NOTES
main source of fear among the Hindus in
Communal Politics in Assam
Growth of AIUDF since 2016
Monoj Kumar Nath
The formation and continuous
electoral success of the Assam
United Democratic Front (AUDF,
which is now known as the All
India United Democratic Front)
has made the state a playground
of communal politics. Its success
has broken down the traditional
Muslim vote bank of the
Congress Party. As a result,
since the 2006 Assam assembly
elections, the Congress Party has
adopted a soft Hindutva approach
to polarise the non-Muslim
voters against the AIUDF.
However, the Bharatiya Janata
Partys open Hindutva line
appeared more attractive to
non-Muslims of Assam in the 2014
Lok Sabha elections.
Monoj Kumar Nath (mknath2007@rediffmail.
com) teaches political science at Nowgong
College, Nagaon, Assam.
88
S
ince the formation of the Assam
United Democratic Front (AUDF),1
shortly after the repeal of the
Illegal Migrants (Determination by
Tribunal) (IM(DT)) Act, 1983 in 2005,
and later the All India United Democratic
Front (AIUDF), politics in Assam has be-
come increasingly communal. Muslims
in Assam have remained a vote bank for
the Congress Party since independence.
However, a large section of them, mainly
the immigrant Muslims, have been
increasingly rallying behind the AIUDF.
As a result, the Muslim vote bank of the
Congress Party has been shrinking. In
this situation, the Congress Party has
followed a two-pronged strategy to
contain the growth of the AIUDF. On one
hand, it has been trying to weaken the
growth of AIUDF by labelling it as
communal, and on the other hand it has
been trying to consolidate the non-
Muslim votes against AIUDF to win the
elections in the state.
The growth of the AIUDF has also
helped the growth of the Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP) in the state. This is
evident from the results of the 2014 Lok
Sabha elections in which the BJP, for the
first time, won seven out of a total of 14
seats in the state, while the AIUDF got
three seats. The Congress Party could
win only three seats against seven in the
2009 Lok Sabha elections. During the
last decade, the Asom Gana Parishad
(AGP), the regional political party that
won the assembly elections in 1985 and
1996, has been gradually marginalised
in electoral politics.
Muslims in Assam
Muslims constitute 34.22% of the total
population of Assam (2011 Census). The
Muslim population has increased signifi-
cantly (Table 1) compared to the Hindu
population and this has become the
APRIL 16, 2016
the state. According to the 2011 Census,
out of 27 districts, nine are Muslim
majority while three have more than
35% Muslim population. Another seven
districts have between 10% and 35%
Muslim population. The 12 districts with
more than 35% Muslim population are
mainly in lower Assam (Dhubri, Barpeta,
Darrang, Goalpara, Bongaigaon, Kam-
rup and Nalbari), and middle Assam
(Nagaon and Morigaon) of the Brahma-
putra Valley, and from Barak Valley
(Hailakandi, Karimganj and Cachar).
Table 1: Religion-wise Growth of Population in
Assam (19612011) (in percentage)
Year Hindus Muslims Christians Others
1961 69.75 24.70 4.45 1.10
1971 71.00 24.03 4.46 0.51
1991 67.13 28.43 3.32 1.12
2001 64.89 30.92 3.09 1.10
2011 61.46 34.22 3.78 0.54
Census was not conducted in Assam in 1981.2
Source: Census of India reports.
The Muslims in Assam can be divided
broadly into two groupsAssamese Mus-
lims (meaning indigenous Muslims) and
Bengali Muslims (meaning immigrant
Muslims) (Ahmed and Yasin 1997). The
indigenous Muslims in Assam do not live
in a contiguous area; they are scattered
throughout the state. Two prominent
indigenous Muslim groups living in middle
and upper Assam are Garia and Maria.
