or mine examples for philosophical material. Ernst Bloch does the best job of dealing
philosophically with the idea in his three-volume work The Principle of Hope. However,
none of these individuals approach utopia in the way my project does.
39 Lewis Mumford, The Story of Utopias, 12.
40 Stephan Bann, Utopias and the Millennium, 1.
by arguing that because we cannot naturalize the species and we can nolonger
arbitrate between universalistic theories and positions [i.e. Kant, Rawls, etc.]
with recourse to evolutionary argumentations a certain anticipatory utopia
becomes necessary.41 I believe my mimetic reading of utopias mitigates this
concern. Still, even as utopias have been abandoned in thought, or attempts to
achieve them have failed in practice, the use of the ideal to express hope has
persisted throughout history as a robust means of communicating romanticized or
sentimental notions of the past, critiques of the status quo, and optimism or fears
about the future. It is in this way that the No Place underpinnings of utopian
thought serve as a standard, albeit an adaptable one, for how social arrangements
ought to be designed.
The etymology of the word utopia itself is well known42 since Sir Thomas
More gave the name to the genre, but the fact that such a perfect place does not
exist does not preclude it, theoretically, from ever existing beyond its hypothetical
trappings. As far as regulative ideas go the hope for a better life seems to be as
ingrained in human notions of the world as are notions of cosmos, self, and god in
a Kantian framework. Many utopias are styled as travelogues where the perfect
society exists contemporaneously with the one of the author such as Atlantis in
ancient lore or Mores genre-defining island.43 Utopian narratives also often point
41 Seyla Benhabib, Critique, Norm, and Utopia, 331.

42 More constructed the title of his book, which now serves to mark out the genre,
by fusing two ancient Greek words. On the one hand, he combined ou, the ancient Greek
for no, with topos meaning place, to create the term No Place. On the other hand, the
combination of topos with the ancient Greek for good, eu, rendered Good Place,
but More dropped the o from ou and the e from eu to produce the Latinate Utopia
which, when spoken, sounded like either Greek formulation, but its written form was a
commitment to neitherinforming the astute reader that they were reading about a Good
No Place or, probably more accurate to Mores intended critique of England, a No Good
Place. This play on words is one of many that More uses throughout his text to amuse
the reader as well as to disguise his critiques of Tudor England. See Chapter 6 for a more
detailed analysis of Mores playfulness with words.
43 Atlantis has become a byword in modern parlance to describe a prehistoric perfect
society. Its persistence in the historical record of humanity stems from its inclusion in
ancient writings and myths of a lost continent or lost civilization in numerous cultures.
In fact, Atlantis is discussed by Plato in both the Timaeus and the Critias. However, the
history of Atlantis stretches further back in history than Platos writings, though scholars
dispute the acceptability of certain textual finds such as those in the Egyptian Book of the
Dead which do not name Atlantis specifically, or writings in ancient Indian Sanskrit which
mention an island in the west, but use an alternative spelling. Atlantis has been variously
located from just outside the Mediterranean Basin in ancient Greek cultures, to North and
South America, as Francis Bacon locates it in his historical account in New Atlantis, to as
far north as Sweden, by the eccentric Olof Rudbeck. For an interesting interpretation of
Atlantis as contemporary to ancient Egyptian cultures, accurately reported by Plato, see
David King, Finding Atlantis, 2005, esp. Ch. 11. See Chapter 6 for a detailed analysis of
Mores idyllic island community.
to a loss of the ideal rather than a yet-to-come future, as in the case of Eden or the
numerous Greek texts that call to mind a past golden age.44 The opposite is just
as true as seen in the more popular attempts at describing utopia, but also lesser
known pieces like William Dean Howells A Traveler from Altruria.45
Depending on the historical time and cultural leanings of the utopians
in question, every age has, bookended by these two contrary types of utopian
dreaming, genuine attempts to bring the dream to fruition. If utopias are regulative
ideas that derive from an ought, we should expect there to be common threads
that bind these different approaches to one another and create a larger, coherent
narrative from which a sense of the human condition is derivable. That is, utopias
as a regulative ideal should open up possibilities for human understanding that
are just as informative as studies of religion or myth, especially when these
forms of human storytelling are studied the same way. This seems especially true
if we consider utopias to be encouragements toward a better way of life or as
admonishments for a particularly unsatisfactory status quo. The same analysis
may be given of religious moral codes that disparage certain aspects of human
private and public life as particularly bad, thereby urging people to strive for a
better, that is, idyllic, afterlife. Nevertheless, utopias have existed as rubrics
for social development and harmony for as long as humans have been concerned
about the state of society.
According to Carl Sagan, three billion years ago stromatolite bacteria were
working together to promote the common good of species preservation at the
expense of individual lives. We glimpse the earliest lifeforms on Earth and the
first message is not of Nature red in tooth and claw, but of a Nature of cooperation
and harmony.46 Such evidence seems to be pretty good proof that life is driven by
an impulse to persevere through cooperation and communal orientation. Whether
or not the natural impulses of single celled organisms three billion years ago can be
adequately extrapolated to account for human behavior during the last 10,000 or
even 100,000 years is a tenuous suggestion at best. However, a charitable reading
of Sagans argument at least implies the possibility of a natural predilection for
44 One of the better examples of this is Ovids Metamorphosis which includes the
following description of an ancient time when men of their own accord, without threat of
punishment, without laws, maintained good faith and did what was right. There were no
penalties to be afraid of, no bronze tablets were erected, carrying threats of legal action, no
crowd of wrong-doers, anxious for mercy, trembled before the face of their judge; indeed
there were no judges, men lived securely without them. Additionally, there was plenty of
food and no war and it was always springtime. Bk. I (89112).
45 Howells is one of the numerous responses to Edward Bellamys Looking
Backward which is by far one of the most famous utopian tracts ever penned. While both
texts propose bright futures Howells is a rural take on Bellamys urban focused utopia.
Cited in The Utopia Reader, 301. Op. Cit. William Dean Howell A Traveler from Altruria,
New York: Harper and Bros., 1894.
46Sagan, Shadows of Forgotten Ancestors, Ballantine Books, 1993. Quoted in
Donald Pitzer, Americas Communal Utopias, 3.
communal behavior. Couple this with the Aristotelian position that humans are
by nature social animals, or more strictly political animals,47 and it seems likely
that if we are naturally compelled to join in social networks that are mutually
advantageous, then we would also be impelled to work to perfect that arrangement
for each member.48
Because the utopian impulse might have its roots in the aftermath of the
founding murder, it is equally difficult, given the long history that utopian
imaginings have in human society, to dismiss them as mere flights of fancy
because they are generally acknowledged to be doing more than just run-of-the-
mill science fiction. In their literary form, they tend to recall a blessed past or
herald a bright future on the one hand, or, on the other hand, they tend to cast the
future in dark tones based on political, economic, or social factors. Understood
this way, utopias are often taken to be the filter through which social critique is
disseminated through certain social spheres. For instance, Thomas Mores utopian
novella is constructed around inside jokes that only someone knowledgeable of
Latin or, in some instances, English law would understand. In fact, the book was
distributed in Latin preventing the majority of people from reading it for some
time, and especially the lower classes.
A similar argument can be made for any discipline that deals with utopias,
that is, that the utopian enterprise is never just doing what an academic discipline
wants to think of it as doing. Hence, it seems like a fair position to claim that
what a utopian tradition provides in a human context is a way of sorting out the
desire to be in a social environment with the realities of a natural setting. For
example, every utopia, in some way, is stereotypically expected to incorporate
adequate resources for its inhabitants. If it did not do so, most people tend to think,
it would not be a utopia. However, adequate resources, and their fair distribution,
are not typically realities for most societies. This is not to say that small groups,
one or several family units say, of average size could not achieve this easily, but
rather, that societies dont tend to be of such a size. As such, resource abundance
and its distribution tend to be integral parts of the utopian narrative, even though,
technically, such a thing is not necessarily under the control of human society. This
is clearly one of the utopian elements that Rawls is concerned with in his work
47 In the Politics Aristotle claims, it is evident that the state is a creation of nature,
and that man is by nature a political animal. (1253a2). Additionally, he claims, hewho
is unable to live in society, or who has no need because he is sufficient for himself,
must be either a beast or a god a social instinct is implanted in all men by nature
(1253a2830).
48 This may seem, at first blush, to contradict my previous argumentation about
the primeval father and his familial horde. I do not think my position is as perplexing as
it might appear. One need only imagine a primeval father, with his many captured wives
in tow, encountering another such individual. Even as they agree to a social contract they
would still be sitting on the powder keg of the mimetic crisis because, presumably, they
would have sons, or, more generally, children, that would be excluded from the contracting,
not to mention the wives. Once the mimetic violence erupts everything changes.
by trying to ensure that everyones basic needs are met and that no one person or
persons can accumulate wealth at the expense of the larger population, or, at a
minimum, the least well off.
Additionally, the desire to create seems to be as natural to humans as the desire
to procreate,49 with one clear caveat being that our desire to create does not stop
at creation, but strives for perfection. The importance of this is that the desire
permeates all aspects of human life from the microcosmic to the macrocosmic
levels. Herbert Muschamp finds evidence of the utopian impulse in architecture50
while Ernst Bloch underscores it with an examination of music.51 This is different
than merely not settling for good enoughthat is, whats being discussed is
not just the fact that we want the best effort on a try-and-try again model but
that we want the best outcome, always finding ways to improve in a continual
effort to achieve perfection. If this is true, then our impulse to strive for the ideal,
be it citizen or society, would seem to stem from an amoral, though concrete,
impulse only conditioned to be responsive to moral concerns.52 Curiously, it
would follow, then, that if the utopian impulse is a product of our constitution,
its manifestation would look similar in important ways across generations and
cultures. This, however, is not necessarily the case, suggesting that while we may
be communally-oriented animals our desire to perfect society may have its roots
in different soil.
Utopian stylings are intended to develop our social arrangements to the
advantage of every member of society. How advantage is defined makes a
significant difference in how a utopia gets constructed. In spite of this, however,
what matters is what underlies the process for determining what defines advantages.
Certainly for some people it will be economic advantages, for others it will be
personal autonomy, and for others still it might be romantic notions of peace,
love, and happiness. Any utopia trades on these, and, certainly, other aspects, to
construct what might look to one person like a utopia while to another it might
resemble hell on earth. The deliberative process referenced to determine what will
constitute the advantageousness of the utopia obviously has its roots in where an
individuals disadvantages are relative to what they desire. As we have already
examined the necessity of a theory of desire, the significant point to emphasize
49 Recall that one of the primary reasons Rawls gives for addressing the family at all
is his concern with reproducing society over time and the reproduction of good citizens.
50 Herbert Muschamp, Service Not Included. Visions of Utopia, 2948.
51 Ernst Bloch, The Spirit of Utopia, trans. Anthony Nassar, Stanford: Stanford UP,
2000. Also, Alan Weisman picks up on the relevance of music to utopia in his work on
Gaviotas, a long enduring utopian experiment in Colombia, where everyone is expected
to learn to play a musical instrument. See Weismans Gaviotas: A Village to Reinvent the
World, White River Junction, VT: Chelsea Green Publishing Co., 2008 [1998].
52 In philosophy there have been attempts to articulate the ideal person appropriately
situated in a moral context such as Aristotles Phronemos or Nietzsches Ubermensch.
These projects are radically different than what, say, Dr. Frankenstein was attempting to
achieve in his laboratory or what Hitler believed about the superiority of the Aryan race.
here is that a truly accurate understanding of the utopian impulse requires that we
understand how we come to desire, and, perhaps, what we desire.
Such a foundational concern is not unwarranted with respect to utopias since
a good many of them could be considered disagreeable. Simply put, one persons
paradise is another persons hell. Consider Orwells Nineteen Eighty-Four as an
exemplary case of the difficulty of differentiating between a utopia and a dystopia.
Orwell intends Oceana to be a utopia. Its citizens are taken care of, even if they are
not cared for, and the state provides them a secure life replete with the necessities
of life, this, of course, in exchange for obedience. However, most readers side with
Winston that something is amiss in this earthly paradise. I am not persuaded that
even were the story told from a more positive position, say, from the perspective of
Big Brother, that most readers would not continue to balk at the idea of Oceana as
a utopia in the pleasant sense. The obvious exception that springs to mind is that of
the archetype of the politically far-right neo-con who would, likely, see the state as
the appropriate arbiter of justice and freedom. A similar criticism could be lodged
against Thomas Mores take on utopia. Told from the perspective of a resident
atheist, or a slave, the best commonwealth would be construed quite differently;
though it is still likely that one could find people to live there.
It is the readily recognizable willingness of a group of people to inhabit a
particular society that places it in the category of utopian versus the more sinister
apocalyptic. Hence, the chief distinction that needs to be explored is that between
dystopia and post-apocalyptic since the two are often conflated. That is, once
something is identified as an undesirable future it is lumped into the dystopian
categorya category which often includes the incompatible future states of
dystopia and post-apocalyptic. Dystopias can be made to appear desirable to some
people, and in some cases many people, but the post-apocalyptic expectations of
end-of-times visions of the future appeal only to an insignificant number of people
whose rationale for considering such a future ideal is readily suspect on practical
and moral grounds. As such, the categories that exist should be characterized as
utopian and post-apocalyptic where utopias and dystopias are separated by
matters of degree under the umbrella of utopian. What separates the utopias
from the dystopias is the amount of individual freedom that derives from the state
apparatus. As I will demonstrate below, a vision of the future can be proposed that
appears to offer a utopian alternative to the present, but is, in fact, quite dystopian.
Post-apocalyptic worlds are most certainly dystopic, but dystopias are not
always post-apocalyptic, as I argue above about Orwells future. In a post-
apocalyptic vision of the future, like, say, the one Cormac McCarthy presents in his
novel The Road,53 the future is beyond bleak and very few, if any, rational people
would elect to live in such future. One of the key distinctions that separate the
post-apocalyptic from the dystopic is the utter destruction of social structures and
institutions, not to mention the impromptu and unpredictable nature of whatever
arises to replace organized society. Additionally, what marks post-apocalyptic
53 Cormac McCarthy, The Road, New York: Random House, 2006.

futures out from their dystopian counterparts is that there is a possibility that a
large number of people would choose to live in dystopian futures, while only the
most foolhardy or unfortunate people are willing to inhabit a post-apocalyptic
world. While some might be incredulous about such an assertion just consider
how many people willingly jumped on the bandwagon of Adolf Hitlers Third
Reich, the ideology for which was made clear publically in the publication of
Mein Kampf.
Hitlers presentation of the new social order to be ushered in by the National
Socialist Program, stripped of its vitriolic racist overtones, sounds eerily like the
rhetoric of both liberals and conservatives today who propagandize the future
to gain electoral support. Complaining of the old order, Hitler argues that when
anything new comes along it must be careful, lest the old commissioners change
their convictions and revise the old program and frame a new one, in which
everybody gets his share. He goes on to describe the future often promised by
these revisionaries. He claims that they make hollow promises ensuring that,
The peasant gets protection for his agriculture, the industrialist protection for
his product, the consumer protection for his purchase, the teachers salaries
are raised, the civil servants pensions are improved, widows and orphans are
to be taken care of most liberally by the state, trade is promoted, tariffs are
to be reduced, and taxes are pretty much, if not altogether, done away with.
Occasionally it transpires that some group has been forgotten after all, or that
some demand circulating among the people has not been heard of. Then anything
there is room for is patched in with the greatest of haste, until the framers can
hope with a clear conscience that the army of run-of-the-mill petty bourgeois
with their women have been pacified and are simply delighted. Thus inwardly
armed with confidence in God and the unshakable stupidity of the voting
citizenry, the politicians can begin the fight for the remaking of [society].54
This is the language that Hitler uses to describe the status quo and the promises of
his opposition. Hitler describes his future vision, by comparison, as ideal, as not
falling victim to the same inherent flaws. He couches his version of the Platonic
noble lie in terms of a folkish-ness that is necessary because the masses generally
lack philosophers and saints, saying, this end [the future he predicts], however, is
not only ideal, but in the last analysis also eminently practical. And in general we
must clearly acknowledge the fact that the highest ideals always correspond to a
deep vital necessity.55 Hitler makes allowances for equality in education between
54 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans. Ralph Manheim. New York, Houghton Mifflin
Co., 1999 [1927], 3745.
55 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, 379. This end, as he describes it, is achievable if
men will swear allegiance to it, so that From the basic ideas of a general folkish world
conception the National Socialist German Workers Party takes over the fundamental traits
[of the German people], and from them, with due consideration of practical reality, the
girls and boys, promotes the cultivation of German culture, and spoke directly to
the needs of the German people. He argues for the possibility of the ideal he is
advancing claiming,
Let it not be said that this is an ideal condition which this world will not tolerate
in practice and will never actually achieve. We are not simple enough, either, to
believe that it could ever be possible to bring about a perfect era. But this relieves
no one of the obligation to combat recognized errors, to overcome weaknesses,
and strive for the ideal man must try to serve the ultimate goal, and failure
must not deter him, any more than he can abandon a system of justice merely
because mistakes creep into it Therefore it is necessary to confront the master
bookkeepers of the present material republic by faith in an ideal [society].56
The majority of people acknowledge, with the great clarity of hindsight that, like
Orwells future, Hitlers ideal is an unwelcome dystopian future. Most people,
however, would agree to that statement because of the great racial and cultural
injustices that are associated with Hitler and the Nazi Party. What really makes
Hitlers vision dystopic, I maintain, is that he proposes a totalitarian future where
individual autonomy is surrendered to the state and individual rights and freedoms
are determined by rationalizations about what the state can and cannot accomplish
within the limits of the states power. Utopias, on the other hand, are identified as
such, because regardless of whatever else is included in the description, individual
autonomy, rights, and freedoms are generated from rationalizations about our
natural endowments. This distinction serves to place utopias on one side of the
ideal society coin and dystopias on the other, but, ultimately, both pursue ideal
futures in a way that the barren landscapes of the post-apocalyptical do not. To put
the point differently, it is possible to find legitimate regulative utopian principles
in both utopian and dystopian futures, but nothing of the sort exists in the wasted
futures of the post-apocalyptic world.
For instance, a poor person in a capitalist society might be drawn to a socialist
leaning utopia with its promise of wealth distribution and egalitarianism. Contrarily,
their wealthy counterpart might be horrified at such a prospect while simultaneously
being drawn to a vision of society where robots do the work of the poor person,
thereby freeing poor workers from their labor to pursue their own interests while
allowing the entrepreneur to cut costs. Presumably, the impoverished person would
have their minimal needs met in the wealthy capitalists utopia thanks to the new
robotic underclass, but poverty is still poverty to the poor person, even though the
richer person thinks they have freed the person from a terrible and redundant life
thereby ushering in a new utopian age. While the two may disagree about which
times, and the available human material as well as its weaknesses, forms a political creed
which, in turn, by the strict organizational integration of large human masses thus made
possible, creates the precondition for the victorious struggle of this world view, p. 385.
56 Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, 437.
future is ideal it seems equally certain that neither of them would want to live in
a future that included the detonation of nuclear warheads. While this example is
fairly simplistic, it highlights the problem of utopias understood as a basic human
impulse, that is, as intrinsic to human nature, because we would expect greater
similarity in the goals of utopias regardless of a persons position in society if that
were the case. Of course, deep beneath the superficiality and playfulness of the
utopian catalogue there may be reasons to believe they are not that different across
class, gender, generations, and cultures.
Differences in purpose or construction are not a problem, conversely, for
utopias as a regulative ideal. My position is that when using utopias to emphasize
an ought, multiple parties can haggle over whether or not the moral status of the
ought is applicable or even legitimate in some circumstances. More importantly,
one could recognize the moral commitment of an ought contrary to ones desires.
So, by example, if someone was driven by a desire to satisfy a sexual urge, that
same person could, barring psychological impairments, understand that rape is
an illegitimate means of achieving satisfaction, even while arguing for a utopian
vision that incorporated incredible sexual promiscuity or developed ingenious
ways to procure copious amount of sex. Comparably, Hitlers vision of a perfect
society does not hold up to a moral critique precisely because it requires extreme
eugenics and racism which render it an illegitimate utopian construct precisely
because these directly define, limit, and undermine the autonomy and freedom
of certain individuals. This, unfortunately, is not enough to prevent people from
thinking life there would be peachy, but that exposes their own immoral beliefs.
I believe that what has kept humans imagining perfect societies is that we have
an identifiable moral impulse and a concrete social impulse which when taken
together give rise to a regulative ideal that guides human interaction. Following
Mumford regarding this point, ideas, theories, superstitions and fantasy worlds
are all facts as long as people regulate their behavior according to those things.57
The point at which people are social beings, it becomes clear why utopias
would look like an impulse to achieve ideal social conditions but, I contend, the
impetus to achieve such a goal is the product of a moral reasoning that requires
two things to function. One is the recognition of a social setting as necessary for
human flourishing and the other is the recognition of obligations to the others that
comprise the social network we find ourselves embedded in. Overlooking, for the
moment, the Aristotelian implications of such a claim, and focusing instead on
how the individual in ideal conditions fairs, it becomes clearer that the individual
is not capable of the ideal in isolation. For instance, Robinson Crusoe58 can live
any type of life he would like on the island upon which he is shipwrecked; and, to
be fair, he does carve out for himself a tolerable existence. It seems equally fair
to argue that few, if any, stable-minded people would jump at the opportunity to
trade places with him. The implications of this are born out in the Tom Hanks film
57 Lewis Mumford, Chapter 1, esp. pages 1416.

58 Daniel Defoe, Robinson Crusoe, London: Hamlyn, 1987.
Castaway59 where Hankss character is forced by his isolation to create an alter

ego from a volleyball with which he can have social interactions.
Now it might be true that Hanks is not Crusoe, and that would be a fair criticism,
but it would also be reasonable to claim that most people would not envy either
of them their life-without-limitations because they are stranded on a deserted isle.
On the one hand, there is the notion of stranded that suggests what people might
want to avoid is the isolation, not necessarily the paradise implied by the island
setting. On the other hand, barring some wilderness types with a pioneer spirit,
most people would not find such circumstances to be ideal as a blueprint that
supports a utopian vision because of the lack of technological conveniences. This,
however, is not true for the protagonist in Margaret Atwoods novel Oryx and
Crake.60 In her novel the hero finds himself the sole inheritor of the planet after
a fast moving and gruesome plague annihilates the human race. At this juncture
it is not important why or how he escapes the fate of everyone else, but what
is important is that, like Crusoe, he is stranded. He is stranded in a world that
provides him everything he needs and without too much concern that things will
stop working, or if they do, that his situation will not get noticeably worse. The
entire planet to himself, left to his own devices, and he is, in the end, miserable.
Taking into account that none of these people choose their circumstances
per se, there is room to criticize here and argue that certainly some people would
choose to live in such a way if doing so were possible. This may be valid, but the
larger point is that the majority of people would not find circumstances such as
these desirable. Our general reluctance to possess utopia by ourselves begs an
interesting question about the human social situation. If we cannot posit an ideal
situation without incorporating others, then it seems as though our need to have
others around us entails an acknowledgment of obligations to others. This is the
second issue that needs to be addressed because recognizing obligations to others
means that our utopian constructs are meant to be instructive regarding how we
structure our social relations. This is where mimetic theory and its subsequent
critique of Rawls become instructive. It is imperative that we supply an answer
to the question of why we feel obligated to others in a social setting. Utopias, like
mimetic theories, present more than just moral rules or codes; they describe, or at
least attempt to describe, in great detail, how social life ought to function.
Consider the Decalogue or Hammurabis Code61 contrasted to utopian social
models. These were lists of rules that were meant to guide or shape human
interaction. Their employment in society is not meant to bring about a utopian
setting nor, I maintain, could they. However, utopian ventures are meant to
completely reshape human social interaction beyond just listing what is and is not
59 Castaway, dir. Robert Zemeckis, 20th Century Fox Studios, 2001.

60 For a more detailed analysis of Atwoods utopia see Chapter 6.
61 The Decalogue is the biblical ten commandments and may be found in the book
of Exodus (20:317). Hammurabis Code is a Babylonian set of laws that in many ways
improves upon or alters the dictates of the Old Testament. The code dates back to 1772 BCE.
to be done. Instead utopias account for the eradication of certain behaviors and
social problems by reinventing social institutions that are geared toward achieving
social harmony in a way that laws alone cannot. While it is certainly true that
people tend to strive for an ideal in most of their activitiesindeed I do not know
of anyone who works to be the worst at something62I think that the grander
scale engendered by social narratives of utopian imaginings bears out their social
function as both regulative ideals and concrete impulses. Reanalyzing the Eden
story will prove beneficial to an understanding of how such notions became
embedded in our social unconscious, and, at the same time, such an undertaking
will illustrate how my mimetic theory is superior to Girards account.
The Eden Story Redux63
It is my contention that utopian tracts incorporate either a complete revision or

an extremely modified version of the family model because latent in the utopian
imagination is the realization that the mimetic influence on society originates in
the archetypal family structure. Hence, the stability of the pre-violent upheaval
family becomes the basis for the golden age narratives. What utopias are trying
to achieve, then, is a Rawlsian future appropriately depicted as addressing the
problem of violent mimesis. While Rawls failed to address it, and utopias generally
have different goals at the fore of their construction, a Girardian mimetic model
lurks beneath the surface of both, pointing to the resolution of the problem of
mimesis in society. To make the point more clearly in Girardian terms, in this last
section, I will reinterpret one of Girards choicest examples according to my MWA
structure and show how the golden age narrative is likely as much a product of
mimetic violence as religion, law, and cultural taboos.
Consider briefly the Eden story according to my MWA reinterpretation of
Girards mimetic narrative. In the beginning, God created a perfect paradise
and populated it with many trees pleasing to the eye; but, mixed in with all of
these pleasing trees were two that were off limitsthe tree of life and the tree of
62 There are interesting parallels with this line of argumentation and Stoic philosophy
especially as it is articulated by Epictetus. Epictetus was a Roman slave turned philosopher
that earned his freedom and began teaching his version of the philosophic principles that
have come to be known as Stoicism. He was heavily influenced by Zeno of Citium and
Chrysippus and his Enchiridion addresses one of his major points of emphasis that no
matter what role you have in society you should strive to do your best at it. He says in
aphorism 17, comparing life to a theater production, Remember that you are an actor in a
drama, of such a kind as the author pleases to make it. If short, of a short one; if long, of a
long one. If it is his pleasure you should act a poor man, a cripple, a governor, or a private
person, see that you act it naturally. For this is your business, to act well the character
assigned you; to choose it is anothers.
63 Holy Bible, Genesis chapters 23.
the knowledge of good and evil.64 Since God is a surrogate place holder for the
deceased father, it makes sense that God would place man in the Garden of Eden
to work it and take care of it.65 This is exactly the kind of dictate a son, chosen
as heir, would likely receive. We are, after all, familiar with the popularized Son,
youre in charge now that Im gone take care of things motif. But Gods
instructions to Adam include the cautionary prohibition on eating from the tree
of knowledge, You are free to eat from any tree in the garden: but you must not
eat from the tree of knowledge of good and evil, for when you eat of it you will
surely die.66
Two things that stand out about this biblical passage are that there are
numerous trees but two are off-limits. It certainly strikes one as a curiosity that
God would include such a dangerous thing in the otherwise perfect and non-
threatening garden. When read allegorically, though, the inclusion of forbidden
things is fitting, since there would not have been any means available in the
post-violence aftermath to eliminate the delineation of what is mine from what is
yours because it was a case of everyone laying claim to the same things, which
all started over everyone clamoring for things that were prohibited. Addressing
the forbidden fruit, Girard argues that Psychoanalytic man is forever an Adam
driven from paradise because he devoured or coveted the forbidden fruit.67
Responding to this very passage Mark Anspach adds, But mimetic man covets
the fruit because it is forbidden; he covets whatever is withheld from him by the
mediator, who acts as both model and rival.68 More to the point, the existence of
the prohibited trees signal the prohibition that leads to violence concealed in the
family model. The second interesting bit is that partaking of the prohibited fruit
leads to certain death.
On the MWA interpretation I have proposed God plays a dual role in the
mimetic narrative. Because the elevated son is struck down out of anger toward
the father, his death represents the first surrogate scapegoat in the mimetic
crisis prevention structure of society. The sons selection by the father, that is,
the fathers recognition of him as the best imitator, makes him identical to the
father, an identity solidified by virtue of his assuming the fathers position as the
head of the family. As such, the designation God is, at one and the same time,
representative of the father and the father surrogateas such, the position of
model in the new mythical and religious narratives that were being carved out to
cope with the mimetic crisis of desire is also representative of the double nature
that leads to violence between the rivals. Reading the initial biblical story this way
God, Adam, Eve and the Serpent all represent the children after the death of the
64 Genesis (2:9).
65 Genesis (2:15).
66 Genesis (2:1617).
67 Ren Girard, Symmetry and Dissymetry in the Myth of Oedipus, Oedipus
Unbound, trans. Mark Anspach. Stanford: Stanford UP, 2004, 94.
68 Mark Anspach, Oedipus Unbound, xxxix.
father; the snake, most obviously, is the disenfranchised sibling with what might
be styled as the second best claim to ascension and god the elevated son.
We are, at this point it seems, safe to make such a conjecture because the
serpent does not have it in for Eve and Adam, as it were, but rather, he seeks to
undermine Gods claim to be the only one to possess the objecthere the object
is allegorically rendered as the apple, but the important thing to bear in mind is
that the apple represents the possession of something not to be shared by all. The
biblical account typically has the serpent cajoling Eve into partaking of the fruit,
reassuring her she will not die, claiming that God knows that when you eat of
it your eyes will be opened, and you will be like God, knowing good and evil.69
What is a person endowed with the knowledge of good and evil if not an authority
figure? In the primeval crucible where violence forces the children to sort out their
competing claims and conflicting desires the authoritarian father is responsible
for being the arbiter of good and evil, right and wrong, so becoming like god
would necessarily entail being in a position to dictate what is good and what is
evil. Following from this it is evident that the serpent incites the other children
to violence, here metaphorically parlayed as disobeying which is apt because
we can easily imagine the siblings in a MWA structure rejecting the authority of
the older elevated child once considered their equal. Essentially, the argument
the serpent offers is that god possesses something he does not want them to
havethe applebut as a sibling the now elevated child has no legitimate or
recognizable right to establish such boundaries. He is, after all, just their brother.
Eves role is important because she is an actor in the betrayal of God; not
merely a spectator or a bystander, but a key participant. Girard, when he deals
with her at all in this context, reads her much the same as he does Rebekah in
the story of Jacob and Esau. But, as an active participant in the plot to undermine
God she is responsible for persuading Adam to partake of the forbidden.70
69 Genesis (3:45). Emphasis added.

