021. Ivler v.

Honesto-San Pedro
G.R. No. 172716 /November 17, 2010/Second Division/Petition for Review of Orders of Pasig RTC
Jason Ivler y Aguilar petitioner
Pasig MTC Br. 71 Judge Maria Rowena Modest-San Pedro, and Evangeline Ponce respondent
Decision by J. Carpio, Digest by Arnel

Short Version: A vehicular collision between Jason Ivler and spouses Nestor and Evangeline Ponce in
2004 (yes, before the infamous 2009 road rage incident involving then Azy Ignacios long-time boyfriend-
nag-tsismis?) resulted in slight physical injuries for Evangeline and the death of Nestor. Ivler was
convicted for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries. This petition seeks the review of
the Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City affirming sub-silencio a lower courts ruling finding
inapplicable the Double Jeopardy Clause to bar a second prosecution for Reckless Imprudence Resulting
in Homicide and Damage to Property arising from the same incident grounding the second prosecution.

Facts:

Following a vehicular collision in 8 August 2004, petitioner Jason Ivler was charged before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, with two separate offenses: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce (respondent Ponce); and
(2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent
Ponces husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponces vehicle.

Ivler posted bail for his temporary release in both cases.

On 2004, Ivler pleaded guilty to the charge on the first delict and was meted out the penalty of PUBLIC
CENSURE. Invoking this conviction, Ivler moved to quash the Information for the second delict for
placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence. MTC denied
quashal. Ivler elevated the matter to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City (RTC), in a petition for
certiorari while Ivler sought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in criminal case, including his
arraignment as a prejudicial question.

Without acting on petitioners motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of
petitioners absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest.

Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioners motion to suspend proceedings and
postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner sought reconsideration but as of the filing of
this petition, the motion remained unresolved.

Issues:

1) WON petitioner forfeited his standing to seek relief from his petition for certiorari when the MeTC
ordered his arrest following his non-appearance at the arraignment in Reckless Imprudence Resulting in
Slight Physical Injuries for injuries sustained by respondent? NO.

2) WON petitioners constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in
Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponces
husband? YES.

Ratio:

On Petition for Certiorari

The RTC dismissed Ivlers petition for certiorari, narrowly grounding its ruling on petitioners forfeiture of
standing to maintain said petition arising from the MeTCs order to arrest petitioner for his non-
appearance at the arraignment in the second offense. Thus, without reaching the merits of the said
petition, the RTC effectively affirmed the MeTC. Petitioner sought reconsideration but this proved
unavailing.

Ponce finds no reason for the Court to disturb the RTCs decision forfeiting petitioners standing to
maintain his petition in S.C.A. 2803. On the merits, Ponce calls the Courts attention to jurisprudence
holding that light offenses (e.g. slight physical injuries) cannot be complexed under Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code with grave or less grave felonies (e.g. homicide). Hence, the prosecution was obliged
to separate the charge in Criminal Case No. 82366 for the slight physical injuries from Criminal Case No.
82367 for the homicide and damage to property. The OSG moved not to file a comment as the public
respondent judge is merely a nominal party.

Dismissals of appeals grounded on the appellants escape from custody or violation of the terms of his bail
bond are governed by the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 124, in relation to Section 1, Rule 125, of
the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizing this Court or the Court of Appeals to "also, upon
motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or
confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of the appeal." The "appeal"
contemplated in Section 8 of Rule 124 is a suit to review judgments of convictions.

On Double Jeopardy

The accuseds negative constitutional right not to be "twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense" protects him from, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with the
prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information.

Ivler adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless
imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical
Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to
Property "as the [latter] requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not."

The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same
provision of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, namely, Article 365 defining and penalizing quasi-
offenses.

The cases cited by the SC uniformly barred the second prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible
under the Double Jeopardy Clause.

The SC declares that for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of
their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent
effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more
than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses"
(or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly).

OBITER: If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasi-crimes the sentencing
formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of
all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the
distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365,
befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of this ruling.

Dispositive: SC grants the petition and reverses the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May 2006 of
the Pasig RTC, Branch 157. SC also dismisses the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against Ivler
pending with the Pasig MTC, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy.