Chapter

7
Policy Responses to
Demographic Changes

From the field notes

50N
100E 110E

MONGOLIA 120E
90E
40N
N.
KOREA
Beijing S.
KOREA

30N C HI N A East
BHUTAN China
Sea
INDIA

MYANMAR
20N
LA

South China
O

TH
S

A IL Sea
AN
D VIETNAM

Beijing is a city transformed, and if the forest of skyscrapers does not

convince, then look around you as people stroll across Tienanmen Square
or along what is reputed to be the worlds longest main street. I must
confess that the symbolism in this photograph only manifested itself after
I had taken the picturean obviously well-to-do local couple walking
toward me, their (probably) only child, a son, in tow, all under the
watchful eye of the police.

98
 KEY POINTS
For practical purposes population data
are reported by country. But demographic
variation within countries can be very large
as, for example, in India.
During the twentieth century national
governments pursued three kinds of popu-
lation policy: expansive, eugenic, and re-
strictive.
International agreements on population
policies are difficult to reach, in part be-
T he foregoing chapters contain ample evidence of
an inescapable reality: try as they might, govern-
ments are unable to effectively control popula-
tion change. The populations of some countries con-
tinue to grow far more rapidly than their administrations
would like. And in other countries where populations
are declining and aging, governments are hard put to get
families to have more youngsters than they choose to
have. In addition, despite their best efforts, govern-
ments are unable to control the flow of migrants across
their borders.
Indeed, national governments even find it difficult to
deal with population issues within their borders. We
noted earlier in Part Two that national statistics on popu-
lation can be deceptive: they do not reveal regional varia-
tions within individual countries. In India, for example,
the population increase in some southern States is close
ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
Population change is a global issue, and the United Na-
tions organizes conferences and meetings to address the
problem on a regular basis. The most revealing confer-
ences are the Population Conferences held every 10
years since the first one in Bucharest, Romania, in 1974.
It is interesting to read the record of this meeting.
The population explosion was in full force, global
hunger and dislocation were being forecast, and control-
ling population growth seemed to be a worldwide prior-
ity. But the minutes of the 1974 Conference paint quite
another picture, and they remind us of the cost of the
99
cause religious ideologies and governmen-
tal goals may be incompatible.
The most dramatic population-policy re-
versal in recent decades was carried out by
communist China.
Many governments have sought to con-
trol immigration through laws limiting the
number or type of people who can cross
borders and become citizens, but few coun-
tries have succeeded in controlling immi-
gration effectively.
to the world average of 1.4 percentbut in Indias north-
east some States record nearly triple the world average.
In the demographic arena, such regional variations com-
plicate efforts to forge effective population policies.
In this chapter we take a look at national and interna-
tional population policies in spatial as well as temporal
context. Much has changed over the past century or so:
there was a time when governments could openly favor
one ethnic group over another, close their borders to per-
sons of particular racial ancestry, even segregate their
own people based on race. Although various forms of
more subtle discrimination still occur, these worst ex-
cesses have been terminated, in part through interna-
tional pressure and action. But governments continue to
see ways to constrain excessive population growth, to
deal with the problems arising from population decline,
and to control immigration.
Cold War and of the difficulty in reaching international
agreement on any issue as sensitive as population.
China, still in the aftershocks of its costly Cultural Revo-
lution, put the Marxist view bluntly: population control
was a capitalist plot designed to hamper the growth and
power of communist societies, and the Chinese would
not agree to any multinational plan to limit growth. On
the contrary, the Chinese applauded the (then) Soviet
policy of giving special recognition and awards to
women who had borne 10 children or more.
The Bucharest gathering was the first in a series of UN-
sponsored conferences on population issues. Although it
was marred by ideological disputes, the great majority of
100 Part Two Population Patterns and Processes
the worlds governments agreed on the urgency of the
population issue. China and the Soviet Union took similar
positions for different reasons: China saw family planning
