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Waldron.
Il breve saggio sul concetto di lex in Surez evidenzia come la nota definizione
di Tommaso dAquino, pur rappresentando un punto di riferimento
imprescindibile nel dibattito giuridico, morale e teologico, possa esser riscritta.
E linnovazione del gesuita spagnolo si delinea in una definizione di legge, ove i
termini intelletto e volont sono posti in modo differente e il dialogo tra questi
concetti generi una costruzione morale, che tenga conto della libert della
volont dallintelletto e da un ordo precostituito.
I suggest a new role for authority and interest in the theory of right: Rights can
be explicated as sets of prohibitions, permissions and commands, and they
must be justified by interests. I argue as follows: (1) The two dominant theories
of rightWill Theory and Interest Theoryhave certain standard problems.
(2) These problems are systematic: Will Theorys criterion of the ability to
enforce a duty is either false or empty outside of its original legal context,
whereas Interest Theory includes in (...)
How Kant's View of Perfect and Imperfect Duties Resolves an Alleged Moral
Dilemma for Judges.
I clarify Kant's classification of duties and criticize the apocryphal tradition that,
according to Kant, perfect duties trump imperfect duties. I then use Kant's view
to argue that judges who believe that an action is immoral and should be illegal
need not set aside their beliefs in order to comply with binding precedents that
permit the action. The same view of morality that causes some people to
oppose certain actions, including abortion, requires lowercourt judges to
comply with binding precedents. Therefore, (...)
Why obey the state? Dorota Mokrosiska presents a fresh analysis of the most
influential theories of political obligation and develops a novel approach to this
foundational problem of political philosophy, an intriguing combination of the
elements of natural duty and associative theories. The theory of political
obligation developed in the book extends the scope of the contemporary
debate on political obligation by arguing that political obligation can be binding
even under the jurisdiction of unjust states. The arguments pursued in the (...)
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Abortion in Applied Ethics Freedom and Liberty, Misc in Social and Political
Philosophy Justifications of Human Rights in Social and Political Philosophy
Obligations in the Law in Philosophy of Law Thomas Aquinas in Medieval and
Renaissance Philosophy
Ronald Dworkin once identified the basic question of jurisprudence as: What, in
general, is a good reason for a decision by a court of law? I argue that, over
the course of his career, Dworkin gave an essentially sound answer to this
question. In fact, he gave a correct answer to a broader question: What is a
good reason for a legal decision, generally? For judges, officials of executive
and administrative agencies, lawyers, non-governmental organizations, and
ordinary subjects acting in the (...)
Semantic Originalism.
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My bibliography
Lawrence B. Solum - 2007 - In Colin Patrick Farrelly & Lawrence Solum (eds.),
Virtue Jurisprudence. Palgrave-Macmillan.
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How do promissory obligations get created? Some have thought that the
answer to this question must make reference to our social practice of
promising. Recently, however, T.M. Scanlon has argued (in his book What We
Owe to Each Other) for a pure expectation view of promising, according to
which promissory obligations arise as a result of our producing certain
expectations in others. He formulates a principle of fidelity (Principle F) that
tells us when one has gained an obligation due to (...)
Bas van der Vossen - 2011 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 31 (3):481-501.
The idea that law claims authority (LCA) has recently been forcefully criticized
by a number of authors. These authors present a new and intriguing objection,
arguing that law cannot be said to claim authority if such a claim is not
justified. That is, these authors argue that the view that law does not have
authority viciously conflicts with the view that law claims authority. I will call
this the normative critique of LCA. In this article, I assess the normative critique
(...)