Indigenous Muslim groups living in the
lower Assam Districts are Ujeni/Deshi/
Goalpara, Datia, Jhula, Dhuli and Musi,
Tulu and Chandar. Maimol and Pongal
are two important indigenous Muslim
groups from the Barak Valley (Ahmed
2014). A section of indigenous Muslims
are low-caste Hindu converts as a result
of the spread of Islam by Muslim reli-
gious saints like Azan Fakir in the 17th
century (Dev and Lahiri 1985; Ahmed
1999).
The immigrant Muslims are those
who came to Assam over different phases
in the last century from East Bengal (now
Bangladesh). They settled mostly in the
char (high land formed in the river by
silt deposits) areas of lower and middle
Assam in the Brahmaputra Valley and in
the Barak Valley. The mother tongue of
this section of Muslims is Bengali.
vol lI no 16 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

However, the immigrant Muslims of the
Brahmaputra Valley identify themselves
as Assamese and their children study
in Assamese medium schools. Such Mus-
lims call themselves Na-Asomiya or
Neo-Assamese. It should be noted here
that the cut-off date for identification
and deportation of illegal migrants from
Assam is 25 March 1971 according to the
clause of the Assam Accord (1985)
against the all-India cut-off date 19 July
1948 as per Article 6 of the Constitution
of India. In this article, when we use the
term immigrant Muslims, it does not
indicate illegal foreigners, but the Mus-
lims who migrated to Assam since the
beginning of the last century till 1971.
Muslims in Electoral Politics
Table I shows how the Muslim popu-
lation is increasing in Assam compared
to other religious communities. This
growth is increasingly influencing elec-
toral equations in the state. The grow-
ing dominance of the Muslim commu-
nity in elections has made the indige-
nous population fearful of losing politi-
cal power. However, it should be noted
that only the immigrant section of Mus-
lims is becoming powerful in electoral
equations because they live in contigu-
ous areas. On the other hand, indige-
nous Muslims cannot dominate the
results in a single assembly constituency
as they do not form the majority of voters
in any constituency. In this situation,
indigenous Muslims are also losing their
importance in the power politics of the
state and are becoming like a minority
within a minority.
Out of the total 126 constituencies in
the Assam Legislative Assembly, 24 are
reservedeight for Scheduled Tribes
(STs) and 16 for Scheduled Castes (SCs).
From the total 102 unreserved constitu-
encies, 23 are Muslim-dominated and
Muslims are the deciding factor in another
eight constituencies. This means that
Muslim voters determine election
results in 31 out of 102 constituencies.
These 31 constituencies are in Dhubri,
Goalpara, Barpeta, Bongaigaon and
Darrang Districts of lower Assam, Na-
gaon and Morigaon Districts of middle
Assam and Cachar, Karimganj and
Hailakandi Districts of Barak Valley,
Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 16, 2016
where mainly immigrant Muslims live/
reside (Nath 2015).
Muslim-based Political Parties
After partition, the Muslims of Assam
joined the Congress Party en masse
under the leadership of Syed Saadulla,
the former Muslim League premier of
Assam creating an enduring alliance bet-
ween the Congress Party and Assamese
Muslims. This alliance was the result of
mutual necessity. The Congress Party
needed the Muslims to boost its image as
a staunch advocate of secularism, and as
a vote-catching instrument for political
power as they would be patronised by
the ruling party. The alliance with the
Congress Party gave Muslims three
benefits: greater safeguards, an image of
being secular and the chance to share
power with the Congress Party (Kar 1990)
The alliance between the Muslims
and the Congress Party continued with-
out a break from 1952 till the 1983
Assembly elections. However, the Muslims
in Assam remained only a vote bank in
elections for the Congress Party. Their
interests were never taken seriously
by consecutive Congress governments.
Against this backdrop, a Muslim-based
political party, the Eastern India Muslim
Association (EIMA), emerged in 1977.
The EIMA argued that Muslims needed a
separate political party because of their
disillusionment with the Congress Party,
the denial of equal rights and privileges,
the need for protection, the belief that
Muslim Congressmen were pseudo rep-
resentatives, the need for a distinctive
Muslim platform and the need for a
Muslim entity in a multicultural India.