as a capitalist plot, whereas the Soviet Union promoted
births because its population had not fully recovered from
the enormous losses it suffered during World War II. The
Soviet Union encouraged large families because it saw its
huge domain as underpopulated (a situation to which Stal-
inists had contributed by exterminating more than 30 mil-
lion farmers, political opponents, and other dissidents dur-
ing the 1930s). Nonetheless, the problems of spiraling
population growth were evident to most of the participat-
ing states, communist and noncommunist alike.
The UN Population Conference of 1984, held in
Mexico City, had a very different tone; gone were the
sense of urgency and the depth of ideological animosity.
The Green Revolution had narrowed the food gap, and
the specter of global famine, predicted by so many sci-
entists, was receding. China, now in its post-Mao era,
F rom the field notes
Searing social contrasts abound in Indias over-
crowded cities. Even in Bombay, Indias most prosperous
large city, hundreds of thousands of people live like this, in
the shadow of modern apartment buildings. Within seconds
we were surrounded by a crowd of people asking for help of
any kind, their ages ranging from the very young to the very
old. Somehow this scene was more troubling here in well-off
Bombay than in Calcutta or Madras, but it typified Indias
urban problems everywhere. (Note: the names of Bombay
and Madras were changed after this field note was written.)
had reversed its position on population growth. It had
now embarked on a severely restrictive population pol-
icy, and its growth rate had declined dramaticallyso
much so that the Beijing regime had been awarded a
United Nations medal for achieving rapid reduction in
the national birth rate. In addition, during the Reagan
(Republican) era the United States did not take an active
role in support of family planning. It kept a relatively low
profile at the conference, and no major confrontations
like those at Bucharest occurred.
During the 1994 conference, held in Cairo, Egypt, a
new and potentially crucial division emerged among the
180 countries represented. The great majority of these
states wanted to endorse a plan to be known as the
Cairo Strategy, a program that would combine family
planning with sex education in schools, along with other
initiatives to achieve reduced population-growth rates in
developing countries. But a relatively small group of
conservative Roman Catholic and Muslim countries,
strongly supported by the Vatican, blocked final agree-
ment on this program. These countries refused to ap-
prove proposals to educate school-age youngsters on
matters of sex and to make contraceptives more readily
available. Roman Catholic countries such as Argentina,
Nicaragua, and Guatemala argued that the program
should endorse parental control over childrens sex edu-
cation rather than high school training (which had been
proposed by Mexico). Muslim countries asserted that
population-control measures of any kind were inconsis-
tent with Islamic precepts (which was the basis for Saudi
Arabias refusal to participate at all).
 CHAPTER 7 Policy Responses to Demographic Changes
Thus the Cairo Conference may have opened a new
chapter in the ongoing struggle to constrain population
growth; Cold War ideological conflict has now been re-
placed by strife between religious fundamentalism and
secularism. The 2004 Conference will undoubtedly con-
tinue the debate begun in Cairo, where a number of del-
egations denounced secular society. These arguments
pushed into the background a key to reducing popula-
tion growth: the education of women and the strengthen-
ing of their rights in all societies (see Chapter 31). When
women have access to education and paid employment,
birth rates decline and development accelerates. Data
from the World Bank indicate that women without some
high school education have an average of seven chil-
dren; the average drops to three for women who attend
high school. And because there is more time between
births, the health of women and children also improves,
saving medical costs for the society as a whole.
Religious fundamentalism can work against the in-
terests of women in societies of all kinds. Many ob-
servers argue that the poverty associated with rapid
population growth is best combated by improving the
status of women in traditional society. On this matter
the conference made little progress.
NATIONAL POPULATION
POLICIES
Over the past century, many of the worlds governments
have instituted policies designed to influence the overall
growth rate or ethnic ratios within the population. Cer-
tain policies directly affect the birth rate via laws that
range from subsidization of abortion to forced steriliza-
tion. Others influence family size through taxation or
subvention. These policies fall into three groups: expan-
