Office of the Ombudsman, Petitioner vs Ramon Galicia,
Respondent. G.R. No. 167711, October 10, 2008 comparison the original of the TOR and Certificate of Grades (COG),
Facts:
Respondent Galicia was a former public school
teacher. Based on the academic records which were part of his 201
file, he graduated from FEU with a degree in civil engineering but
failed to pass the board examinations and has earned 18 units in
education, evidenced by a copy of a Transcript of Records from the
Caloocan City Polytechnic College. Likewise, he passed the
Teachers Professional Board Examination (TPBE) given on
November 22, 1987.
On December 2001, Reynaldo V. Yamsuan, then Principal of
the MBASHS, reviewed the 201 files of his teaching staff and noticed
that Galicias TOR was not an original copy and required Galicia and
other teachers with similar records, to secure authenticated copies of
their TOR. All of the teachers complied except Galicia. Yamsuan
verified with the school the authenticity of Galicias TOR and was
informed that the said school had no record of the said TOR, and
more importantly, that they had no records that Galicia took up 18
units of education in SY 1985-1986.
Acting on his findings, Yamsuan lodged an affidavit-
complaint for falsification, dishonesty, and grave misconduct
against Galicia before the Ombudsman.
In his Counter-Affidavit, Galicia stated that the complaint was
malicious and motivated by revenge. Galicia stressed that the TOR
he submitted was authentic, as shown by the signature of then
College Registrar Rolando Labrador. He argued that the
certification from the present college registrar that CCPC had no
record of his TOR did not prove that the document was
spurious. Rather, it only proved that CCPCs filing system of
scholastic records was disorganized. Moreover, Galicia argued that
the TPBE was a highly specialized type of exam that could only be
passed if the examinee acquired academic units in education. If he
did not take up the said 18 units in education, then he could not have
possibly passed the TPBE.
During the preliminary conference, Galicia presented for
as well as the original copies of the other documents in his 201
file. A subpoena duces tecum was subsequently served upon Prof.
Marilyn T. De Jesus, Registrar of CCPC, for the purpose of certifying
the authenticity of Galicias school records. De Jesus declined to
certify the documents because no copies were on file in the school.
Subsequently, the Ombudsman found Galicia guilty of
Dishonesty for which the penalty of Dismissal From the Service,
Forfeiture of Leave Credits and Retirement Benefits and Temporary
Disqualification for Re-employment in the Government Service for a
period of One (1) Year was imposed.
Galicia filed a motion for reconsideration and raised the
issue of jurisdiction for the first time. He argued that it is not the
Ombudsman, but the Department of Education, through the School
Superintendent, which has jurisdiction over administrative cases
against public school teachers, as mandated by RA 4670, (Magna
Carta for Public School Teachers).
Galicia further challenged the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
by invoking Section 20 of R.A. No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act
which enumerates the instances when the Ombudsman may not
conduct an administrative investigation:
1. Complainant has an adequate remedy in
another judicial or quasi-judicial body;
2. The complaint pertains to a matter outside
the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman;
3. The complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or
made in bad faith;
4. Complainant has no sufficient personal
interest in the subject matter of the grievance;
or
5. The complaint was filed after one year from
the occurrence of the act or omission
complained of.
According to Galicia, all of the above conditions were
present in the case filed against him. An adequate remedy existed in
the Office of the Secretary of Education; the matter was outside the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman; the complaint was made in bad faith;
and complainant Yamsuan had no sufficient personal interest in the
matter.
Lastly, Galicia claimed that the Ombudsman lacked
jurisdiction since the complaint was filed only in 2002, thirteen (13)
years from the time he allegedly committed the dishonest act in
1989. According to him, this violated Section 20(5) of R.A. No. 6770,
which mandated that all complaints must be filed within one year
from the occurrence of the act charged.
The Ombudsman denied Galicias motion for
reconsideration. It declared that the Ombudsmans disciplining
authority extended the School Superintendent over administrative
cases against public school teachers. Galicia elevated the case to
the CA.
On January 20, 2005, the CA reversed and set aside the
decision of the Ombudsman holding that jurisdiction over public
school teachers belonged to the School Superintendent as
mandated by R.A. No. 4670.
Issue:
WON the CA erred in nullifying the decision of the
Office of the Ombudsman on alleged jurisdictional infirmity?
Ruling:
Section 12 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution states that
the Ombudsman and his Deputies shall act promptly on complaints
filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of
the Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, xxx. Under Section 13, Article XI, the Ombudsman is
empowered to conduct investigations on its own or upon complaint
by any person when such act appears to be
illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient. He is also given broad powers
to take the appropriate disciplinary actions against erring public
officials and employees.
And Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act grants the
ombudsman the power to Investigate and prosecute on its own
or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or
omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It
has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it
may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of
Government, the investigation of such cases. While Section 19 of
the Act enumerates the types of acts covered by the authority
granted to the Ombudsman. In the exercise of its duties, the
Ombudsman is given full administrative disciplinary authority. His
power is not limited merely to receiving, processing complaints, or
recommending penalties. He is to conduct investigations, hold
hearings, summon witnesses and require production of evidence and
place respondents under preventive suspension. This includes the
power to impose the penalty of removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
or censure of a public officer or employee.
A review of the Ombudsman Act and the Magna Carta for
Public School Teachers reveals an apparent overlapping of
jurisdiction over administrative cases against public school teachers.
Section 9 of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers
grants jurisdiction over erring public school teachers to an
Investigating Committee headed by the Division School
Superintendent which reads: SEC. 9. Administrative
Charges. Administrative charges against a teacher shall be
heard initially by a committee composed of the corresponding
School Superintendent of the Division or a duly authorized
representative x x x.
Galicia argues that jurisdiction exclusively belongs to the
investigating committee on the main thesis that the Magna Carta for
Public School Teachers is a special law which should take
precedence over the Ombudsman Act, a general law. The
Ombudsman maintains that jurisdiction among the two bodies is
concurrent since there is no express repeal in either of the laws that
would oust the Ombudsman from its authority over public school
teachers.
 By virtue of the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers,
original jurisdiction belongs to the school superintendent. The
intention of the law, which is to impose a separate standard and
procedural requirement for administrative cases involving public
school teachers, must be given consideration. Hence, the
Ombudsman must yield to this committee of the Division School
Superintendent. Even in the earlier case of Alcala v. Villar, the Court
held that:
Republic Act No. 6770, the Ombudsman Act
of 1989, provides that the Ombudsman shall have
disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive
officials of the Government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies, including members
of the Cabinet, local government, government-
owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries except over officials who may be
removed by impeachment or over Members of
Congress, and the Judiciary. However, in Fabella v.
Court of Appeals, it was held that R.A. No. 4670,
the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers,
specifically covers and governs administrative
proceedings involving public school teachers. x
x x (Emphasis supplied)
Be that as it may, We hold here that the Ombudsmans
exercise of jurisdiction was proper.
The CA was in error in relying on Alcala, without taking into
consideration the cases full import. In Alcala, the Court, while
recognizing the jurisdiction of the School Superintendent,
nonetheless upheld the decision of the Ombudsman on the rationale
that the parties were afforded their right to due process during the
investigation proceedings. Respondent in the Alcala case was given
sufficient opportunity to be heard and submit his defenses to the
charges made against him. Thus, he is estopped from questioning
the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman after an adverse decision was
promulgated.
In the same manner, the recent Estandarte case recognized
similar circumstances cited in Emin v. De Leon. In De Leon, it was
found that the parties were afforded their right to due process when
both fully participated in the proceedings before the Civil Service
Commission (CSC). The Court ruled that while jurisdiction lies with
the School Superintendent, respondent is estopped from attacking
the proceedings before the CSC.
In the present case, records show that Galicia was given the
right to due process in the investigation of the charges against
him. He participated in the proceedings by making known his
defenses in the pleadings that he submitted. It was only when a
decision adverse to him was rendered did he question the jurisdiction
of the Ombudsman.
Under the principles of estoppel and laches, We rule that it is
now too late for Galicia to assail the administrative investigation
conducted and the decision rendered against him.
(Short Version)
Morales v CA and Binay
Facts:
Binay, Jr. was charged with administrative and criminal
cases in connection with the allegation that he is involved in
anomalous activities attending the procurement and
construction phases of the Makati Parking Building project,
committed during his previous and present terms as City
Mayor of Makati.
Binay, Jr. argued that he could not be held administratively
liable since Phases I and II were undertaken before he was
elected Mayor of Makati and Phases III to V transpired
during his first term. His re-election as mayor for a second
term effectively condoned his administrative liability therefor,
if any, thus rendering the administrative cases against him
moot and academic.
The Ombudsman issued an order placing Binay, et al. under
preventive suspension.
The CA granted Binays prayer for TRO enjoining the
implementation of the preventive suspension order.