70 For an acute analysis of how Eve managed to convince Adam to join her in
transgressing Gods prohibition see Jean Higgins, The Myth of Eve: The Temptress,
Journal of the American Academy of Religion, 44(4) (December, 1976): 63947. Higgins
traces the historical interpretations of Genesis 3:6 from Tertullian and John Chrysostom
through modern commentators readings of the interactions that passed between the two.
While most male commentators have cast Eve in the role of temptress Higgins argues
this is a stretch as a substitution for the literal gave some to her husband that appears
in the older versions of the text, p. 640. I, however, find the persuaded interpretation, the
roots of which stretch back to Tertullian, to have some traction, not because Eve was a vile
temptress that corrupted an otherwise innocent Adam, but because the snake approaches
her separately inducing her, through an act of persuasion, to eat first and then she, in turn,
approaches Adam convincing him to join her in partaking of the fruit. This line of reasoning
is not undermined by Adams explanation to God once they are found out. Adam claims
The woman you put here with meshe gave me some fruit from the tree and I ate it,
Genesis 3:12. This only shows that Adam might have been a cowardly finger-pointer at
worst or a dupe at best.
My MWA modification of the GST requires that the object be understood as

participating in the overthrow of the elevated son. How the other siblings are
enlisted is unclear, but the persuasion angle provides both the clearest interpretation
that does not denigrate Eve and a possible link between elevated son and violence.
Following Sally Miller Gearhearts position that acts of persuasion are acts of
violence, Eves inducement of Adam to partake of the forbidden fruit could be
considered an act of violence.71 In the context of the rebellion against Gods
authority, her persuasion of Adam could be code for the Machiavellian coercion of
the other siblings who, for whatever reason, did not feel the sting of being passed
over. More to the point, if Eves persuasion was a coercive act of violence, then
that sheds light on why the development of laws as such developed along the
lines of rhetoric and persuasion where the person with the best logic or reason is
considered dominant to competing positions; such a paradigm favors a patriarchal
social structure but does not admit of a deeper analysis in the present context.
In the first generation brought forth after their expulsion from the garden, a
mimetic story again plays out that the MWA can accommodate better than the
GST. The story of Cain and Abel is similar, but with a twist cautioning favoring
one son over the other.72 It is enticing to read this as a continuation of the Adam
and Eve saga, that is, as a tale about privileging one son over the other. In the story
of Adam and Eve, we are given an analysis of the problems of elevating a son
when there are others that have, possibly, equally good claims. Additionally, the
creation myth lends itself nicely to a collective murder interpretation. The story of
Cain and Abel could easily be read as a continuation of that story by examining
the dangers of favoring a younger son over an older son which is a possibility the
MWA can accommodate that the GST cannot.
Cain, the farmer, is the first born of Adam and Eve. Eves second child, Cains
younger brother Abel, is a shepherd. On a day when both boys present offerings
to God, The Lord looked with favor on Abel and his offering, but on Cain and
his offering he did not look with favor. So Cain was very angry, and his face
was downcast.73 Cains anger does not go unnoticed and his demeanor draws an
interestingly worded reproach from God. Chastising Cain, God says, Why are
you angry? Why is your face downcast? If you do what is right, will you not be
accepted? But if you do not do what is right, sin is crouching at your door; it desires
to have you, but you must master it.74 There are dangerous mimetic undertones
in the scolding God offers to Cain. After all, he does offer the sacrifice required of
71 Sally Miller Gearheart, The Womanization of Rhetoric, Womens Studies

International Quarterly, 2(2) (1979): 195201. Gearheart argues that persuasion represents
an intentional attempt to change a persons values or worldview. She claims, the difference
between a persuasive metaphor and a violent artillery attack [is] obscure and certainly one
of degree rather than kind, p. 197.
72 Genesis Chapter 4.
73 Genesis 4:45.
74 Genesis 4:67. Emphasis added.
him so the inducement to do what is right must be understood as a comparative

reference to Abel who has won Gods favor. Shortly thereafter Cain strikes his
brother dead incurring the wrath of God for his fratricidal act. My interpretation
of Cains murder of Abel differs from Girards more superficial reading of the act.
Girard asserts that the story of Cain reinforces that the murderer is the one who
does not have the violence-outlet of animal sacrifice at his disposal.75
Girards position is at odds, however, with his arguments that the collective
murder, the foundational murder, is followed by individual murders in the religio-
mythical frameworks of early civilizations. We are given no information about
the two boys prior to the fratricidal scene. However, Cains act is not punished
with retributive violence; rather he is ostracized from the founding family. His
act of violence is a result of not having access to the sacrificial violence at Abels
disposal, but by this time there are, presumably, laws in place to deal with people
that are outside the prescriptions of the post-violence society. Girard posits the
story of Cain and Abel as the foundational story because Cain goes on to found
a civilization. Overlooking the immediate implications of the expulsion from
the paradise of Eden puts Girard at a distinct disadvantage for understanding
the mimetic unfolding of society that the Cain and Abel story represents. If one
understands that the mimetic drama of Cain and Abel is meant to address the
second generation of attempts to control mimesis, then it becomes clear why Cain
was not murdered, and, perhaps, why Seth is not introduced until after Cains
expulsion in the story. In this light, Girards position on the reflexive nature of the
mimetic community becomes clearer. Girard asserts,
It is not a question of an immediate suppression of the gods crime. If censored

carelessly, it would eliminate one problem only to create another. Religious
adapters of myths are more perceptive than ethnologists and understand clearly
that the violence inflicted on their god is justified by a fault he committed
previously. If this justification is eliminated purely and simply, then the most
sacred character in the myth is exonerated, but the community that punished him,
deprived of its justification, then becomes criminal. This community of murderers
is almost as sacred as the original victim, for it engenders the community of
the faithful. The attempt to moralize myths ends in a dilemma. We can easily
deduce this dilemma from primordial mythic themes, but we can also read the
results clearly in more developed texts. The frequently subtle nuances of divine
culpability which have been incomprehensible until now suddenly appear to be
rather ingenious solutions invented by the faithful throughout the ages, and myths
simultaneously designed to free all actors in the sacred drama of blame.76
There are two ideas that stand out in the above passage that help explain the dilemma
of Cain before and after his slaughter of Abel. First, in the mythos that drives the
75 Ren Girard, Violence, 4.

76 Ren Girard, The Scapegoat, 82. Emphasis added.
mimetic cover-up Girard acknowledges that the violence done to the God is done
for a crime he committed previously. In the moment of founding murder, the father,
who is the cause of the violence, is guilty before the elevated son is assigned the
blame and killed. Cain is motivated to murder Abel not for a transgression Abel is
guilty of, but rather, because God favored Abel and rebuked Cain for not behaving
appropriately. Cains unsuitable behavior, whether it was on-going leading up the
sacrificial scene with Abel, or wholly bound up in the sacrifice itself, places him
outside of the community of murderers, to whom Abel clearly belongs as one for
whom sacrifice is the expected behavior. So, Cain is presented in the story as being
unfaithful in his dealings with God, who by now has fully assumed the mantle of
surrogate while the community has already moved toward sacrifices from amongst
the totem animals or, possibly, from those outside the community of the faithful.
The mark of Cain is, then, nothing other than the brand of civilization.
Cain is expelled from the land, condemned to be a restless wanderer on
earth.77 In addressing this aspect of the story Girard skips a critical passage. Girard
moves from expulsion to Cains fear that anyone may kill him, but before that God
extends the punishment beyond his ejection from the society of the primal family.
It may seem impolitic to speak of the primal family as a society; yet, we have not
seen the extension of the family comprised of the original murderers beyond the
next generation. Cain is, ultimately, responsible for founding society, but first he
must be made to leave the protection of the family. The story makes clear that the
serpent was laid low when Adam and Eve were cast from the Garden of Eden, but
they remain together, presumably, in a family unit bent on multiplying as we see
with the birth of the two sons, Cain and Abel. But Cains dismissal is preceded by
an admonishment from God that when he work[s] the ground, it will no longer
yield its crops.78 Recall that Cain is the farmer and this becomes more than a
curse, it is a complete disinheritance, a complete loss of his patriarchal inheritance.
Cains fears about being killed by any who cross his path becomes the opportunity
for the first biblical law prohibiting murder. As Girard explains,
The founding murder teaches the murderer(s) a kind of wisdom, a form of

prudence that moderates their violence. God takes advantage of the lull by
promulgating the first law against murder: If anyone kills Cain, he shall
be avenged sevenfold (Gen. 4:15). The foundation of Cainite culture is the
first law against murder: each time a new murder occurs, the community will
immolate seven victims in a memory of the original victim, Abel. Even more
than the crushing character of the retribution, it is the ritual nature of the
sevenfold sacrifice that reestablishes peace. This ritual character is rooted in the
lull the original murder produced and the unanimous accord of the community
in recollecting this murder.79
77 Genesis, 4:12.
78 Genesis, 4:12.
79 Ren Girard, I See Satan Fall Like Lightening, 84.
Girard is, generally speaking, correct on this point, and he is right about Abel
being the first victim, but his reading needs the qualification that Abel is the first
victim after the original murder. Why else should the story skip forward from
Abels birth to the tragedy of his fratricidal demise? Abels death resonates with
the first murder, which, until the boys had grown up, had not been sufficiently
handled by the construction of prohibitions in the immediate aftermath of the
founding murder. So, when the violence repeats, it is handled differently than the
originary time and Cain is sent away. But this is not enough to deter the mimetic
cycle from re-occurring, because the actions taken are reactive and grounded in a
feeble understanding of what was causing the violence. Cain goes on to found a
society of his own east of his kin in the land of Nod. The biblical tale chronicling
Cains life after the murder of his brother boringly details several generations
before the story takes on an interesting element. Cains great-great-great-great-
grandson Lamech marries two women who, between them, bore him three sons
and a daughter. Again, omitting any details of the life of this family, the biblical
account merely reports Lamech as saying, Adah and Zillah, listen to me: wives
of Lamech, hear my words. I have killed a man for wounding me, a young man for
injuring me. If Cain is avenged seven times, then Lamech seventy-seven times.80
It is easy to think this scene is nothing more than a man confessing his guilt and
attempting to repent of his sins. But, surviving through six generations, from Cain
to Lamech, in an era populated by small communities engaged in conflict at least
some of the time, it is difficult to believe that this is Lamechs first time to strike a
death blow against another human being, and if it is not, then we are left to wonder
at the special nature of the incident that it requires such a stiff penalty. Here,
again, in this story the lack of detail provides all the detail we need to unravel the
mystery of what likely happened. First, the biblical description of Lamech starts
with him being married to two wives, and this cannot fail to be of consequence.
Second, he has slain a young man for injuring him, which immediately suggests
self-defense or the defense of another. Finally, in his lament to his wives he calls
down the penalty applied to Cain. But Cains penalty was specifically for killing his
brother, so there would be no need to self-inflict a similar penalty unless the crime
was similar. We are not told whether Lamech had a brother, perhaps a younger one
trying to usurp his authority, or if the blow was delivered against one of his own
sons attempting to overpower Lamechs chosen successor to gain access to the
harem. Regardless of how one chooses to interpret the story, one thing is perfectly
clear: the mark of Cain is mimetic civilization.
Every example Girard uses can be retold on my alternative triangle, more
convincingly I believe. Plus, with my modeling of the mimetic crisis we get the
additional benefit of a story about justice and critical insights into how to make
society more just. The next chapter is a tentative first step toward developing an
understanding of what a social framework would look like that could successfully
break the mimetic cycle of violence that is embedded in our most enduring social
80 Genesis, 4:2324.
institutions. Of course, as with the construction of a mimetic narrative, the solution

begins by examining the relationships of the family and the changes necessary to
alter the course of human existence. Therefore, to better present the importance of
utopias to a mimetic account of Rawlsian society, I will turn to several examples
that I believe help emphasize the importance of the social narratives of utopian
imaginings and their relationship to both of the theories of Rawls and Girard.
In the examples that follow in Chapter 6, I will endeavor to show how the
mimetic aspects of society I am targeting are dealt with in these utopian schemes.
More importantly, perhaps, is that they represent a historical development of the
ideas advanced by mimetic theory while also highlighting how utopias are useful
in establishing what to address in order to break free of cyclical mimetic violence.
Each of these examples represent the idea of utopia in a particular way and not all
fit easily into a particular category of utopian history for reasons unique to each
one. None of the classical examples I employ are utopias in the contemporary
sensethat is, the term is applied to them anachronistically, so while they are
ideal societies they are not formulated according to the concepts that have come
to be bound up in the notion of utopia. Of course, the obvious exception to
this anachronistic stipulation is Mores Utopia, which is a special case since its
publication literally ushered in the age of utopias as the idea has come to be
known in more modern times. Mores playful utopian creation, however, is mostly
a readily recognizable, and scathing, critique of the English society he lived in.
What cements its reputation as such is that only the most erudite individuals would
have been in a position to recognize it as anything other than a quirky fantasy tale.
The other two classic utopian examples I examine are Platos Republic and
the myth of King Arthur. Each of these could be used to present an in-depth and
encompassing account of my construal of mimetic utopianism, but my intent
founded on the hope that their familiarity in popular culture will permit me to do
sois to offer brief sketches of each in order to provide an historical backdrop
for my theory. Arthurs legend is the most tenuous of the three examples I utilize
because his story is grounded in historical facteven though many of those facts
are disputed, locked as they are in a hazy and poorly documented past.81 Still, I
believe that certain aspects of the Arthurian Legend speak directly to the problem
of mimesis and its historical tinge adds some small measure of consequence to
the otherwise purely theoretical nature of the anthropological mimetic project.
Platos republic is closest to a traditional utopia by virtue of its being an ideal
81 On this score Geoffrey Ashe says, Readers of medieval romance thought of the
Arthurian realm somewhat as we, today, think of the Wild West. The Wild West of fiction
and films is a country of imagination, created by novelists like Zane Grey and Hollywood.
All the same, we know in a hazy way that realities underlie it. For thirty or forty years the
American West was wild, or a good deal of it was So it was, on the whole, with medieval
views of King Arthur. For the purposes of romance his existence didnt matter much. Still,
like Billy the Kid, he had existed, and more or less when Geoffrey [of Monmouth] said.
The Discovery of King Arthur, 15.
city in speech used by Socrates as a device to make a larger point about justice.
In that sense it demands inclusion because it parallels Rawlss own endeavors on
the ideal theory score. However, my brief sketch of the important aspects of the
republic will highlight only those functional aspects that Socrates depends on to
provide a coherent creation. My purpose is to illustrate the ancient beginnings of
the themes that link my readings of mimesis and utopia together.
I begin with brief examinations of these three classic illustrations to
substantiate my claims that mimetic tropes and themes permeate the tradition
as well as providing an historical catalogue for a background against which my
subsequent, and more recent, examples can be compared. For those examples,
I turn to two of the best writers of utopian literature of the late twentieth and early
twenty-first centuries, Ursula le Guin and Margaret Atwood. When dealing with
the utopian samples from these authors I present them out of chronological order
to give coherence to the utopian critique I will derive from my examinations of
utopia in Chapter 6. To derive that critique, and link Girard and Rawls together
inside a utopian social critique, I will focus only on those aspects of these projects
that deal with the mimetic tropes pertinent to the investigation at hand. The topical
areas of focus I will zero in on are the family, religion, and governance where it
is applicable to developing a sense of justice responsive to the mimetic forces
driving society.
Chapter 6
Utopian Undercurrents:
Undoing Mimesis in the Social Imagination
Antique Justice: Platonic Rationalizations and Ending the Crisis1
Plato wrote the Republic in 380 BCE and presents it as the record of a conversation
that occurred between Socrates and a host of interlocutors concerning the nature of
justice. The conversation begins with the group sifting through different accepted
notions of justice, finding each of them lacking in some critical way, before
turning to an attempt to discover the true nature of justice. It is in the attempt
to discover what constitutes justice that Socrates unveils his utopian scheme.
The Republic, as such, represents one of the oldest surviving complete utopian
endeavors, even though it bears that title anachronistically. One of the hallmarks
of these proto-utopian tractsthose works published before Mores Utopia
is that usually the author either does not recognize the possibility of its coming
into existence or expressly denies that possibility. Socrates does this very thing2
during the conversation denying that the philosophic city could come to be in any
of the existing types of city-states. He tells Adeimantus that none of the existing
polities are suitable for the philosophic city because, there are none constituted
in a way that is worthy of a philosophic nature.3 This sentiment is echoed later
by Glaucon who, complimenting Socrates on his construction of the city, says,
1 Ancient Greek society provides the first complete attempts to understand what we
call utopia today. Plato, as one of the most famous figures in Western history, and, arguably,
the founder of Western philosophy, has had his works circulated in print and studied for
centuries, so I will, naturally, assume some familiarity on the part of the reader in my
handling of his Republic. I will, however, limit myself solely to his articulation of the
perfect society as he articulates it in the Republic, recognizing that there are supporting
arguments and interesting tidbits spread throughout his larger corpus of work, especially
the Laws. For my purposes here, however, the Republic is sufficient.
2 Socrates makes it clear throughout the discussion that the city is hypothetical. This
is because many of the things that he advocates as necessary to the perfectly just society
are potentially seditious claims in Athenian society. For instance, Socrates explains his
reluctance to delve too deeply into certain aspects of the city because it could even be
doubted that whats spoken of is possible, even if it came about as much as it possibly
could, there will also be doubts even in that case that this would be the best thing. Thats
why there was a certain reluctance to touch on these things, for fear, dear comrade, the
argument would seem to be only a prayer. Plato, Republic, 450CD.
3Plato, Republic, 497B.
And as for how it would come into being, if it ever did come into being, you
seem to me to have described it well.4 Aristotle goes even further, stating that
the imagined community of Socrates is a victim of impossibility cautioning his
audience that, inframing an ideal we may assume what we wish, but should avoid
impossibilities5 Nevertheless, whether the ideal community constructed in the
Republic is possible or not, a blueprint for overcoming the crisis of mimesis is
present in the text. While the Republic is a wealth of philosophical topics, I will
focus narrowly on the talking points that reflect either Socratess employment of
means and methods to handle the mimetic crisis of society or upon his reasons and
explanations for doing so.
The construction of the city in speech begins with the bringing together of
individuals concerned with meeting the basic needs of each other. This seems like
the natural starting point for Socrates because a city comes into being because
it happens that each of us is not self-sufficient, but needs many things.6 Self-
sufficiency is a key ideal associated with the perfect society and plays an important
role in the conception of utopia throughout its history. For this reason, Socrates
begins by pooling together only those individuals that provide a necessary function
to the self-sufficiency of the state. These include a farmer for food production, a
carpenter for house-building, a weaver for clothing, a leatherworker for material
necessities, and a doctor for obvious reasons. Of course, for Socrates, each of these
individuals will be engaged in doing the thing they are best at and provide that fruit
of their labor to the whole of society. So, the farmer produces all the food while
the weaver makes all the clothing concerning themselves with no other matter. In
this way, believes Socrates, everything comes about in more quantity, as more
beautiful, and with more ease when one person does one thing in accord with his
nature and at the right moment, being free from responsibility for everything else.7
But this is not enough for the interlocutors or Socrates because the citizens
are skilled at crafts that will require tools and raw materials that they would not
produce themselves since they are focused on their own craft. Thus, metalworkers,
cattlemen and shepherds, and others are added to provide the needs and necessities
of the city and its skilled workers.8 At this point, the city is larger than the original
handful thought necessary, but on the whole it is still thought to be harmonious,
happy, and functional. There are, however, some noticeable omissions amongst
the necessary citizenry. For example, there is no mention of entertainment
in the original city, and the reason for this must stem from the idea that their
companionship provides them enough distractions to break up the drudgery of

5 Aristotle, The Politics, 1265a1718.
7Plato, Republic, 370C.
8Plato, Republic, 370C371B.
Utopian Undercurrents: Undoing Mimesis in the Social Imagination 155
their day.9 A somewhat trivial example to be sure, but, there are two functions
excluded from consideration that help unravel the mimetic mysteries of Platos
perfect society.
First, there is no mention of government, laws, or regulations to establish
boundaries between, or expectations of, the citizens. The first city Socrates develops
is clearly meant to be an anarchist state where life flows smoothly from day to
day without the need for formal regulation or control.10 One should not interpret
this first city as primitive in a Neolithic sense because of its lack of government.
The individuals are skilled and their downtime is filled with merrymaking so it is
disingenuous to presume that this simple city does not need a government because
of an innocent pre-social nature attributed to the citizenryclearly Socrates was
not thinking of gentle cavemen when he was postulating his first city. Conversely,
it appears that Socrates sees no need for a government in a just society, which
is a refutation of the idea, espoused by several of the interlocutors, that people
are, by nature, unjust. The second feature of the first city that is omitted is any
mention of the family proper. Socrates mentions children feasting in the evenings
with the others so it must be that the first city has families, or, rather, parents. The
only real concern Socrates acknowledges with reference to family matters is that
the inhabitants be careful not [to produce] children beyond their means, being
cautious about poverty or war.11
The failure to mention families at this juncture is relevant because it will be
of such critical concern later in the subsequent evolutions of the just city. It is
also important because it is here, I argue, that Socrates misses the opportunity to
investigate the need to breakdown the mimetic structures of society. Adeimantus,
however, does not commit such an oversight, but Socrates fails to pick up the
point. Socrates asks Adeimantus if he can identify where in this first city justice
and injustice might originate. Adeimantus says, I have no idea, Socrates, unless it
was somewhere in some need that these people have of one another.12 Given the
simple account Socrates has offered this need the citizens have of one another
could be located in any number of social relationships, but the unspoken and
unaddressed assumptions Socrates makes on this score make it more than possible
that an investigation of the family would have yielded interesting conclusions
about the nature of justice before developing the city further.
9See Republic, 372B where Socrates says in the evenings they will recline on leafy
beds spread smooth with yew myrtle, they and their children will feast themselves, drinking
wine to top it off, while crowned with wreaths and singing hymns to the gods, joining with
each other pleasurably.
10 Daniel Devereux, Socrates First City in the Republic Apeiron: A Journal for
Ancient Philosophy and Science, 13(1) (June, 1979): 36. The anarchist state is a theme that
will be explored in more detail below in section 5.
12Plato, Republic, 372A. Emphasis added.
Socrates neglects this chance to offer a direct response to Adeimantus,

choosing, instead, to approach the matter in his characteristic roundabout way.
By doing so, Socrates invites the scorn of Glaucon who refers to the city as
a city of pigs and he and Socrates haggle over the lack of luxuries in the city. At this
point in the conversation the city, which already has a minimalist market-economy
to allow the citizens to export surplus goods, begins to transform from what Socrates
calls a healthy city into a larger infected or sick city full of unnecessary things.13
The sick city is a necessary step in realizing the most robust account of justice and
the perfect society because a city with luxuries will need governing philosopher
kings to mediate the unnecessary desires that those items bring with them.
The philosophic account of the perfect society also requires a government so
there is, in one sense at least, a notion of this society as less perfect than the first
proposed city. Glaucons challenge to Socrates brings luxury into the city and it
is from these unnecessary things that the group, Socrates included, identify the
origins of justice and injustice. This reading of the Republic has led many people
to reject the first city as a false start of sorts. But, to the contrary, for Socrates,
thefirst city is an essential first step in setting out the origin of justice, and is
therefore not a false start. It serves as Socrates rejoinder both to Glaucons
account of the origin of justice and to the pessimistic view of human nature
implicit in that account.14 Whether he knows it or not, Socrates already has the
seeds of injustice in his city, so it matters little if his citizens dine upon leafy mats
or comfortable couches, and Adeimantus rightly points that out even if he does not
articulate the point well enough.
However, in the fully evolved city two things stand out as relevant to a mimetic
account of the perfect Socratic society. The first is the disintegration of the family
and the second is the proscription of the poets. Because the family is not dealt with
as part of the original city plan, there is no basis of comparison in the narrative
for how it is altered in the city of luxuries and beyond. Socrates equalizes the
men and women of the republic,15 doing away with marriage in the process; in
place of marriage is a communal sharing of the sexes. But, as we already know
that population control is of a paramount concern in the perfect society, it is not
surprising that, while promiscuity is the rule, procreation is micro-managed. It is
not necessary to break up the family to allow women to participate in the daily life
of the city, but it is necessary for the harmony of the city. Socrates doubts there
would be any arguing that it is not the greatest good for the women to be shared
13Plato, Republic, 373A374A.