sive, eugenic, and restrictive.
The former Soviet Union and China under Mao Ze-
dong led other communist societies in expansive pop-
ulation policies, which encourage large families and
raise the rate of natural increase. Ideological, anticapital-
ist motives drove those policies, now abandoned. But
today, some countries are again pursuing expansive pop-
ulation policiesbecause their populations are aging
and declining. We have already taken note of the situa-
tion in Europe, where France has embarked on a policy
to encourage (through tax incentives and by other fiscal
means) families to have more children. Another case is
Singapore, where, shortly after its secession from
Malaysia (1965), the government instituted a restrictive
population policy. Sterilization was encouraged, abor-
tion was legalized, and families with more than two
children were fiscally punished. So successful was this
policy that the population stopped growing and started
aging. At this point, the government reversed itself, insti-
tuting an expansive population policy. Singapores expe-
101
rience underscores the difficulties governments face
when trying to constrain population growth: the islands
city-state population is small (4.1 million), well-educated,
and tightly ruled by an autocratic governmentand still
its population policies had unintended consequences.
In the past, some governments engaged in eugenic
population policies, which were designed to favor
one racial or cultural sector of the population over oth-
ers. The ultimate example of eugenics was Nazi Ger-
many, but other countries also pursued such strategies,
though in more subtle ways. Up until the time of the
Civil Rights movement, some accuse the United States of
pursuing social policies tinged with eugenics that
worked against the interests of African-Americans;
Japans nearly homogeneous culture is sometimes said
to result from deliberately eugenic social policies. Eu-
genic population policies can be practiced covertly
through discriminatory taxation, biased allocation of re-
sources, and other forms of racial favoritism.
Today the majority of the worlds governments seek
to reduce the rate of natural increase through various
forms of restrictive population policies. These poli-
cies range from toleration of officially unapproved
means of birth control to outright prohibition of large
families. As we note later in this chapter, Chinas one-
child-only policy, instituted after the end of the Maoist
period, had spectacular effect, reducing Chinas growth
rate from one of the worlds fastest to one of the devel-
oping worlds slowest. But again the policy had unin-
tended consequences and has been relaxed somewhat
in recent years.
Limitations Many governments have learned that
changing circumstances tend to overtake their carefully
constructed population policies; the case of Singapore is
one among these. Urbanization and industrialization in-
hibit population growth more effectively than restrictive
population policies can; the liberation and education of
women in traditionally male-dominant societies does
more than sex education and condoms. Restricting the
immigration of foreign workers will do more to age a
population than any population policy can. Cultural tra-
dition (especially religion) can neutralize the best-formu-
lated strategies. Still, governments must keep trying be-
cause population continues to grow.
Contradictions No one who has looked carefully at
the map of world population growth (Fig. 5-1) will have
failed to note that natural increase is at its lowest in the
very heart of the Roman Catholic world. (Italys popula-
tion is actually declining today.) Adherence to Catholic
doctrine, it would appear, is far stronger in areas re-
mote from the Vatican than within the Catholic core.
Another case in point is in the Philippines, Asias only
Roman Catholic country (population: 84 million). Here,
the still-powerful church opposes the use of artificial
102 Part Two Population Patterns and Processes
contraceptives, and church and state have been locked
in a battle over birth control. Abortion is prohibited by
the countrys constitution. When Manilas cardinal de-
manded that the Philippine government boycott the
Cairo Conference on Population and Development in
1994, the issue roiled the nation. But the Philippines is a
democracy, and while Manila did send a delegation to
Cairo, the government could not afford to ignore the
pronouncements of the church. In the first decade of the
twenty-first century, population growth in the Philip-
pines remained one of Asias highest at 2.2 percent, with
a doubling time of only 31 years.
In the Islamic realm, the geographic situation seems
to be the opposite. Saudi Arabia, home of Mecca and the
heart of the Muslim world, has one of the globes fastest
growth rates (3.0 percent; doubling time 23 years). But in