 According to the CA, it was more prudent on its part to issue
a TRO considering that if it were established that the acts
subject of the administrative cases against Binay, Jr. were all
committed during his prior term, then, applying the
condonation doctrine, Binay, Jr.'s re-election meant that he
can no longer be administratively charged.
Under the Condonation Doctrine, which applies only to
administrative cases,
(1) the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond
the term in which the public officer was elected for each
term is separate and distinct;
(2) an elective official's re-election serves as a
condonation of previous misconduct, thereby cutting
the right to remove him therefor; and
(3) courts may not deprive the electorate, who are
assumed to have known the life and character of
candidates, of their right to elect officers.
Issue: Whether or not Whether or not the CA gravely abused its
discretion in issuing the TRO and the WPI enjoining the
implementation of the preventive suspension order against Binay, Jr.
based on the condonation doctrine
Ruling:
No. The CA's resolutions were all hinged on cases
enunciating the condonation doctrine. By merely following
settled precedents on the condonation doctrine, which at that
time, unwittingly remained "good law," it cannot be
concluded that the CA committed a grave abuse of discretion
based on its legal attribution.
However, the condonation doctrine should be
abandoned. There is no constitutional or statutory basis
to support it.
The continued application of the condonation doctrine is
simply inconsistent and impermissible under the
auspices of the present Constitution which explicitly
mandates that public office is a public trust and that
public officials shall be accountable to the people at all
times.
Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative
offense.
In fact the LGC and the RRACCS precludes condonation
since in the first place, an elective local official who is meted
with the penalty of removal could not be re-elected to an
elective local position due to a direct disqualification from
running for such post.
There is no presumption in any statute or procedural rule
that the electorate, when re-electing a local official, do so
with knowledge of his life and character, and that they
disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had
been guilty of any.
In reality, most corrupt acts by public officers are shrouded in
secrecy, and concealed from the public. Condonation
presupposes that the condoner has actual knowledge of
what is to be condoned. Thus, there could be no
condonation of an act that is unknown.
However, the Court's abandonment of the condonation
doctrine should be prospective in application. It should
be, as a general rule, recognized as "good law" prior to its
abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance
thereupon should be respected.
(longer version)
Morales v CA and Binay
Facts:
A complaint was filed against Binay and other public officers
of the City Government of Makati charging them with
administrative cases for Grave Misconduct, Serious
Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service, and criminal cases for violation of RA 3019,
Malversation of Public Funds, and Falsification of Public
Documents. Binay, Jr. was alleged to be involved in
anomalous activities attending the procurement and
construction phases of the Makati Parking Building project,
committed during his previous and present terms as City
Mayor of Makati.
 The Ombudsman issued a preventive suspension order,
placing Binay Jr., et al., under preventive suspension for not
more than six (6) months without pay, during the pendency
of the OMB Cases.
Binay, Jr. filed a petition for certiorari before the CA seeking
the nullification of the preventive suspension order.
The CA granted Binay, Jr.'s prayer for a TRO,
notwithstanding Pea, Jr.'s assumption of duties as Acting
Mayor. Citing Governor Garcia, Jr. v. CA, it found that it was
more prudent on its part to issue a TRO in view of the
extreme urgency of the matter and seriousness of the issues
raised, considering that if it were established that the acts
subject of the administrative cases against Binay, Jr. were all
committed during his prior term, then, applying the
condonation doctrine, Binay, Jr.'s re-election meant that he
can no longer be administratively charged.
Binays contention:
Phases I and II were undertaken before he was elected
Mayor of Makati in 2010; and
(b) Phases III to V transpired during his first term and that his
re-election as City Mayor of Makati for a second term
effectively condoned his administrative liability therefor, if
any, thus rendering the administrative cases against him
moot and academic.
In view of the condonation doctrine, as well as the lack of
evidence to sustain the charges against him, his suspension
from office would undeservedly deprive the electorate of the
services of the person they have conscientiously chosen and
voted into office.
The Ombudmans contentions:
The condonation doctrine is irrelevant to the determination of
whether the evidence of guilt is strong for purposes of
issuing preventive suspension orders.
Reliance on the condonation doctrine is a matter of defense,
which should have been raised by before it during the
administrative proceedings.
There is no condonation because Binay, Jr. committed acts
subject of the OMB Complaint after his re-election in 2013.
Issue: Whether or not the CA gravely abused its discretion in issuing
the TRO and the WPI enjoining the implementation of the preventive
suspension order against Binay, Jr. based on the condonation
doctrine.
Ruling: No. However, the condonation doctrine is abandoned,
but the abandonment is prospective in effect.
A. The WPI against the Ombudsman's preventive suspension order
was correctly issued.
1. The CA's resolutions directing the issuance of the assailed
injunctive writs were all hinged on cases enunciating the
condonation doctrine. By merely following settled precedents
on the condonation doctrine, which at that time, unwittingly
remained "good law," it cannot be concluded that the CA
committed a grave abuse of discretion based on its legal
attribution above.
B. The Condonation Doctrine
1. Condonation is defined as "a victim's express or implied
forgiveness of an offense, especially by treating the offender
as if there had been no offense."
2. Under the Condonation Doctrine,
a. First, the penalty of removal may not be extended
beyond the term in which the public officer was
elected for each term is separate and distinct.
b. Second, an elective official's re-election serves as a
condonation of previous misconduct, thereby cutting
the right to remove him therefor.
c. Third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are
assumed to have known the life and character of
candidates, of their right to elect officers.
3. It is not based on statutory law but a jurisprudential creation.
a. It originated from the 1959 case of Pascual v. Hon.
Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija. In which case, as
there was no legal precedent on the issue at that
 time, the Court, resorted to American authorities and
found that the weight of authorities seems to incline
toward the rule denying the right to remove one from
office because of misconduct during a prior term.
4. The condonation doctrine does not apply to a criminal case.
Also, it would not apply to appointive officials since, as to
them, there is no sovereign will to disenfranchise.
C. The doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal bases.
1. There is really no established weight of authority in the US
favoring the doctrine of condonation.
2. The plain difference in setting, including the sheer impact of
the condonation doctrine on public accountability, calls for
Pascual's judicious re-examination.
a. Pascual was decided within the context of the 1935
Constitution which was silent with respect to public
accountability, or of the nature of public office being a
public trust.
3. The concept of public office, under the 1987
Constitution, AS A PUBLIC TRUST and the corollary
requirement of ACCOUNTABILITY TO THE PEOPLE AT
ALL TIMES is PLAINLY INCONSISTENT with the idea that
an elective local official's administrative liability for a
misconduct committed during a prior term can be wiped
off by the fact that he was elected to a second term of
office, or even another elective post.
4. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative
offense.
5. There is no constitutional or statutory basis to support the
notion. In fact the Local Government Code and the RRACCS
precludes condonation since in the first place, an elective
local official who is meted with the penalty of removal could
not be re-elected to an elective local position due to a direct
disqualification from running for such post.
6. If condonation of an elective official's administrative
liability would perhaps, be allowed in this jurisdiction,
then the same should have been provided by law under
our governing legal mechanisms.
7. The proposition that the electorate, when re-electing a local
official, are assumed to have done so with knowledge of his
life and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his
faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any, is infirm.
No such presumption exists in any statute or procedural
rule.
a. Most corrupt acts by public officers are shrouded in
secrecy, and concealed from the public. At a
conceptual level, condonation presupposes that the
condoner has actual knowledge of what is to be
condoned. Thus, there could be no condonation of
an act that is unknown.
8. Liability arising from administrative offenses may only be
condoned by the President in light of Section 19, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution.
D. The Court's abandonment of the condonation doctrine
should be prospective in application. It should be, as a general
rule, recognized as "good law" prior to its abandonment.
Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon should be respected.
Digested by:ROLOMA, Angelie Rose F.Rm. 405
G.R. No. 170447
BIENVENIDO DIO and RENATO
COMPARATIVO,
Present:
Petitioners
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.,
Chairperson,
 VELASCO, JR., CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

NACHURA,

PERALTA, and

VILLARAMA,*
Before Us is a Motion for Reconsideration [1] of Our
Decision[2] filed by respondent Pablo Olivarez
Promulgated:

- versus -
December 4, 2009In Our decision dated 23 June 2009, We found that the public
prosecutor, in filing the Amended Informations, did not exceed the
authority delegated by the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC). We likewise ruled that no abuse of discretion could be
attributed to Judge Fortunito L. Madrona (Madrona) when he issued
the Orders dated 9 March 2005 and 31 March 2005 for the arrest of
respondent due to his failure to be present for his arraignment and
PABLO OLIVAREZ, for the confiscation of his cash bond.

Respondent.