14 Devereux, Socrates First City, 38. It should be noted that Glaucons account of
human nature as implicitly unjust is similar to what one would expect to find in a Hobbesian
account of the state of nature.
15 For an account of the problematic nature of Socratess terms of equality see Julia
Annas, Platos Republic and Feminism, Philosophy, 51(197) (July, 1976): 30721.
or for the children to be shared, if possible, but about whether it is possible or not
there would be many disputes.16
The micro-management of procreation and the communal nature of sexual
relations entails, for Socrates at least, that children are to be raised by the state. This
fits nicely with Socratess overall program at this stage of the citys development
because he is focused on how to create the best citizens. Left to their own devices,
presumably, parents would fail to raise children in an appropriate waya way that
contributes to and helps maintain social harmony. Moreover, having a husband
or wife is a source of conflict, which one would imagine was present in the first
city as well, but here Socrates is clear that none of the women or men is to live
together privately, nor should they know their own offspring.17 The overarching
reason for this radical re-conception of the family is to ensure the equality of the
sexes in society even though the primary purpose of these provisions may be to
rid men and women of self-interest and allow them to be concerned with the total
society.18 Equality, achieved through the reduction of self-interest by means of
sexual freedom, if, in fact, that is what Socrates is up to, is clearly an explosion of
a mimetic social device.
The other aspect of the perfect society that piques the interest of mimetically
sensitive readers is the elimination of the epic poets of the day. Socrates is
concerned about what such topics will teach the youth, and, possibly, what
thoughts it might inspire in adults. Socrates says he would not allow any of the
imitative arts into the society, arguing that everything like that appears to be a
corruption of the thinking of the people who hear it, all those who do not have
the knowledge of how the things themselves are as an antidote.19 It is clear in an
early passage from Book III that Socrates has an idea of mimesis that parallels the
mimetic rivalry. He claims that imitating is making oneself like another person,
either in voice or in gesture, and that doing so takes away from the ability of the
citizens to do their work properly.20 The passage is, by itself, innocuous enough,
but when coupled with the arguments against the imitative arts in Book X it is
clear that the imitator is both an imitator and a model for imitation.21 It does not
take much to understand that Plato does not want his citizens taking the Gods
of Hesiod or Homer as role models. In this brief outline I hope to have laid the
groundwork for a reasonable account of mimetic rejection in Platos construction
of the ideal state.
16Plato, Republic, 457D.

17Plato, Republic, 457D.
18 Lyman Tower Sargent, Women in Utopia, Comparative Literature Studies,
10(4) (Dec., 1973): 303.
21 Elizabeth Bellifiore, A Theory of Imitation in Platos Republic, Transactions
of the American Philological Association, 114 (1984): 124.
Utopian Interlude: Mimesis and the Downfall of Camelot22
There is no definitive publication date for the Arthurian Legend proper because it
existed as part of a popular oral tradition for many years, possibly for hundreds
of years, before it started to find its way into print.23 When it was, finally, written
down, it was not set down in a definitive compilation of the myths surrounding
Arthur. Rather, its textual beginnings24 are in poetry and song in the early- and
mid-twelfth century when Arthur becomes the focus of epic poetry centering
22 There is no definitive account of the Arthurian Legend, but the accepted account is
Sir Thomas Malorys Le Morte DArthur which was adopted as the standard account based on
two facts. One, it was the first widely available published version of the Legend and, two, it
was rightly recognized as the first comprehensive, ordered compilation of Arthurian stories
though this does not entail that Malorys selections are the best or most complete versions of
the stories themselves, many of which he slightly or significantly altered, depending on the
dictates of the Christian faith or the demands of the social milieu, necessary to make the tales
appeal to the audience of the day. I will draw heavily from the narrative followed by Malory,
but given the difficulty in pinning down key details I will also stray from him when doing so
is justified. However, I will not exceed the limits of the elements contained in the popularized
myths, that is, I will not create details where they do not already exist.
23 One of the major difficulties for Arthurian scholars is disentangling the various
oral traditions that were combined to create the legend of Arthur, his knights, and their
fabled deeds. While Arthur is, in scholarly circles, widely considered to have been an actual
person there is an enormous amount of speculation about his identity, generated by multiple
factions engaged in an on-going, and often very heated debate, over every detail all the way
down to when he actually may have lived. The problem is that his legend is a staggering
array of Celtic, Welsh, Breton, Saxon, French, Cornish, and Roman cultural motifs mixed in
unequal parts with historical intricacies and mythological beliefs purported as fact.
24 While I am laying out the historical development of the Arthurian myth as it
appeared in the literary cultural canon which has come, ultimately, to be the defining force
of the Legend, Arthur is reputed to have appeared in print long before the Arthurian literary
explosion of the twelfth century and beyond. In Y Gododdin, a Welsh poem believed to have
been written sometime in the ninth century, there is a mention of Arthur by comparison. In
stanza 99 a warrior named Gwawrddur is praised for bravery similar to Arthur,
He fed black ravens on the rampart of the fortress

Though he was no Arthur
Among the powerful ones in battle
In the front rank, Gwawrddur was a palisade
This is, obviously, one of the hotly disputed points in Arthurian Legend with proponents
at odds over whether or not the mention of Arthur is a late addition. If it is a part of the
original, however, the poems historical references place the events it heralds as occurring
before 638 giving credence to claims that Arthur lived in the fifth or sixth centuries. For
more see, Jarman, A.O.H. (ed.), Y Gododdin. Britains Oldest Heroic Poem. The Welsh
Classics vol. 3, 1988, from which the above quotation is taken.
solely on him and his exploits.25 This leads to a slow transition into prose works,
the most famous of which is the Historia Regum Brittaniae, written by Geoffrey
of Monmouth in 1136, which chronicles the royal history of Britain, but is more
story26 than history.27 The Legend is bandied about the European countryside
suffering addendums and omissions, alterations and additions,28 until Malory pens
what has become the definitive collective account. What makes the myth of Arthur
so relevant to my study is that it is the last time in history that a myth could
captivate an audience and turn them into believers. Arthur was created during
the last age when mythologizing was possible because myths still mattered tothe
people in a way they do not anymore.29 In light of this, there is no doubt that
the Arthurian Legend is as philosophically rich and complex as the Republic, or,
really, any utopian account of social relationships, but my focus will be limited
to Arthur and his half-sisters, Morgan le Fay and Margawse, and the well-known
love triangle of Arthur, Guinevere, and Lancelot.
There are immediate mimetic problems in the relationship between Arthur
and Morgan that stem from Morgans name before we even investigate the
other tropes that exist. Morgan is the typical spelling of a mans name in Middle
25 Wace, a Jersey poet, penned the still influential Roman de Brut (1155) which is
responsible for the inclusion of the Round Table into the myth. Toward the end of the
twelfth century Layamon, a Worcestershire priest, wrote the poem Brut which is the first
time that the history of Arthur was penned in English.
26 Monmouths history begins after the fall of Troy when Brutus, great-grandson
of Aeneas, leads a band of Trojan survivors to Albion (modern day England) and slays
the giants inhabiting the land. He then chronicles the lives of 75 kings, nearly all of them
products of his own imagination, before finally arriving at the withdrawal of the Romans
from Britain. It is in the shadowy history between the evacuation of the Romans in
409 CE and the ascension to power of Arthurs cousin Constantine in 542 CE that Geoffreys
history of Arthur occurs. It is in the chaos of the Roman withdrawal that Vortigern assumes
control and, bringing order to the land, sets the stage for the rise of Arthurian Legend. For
an accessible and concise explanation of Monmouths tale as it relates to the episodes
concerning Vortigern through Arthur see Geoffrey Ashe, The Discovery of King Arthur,
London: Guild Publishing, 1985, Ch. 1 and esp. pp. 413.
27 Monmouths work, written in Latin, is meant to provide Britain citizenry with
an historical account of their origins as well as a king, Arthur in this case, that could be a
rival to Charlemagne. While Geoffreys account is published in the twelfth century it is the
publication of the Vulgate Cycle, believed to have been compiled by Cistercian monks in
the early thirteenth century and composed of the stories Estoire del Saint Graal, Merlin,
Lancelot Propre, La Queste del Saint Graal, and La Mort (de Roi) Artu, which are typically
used to mark the transition from verse to prose in the Arthurian tradition.
28 Most notably by Chrtien de Troyes whose major contributions are Erec et Enide,
Cliges, Le Chevalier de la Charrette, Le Chevalier au Lion (Yvain), and Le Conte del Graal
(Perceval).
29 For an interesting study in modern attempts at mythmaking through the medium
of space exploration see Jon Wagner and Jan Lundeen, Deep Space and Sacred Time,
Westport, CT: Praeger Press, 1998.
English, opposed to the corresponding womans name, which would have been
Morgaine. However, the associations of Morgan with faeries (le Fay) and nymphs
marks her character out as concretely female and while the spelling may be a
corruption of the name over time,30 it does present a serious mimetic problem
in the literature of Arthur. The problem is the transmutation of the physicality
of Morgan as a female character with the masculine identity her name bestows
upon her. An underlying recognition of this is an immediate connection to my
claims in Chapter 3 that the daughters of the primeval father could certainly have
acted as claimants in the violence that erupts following the fathers death. It is
incredibly suggestive that Morgan is not mythologically passed down to us as a
brother whose competitive claim on the throne of Camelot would be permissibly
socially acceptablenevertheless Morgan is often cast as the principal rival for
the kingdom that is Camelot. Buried deep in the myth, and possibly lost in its
countless early manifestations, is the mimetic possibility that daughters, and by
extension, mothers, or women generally, may have played a pivotal role in the
construction of society well beyond the scope of being mere sex objects.
However, regardless of whether one is inclined to assume that Morgan was
a sister and the mistranslation is an isolated slip of the pen, it is still possible to
render the relationship between Morgan and Arthur mimetically. Before Arthur
is even conceived, Morgan, the youngest of three daughters, is born to Igraine,
queen to the Duke of Cornwall. Arthurs father, Uther Pendragon, develops
feelings for Igrainea lustful desire that quickly blossoms into love when he
is denied access to her by her husbandsubsequently waging war on the Duke in
order to possess her. Heartsick over his inability to possess Igraine, Uther seeks
the aid of Merlin in winning access to her. One might expect Uther to employ
the wizard to kill the Duke, but Uther has other plans. With magical assistance
from Merlin, Uther morphs into the Duke, slips past the Dukes castle guard at
Tintagil, where Igraine is entrenched, and there Uther, by his deception, rapes
Igraine and conceives Arthur. Fortuitously for Uther, during the siege the Duke
is killed and Uther is able to wed Igraineone should not too easily entertain
the idea that there was no small amount of force applied to Igraine to convince
her to wed Uther. After the wedding, which includes the marriage of Igraines
oldest daughters to knights in the retinue of Uther, Morgan is sent to a Christian
nunnery.31
Despite her early incarnations as a goddess of healing, Morgan is transformed
in the Legend into an evil enchantress hell bent on destroying Arthur and the
knights of Camelot. While there is never a satisfactory explanation given by
30 For an analysis of the likely corruption of Morgans name in Arthurian Legend see
J.D. Bruce, Some Proper Names in Layamons Brut Not Represented in Wace or Geoffrey
of Monmouth Modern Language Notes, 26(3) (March, 1911): 659.
31 Malory, Bk. I Ch. 12. It is of no small importance that the eldest sister is
Margawse, the eventual mother of Gawain. Also, here it is first intimated to the reader that
Morgan is a student of the Dark Arts learning necromancy during her time at the nunnery.
Malory, or any authors of the other early texts, for Morgans desire to kill Arthur,
one easily suspects it is because he has inherited Uthers kingdom, which includes
her stolen birthright. Most scholars point to Morgans sexual appetites and
ill-fated attempts at love, which include an emotional attachment to Lancelot,
among others in the court of Camelot, as the primary reason for her continued
assaults on Arthur,32 but my mimetic explanation provides a less negative account
of Morgan to achieve the same plotline. And Morgan has, historically, been
handled negatively, like Medusa, because she represents a strong female character.
What bolsters the mimetic account of Morgan is that she is later reconciled with
Arthur, in spite of the numerous attempts she makes on his life, and lovingly
attends to him after he is struck down in battle, going so far as to escort his body
to Avalon. Ominously, in the aftermath of Arthurs death, Camelot is destroyed.33
There are also, in addition to the sibling rivalry of Morgan and Arthur, two
triangles, one with Margawse and the other with Lancelot, that support a reading
of Arthurian Legend as constructed around the mimetic crisis. First, and least well
known in the popular tradition, is Arthurs liaison with his half-sister Margawse.
Margawse is sent by her husband King Lot, whom Uther married to her after his
sacking of the Duke of Cornwall, to espy the court of King Arthur.34 While
there King Arthur desires to sleep with her because she is still a passing fair
lady and, once she agrees to the coupling, Arthur begets Mordred upon her. The
incestuous nature of the pairing links nicely to the mimetic crisis, but Merlins
disapproval of Arthur is what hammers home the connection. Merlin chastises the
king saying, ye have done a thing late that God is displeased with you, for ye
have lain by your sister, and on her ye have gotten a child that shall destroy you
and all the knights of your realm.35
The familial relation between Arthur and Mordred is echoed in the Alliterative
Morte Arthure where Arthur leaves Mordred in charge of Camelot while he and
his knights journey to the continent to rebuke, with bloodshed, the emperor of
Rome. Before he departs, Arthur says to his subjects, I assign to you a sovereign,
should you show your assent: my sisters own son, Sir Mordred. Arthur cautions
Mordred to betray me never [so that] if you have in you the grace to govern
32 For an excellent overview on the sordid history of Morgans love life see Albert
Freidman, Morgan le Fay in Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, Speculum, 35(2) (April,
1960): 26074.
33 Avalon is a fabled island paradise often referred to as the island of apples and
represents the promised return of utopia in the Arthurian Legend. Camelot is destroyed
after Arthurs death, but he is taken by Morgan, the healer enchantress, to recover and
recuperate, in order to return when Britain once again has need of him. Hence, by virtue
of his being taken to Avalon, as opposed to being given an actual burial befitting a king,
he is the once and future king. For more on the controversy and historical evidence
surrounding the location of Avalon and Arthurs burial see Geoffrey Ashe, The Discovery
of King Arthur, esp. Ch. 8.
34 Malory, Le Morte, Bk. I Ch. 19.
35 Malory, Le Morte, Bk. I Ch. 20.
with goodness I shall crown you, my knight, a king with my hands. But Mordred
attempts to refuse the responsibility so that he may join the war party, responding,
I beseech you, sir, my sibling by blood, that you choose another in the name of
charity.36 But Arthur does not relent and Mordred has an affair with Guinevere
in Arthurs absencea relationship which is interpreted by turns as a rape or
collusion. Either way, Mordred begins to usurp Arthurs authority throughout
the kingdom and his actions result in the return of the king setting the stage for
his final battle.37 In their climatic meeting Arthur smote Sir Mordred under the
shield, with a foin of his spear, throughout the body, more than a fathom but
the blow, while decisive, did not deliver instantaneous death to Mordred who
felt that he had his death wound [so he] thrust himself with the might he had up
to the bur of King Arthurs spear. Impaled on Arthurs spear, Mordred, holding
his sword with both hands, smote his father Arthur on the side of the head,
that the sword pierced the helmet and the brain-pan, and therewithal Sir Mordred
fell stark dead to the earth; and the noble Arthur fell in a swoon to the earth.38
Lingering in the background of Arthurs death is the mimetic resolution of
the triangular crisis. A father/sibling kills and, in return, is killed by his son/
sibling as the two war over the right to govern and the object of their affections.
While Mordreds relationship with Guinevere is often interpreted as a rape, it is
also true that he attempts to woo her after she flees from him, at least according
to Malorys account. There are insinuations in the relationship of Mordred and
Guinevere that recall Uthers lustful lovesickness for Igraine. But, regardless of
how one interprets the Mordred/Guinevere relationship, it is difficult to deny the
importance for mimesis of a woman embroiled in two triangles featuring the same
man as model, responsible, in the end, for bringing about the destruction of the
utopia that is Camelot.
36 Anon., Alliterative Morte Arthure, circa 1400, trans. Simon Armitage, The Death
of King Arthur, New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2012. Lines 64481. Emphasis added.
The AMA was most certainly available to Malory as was another popular poetic rendition
of Arthurs life at the time the Stanzaic Le Morte Arthur both of which contributed, along
with Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, to a resurgence in Arthurian literature and interest.
Interestingly, Morgan plays a pivotal role in the tale of Sir Gawain and the Green Knight
which is one of her attempts to undermine Arthur and the court at Camelot. Chief among
her aims are the discrediting or destruction of Arthur and the death of Guinevere.
37 Mordreds behavior smacks of the actions of John Lackland during the absence
of Richard I (the Lionheart). This resemblance has led some commentators to compare the
Arthurian Legend to that of Robin Hood. That is, Robin Hood was to the common folk
what Arthur was to the nobility. John Lackland and Richard the Lionheart are one of the
great fratricidal pairs identified by Girard in his work. If the analogy holds, then, Arthur and
Mordred are a better mimetic example since Arthur is both father and brother of Mordred.
38 Malory, Le Morte, Bk. XXI Ch. 4.
Guineveres involvement with Lancelot is almost as well known in popular

culture as Juliets involvement with Romeo.39 In fact, Lancelots entanglement
with the queen is the site of much dispute among the various sources that report
on the twosome. It does not matter how the relationship is portrayedas Lancelot
ravishing the queen or Guinevere pursuing the good knightthe important aspect
for a mimetic reading is that Lancelot fears Arthurs discovery that he is being
cuckolded. Arthur is warned by Merlin that his marriage will be a sham from
day one because Guinevere is not a wholesome wife for him because Lancelot
should love her, and she him again.40 Malory, wishing to present Arthur as the
most worshipful king in Christendom, must have realized from the beginning
he had to represent Lancelot as the true lover of Arthurs queen.41 But even
Malorys gentle handling of the affair could not save Lancelot from his mimetic
fate. But, perhaps, it is too quick of a sentencing upon the unfortunate pair to
judge them to be the downfall of Camelot based on their affair. Indeed, their
respective roles in the Arthurian Legend suggest a more forgiving read of their
star-crossed love.
Their romance is, for one, quite different than the intimate affairs of other
characters in the Legend. Lancelot and Guinevere are depicted as being genuinely
in love, that is, a true love as opposed to a lustful one, as her marriage to
Arthur is portrayed, or a love based purely on convenience or mutual advantage.
The depth of their love is revealed in the scene where they are exposed to
Arthur and caught by a cunning trap laid by Sir Agravaine.42 Lancelot, naked
in bed with Guinevere, has only his sword and no armor, and fearing that he
shall be slain, Guinevere laments, wherefore I dread me sore our long love is
39 The comparison is not without merit given that one of the raciest encounters
between the two occurs after Guinevere is abducted by the traitorous Sir Meliagrance.
Lancelot, in an attempt to save her, challenges Meliagrance to a fight. But Meliagrance
throws himself on the mercy of Guinevere that she might subdue the anger of Lancelot and
spare him. This she does and Meliagrance opens his castle to Lancelot with the promise
that they shall be set free the next day. Overnight, however, Lancelot visits Guinevere by
stealing through her window under cover of darkness to spend the night with her, leaving
just before the break of day. Bk. XIX Ch. 6. The scene is clearly evocative of Romeos
secret rendezvous with Juliet.
40 Malory, Le Morte, Bk. III Ch. 2.
41 Beverly Kennedy, Adultery in Malorys Le Morte dArthur, Arthuriana, 7(4)
(Winter 1997): 64.
42 Sir Agravaine is the brother of Sir Mordred which, by extension, makes him the
brother of Arthur. Agravaine and Mordred plot and scheme against Guinevere and Lancelot
for some time because they have ever a privy hate unto the queen Dame Guinevere and
to Sir Lancelot, Bk. XX Ch. 1. Their hatred is the result, according to some scholarly
interpretations, of jealousy toward both; the Dame because they cannot lie with her and the
Knight because they cannot match his skill.
come to a mischievous end wherefore ye are likely to be slain, and then shall
I be brent.43
The long tradition of analyzing Guinevere in light of her adulterous ways
does not do justice to her plight. She is, in fact, a dutiful wife for Arthur who
manages the affairs of the realm with grace and mercy. This is evidenced by
the The Wife of Baths Tale in Geoffrey Chaucers Canterbury Tales where
Guinevere uses her influence with Arthur to convince him to spare a knights
life.44 Moreover, her judiciousness keeps her at the fore of Arthurs dealings with
his knights. Her dependence on Lancelot during times of crisis is uncharacteristic
and rather than establish her as subordinate because she is merely Arthurs
wife, [it helps] establish her vulnerability because she is Lancelots lover.45
What is more perplexing in judging their relationship is the fact that after their
exposure to Arthur his first concerns are that Lancelot is against him and that
the noble fellowship of the Round Table will be broken foreverconcerns he
bewails before casually condemning the queen to death for treason.46 Guineveres
sexuality holds important clues to the fate of Camelot because the possible
violation of Guinevere [before the discovery of her affair with Lancelot] and the
loss of the Arthurian kingdoms integrity will later work itself through in terms
other than the figurative and speculative, with the threat of violence again coming
from within the community.47
Lancelot, for his part, recruits as many knights to his cause as he can before
striking out for his own castle fully aware that the revelation of his actions will
incite a civil war. Indeed, in Malorys text, it is Lancelot that Arthur is chasing in
France when Mordred undertakes his own treason with Guinevere. But Lancelot
is intriguing mimetically in another way as well; he is the focal point for more
than a few nefarious relationships in the Arthurian Legend. In addition to his
seditious love affair with Guinevere, Lancelot is an object of desire for Morgan
43 Malory, Le Morte, Bk. XX Ch. 3. I shall be brent. is often taken to mean

Ishall die shortly afterward. Whether she means a broken heart or the wrath of Arthur is
left to the imagination though she does implore Lancelot to promise that should he escape
he will rescue her from whatever danger she finds herself in.
44 Geoffrey Chaucer, Canterbury Tales, Pennsylvania: The Franklin Library, 1981.
The copy I reference is a facsimile reprint of William Caxons second editionCaxon
was also the publisher of Malorys Le Morte dArthur. Sansa Starks intervention with
King Joffrey on behalf of Ser Dontos in George R.R. Martins Game of Thrones saga is
reminiscent of Chaucers tale.
45 Kenneth Hodges, Guineveres Politics in Malorys Morte dArthur, The Journal
of English and Germanic Philology, 104(1) (January 2005): 56.
46 Malory, Le Morte, Bk. XX Ch. 7.
47 Catherine Batt, Malory and Rape, Arthuriana, 7(3) (Fall 1997): 86. Emphasis
added. The possibility of violation, the threat of sexual violence, originates in a giant known
for abducting maidens and raping them to death. Arthur undertakes a quest to kill the giant
when he learns that the giant has carried off the Duchess of Brittany and has desires for
Guinevere. For a retelling of the scene see the Alliterative Morte Arthure lines 9761032.
le Fay, he is twice raped at the hands of King Pelless daughter Elaine, he is

mistaken for a woman and caught up in a homosexual embrace as a result, and he
is nearly raped by the enchantress Hellawas, whose failure to trick him into bed
results in her death by broken heart within a fortnight.48
Malorys narrative investigates the consequences of rapein terms of its
effects on the physical person and its implications for the sense of a moral and
social selfnot in relation to a female character, but to the person of Lancelot.49
Lancelots role as victim in his relationships with people other than Guinevere
inverts the traditional paradigmatic approach to understanding rape as it plays
out in a mimetic setting. That is, Lancelots suffering of repeated violations
are dehumanizing for him because his assumed moral and social integrity
guarantee his physical wholeness so it is fitting that desire for Lancelot, and for
knowledge of what and who Lancelot is, should manifest itself as a transgressive
desire for his body.50 In short, Lancelot is simultaneously representative of the
disciple that yearns to supplant the model and the disciple that is desired by the
mother whose incestuous interests incite the overthrow of the modelthis is an
alternative to the GST that I explored in Chapter 3, but it is, more importantly, a
mimetic story the GST cannot account for.
Given the destructive mimetic nature of the relationships of Arthur, Guinevere,
and Lancelot it is difficult to deny the mimetic underpinnings of the Legend.
Couple these triangles with the sibling rivalry embedded in the relationships of
Arthur, Morgan, and Mordred and it is nigh impossible to fail to see how the
Arthurian Myth, in spite of what its creators may have had in mind, is anything
but a re-telling of the mimetic dangers of a society. And, I might add, not just
any society, but the utopia that was Camelot. Camelot did not fail because it
was overrun by barbarian hordes, or because it was politically mismanaged, but,
rather, because it was infected with a terrible crisis generated from within the
community.
48 Morgans interest in Lancelot is difficult to gauge because it is a mixture of

legitimate desire for him and jealousy of Guinevere, and hatred for Arthur. She is often
responsible for imprisoning Lancelot in attempts to make him love her or tricking Lancelot
into doing shameful things, see Bk. VI Ch. 3, Bk. XI Ch. 4, and in Bk. IX Ch. 41 Morgan
attempts to expose Lancelot and Guinevere to Arthur by way of a shield smuggled into
a tournament. When Arthur inquires about the shields meaning Morgan, disguised as a
maiden, informs him of its meaning. This she does because she loved [him] best, and ever
she desired him, and he would never lover her nor do nothing at her request. Elaine is able
to succeed in her plans to rape Lancelot by way of enchantmentshe is made to look like
Guinevere in both instancesand her second tryst with him is discovered by Guinevere
driving Lancelot insane, see Bk. 11 Ch. 2 and 9. The case of mistaken identity that leads to
Lancelot being mistaken for a woman occurs after he is enchanted by Morgan le Fay, see
Bk. VI Ch. 5. For his encounter with Hellawas see Bk. VI Ch. 15.
49 Catherine Batt, Mallory and Rape, 84.
50 Catherine Batt, Mallory and Rape, 91.
Mimetic Distortion: Thomas More and the Best State of a Commonwealth51
The importance of Thomas Mores seminal work in the utopian catalog cannot be
understated.52 Its contributions to social and political theory, philosophy, literature,
history, and other disciplines are well deserved and well documented. As the first
utopian tract acknowledged as such by both its author and its audience I include
it here as the final classic example because its design deals specifically with the
mimetic tropes I have previously identified as paramount to this investigation.
So significant is Mores publication of Utopia53 that it is often seen as the end
of the ideal society drought supposedly occurring between Plato and the 1516
publication of Mores text. The interval between the two authors is dotted, in the
west, with Christian descriptions of Heaven, or the afterlife, but few thinkers
or fiction writers sought to describe an earthly paradise in their works since the
dominant idea of the age held that paradise on earth had already been lost in the
fall, and could not be gotten back save by salvation. As late as 1922, this mistaken
belief was still firmly fixed in the scholars mindset as Lewis Mumford makes
clear. In his chapter on Thomas More, which follows immediately his chapter on
Plato, Mumford writes,
There is a span of nearly two thousand years between Plato and Sir Thomas More.
During that time, in the Western World at any rate, utopia seems to disappear
beyond the horizon. Plutarchs Life of Lycurgus looks back into a mythical past;
Ciceros essay on the state is a negligible work; and St. Augustines City of
51 There are no surviving copies of the original text for Mores utopia. All extant
versions are based on surviving manuscripts from the first four editionsthose More or
those close to him are known to have had a direct hand in shapingpublished at Louvain
(1516), Paris (1517), and, two editions published in Basel, one in March and the other in
November (1518). I use the George Logan and Robert Adams translation of the March 1518
edition, which is, generally, considered the most complete vision Thomas More had for his
utopia. Thomas More, Utopia, trans. G. Logan and R. Adams. Cambridge: Cambridge UP,
1975 [2006]. All page numbers for Utopia refer to this edition.
52 For an explanation of the name utopia which More introduced into the modern
lexicon see Chapter 5, fn. 41.
53 The full title of the work is On the Best State of a Commonwealth and on the
New Island of Utopia: A Truly Golden Handbook, No Less Beneficial than Entertaining, by
the Most Distinguished and Eloquent Author THOMAS MORE, Citizen and Undersheriff
of the Famous City of London. More divides the work into two parts, or dialogues,
between Raphael Hythloday, More, and Mores friend, and host of the discussions, Peter
Giles. The first part of Utopia consists primarily of Hythloday explaining why he would
not be good at politics because his talents would be wasted in a court composed of people
who envy everyone else and admire only themselves (p. 14). The second part consists
of Raphaels account of Utopia per his travels there. He claims to have visited the island
off the coast of North America when he was left as a member of a landing party by the
explorer Amerigo Vespucci.
God is chiefly remarkable for a brilliant journalistic attack upon the old order of
Rome which reminds one of the contemporary diatribes of Maximilian Harden.
Except for these works there is, as far as I can discover, scarcely any other piece
of writing which even hints at utopia except as utopia may refer to a dim golden
age in the past when all men were virtuous and happy.54
This is, I believe, demonstrably false, but the idea continues to overshadow the
reality outside of the limited scope of scholarship on utopian studies. Mores
utopia is certainly a landmark in the literary landscape of utopian thought, but
it is equally certain that he is the beneficiary of exposure to a number of ideal
societies popularized throughout the medieval period, Arthurs Camelot not least
among them. What gives Mores little treatise its historical clout is the fact that it
was initially circulated primarily among the ruling and elite classes of society. It is
also noteworthy for having consolidated a specific tradition of social and political
thoughtone in which the dilemmas of society are considered and a prescriptive
account provided of the best way to resolve them.55 On these grounds, then, it
is possible to argue that Mores utopia is the first to present itself as more than a
fantastic hope for a better future.
Mores work is prescriptive because he seeks to articulate how certain social
practices and institutions fail to meet a standard of basic humanism. His critiques
of English society, however, were couched in linguistic jokes and a casual,
humorous style, making it seem as if it were just as fanciful as other medieval and
Renaissance visions of the future common at the time among the lower classes.56
That is, if Mores utopia was geared toward the educated upper and emerging
middle classes, then the raucous tales embodied by the various, long established,
Cockaign poems, songs, and stories were the poorer classes reply. In these tales,
birds, roasted and covered in gravy, fly right into open mouths, theres no work
to be done, no illness, everyones equal, and so on, embodying a whole host of
exaggerated notions that are typically associated with fanciful utopian narratives.57
54 Lewis Mumford, The Story of Utopias, Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith Publisher,
1922, 59.
55 David Halpen, Utopianism and Education: The Legacy of Thomas More, British
Journal of Educational Studies, 49(3) (September, 2001): 300.
56 Mores playfulness in Utopia echoes his friend Erasmuss claim in the dedication
of The Praise of Folly that every other profession is entitled to a bit of leisurewhats so
terrible if scholars take a little time off for play, especially if their foolery leads to something
slightly more serious? Some jokes can be managed in such a way that a reader who isnt
altogether thick of nose can profit by themmore, perhaps, than from the pompous formal
arguments of certain people we know (pp. 45). Erasmuss dedication is made specifically
to More whose family name is derivative of the Greek word moria () which means,
literally, idiot but a likely better fit in translation is Erasmuss term folly. Erasmus,
The Praise of Folly, trans. Robert Adams. New York: W.W. Norton and Co., 1989.
57 A variety of these tales are showcased in The Utopia Reader. These lower
class utopias resonate nicely with the utopian themes popularized in the numerous
Mores text is riddled with linguistic nuances that only the most astute readers
of the day would have picked up on. This is because the situation in Utopia is
complex: a nonsense peddler [Raphael Hythloday] condemns Europe and
praises Noplace; and his viewsmany of which are clearly not nonsenseare
reported by a character who bears the authors name, and who dissociates himself
from most of them.58 Mores need to dissociate himself from the claims made by
Raphael Hythloday, the books primary speaker, arise because so many of them
are in line with the less appreciated Greek ideas being espoused by the early
Humanists gathered together by Erasmusa group More identified with. More
has Raphael say things that are pro-Greek in contradistinction to the pro-Roman
sentiments popular among Europeans of the day. Further relevance for the humor,
according to Eric Nelson, is that Mores network of Greek puns do not simply
entertain; they organize his thoughts and present his arguments in a way that
suggests he is not just playing seriously.59
Perhaps the most overlooked barbed witticism More uses to antagonize the
pro-Roman factions in his audience is positioning himself as a character opposite
Hythloday. More, the character, disputes as nonsensical all of the arguments
for the best commonwealth that Hythloday puts forward. Speaking to this issue
Eric Nelson writes, Mores word-play leaves us as witnesses to a dialogue between
a speaker of nonsense and a fool, but the discussions Greek versus Roman slant
also recalls Platos Republic where Socrates is one who speaks nonsense to those
still in the cave.60 As such, in the confrontation between More and Hythloday
we have a clash between a man trapped in the cave [More, the defender of English
society] and one who has seen the sun [the worldly wise, Greek-inspired humanist,
Hythloday].61 Mores connections to Platos Republic are by turns obvious and
twentieth-century remakes of the Big Rock Candy Mountain motif especially in the
country and western music genre. For instance, in the original lyrics written by Harry
Haywire Mac McClintock, the Big Rock Candy Mountains are a land thats fair and
bright/ The handouts grow on bushes, And you sleep out every night./ The boxcars all are
empty, And the sun shines every day/ Im bound to go, Where there aint no snow/ Where
the sleet dont fall, And the winds dont blow. For more on what Hal Rammel calls the
poor mans paradise see his Nowhere in America: The Big Rock Candy Mountain and
Other Comic Utopias, Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1990.
58 Adams, More Utopia, xxi.
59 Eric Nelson, Greek Nonsense in Mores Utopia. The Historical Journal,
44(4) (Dec., 2001): 890. Nelsons work provides an excellent study of the Greek puns and
Mores use of them. See also, James Romm, Mores Strategy of Naming in the Utopia.
The Sixteenth Century Journal, 22(2) (Summer 1991): 17383.
60 Eric Nelson, Greek Nonsense, 891. The reference to a speaker of nonsense is
Hythloday and the fool is the character More, whose name can be associated with folly.
See fn 56 above.
61 Eric Nelson, Greek Nonsense, 892.
ambiguous, but his utopia has, in the realm of political philosophy, often been
treated as an imitation of and implicitly a supplement to the Republic.62
More is not just offering a re-purposed Republic, however, his island is meant
to be more than just a city in speech qua Socrates; he is openly criticizing
English principles and values, but doing so by highlighting the dangers of using
ideal theories to model civilization. Mores utopia is, for this reason, rightly seen
as a turning point in political philosophy because it picks up the platonic theme
that ideal societies can be something other than lost Edens, that is, recalling
Plato, they can be useful critiques. Benedict Anderson argues that this had to be so
because the utopias written in the wake of New World discoveries, starting with
More, were composed as criticisms of contemporary societies, and the discoveries
had ended the necessity for seeking models in a varnished antiquity.63 Mores
use of the medium to present a critique of English society and the dangers that
came with idealizing Roman culture, or believing that our own imaginations could
guide us to a future optima respublica, revolutionized the tools at the disposal of
the social and political critics. Following Erasmuss much-truth-in-jest foray
into criticism, Mores humorous aside sets the stage for Enlightenment thinkers
to employ similar tactics. More, and his contemporaries, who followed his lead,
made it possible for the luminaries of the Enlightenment, Vico, Montesquieu,
Voltaire, and Rousseau, who increasingly exploited real non-Europe for a
barrage of subversive writings directed against current European social and
political institutions, to offer stringent criticisms of their societies couched in the
non-offensive medium of fiction.64
More does not turn Plato on his head; rather, he picks up on the Socratic idea
that there are no current nation-states suitably situated to become ideal philosophic
statesevidenced in Hythlodays rejection of the idea that he should become an
advisor to kings on the grounds that they would either not listen to him or that they
would fail to understand him. On this point Hythloday notes that kings often think
themselves above the concerns of justice because they are far more wont to follow
their whims than their reason. Thus, Hythloday says, people are apt to think that
justice is altogether a humble, plebian virtue, far beneath the dignity of kings. Or
else they conclude that there are two kinds of justice, one for the common herd
and one which is the justice of princes.65
62 James Nendza, Political Idealism in Mores Utopia. The Review of Politics,

46(3) (July, 1984): 428. In the poem Six Lines on the Island of Utopia, the authorship of
which is unknown, but was most likely written by More or one of his close companions,
but is reportedly written by Anemolius (the windy one), the author says now with
Platos state I can compare, perhaps outdo her (for what he drew,/ In empty words I have
made live anew ) The poem is in the supplementary texts included by Logan and
Adams. See p. 117.
63 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, New York: Verso, 1983 [2006], 69.
64 Anderson, Imagined Communities, 69.
65 Thomas More, Utopia, 84.
Toward the end of their conversation in the first part of the text, Hythloday tells
More the Utopians have made themselves masters of all our useful inventions,
but I suspect it will be a long time before we adopt any institutions of theirs which
are better than ours. This readiness to learn is the really important reason for
their being better governed and living more happily than we do.66 More implores
Hythloday to provide a more detailed account of his other-worldly travels and
share all he knows because like the Utopians, More and Giles want to know
everything [they] dont know yet.67 One of the possible purposes of Mores project
is to provide a rejoinder to the fermenting Protestant Reformation by promoting
civic peace and social, specifically religious, reforms.
More attempts to offer a coherent account of an ideal society along reformist
lines in spite of his seeming commitment to the futility of such an enterprise. While
Utopia abounds with contradictions that stem from the need for social functions to
be both practical, that is, expedient, and ideal, for my purposes I will focus only on
three areas that inform the mimetic account I am offering of Mores contribution
to generating a mythology of the future. Toward that end it will be pertinent to
examine the family structure in Utopia, the religious and relevant governing
principles of the Utopians, and the citizens concerns about violence. Each of these
concerns is linked together in Mores account of Utopia and, whether he thought
the ideal was possible or not, reveals some interesting insights into the ongoing
response to the mimetic crisis I am developing.
There are fifty-four cities in Utopia and all are spacious and magnificent,
entirely identical in language, customs, institutions and laws. So far as the location
permits, all of them are built on the same plan and have the same appearance.68
Each house is indistinguishable from the next and where variation occurs, or
idiosyncrasies develop, they do not matter, because the Utopians swap houses
every decade, a process which occurs by lot, rather than preference or hierarchy.
The houses have to be identical because the family structure is built around the
living arrangements the Utopians have developed to ensure that everyones needs
are met. Each house has a front door that opens up to the street and a back door
that opens upon garden so that their entire backyard is given over to the garden.69
The gardens are a point of pride and competition for the Utopians, but, while they
grow a variety of food stuffs, the gardens are not enough to supply the food needs

68More, Utopia, 43.
69 About the gardens in Utopia Bob Adams notes Apart from its obvious practical
advantages, the Utopians fondness for Gardens may hint at a connection of their way of
life with Epicureanism. This is certainly possible given their focus solely on the bare
necessities of sorts for which Epicurus was a strong proponent. However, the connection
breaks down quickly because of the Utopian commitment to a soul and an afterlife which
Epicurus did not believe in. As I will address below, what this means, in short, is that
Epicurus could not live in Utopia. See More, Utopia, 46, fn 17.
of the families, or the individual cities. Hence, each municipal area is split into the
city proper and farm acreage extending twelve miles in every direction. Every year
citizens from the cities trade places with citizens in the country so that all learn the
farm trades and learn to become cultivators instead of landlords.
Learning agricultural skills is important, but these do not replace the
individual skills each person is expected to learn to contribute to the society.
Every person is expected to learn at least one trade which will supply both their
family, and the larger community, with the necessities of life.70 These skills are
mostly learned in the family, passed down through the generations, and all of
them are learned through an apprenticeship style, but the Utopian notion of
family is an alien concept compared to Mores England. Much like Socratess
early Republicans the Utopians do not desire the finer thingsindeed, Glaucon
would never book a passage to such a placebelieving, as they do, that Nature
has placed her best gifts out in the open, like air, water and the earth itself;
vain and unprofitable things she has hidden away in more remote places.71
Accordingly, the Utopians use golden chamber pots and give their children fine
jewels as toys. They despise idleness and lax efforts,72 often working together on
common projects to build camaraderie and unity, and when the work is finished
they eat their meals in common before either [playing] music or [amusing]
themselves with conversation.73
All of the work is achieved through a careful management of the population
with neighborhood leaders and, ultimately, individual families responsible for
ensuring that everything is done when and how it is supposed to be, and that there
is no shortage of labor, which can involve the forced migration of the population
to other areas. While the leaders are elected from among the population, the
Utopians never elect a person that seeks office, in fact, if a person seeks election
70 According to Hythloday the Utopians stockpile their supplies in common

warehouses and draw what is necessary when it is needed. The idea that each family be
productive with respect to a particular thing is surely reminiscent of Platos emphasis on
the importance of specialized labor in the first city. That More extends that analysis to
the family is important because each family produces, and contributes their products to
society, because everything is held in common. The Utopians themselves practice a strict
communalism that ensures justice for all by abolishing private property. This is clearly
indicated by their house-swapping as well as by a common, and plain, dress code. These
themes are explored in more careful detail by Ursula le Guin in her novel The Dispossessed.
72 Hythloday describes the situation such that nowhere is there any chance to loaf or
any pretext for evading work; there are no wine-bars, or ale-houses, or brothels; no chances
for corruption; no hiding places; no spots for secret meetings. Because they live in full view
of all, they are bound to be either working at their usual trades or enjoying their leisure in
a respectable way. Such customs must necessarily result in plenty of lifes good things, and
since they share everything equally, it follows that no one can ever be reduced to poverty
or forced to beg, p. 59.
they are banned from ever holding office. The leaders deal with public matters,
consulting the popular vote when necessary, but fathers head up the family and
bear responsibility for the supervision and productivity of the family. Hythloday
explains the organization of the public hierarchy with the frame of reference that
the whole island is like a single family.74 As such, the basis of the Utopian
political state is the family.75
The families in Utopia are large extended family units consisting of several
generations living under one roof. Each household consists generally of blood
relations. When the women grow up and are married, they move into their
husbands households. One the other hand, male children and grandchildren remain
in the family, and are subject to the oldest member, unless his mind has started to
fail from old age, in which case the next oldest takes his place.76 When there is
a marriage the woman moves into the home of her husband, unless extenuating
circumstances demand otherwise (i.e. her family, or some other city, is in need of
people to replenish those lost to illness, war, or colonization) because the balance
of population is necessary to ensure that each persons, familys, and citys needs
can be met by the society. More uses the masculine pronoun to speak of the oldest
in charge, and the movement of the wives into the husbands home would also
suggest that the male members of the families dominate its administration.
However, a male-dominated heirarchy simply cannot be the case because the
Utopians favor gender equalityalong the lines of Socratess Republicthey
even send their women and children to war.77 So, it must be that the oldest is the
head of the family, male or female, and this eliminates the need for the selection
of an heir. In fact, with so many couples in the family the order of succession
could hardly work in any other way.78 The equality of the sexes in society is
confounded with the seeming inequality inflicted on women in the household,
however, because while the oldest of every household is the ruler, wives act
as servants to their husbands, children to their parents, and generally the younger

75 Lewis Mumford, The Story of Utopias, 71.
77 Hythloday tells his audience that in Utopia the women and children are encouraged
to accompany, and are praised for joining, their men in battlethough they are not forced
to accompany them to war, just as no man is required to fight. But if they choose to go
with their men Each leaves with her husband, and they stand shoulder to shoulder in the
line of battle; in addition, they place around a man his children and his blood- or marriage-
relations, so that those who by nature have most reason to help one another may be closest
at hand for mutual support. It is a matter of great reproach for either spouse to come home
without the other, or for a son to return after losing a parent. The result is that if the enemy
stands his ground, the hand-to-hand fighting is apt to be long and bitter, ending only when
everyone is dead, p. 90. Such a concept has clear conceptual ties with ancient Sparta.
78 There are 6,000 households in a given city and each one may contain no fewer
than 10 and no more than 16 adults, or five to eight married couples, minor children in the
household are not regulated.
to their elders.79 In the households, More provides both the basic structure of
mimetic relationships and a corrective to them, but it is impossible to have them
both, and as I have already argued, the mimetic crisis is a perpetual threat. There
are additional safeguards, however, that More allots in the actual institution
of marriage.
Choosing a mate in Utopia is of the utmost importance because the pairing is
expected to last until someone dies. Women do not marry till they are eighteen,
nor men till they are twenty-two. Clandestine premarital intercourse, if discovered
and proved, brings severe punishment on both the man and the woman the
mother and father of the household where the offence was committed suffer
public disgrace for having been remiss in their duty. The reason they punish
this offence so severely is that they suppose few people would join in married
lovewith confinement to a single partner and all the petty annoyances that
married life involvesunless they were strictly restrained from promiscuous
intercourse.80 It is clear that More is attuned to the problems of marital life
and strife, even if he does not think of those problems in mimetic terms. Yet,
his arrangement of the family, while attempting to mitigate the problems of
mimesis in the household contradictorily construe the situation so that mimesis,
while somewhat thwarted, would not be eradicated. However, in the larger
construction of the multi-generational, multiple adult household More has hit
upon one of the necessary societal shifts that must occur if mimesis is to be
eradicated form society.81
Divorce is granted only in unusual or extreme circumstances and requires
both popular public support and approval by the senate. Divorce is deliberately
made difficult because they know that conjugal love will hardly be strengthened
if each partner has in mind that a new marriage is easily available.82 The
emphasis on a happy, monogamous married life is where I think More exposes
his misunderstanding of the mimetic crisis, especially where he thinks that a
commitment to it is better through coercion than a dismissal of it as an integral
part of the family life. More recognizes that an acceptable sex life is important
to a happy, healthy family and to ensure that conjugality continues men and
women are shown naked to each other prior to marriage so that both may take
note of any bodily deformities that may exist on their future partner. While this
may, again, seem to place some equality between the sexes, Hythlodays account
reserves desirability as a trait of the female sex. So, while the Utopians eschew
artificial beauty and understand that no physical attractions recommend a wife
to her husband so effectually as an upright character, they also recognize that
men may be captured by beauty alone, [but] none are held except by virtue and

80 Thomas More, Utopia, 79. Emphasis added.
81 This concept will be explored in greater depth in Chapter 7.
compliance.83 More makes no such claims about men or what they should do in
order to continue to be desirable to their wives.
The family structure is the basis of government in Utopia, and Utopia is
governed like a large family, so it only stands to reason that the foundations of the
Utopian government ought to shed light on the guiding principles of the family.
The country of Utopia was conquered, and subsequently settled, by Utopus, who
gave his name to the island. When Utopus came to the island, not only was it not
an island,84 it was covered with natives that were constantly engaged in warfare
over religious disputes. The natives were unable to unify against the invading
forces and so at the very beginning, after he had gained the victory, he prescribed
by law that everyone may cultivate the religion of his choice, and strenuously
proselytize it too, provided he does so quietly, modestly, rationally, and without
insulting others. If persuasion fails, no one may resort to abuse or violence; and
anyone who fights wantonly about religion is punished by exile or slavery.85
By preventing the privileging of one religious sect over another, Utopus
positioned the government to proscribe politically dangerous forms of religion
and to require all Utopians to subscribe to certain religious doctrines that promoted
virtue. This limited type of religious freedom made Utopia a theologically
diverse, but morally unified society wholly free of religiously inspired violence.86
The attempt to establish a society free of religious violence in the context of a
re-envisioned family model are clear hints that Mores Utopia is responsive to the
evils of the mimetic crisiswhether he knew that or not. Utopus also institutes
a form of social contract that is intended to function with very few laws.87 The
success or failure of his newly founded island is wholly dependent upon the type
and quality of education provided to the children. Utopus was chiefly concerned
in his construction of the commonwealth with the evils of greed and faction,
which, once they have taken root in society, soon destroy all justice, which is the
strongest bond of any society.88 It is clear that Mores concerns are the same as
those of any society that must manage the mimetic crisis.

84 Utopuss first major project after conquering the land was to sever its isthmus and
transform it into an islanda project not unlike the construction of the Panama Canal. The
land was originally called Abraxa which some scholars associate with Abraxas highest of
the 365 heavens postulated by the Greek Gnostic Basilides in the second century. Erasmus
refers to Abraxas several times in his writings and the general scholarly consensus is that
his references are derisive in nature treating it as a fantasy world. Mores use of the name,
if it stems from this source, could be another nod to his friend Erasmus.
86 Sanford Kessler, Religious Freedom in Thomas Mores Utopia. The Review
of Politics, 64(2) (Spring 2002): 207. Emphasis added. Kessler provides an original if not
unorthodox reading of More, but his analysis of the Utopians religious beliefs is riddled
with interesting insights.
87 See p. 68 for a long detailed analysis of the government.
But there is one other aspect of the Utopian culture that helps bring into sharper
focus the responsiveness to the mimetic crisis. In addition to the limited nature
of the laws, regulation of education, marriage, and family, not to mention the
numerous prohibitions on personal behavior, Utopians have a visceral aversion
to bloodshed by citizens in the communityoutside the context of warthat
speaks to Mores attempts to undo the stranglehold of mimesis on society. Slaves
are employed in the task of slaughtering animals for market because citizens
are not allowed to do such work.89 Hythloday explains the Utopians feel that
slaughtering our fellow creatures gradually destroys the sense of compassion, the
finest sentiment of which our human nature is capable.90 Their abhorrence of
butchery carries over into their religious beliefs where they slaughter no animals
in their sacrifices [because] a merciful God will [not] be gratified with slaughter
and bloodshed.91 Harkening back to the Eden story, it is easy to see the break with
the Christian traditionwhich exists in Utopiabecause Abels God was pleased
at his sacrifice. In fact, the only incidence of religious zealotry that Hythloday
recounts is that of a Christian convert who had to be exiled. Bearing in mind
Girards understanding of Christianity as a mediating force for society against
mimesis and, in Mores take on the religion, the same types of concerns are present.
Hythloday maintains throughout his testimony that whatever their principles
are, there is not a more excellent people or a happier commonwealth anywhere
in the whole world.92 And, while this may be true, especially for Hythloday, if
not for More, it is also true that a great many people, strong of mind or gallant of
heart, might, depending on their constitutions, choose to live in Platos Republic
or Arthurs Camelot, but, I believe, fewer would choose to live on Mores fanciful
island. Mores Utopia becomes the keystone for utopian scheming and the
touchstone of the genre for the next 500 years after its publication. There are a
great number of utopian landscapes I could trudge across to continue making my
point, but it is better suited to the project at hand to skip ahead almost five centuries
and study a more contemporary utopian design. A utopian future that derives its
motivation for creating an ideal society out of a similar understanding as Mores
of humanity as incapable of achieving such high ideals, that is, a utopia that begins
with the rejection of the idea that such idyllic hope is good for humanity.
89 Slavery is the most harsh punishment meted out to the citizenry of Utopia, but slaves
can also be taken as prisoners of war, death row inmates purchased out of the prisons of
other countries, and from volunteers who come to Utopia to escape extreme poverty in other
countries, but those in this last group can come and go as they please while the former groups
can, by the forgiving and judicious nature of the Utopians gain their freedom. In a damning
critique of popular practice at the time Utopians allow no children to be born into slavery.
90 Thomas More, Utopia, 55. In a marginal note of the text this is qualified as
necessary because by butchering beasts we learn to slaughter men which is a sentiment
explored at length by Walter Burkert in his work Homo Necans.
Starting Over: Abolishing the Crisis in Margaret Atwoods Oryx and Crake93
Atwoods novel is at once an exciting cautionary tale that easily deserves a place
next to Orwells Nineteen Eighty-Four, and is an interesting lens through which to
view the problem of mimesis in society. Set in a harrowing near-present, the story
is told from the perspective of Jimmy, a.k.a. Thickney, who survives a devastating
plague that seems to him to have annihilated humankind. Jimmy is one of three
characters vital to the story and, mimetically speaking, his role as the disciple in
the triangulation is imperative to understanding what Atwoods dystopian future
has to teach us about the damage mimesis has done to society. The other two
characters, completing the triangle are Glenn, a.k.a. Crake, who becomes Jimmys
model and the beautiful, yet elusive, Oryx94 whose real name is never divulged.
These three characters live out the tragedy of their lives in a future that is fueled
by corporate greed, sustained by technological dependence, and fractured by
extreme class warfare. Atwoods story, in addition to being a cautionary tale about
the pitfalls and dangers of a technofuture that values production, efficiency, and
money more than morality, beauty, and critical thought, is also a case study in
breaking the mimetic cycle.
In this particular case, however, the mimetic triangle centers on these three
characters rather than a family unit per se.95 The important feature of the novel,
however, resides in the Crakers. The Crakers are the petri dish created, laboratory
perfected, neo-humans designed by Crake as floor models to showcase the
genetic enhancements his employer will soon make available to the rest of
the world. They are also the creation of a perfect human society according to
the gospel of Crake.96 As Jimmy describes them, theres no more jealousy, no
93 Margaret Atwood, Oryx and Crake, New York: Anchor Books, 2003.
94 The three character names are chosen by Glenn from Extinctathon, a game
about extinct animals. Crake had picked their codenames. Jimmys was Thickney, after
a defunct Australian double-jointed bird that used to hang out in cemeteries, andJimmy
suspectedbecause Crake liked the sound of it as applied to Jimmy. Crakes codename
was Crake, after the Red-necked Crake, another Australian birdnever, said Crake, very
numerous. For a while they called each other Crake and Thickney, as an in-joke. After
Crake had realized Jimmy was not wholeheartedly participating and theyd stopped playing
Extinctathon, Thickney as a name had faded away. But Crake had stuck, p. 81. Oryx gets
her name from Crake later, taken from the same Extinctathon lists. An Oryx is a variety of
African antelope.
95 This is not a break with the Girardian tradition since Girard himself often locates
the mimetic triangle in non-familial relationships. Recall the example of Don Quixote
where the triangle centered on Quixote, the knight Amadis, and perfect chivalry. While the
main players in this example are not family the end goal of the triangle is breaking down
the series of mimetic events.
96 While the Crakers bear Crakes name it is only fair to point out that, whatever
else he might be, Crake was not so much of an egomaniac that he named his creation after
himself. The name Crakers was bestowed upon the creation by Oryx.
more wife-butcherers, no more husband-poisoners. [Theyre] all good-natured: no

pushing and shoving, more like the gods cavorting with willing nymphs on some
golden-age Grecian frieze.97
The world of Jimmy and Crake is dominated by class warfare where the lines
have been drawn by corporations, and governments have become non-existent as
major players on the local, national, and international scenes. Both of the boys come
from broken homes and each, in their own way, is socially isolated, and the two
form an unlikely bond. Jimmy and Crake grow up among the privileged, housed
in enclosed corporate oases known as compounds or their smaller counterparts
known as modules. These corporate spaces are secure communities that provide
everything their inhabitants need to ensure that few people have any reason to
venture out into the toxic pleeblands where the poor and the riff-raff live.
The environment is in shambles and most food is produced in research labs and
manufactured from synthetic materials. The few non-synthetic items that can still
be gotten are considered delicacies; this includes simple things like cheese, eggs,
and chocolate. In fact, one of the games the boys grow up playing is Extintathon
where the object is to guess an extinct animal faster than your opponent based
on clues provided by a Gamemaster. The caveat is that the animal must have
gone extinct in the last 50 yearsthere are enough animals on the list so that it
comprises numerous pages. More than just environmental degradation plagues
the future, however, moral depravity and overpopulation provide the primary
backdrop for the bulk of the story, and the social milieu of the story highlights the
moral decay and corporate greed that drives society to its collapse.
Jimmy and Crake are the sons of men whose particular scientific abilities keep
them employed by the compounds. Jimmys dad is responsible for helping to create
the pigoons which are genetically altered pigs that grow human organs and
tissues for transplants and cosmetic upgrades.98 Jimmys father is headhunted by
HelthWyzer, Inc., a rival firm, and takes a job at the HelthWyzer, Inc. compound
working in the Nooskin division of the company. There he is responsible for
developing the next cutting edge innovation in the on-going fight against aging.
Crakes step-father is a one-time scientist whose ability with numbers lands him
97 Margaret Atwood, Oryx and Crake, 169.