far-off Indonesia (the Philippines neighbor), the govern-
ment in 1970 began a nationwide family-planning pro-
gram. When fundamentalist Muslim leaders objected, the
government used a combination of coercion and induce-
ment to negate their influence. Eventually, Indonesias
family-planning program came to be regarded as the
most successful in the Muslim world: in 1970 the coun-
trys rate of natural increase was over 2.5 percent; by
2000 it was down to 1.6 percent, far below that of the
Philippines. Doubling time rose from 28 to 44 years.
THREE CASE STUDIES
The governments of three countries in Asia which, in
combination, account for 40 percent of the worlds popu-
lation have had quite different experiences in their efforts
to institute policies to limit and control population growth.
The consequences of their efforts have varied widely
and have had a crucial impact on global prospects.
Japan
The Japanese experience is a prime example of success
perhaps too much successin population control. Dur-
ing Japans nineteenth- and early twentieth-century era
of modernization, expansion, and military victories, fam-
ilies were encouraged to have several children. How-
ever, Japan also had growing urban centers, which
tended to somewhat reduce the birth rate. This combina-
tion of circumstances helped stabilize the rate of popula-
tion growth.
At the end of World War II, hundreds of thousands
of Japanese nationals returned from the colonies. Sol-
diers came home and rejoined their families. During the
American occupation medical services and public health
were improved. The net result was an unprecedented in-
crease in the birth rate and a simultaneous drop in death
rates. Japans rate of growth, which over the decades had
averaged about 1.3 percent, suddenly rose to 2.0 percent
per year. That represents a doubling time of 35 years,
and with Japans population already about 70 million at
the time, it created a crisis.
In 1948 the Japanese government took action, and the
results can be seen in the population pyramid in Figure
5-5. The Eugenic Protection Act legalized abortions for
social, medical, and economic reasons. Contraceptives
were made available, and family-planning clinics were set
up throughout the country. Although contraception and
female sterilization (also made widely available) helped
reduce the birth rate, it was the enormous number of
abortions that really brought it down. So many abortions
were performedperhaps 7 to 8 million in a decade
that the Japanese authorities began to worry about their
effect on the well-being of the nation. They then began to
use propaganda and educational programs to encourage
contraception.
As a result of these measures, the birth rate, which
had been over 34 per 1000 in 1947, had fallen to 18 per
thousand just one decade later and was reduced to 13
per thousand by 1985. Meanwhile, the death rate de-
clined from 14.2 in 1948 to 7.5 in 1958 to 6.0 in 1985.
Thus in the early 1980s Japans population, growing at
less than 1 percent per year, increased by about 1 million
annually. Immigration contributed little to population
growth, and emigration also had little effect.
In the 1990s, Japans demographic situation became
a matter of growing concern for its leaders. The countrys
fertility rate had fallen to a new low of just over 1.5, far
below the 2.1 needed to maintain the population with-
out loss. (This is still higher than the prevailing TFR in
West Germany just before reunification, which was
below 1.3.) The effects of this decline can be seen in pro-
jections of Japans future population, which will reach a
peak of approximately 127 million in 2007 and then
begin a slow but accelerating decline down (by some
projections) to 70 million by 2060.
In 1991, the Japanese government increased the
benefits available to parents and embarked on an expan-
sionist population policy. But under the special condi-
tions of Japanese life it will be difficult to reverse the
trend just described. Japan is a small country, about the
size of Montana. It is among the worlds most highly ur-
banized, industrialized, and regimented societies. Living
space is at a premium; living costs are high. The financial
and social burdens of raising a child are great, and par-
ents are well aware that some child benefits will not be
much help. So Japan, like Germany, faces an aging pop-
ulation, a dwindling workforce, and a shrinking tax base
at a time when welfare and pension costs are rising.
What alternatives are available? Labor immigration is
one possibility, but the Japanese refuse to allow large
numbers of foreign workers into their nearly homoge-
neous island nation. A Singapore-style campaign to re-
verse the downward population spiral is not likely in
Japan, nor would it be likely to work. For the time being,
Japan will probably turn to an old allytechnology. It
 CHAPTER 7 Policy Responses to Demographic Changes 103

still is possible to turn over more work to robots and plex as India are enormous. India is a federation of 28
other advanced technologies in order to increase pro- States and 7 so-called Union Territories, and the individ-
ductivity. Some observers also suggest that many more ual States differ greatly both culturally and politically. As
women will enter the skilled workforce in the early in all true federations, the will of the federal government
twenty-first century. cannot be forcibly imposed on the States.
None of this, however, will ultimately protect Japan Earlier we mentioned the regional variation in
from the social and economic adjustments that must Indias rate of population growth (Fig. 7-1). From a de-
accompany less-than-zero or negative population mographic standpoint, in fact, there are several Indias.
growth. With its borders effectively closed to immigra- Population growth is most rapid (and still explosive) in
tion, its future problems will be substantially self- Assam and neighboring states adjacent to Bangladesh. In
imposed, proving again that in this age of interaction Nagaland and Mizoram, the rate of natural increase dur-
and interconnection, cultural isolation is no guarantee ing the 1970s actually exceeded 4.5 percent, one of the
of a secure future. worlds highest. It has been about 2.5 percent in Indias
great eastern population cluster in the lower Ganges-
Brahmaputra Basin. As Figure 7-1 shows, the growth rate
India in the southern peninsula has been below the national
Demographers predict that sometime during the first half average. The national average for population growth
of the twenty-first century India will overtake China as the does not reveal these internal spatial variations. When
worlds most populous countryif Indias political frame- the food situation was less secure than it has been in re-
work holds together. In the late 1990s, Indias population cent years, hunger often afflicted the east at a time when
was still growing at a rate of about 1.9 percent, adding over food was adequate in the west.
18 million per year to a population approaching 1 billion. Population planning began on a shoestring budget
The problems involved in carrying out a coordi- in the 1950s, not long after India became independent.
nated population policy in a country as culturally com- Limited funds were made available for family-planning

0 250 500 750 Kilometers

AFGHANISTAN JAMMU 0 250 500 Miles
AND

KASHMIR
Islamabad
CHINA
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PAKISTAN PUNJAB UTTARANCHAL

ng River
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G
anges R. BANGLADESH MANIPUR
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INDIA JHARKHAND WEST Dacca TRIPURA
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INDIA:

RECENT POPULATION
a River
hn
Sea Kris
GROWTH RATES BY STATE
PONDICHERRY
15
GOA ANDHRA
PRADESH
KARNATAKA 3.5% or greater
Bangalore
Chennai

Andaman
TAMIL
3.0-3.4%
Islands
PONDICHERRY
NADU
Laccadive uvery 2.5-2.9% Figure 7-1 Recent Population Growth
KE

Ca PONDICHERRY
Islands
RA

10
Rates in India. Data from census of India
LA

(INDIA)
2.0-2.4%
since 1970 and from demographic reports
SRI Nicobar of individual State agencies were used to
70 MALDIVES 75 LANKA 85 under 2.0%
Islands
derive yearly population growth rates.
deBlij Human W-168 Figure 34-2
104 Part Two Population Patterns and Processes
clinics and programs, but government leaders them-
selves were not aware of the real dimensions of the pop-
ulation explosion in progress at the time. In the 1960s,
however, Indias official census left no doubt, and the
governments investment in population planning in-
creased. A national program was instituted, and the
States were encouraged to join.
Despite this national effort, rapid population growth
continued, especially in the eastern States. Also, social
problems arose in some of the States where the cam-
paign was pursued most vigorously. The State of Maha-
rashtra instituted a plan that required sterilization of any-
one with three children or more. Public opposition led to
rioting and the program was abandoned, but not before
3.7 million people had been sterilized. Other States also
engaged in compulsory sterilization programs, but the
F rom the field notes
Chinas communist regime could institute a one-
child-only policy and enforce it, but India is a democracy,
and Indias States have considerable autonomy. Above this
entrance to a suite of medical offices was some evidence of
recent disputes over family planning in the State of Maha-
rashtra: GOVERNMENT APPROVED URBAN FAMILY PLAN-
NING CENTRE IS CLOSED FROM 1.1/1996, says one notice;
FREE FAMILY PLANNING STERILISATION OPERATION
NOW NOT CONDUCTED HERE FROM 1.1/1996, says an-
other. These notices mark the outcome of decisions by the
Maharashtra government to overrule federal family-planning
initiatives; here is one reason why Indias rate of population
growth remains comparatively high.
social and political costs were heavy. Eventually, a total
of 22.5 million people were sterilized, but this form of
population control could not be sustained for long.
Today Indian State governments are using advertis-
ing and persuasion to encourage families to have fewer
children. Almost everywhere one can see posters urging
people to have small families, and a network of clinics
has been established to aid women even in the remotest
villages. As Figure 7-1 indicates, progress has been made
in some areas, not only in the better educated areas of
the south but elsewhere as well. We should keep in
mind that several of Indias States have 100 million in-
habitants or more, which would put them among the
worlds larger countries. Any reduction in population
growth rates in such States is a major achievement. How-
ever, India does not have enough resources to achieve a
significant decline in population growth rates in the na-
tion as a whole.
China
For nearly 30 years after the communist government
took power, Chinas demography was a mystery to the
outside world. Estimates of Chinas population and its
rate of natural increase varied widely. In 1978 the World
Banks World Development Report estimated the Chi-
nese population at 826 million. Shortly thereafter the
Chinese government announced that the 1 billion mark
had been passed. Guesses about Chinas population had
been wrong by as much as 200 million!
If there were doubts about the size of Chinas popu-
lation, the political and social regime of Mao Zedong left
 CHAPTER 7 Policy Responses to Demographic Changes
no doubts about its views on family planning. At the
1974 Bucharest Conference, as noted earlier, the Chinese
representative denounced population policies as imperi-
alist tools designed to sap the strength of developing
countries.
After Maos death in 1976, Chinas new leaders ex-
pressed very different views. If China was to modernize,
they said, population growth would have to be brought
under control. In 1979 they launched a policy to induce
married couples to have only one child. This would have
stabilized Chinas population at about 1.2 billion by the
end of the century.
The one-child policy was applied loosely at first,
but when it had less than the desired effect, it was en-
forced more strictly. The results were dramatic. In 1970,
Chinas population was growing at a rate of 2.4 percent
(as estimated by Chinas own planners); by 1985, it was
down to 1.1 percent. In 1983, by which time the growth
rate had been reduced to 1.2 percent, the United Nations
gave China (along with India) its first Family-Planning
Award.
These statistics are encouraging, but they conceal
the stresses the policies impose on families. After 1982,
the government made it mandatory for women to use
contraceptive devices after they had their one child. If a
second child was born, one of the parents would have to
be sterilized. Only members of Chinas recognized mi-
norities (less than 3 percent of the total population) were
exempt from these rules.
Such rules imposed severe hardships, especially on