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - We disposed of the case as follows:

- -x

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is

GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 28 September 2005 in CA-G.R. SP No. 89230
RESOLUTION is REVEERSED. This Court orders the continuation
of the proceedings in Criminal Cases No. 04-1104
and No. 04-1105 before the RTC, the prosecution of
which shall be under the direction of the Law
Department of the COMELEC. No. costs.[3]

In order to fully understand our resolution of the instant motion, we
quote the factual antecedents as narrated in our decision:
Petitioners instituted a complaint for vote
buying against respondent Pablo Olivarez. Based on
the finding of probable cause in the Joint Resolution
issued by Assistant City Prosecutor Antonietta
Pablo-Medina, with the approval of the city
prosecutor of Paraaque, two Informations were filed
before the RTC on 29 September 2004 charging
respondent Pablo Olivarez with Violation of Section
261, paragraphs a, b and k of Article XXII of the
Omnibus Election Code x x x.
xxxx
The arraignment of the respondent was
initially set on 18 October 2004.
On 7 October 2004, respondent filed before
the Law Department of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) an [a]ppeal of [the] Joint Resolution of
the City Prosecutor of Paraaque City with Motion to
Revoke Continuing Authority pursuant to Section 10,
Rule 34 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of
Procedure. Respondent argued that the pendency of
the appeal of the Joint Resolution before the
COMELEC should prevent the filing of the
Informations before the RTC as there could be no
final finding of probable cause until the COMELEC
had resolved the appeal. Moreover, he argued that
the charges made against him were groundless.
In a letter dated 11 October 2004, the Law
Department of the COMELEC directed the city
prosecutor to transmit or elevate the entire records
of the case and to suspend further implementation of
the Joint Resolution dated 20 September 2004 until
final resolution of the said appeal before the
COMELEC en banc.
On 11 October 2004, respondent filed a Motion to
Quash the two criminal informations on the ground
that more than one offense was charged therein, in
violation of Section 3(f), Rule 117 of the Rules of
Court, in relation to Section 13, Rule 110 of the
Rules of Court. This caused the resetting of the
scheduled arraignment on 18 October 2004 to 13
December 2004.
Before Judge Madrona could act on the
motion to quash, Assistant Prosecutor Pablo-
Medina, with the approval of the city prosecutor, filed
on 28 October 2004 its Opposition to the Motion to
Quash and Motion to Admit Amended
Informations. The Amended Informations sought to
be admitted charged respondent with violation of
only paragraph a, in relation to paragraph b, of
Section 261, Article XXII of the Omnibus Election
Code.
On 1 December 2004, Judge Madrona issued an
Order resetting the hearing scheduled on 13
December 2004 to 1 February 2005 on account of
the pending Motion to Quash of the respondent and
the Amended Informations of the public prosecutor.
On 14 December 2004, respondent filed an
Opposition to the Admission of the Amended
Informations, arguing that no resolution was issued
to explain the changes therein, particularly the
deletion of paragraph k, Section 261, Article XXII of
the Omnibus Election Code . Moreover, he averred
that the city prosecutor was no longer empowered to
amend the informations, since the COMELEC had
already directed it to transmit the entire records of
the case and suspend the hearing of the cases
before the RTC until the resolution of the appeal
before the COMELEC en banc.
On 12 January 2005, Judge Madrona issued
an order denying respondents Motion to Quash
dated 11 October 2004, and admitted the Amended
Informations dated 25 October 2004.Respondent
filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration dated 20
January 2005 thereon.
On 1 February 2005, Judge Madrona reset
the arraignment to 9 March 2005, with a warning that
the arraignment would proceed without any more
delay, unless the Supreme Court would issue an
injunctive writ.
On 9 March 2005, respondent failed to
appear before the RTC. Thereupon, Judge Madrona,
in open court, denied the Motion for Reconsideration
of the Order denying the Motion to Quash and
admitting the Amended Informations, and ordered
the arrest of respondent and the confiscation of the
cash bond.
On 11 March 2005, respondent filed an
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Lift the
Order of Arrest of Accused Dr. Pablo Olivarez, which
was denied in an Order dated 31 March 2005. The
Order directed that a bench warrant be issued for
the arrest of respondent to ensure his presence at
his arraignment.
On 5 April 2005, the Law Department of the
COMELEC filed before the RTC a Manifestation and
Motion wherein it alleged that pursuant to the
COMELECs powers to investigate and prosecute
election offense cases, it had the power to revoke
the delegation of its authority to the city
prosecutor. Pursuant to these powers, the
COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 7457
dated 4 April 2005. The dispositive portion of
Resolution No. 7457 states:
Considering the foregoing,
the Commission RESOLVED, as it
hereby RESOLVES,
to APPROVE and ADOPT the
recommendation of the Law
Department as follows:
 1. To revoke the deputation
of the Office of the City Prosecutor
of Paraaque to investigate and
prosecute election offense cases
insofar as I.S. Nos. 04-2608 and 04-
2774, entitled Renato Comparativo
vs. Remedios Malabiran and Pablo
Olivarez and Bienvenido et. al. vs.
Sally Rose Saraos, et. al.,
respectively, are concerned; and
2. To direct the Law
Department to handle the
prosecution of these cases and file
the appropriate Motion and
Manifestation before the Regional
Trial Court of Paraaque, Branch
274, to hold in abeyance further
proceedings on Criminal Case Nos.
1104 and 1105 until the Commission
has acted on the appeal of
respondents.
Let the Law Department
implement this Resolution.
Thus, the Law Department of the COMELEC moved
(1) that the RTC hold in abeyance further
proceedings in Criminal Cases No. 04-1104 and No.
04-1105 until the COMELEC has acted on
respondents appeal; and (2) to revoke the authority
of the city prosecutor of Paraaque to prosecute the
case, designating therein the lawyers from the Law
Department of the COMELEC to prosecute Criminal
Cases No. 04-1104 and No. 04-1105.
On 8 April 2005, respondent filed a Special Civil
Action for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 89230, assailing the
Orders, dated 12 January 2005, 9 March
2005 and 31 March 2005 of the RTC. The appellate
court granted the appeal in a Decision dated 28
September 2005 declaring that the COMELEC had
the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation
of election offenses and to prosecute the same. As
such, the COMELEC may delegate such authority to
the Chief State Prosecutor, provincial prosecutors,
and city prosecutors.The COMELEC, however, has
the corresponding power, too, to revoke such
authority to delegate. Thus, the categorical order of
the COMELEC to suspend the prosecution of the
case before the RTC effectively deprived the city
prosecutor of the authority to amend the two
informations. The appellate court also pronounced
that Judge Madrona erred in admitting the amended
informations, since they were made in excess of the
delegated authority of the public prosecutor, and his
orders to arrest the respondent and to confiscate the
latters cash bond were devoid of legal
basis. The fallo of the Decision reads:
UPON THE VIEW WE TAKE OF
THIS CASE, THUS, the petition at
bench must be, as it hereby
is, GRANTED. The impugned
Orders of the public respondent
Judge Fortunito L. Madrona of
Branch
 274, Regional Trial Court of Paraaq
ue City dated 12 January 2005, 9
March 2005, and 31 March 2005 are
hereby VACATED and NULLIFIED.
The Temporary Restraining Order
issued in the instant petition is
made PERMANENT. Without costs
in this instance.[4]
In finding that the public prosecutor of Paraaque, in filing the
Amended Informations, did not exceed the authority delegated by the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), we said that the public
prosecutors delegated authority to prosecute the case was not yet
revoked when said amended informations were filed on 28 October
2004, since the authority was revoked only on 4 April 2005 when
COMELEC Resolution No. 7457 was issued. We explained that the
letter from the COMELEC Law Department dated 11 October 2004,
which directed the public prosecutor to transmit the entire records of
the case by the fastest means available and to suspend further
implementation of the questioned resolution (finding of probable
cause to charge respondent with Violation of Section 261,
paragraphs a, b and k of Article XXII of the Omnibus Election Code)
until final resolution of respondents appeal therefrom by the
COMELEC En Banc did not revoke said delegated authority. We
added that the filing of the amended informations was not made in
defiance of the instructions dated 11 October 2004, but was rather an
act necessitated by the developments of the case. We said that the
instructions were intended not to have the public prosecutor abandon
the prosecution of the case and negligently allow its dismissal by not
filing the Amended Informations. By filing the amended informations,
the public prosecutor avoided the undesirable situation that would
have forced the COMELEC to re-file the cases, waste government
resources and delay the administration of justice.
As regards Judge Madrona, we ruled he did not abuse his discretion
when he issued the Orders dated 9 March 2005 and 31 March
2005 for the arrest of respondent due to his failure to be present for
his arraignment and for the confiscation of his cash bond. Having
acquired jurisdiction over the cases and the persons of the accused,
the disposition thereof, regardless of what the fiscal may have felt
was the proper course of action, was within the exclusive jurisdiction,
competence and discretion of the court.