However, in October in the same year,
EIMA was formally dissolved and merged
with the Indian Union Muslim League to
re-emerge as the Eastern Zonal Muslim
League (Kar 1990). Although the latter
could not influence electoral politics in
the state, the formation of EIMA estab-
lished the arguments for a Muslim-based
political party in the state.
United Minority Front
The Assam Accord was signed on 15
August 1985 to bring an end to the six-
year long Assam movement. It provided
for detection and deportation of illegal
vol lI no 16
NOTES
migrants staying in Assam. Several
Muslim and linguistic minority groups
opposed the Assam movement (1979
1985) and the Assam Accord. Three months
after the accord was signed, a new region-
al political party, the United Minority
Front (UMF) emerged. Representatives
of the All Assam Minority Students
Union (AAMSU), All Assam Minority
Front, Citizens Right Prevention Com-
mittee (formed to oppose the Assam
movement), All Assam Minority Yuva
Parishad, the Assam unit of Jamiat Ulema-
e-Hind and others participated in the
convention where the party was formed.
The partys principal commitments were
the well-being of minorities and their
protection in the atmosphere created by
the Assam Accord (Ahmed 1999).
Though Jamiat was involved in the
formation of the UMF, its role was mar-
ginal. Kalipad Sen, a linguistic minority
leader, was elected as the first president
of the party. In the assembly elections
(1985) held just after its formation, the
party received support from a large
section of the linguistic minority and
immigrant Muslims. In this election, the
party won 17 assembly seats out of 126
and got 10.85% of the total votes polled.
However, after the 1985 elections, several
prominent members of the party defect-
ed to other political parties and two
decades after its formation, it broke up
several times. In the 1996 elections, the
UMF could win only two seats and in the
2001 assembly elections, only 0.41% of
the total votes. In 2005, a section of the
UMF merged with AUDF when the latter
was formed.
Assam United Democratic Front
In July 2005, the Supreme Court of India
declared the IM(DT) Act as illegal and
undemocratic and the act was repealed.
The IM(DT) Act was imposed on Assam in
1983 by the then Congress-led central
government to show its solidarity towards
the minorities in Assam. This made the
process of identification and deportation
of illegal nationals in Assam very com-
plex. After this law was passed, the Con-
gress Party claimed that it had been en-
acted to safeguard the minorities from
the Assam Movement. Yet, like the AGP,
the BJP and students organisations such
89
NOTES
as All Assam Students Union (AASU) re-
peatedly demanded repeal of the act.
This polarisation helped the Congress
Party to keep its Muslim vote bank intact.
The repeal of IM(DT) Act generated
fear among immigrant Muslims in Assam.
Minority organisations, led by a section
of Muslims, began to blame the Con-
gress governments at the centre and in
Assam for their inactivity in the Supreme
Court to stop the repeal of the act. Since
the repeal of the law, the Jamiat came
forward to address the fear of the Mus-
lims. The president of the state unit of
the Jamiat, Badruddin Ajmal, took the
lead to form a new political outfit. His
intention was to teach the Congress Party
a lesson which had, according to him,
betrayed the Muslims of Assam. In Octo-
ber 2005, 13 Muslim minority organisa-
tions came together and formed a new
regional political party, the AUDF. The
state president of the Jamiat, Badruddin
Ajmal, became its president.
For the first time in the politics of
India, Jamiat actively involved itself in
the formation of a political party. In
2000, the Shahi Imam of the Jama Masjid,
Syed Ahmed Bukhari, announced that he
would play a direct role to set up a politi-
cal party for Muslims to ensure that the
lost rights of the minorities are regained
(Engineer 2003). He blessed Badruddin
Ajmal for forming the AUDF. In this
respect, the AUDF can be seen as a new
experiment by Indian Muslim leaders to
form a political party for Muslims
(Bhaumik 2009). After three years of
formation, in February 2009, the AUDF
relaunched itself as a national party
under the name of All India United Demo-
cratic Front. However, its activities have
remained confined to Assam.