98 Jimmy struggles as a child to come to terms with the existence of the pigoons,
and in his inner turmoil we catch a glimpse of Freudian totemism. While visiting his
father at work, the two go to lunch at the company cafeteria which sells a lot of pork
products, even though they are prohibited from selling pigoon meat. Jimmys fathers
coworkers would tease Jimmy about this saying things like Pigoon pie again come
on, Jimmy, eat up! This taunting would upset Jimmy because he was confused about
who should be allowed to eat what. He didnt want to eat a pigoon, because he thought
of pigoons as creatures much like himself, p. 24. Whether or not the similarity between
himself and pigoons is because they produce spare human parts or because they are both
his fathers children it is hard to say and Atwood is mum on the point. Nevertheless,
Jimmys identification with the pigoons lays a Freudian foundation for the mimetic tale
that plays out in the rest of the story.
a job running the books for HelthWyzer Inc. It is at HelthWyzer High School
that Jimmy and Crake first meet and become fast friends. Jimmy is immediately
taken in by the cool demeanor of Crake and the two boys spend most of their time
together. It is apparent that Crake is a numbers guy and Jimmy is a word guy
very early on and this difference lays the foundation for their mimetic rivalries
later since being a word guy makes Jimmy inherently less socially valuable.
In Atwoods imagined future universities bid on students after high school and
the bidding for Crake and Jimmy underscores more than the corporate engine
of society, it also formalizes the model/disciple relationship between Crake and
Jimmy. Crakes price is driven up as EduCompounds compete for him until he is
ultimately claimed by the prestigious Watson-Crick Institute. Jimmys fortunes
are not so great and it takes some backdoor dealings by his father to get him
accepted into the third-tier Martha Graham Arts Academy. While Crake goes on
to stardom at Watson-Crick applying his considerable intellect to problems of
genetic splicing and creating new ways to augment and swindle the pleebland
herd, Jimmy is off to study Problematicsthat is, the art of deceptive advertising.
At their respective colleges the two remain close and stay in contact via email.
While Jimmys schooling is not terribly challenging, his social life is not that
great either as the conditions at Martha Graham are less than miserable. In the
meantime, Crake is working alongside the best and the brightest creating the
most cutting edge new bioforms and earning 50 percent of all profits from any
technology or enhancement he creates.
On a visit to Watson-Crick Jimmys envy of Crake is made even more apparent
as he comes to understand how great the gulf is between them, but he is especially
jealous of the Student Services department, which provides everything from
sound academic advice to prostitutes catering to every student fetish or desire. The
workers are trained professionals brought in from the pleeblands and, of course,
they are thoroughly checked for disease. The reason for this, explains Crake, is
that students cannot be expected to waste time in unproductive random scanning
if you really need to, you can arrange that kind of thing through student
services. To mollify Jimmys obvious disbelief Crake continues, It makes sense
as a system, it avoids the diversion of energies into unproductive channels, and
short-circuits malaise. The female students have equal access theyll provide
everything. If youre gay or some kind of fetishist, theyll fix that too.99
It is the only time in his life that Jimmy thinks Crake might be jealous of him
because he has time to pursue women. Mimetically speaking, this is important
because it establishes the mimetic rivalry between Jimmy and Crake has taken
on the equalization of model and disciple necessary to bring about a mimetic
crisis. In other words, Crakes jealousy of Jimmy highlights the beginning of
the deterioration of the distinctions that define Crake and Jimmy as model and
disciple. After college, Jimmy struggles to find work while Crake moves on to
a classified position at the very top of the most powerful of all the compounds,

RejoovenEsense. It is during his time at RejoovenEsense that Crake begins his

top-secret Paradice Project developing human enhancements that will supersede
everything currently on the market for people looking to get an edge in a world
full of people and devoid of opportunity. Before examining how the Crakers are
supposed to save humanity from the mimetic crisis it is necessary to meet Oryx to
fully understand the mimetic rivalry of Jimmy and Crake.
During their childhood Jimmy and Crake spend their free time surfing the web,
and like most juvenile boys, their tastes are for the more adult fare available on
the internet. Crake has discovered a way to untraceably use his step-fathers credit
card, so the boys surf with reckless abandon, viewing websites such as brainfrizz.
com which broadcasts executions, alibooboo.com whose fare is Middle Eastern
beheadings, or numerous porn sites catering to any number of fetish behaviors.
It is on one such site, HottTotts.com, a porn site where little Asian girls do adult
things with Western tourists, that Jimmy and Crake first encounter Oryx. During
her performance Oryx casts a wanton glance over her shoulder that rattles Jimmy
and Crake. Jimmy believes the girl is looking directly at him, into the secret
person inside him he felt burned by [the] lookeaten into, as if by acid.
Shed been so contemptuous of him.100 Both boys are transfixed by the glance,
the moment when Oryx looked, and he and Crake print out screen shots of the
momenta memento which Jimmy will carry with him, like a secret talisman, the
rest of his life.
After the HottTotts scene Oryx is an ever-present phantom haunting Jimmys
desires. However, we do not encounter her again until she is in her teens when
Jimmy spies her on television as one of many girls liberated from a San Francisco
prostitution ring, she stands out because her interview testimony is a defense of
her pimp. Finally, Oryx makes an in-the-flesh appearance in the book when she is
introduced to Jimmy by Crake. As Jimmy soon learns, Crake had his Watson-Crick
student services find her and he later hires her to teach the Crakers while they are
living in the laboratory at the RejoovenEsense compound. Throughout the story
Oryx is presented as a caricature from male fantasy rather than a fully realized
East Asian woman. [She] embodies sexual and racial oppression. [Contrary to
Jimmy and Crake] Oryx has been schooled by the ambiguous compromises
required for her survival.101 Her role as object in the mimetic triangle is cemented
by her position first as Crakes lover and then as the object of Jimmys desirean
object he realizes is off limits because of his relationship to Crake.
Jimmys dismay at learning that Oryx is Crakes lover is exacerbated by the
fact that during his one and only visit to Watson-Crick, Crake was using the
HottTotts photo as a secret portal on his computer to connect with the radical group
of Extinctathon Gamemasters known, appropriately, as MaddAddam. During that
visit Jimmy became concerned that Crake was still harboring desires for the girl
100 Margaret Atwood, Oryx and Crake, 91. The subsequent quotation is also from p. 91.
101 Susan Squier, A Tale Meant to Inform, Not to Amuse, Science, 302(5648)
(Nov., 2003): 1154.
because Jimmy had thought that Crake would have long since forgotten about her.
In time, however, Oryx makes her way to Jimmy and seduces him causing Jimmy to
constantly fret that Crake will find out. He tries to convince Oryx to leave with him
because he fears Crakes jealousy. But she refuses to leave, saying, Whywould
Crake be jealous? He doesnt approve of jealousy. He thinks its wrong, adding
that she believes in his vision to make the world a better place.102 Crakes vision
is not her only reason for not fleeing, she convinces Jimmy that Crake needs her
as much as Jimmy does. As it turns out, Crake and Oryx both need Jimmy, and
one suspects, though there is no direct proof, that Crake and Oryx are conspiring
to recruit Jimmy for the same purpose. That purpose is, of course, to care for the
Crakers. It is the ambiguous nature of Oryxs relationship with CrakeAtwood
never lets on how deeply she is committed to Crake or how much she knows about
what is going onthat leads to her permanent relegation to the status of a fully
unrealized woman.
Crake makes Jimmy his second in command and puts him in charge of the
Paradice Projectcode for the Crakersin the event that something happens to
Crake. Oryx makes Jimmy swear that he will take care of the Crakers and take
over teaching them if something happens to her. Jimmy is incredulous about his
ability to take over the project, but Crake has his reasons for believing Jimmy
is perfect for the job. Jimmy is less deterred by his promise to Oryx to take care
of the Crakers because they live in the most secure compound on the planet and
Crake handles everything. It is the navet of Jimmy that renders him incapable
of understanding Crakes plans, but more importantly, Jimmy is too distracted by
his love and concern for Oryx to pay enough attention to the events taking place
around him to have figured anything out. He will come to realize the truth too late,
but the truth is that Crakes plan is the salvation of humanity by finally breaking
the mimetic cycle, though that is not what Atwood calls it.
The Crakers have been designed to develop without the limitations that
being human is usually linked to, but this is particularly germane to how Crake
has psychologically designed them. The Crakers are genetically modified to be
vegetarians, to not accumulate wealth, to not need or wear clothes, to age at
an advanced rate, to purr on a wavelength that allows individuals to be healed
by communal purring, and to drop dead at the age of 30. Most importantly are
two features that change the psychological construction of the individuals and
the society generally. One, the Crakers no longer possess the mental aspects that
lead to a need for metaphysical questioningso, no religious curiosity. Second,
the females go into heat when it is time to mate rather than have the community
bogged down in the constant pursuit of sexual pleasure.103

103 This attribute is directly related to Crakes belief that time spent wooing partners
for sex is time wasted, a position that he clearly expresses to Jimmy during his visit to
Watson-Crick University.
The mating ritual is of distinct significance, mimetically speaking, because the

whole process is designed to eliminate knowledge of whom the father is, ensuring
that all the men involved with the woman are responsible for the child. When
a woman goes into heat, once every three years per woman, which is the ideal
according to Crake, her belly and vagina turn a deep shade of blue and all the men
present her with flowers and do a dance to showcase their similarly sized penises,
which will have also turned blue. The woman chooses four men from the group
and they go off together, somewhere secluded, and three men stand guard while
the fourth man engages in the procreative act. This process lasts until all four men
have been with the woman.
Crakes emphasis on creating the neo-humans is to rid the human race of the
traits that make us flawed as beings inhabiting the world. In the novel, Crake is
the mad scientist par excellence and Atwoods novel is a terrifying cautionary
tale about one mans attempt to create a utopia by ridding the world of its
biggest threathumanity. However, the story showcases, perhaps unwittingly on
Atwoods part, the tearing down of the mimetic structure of society. Crake and
Oryx represent the model/object pairing of the triangle. Oryx, always portrayed as
a sex object, is more than just a sex object; she is an active accomplice and she is
desire itself for Jimmy as disciple. When Jimmy is alone in the world he continues
to pine for Oryx as intensely as he agonizes over her sordid past during their brief
time together. At one point, recalling her, Jimmy says to himself, Oryx I know
youre there. He repeats the name. Its not even her real name, which hed never
known anyway; its only a word. Its a mantra.104 However, Oryx is not a static
participant in the triangle, a feature of the mimetic narrative that I argued for in
Chapter Three. Jimmys desire for Oryx is not unknown to Crake, but neither is
Jimmys jealousy of him. In fact, it is Jimmys jealousy and desire for Oryx that
Crake depends on to ensure the success of his plan to establish the Crakers as the
next evolutionary step of humanity.105
In a traditional mimetic account, Jimmy and Crake would come to blows over
Oryx until one of them possessed her and the other was vanquished. Oryx is already
committed to both of them, however, so the rivalry between them would have to
escalate to turn toward violence. All the criteria are there for this to happen: Jimmy
is envious of Crake, Jimmy desires Oryx, but cannot have her, Jimmy tries to steal
Oryx away and proposes going on the run to accomplish this, Oryx continues to

105 It probably seems unfair to position the Crakers as the next evolutionary step,
but in the novel it is made abundantly clear that Crake does not believe in Nature and,
therefore, believes what he is doing is not illegitimate. During a conversation with Jimmy
the following exchange occurs where Crake says, Nature is to zoos as God is to churches.
Meaning what? Those walls and bars are there for a reason. Not to keep us out but
to keep them in. Mankind needs barriers in both cases. Them? Nature and God.
Ithought you didnt believe in God, said Jimmy. I dont believe in Nature either, said
Crake, Or not with a capital N, p. 206.
put Crake first in her life even as she tells Jimmy she loves him, too, and, secretly,
perhaps, Crake is actually jealous of Jimmy. Clearly, without intervention, the
rivalry is headed toward violence. But Crake heads off the violent trajectory by
removing himself and Oryx from the picture and, by doing so, thwarts a repetition
of the mimetic cycle. Before the plague that eradicates humankind, and before
Jimmy takes a job as Crakes second-in-command, Jimmy is awash in the problems
of his life and where it is headed. Uncertain what is wrong, and unaware that he is
locked into a dangerous relationship with his friend Crake, Jimmy acknowledges
having a desire for revenge.
Feeling like he is being rubbed all over with sandpaper Jimmy tells himself
to Get a grip and Make a new you before realizing that what he wants is
revenge, even as he struggles to identify against whom and for what.106 By the time
Jimmy figures out where his desire for vengeance should be targeted the target is
gone and he is left with his promises to Oryx and Crake to care for the Crakers.
He tries to vent his frustrations upon the Crakers, but is incapable of doing so
because he sees them as innocent of the actions and circumstances that led him
to his predicament. Jimmys reluctance to vent his frustrations upon the Crakers
is a clear demonstration that the scapegoat mechanism has been derailed. Jimmy
must find a different way to handle his desire for revenge because he cannot
visit his anger upon the innocent. Thanks to Crakes dismantling of the mimetic
structure of society, Jimmy is incapable of resorting to the social conditioning
he has heretofore relied upon without question. To produce a suitable scapegoat
there must be similarities between the victim and the community, but Jimmy is a
community of one and he cannot construe the Crakers in an acceptable way that
would allow him to victimize them. Hence, the mimetic cycle is broken.
Yet, consider the traits Crake has endowed the Crakers with before everything
goes to hell in a hand basket. Although Jimmy has been left to care for the Crakers,
to ensure they can survive in the world outside of their laboratory existence, they
are genetically coded to be incapable of adopting any of Jimmys negative human
traits. Once Jimmys gone, the Crakers will be a perfect human species, capable of
coexistence with other beings and the planet, neither creating anything they do not
need, nor arbitrarily destroying the world for personal or social gain. Their symbiosis
with their natural environment is punctuated by a social structure that is genetically
coded for, and eliminates all the aspects of, the familial and societal environments
that led to the end of humanity. What has Crake identified as the foundational culprit
that needs to be eradicated more than anything else as responsible for the downward
spiral of humanity? The desire for sex. Over lunch Crake asks Jimmy How much
misery how much needless despair has been caused by a series of biological
mismatches, a misalignment of the hormones and pheromones? Resulting in the
fact that the one you love so passionately wont or cant love you. As a species
were pathetic in that way: imperfectly monogamous.107

While Crakes self-scapegoating alleviates the need for Jimmy to find a source
of blame, it also removes the object of desire that motivates the kinds of unwanted
behaviors Crake does not want the Crakers to develop. Meanwhile, the Crakers
have no knowledge of the prior existence of humanity because of their careful
development and instruction by Crake and Oryx. So, while they find Jimmy a
curiosity in the world, they also do not think of him as an ancestor. In the grand
scheme of things, then, when Jimmy finally dies, Crake will have eliminated
the mimetic entanglements of society, or so he believes. As such, Crakes self-
scapegoating is a perfect inversion of the scapegoat mechanism that Girard has
tried to achieve with Christ.
Where Christ allowed himself to be killed by the mob, Crake takes his own
life by forcing the hand of his disciple in the mimetic triangle. For Girard, since
the scapegoat willingly offers himself up to the crowd, he becomes the savior.
However, this is, as I have already argued, a dysfunctional approach to the solution
of the mimetic cycle. What Atwoods mimetic model does is less self-sacrificing
in a sense, because Crake uses the violence of the mimetic rivalry to obliterate
the triangle which Christ does not accomplish. Christ incurs the wrath of the mob
and his sacrifice is upheld by Girard as the clearest expression of a rejection of the
function of the scapegoat by a scapegoat, but Crakes destruction of the mimetic
triangle is wholly devastating because he destroys the very thing that makes a
continuation of mimesis possiblesociety; Jesuss solution is the more elegant,
but less decisive, promise of a utopian afterlife. I do not think that it is necessary to
destroy all of society, but a close look at the Crakers highlights the very aspects of
society that do need to change and at the base of everything is the realization that
the family model currently employed by society must undergo revision. After that,
everything else will follow. Crake did not have the time or resources to change the
entire desire structure of humankind before humanity self-destructed, so he wiped
the slate clean and started over. Since that is not an appealing option, it is best to
accept the conclusion, reject the means of achieving it, and ask ourselves what
must happen to begin the process of change that Crake sought to by-pass.
Possessing the Future:

Beyond Mimesis in Ursula Le Guins The Dispossessed108
The Dispossessed is often read as an anarchist response to contemporary social

structures and norms. Le Guins investigation into not only what a utopia looks
like and demands from its citizens, but also the problems inherent in utopia, breaks
new ground in the attempt to understand the relationship between utopia and
dystopia. She styles the society of the novel as an ambiguous utopia in order
108 Ursula Le Guin, The Dispossessed: An Ambiguous Utopia, New York:

HarperCollins Publishers, 1974. EOS edition, 2001.
to signal to the reader that the society still has problems with which it must
deal.109 The story itself takes place several generations after the initial social
break-up that led to the creation of the utopian society of Anarres, that is, unlike
the story of Oryx and Crake which ends with the beginning of Crakes new social
experiment, Le Guin offers her readers a tale that picks up several generations
into the struggles of the utopians to craft their world according to their beliefs.
Interestingly, Le Guins targets in the critique provided by the novel are the power
structures of society, but she makes no obvious mentions of the role of mimesis;
yet, her anarchist utopia survives because it has broken the mimetic chain.
The main character of the novel is the brilliant physicist Shevek, one of the
utopians that inhabits the anarchist world of Anarres. When Shevek is introduced
in the story he is in the process of breaking one of the few rules, or laws, that
the Odonians110 have in placein fact, the one law that has allowed them to
flourishhe is leaving Anarres; to make matters worse he is leaving to visit
Urras,111 the despised planet of origin of Anarresti civilization. Prior to Sheveks
decision to leave it was understood that, generally speaking, no one could leave
and no outsiders could get inan isolationist theme common to utopian literature.
However, it is in Sheveks moment of transgression regarding this rule that
Le Guin establishes the major theme of the book, and one surmises, one of the key
elements to a successful utopian experiment, crossing boundaries, tearing down
walls as Shevek comes to articulate it. Boundaries exist as a function of power,
invested in an authority capable of establishing, defining, defending, maintaining,
and enlarging the limits expressed by the boundaries themselves. What makes
Anarresti society function is that such a power structure does not exist because
there are no social or political boundaries, and the prevention of its development
hinges on the Odonians conviction that their society is a permanent revolution.
The permanent revolution that is the utopia of Anarres is founded on two
principles that go against the grain of traditional utopian constructions. First, the
moon upon which the anarchists build their perfect society is devoid of all but
the barest essentials needed to sustain life. When the Odonians make the move to
Anarres they must cultivate the native hollum trees and master the art of managing
the few aquatic species that can be used for food and production. There are no
109 The Utopia Reader, 408.

110 The citizens of Anarres are known as Odonians after the leader that initiated the
break with the society of Urras where they originate. Odo was a Gandhian-esque figure
on Urras that began the successful revolution on that planet which eventually led to the
establishment of Anarresti culture on the moon of Anarres.
111 It is hard not to see earth immediately in the descriptions of Urras replete with the
economic and socio-political conflicts that existed between the United States and Russia
during the Cold War. There are different countries, guided by competing ideologies, with
one country, A-Io, the country Shevek is planning to visit, economically dominant, but
existing in a balanced, if not stable, power nexus with other countries, specifically, Thu,
which is plainly socialist in its construction.
native birds or mammals, no idyllic nature venues, no serene weather patterns;

in short, the moon is a harsh landscape of scarcity. While most utopias strive to
minimize the impact of resource scarcity, either by stipulating a land of plenty or by
technological know-how that ensures none go without, Le Guins proposed utopia
is successful precisely because people must survive on very little. The second
aspect that challenges common conceptions of how utopias typically function
is two-fold and is a direct outcome of the first. As Judah Bierman explains, the
scarcity of Anarres requires, on [a] personal level, an individual freedom based
on absolute noncoercion, and on a social level, a non-profit, need-use economy.112
The freedom that comes with living in a society governed by a principle
of absolute noncoercion entails that people are free to come and go as they
please, to engage in work they find meaningful, to pursue, in their purest sense,
the notions of life, liberty, and happiness. Of course, what checks their behavior
is that the extreme scarcity of the planet requires a strong commitment to mutual
aid and interdependence. So, when a job needs doing everyone pitches in, when a
crisis arises everyone sacrifices, when there is a success, communal or individual,
everyone is benefitted by it, so that, in short, the community is a holistic organism
whose success and stability depends on a principle of not abusing the need-use
economy. On Anarres, the materials for production are communally generated and
communally owned. There is an expectation that ownership of an item is temporary;
that whatever one possesses is only possessed until it is not needed any longer.
Clothes are available at the depository, tools and materials at the manufacturing
facilities, education is free, food is provided by public cafeterias and all diners eat
together. At the end of the day people retire to public sleeping houses which are
outfitted with singles so that casual couples may spend the night together.
What Le Guin has accomplished in her presentation of Anarres is the abolishment
of the public and private. So, necessarily, the communal sharing of the public facets
of life carries over into the private arenas as well. Family life on Anarres is quite
different from what most utopian tourists will expect. Odonians form pairings
when they want to form a long-term relationship. These require no marriage licenses,
no government approval, they provide no social benefits to the partners, and they
bear no religious significance. In fact, Odonian pairings resemble little more than
middle schoolers going steady. All that is required to partner up is the consent of
both parties and all that is required to end a pairing is one partner walking away.113
Pairings can last a night or two, or years, but there is a cultural commitment to the
112 Judah Bierman, Ambiguity in Utopia: The Dispossessed. Science Fiction

Studies, 2(3) (Nov., 1975): 250.
113 According to Le Guin, Pravic, the Anarresti language, lacks proprietary idioms
for the sexual act. It would make no sense to speak to an Odonian about having a woman
or man. The word which came closest in meaning to fuck and had a similar secondary
usage as a curse was specific: it meant rape. The usual verb, taking only a plural subject,
can be translated only by a neutral word like copulate. It meant something two people did,
not something one person did, or had, p. 53.
radical equality of the individuals that renders the pairing little more than a personal
choice that confers no social status.114 This is one area of Odonian life where the
ambiguity of Le Guins utopia comes into sharper focus.
Some Odonian men continue to think of women as less perfectly suited to the
Anarresti lifestyle because child-bearing triggers a natural inclination to become
possessive. There is a telling conversation between Shevek and one of his
fellow anarchists that identifies this singular facet of womanhood as particularly
dangerous. Shevek is conversing with Vokep, a fellow worker, who claims,
Women think they can own you. No woman can really be an Odonian. Shevek
responds,
Odo herself?
Theory. And no sex life after [her husband] Asieo was killed, right? Anyhow
[there are] always exceptions. But most women, their only relationship to a man
is having. Either owning or being owned.
You think theyre different from men there?
I know it. What a man wants is freedom. What a woman wants is property.
Shell only let you go if she can trade you for something else. All women are
propertarians.
Thats a hell of a thing to say about half the human race, said Shevek,
wondering if the man was right. Beshun [Sheveks most recent lover] had cried
herself sick when he got posted back to Northwest, had raged and wept and
tried to make him tell her he couldnt live without her and insisted they must be
partners. Partners, as if she could have stayed with any one man for half a year!
***
Vokep shook his head grimly. Its the kids, he said. Having babies. Makesem
propertarians. They wont let go. He sighed. Touch and go, brother, thats the
rule. Dont ever let yourself be owned.
Shevek smiled and drank his fruit juice. I wont. 115
114 In order to abolish the negative effects of the institutions of marriage Odonian
social theory conceived of monogamy as a joint enterprise. Marriage, or what passed for
such in Anarresti culture, was a partnership a voluntarily constituted federation like any
other. So long as it worked, it worked, and if it didnt work it stopped being. It was not an
institution but a function. It had no sanction but that of private conscience, p. 244.
115 Ursula Le Guin, The Dispossessed, 524. Emphasis in original.
This native insight about women is echoed during one of Sheveks first encounters
with an Urrasti citizen off world. While on board the Urrasti spacecraft that will
deliver him to the planet of his ancestors origin, Dr. Kimoe, the Urrasti medical
doctor attending him, expresses dismay at the gender equality of Anarresti men
and women.116 Sheveks reservations in the former conversation, and his inability
to grasp the incredulity of the doctor in the latter, highlight the transformed nature
of gender roles that exist on Anarresand also how deeply entrenched mimetic
management has rendered them in both Urrasti and our own culture. Curiously,
Vokeps position suggests that women are better suited as mimetic models based
on their innate need to possess things. Of course, the explanation in terms of child-
bearing and child-rearing suggests, at a minimum, that the mother-as-object that
Girard proposes is most likely a defunct idea because even on his understanding
it is unlikely that the mother, naturally possessive, would be a non-participant
in the overthrow of her husband or her child as father surrogate. In this example
especially, the superiority of my WAT interpretation is clear. But the importance of
the story for mimesis does not stop here.
Sex and gender roles are deeply altered by the Anarresti arrangement and it is
in the reconceptualization of these aspects of the private lives of the Anarresti that
Le Guin achieves her best insights into the breakdown of mimesis. On Anarres,
sex is not a foreign act reserved for adults, instead, children are free to explore
their sexuality as they grow and mature rather than face years of repression and
social stigmatization. One gets the impression that, even though Odonians tend
to identify as either more heterosexual or homosexual, there are many that are
bi-sexual. This is because sex is a form of intimacy that establishes trust and deep
bonds between friends as opposed to an activity designed to generate pleasure or
foster procreation. The acceptance of sex as a run-of-the-mill activity in the lives
of Odonians, but also as an expression of deep affection is made manifest in an
encounter between Shevek and one of his childhood friends, Bedap, later in their
116 In response to Sheveks queries about the lack of women aboard the space ship
Dr. Kimoe explains that running a space freighter was not womens work. He is further
perplexed by Sheveks answer to his questions about the equality of men and women on
Anarres. He asks, Is there really no distinction between mens work and womens work?
Shevek replies, Well, no, it seems a very mechanical basis for the division of labor, doesnt
it? A person chooses work according to interest, talent, strengthwhat has sex to do with
that? Kimoe responds with defenses that are typical of patriarchal inequality and signals
the fear of what might be thought of as the loss of masculine self-respect, but Shevek
rebuffs the doctor saying, I have often wished I was as tough as a woman, pp. 1617. This
difference is signaled again when Shevek asks Pae, one of his Urrasti handlers, a fellow
scientist, why there are not women instructors or students at the university. Pae explains,
Scientists. Oh, yes, certainly, theyre all men. There are some female teachers in the girls
schools, of course. But they never get past certificate level [they] cant do math; no head
for abstract thought; dont belong. You know how it is, what women call thinking is done
with the uterus! Of course, theres always a few exceptions, God-awful brainy women with
vaginal atrophy, pp. 734.
adult life. After having not seen each other for many years they reconnect in the
city of Abbenay, where both of them are working, and spend the night together. As
Shevek understood his motivations for the pairing,
the pleasure of it would be mostly for Bedap. Shevek was perfectly willing,
however, to reconfirm the old friendship; and when he saw that the sexual
element of it meant a great deal to Bedap, was, to him, a true consummation,
then he took the lead, and with considerable tenderness and obstinacy made sure
that Bedap spent the night with him again. They took a free single in a domicile
downtown, and both lived there for about [ten days]; then they separated again
There was no strong sexual desire on either side to make the connection last.
They had simply reasserted trust.117
The ambiguity about sex is an outgrowth of the ambiguous nature of gender roles in
Anarresti society. Of course, where there is sex, there are likely to be children, and
the indistinct nature of sex and gender naturally involves an ambiguity toward the
raising of children. Children produced during pairings can be raised by the parents
until the child is old enough to attend school at which time they are, essentially,
turned over to the community, but placing a child in the care of the community can
be done at any timeeven immediately after birth. There are several reasons for
children being raised outside of the home on Anarres. Of primary concern is that
the children not grow up to be propertarians118 and for this reason it is important
to have the children living in a suitably communal setting as soon as possible. The
use of communal care also deters the parents from becoming too attached to the
children, developing their own propertarian sentiments, which would eventually
lead to attempts to provide better things, or more things, to the childand on this
score Vokeps suspicions about Odonian women apply just as aptly to Odonian
men.119 Also, since custody entails ownership, and because pairs can break up
117 Ursula Le Guin, The Dispossessed, 172. Emphasis added.