We further ruled that pursuant to Section 11 of Rule 116 of the 2000
Rules on Criminal Procedure, the arraignment of respondent cannot
be suspended indefinitely, for the reviewing authority has at most 60
days within which to decide the appeal. The arraignment of
respondent was initially scheduled on 18 October 2004, but the
same was reset three times. A motion to quash the two informations
was filed on 11 October 2004. On 12 January 2005, Judge Madrona
denied the Motion to Quash and admitted the Amended

Informations. Respondent sought the reconsideration of
order. On the scheduled arraignment on 9 March 2005, respondent
failed to appear, resulting in the denial of his motion for
reconsideration of the order denying the motion to quash and
admitting the amended informations, the order for his arrest, and the
confiscation of his cash bond. We said that five months was more
than the sixty days allowed by the rules for the suspension of the
arraignment and was ample time to obtain from COMELEC a
reversal of the Joint Resolution finding probable cause.
Respondent anchors his motion for reconsideration on two grounds,
to wit:
a. The Honorable Court, with due respect, is
incorrect in finding that the public prosecutor (of
Paranaque City) did not exceed the authority
delegated by the COMELEC when they filed the
subject Amended Informations against herein
Respondent; and
xxxx
b. The Honorable Court, with due respect, incorrectly
ruled that Judge Madrona of the Regional Trial Court
of Paranaque City, acted, in accordance with law
when he admitted the two (2) Amended Informations
and dismissed the Respondents Motion to Quash,
as the ground stated therein the informations
charged more than one offense could no longer be
said
sustained, and ordered the arrest of the Respondent
due to his alleged failure to be present for his
arraignment and for the confiscation of his cash
bond (at page 11 of the Assailed Decision).[5]
On the first ground, respondent argues that this Court erred in not
construing the directive of the COMELEC to the public prosecutor of
Paraaque City -- to transmit the entire records of the case to the
COMELEC Law Department by the fastest means available and to
suspend further implementation of the questioned resolution until
final resolution of the appeal by the COMELEC En Banc -- as not a
revocation of the public prosecutors delegated authority. He further
argues that the intention to revoke the delegated authority given to
the public prosecutor is crystal clear. The order directing the
transmission of the entire records deprives the public prosecutor of
the means and bases to prosecute the criminal cases. He adds that
the directive to suspend further implementation of the questioned
resolution until final resolution of the appeal by the COMELEC En
Banc is an express or, at the very least, an implied indication of
revocation of the delegated authority inasmuch as the public
prosecutor has been prevented, warned and stripped of any authority
and control over the prosecution of the criminal cases. In not
construing the mandatory directive as a revocation of the delegated
authority, respondent argues that this Court violated the Pro Reo
Doctrine[6] and the Rule of Lenity.[7] Since the COMELEC directive is
capable of two interpretations, respondent argues that we should
have adopted the interpretation that is favorable to him.
Moreover, respondent maintains that since the Court liberally applied
the rules when it did not dismiss petitioners defective petition, it
should likewise apply the liberal and relaxed interpretation of the
COMELEC directive in favor of respondent by finding that the
COMELEC directive revoked the delegated authority of the public
prosecutor. By filing the amended informations, despite receipt of the
COMELEC directive issued on 13 October 2004 which was
confirmed by COMELEC Resolution No. 7457, the public prosecutor
defied the entity from which it derived its authority and power to
prosecute the election cases involved. It being made in defiance of
the COMELEC directive, all acts of the public prosecutor are void
and of no effect.
On the second ground, respondent argues that we erred in ruling
that the court a quo acted in accordance with law when he admitted
the two amended informations and dismissed his motion to quash
and ordered his arrest and confiscation of his cash bond. In support
thereof, he contends that since the trial court had knowledge of the
COMELEC directive dated 11 October 2004, stripping the public
prosecutor of his delegated authority to prosecute the criminal cases,
the trial court should have rejected the amended information, as
there was no right that could be invoked from a defective/illegal
source.
Moreover, respondent contends that Section 11, Rule 116 of
the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure does not apply to this case,
because the application thereof presupposes a resolution issued by
a public prosecutor who has the authority to prosecute. Since the
public prosecutor has been deprived of its delegated authority by
virtue of the 11 October 2004 directive, such directive has retroactive
application, it being favorable to him. This being the case, there is no
Joint Resolution of the City Prosecutor to speak of, because the
same was issued without authority.
The resolution of the instant motion boils down to whether
the city prosecutor defied the order or directive of the COMELEC
when it filed the amended informations.
After giving the records of the case and the arguments
adduced by respondent a second hard look, we grant the motion.
 The Constitution, particularly Article IX, Section
empowers the COMELEC to investigate and, when appropriate,
prosecute election cases.[8]
Under Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code, the
COMELEC, through its duly authorized legal officers, has the
exclusive power to conduct a preliminary investigation of all election
offenses punishable under the Omnibus Election Code, and to
prosecute the same. The COMELEC may avail itself of the
assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government. Section 265
reads:
Section 265. Prosecution.The Commission
shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have
the exclusive power to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses punishable
under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The
Commission may avail of the assistance of other
prosecuting arms of the government: Provided,
however, That in the event that the Commission fails
to act on any complaint within four months from his
filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the
office of the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice for
proper investigation and prosecution, if warranted.
20, Section 2, Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
details the continuing delegation of authority to other prosecuting
arms of the government, which authority the COMELEC may revoke
or withdraw anytime in the proper exercise of its judgment. It
provides:
Section 2. Continuing Delegation of Authority to
Other Prosecution Arms of the Government.The
Chief State Prosecutor, all Provincial and City
Fiscals, and/or their respective assistants are hereby
given continuing authority, as deputies of the
Commission, to conduct preliminary investigation of
complaints involving election offenses under the
election laws which may be filed directly with them,
or which may be indorsed to them by the
Commission or its duly authorized representative
and to prosecute the same. Such authority may be
revoked or withdrawn any time by the Commission
whenever in its judgment such revocation or
withdrawal is necessary to protect the integrity of the
Commission, promote the common good, or when it
believes that successful prosecution of the case can
be done by the Commission.
Furthermore, Section 10 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure gives the COMELEC the power to motu proprio revise,
modify and reverse the resolution of the Chief State Prosecutor
and/or provincial/city prosecutors. Said section reads:
 expected to act in accord with and not contrary to or in derogation of
Section 10. Appeals from the Action of the State its resolutions, directives or orders in relation to election cases that
Prosecutor, Provincial or City Fiscal.Appeals from such prosecutors are deputized to investigate and prosecute. [9] Being
the resolution of the State Prosecutor or Provincial
or City Fiscal on the recommendation or resolution mere deputies, provincial and city prosecutors, acting on behalf of
of investigating officers may be made only to the the COMELEC, must proceed within the lawful scope of their
Commission within ten (10) days from receipt of the
resolution of said officials, provided, however that delegated authority.
this shall not divest the Commission of its power
to motu proprio review, revise, modify or reverse the
resolution of the chief state prosecutor and/or
provincial/city prosecutors. The decision of the In our assailed decision, we ruled that the letter dated 11 October
Commission on said appeals shall be immediately
2004 of Director Alioden D. Dalaig of the COMELEC Law
executory and final.
Department, which reads in part:

In this connection, you are hereby directed

From the foregoing, it is clear that the Chief State to transmit the entire records of the case to the Law
Prosecutor, all Provincial and City Fiscals, and/or their respective Department, Commission on Elections,
Intramuros, Manila by the fastest means
assistants have been given continuing authority, as deputies of the available.You are further directed to suspend further
Commission, to conduct a preliminary investigation of complaints implementation of the questioned resolution until
final resolution of said appeal by the Comelec En
involving election offenses under the election laws and to prosecute Banc.
the same. Such authority may be revoked or withdrawn anytime by
the COMELEC, either expressly or impliedly, when in its judgment
such revocation or withdrawal is necessary to protect the integrity of
the process to promote the common good, or where it believes that did not revoke the continuing authority granted to the City Prosecutor
successful prosecution of the case can be done by the of Paraaque, for it was COMELEC Resolution No. 7457 issued on 4
COMELEC. Moreover, being mere deputies or agents of the April 2005 that effectively revoked the deputation of the Office of the
COMELEC, provincial or city prosecutors deputized by it are City Prosecutor of Paraaque.
 Banc. This suspension of delegated authority was made
permanent and this delegated authority was revoked upon
We stand by our ruling that it was COMELEC Resolution No. 7457
issuance of COMELEC Resolution No. 7457 because of the City
that revoked the deputation of the City Prosecutor of
Prosecutors willful disobedience of the order of the COMELEC En
Paraaque. However, when the COMELEC Law Department directed
Banc, through the COMELEC Law Department, to suspend further
the City Prosecutor of Paraaque to transmit the entire records of the
implementation of the questioned resolution until final resolution of
case to the Law Department, Commission on Elections, Intramuros,
said appeal by the COMELEC En Banc.