In the 2006 assembly elections, AUDF
won 10 seats by securing 9.03% of the
vote. Compared to this, the UMF had
done better in 1985 when it got 17 seats
and 10.85% of the vote. However, AIUDF
continued its success in the 2011 assem-
bly elections by securing 18 seats and
12% of the vote. As a result, it became
the main opposition party in the Assam
Legislative Assembly.
Although both the UMF and the AIUDF
were created to safeguard the interests
of the minorities, between the two it is
90
the AIUDF that can be considered a
Muslim-based political party. While the
Jamiat was actively involved in its
formation, no significant organisation of
linguistic minorities was involved (unlike
the UMF). In the 1985 assembly elections,
both linguistic and religious minorities
of Assam sided with the UMF. But in the
2006 and 2011 assembly elections, the
immigrant Muslims remained the main
supporters of the AIUDF.
Communal Politics in Assam
(200514)
Since the formation of the AIUDF, both
national parties, the Congress and the
BJP, as well as the AIUDF have been play-
ing communal electoral politics.
2006 Assembly Elections
After the AIUDF was formed, the immi-
grant section of Muslims rallied behind
the party. AIUDF chief Badruddin Ajmal
termed the Congress governments at the
centre and in the state as betrayer of the
Muslims of Assam because of the repeal
of the IM(DT) Act. Jamiat strongly sup-
ported the AIUDF and openly campaigned
for the party. The Congress Party had
calculated that the Muslim vote would
probably shift to AIUDF. To attract and
mobilise the non-Muslim vote, the seas-
oned Congressman and Chief Minister
Tarun Gogoi played a game of soft
Hindutva. Gogoi started to question the
identity and existence of AIUDF chief by
openly and repeatedly asking, Who is
Badruddin? This became the Congress
Partys slogan during the 2006 assembly
elections.
When the Supreme Court declared
IM(DT) Act as undemocratic and illegal,
Sarbananda Sonowal, then Lok Sabha
Member of Parliament (MP) from the
AGP, was the petitioner in the case. The
judgment helped Sonowal to emerge as
the leader of the ethnic Assamese who
considered the act as an obstacle to iden-
tification and deportation of illegal for-
eigners from the state. The AASU that led
the Assam movement and had always
demanded the scrapping of the IM(DT)
Act, declared Sonowal as the Jatiya
Nayak (the hero of Assamese nationali-
ty). However, Sonowals own political
party, the AGP, could not reap the benefit
APRIL 16, 2016
of this victory because of the infighting
among its top leadership. On the other
hand, the Who is Badruddin? cam-
paign of Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi
made him the hero among the ethnic
Assamese population in the 2006 elections.
The ethnic Assamese populations were
increasingly suffering from the threat of
losing political domination in the state at
the hands of the immigrant Muslims and
they considered AIUDF as a political party
of the immigrant Muslims. In such a
situation, the open challenge of Tarun
Gogoi to Badruddin Ajmal polarised the
assembly elections between immigrant
Muslims and others.
In this election, even though the
Congress Partys traditional Muslim vote
bank shifted to AIUDF, it still won 53
seats. The indigenous Assamese popula-
tion supported the Congress to contain
Table 2: Party Position in Assam Assembly
Election, 2006
Name of the Political Party % of Total No of Seat
Vote Polled Won
Indian National Congress 31.08 53
Asom Gana Parishad 20.39 24
BPF (H) 3.72 11
Bharatiya Janata Party 11.98 10
Assam United Democratic Front 9.03 10
Others 23.80 18
Total 100.00 126
Source: Election Department, Government of Assam.
the AIUDF. After the elections, the
Congress Party formed the government
in alliance with the Bodoland Peoples
Front (Hagrama) (BPF, H) a regional po-
litical party influential in Bodoland Ter-
ritorial Area Districts (BTAD) region.