118 Propertarian is the derogatory slang term used by the Anarresti to describe the
Urrasti citizens. To be a propertarian is to possess things, to accumulate wealth, to separate
the world into mine and yours and this behavior above all else is regarded as evil to
the Odonians.
119 An additional measure employed by the Anarresti to help curtail the propertarian
sentiments from developing in the parents is the naming of children by computer. When
a child is born its name is chosen by a computer program which also ensures that no
two people, living at the same time, have the same name. So, as long as Shevek is alive,
for instance, there will be no other Shevek. The five- and six-letter names issued by
the central registry computer, being unique to each living individual, took the place of
the numbers which a computer-using society must otherwise attach to its members. An
Anarresti needed no identification but his name. The name, therefore, was felt to be an
important part of the self, though no one more chose it than ones nose or height, p. 250.
By removing the responsibility of naming from the parents, the parents are stripped of one
of the critical endearing moments of child rearing.
at any time, parents are not required to care for their children since dissolution
of the pairing would mean that one of the parents would be unfairly burdened
with the care of the child. This would undermine the gender equality that exists
in Odonian society, either both parents are responsible for the child or neither of
them are. So, children are raised by the community which ensures that they are
given an education befitting an Odonian citizen and also that the parents are free to
pursue their interests and goals, especially where doing so benefits the community,
without the stigma that comes with abandonment.120 This is not to say that parents
do not have lasting bonds with their children, but rather, that parents and children
are both aware of their responsibility to put the community first.121 It is easy to see
shadows of Plato in the Anarresti arrangement.
The Anarresti modifications to the family are illustrative of the necessary
first step in breaking the mimetic cycle of violence. This is unmistakable in an
exchange between Shevek and one of the few women he is able to interact with
on Urras. Before a party thrown by Vea, the wife of one of Sheveks university
colleagues and appointed handlers during his stay on Urras, she challenges the
marriage arrangements of Anarresti culture. The conversation devolves into a
discussion about morality on Anarres. Vea challenges Sheveks moral rationalizing
by claiming the Anarresti have thrown out all the dos and donts. But you
Odonians missed the whole point. You threw out the priests and judges and divorce
laws and all that, but you kept the real trouble behind them. You just stuck it inside,
into your consciences. But its still there. Youre just as much slaves as ever! You
arent really free.122 Shevek responds by pointing out that is where the trouble
belongs because that way the Anarresti learn that to hurt another person is to hurt
oneself. Dissatisfied, Vea continues to pressure Shevek, arguing,
120 The Anarresti family structure is built around the communal raising of children
so that familial expressions are made in a general context. For instance, any child may call
any adult mamme (mama) or tadde (papa). The title may apply to an actual parent, an aunt
or uncle, or an unrelated adult who showed parental or grandparental responsibility and
affection. A person might call several people tadde or mamme, but the word had a very
specific use compared to ammar (brother/sister) which may be used to address anybody.
The linguistic usage of ammar probably comes closest to being translated as comrade in the
socialist tradition, but its social usage is meant to reinforce the familial nature of Anarresti
society as much as the equality of Anarresti citizens. See p. 47.
121 It is, perhaps, pertinent to point out that Sheveks mother, Rulag, does leave him
as an infant to pursue her work while his father, Palat, stays close to Shevek, the two never
cohabitate as father and son. Conversely, Rulag makes no effort to stay in contact with
Shevek and when they eventually reunite during his adult life the relationship is strained.
However, Shevek handles his emotions about his mother by rationalizing the importance
of the Odonian commitment to intellectual anarchism and whatever his judgments of his
mother he never faults her for leaving.
122 Ursula Le Guin, The Dispossessed, 219. Emphasis added.
The same old hypocrisy. Life is a fight, and the strongest wins. All civilization
does is hide the blood and cover up the hate with pretty words!
Your civilization, perhaps. Ours hides nothing. It is all plain. We follow one
law, only one, the law of human evolution.
The law of evolution is that the strongest survives!
Yes, and the strongest, in the existence of any social species, are those who are
most social. In human terms, most ethical. You see, we have neither prey nor
enemy, on Anarres. We have only one another. There is no strength to be gained
from hurting one another. Only weakness.123
The exchange highlights the recognizable existence of mimesis even in the

aftermath of the destruction of the institutions that preserve it. Moreover, by
abolishing organized, creed based religions when they did away with centralized,
hierarchical government the founding Odonians essentially removed the major
social venues for mimetic management. However, Anarresti culture, even 200
years in to the permanent revolution that is the utopian experiment of the Odonians,
is clearly not free of mimetic elements. I contend that the mimetic struggles of
Shevek highlight the deep entrenchment of mimesis in society, but also, that his
purpose of breaking down walls, of transgressing boundaries, is singularly related
to the task of overcoming the remnants of the mimetic crisis. Sheveks most fully
articulated encounter with mimetic rivalry centers on him, an Anarresti physicist
named Sabul, and the procurement of knowledge.124
Shevek moves to Abbenay, the largest Anarresti city, in order to publish his
work in physics and teach at the research university there. While there he is
assigned to work with Sabul and his relationship with Sabul quickly becomes
mimetic. Sabul is responsible for approving the publication of physics materials, a
quality control specialist of sorts, and he is also one of the few people on Anarres
capable of understanding the highly abstract physics Shevek deals with in his
123 Ursula Le Guin, The Dispossessed, 21920.

124 There are a number of truncated instances where mimetic elements are recognized
by Shevek throughout the novel. One such instance, that is closely linked with the rivalry
with Sabul occurs during a conversation between Shevek and his one-time friend Desar,
a mathematician at the university with Shevek. After a brief hiatus from the university to
volunteer for a famine-prevention work detail Shevek returns to the university where Desar
fills him in on the happenings that have taken place during his absence. Upon realizing that
Desar has used Sheveks reputation to advance his own career Shevek realizes the reason
for his moments of detesting Desar [was] a recognition, heretofore unadmitted, of the
element of pure malice in Desars personality. That Desar also loved him and was trying
to gain power over him was equally clear, and, to Shevek, equally detestable. The devious
ways of possessiveness, the labyrinths of love/hate, were meaningless to him. Arrogant,
intolerant, he walked right through their walls, p. 263.
work. Each time Shevek proposes to publish something Sabul either wants to
share in the writing of the text to share in the acclaim or, when Shevek refuses to
allow him to do so, he refuses to publish it alleging it is unsuitable for publication
for some trite reason. There is not a more straightforward example of mimetic
rivalry in the text than the relationship between Shevek and Sabul. Sabul wants
Shevek to be more like him while simultaneously desiring to be as good at physics
as Shevek creating a classic mimetic rivalry between the two where knowledge is
the object of their rivalry. Sabuls age and station at the university position him as
the model and, along similar lines, Shevek becomes the disciple. But their abilities
as physicists and their desire to acquire knowledge render them Girardian doubles
headed for a crisis.
What makes this mimetic relationship so easy to breakdown without recourse
to violence is the nature of the Anaresti society. Even in his greatest state of
agitation Shevek is aware that no one was to blame [for his anger]. That was the
worst of it Society was not against them. It was for them; with them; it was
them.125 So, when Shevek realizes, with the help of Bedap, the predicament his
involvement with Sabul epitomizes, violence is never discussed as a means of
overcoming the obstacle that Sabul represents, it is never even considered as an
option.126 Rather, the society itself presents the means for overcoming Sheveks
problems with Sabul. The Anarresti commitment to absolute individual freedom
and a need-use economy make dissolving the mimetic structure possible. Shevek,
with the help of Bedap, sets up his own publishing outfit and self-publishes his
work. To contact his Urrasti counterparts, something he was only able to do
with university permission and assistance before, he accomplishes by building
his own radio station. This is possible because he comes to understand what his
inheritance is as an Odonian. That is, he learns that, like Bedap, who is already
in possession of this realization, he can do whatever he wants; no more fear of
social ostracism, convention, moralism, in short, he decides that he will no longer
be afraid of being free.
Such a realization is mimetically important, especially for an exploration about
how to overcome the mimetic crisis, because, one suspects, if a similar realization
had occurred to the women in the primeval horde, or to the sons, human society
most likely would have developed in inestimably different ways. That is, if the
women had not taken the loss of their freedom compliantly, but had, instead,

126 The conversation where Shevek begins to understand Bedaps criticisms of
Odonian society occurs in the context of a musician whose operas and symphonies have
been censored. Bedap declaims that their culture has finally come full circle right back
around to the most vile kind of profiteering utilitarianism. The complexity, the vitality,
the freedom of invention and initiative that was at the center of the Odonian ideal, weve
thrown it all away. Weve gone right back to barbarism. If its new, run away from it!
p. 176. However, the true realization occurs later during a conversation he has with his
partner along the same lines. See pp. 33035.
asserted it as a fundamental right, if they had exercised their right to pair up

or walk away, or if the sons had exercised their fundamental rights to possess the
objects, transgressing the fathers dictates and possessiveness, then assassination
would likely not have been needed. If the encounter with the father had taken
the form of an intervention, a rational discussion, about the inherent freedoms
endowed by nature and preserved by community, rather than a violent overthrow,
the organization of society would have followed a necessarily divergent path. For
Shevek, the realization of what his social identity entails as an Odonian thoroughly
reflects this sentiment. He concludes,
his need to be in Odonian terms his cellular function, the analogic

term for the individuals individuality, the work he can do best, [was] therefore
his best contribution to society. A healthy society would let him exercise that
optimum function freely, in the coordination of strength. That was the central
idea of Odos Analogy. That the Odonian society on Anarres had fallen short of
the ideal did not, in his eyes, lessen his responsibility to it; just the contrary. With
the myth of the State out of the way, the real mutuality and reciprocity of society
and individual became clear. Sacrifice might be demanded of the individual, but
never compromise: for though only the society could give security and stability,
only the individual, the person, had the power of moral choicethe power of
change, the essential function of life. The Odonian society was conceived as a
permanent revolution, and revolution begins in the thinking mind.127
A true and meaningful recognition of such truth is only available, I maintain, to

the individual struggling to overcome societal mimesis. Which is why the Urrasti
elite cannot make sense of the Urrasti workers desire to reject their place in that
society, and why those same elites fear the recognition of such principles among
the lower classesstricken as they are with the memory of Odos rebellion. But, it
is also why the other Anarresti continue to struggle with the mental importation of
mimetic mechanisms of control and why Bedap, acknowledged among his friends
as the first to overcome the frailty of dependence on such modes of control, is
identified as the promised man Odo predicts in her writingshe is the first,
Shevek the second, to become completely free of mimetic social bonds.
If we are to achieve an ideal, mimetically unencumbered society, then it seems
reasonable to suggest that, based on the foregoing utopian investigations, the
family is the place to begin. In the next chapter, I will examine the current social
pressures affecting the mimetic structure of society and consider changes to our
current societal values to counterbalance the mimetic influence of society. In doing
so, I will present several arguments for how to break the mimetic cycle while
laying the foundation for a better, more just, less violent, future society.

Chapter 7
Squaring the Triangle:
Correcting the Girardian Theory of Mimesis
The Problem of Tradition versus Idealizing the Family Structure
Now that I have shown how the mimetic crisis blackens our past and mars our
future, I want to turn toward the present and consider what, if anything, in our
current social situation is suggestive of our struggle to overcome mimesis. The
foregoing analysis of utopias along the lines of mimesis advocated by Girard helps
to contextualize the analysis I provide in this chapter of the present status quo of
society. My analysis of utopias as the collective social sub-conscious is not unlike
Girards use of mythology to pinpoint the origin of violence in our society and the
purpose behind our social institutions. Since I am arguing that justice as a social
concept arises from the mimetic crisis engendered by the primeval family, the best
place to concludethe logical conclusion required by following the evidence to
its natural conclusionis arguing for a new structure to the family. Contrary to
Girards attempt to mitigate the social damage done by mimesis by advocating the
promises of a scapegoat saviorbecause the scapegoat is a part of the process and
not the process itselfI argue that we, as a society, ought to unravel the problem
of mimesis by undoing the structure that causes itthe family. If Girard is correct
about the responsiveness of mimesis to social trends, that is, as society changes
mimetic structures adapt in order to continue to conceal and manage the crisis, then
our society is, I am persuaded, undergoing exactly these types of radical paradigm
shifts to redefine the control mechanisms necessary to manage the mimetic crisis.
The ebbing influence of religion and the surging predominance of secularization
in society herald a coming shift in the mimetic paradigm.1 This is not to say that
1 According to the Center for Applied Research in the Apostolate (CARA) which
conducts social scientific research for the Catholic Church the number of non-infant
converts to the Catholic faith has been in steady decline since 1994. A study published
by CARA in August 2011 concluded that since 2005 conversions have fallen below one
million each year for the first time since 197376 making it the longest period of below-
a-million converts since data collection began in 1947. Moreover, the number of infants
baptized into the faith has been in a state of decline since 2000. The declining numbers of
converts and infant baptisms began prior to the fully-fledged outing of the sexual abuse
scandals that have plagued the church, a controversy which has, no doubt, helped to keep
the numbers in decline. According to Gallop polling data in the United States, generally,
the number of Americans that identify themselves as religious is down from 75 percent
in 1952 to 55 percent in 2011. Over the same time period the number of Americans that
religion is going to fade from society, far from it, but rather new religious attitudes
will emerge more in line with the dominate cultural belief set so that social and
cultural beliefs can be mapped onto the institutional positions necessary to manage
mimesis. That society is currently in the throes of a sweeping shift in its cultural
worldview is evident in the struggles between intelligent design and science, new
religions and new interpretations of old religions, increasing globalization ushering
in demands for reconceiving justice, and increasing awareness of environmental
degradation prompting discussions about inhabiting the global village, to name
only a few. In the midst of these struggles, some of which have been on-going for
decades and others which will take decades more to resolve, oscillating between
fringe and focal point, is the mimetic struggle beneath the surface of the cultural
battle for marriage and the family.
For most people the major battle in the fight over marriage today centers on
civil unions, gay marriage, and the fear of the slippery slope to something far
worse than homosexuals being included in the sacred institution of marriage, but
struggles like this are not new to society; there have been changes to the institution
of marriage regarding the property rights of women, interracial marriage, and the
government prohibition against polygamy. What makes the current battles over
gay marriage particularly potentially devastating is that doing so could upset
the balance of the mimetically-oriented family. However, my position is that
incorporating homosexualsand, perhaps, even the entire LGBTQ community
is necessary to maintain the mimetic structure of society. As the war of words and
proposed legislation rages on, the fight has narrowed to what constitutes marriage,
a family, and how might accommodating homosexual elements of the cultural
narrative impact the overall story necessary to maintain institutional balance and
social security.
Another way to think of this struggle is to put it in terms of incorporating the
scapegoat. Just as Cain could not be integrated into the community of sacrificers
and had to be expelled, just as the self-scapegoating of Jesus laid the foundations
for re-evaluating entire religious and cultural ways of life, so, too, does the twenty-
first-centurys fight over homosexual marriage have the potential to redefine
Western, and, specifically, American culture. The fight is not insignificant because
of the positive and negative influences American culture exerts on the rest of the
world economically, politically, legally, and culturally. But how the prospect of
incorporating the LGBTQ community into the marital institution is handled could
determine the mimetic status of society for generations to come.
American society, for better or for worse, is positioned, in the current milieu
of cultural upheaval, to lay the foundation stones for the future of human societies
because, as my argument is designed to demonstrate, the family is ground zero for
the design, definition, and purpose of all other cultural institutions. Simply put, as
the family goes, so goes society. If society is designed around a desire to prevent
identified religious influence in their lives as not important rose from 5 percent in 1952
to 19 percent in 2011.
Squaring the Triangle: Correcting the Girardian Theory of Mimesis 195
the recurrence of mimetic violence, then the modern family is representative

of the long process of social distillation toward managing the mimetic crisis.
Through a long process of prohibitions, expectations, laws, religious practices,
revisions, additions, addendums, wars, refinements, and reinterpretations, the
modern family emerged in this particular social context, not by accident, but
deliberately, to allow for the shuffling of people into different familial structures
before the mimetic crisis could explode. This is why, I maintain, the crisis is
so prevalent in our popular consciousness and why, also, radical changes to the
family are an important component in ideas about ideal societies. In Plato, More,
Atwood, and Le Guin the family is fundamentally reinterpreted as a necessary
step for achieving a successful utopian ideala future free of the mimetic
crisisand, in King Arthurs Camelot, where it was not, Camelot was destroyed
by the mimetic crisis.
So, in concluding my arguments, my position is that it is not a coincidence
that successful utopias are imagined along significantly redefined familial lines,
but rather that envisioning a better future requires us to culturally alter the family
structure in order to break the cyclical mimetic crisis generated by the triangular
structure identified by Girard. With the goal of restructuring the family in mind, it is
instructive that individual states are beginning to move toward a legal redefinition
of the family. The primary impetus for this response is the steadily increasing
number of homosexual couples seeking matrimony, but it is not the only reason
behind the legal push for a broader definition of the family. The most recent
battleground to open up is California where legislator Mark Leno introduced a
bill2 to redefine the family by changing the number of parents a child can have; a
bill with precedents, he claims, in four other states.3
The fight for Leno and the California legislature centers on problems in the
family that can arise for reasons other than gay marriage. Leno explains, the
bill brings California into the 21st century, recognizing that there are more than
Ozzie and Harriet families today, a recognition that extends beyond same-sex
couples including, surrogate births and assisted reproduction [all of which]
2 Senate Bill 1476, introduced by Senator Leno February 24, 2012, is an act to amend
sections of the family code of California law relating to parentage.
3 Pennsylvania allows for a de facto parent based upon a ruling in the state superior
court (Jacob v. Shultz-Jacob 923A.2d 473 (PA Super. 2007)), Maine also accommodates
more than one parental claim based upon a court ruling (C.E.W. v. D.E.W. 845A.2d 1146,
114951 (ME 2004)), Delaware has legislation regarding the status of de facto parents
(Del. Title 13, secs. 8201, 8202.), finally, the District of Columbia has legislation
regarding the status of de facto parents (DC ST sec. 16831.01). Additionally, many Native
American tribes, subsequent to the forced fragmentation of their communities during the
colonization of the Americas, established multiple parent strategies to ensure their children
were cared for especially during forced assimilation. Many of these parental structures
survive today in Native American communities and have found their way into the laws of
various states as well. California is one such state that recognizes the de facto multi-parent
social structures employed by Native Americans. See CA Welf. & Inst. Code sec. 294.
are changing society by creating new possibilities for nontraditional households

and relationships.4 The bill itself is designed to allow judges greater flexibility in
child custody cases to keep children out of state care when there is a viable third
or fourth parental option. The custody aspect is the least controversial aspect of the
legislation, as noted by Diane Wasznicky, president of the Association of Certified
Family Law Specialists. She argues, the bill will cause significant unintended
consequences, sending ripple effects into areas as diverse as tax deductions,
citizenship, probate, public assistance, school notifications, and Social Security.5
While the lawyers haggle over the details of the bill and its legal applicability,
advocates for traditional family values underscore, with their arguments against the
bill, what is really at stake in the legislative fight. Leaders for three conservative,
heavyweight, family values-oriented organizations have spoken out against
Lenos bill and, as we will see below, it is in their rebuttals that the fear of the
erosion of mimetic order is most clear. I maintain that the opportunity to change
the family structure to undermine mimesis has never been better than it is currently
and the value-laden language of Lenos moralizing opponents provides the best
signposts for what needs to change socially. In fact, while they present separate
arguments against Lenos legislation, the coherency of their arguments is a near
perfect roadmap to understanding the changes necessary to undermine the cyclical
mimetic crisis as it is in the utopias examined in Chapter 6.
The accusations made by the representatives of these organizations center not
on the attempts to resolve the legal calamities confronted by judges who have to
send a child to state care when a viable third parent is available,6 but, rather, their
focus is on the presumed assault upon the family and traditional family values.
In opposition to the bill Peter Sprigg, a senior fellow at the Family Research
Council, argues, [the bill] represents an attack on the fundamental nature of
parenthood, which is every child has two parentsone mother and one father.7
Spriggs position equivocates on the idea of parenthood; he is making a statement
about the number of people involved in the process of making a child, where
one male and one female come together and procreate. Such a position as Spriggs
certainly informs the definition of parent for a presumably large number of
4 Jim Sanders, California bill would allow a child to have more than two parents,
Sacramento Bee, 2 July 2012, 1A.
5 Jim Sanders, California bill, 1A.
6 Leno claims his justification for introducing the bill came from a 2011 appellate
court case when the child of a lesbian couple was placed in foster care when they became
unable to care for her. Her placement in foster care was required by law even though the
child had a relationship with her biological father. For more of Lenos explanation see
Susan Donaldson James, My Three Daddies: California Eyes Multiple Parenting Law,
ABC News 3 July 2012. <http://abcnews.go.com/Health/GMAHealth/california-considers-
bill-multiple-legal-parents/story?id=16705628> (accessed 19 July 2012).
7 Cristina Corbin, California bill would redefine family, allow children to have more than
2 parents, Fox News 10 July 2012 <http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/07/10/california-
bill-would-redefine-family-allow-for-more-than-2-parents/> (accessed 19 July 2012).
people, and yet his definition of parenthood is deficient because it does not address
what a parent is in practice. Lenos bill makes no claims about multiple parents
outside of the cultural norms about involvement in a childs life, but Sprigg argues
as if the bill is going to make it possible for a multitude of people to be involved
in the procreative act. Spriggs argument centers on the fundamental nature of
parenthood and his definition of that fundamental nature is merely one mother and
one father.
It comes as no surprise that Peter Sprigg is concerned about same-sex
marriage and the implications Lenos bill has for same-sex parentsthe basis
for the legislation, in fact, deals with complications of a same-sex partnership
but Spriggs position is more in line with that of the Family Research Council.
Researchers and spokespersons with the organization boast a deep commitment
to traditional, monogamous, family life. However, it is never discussed in their
numerous publications and public addresses what exactly they take to be the
fundamental nature of parenthoodnor does Sprigg offer an explanation in his
response to Leno or his contributions to the Family Research Council online-
archives. Given Spriggs reaction to Lenos bill it seems fair to assume that his
position understands the role of a parent as essentially bound up with being a
parent, failing to acknowledge that parental roles can be, and often are, fulfilled by
non-parents. Though we might want to tread carefully around clichs like it takes
a village to raise a child there is something important in the idea of a broader
spectrum for parentsan idea expressly explored by Plato and le Guin in their
utopian constructs.
However, if we can question who, and how many persons, can be a parent
involved in a childs life and well-being, then Benjamin Lopezs concerns about
the breakdown of the family structure become more salient in the fight over Lenos
bill alongside Spriggs concerns. Benjamin Lopez, a legislative analyst for the
Traditional Values Coalition, argues Lenos bill is nothing more than an attempt
to revamp, redefine, and muddy the waters of the family structure.8 Lopez
represents the interests of the Traditional Values Coalition where the family is
biblically defined, requires monogamous fidelity, and is expressed in the union of
one man and one woman, with or without children. This definition, however, is only
one of many ways that the family has historically been constructed and Lopezs
concerns mark out a particular boundary that is being transgressednamely, the
fear of having to forfeit the traditional biblical familya family structure already
crippled by mimetic forces.
What is not abundantly clear in Lopezs challenge, or the value statements of
the Traditional Values Coalition, is what makes a family with three or four parents
cease to be a family. Peter Sprigg is concerned that the idea of a parent is under
attack, having failed to understand that anyone can be a parent to a child except in
the strictest sense which is too narrow to fully capture the essence of parenthood.
In a similar way, Lopez and his cohorts at the Traditional Values Coalition have
8 Jim Sanders, California bill, 1A.

failed to understand what makes a family. More importantly for my position is

that, where the family is concerned, they have failed to understand that what
makes a family feasible and socially viable is different than what makes a family
functional and socially secure. As such, not only do we need to redefine what
constitutes a parent, but also, we, as a society, need to redefine what constitutes
the best family structure. My understanding is that the redefinition of these two
social elements must begin with a recognition of, and a commitment to, breaking
down the mimetic structure of human social relationships. In spite of traditional
claims to the contrary, the biblical family is imbued with the mimetic crisis from
its inception and is, therefore, the least desirable family structure.
Reconceptualizing the family will lead to the radical families that Glenn
Stanton fears in his attempted rebuttal of Lenos bill. Stanton, the director of Global
Family Formation Studies for Focus on the Family, claims, the bill appears to
advocate for childrens rights, but in reality gives adults legal protection to create
radical families.9 Stantons bigger picture rejection of Lenos bill is actually
the culminating point for the arguments made by Sprigg and Lopez. The three
men articulate concerns that mark out the utopian ideal and summarily dismiss it.
That we, as a culture, need to reconceive of the nature of parenthood is paramount
if we are to redesign the framework of desire formation, that there needs to be
an overhaul of the family as a unit is borne out by the need to implement a new
context for desire formation, and, ultimately, this social revision will require the
creation of radical families as Stanton labels them. Without addressing these
needs the mimetic cycle will continue to operate as the guiding principle of society
and utopias will continue to espouse the cultural subconscious desire for a new
family model.
Merely acquiescing to the challenges by the homosexual community and
allowing them full participation in the marital institution would pave the way for
the continuation of the mimetic cycle. This is particularly true if they are allowed
to participate in the current model defined and defended by people like Sprigg,
Lopez, and Stanton. Even Leno is clear that his bill is designed to assist judges in
legal matters by generating greater flexibility rather than anything more culturally
substantive. Leno defends his bill against its opponents saying, We are not
touching the definition of a parent under the current law. When a judge recognizes
that a child is likely to find his or her way into foster care and if there is an existing
parent who qualifies as a legal parent, why not have the law when it is required to
protect the well-being of the child? Parents would have to qualify under all legal
standards and agree on custody, visitation and child support before a judge could
divide up responsibilities.10 Of course, changing the way we culturally employ
the family model would need to go further than even Leno is willing to go.
The institution of marriage, as it has been formulated to accommodate the
institutional needs of society to manage the mimetic crisis, has to be recast to
9 Susan James, My Three Daddies.