Manila, by the fastest means available and to suspend further
implementation of the questioned resolution until final resolution of
said appeal by the Comelec En Banc, it had the effect
It cannot also be disputed that the COMELEC Law Department has
ofSUSPENDING THE AUTHORITY of the City Prosecutor to
the authority to direct, nay, order the public prosecutor to suspend
prosecute the case. This was what we did not consider in our
further implementation of the questioned resolution until final
decision. We overlooked the fact that the order issued by the
resolution of said appeal, for it is speaking on behalf of the
COMELEC Law Department was with the authority of the
COMELEC. The COMELEC Law Department, without any doubt, is
COMELEC En Banc. In other words, it was as if the
authorized to do this as shown by the pleadings it has filed before
COMELEC En Banc was the one that ordered the public
the trial court. If the COMELEC Law Department is not authorized to
prosecutor to transmit the entire records and to suspend further
issue any directive/order or to file the pleadings on behalf of the
implementation of the questioned resolution until it finally
COMELEC, the COMELEC En Banc itself would have said so. This,
resolves the appeal. As contained in the letter of the COMELEC
the COMELEC En Banc did not do.
Law Department, an appeal has been filed before the COMELEC
and has yet to be resolved. Since the COMELEC has already taken
cognizance of the appeal, and the public prosecutor has been
The records are likewise bereft of any evidence showing that
directed to suspend further implementation of the questioned
the City Prosecutor of Paraaque doubted such authority. It knew that
resolution until final resolution of said appeal, it was but proper for
the COMELEC Law Department could make such an order, but the
the City Prosecutor of Paraaque to have held in abeyance any action
public prosecutor opted to disregard the same and still filed the
until after the resolution of the appeal by the COMELEC En
Amended Informations contrary to the order to hold the proceedings

in abeyance until a final resolution of said appeal was made by the
COMELEC En Banc.
The abuse of authority by the City Prosecutor of Paraaque
was aptly explained by the Court of Appeals:
In the case at bench, public respondent city
prosecutor clearly exceeded his authority as a
COMELEC-designated prosecutor when he
amended the two informations. For there is hardly
any doubt or question that public respondent city
prosecutor had already been duly advised and
informed of the directive of the COMELEC days
before he filed the amended informations. But
instead of filing a motion to suspend proceedings
and hold abeyance the issuance of warrants of
arrest against petitioner and to defer the latters
arraignment until after the appeal shall have been
resolved, public respondent city prosecutor took it
upon himself to substitute his own judgment or
discretion for that of the COMELEC, by proceeding
with the prosecution of the criminal cases. Such act
was a clear defiance of a direct and explicit order of
the COMELEC, which was to suspend further
implementation of the questioned resolution until the
final resolution of said appeal by the COMELEC En
Banc. Indubitably, there was, on the part of the
public respondent city prosecutor, inordinate, if not
indecent, haste in the filing of the amended
informations, thereby depriving petitioner of due
process.
x x x However, despite the clear and categorical
directive of the COMELEC to transmit or elevate the
records of the case by the fastest means available,
the public respondent city prosecutor took his time to
forward the records of the case. In fact, it was only
on December 11, 2004 that he forwarded the
records, and these were not even the original
copies, but mere photocopies.
Quite irremissibly, his defiance of the order
of the COMELEC, by itself, more than sufficed to
warrant the revocation of the authority delegated to
him.
Considering that it was patently beyond his
powers or authority to do such act, the amended
informations are deemed scraps of papers, which
have been stripped bare of their legal effect
whatsoever.[10]
In filing the Amended Informations despite the order to hold
the proceedings in abeyance until final resolution of said appeal, the
City Prosecutor of Paraaque clearly exceeded the legal limit of its
delegated authority. As a deputy of the COMELEC, the public
prosecutor acted on its own and wantonly defied the COMELECs
directives/orders.For that reason, we rule that any action made by
the City Prosecutor of Paraaque in relation to the two criminal
cases subsequent to the issuance of the COMELEC order dated
11 October 2004, like the filing of the amended informations and
the amended informations themselves, is declared VOID and of
NO EFFECT.
The next query to be answered is: Did the trial court judge
commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when he admitted the amended informations despite full
knowledge that the COMELEC had ordered the City Prosecutor of
Paraaque to suspend further implementation of the questioned
resolution until final resolution of the appeal before it?
We rule that he did.
As ruled above, all actions of the City Prosecutor of
Paraaque after the COMELECs issuance of the order to transmit the
entire records and to suspend all further proceedings until it has
finally resolved the appeal before it, are void and of no
effect. Consequently, the amended informations filed before the trial
court are nothing but mere scraps of paper that have no value, for
the same were filed sans lawful authority.
As early as 14 December 2004, through respondents
Opposition to the Admission of the Amended Informations, the trial
court judge knew that the COMELEC had directed the City
Prosecutor of Paraaque to transmit the entire records of the case to
the COMELEC by the fastest means available and to suspend
further implementation of the questioned resolution until final
resolution of respondents appeal. He knew that the City Prosecutor
no longer had any authority to amend the original
informations. Despite this, the trial court judge still admitted the
amended informations. In doing so, the judge committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction.
We are not unmindful of the settled jurisprudence that once a
complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case
as to its dismissal, or conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests on
the sound discretion of the said court, as it is the best and sole judge
of what to do with the case before it. [11] Under the circumstances
obtaining in this case, we hold that this settled jurisprudence does
not apply in this case. The trial courts knowledge that the filing of the
amended informations was done by the public prosecutor in excess
of his delegated authority no longer gives him the discretion as to
whether or not accept the amended informations. The only option the
trial court had was not to admit the amended informations as a sign
of deference and respect to the COMELEC, which already had taken
cognizance of respondents appeal. This, the trial court did not
choose. It insisted on admitting the amended informations, which
were patent nullities for being filed contrary to the directives of the
COMELEC. Necessarily, all actions and rulings of the trial court
arising from these amended informations must likewise be invalid
and of no effect.
As it stands, since there are no amended informations to
speak of, the trial court has no basis for denying respondents motion
to quash. Consequently, there can be no arraignment on the
amended informations. In view of this, there can be no basis for
ordering the arrest of respondent and the confiscation of his cash
bond.
For having been issued with grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the trial courts orders --
dated 12 January 2005 denying the Motion to Quash and admitting
the amended information; 9 March 2005 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order denying the Motion to Quash, admitting
the amended informations, and ordering the arrest of the respondent
and the confiscation of his cash bond; and 31 March 2005 denying
respondents Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and/or to lift the
Order of Arrest -- are declared void and of no effect.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion for reconsideration filed by
respondent Pablo Olivarez is GRANTED, and our assailed decision
dated 23 June 2009 is RECONSIDERED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28 September 2005 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 89230 is REINSTATED. The amended informations
filed by the City Prosecutor of Paraaque on 28 October 2004 are
declared VOID and of NO EFFECT.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 152889
ENRIQUE V. VIUDEZ II, Petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and HON. BASILIO R. GABO, JR. in
his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 11, Regional Trial
Court, Malolos, Bulacan, Respondents.
Case: This is a petition for review on certiorari under Section 1, Rule
45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, with prayer for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
67115 dismissing the petition for certiorari filed by herein petitioner
against Judge Basilio R. Gabo, Jr., in his capacity as Presiding
Judge of Branch 11, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan.
Facts: On June 26, 2000, a complaint for the alleged murder of
Honorato Galvez and his driver was filed by the 303rd PNP CID)
Team with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor against the
following: Cirilo de la Cruz, Guilberto Chico, Edmund Fernando, two
persons named Ronald and Gerry, three (3) John Does, and Eulogio
Villanueva. Likewise, on July 14, 2000, a complaint for murder
against petitioner Enrique Viudez II was filed by Estrella Galvez,
widow of Mayor Honorato Galvez, for the killing of the latter and his
driver.
Upon finding of probable cause to indict the petitioner and
others for the crime of murder, the Investigating State Prosecutor
filed 2 Informations for murder with the RTC of Malolos, which then
issued warrants of arrest on the same day. The petitioner filed a
Motion to Suspend Proceedings and to Suspend the Implementation
of the Warrant of Arrest, pursuant to Section 96 of Department (of
Justice) Circular No. 70, the implementation of the warrant of arrest
against petitioner should be suspended and/or recalled pending
resolution of the said petition for review.
The RTC denied petitioners Motion stating that, there was
no way for it to recall the warrant of arrest in the absence of any
compelling reason, and that jurisdiction over his person had not yet
been acquired by it; hence, petitioner had no personality to file any
pleading in court relative to the case until he was arrested or
voluntarily surrendered himself to the court. Thus, petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration but was likewise denied. Thereafter,
petitioner filed with the CA but the latter court dismissed the petition
for certiorari for lack of merit and found no whimsicality or
oppressiveness in the exercise of the respondent Judge's discretion
in issuing the challenged Orders.
Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE: W/N a pending resolution of a petition for review filed with
the Secretary of Justice concerning a finding of probable cause will
suspend the proceedings in the trial court, including the
implementation of a warrant of arrest.
HELD: Petitioner's contention is wrong.
The task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed
with the court is first and foremost to determine the existence or non-
existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accusedThe
purpose of the mandate of the judge to first determine probable
cause for the arrest of the accused is to insulate from the very start
those falsely charged with crimes from the tribulations, expenses
and anxiety of a public trial.
The function of the judge to issue a warrant of arrest upon
the determination of probable cause is exclusive; thus, the
consequent implementation of a warrant of arrest cannot be deferred
pending the resolution of a petition for review by the Secretary of
Justice as to the finding of probable cause, a function that is
executive in nature. To defer the implementation of the warrant of
arrest would be an encroachment on the exclusive prerogative of the
judge.
Nowhere in the said provision does it state that the court
must hold the proceedings in abeyance. Therefore, the discretion of
the court whether or not to suspend the proceedings or the
implementation of the warrant of arrest, upon the motion of the
appellant or the trial prosecutor, remains unhindered. This is in
consonance with the earlier ruling33 of this Court that once a
complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case
as to its dismissal, or the conviction or acquittal of the accused, rests
on the sound discretion of the said court, as it is the best and sole
judge of what to do with the case before it.
The factual antecedents in Ledesma, Solar Team
Entertainment, Inc,., Dimatulac and Marcelo clearly show that a
common issue among them is whether the arraignment of an
accused may be deferred pending resolution by the Secretary of
Justice of a petition for review on the finding of probable cause, to
which this Court ruled in the affirmative. Nowhere in the said
decisions did it state that the implementation or enforcement of the
warrant of arrest was also deferred or suspended, as herein
petitioner prays for.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction dated April 25, 2002 is DENIED -- the petition
for review, for lack of merit; and the issuance of TRO and/or
preliminary injunction, for being moot and academic. *
*The Secretary of Justice had already sustained the petitioners
petition for review, who directed the Chief State Prosecutor to move,
with leave of court, for the withdrawal of the information for murder
against the petitioner. (Sept. 19, 2002)
PEOPLE V DUCA
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure which seeks to set aside and annul the
Decision[1] dated November 23, 2005 rendered by the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 28312.
The CA decision reversed the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 44, in Criminal Case No. 2003-0194-
D[3] which affirmed an earlier decision[4] of the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court of San Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan, convicting
respondent Arturo Duca of the crime of falsification under Article 171
of the Revised Penal Code.
The facts as found by the CA are quoted as follows:
It appears that Arturo Duca, together with his mother, Cecilia Duca,
were charged of the crime of Falsification of Official Document
defined and penalized under Article 172, in relation to Article
171, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code in an Information which
reads
That on or about December 10, 2001 in the Municipality of San
Fabian, Province of Pangasinan, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused confederating together and
mutually abiding each other, with intent to cause damage, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously cause the preparation
of a Declaration of Real Property over a bungalow type residential
house covered by Property Index No. 013-32-027-01-116131 of the
Municipal Assessors Office of San Fabian, Pangasinan by making it
appear that the signature appearing on the sworn statement of
owner is that of Aldrin F. Duca when the truth of the matter is not
because the latter was abroad at that time having arrived in the
Philippines only on December 12, 2001, and it was accused Arturo F.
Duca who affixed his own signature thereon to the damage and
prejudice of the undersigned private complainant Pedro Calanayan.
Upon being arraigned, both the accused pleaded not guilty. Then trial
on the merits ensued.
The evidence for the prosecution shows that sometime in 1999,
Pedro Calanayan (hereinafter Calanayan), private complainant
herein, filed an action for ejectment and damages against Cecilia F.
Duca, Ruel F. Duca, Arsenio F. Duca and Vangie F. Duca before the
4th Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of San Fabian-San Jacinto,
Pangasinan, docketed as Civil Case No. 960 (SF-99). The case was
decided in favor of Calanayan. There being no appeal interposed by
the aforesaid defendants, the said decision became final and
executory. On November 22, 1999, a writ of execution was issued by
the MCTC to enforce the decision. On February 29, 2000, the money
judgment was likewise satisfied with the public auction of the lot
owned by Cecilia Duca covered by TCT No. 233647. On March 1,
2000, a certificate of sale was issued in favor of Jocelyn Barque, the
highest bidder in the auction sale.
On October 19, 2001, Cecilia Duca filed an action for the Declaration
of Nullity of Execution and Damages with prayer for Writ of Injunction
and Temporary Restraining order against Sheriff IV Vinez Hortaleza
and Police Officers Roberto Vical, Alejandre Arevalo, Emilio Austria,
Victor Quitales, Crisostomo Bonavente and Calanayan. The case
was docketed as Civil Case No. 2000-0304-D.
When the said case was heard, Cecilia Duca testified to the effect
that the house erected on the lot subject of the ejectment case is
owned by her son Aldrin Duca. In support of such claim she
presented Property Index No. 013-32-027-01-116131 (Exhibit B). At
the back of the said exhibit is a sworn statement showing that the
current and fair market value of the property, which is a bungalow, is
P70,000.00 with the signature affixed on top of the typewritten name
Aldrin F. Duca and subscribed and sworn to before Engr. Reynante
Baltazar, the Municipal Assessor of San Fabian, Pangasinan, on
December 10, 2001. The signature on top of the typewritten name
Aldrin F. Duca is that of Arturo Duca. According to the prosecution,
Arturo made it appear that the signature is that of his brother Aldrin
who was out of the country at that time. Aldrin arrived in
the Philippines only on December 12, 2001, as evidenced by a
certification from the Bureau of Immigration, Manila. Arturo even
made it appear that his Community Tax Certificate (CTC) No.
03841661 issued on December 10, 2001 is that of his brother
Aldrin. That because of the misrepresentation, Cecilia and Arturo
were able to mislead the RTC such that they were able to get a TRO
against Sheriff Hortaleza and the policemen ordering them to stop
from evicting the plaintiffs from the property in question.
Both accused denied that they falsified the signature of Aldrin
Duca. Cecilia testified that she had no participation in the execution
as she was in Manila at that time
On the other hand, Arturo testified that the signature atop the name
Aldrin Duca was his. However, he intersposed the defense that he
was duly authorized by the latter to procure the said tax
declaration.On April 3, 2003, the MCTC of San Fabian-San Jacinto
rendered a decision, dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Arturo F. Duca guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification defined and
penalized under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby
imposes upon said accused a prison term of two years, four months
and one day to six (6) years of Prision Correccional and a fine of
P2,000.00.Accused Cecilia is acquitted for lack of evidence.
The accused Arturo F. Duca is hereby ordered to pay to the
complaining witness actual damages in the amount of P60,000.00
moral damages of P150,000.00 plus exemplary damages in the
amount of P100,000.00 plus cost.
Dissatisfied with the decision, Arturo Duca appealed. On March 24,
2004, the RTC of Dagupan City, Branch 44, rendered a decision,
disposing the case as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision dated April 3, 2003 of the 4th Municipal
Circuit Trial Court, San Fabian-San Jacinto, Pangasinan convicting
accused Arturo F. Duca of the crime of Falsification defined and
penalized under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code and imposing
upon said accused an imprisonment of two years, four months and
one day to six (6) years of Prision Correccional and a fine of
P2,000.00, and ordering him to pay to the complaining witness actual
damages in the amount of P60,000.00, moral damages in the
amount of P150,000.00 plus exemplary damages in the amount of
P100,000.00 plus cost, is AFFIRMED.
Aggrieved with the ruling of the RTC, Duca elevated the case to the
CA via a petition for review. On November 23, 2005, the CA
promulgated its assailed decision acquitting Duca of the crime
charged and reversing the RTC decision. The CA held:
However, the prosecution failed to establish the fact that Arturo was
not duly authorized by Aldrin in procuring the tax declaration. On the
contrary, the defense was able to establish that Arturo Duca was duly
authorized by his brother Aldrin to secure a tax declaration on the
house erected on the land registered under their mothers name.
From the foregoing testimony, it can be deduced that Arturo could
not have falsified the Tax Declaration of Real Property under
Property Index No. 013-32-027-01-116B1 (Exhibit B) by making it
appear that Aldrin Duca, his brother, participated in the
accomplishment of the said document since he was actually acting
for and in behalf of the latter. It must be noted that as early as June
2001, Arturo has already been authorized by Aldrin; albeit verbally, to
register the house in the latters name as he cannot do it personally
as he was abroad. This authority of Arturo was confirmed by the
latters execution of an Affidavit dated January 19, 2002 confirming
the procurement of the said tax declaration (Exhibit 6) as well as a
Special Power of attorney executed on June 17, 2002 (Exhibit 7).
Thus, what appeared to be defective from the beginning had already
been cured so much so that the said document became valid and
binding as an official act of Arturo.