2011 Assembly Elections
After the 2006 assembly elections, the
Congress presumed it could marginalise
the AIUDF as it had done with UMF in the
past. Three years after the UMF showed
surprising success in the 1985 assembly
elections, 10 UMF Members of Legisla-
tive Assembly (MLAs) defected from the
party and joined the Congress. The main
architect of this exercise was former
Congress chief minister and later Gover-
nor of Mizoram, the late Hiteswar Saikia.
Tarun Gogoi was president of the Assam
Congress at that time. This defection
weakened the UMF and no candidate
from the party could win in the 1991
assembly elections. With AIUDF too, the
vol lI no 16 EPW Economic & Political Weekly

Congress has tried hard to break the
party. Just before the 2011 assembly
elections, two MLAs from AIUDF defied
the party whip and voted for Congress
candidates in the Rajya Sabha election
from Assam. But repeated attempts by the
Congress could not stem the growth of
the AIUDF in the 2011 assembly elections.
Between 2006 and 2011, the Congress
repeatedly branded the AIUDF as com-
munal and declared it as enemy. After
the 2006 elections, the AGP again broke
into two fractionsAGP and AGP (Pro-
gressive) led by former president and
Chief Minister Prafulla Kumar Mahanta.
As a result, the 2011 election campaign
began with the Congress as the favour-
ite. The Congress did not face any strong
opposition in upper Assam, but in middle
and lower Assam and Barak Valley it had
to contend with the AIUDF. This time
also, indigenous Assamese rallied behind
Congress to stop AIUDF, as there was no
other better alternative, while the
Muslims supported the AIUDF. From
200511, the Congress government tried
hard to woo back Muslim voters through
different government schemes and
measures, but failed. Security and iden-
tity have always remained important
issues for immigrant Muslim voters. These
twin issues were hijacked by AIUDF from
the Congress during the 2006 elections.
Since 1998, the Congress had repeatedly
spoken about the D (Doubtful) voters,3
but never took any initiative to address
the problem. AIUDF began to expose the
hypocrisy of the Congress on this issue
by speaking louder than Congress about
D voters. The party approached the
Supreme Court before the 2011 assem-
bly elections against the provision of
D voters. This helped the AIUDF to
keep its voters intact and to attract more
to its fold.
Table 3: Party Position in Assam Assembly
Election, 2011
Name of the Political Party % of Total No of Seats
Vote Polled
Indian National Congress 39.39
Asom Gana Parishad 16.29
BPF (H) 06.13
Bharatiya Janata Party 11.47
Assam United Democratic Front 12.57
Others 14.15
Total 100.00
Source: Election Department, Government of Assam.
Economic & Political Weekly EPW APRIL 16, 2016
In the 2011 assembly elections, Con-
gress gained 39% of the total vote polled
and won 78 seats as against 31% of the
vote and 53 seats in the 2006 assembly
elections. The vote share and total seats
won by the AGP declined from 20.39%
and 24 seats in the 2006 elections to
16% and 10 seats in the 2011 elections.
The BJPs vote share remained almost
the same in the 2006 and 2011 elections
(11%). However, the number of seats it
won fell from 10 in 2006 to five in the
2011 elections. The AIUDF increased its
vote share from 9% in 2006 to 12% in
the 2011 elections. The number of seats it
won increased from 10 in 2006 to 18 in
the 2011 elections.
2014 Lok Sabha Elections
The 2014 Lok Sabha elections showed a
clear religious polarisation in the whole
country. Although Narendra Modi led
the BJP campaign on the agenda of
development, the communal ideology of
the party also influenced voters. Inci-
dentally, Sarbananda Sonowal, who
became a hero among the indigenous
Assamese population because of the
repeal of the IM(DT) Act, joined BJP after
the 2011 assembly elections and became
the president of the Assam BJP a year
before the 2014 Lok Sabha elections.