10 Susan James, My Three Daddies.
embolden the flourishing of desire rather than its restriction. The marital trend
of the monogamous family has been incorporated into the social fabric as
shackles designed to stunt the development of desire and blunt the force of those
desires by continual reinvention and refining of the idea that a harmonious life
is possible only as the product of self-repression and a commitment to fairness
defined as limitation. As such, the challenge for the monogamous one-man-one-
woman family created by Lenos bill is only a partial corrective. There must be a
reconceptualization of parenthood and family, but there must also be a recognition
that monogamy is mimetically dangerous precisely because what we need in
society is a family model that can accommodate the complexity and richness of
the desires we develop in the family. That is, as we are concerned for the children
in the family we must also be concerned in equal measure for the adults whose
desires are constrained by the traditional triangulated approach to the family.
Reshaping the Triangular Family Model around Desire
Infidelity has long plagued human relationships and dealing with it has proven
difficult regardless of either a tightening or loosening of the social controls
regulating marriage. But infidelity masks a deeper social problem which has
been, historically, a localized problemunchecked and unfulfilled desire; that is,
infidelity used to be the scandalous secret whispered around office water coolers
and neighbors mailboxes. In todays cosmopolitan world, however, technology
has turned infidelity into a science and a commercial business. It is in the
cyberworld of Generation Next that the resolution of mimetic desire is on clearest
display, not in the promiscuity of anonymity enabled by the internet, but rather,
in the searches of happily married people looking for greater fulfillmenteither
through curiosity, experimentation, or access to things that a partner is incapable or
unwilling to provide. In technologically facilitated infidelity, a plea for a modern
utopian experiment is abundantly evident, which is to say, by allowing people
greater access to desire fulfillment technologically facilitated infidelity highlights
the need to break the bonds of mimesis.
In our modern era there is little that has not been altered by ever-advancing
technological progress. This is, in many respects, not that surprising, and given
the wager placed on technological progress as the event horizon for human social
salvation by many early critical theorists, some might say this is a welcome form of
progresseven if it is, perhaps, a bit too fast and too clumsily handled. Technology
has freed people to use their free time to pursue new hobbies, interact with people
around the globe that share their interests, technology has revolutionized the
market place and required new vocabulary words to talk intelligibly about the
worldwords like global villageand it has changed how we think of social
relationships. By altering the way we define terms like friend, group, and
audience technology has transformed, in both trivial and substantive ways, how
we interpret both our public and our private lives. But, in so doing, technology
has also begun to undermine how we understand and employ more traditional
and valued ideas like marriage, monogamy, and love. It is at this juncture of
society and technology that the philosophy of Herbert Marcuse becomes salient
to my arguments regarding the family and its relationship to the social structure.
Marcuses philosophy is equally important, paramount even, for understanding
how the fusion of Girardian mimesis, Rawlsian justice, and a restructured family
model can help us save ourselves from ourselves.
One of the main features of Marcuses philosophy is his persistent belief
in a yet-to-come erotic society. In the remainder of this section I explore this
yet-to-come social aspect of Marcuses philosophy to develop the broader erotic
contextual possibilities of his understanding of our technological opportunities.
It is too easy to think about Marcuses broader philosophical system as merely
predicating that technology will enable people to enjoy greater leisure time and
from that imagine how a community with more time for play might develop
into the Eros-based community of Marcuses utopian project. However, I want
to challenge this notion by teasing out a more complex understanding of the
relationship between technology and Eros by offering an argument that the
internet might already be shaping the parameters of the debate about our erotic
lives. Toward the end of Eros and Civilization, Marcuse claims that we must move
beyond monogamic reproduction which he identifies as the central fortification
of the performance principle.11
Marcuses Marxist oriented social critique posits a social setting where
technology is used to produce, among other things, more free time for workers.
This free time then becomes the basis of an Eros-centered community precisely
because people will have the time necessary to do the things they enjoy and
cultivate relationships free of the restrictions and destructive requirements
of a capitalist endorsed way of living. As such, I will focus on how this erotic
technological relationship might be understood in the context of how internet
based companies that promote infidelity impact an Eros directed Marcusean
project. Specifically, I advance an argument that the tacit social acceptance of
infidelity websites is allowing for a re-evaluation, if not a breakdown, of the
concepts monogamy and marriage. This re-evaluation opens up new ways of
thinking about how technology might already be eroding the capitalist structured
ways of understanding productive relationships, but more importantly, the
breakdown of the relationships usually associated with the modern nuclear
family makes it possible to rethink how to structure those relationships without
the inherent dangers of mimetic rivalry.
The first industry to grasp, and take full advantage of, the internets
capabilities was arguably commodified pornography. And, while we may not
know it until we see it, social and critical theorists generally acknowledge that
pornography has little to add positively to society. Yet, quietly in the shadow
11 Barbara Celarent, Eros and Civilization, Review of Eros and Civilization by

Herbert Marcuse, American Journal of Sociology, 115(6) (May 2010): 1969.
of porns electronic dominance, another sex-based industry is taking advantage

of the possibilities offered by the internetprostitution. Outside of places
like Nevada, where prostitution is legal, prostitution is thought of negatively
and is oftencorrectlylinked with a black market sex trade that is socially
destructive. Contrary to popular opinion, however, many of the working
girls in places like Nevada describe their lifestyle as one of choice and think
of the services they provide as therapeutic.12 As a pre-theoretical position to
the one I am advancing in this section prostitution has historically provided
the only socially accessible, discreet, and, where state monitored brothels are
concerned, sexually safe means for infidelity. In this context infidelity is more
than bad faith or a lack of faith it is, more often than not, an expression of
unhappiness, dissatisfaction, or, more commonly, an outlet for the satisfaction
of repressed desires or taboo fetishes. Visits to a brothel are often an attempt
to satisfy those perversions that most clearly express a persons rebellion
against the subjugation of sexuality under the order of procreation, and against
the institutions which guarantee this order.13
As an alternative to marriage, prostitution may seem like an unlikely
proposal, but prostitution enjoys a much more privileged rank than pornography
in feminist discourse about marriage. Marriage is often seen as a screen for
forced prostitution since the marital bond often compromises a womans ability
to dictate the use of her body.14 Yet, prostitution is the height of female control
regarding sexual use of the body15 and, typically, represents an inversion of the
dominance and control in a sexual encounter as characterized in monogamous
marriage. In an exchange between prostitute and customer two adults consent
to terms, making a short term arrangement for access to the body, whereas
in marriage there is an expectation that the wife will be sexually available at
12 For instance see Alexa Albert, Brothel: Mustang Ranch and Its Women, New York:
Ballentine Books, 2002.
13 Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, p. 49. Emphasis added.
14 There is an obvious parallel to homosexual relationships where heteronormal
gender roles often become manifest in the distinctions between penetrative and receptive
relationship roles. The distinction is not as simple as it appears here and the complexity
of the issue would require quite a bit of research given that data for homosexual couples
is incomplete. Nevertheless, I have no intention of limiting my arguments to heterosexual
couples since my solution to the mimetic crisis requires a blurring of the lines between such
socio-normative distinctions.
15 This is true of women as both the prostitute and, in rarer instances, the client.
In the former, the prostitute sets the price, defines the parameters, and is ultimately
responsible for agreeing to the contract temporarily construed. As the client, women are
also in a more commanding position to make demands upon the male prostitute because the
arrangement is an inversion of the traditional power relationships that exist in society. The
power structure of such arrangements parallels the arguments Ellen Klein makes regarding
female professors and male students as exemplary of a power balanced relationship.
See Undressing Feminism for Kleins analysis.
all times for her husband.16 However, if such an arrangement between two
consenting individuals is the most advantageous for both individuals, then the
logic of contract is that marriage would be supplanted by contracts for access
to sexual property. Marriage would give way to universal prostitution.17 Thanks
to the Internet, the sexual outlet once provided primarily by girls hooking on the
corner has quietly transformed into a website that is infiltrating suburbia and
mainstream society and while it is not quite universal prostitution in practice it
embodies the spirit.
There are numerous websites that pander to singles looking to meet for fun,
friendships, relationships and hook-ups and thousands of adults utilize these sites
every day. Of course, it would be normal to call to mind run of the mill sites
like eHarmony, Match.com, Cupid.com, or even the matchmaker itsjustlunch.
com when talking of such sites and, increasingly these days, even phone apps like
Zoosk, among the many that exist. These, however, are not of any concern for the
current investigation. Instead, consider what prostitution is believed to be offering
and then think of the types of sites that might attract those bent on straying
meet2cheat.com, the alibi network, fast seduction, and, perhaps most famously,
AshleyMadison.com. All of these websites provide an online community to
interact with, meet, and hook-up with singles and married people looking to find
no-strings-attached relationships. Because of the popularity of Ashley Madison
due in large part to an aggressive public marketing campaignits founder, Noel
Biderman, has become the focal point of an increasingly heated debate about the
status of marriage in society.
Familiarity with Ashley Madison is to be expected, after all, there are
advertisements for the website on television, buses and bus benches, in magazines,
and on billboardsin multiple countries. The advertisements usually carry a
catchy to-the-point message and feature racy content. In one televised advert,
for example, a couple undresses each other as they enter a hotel room before a
voiceover informs the audience that the couple is marriedjust not to each other.
Then the big company tagline is splashed across the screen Life is Short. Have
an Affair. Unfortunately, the ads do not usually last very long in public spaces as
many communities react immediately to them demanding their removal. Biderman
is often happy to oblige since the community uproar does more for his business
than the adverts do. More telling, perhaps, is the latent fear that a website will
bring ruin to the otherwise happily married people in the community who would
never consider cheating otherwise.
16 Again, such distinctions are merely expedient here. I recognize and acknowledge
that such demands are potentially problematic for those homosexual individuals that
identify as receptive.
17 Carole Pateman, The Sexual Contract, Stanford, CA: Stanford UP, 1988, 184.
Emphasis in original.
Biderman began Ashley Madison after reading that 30 percent of users of

internet dating services were pretending to be single.18 In light of this fact,
Biderman decided that there was a market for infidelity and, it turns out, he
was right. Ashley Madison currently has 8.5 million members in 10 countries
and every seven seconds someone signs up for the service.19 When challenged
that his business is contributing to the erosion of societys moral fabric and
encouraging people to cheat rather than, say, get couples counseling, Biderman
is quick to respond that if 30 percent of people who use mainstream dating sites
are already in relationships, if theyre having affairs at work which jeopardize
their jobs or lead to unfair benefits or promotions, if theyre visiting escorts
and breaking the law, arent we better off cannibalising [sic] those destructive
behaviours [sic]? Instead of [infidelity] impacting on all these other areas, why
not give them an aggregated community of their own?20 Why not, indeed?
Consider that Biderman is arguing that his discreet infidelity website is intended
to replace prostitutes as a means for extra desire fulfillment while facilitating
greater access to like-minded individuals. That is, instead of being limited to
office colleagues, next door neighbors, or others in ones closest circles of friends
and acquaintances, and prostitutes, all of which can potentially create problems
beyond the marital situation being compromised, now, a person inclined to stray
has access to all available, willing partners at the click of a mouse.
According to Elaine George, many people, fearing their spouse may be tempted
to stray, despise anything that attempts to normalize an affair.21 And, for that
reason, many people opposed to such sites fit into a few social categories: Those
that, because of an affair, have been through a divorce, those whose religious
commitments do not allow them to recognize as legitimate alternative lifestyles,
and those that are genuinely happily married. That matrimonial monogamy might
appeal to some is not, in itself, surprising. Even Biderman admits to being happily
married in a committed relationship, but he is also quick to add, if his wife were
no longer interested in him sexually he would consider an affair long before he
would consider walking away from his children and his economic situation.22 So,
it might be prudent to consider that the last group is not really opposed to any but
the most drastic assaults on our current marital model, something tantamount to
the outlawing of monogamywhich is not what I am advocating.
18 Sarah Bahari, Pastor debates merits of monogamy with founder of infidelity

website. Star Telegram (4 March 2011) (accessed 1 April 2011). Emphasis added.
19 Sarah Bahari, Pastor Debates. To emphasize the popularity of the website there
are roughly 12,343 new members every day to the website.
20 Nirpal Dhaliwal, Current Affairs: Married Life in London is about to get Much
Harder. Evening Standard (29 September 2010) (accessed 1 April 2011).
21 Elaine George, Selling Lies is All Too Easy. Daily Telegraph (19 March 2011)
(accessed 1 April 2011).
22 Nirpal Dhaliwal, Current Affairs.
The other two groups are a little more difficult to get a handle on because, on
the one hand, the negative fallout of an affair has tainted what might have been a
positive experience. Biderman is convinced that counseling leads to divorce more
than it helps couples whereas a relationship can often not only survive an affair, but
an affair can strengthen a relationship by providing a wakeup call that something
is wrong within the relationship. On the other hand, religious outlooks pose
their own problem because of the ways that infidelity is entangled in a particular
religious morality. The religious arguments against what Biderman is doing are,
generally, unpersuasive because they are usually grounded in gods plan. In a
public debate with a Texas pastor, Ed Young, Biderman argued, Monogamy
is a failed experiment [and it] places an artificial strain on relationships.23 This
is particularly interesting when one takes the time to consider that high divorce
rates, separations, and desertions, along with the emotional trauma of domestic
violence cannot possibly be attributed solely to a weakness of character or the
moral degeneracy of an individual. If that were the case then a religious approach
to marriage might actually be desirable.24 Rather, as Biderman seems to be
acknowledging, the problem is inherent in the institution of marriage.
For Biderman, these arguments always turn to the question of monogamy.
One of the companys advert campaigns plays on this very notion enticing
prospective members with the tagline When monogamy becomes monotony
join us at AshleyMadison.com. Recognizing that [a]n amazingly high number
of individuals fail to meet the emotional and sexual needs of their [partner]
Biderman is quick to point out that in countries where infidelity rates are higher
(Japan and Europe) their divorce rates are lower than in the US or Australia
where the opposite is true.25 But, perhaps, the most telling statistic is the number
of newlyweds that frequent the site. In Toronto alone, between 2009 and 2010,
the number of women using the site that reported being married three years or
less quadrupled from 3,184 to 12,442. Bidermans explanation for this is simple,
As more and more people get married later and later in life, does it really surprise
you that a 30-year-old woman who just got married a year or two ago, but has a
very robust career and is very independent, is really going to tolerate the same kind
of failed expectations that her mother or grandmother were expected to accept?26
Here we hear echoes of Marcuses belief that the sublimation of desires
brought about by society supports vast social production and often makes
[workers] very happy, particularly during their leisure time But, as this vast
discipline makes society more and more productive, it comes to dominate all
of social life. Its dominance eventually colonizes leisure itself, which becomes
a realm of performance and discipline, as even does the erotic life, which is
23 Sarah Bahari, Pastor Debates.

24 Ron Mazur, The New Intimacy, 11.
25 Elaine George, Selling Lies.
26 Nicole Baute, The New Wives Cheaters Club. Toronto Star (10 April 2010)
(accessed 1 April 2011).
limited and confined to one other person and one particular zone of the body.27
Not only does this domination reduce the erotic to one person and one zone, but
it also emphasizes one particular sensetouchas the appropriate erotic sense.
However, Marcuse challenges this preference by endorsing smell and taste as
more immediate to sexual desire because of their ability to transmit unsublimated
pleasure per se. Such immediacy is socially troubling because it is incompatible
with the effectiveness of organized domination, [within] a society which tends
to isolate people, to put distance between them, and to prevent spontaneous
relationships and the natural animal-like expressions of such relations.28
It certainly seems clear that the traditional marital-industrial complex is
no longer functioning the way it is expected to in society. The problem is not
with marriage per se but with the demands built into the very structure of the
marital relationship. Plainly, infidelity is not a term that is easily defined because
what constitutes it is generally dependent on who is responsible for defining it.
However, if the locus of infidelity is the inability of a marital relationship to
produce not just happiness, but satisfaction on all frontsphysical, emotional,
mental, and spiritualthen it seems like society needs to take a hard look at
what marriage and monogamy might mean in the future. So, if we conceive
of marriage as a contractual arrangement then an act of infidelity would be the
first sign that the arrangement was no longer desirable and since a contract
of mutual advantage and reciprocal use will last only as long as it appears
advantageous to either party high rates of infidelity would suggest that our
current marital model is disadvantageous.29 And, echoing the monotonous
undertones of Bidermans advertised position on marriage, Carole Pateman
argues that [a] new contract with a different partner will always appear as a
possible and enticing alternative.30
Marriage is already an institution under attack primarily because it is such a
fluid term. Marriage can take a variety of formspolygyny, polyandry, homosexual
partners, heterosexual partners, groups, etc.because the idea of what constitutes
a marriage is socio-historical. Today our conception of marriage is rooted in our
capitalist orientation to history. That is, marriage today is meant to be productive,
indeed reproductive, and continue a process of replacing workers with new workers.
More often than not, in modern society the capitalist conception of monogamous
marriage is the social sphere of domesticated stabilized identities.31 This idea of
marriage is an ideal that has been reinforced by our cultural disposition since at
least the nineteenth century when we, in the West, began to see marriage as the only
27 Barbara Celarent, Eros and Civilization, 1968.

28 Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, p. 39. Here Marcuse is quoting Ernest
Schachtel. This citation covers both this quotation and the immediately preceding one.
Emphasis in the original.
31 Linda Singer, Erotic Welfare, New York: Routledge, 1993, 223.
truly acceptable form of adult social relations. In the West where monogamous,
hetero-oriented marriage has been elevated to the only acceptable form of marriage
for adult social relations, individuals are expected to choose a single mate whose
qualities will not be supplemented or complimented by another one.32
That one individual is expected to meet, entirely, the needs of another is a
flimsy concept at bestwhat might be best described as navely utopian. That
this is the case is evident in the historical emphasis on the grooming and training
of young girls to become desirable mates. That women are commonly held
accountable for marital failings is, among other things, socially and psychically
destructive. As a result, it should come as no surprise that women are among
the strongest detractors of the modern marriage model. However, as Biderman
points out above, women today do not need a male counterpart to be financially
secure, to have a career of choice, to express their interests or pursue their dreams
in a variety of ways, so why ought women today settle for a traditional, and
often harmful, socially constructed relationship model that detracts from a robust
and fulfilling life? In point of fact, Biderman expected his website to function
primarily as go-between for unhappily married men and working girls. What
he discovered, however, was that just as many women as men use his services.
Following Marcuse on this point, we might think of the individual Ashley
Madison consumer, male or female, gay or straight, as no longer repressed by
natural necessity, nor by such conventions as marriage and the family, [allowing]
[their] id [to] be gratified in an infinite variety of ways.33
How might we understand the role of the individual in an eros-directed future
society? Given that the individual is meant to have certain desiresdesires which
are dictated by historic socio-economic circumstancesand these desires are as
much a product of early learned behavior as they are the need to repress certain
other desires according to societal pressures, we ought to expect the eros-directed
individual to freely find fulfillment in a variety of places. Since the economic
institution of our modern society is predicated on an economy of desire it is
imperative that consumers have the right kinds of desires in whatever quantity
they wish. But, according to Marcuse, the right kinds of desire are also, by virtue
of the socio-economic organization of culture today, public desires, so private
desires are repressed. The burden on individuals is to make these public and
private desires match. However, with access to sites like Ashley Madison a person
is better able to maintain public appearances while also pursuing the satisfaction
of private needs, desires, and wants. As a result, an open marriage where two
people share a commitment to each other becomes a more functional ideal because
the public performative burden is removed from both parties, as is the frustration,
resentment, and guilt that come with failing to uphold an unrealistic, and ultimately
repressive, social norm.
32 Elizabeth Abbott, A History of Marriage, Toronto: Penguin Books, 2010, 24.

33 Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, 176, 1845.
From Marcuses understanding of what constitutes repression and self-

determination it follows that the individual, to be truly free, must live as he likes.34
But to live as he likes, he must have or receive whatever he desires. To live as
he likes the individual must live in the kind of society he likes. But inasmuch
as his likes may change, the form of society would have to change as well. In
other words, he shall have to live in what Marcuse calls a polymorphous
society.35 And this type of society is necessary, one could argue, to bring about a
legitimate polyamorousthat is, eros-directedsociety. Still, according to family
relationship specialist Ron Mazur, there will be people who will consider open-
ended marriage to be nothing more than a brazen form of institutionalized adultery
[many] will condemn and actively oppose it as a perversion of morals and a
destructive influence on monogamous marriage and family life.36
Nevertheless, along with Ron Mazur and his co-author wife, Joyce, those of us
inspired by, and committed to, Marcuses yet-to-come, eros-oriented society, must
begin to reappraise the ways we commit ourselves to one another and understand
interpersonal intimacy. Iris Marion Young, recalling the sexual revolution of the
1960s, remembers that people were [r]eacting to the combination of Puritanism
and plastic sexuality of post-World War II American culture. The Sexual
Revolution was an attempt to reinvent intimacy by challenging the moral valuation
of marital, monogamous, or heterosexual sex. Young further claims, Sex should
be understood as without rules, in itself a life-affirming and liberating force.37 It
seems that infidelity websites like Ashley Madison are currently creating the social
need for a resurgence of this discourse to occur and, possibly, the opportunity for
a resurgence of the type of intimate social revolt, begun in the 1960s, which could
usher in a Marcusean future.
That fissures exist in the discourse about marriage is evident in the current
struggles regarding gay marriage rights, but exploiting gaps in our understanding
about ideal marriage will require more than merely including the LGBTQ
community in the marital institution. Instead, there needs to be a move away from
the conventional model of marriage toward a more open-ended and supportive
model similar to the type advocated by the small polyamorous subcultures that
exist today. The dangers of advocating for polyamory of any sort begin with the
common conflation of poly anything with an outdated patriarchal ideal of the
primitive fathers harem. That is, polyamory, as I am employing the term, ought
not be conflated with either polygyny or polyandry.38 Polygamous relationships
34 Cf. Herbert Marcuse, Eros and Civilization, 174, 208.

35 Paul Eidelberg, The Temptation of Herbert Marcuse. The Review of Politics,
31(4) (Oct., 1969): 446. See also, Marcuses One Dimensional Man.
36 Ron Mazur, The New Intimacy, 1.
37 Iris Marion Young, Review: Sexual Ethics in the Age of Epidemic, 189.
38 Polygamy is the marriage of one primary spouse to multiple secondary spouses
and may take either of the forms mentioned where polygyny is the marriage of one man to
multiple wives and, in the West, is often associated with the exploitation of young women
exist in most cultures either overtly, as the preferred marital arrangement, or

subtly as socio-cultural arrangements rather than relationships with recognized
legal standing. Polygamous relationships also tend toward social status or fertility
concerns and, and as a result, tend to be more popular in poor or rural areasthe
highest concentration of practicing polygamous cultures and societies is in Africa
where successful males are expected to take on more than one wife and numerous
children are socially desirable.39
Polygamy, in both of its instantiations is socially harmful, although, given
the rarity of polyandry, the threat of polygamy is usually associated with the
practice of polygyny. For instance, polygyny most often manifests in authoritarian
societies and tends to be socially oppressive to women, not to mention psychically
destructive when the relationships are one-sided and the spouses are treated like
chattel property rather than full members of the family. Additionally, polygyny,
as the predominant type of polygamy practiced, can have socially destructive
consequences. John Corvino, citing Jonathan Rauch, argues, as a mathematical
necessity, for one man to have two wives means that some other man has none.
Moreover, the higher a mans status, the more wives he gets with elite men
taking more than their share, low-status men have trouble finding mates, and some
cant marry at all.40 The social problems develop from the creation of a low-status
male population that cannot find marriageable mates. The problems associated
with polygyny are only incurred if there exists in society a cultural assumption
of inequality between the sexes. Barring that assumption, however, polygyny
in a religious ideological system. Polyandry is the marriage of one woman to multiple men
and has less cultural purchase historically usually being practiced on a limited basis in
cultures where there is a shortage of women.
39 The polygamous trend in rural areas is, however, giving way to greater instances
of unofficial polygamous relationships in urban and impoverished areas, especially in
the United States, where the practice is often identified as man sharing among single
women. Instances of this are higher among African-Americans and reflect the socio-
economic circumstances of minority communities in American cities. For an in-depth
look at this trend, and polygamy generally by comparison with African communities, see
Cynthia Cook, Polygyny; Did the Africans Get It Right? Journal of Black Studies, 38(2)
(November, 2007): 23250.
40 John Corvino, Homosexuality and the PIB argument, Ethics, 115(3) (April
2005): section IV. The PIB argument is shorthand for polygamy, incest, and beastiality
which are commonly linked to homosexuality in the form of If homosexuals can marry
whats to stop polygamists, or incestuous peoples, or animal-lovers from getting married?
Corvino offers a fairly solid argument for the moral separation of homosexuality from these
other forms of sexual relationships. However, on the point of polygamy Corvino separates
concerns of polyamory though his reasoning for doing so is more flimsy than it needs to
be, but his overall argument need not exclude polyamorous relationships from joining the
fray as legitimate forms of marriage even as a society acknowledges the harms inherent in
polygamy. Op. Cit. Jonathan Rauch, Gay Marriage: Why It Is Good for Gays, Good for
Straights, and Good for America, New York: Holt, 2004, 129.
could not undertake the development of social relationships that generate these
problems because the women would be assumed to participate as full members
of the family, rather than subject to the rule of the lone, dominant male, making
unilateral decisions.41
Polyamory is different from polygamy because its major operating premise
is not the dominance of one sex over the other, but rather an intermingling of
individuals along shared interests and desires. There is no one partner with
alpha status because polyamory requires equality of the practicing members
to function. However, this is harder to achieve in practice because polyamory,
while theoretically sound, has the greatest potential to immiserate people by
putting them in the position of having to be available to multiple partners at
once on a relationship model currently influenced by conventional ideas about
intimacy. Of course, polyamory is theoretically sound because it is utopian in its
construction; society has no frame of reference for interpersonal utopian intimacy
structures in the mainstream of social discourse so polyamory is difficult to
practice successfully. My position is that a robust understanding of polyamory
and a commitment to restructuring society around polyamorous principles, as
I employ them against the mimetically structured strictures of monogamous
marriage, present the best means for achieving the eros-oriented society Marcuse
predicts for the future. Moreover, with the technology at our disposal our current
society is ideally situated to take full advantage of the opportunity to rewrite the
institution of marriage.
Polyamory is currently a tainted relationship option because it is often
understood as co-opting the females by making them readily sexually available
for a number of men while simultaneously decreasing their social standing even
among the most progressive groups. Polyamory has also been pigeonholed as
a lifestyle of the radical left allowing it to be marginalized, trivialized, and
demeaned as a legitimate option for people in todays society. Kimberley Kreutzer,
a one-time defender of the lifestyle, changed her position when she saw men using
the idea to coerce women into multiple sexual partnerships so that the women
could prove they were not old fashioned and were truly liberated women.
Her refusal to continue to support polyamory is grounded in the inequality of the
current social structure. She argues, polyamory, in its ideal form, is based upon
41 A similar concern about the number of marriageable mates could be lodged

against a society practicing polyandry as well as an equitable concern about latent sexism.
However, there is another concern for a polyandrous society that concerns the reproduction
of society over time. One woman with multiple husbands could only provide offspring
to one husband at a time limiting the rapidity with which the society could regenerate
its population. The inverse is true of a polygynous society because one man could
impregnate all of his wives over the same gestational period allowing for a massive and
rapid expansion of the population. Neither of these results is desirable for the successful
long-term management of a society and ought to be considered serious drawbacks to both
matrimonial models.
mutuality and respect for all people involved. But respect is impossible without
equality and therefore polyamory cannot exist in our society.42
If the family is expected to be the social training ground for morality, then equality
has to be in the structure of the family. This is one of the critical insights missed by
Rawls, but more importantly, polyamory cannot function in a maximally socially
beneficial way until there is a cultural shift in the understanding of equalityor,
rather, a change in the idea of fairness as justice where the commitments of justice
are the result of institutionalized inequality. The problems Kimberley Kreutzer
identifies as inherent to the nature of polyamory as it is currently practiced result,
as she rightly points out, from socially constructed notions of masculinity that men
do not want to relinquish. Men tend to fail to acknowledge their privilege as men,
or recognize their behaviorslike expecting [women] to be sexually available
to themthat reinforce sexism in society, leading to the importation of harmful
relationship expectations from the conventional ideas of marriage.43
Yet, what I am arguing for in polyamorous terms requires a move away from
exactly this kind of thinking. Unfortunately, importing traditional norms for
marriages and relationships is not the sole bastion of men seeking to expand their
sexual conquests through manipulation. Women are equally capable of grasping
too tightly to long entrenched standards and expectations when polyamorous
alternatives are offered thereby preventing the full development of a real and
viable alternative that is not based solely on sexual access. A relationship triangle
that illustrates this point is found in the literature of the popular The Walking
Dead series.44 The premise of The Walking Dead is the collapse of civilization
in the throes of the zombification of the worlds population. There are very few
survivors struggling against the odds and adjusting to the loss of everything they
have known is their primary occupation after surviving. Among the survivors are
the married couple Lori and Rick Grimes, along with their young son Carl, and
Carol Peletier and her daughter Sophia. Obviously, in the calamitous aftermath of
a zombie apocalypse, it is fair to say that a significant amount of social upheaval
has occurred, which allows the small band of survivors to create their own rules
for governing themselves. The struggle to define their lives in this context is, in
fact, one of the primary driving forces of the story. As the group of strangers
coalesce around their need to survive not only to do they form close bonds with
one another, but as they suffer through shedding their commitments to rapidly
fading traditions and beliefs together, they begin to question what is right, moral,
and permissible together as well. It is in this context of exploring the best future
42 Kimberley Kreutzer, Polyamory on the Left: Liberatory or Predatory? Off Our