farming families. Many hands are needed to do farm
work, and large families are common in many rural
areas. Therefore, many Chinese families defied the au-
thorities: they kept pregnant women out of sight, did not
register births, and prevented inspectors from visiting
villages.
In response, the government took drastic action.
Those who violated the rules were fired from their jobs,
had their farmlands taken away, lost many benefits, and
were otherwise put at a disadvantage. In some parts
of China the punishment was even worse: pregnant
women known to have one or two children were ar-
rested at work, in the fields, or at home and taken to
abortion clinics to have their babies abortedsometimes
after more than six months of pregnancy. The national
policies were imposed more harshly in some provinces
than in others. Southeast China appears to have been tar-
geted most severely.
Chinas Ministry of Public Health estimates that dur-
ing the first six years of the population-control cam-
paign, nearly 70 million abortions were performed in the
country (where abortion was regarded as murder just a
generation earlier). In addition, during the 1980s more
than 20 million persons were sterilized annually (three
times as many women as men), according to govern-
ment reports.
105
The effectiveness of the Chinese population policies
was ensured, not only by government incentives and
punishments, but also through the actions of Communist
Party officials and members. Through promises of ad-
vancements and cash payments for local compliance,
party members became, in effect, the birth-control po-
lice. No village, neighborhood, factory, or collective es-
caped constant scrutiny.
But China is changing. In 1984, in response to a ris-
ing tide of complaints from rural areas, the government
relaxed its one-child policy in the countryside. A couple
whose first child was a daughter were allowed to have a
second child after a four-year wait. Then the Party-
imposed system of controls began to break down as en-
forcement weakened, people found more effective ways
of circumventing the rules (sending an illegally pregnant
woman to distant family members to await the birth, for
example), and peasants with rising incomes could afford
to pay the fine for unauthorized births. Corruption, an
endemic problem in China, also enabled some people to
evade punishment for violations. Briefly Chinas growth
rate moved upward again, and Chinas census revealed
that its goal for the end of the twentieth centurya sta-
ble population of 1.32 billionhad not been achieved;
its total had been exceeded by 80 million. But the official
data for the year 2000 are more optimistic: a growth rate
of only 0.9 percent (see Table in Resource B).
Chinas one-child-only policy has had a major social
impact in a society where sons carry on the family name.
In the cities a one-child policy was feasible. In the tradi-
tion-bound countryside, however, where large families
have long been the norm, the notion of one (possibly fe-
male) child was not acceptable. Observers reported that
the one-child policy led to female infanticide and that
hundreds of thousands of such killings went unreported
at the height of the one-child-only campaign. Demogra-
phers estimated that the number of surviving male chil-
dren exceeded females by 300,000 annually. Chinas
own population experts have expressed concern over
this imbalance. In the future males will greatly outnum-
ber females, with unpredictable social consequences.
Thus Chinas relentless drive for zero population
growth eroded the traditions of Chinese society and
brought misery to millions of people. Chinese govern-
ment and Communist Party officials admit that the pol-
icy, when strictly applied, was severe. But they argue
that in a country with 100 million excess births, many
millions of people will be mired in stagnation and
poverty. To get ahead, they argue, the country cannot
allow its material gains to be negated by an ever-grow-
ing population.
Chinas experience underscores the depth of the
population dilemma. Even with an authoritarian govern-
ment backed by party machinery, strict policies could
not be enforced over the long term. Significant short-
term gains were quickly wiped out, and population
106 Part Two Population Patterns and Processes
growth once again became an obstacle to moderniza-
tion. Given Chinas experience, Indias regional progress
is all the more remarkable.
POLICIES TARGETING
MIGRATION
The control of immigration, legal and illegal, the prob-
lem of asylum seekers, genuine and fraudulent, and the
fate of cross-border refugees, permanent and temporary,
have become hot issues around the world. In Europe,
right-wing political parties whip up anti-immigrant senti-
ment. In California, the state government demands fed-
eral help to provide services for hundreds of thousands
of illegal immigrants; if the federal government cannot
control its borders, the argument goes, the States should
not have to foot the bill. In Cuba, the Castro regime has
used migration as a threat: in August 1994, Castro threat-
ened to open Cubas doors to a flood of emigrants that
will make the Mariel Boatlift look like childs play. And
in the United States the government faced reproach for
preventing tens of thousands of Haitians from entering
Florida.
Efforts to restrict migrations are nothing new, how-
ever. Media coverage, democratic debate, and political
wrangling only make it seem so. Chinas Great Wall was
built in part as a defensive measure but also as a barrier
to emigration (by Chinese beyond the sphere of their au-
thorities) and immigration (mainly by Mongol barbar-
ians from the northern plains). The Berlin Wall, the