Sonowal was previously the president of
AASU. Because of the Assam movement,
AASU leaders are not accepted by immi-
grant Muslims. However, Sonowal, be-
cause of his active role in the Lok Sabha
during 200409 and his role in the
IM(DT) Act repeal, has emerged as a
strong ethnic leader among the indige-
nous communities of Assam. He belongs
to Sonowal Kachari community, a ST
(Plains) community. Because of his tribal
status, he has a better appeal among the
tribal communities of the state than other
non-tribal leaders. The Narendra Modi
Sarbananda Sonowal combination has
brought a new Hindutva-regionalism
Won
formula for the BJP in Assam. This com-
78
bination worked very well for the BJP in
10
Assam in the 2014 Lok Sabha elections.
12
In 2014, AIUDF faced a huge challenge
05
from the BJP. To counter it, the AIUDF
18
03
started communal politics on an unprec-
126 edented scale. For example, on 22 March
2014, after returning from Mecca, AIUDF
vol lI no 16
NOTES
chief Badruddin Ajmal declared at a
public meeting that if BJP wins because
of the mistakes of his party, almighty
Allah would not forgive him (Nath 2014).
The AIUDF chiefs communal campaign
divided Assamese voters along commu-
nal lines. This made it easier for the BJP
to mobilise Hindu voters. While immi-
grant Muslims rallied behind the AIUDF
to oppose the BJP, this time, a large
section of the indigenous Muslims also
supported AIUDF and opposed the BJP.
On the other hand, indigenous Assamese
largely rallied behind the BJP, considering
it as a better alternative than the Con-
gress to defeat the AIUDF.
The results of the 2014 elections
showed clear religious polarisation in
the state. For the first time in Assam, the
BJP won seven (50%) of the total 14 Lok
Sabha seats. AIUDF won three seats, and
the Congress got only three seats. Clear-
ly, the soft Hindutva of Congress lost
to the open Hindutva of the BJP. Because
of clear religious polarisation, the BJP
and the AIUDF showed unprecedented
success.
Table 4: Party-wise Performance in Lok Sabha
Elections in Assam (200914)
Name of the Political Party 2009 2014
% of Vote Seats % of Vote Seats
Polled Won Polled Won
Indian National Congress 34.89 07 29.90 03
Bharatiya Janata Party 16.21 04 36.86 07
Asom Gana Parishad 14.6 O1 3.87 00
Assam United
Democratic Front 16.01 01 14.98 03
Others 18.29 01 14.39 01
Total 100.00 14 100 14
Source: Election Commission of India, 2014.
In the 2014 Lok Sabha elections, the
BJP won Dibrugarh, Guwahati, Jorhat,
Lakhimpur, Mangaldoi, Nagaon and
Tezpur constituenciesall Hindu-domi-
nated. The AIUDF won Muslim-dominated
Barpeta, Dhubri and Karimganj constitu-
encies. The Congress won the Autono-
mous District constituency dominated by
hill tribes Karbi and Dimasas and Kalia-
bor and Silchar constituencies. Kaliabor
Lok Sabha constituency has both Mus-
lims and Hindus in almost equal propor-
tions. Gaurav Gogoi, Assam Chief Minis-
ter Tarun Gogois son, won it. The Silchar
constituency is Hindu Bengali dominated
and Sushmita Deb, daughter of veteran
Congressperson from Barak Valley San-
tosh Mohan Deb, won it.
91
NOTES
Jamiat and Electoral Politics
The Assam Jamiat has been playing a
very active role in the states electoral
politics. As has already been discussed,
it participated in the formation of the
UMF prior to the 1985 assembly elections
in which the party won 17 seats. This
was the first time that immigrant
Muslim voters deserted the Congress
resulting in its worst-ever performance
in assembly elections. However, in the
1991 assembly elections, Jamiat lent its
support to the Congress again and
Congress returned to power with a com-
fortable majority. In the 1996 elections,
Jamiat supported the AGP-led coalition
and the coalition came to power after
the election by defeating the Congress.