Backs, 34(5/6) (MayJune 2004): 41.
43 Kimberley Kreutzer, Polyamory on the Left, 41.
44 For the purposes of this example I will be referring strictly to the graphic novel
series. My references to the graphic novel are drawn from The Walking Dead Compendium,
vol. 1, comprising numbers 148 of the single magazine format used to originally publish
the series.
possibilities that the story takes on the issue of how polyamorous marriage can
replace the traditional marital model.
Carols relationship with Lori and Rick begins with a shared parental identity
that most of the group lacks, as well as Sophias fondness for Carl. The two
women share in the responsibilities and duties of camp life and form a bond first.
As the story progresses Carol takes a more than friendly liking to Rick since he
is, by all estimations, the alpha male of the group. The first instance where Carols
budding desire to be connected to Lori and Rick is exposed follows on the heels
of what she thinks is the death of her boyfriend. Following a particularly bloody
scene, Lori is consoling a distraught Carol who, between tears, confides in Lori
that she doesnt know how to thank her and Rick for all of their support. She
goes on to say, I owe you so much, before kissing Lori on the mouth. In this
scene, where Carol is confused, sad, and upset, the reader is invited, along with
Lori, to write the behavior off as the expression of a needy woman reaching out
for comfort and, possibly, stability.
However, the kiss with Lori is the tip of the iceberg for Carol as she begins to
formulate in her mind the possibility of a future with Lori and Rick. Later, Carol
and Lori are sharing a quiet moment discussing crafting projects and just as the
focus of the discussion is sharpening toward a discussion of family life the two are
interrupted by yet another disastrous event that threatens a member of the group.
Unnerved by the event Carol goes in search of her boyfriend to ensure that he is
okay only to catch him receiving a blowjob from another womanMichonne,
a new arrival. Witnessing the incident Carol immediately becomes jealous of
Michonne, and particularly, we are later told, because she was performing a sex act
that Carol refuses to do because she finds the act degrading. Still, that night with
her boyfriend Carol attempts to perform fellatio, and failing, she elects to dissolve
the relationship. The mimetic elements are clear between Carol and Michonne,
both are interested in the same man and find him sexually desirable. The two are
jealous of each other, or, at a minimum, they are in competition with each other
and Carol is clearly jealous. Carols breakup and, perhaps, no small amount of
disillusionment caused by the state of the world, leads her to attempt suicide.
Carols suicide attempt closes the gap between her situation as it is and her
situation as she would like it to beone that includes Lori and Rickafter Rick
confronts Carols boyfriend accusing him of being responsible for the suicide
attempt, leading to fisticuffs between the two men. Carol visits Rick after the fight
to tell him how much she appreciates him taking up for her and, during their brief
exchange, she spontaneously kisses him much like she had done with his wife
earlier. This time, however, unlike the sympathetic acceptance Lori provided, Rick
outright rejects the advance defending himself against her advances by explaining
that he likes her but that he is married to Lori and loves her before trying to
console Carol with the hope that there are other men out there for her. Using the
traditional, pre-zombie apocalypse, conciliatory lines to explain himself to Carol
it is clear that Rick does not understand what is at stake in the exchange; but,
his softened position by conversations end leaves Carol with enough hope that
something might still be possible that she pursues the opportunity of a polyamorous
relationship further.
Talking with Lori about her suicide attempt Carol relates her fear that Lori and
Rick, despising what she had tried to do, may hate her. Lori, again attempting to
console her friend, tells Carol she is over-reacting, but Carol persists, claiming,
I feel like I let you down. I love you both and I dont want you to hate me.
Clearly exasperated by the proclamation of love, but equally disconcerted by
Carols emotional state, Lori tells Carol not to worry because she and Rick love
her too. After hearing the needed confirmation that Lori and Rick feel strongly
toward her Carol approaches Lori after Rick leaves to go scouting without telling
Lori. Lori is furious at Rick for his unannounced departure and in her attempt to
calm Lori down, or distract her, Carol tells Lori,
I kinda want to marry you. Not just you, you understandyou and Rick. Just
hear me out its not as crazy as it sounds. I mean, Ive been thinking about what
Rick said, yknowabout how things are never going to go back to the way
they used to be and how we need to just make a new life for ourselves. This just
makes sense to me. I love you both and we could all raise Carl and Sophia and
the new baby together. I know it seems weird now but we dont have to follow
the old rules, we can make new ones. We could be happy together.
Lori is considerably shocked by the proposal and Carol tries to explain further that
itd be like being married, but without the ceremony. Carols position parallels
my own arguments nicely because she seeks to establish the plurality outside of
the norms they are all used to as holdovers from their former lives. She couches
her argument in a belief that Rick had expressed previously to the group and she
approaches Lori with the initial proposal because, as has been indicated by this
point in the story, she is closer to Lori than Rick. Loris speechlessness at the
proposal makes Carol immediately question whether or not she has misread the
situation, but the real problem is with the notions Lori has about relationships. For
her, and, presumably, Rick, the idea that the group can re-write the rules applies
to group concerns, like how to treat other living non-group members, but it is
less clear that anyone, other than Carol, has thought much about what such a
commitment might mean for their personal, private lives.
Loris rejection of Carols proposal accelerates from mundane concerns that
this is just the trauma of their situation speaking to an acerbic defense of her
traditional marriage. She challenges Carol, in part, by demanding to know How
exactly would this work out? What would our children think? Can you imagine
how a living arrangement like this would scar them for life?! Frustrated, Lori
says in dismay, Jesus Christ, CarolIm from a small town in Kentucky. Did
you really think Id go for this? It is this final, virulent rejection of Carol that
ends the discussion of a polyamorous relationship between the three. However, it
is clear in their discussions that Carols concept of a new marriage model stems
from the same concerns that I have expressed in my arguments against traditional
mimetic-based marital relationships. It is difficult not to wonder if Carol would

have been more successful approaching her boyfriend and Michonne with her
polyamorous proposal, but, regardless, her attempt to construct a new marriage
model emphasizes the concerns of polyamory that currently dog the pluralist
subcultures in society today. Interestingly, it is Loris defense of her traditional
values that ends Carols pursuit of the couple even though it is Lori that is, for all
intents and purposes, the most responsible for egging Carol onhence, Carols
concern that she had misread the situation.
If polyamory is exempted, temporarily anyway, from the political and legal
questions that are entailed by its practice, as noted in the fight over the multiple
parents law in California, then it might be possible to identify what the primary
design flaw is in the current manifestations of polyamory in society. There are
three problematic aspects of polyamory identified by its opponents and none of
them are profound enough to be crippling to the arguments in favor of polyamory.
First, as I argued above, polyamory is linkable to the harmful social consequences
of polygamous relationships. This challenge is, I believe, a product of the overall
cultural values placed on equality and not an inherent problem in the structure of
polyamorous relationships. Secondly, it is argued that polyamory is a product of
a capitalist cultural mindset that treats people as expendable. Finally, there is an
argument that polyamory places a greater value on sexual access and gratification
than on intimacy and lasting love. In my defense of polyamory I will focus on the
latter two challenges since the first was addressed above.
The capitalist critique of polyamorous relationships and sexual intimacy derives
its strength from the throw away cultural mindset induced by societies grounded
in consumption and concerned primarily with use-value. That the family structure
should take on the coloring of the governmental controls which regulate it is not,
in itself, surprising; however, the argumentative shift here is that monogamous
relationships are understood as stable even as social controls make it easier to
obtain divorces, co-habitat, or begin a family as a single parent or guardian through
the use of IVF treatments or adoption. As governments have become increasingly
complex so, too, have the ways in which governments regulate and control the
reproductive unit of society. Toward this end, polyamorous relationships have
been portrayed as an assault upon the sacred nature of what fidelity and monogamy
in a relationship are meant to embody. However, there is no reason to believe
that participants in a committed polyamorous relationship would fail to meet
the standards of fidelity toward one another. As one of many ways to resist the
influences of patriarchy, male-dominance, and capitalism in our social structure,
polyamory offers one of the surest ways to breakdown those influences in the
family. That polyamory can be used to deny the throw away mindset challenge
is inherent in the fact that polyamory, unlike its monogamous counterpart, requires
the maintenance of multiple loves and relationships rather than the one-at-a-time
approach designated as acceptable by social standards today.
The final serious challenge to polyamorous relationships is that polyamory
places too high a premium on sexual access and gratification. The easy response to
this is that the conflation of sexual desire and love is at the heart of monogamous
relationship standards. To assume that polyamory is code for destigmatized
promiscuity is to ignore the fact that promiscuity exists outside of committed
relationships of any kind. There is no reason to believe that a monogamous couple
is having less sex than a polyamorous group of peoplethis is true in both the
qualitative and quantitative approaches. What polyamory does allow for that
state sanctioned monogamy does not is the avoidance of legal intrusion into the
relationship proper. Because polyamory, properly understood and practiced, is
grounded in equality, mutual support and commitment, when a transgression occurs
the group is responsible for dealing with it in ways that appeal to the structure and
personality of the group. When a transgression occurs between monogamists the
arbitrator is, more often than not, the state. It is true that friends and family may
try to intervene and act as arbitrators as such, but on the whole, their influence is
superficial because they are not participants in the intimacy of the relationship.
Of course, if polyamory is the answer to the mimetic crisis that exists at the
heart of the core family unit, then the family structure most beneficial to society
is one that begins minimally as a square. That is, consider how a polyamorous
relationship meets the needs of the family while simultaneously improving
society. First, let me state a caveat to my proposal, which is, it may be possible
for the right people to have a healthy, wholesome, productive, socially beneficial
traditional monogamous marriage. My proposal is not meant to prohibit such
things, but rather to pronounce them rare, and, perhaps not unfairly, increasingly
so when subjected to the strictures of state control. The turn toward polyamory
allows people to engage in the type of group involvement that utopians tend
to develop in their idyllic schemes. More importantly, it allows for individuals
to pursue multiple desires simultaneously which decreases the instances of
repression in the individual. Polyamory in the household also removes the alpha
status of the individual father- or mother-figure, thereby providing the offspring
with multiple models; additionally, it removes the need for a child to need to be
chosen as the heir since the multiplicity of adults allows the home to function in
the event that one or more of the adults leaves, becomes incapacitated, or dies.
Simply put, multiple parents, existing in a state of mutual recognition and equality,
do not permit of a power vacuum in the event that one of the parents is removed.
The power vacuum created by the fathers removal is, according to my reading
of mimesis, the foundational fact of society which leads to the transformation
of mimetic rivalry into the destructive expression of the mimetic crisiswith a
polyamorous family structure the crisis is preemptively averted.
For polyamory to function counter-mimetically, social constraints, which
regulate with whom, and how, people may interact intimately, and toward
what ends, must be rewritten in the culturally coded framework of society and
social institutionsthat is, polyamory, unlike our current social commitments
to monogamy, must separate sex and love giving primacy to love. This position
is, perhaps, best articulated by example. Consider a group of people, say, three
men and three women, that decide to enter into a polyamorous relationship.
It does not matter if all the people are heterosexual, homosexual, bi-sexual, or a
mixture of any number of sexual persuasions, what does matter is that all six of the
individuals are committed to one another. Each person needs to understand their
role in the relationship structure and everyone else needs to be aware of how the
others understand their roles. Open communication is, therefore, a must, but need
not preclude the development of deeper personal relationships among the group.
What each member contributes to the other members individually may differ
from what each person singly provides the group. The ideal situation would entail
sexual intimacy between all the members, but this is by degrees. The goal of such
a relationship structure is to ensure that each person has the greatest fulfillment
possible with the least amount of stress on the interpersonal relationships.
So, for instance, it is possible that several members of the group enjoy anal
intercourse while the others do notagain, this may be any combination of
persons in the group, but for an example of the inner workings of a polyamorous
group assume that two of the men and one of the women are inclined to engage
in anal intercourse. It ought to be the case that those so inclined can engage in
that activity without putting undo stress on the relationship of the group. Perhaps,
the woman and one of the men enjoy receiving anal sex, while the second man
enjoys being both the penetrative and receptive partner. In this example the second
man could engage in penetrative sex with either the other man or the woman.
Additionally, the woman may come to find that she enjoys, through the use of toys,
being a penetrative partner as well. While the three individuals may develop a
deep and abiding affection for one another through their shared enjoyment of anal
intercourse, this need not preclude them from being full participants in the group
or from being sexually involved with other members. Moreover, because they are
able to find satisfaction for their desires they are less likely to stray or become
isolated in the relationship.
Compare this to a one-man-one-woman structure where one partner enjoys
anal sex but the other does not. One of the partners is going to have to compromise,
or both are by turns, but ultimately the compromise is a band-aid for the sexual
frustration that will result. For the monogamous couple there is a real concern
that the partner interested in anal intercourse will turn to prostitutes, or join an
online organization like Ashley Madison, in order to satisfy their sexual desire
even as they acknowledge they are in love with their mate. The common reproach
to this position usually takes the form they knew what they were getting when
they married or why cant they just be satisfied with what they have, but the
truth is that people change and the desire for anal intercourse may have been
a post-marriage development. Worse, it may not have been brought up during
courtship because the uninclined partner was vocal about their condemnation of
the behavior. Certainly it is a sad state of affairs when an unfulfilled sexual desire
is allowed to destroy an otherwise loving relationship. In the polyamorous group
each person is a participant in the fulfillment of those desires they share in the
group. As such, the group can grow or shrink according to the evolving needs of the
group or the expansion of the group based on the mutual desire to include others.
The flexibility of polyamory allows the group to make these decisions apart
from the infiltrating demands of the state whereas in the traditional monogamous
structure when one or both partners outgrow the relationship their only recourse
for resolving the problems of their relationship are desertion or divorce. I have
provided only one example, but such arguments can be applied to both the sexual
and non-sexual interests and desires of the differing groups.
To pursue the ideal further, consider the family matrix and how polyamory
upsets the mimetic structure where children are concerned. If each adult is
connected to the other adults for different reasons there is no one model from
whom the child(ren) learn to desire, nor is there a particular right way to desire
those things which are desirable. In fact, the children will be exposed to reasons
for desiring from all parents in the core structure creating ample opportunities for
children to explore their own personalitynot to mention their own sexuality
free from the need to repress those aspects that find no outlet for expression in
the Girardian identified model-disciple relationship. That is, rather than creating
a need for the disciple to mimic one model, which entails the repression of
desires the model either does not embody or does not acknowledge or condone,
the disciples desire structure itself becomes a patchwork of possibilities modeled
by the polyamorous group. When the child is ready to leave home and join a
group of their own they will have had a long-time to identify those desires
which they can fulfill as well as those desires which they would like fulfilled.
In this way, each person in successive generations has a greater chance at
eros-based happiness.
Because the polyamorous group creates a mimetic imbalance that undermines
the mimetic crisis engendered by the traditional core family unit society as a whole
benefits. Polyamory requires that each member be treated as a full participant
establishing a ready egalitarianism and a greater degree of individual tolerance
from the earliest stages of development. My position is that a shift from monogamy
to polyamory is necessary to achieve what Marcuse refers to as the process of
humanization. According to Marcuse, culture is a process of humanization
characterized by the collective effort to protect human life, to pacify the struggle
for existence by keeping it within manageable bounds, to stabilize a productive
organization of society, to develop the intellectual faculties of man, to reduce and
sublimate aggressions, violence and misery.45 One of the qualifications for such
a process is the exclusion of identification processes that rely on tribal, national,
religious, or other identity markers which produce enemies. Enemies are essential
to mimetic society because of the need for scapegoats, hence, the restructuring
of identity politics to remove enemies is necessary for overcoming the mimetic
structure of society. As polyamory undermines mimesis there will be less and less
need for scapegoats because there will be fewer and fewer instances of claims to
justice founded upon the need to justify inequality among the members of society.
45 Herbert Marcuse, Remarks on a Redefinition of Culture. Daedalus, 94(1)

(Winter 1965): 19091.
A re-oriented eros-focused society is attainable through the tolerance

and acceptance instilled by the non-alpha-model dominated family group.46
Such a move away from mimetically infected monogamy highlights how the
role of the egalitarian family is necessary to a configuration of justice, especially
behind the veil of ignorance, where justice is supposed to usher in the age of the
realistic utopia. Put differently, to achieve a Rawlsian notion of justice inspired
by individuals behind the veil, there must first be a Marcusean reckoning
over how we socially perpetuate the satisfaction of needs. As Marcuse rightly
points out,
What is now at stake are the needs themselves. At this stage, the question is no
longer: how can the individual satisfy his own needs without hurting others,
but rather: how can he satisfy his needs without hurting himself, without
reproducing, through his aspirations and satisfactions, his dependence on
an exploitative apparatus which, in satisfying his needs, perpetuates his
servitude? The advent of a free society would be characterized by the fact
that the growth of well-being turns into an essentially new quality of life.
This qualitative change must occur in the needs, in the infrastructure of man
(itself a dimension of the infrastructure of society): the new direction, the
new institutions and relationships of production, must express the ascent of
needs and satisfactions very different from and even antagonistic to those
prevalent in the exploitative societies. Such a change would constitute the
instinctual basis for freedom which the long history of class society has
blocked. Freedom would become the environment of an organism which is no
longer capable of adapting to the competitive performances required for well-
being under domination, no longer capable of tolerating the aggressiveness,
brutality, and ugliness of the established way of life. The rebellion would then
have taken root in the very nature, the biology of the individual; and on
these new grounds, the rebels would redefine the objectives and the strategy
of the political struggle, in which alone the concrete goals of liberation can
be determined.47
46 Many intentional communities have followed a similar approach to the one I

am advocating here. Perhaps the most successful is the intentional community of Oneida
founded in the nineteenth century which lasted for over 30 years before inner turmoil
caused by lingering commitments to capitalist and traditionalist ideologies weakened the
resolve of the participants. For an informative, yet brief, account of the Oneida community
see Lawrence Foster, Free Love and Community: John Humphrey Noyes and the Oneida
Perfectionists, Americas Communal Utopias ed. Donald Pitzer, Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 1997, 25379.
47 Herbert Marcuse, An Essay Concerning Liberation, Boston, MA: Beacon Press,
1969, 45. Emphasis added.
Further and Future Questions
What I have tried to achieve with the arguments presented here is the tentative
first step in a larger social critique that seeks to undermine traditional notions
of justice in society. To do this, I have examined Girards mimetic theory and
offered reinterpretations of his theory to render it more viable to a socio-political
philosophical understanding of justice as a product of a social contract. By reading
Girardian mimesis as a social contract, and placing it in the socio-political matrix,
I have attempted to ground an understanding for how justice is best understood
by extrapolating from utopian literature the tropes that mirror the mimetic crisis.
Pulling the threads of mimesis, justice, and utopianism through the narrative
structure I propose for social development, I have concluded that the family
structure must change from its current, traditionalist, monogamous two partner
structure into a polyamorous group oriented structure. Doing so renders the effects
of mimesis moot in society and opens up to human society a more peaceful vista
from which it might be possible to actualize the realistic utopia of the future that
so many social theorists have prophesied.
Yet, while the goals for this project have been met there is still work to do,
and further developments will require still greater investigations in how to
structure the polyamorous family in order to avoid the pitfalls of those who have
attempted or are currently engaged in trying to maintain a polyamorous social
structure. Hopefully, this project will serve both as a discussion starter for further
investigations into the questions of the familys relationship to justice, but also
to a deeper understanding of how desires are formed and how that process can
be harmful or helpful to society. Addressing the formation of desire and the role
such a process plays in the exemplification of justice is, if my arguments here
are accurate, paramount for Rawlsians focused on achieving the just, realistically
utopic societies Rawls predicted. Furthermore, it is imperative, based upon
what I have argued here, that social theorists begin to take utopian claims more
seriously, but more than that, that utopianism be interrogated to reveal what other
truths about human society are hidden in the collective subconscious of these
idyllic dreams.
I believe that a better future is possible and, I believe, that bringing it about
will require more than just run-of-the-mill sacrifices from us. Social reform will
require, to the contrary, a great amount of self-analysis and firm commitments to
ideas that are foreign to our shared beliefs about morality, love, social organization,
and individual fulfillment. I believe I have offered here a sound argument for why
we should, both as individuals and as a society, begin to question more stringently
our deepest convictions and shift our commitments to the possibility of a better
future built upon the polyamorous, polymorphous foundation of an eros-oriented
future presaged by Marcuse.
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Index
Adeimantus 155 Fourier, Charles 124

Anaximander 52 Freud, Sigmund 32, 35, 45, 48, 57, 9091,
Anspach, Mark 41 94, 112, 115
Aristotle 136, 154
Arthur Pendragon 158 Gay marriage 194
AshleyMadison.com 202 Gearheart, Sally Miller 146
Atwood, Margaret 142, 176 Genesis 144
Geoffrey of Monmouth 159
Benhabib, Seyla 133 Girard, Ren
Butler, Samuel 122 and Freud 33, 37, 43, 47, 54, 57, 67,
76, 86, 1268
Caiaphas 67, 1278 and Hegel 18, 23, 26, 29, 31, 43
Cain and Abel 1467, 194 and mimetic models 16, 17, 155
Chaucer, Geoffrey 164 monstrous doubles 29, 44, 69, 110
Christ also Jesus 21, 25, 268, 30, 48, 68, and Nietzsche 28, 34, 38, 40, 43
1268, 183, 194 and Rawls 17, 1037, 123, 127, 143,
Cockaign 167 1623
Crusoe, Robinson 141 and Royal Power 118
and utopia 125, 129
Decalogue 142 Girardian standard triangle also GST 40,
Desire 59, 646, 73, 86, 111, 115, 146
imitation 32, 43, 157, 169 Godfather, The 75
metaphysical 16
mimetic 38, 54, 57, 68, 128, 199 Hamlet 16
and surrendering 39 Hammurabis Code 142
Dionysus 2530 Hegel, G.W.F.
Disenfranchisement 71, 73 and dialectic 8, 1415
Domination 110, 205 and marriage 17
and recognition 10, 2024
Eden also Garden of Eden 143, 175 and slaves consciousness 14
Hitler, Adolf 132, 139, 141
Fallacy of reification 133 Hobbes, Thomas 7880
Family Research Council 196 Howell, William Dean 135
Focus on the Family 198
Founding murder also Founding violence Incest 18, 34, 36, 40, 45, 489, 59, 617,
26, 356, 41, 43, 478, 52, 556, 69, 72, 74, 76, 78, 80, 109, 161,
5864, 66, 69, 74, 7680, 82, 86, 165, 208
90, 100, 102, 10910, 11415, 119, Infidelity 199200
1278, 133, 136, 1489
Jacob and Esau 7071, 145 and transvaluation of values 21, 246
Justice as fairness 868, 916, 100, 1045, and ubermensch 21, 25
11314, 11819 Nowak, Susan 47
Justice as unfairness 91
Oedipal Complex 33, 36, 56, 58, 95
Kant, Immanuel 98101, 134 Okin Susan M. 107, 118
Kirwan, Michael 11, 23, 66 Open marriage 206
Kluckhohn, Clyde 56, 69 Orwell, George 122, 129, 138
Kojeve, Alexander 11, 20, 23 othering 72
Lancelot 163, 165 Pateman, Carole 89, 108, 110, 205

le Guin, Ursula 123, 183 Patricide 24, 356, 45, 48, 556, 667, 72
Leno, Mark 195 Pilate, Pontius 1278
Locke, John 812 Plato 153, 168, 189
Lot 61 Polyamory 207, 209, 213, 216
Prostitution 201
Mack, Burton 41 Puzo, Mario 75
Marcuse, Herbert 200, 204, 2067, 21617
Marx, Karl 123, 125 Rawls 878, 90, 217
McCarthy, Cormac 138 and envy 91, 97
Medusa 60, 161 and family 100, 105, 117, 210
Mimetic contract 79, 81, 85 and Freud 923, 95
Mimetic square 214 and mimesis 97
Mimetic triangle 41 and original position 92
Mimetic violence 25, 41, 45, 49, 51, 57, and social institutions 104
647, 71, 789, 82, 856, 90, 968, and utopia 121
104, 11718, 1212, 126, 136, 143, Renaldo, Renato 126
150, 195 Rike, Jennifer 66
Modified Electra triangle also MET 60 Rousseau, J.J. 824, 107, 113, 169
Modified Girardian standard triangle also
MGT 64 Sacrifice also sacrificial victim 245, 278,
Modified Oedipal triangle also MOT 62 35, 37, 41, 467, 657, 83, 126,
Modified weak alternative triangle also 1468, 175, 183, 185, 194, 218
MWA 74, 87, 112, 116, 1436 de Saint-Simon, Henri 124
Monogamy 173, 204, 214 Sargent, Lyman Tower 122
Moral psychology 92 Scapegoat also surrogate victim 356
Mordred 161 Scheler, Max 23
More, Thomas 134, 136, 138, 166 Social contract 66, 7781, 8590, 10910,
Morgan le Fay 159 136, 174, 218
Mumford, Lewis 133, 141, 166 Strong alternative triangle also SAT 724
Muschamp, Herbert 137 Sublimation of instinct 34
Subordination 110
Nietzsche, Friedrich
and Freud 20 Teleological Historical Narrative 12, 14, 20
and pity 22 theory of justice 78, 869, 956, 100,
and ressentiment 18, 23 104, 113, 11718, 1212
Index 227
Traditional Values Coalition 197 Voltaire 169
Uther Pendragon 160 Walking Dead, The 210

Utopia also utopian Weak alternative triangle also WAT 69,
and history 132 73, 187
and mythology 130 Wells, H.G. 122
and regulative ideal 133, 135, 141 Wolff, Robert Paul 100, 124
and violence 131 Wood, Allen 17
veil of ignorance 96, 100, 112, 114, 119, Young, Iris Marion 207
122, 125, 217
Victimage mechanism 36 Zizek, Slavoj 18, 31, 378

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A Genealogy of Social Violence

Classical and Contemporary

Also in the series

The Social Pathologies of Contemporary Civilization

Utopia: Social Theory and the Future

Torture, Intelligence and Sousveillance in the War on Terror

British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

2 Historical and Philosophical Context 7

3 Girardian Mimetic Theory: Objections and Responses 51

4 Justice as Unfairness: The Social Contracts of Girard and Rawls87

5 Mythologies of the Future: Justice, Mimesis, and Idyllic Hope 121

7 Squaring the Triangle:

2.1 The Girardian Standard Triangle 40

Structure of the Argument

of human imaginingutopic dreamingand show how a Girardian model can

In Chapter 3 I will offer my critique of Girards mimetic model. I will use

The Historical Situation

1 Michael Kirwan, Discovering Girard, New York: Cowley Publications, 2005: 8.

Hegel: The Necessity of Social Evolution2

in the teleological development of history he proposes. To take into account

3Kirwan, Discovering Girard, 31.

recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another.5 Yet, in this mutuality

5Hegel, Phenomenology, 112. Emphasis in original.

For Hegel, then, desire to be recognized leads the individual self-

If, on the one handas Hegel saysself-consciousness and man in general

Once the conflict engendered by recognition is resolved as one of the combatants

13 Kojve, Desire and Work, 57.

22Girard, Deceit, 158.

in the foundation of states by gods or heroes.29 This position is surprisingly

29Hegel, Philosophy of Right, 207.

That is why violence can always stage a stunning, catastrophic comeback.34 If

Nietzsche: Genealogy, Dionysus, and the Crucified

Nietzsche contributes the necessary component of ressentiment35 to the

34Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 307. Emphasis added.

42Nietzsche, Daybreak, 236. Emphasis in original.

50 Girard, Dionysus and the Crucified, 825.

54 Girard, Strategies of Madness, in To Double Business Bound, 70.

59Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, 31.

63Nietzsche, Human, All Too Human, vol. II 328.

65Nietzsche, Daybreak, 13.

67Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols, 32.

70 iek, Violence, 8990. My critique of Rawlss notion of justice as fairness takes

The moral by-product of that revelation is the Christian conscience that

Freud: Girards Mimetic Precursor

My approach to differentiating myself from Freud will focus narrowly on his

71Bailie, Violence Unveiled, 31.

78Freud, Group Psychology, 61.

81Freud, Group Psychology, 89.

problematic because the surrogate is supposed to be standing in for the object of

85Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 84.

89Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 8.

ieks formulation of the problem of desire and rivalry highlights the

Girard: The Mimetic Narrative and the Triangular Construction of Mimesis

Before delving farther into the difficulties of a Freudian or Girardian theory

93Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 49.

conceptualizes the mimetic triangle and to illuminate how the relationships

Figure 2.1 The Girardian Standard Triangle97

community.99 This deconstructive project, according to Girards interpretation,

99 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 94.

102Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 145.

by a strange but inexplicable consequence of their relationship, neither the

103Girard, Violence and the Sacred, 146. Emphasis added.

2 Historical and Philosophical Context 7

3 Girardian Mimetic Theory: Objections and Responses 51

4 Justice as Unfairness: The Social Contracts of Girard and Rawls87

5 Mythologies of the Future: Justice, Mimesis, and Idyllic Hope 121

2.1 The Girardian Standard Triangle 40