Korean DMZ (demilitarized zone), the fences along the
Rio Grandeall evince the desire of governments to
control the movement of people across their borders.
Legal Restrictions
Usually, however, the obstacles placed in the way of po-
tential immigrants are legal, not physical. Restrictive leg-
islation made its appearance in the United States in 1882,
when Congress approved the Oriental Exclusion Acts
(1882 to 1907). These immigration laws were de-
signed to restrict the immigration of Chinese people to
California. In 1901 Australias government approved the
Immigration Restriction Act, which terminated all non-
white immigration into the newly united Common-
wealth. This act, too, was aimed primarily at Japanese
and Chinese immigrants (but it included South Asians as
well). It also had the effect of prohibiting immigration by
South Pacific islanders who had entered Australia to
work on the large sugar plantations. These workers, the
Kanakas, were the target of a provision that facilitated
their deportation by the end of 1906. The White Australia
Policy was one of the issues on which the Australian
colonies were united prior to the establishment of the
Commonwealth, and it remained in effect until it was
modified in 1972 and again in 1979.
In the United States, restrictive legislation affecting
European immigrants was passed in 1921. The balance
of European immigration had been shifting from West-
ern Europe to Southern and Eastern Europe, and many
immigrants had no training or resourcesat a time when
industrys need for skilled labor was declining. The 1921
legislation was a quota law. Each year each European
country could permit the emigration to the United States
of 3 percent of the number of its nationals living in
America in 1910. This had the effect of limiting annual
immigration to about 357,000 Europeans, most of them
from Western Europe. In 1924 the Immigration Act low-
ered the quota to 2 percent and made 1890 the base
year; this further reduced the annual total to 150,000
immigrants.
The National Origins Law took effect in 1929. It sus-
tained the limit of 150,000 immigrants per year, but it
also tied immigration quotas to the national origins of
the U.S. population in 1920. This law had the effect of
preventing the immigration of Asians. Immigration
slowed to a trickle during the 1930s, and in some years
emigration actually exceeded immigration.
After 1940, the restrictions on immigration to the
United States were modified. In 1943 China was given
equal status with European countries, and in 1952 Japan
received similar status. A new Immigration and National-
ity Act (1952) was designed to incorporate all preceding
legislation, establishing quotas for all countries and limit-
ing total immigration to under 160,000. However, far
more immigrants entered the country as displaced per-
sons (refugees), thereby filling quotas for years ahead.
Estimates vary, but more than 7 million immigrants may
have entered the United States as refugees between 1945
(the end of World War II in Europe) and 1970. The 1952
law was acknowledged to be a failure, and in 1965 the
quota system was abolished. New limits were set:
170,000 immigrants per year from countries outside the
Western Hemisphere and 120,000 from countries in the
Americas. Nevertheless, in the 1970s and 1980s the num-
ber of Cuban, Haitian, and Mexican arrivals far exceeded
these limitations.
The United States and Australia are not the only
countries that have restricted immigration. Many coun-
tries practice selective immigration, in which individuals
with certain backgrounds (criminal records, poor health,
subversive activities) are barred from entering. Other
countries have specific requirements. For example,
South Africa long demanded pure European descent;
New Zealand favored persons of British birth and
parentage; Brazil preferred people with a farming back-
ground; and Singapore courts financially secure persons
of Chinese ancestry. Today South American countries
place limits on the number of immigrants who may cross
their borders, and quota systems are being instituted.
Thailand has restricted Chinese immigration, and Myan-
mar (Burma) limits immigration from neighboring India.
 CHAPTER 7 Policy Responses to Demographic Changes
In France, problems associated with the large and grow-
ing Arab population from North Africa have resulted in
calls for repatriation of those without residency permits
and for restrictions on further immigration from the for-
mer French North African colonies (Algeria, Morocco,
and Tunisia).
As the worlds population mushrooms, the volume
of migrants will likewise expand. In an increasingly
KEY TERMS
eugenic population policy immigration laws
Eugenic Protection Act negative population growth
expansive population policy
APPLYING GEOGRAPHIC KNOWLEDGE
1. For many years population geographers and others
have been concerned over the continuing rapid growth
of the worlds population. But some countries, having
traversed the demographic transition, now confront the
reality of stable or even declining populations. What
are the impacts of negative population growth on
countries cultural and economic geographies?
Part Two
POPULATION PATTERNS AND PROCESSES
A
How serious a problem is population growth?
t Issue: Revisited
Should lowering the worlds population growth
rate be a global objective? Any attempt to address the
hard questions about population growth must begin with
the fundamental geographical concept of scale. Continued
rapid global population growth presents troubling problems
for the twenty-first century, but look regionally instead of
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