Again in 2001 elections, Jamiat support-
ed the Congress and it returned back to
power in the state. In 2005, the Jamiat
helped in the formation of the AIUDF and
its president became the head of the new
party. He has remained president till
now. Jamiat leaders openly campaigned
for AIUDF both in the 2006 and the 2011
assembly elections. The AIUDF did well
in the 2006 assembly elections, and
emerged as the main opposition party in
the 2011 assembly elections.
Jamiat Ulema-e-Hinds primary politi-
cal purpose has been to defend Muslim
Personal Law and oppose any attempt
by the state to change or interfere with it
through either specific laws or through
the enactment of a uniform civil code
(Brass 2001). Its constitution allows it to
support any political party from outside
for the cause of Muslim welfare.
In the post-Assam movement period,
the Jamiat has had a significant influence
over the immigrant Muslim voters. In
1991, 1996 and 2001 assembly elections,
that party or coalition came to power
to which the Jamiat lent its electoral
support. From this, three aspects of the
Jamiats role and influence over Muslim
voters are evident. First, whenever the
Jamiat supported the Congress in the
assembly elections, immigrant Muslims
en masse voted for the party and the
Congress comfortably won the elections.
The 1991 and 2001 assembly elections are
examples of this. However, the Congress
continued to retain power in the state
after the 2006 and 2011 elections without
92
the support of the Jamiat. After the 2006
elections, Congress had to ally with BPF
to form a government as the party did
not have a majority. And in the 2011 elec-
tions, the Congress got the support of
the indigenous Assamese people against
the AIUDF.
Second, whenever Jamiat has not sup-
ported the Congress, but provided a suit-
able alternative, Muslim voters have
shifted their vote to that alternative. The
elections of 1985, 2006 and 2011 prove
this. Muslim voters shifted from the
Congress to the UMF in 1985, and to the
AIUDF in 2006 and 2011.
Third, when the Jamiat is not
supporting the Congress but has failed
to provide an acceptable alternative for
Muslim voters, the voters remained
divided. The 1996 assembly elections is
proof of this. In this election, Jamiat
lent its electoral support to the AGP-led
coalition. The AGP is not a party of choice
for a significant portion of immigrant
Muslims as leaders of the Assam move-
ment formed it. As a result, a significant
portion of immigrant Muslim voters vot-
ed for the Congress against the recom-
mendation of the Jamiat. Although the
AGP-led coalition won the election, the
Congress improved its performance in
the immigrant Muslim-dominated con-
stituencies.
Although the Jamiat has played a
crucial role in determining the electoral
behaviour of the immigrant Muslims in
Assam in the post-Assam movement
period, this has remained controversial
for several reasons. First, from 1985 to
2006 in every assembly election, Jamiat
shifted its electoral support to different
political parties/coalitions. In 1985, it
supported the UMF, in 1991 it supported
the Congress, in 1996 it supported the
AGP-led coalition, in 2001 again it
supported the Congress and in 2006 it
supported the AIUDF. Jamiat has never
disclosed on what basis it lends its
electoral support to a political party or
coalition. It is also not known what
Jamiat has achieved from consecutive
governments in return for its electoral
support of the welfare of the Muslim
community in Assam.
Second, the Jamiats electoral choices
have remained questionable. Although it
APRIL 16, 2016
strongly opposed the Assam movement
and played an active role in the forma-
tion of UMF against the AGP in 1985, it
still supported the AGP-led coalition in
the 1996 assembly elections.
Third, the Jamiats electoral support
has remained confined to the election
period. In 1985, it took part in the
process of forming the UMF against the
Assam Accord and AGP. However, after
the elections, it did not pay any attention
to keep the UMF united and to make it
stronger. After the 1985 elections, most
of the MLAs who won on UMF tickets
defected to the Congress and the UMF
disintegrated. The Jamiat did not pay
any attention to these developments and
in the 1991 elections, it shifted electoral
support to the Congress.
The Jamiats constitution allows it to
support any political party from outside.
However, in Assam, the Jamiat openly
led the process to form the AIUDF in
2005 and Badruddin Ajmal has remained
the president of both the Assam Jamiat
and the AIUDF. In the 2005 and 2011
assembly elections, the Jamiat leaders
openly campaigned for the AIUDF.