If Arturo did not state in the Tax Declaration in what capacity he was
signing, this deficiency was cured by Aldrins subsequent execution of
Exhibits 6 and 7.
The RTCs conclusion that the special power of attorney executed by
Aldrin was a mere afterthought designed to extricate Arturo from any
criminal liability has no basis since from the very start, it has been
duly established by the defense that Aldrin had verbally instructed
Arturo to cause the execution of Exhibit B for the purpose of
registering his house constructed on his mothers lot for taxation
purposes.[6]
Hence, the instant petition anchored on this sole ground:
PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION AND HAD ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION
WHEN IT RESOLVED PRIVATE RESPONDENT ARTURO F.
DUCAS APPEAL WITHOUT GIVING THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES THROUGH THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR
GENERAL THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD THEREON.[7]
Petitioner argues that the prosecution was denied due process when
the CA resolved the respondents appeal without notifying the People
of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, of the pendency of
the same and without requiring the Solicitor General to file his
comment. Petitioner contends that once the case is elevated to the
CA or this Court, it is only the Solicitor General who is authorized to
bring or defend actions on behalf of the People. Thus, the CA gravely
abused its discretion when it acted on respondents appeal without
affording the prosecution the opportunity to be heard. Consequently,
the decision of the CA acquitting respondent should be considered
void for being violative of due process.
In his Comment,[8] respondent argues that there was no denial of
due process because the prosecution was properly represented by
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor and a private prosecutor who
handled the presentation of evidence under the control and
supervision of the Provincial Prosecutor. Since the control and
supervision conferred on the private prosecutor by the Provincial
Prosecutor had not been withdrawn, the Solicitor General could not
claim that the prosecution was not afforded a chance to be heard in
the CA. According to the respondent, he should not be prejudiced by
the Provincial Prosecutors failure to inform the Solicitor General of
the pendency of the appeal
The petition is impressed with merit.
The authority to represent the State in appeals of criminal cases
before the CA and the Supreme Court is solely vested in the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG). Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III of
Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code explicitly provides, viz.:
SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. The Office of the Solicitor General
shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers.
x x x It shall have the following specific powers and functions:
(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court
of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government
and its officers in the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, and all
other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in
which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is
a party. (emphasis supplied)
Jurisprudence has been consistent on this point. In the recent case
of Cario v. De Castro,[9] it was held:
In criminal proceedings on appeal in the Court of Appeals or in the
Supreme Court, the authority to represent the People is vested solely
in the Solicitor General. Under Presidential Decree No. 478, among
the specific powers and functions of the OSG was to represent the
government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all
criminal proceedings. This provision has been carried over to the
Revised Administrative Code particularly in Book IV, Title III, Chapter
12 thereof. Without doubt, the OSG is the appellate counsel of the
People of the Philippines in all criminal cases.[10]
Likewise, in City Fiscal of Tacloban v. Espina,[11] the Court made the
following pronouncement:
Under Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court all criminal actions
commenced by complaint or information shall be prosecuted under
the direction and control of the fiscal. The fiscal represents the
People of the Philippines in the prosecution of offenses before the
trial courts at the metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts,
municipal circuit trial courts and the regional trial courts. However,
when such criminal actions are brought to the Court of Appeals or
this Court, it is the Solicitor General who must represent the People
of the Philippines not the fiscal.[12]
And in Labaro v. Panay,[13] the Court held
The OSG is the law office of the Government authorized by law to
represent the Government or the People of the Philippines before us
and before the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings, or before
any court, tribunal, body, or commission in any matter, action, or
proceeding which, in the opinion of the Solicitor General, affects the
welfare of the people as the ends of justice may require.[14]
Indeed, in criminal cases, as in the instant case, the Solicitor General
is regarded as the appellate counsel of the People of
the Philippines and as such, should have been given the opportunity
to be heard on behalf of the People. The records show that the CA
failed to require the Solicitor General to file his Comment on Ducas
petition. A copy of the CA Resolution[15] dated May 26, 2004 which
required the filing of Comment was served upon Atty. Jaime Dojillo,
Sr. (counsel for Duca), Atty. Villamor Tolete (counsel for private
complainant Calanayan) and RTC Judge Crispin Laron. Nowhere
was it shown that the Solicitor General had ever been furnished a
copy of the said Resolution. The failure of the CA to require the
Solicitor General to file his Comment deprived the prosecution of a
fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case.
Pertinently, Saldana v. Court of Appeals, et al.[16] ruled as follows:
When the prosecution is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute
and prove its case, its right to due process is thereby violated (Uy vs.
Genato, L-37399, 57 SCRA 123 [May 29, 1974]; Serino vs. Zoa, L-
33116, 40 SCRA 433 [Aug. 31, 1971]; People vs. Gomez, L-22345,
20 SCRA 293 [May 29, 1967]; People vs. Balisacan, L-26376, 17
SCRA 1119 [Aug. 31, 1966]).
The cardinal precept is that where there is a violation of basic
constitutional rights, courts are ousted of their jurisdiction. Thus, the
violation of the States right to due process raises a serious
jurisdiction issue (Gumabon vs. Director of the Bureau of Prisons, L-
300026, 37 SCRA 420 [Jan. 30, 1971]) which cannot be glossed
over or disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right
of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that
right is void for lack of jurisdiction (Aducayen vs. Flores, L-30370,
[May 25, 1973] 51 SCRA 78; Shell Co. vs. Enage, L-30111-12, 49
SCRA 416 [Feb. 27, 1973]). Any judgment or decision rendered
notwithstanding such violation may be regarded as a lawless thing,
which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored
wherever it exhibits its head (Aducayen vs. Flores, supra).[17]
The State, like the accused, is entitled to due process in criminal
cases, that is, it must be given the opportunity to present its evidence
in support of the charge. The doctrine consistently adhered to by this
Court is that a decision rendered without due process is void ab
initio and may be attacked directly or collaterally. A decision is void
for lack of due process if, as a result, a party is deprived of the
opportunity to be heard.[18]
The assailed decision of the CA acquitting the respondent without
giving the Solicitor General the chance to file his comment on the
petition for review clearly deprived the State of its right to refute the
material allegations of the said petition filed before the CA. The said
decision is, therefore, a nullity. In Dimatulac v. Villon,[19] we held:
Indeed, for justice to prevail, the scales must balance; justice is not
to be dispensed for the accused alone. The interests of society and
the offended parties which have been wronged must be equally
considered. Verily, a verdict of conviction is not necessarily a denial
of justice; and an acquittal is not necessarily a triumph of justice; for,
to the society offended and the party wronged, it could also mean
injustice. Justice then must be rendered even-handedly to both the
accused, on one hand, and the State and offended party, on the
other.[20]
Further, the CA should have been guided by the following provisions
of Sections 1 and 3 of Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Court:
Sec. 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. A party desiring to appeal
from a decision of the Regional Trial Court rendered in the exercise
of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with
the Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of said
court the corresponding docket and other lawful fees, depositing the
amount of P500.00 for costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial Court
and the adverse party with a copy of the petition. The petition shall
be filed and served within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of petitioners motion
for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. Upon
proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and
other lawful fees and the deposit for costs before the expiration of
the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an
additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the
petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for
the most compelling reason and in no case to extend fifteen (15)
days.
Sec. 3. Effect of failure to comply with requirements. The failure of
the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing requirements
regarding the payment of the docket and other lawful fees, the
deposit for costs, proof of service of the petition, and the contents of
and the documents which should accompany the petition shall be
sufficient ground for the dismissal thereof. (emphasis supplied)
Respondent appealed to the CA from the decision of the RTC via a
petition for review under Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Court. The
respondent was mandated under Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court to serve copies of his petition for review upon the adverse
party, in this case, the People of the Philippines through the
OSG. Respondent failed to serve a copy of his petition on the OSG
and instead served a copy upon the Assistant City Prosecutor of
Dagupan City.[21] The service of a copy of the petition on the People
of the Philippines, through the Prosecutor would be inefficacious for
the reason that the Solicitor General is the sole representative of the
People of the Philippines in appeals before the CA and the Supreme
Court. The respondents failure to have a copy of his petition served
on the People of the Philippines, through the OSG, is a sufficient
ground for the dismissal of the petition as provided in Section 3, Rule
42 of the Rules of Court. Thus, the CA has no other recourse but to
dismiss the petition. However, the CA, instead of dismissing
respondents petition, proceeded to resolve the petition and even
acquitted respondent without the Solicitor Generals comment. We,
thus, find that the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering its assailed decision.
On a procedural matter, the Court notes that petitioner filed the
instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 without filing a motion for
reconsideration with the CA. It is settled that the writ of certiorari lies
only when petitioner has no other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Thus, a motion for
reconsideration, as a general rule, must be filed before the tribunal,
board, or officer against whom the writ of certiorari is
sought. Ordinarily, certiorari as a special civil action will not lie unless
a motion for reconsideration is first filed before the respondent
tribunal, to allow it an opportunity to correct its assigned errors.