For all these reasons, the role of the
Jamiat in Assams electoral politics has
remained controversial. At present, the
AIUDF represents the Assam Jamiat in
the politics of Assam. If AIUDF fails to
remain strong in Assams electoral
politics, it will definitely marginalise the
importance of the Jamiat in the states
electoral politics.
AIUDFs Success
Unlike the UMF, the AIUDF showed
continuous success in two consecutive
elections (2006 and 2011) and the Jamiat
stood solidly behind the party. The
AIUDFs success is increasing the religious
polarisation in the state. There are four
reasons for the AIUDF becoming stronger
in successive elections.
First, Jamiat has a strong presence
and influence among immigrant Muslims
of Assam. They are Assams most back-
ward community both socially and eco-
nomically. They mainly live in rural and
char areas. A large section of this com-
munity has been voting in the elections
on the directions of the Jamiat. They
voted for AIUDF in the 2006 and 2011
vol lI no 16 EPW Economic & Political Weekly
 NOTES

elections because the Jamiat supported
the party.
Second, immigrant Muslims do not
have any alternative but to vote for the
AIUDF. Till the 1983 elections, Assamese
Muslims supported the Congress. In the
1991 and 2001 elections they continued
to support the Congress. However, in
return for the continuous support of the
community, consecutive Congress gov-
ernments did nothing special for it. As
a result, Assamese Muslims feel neglected
and deprived. This feeling is becoming
stronger with the spread of education.
However, the problem they face is that
there is no secular alternative to the
Congress in Assam. The community
never trusted the BJP. It cannot support
the AGP as its leaders were the leaders of
Assam movement. Moreover, the AGP
aligned with the BJP in the 2006 assem-
bly elections held in Assam. And the left
parties do not have a significant pres-
ence in Assam or do not have the possi-
bility to form a government.
Third, immigrant Assamese Muslims
have always been equated with and bran-
ded as illegal Bangladeshis by popular
media and some political and non-political
organisations of the state. This is creating
anguish among the community and it is
feeling increasingly alienated from the
mainstream society of Assam. It realises
that a strong political existence is neces-
sary and this is helping the AIUDF to
grow election after election.
Finally, Muslims constitute more than
one-third of the total population in
Assam and can therefore be influential
in election politics. The immigrant
Muslims live in contiguous areas and
can dominate electoral politics signifi-
cantly. The community realises this and
has thus started to believe that it can
easily grab power in Assam if it remains
politically united. After the 2011 election,
AIUDF emerged as the main opposition
party in the Assam Legislative Assembly.
This has encouraged the community to
remain united and to rally behind AIUDF
for a greater role in politics of Assam in
the days to come.
extend the activities of the party to other parts
of the country and the party was renamed as
All India United Democratic Front (AIUDF).
However, till Lok Sabha election 2014, the
Election Commission of India recognises the
AIUDF as a state party in Assam.
2 Census could not be held in Assam for 1981
because of Assam movement and the opposition
of the movement leaders.
3 In 1998, the Election Commission of India initi-
ated the process of identifying D (Doubtful)
voters in Assam. Those, who cannot provide any
document of nationality during preparation of
voters list, will be identified as doubtful voter
in the voters list and they will be debarred
from casting their vote. This has become a very
contentious issue among the immigrant
Muslims in Assam, and after 1998, in every
election, D voter has become an election issue.
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nominal rates.
The entire set for each year is available for just Rs 100 plus postage and packing charges.
(The cost of postage for each setweighing around 10 kgby registered parcel will be
around Rs 400 to Rs 500. Packing charges will be Rs 100).
The total payable amount is Rs 700. Interested buyers can also call and visit our office in
Mumbai and collect the volumes by paying just Rs 100 each.
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L
Pr ow
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notes
1 AUDF was formed in 2005 and it fought 2006
Assam Assembly election as a state political
party. In 2009, leaders of the party decided to
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