[22] This rule, however, is not without exceptions. In National
Housing v. Court of Appeals,[23] we held:
However, in Progressive Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, we held that while generally a motion for reconsideration
must first be filed before resorting to certiorari in order to give the
lower court an opportunity to rectify its errors, this rule admits of
exceptions and is not intended to be applied without considering the
circumstances of the case. The filing of a motion for reconsideration
is not a condition sine qua non when the issue raised is purely one of
law, or where the error is patent or the disputed order is void, or the
questions raised on certiorari are the same as those already
squarely presented to and passed upon by the lower court.
[24] (emphasis supplied)
The CA decision being void for lack of due process, the filing of the
instant petition for certiorari without a motion for reconsideration is
justified.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The
assailed decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CR No. 28312 is hereby SET
ASIDE and the case is REMANDED to the CA for further
proceedings. The CA is ordered to decide the case with dispatch.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, P e t i t i o n e r ,- versus-
CRASUS L. IYOY, R e s p o n d e n t
FACTS:
Crasus married Fely on 16 December 1961 at Cebu City. After the
celebration of their marriage, respondent Crasus discovered that
Fely was hot-tempered, a nagger and extravagant. In 1984, Fely
left the Philippines for the United States of America (U.S.A.), leaving
all of their five children, the youngest then being only six years old, to
the care of respondent Crasus.
Barely a year after Fely left for the U.S.A., respondent Crasus
received a letter from her requesting that he sign the enclosed
divorce papers; he disregarded the said request. Sometime in 1985,
respondent Crasus learned, through the letters sent by Fely to their
children, that Fely got married to an American, with whom she
eventually had a child. At the time the Complaint was filed, it had
been 13 years since Fely left and abandoned respondent Crasus,
and there was no more possibility of reconciliation between them.
Respondent Crasus finally alleged in his Complaint that Felys acts
brought danger and dishonor to the family, and clearly demonstrated
her psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of
marriage. Such incapacity, being incurable and continuing,
constitutes a ground for declaration of nullity of marriage under
Article 36, in relation to Articles 68, 70, and 72, of the Family Code of
the Philippines.
Fely filed her Answer and Counterclaim with the RTC on 05 June
1997. She asserted therein that she was already an American citizen
since 1988 and was now married to Stephen Micklus. She argued
that her marriage to her American husband was legal because now
being an American citizen, the law of her present nationality shall
govern her status.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
(1) RTC Cebu: declared the marriage null and void on the basis of
Article 36 of the Family Code of the Philippines.
(2) CA: affirmed RTC.
ISSUE:
Where the marriage between Crasus and Fely remains valid and
subsisting
RULING:
YES.
At most, Felys abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give
respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal separation under Article
55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the same Code. While this
Court commiserates with respondent Crasus for being continuously
shackled to what is now a hopeless and loveless marriage, this is
one of those situations where neither law nor society can provide the
specific answer to every individual problem.
I. The totality of evidence presented during trial is insufficient to
support the finding of psychological incapacity of Fely.
The psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) Gravity It must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage;
(b) Juridical Antecedence It must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may
emerge only after the marriage; and
(c) Incurability It must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
Intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage. The root cause of the
incapacity be identified as a psychological illness and that its
incapacitating nature must be fully explained.
II. Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Family Code of the Philippines is not
applicable to the case at bar.
By its plain and literal interpretation, the said provision cannot be
applied to the case of respondent Crasus and his wife Fely because
at the time Fely obtained her divorce, she was still a Filipino citizen.
At the time she filed for divorce, Fely was still a Filipino citizen, and
pursuant to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, she was still bound by Philippine laws
III. The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the
Republic, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages.
The Solicitor General is authorized to intervene, on behalf of the
Republic, in proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of
marriages.
Invoking Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines, respondent
Crasus argued that only the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned
to the RTC may intervene on behalf of the State in proceedings for
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages; hence, the Office of
the Solicitor General had no personality to file the instant Petition on
behalf of the State. Article 48 provides
ART. 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage, the Court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to
prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that the
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
That Article 48 does not expressly mention the Solicitor General
does not bar him or his Office from intervening in proceedings for
annulment or declaration of nullity of marriages. Executive Order No.
292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, appoints
the Solicitor General as the principal law officer and legal defender of
the Government.[33] His Office is tasked to represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities
and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation
or matter requiring the services of lawyers. The Office of the Solicitor
General shall constitute the law office of the Government and, as
such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of lawyers.[34]
The intent of Article 48 of the Family Code of the Philippines is to
ensure that the interest of the State is represented and protected in
proceedings for annulment and declaration of nullity of marriages by
preventing collusion between the parties, or the fabrication or
suppression of evidence; and, bearing in mind that the Solicitor
General is the principal law officer and legal defender of the land,
then his intervention in such proceedings could only serve and
contribute to the realization of such intent, rather than thwart it
Furthermore, the general rule is that only the Solicitor General is
authorized to bring or defend actions on behalf of the People or the
Republic of the Philippines once the case is brought before this
Court or the Court of Appeals.[35] While it is the prosecuting attorney
or fiscal who actively participates, on behalf of the State, in a
proceeding for annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage before
the RTC, the Office of the Solicitor General takes over when the case
is elevated to the Court of Appeals or this Court. Since it shall be
eventually responsible for taking the case to the appellate courts
when circumstances demand, then it is only reasonable and practical
that even while the proceeding is still being held before the RTC, the
Office of the Solicitor General can already exercise supervision and
control over the conduct of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal therein
to better guarantee the protection of the interests of the State.
In fact, this Court had already recognized and affirmed the role of the
Solicitor General in several cases for annulment and declaration of
nullity of marriages that were appealed before it, summarized as
follows in the case of Ancheta v. Ancheta[36]
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals [268 SCRA 198 (1997)],
this Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the
role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
appear as counsel for the State:
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15)
days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of
the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095. [Id.,
at 213]
This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin [355 SCRA 285
(2001)] reiterated its pronouncement in Republic v. Court of
Appeals [Supra.] regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State[37]
Finally, the issuance of this Court of the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages,[38] which became effective on 15 March 2003, should
dispel any other doubts of respondent Crasus as to the authority of
the Solicitor General to file the instant Petition on behalf of the State.
The Rule recognizes the authority of the Solicitor General to
intervene and take part in the proceedings for annulment and
declaration of nullity of marriages before the RTC and on appeal to
higher courts. The pertinent provisions of the said Rule are
reproduced below
Sec. 5. Contents and form of petition.
(4) It shall be filed in six copies. The petitioner shall serve a copy of
the petition on the Office of the Solicitor General and the Office of the
City or Provincial Prosecutor, within five days from the date of its
filing and submit to the court proof of such service within the same
period.
Sec. 18. Memoranda. The court may require the parties and the
public prosecutor, in consultation with the Office of the Solicitor
General, to file their respective memoranda in support of their claims
within fifteen days from the date the trial is terminated. It may require
the Office of the Solicitor General to file its own memorandum if the
case is of significant interest to the State. No other pleadings or
papers may be submitted without leave of court. After the lapse of
the period herein provided, the case will be considered submitted for
decision, with or without the memoranda.
Sec. 19. Decision.
(2) The parties, including the Solicitor General and the public
prosecutor, shall be served with copies of the decision personally or
by registered mail. If the respondent summoned by publication failed
to appear in the action, the dispositive part of the decision shall be
published once in a newspaper of general circulation.
(3) The decision becomes final upon the expiration of fifteen days
from notice to the parties. Entry of judgment shall be made if no
motion for reconsideration or new trial, or appeal is filed by any of the
parties, the public prosecutor, or the Solicitor General.
Sec. 20. Appeal.
(2) Notice of Appeal. An aggrieved party or the Solicitor General may
appeal from the decision by filing a Notice of Appeal within fifteen
days from notice of denial of the motion for reconsideration or new
trial. The appellant shall serve a copy of the notice of appeal on the
adverse parties.
Given the foregoing, this Court arrives at a conclusion contrary to
those of the RTC and the Court of Appeals, and sustains the validity
and existence of the marriage between respondent Crasus and Fely.
At most, Felys abandonment, sexual infidelity, and bigamy, give
respondent Crasus grounds to file for legal separation under Article
55 of the Family Code of the Philippines, but not for declaration of
nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the same Code. While this
Court commiserates with respondent Crasus for being continuously
shackled to what is now a hopeless and loveless marriage, this is
one of those situations where neither law nor society can provide the
specific answer to every individual problem.[39]
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 62539, dated 30 July
2001, affirming the Judgment of the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 22, in
Civil Case No. CEB-20077, dated 30 October 1998, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE.
The marriage of respondent Crasus L. Iyoy and Fely Ada Rosal-Iyoy
remains valid and subsisting.
SO ORDERED.