DA

Paris set the stage for a new climate regime---multilateral

cooperation is key
ACT Alliance 15 coalition of European development agencies, focusing on
climate change, food security, and the EUs development policy, Paris Climate
Agreement: a good but insufficient step forward, 2015, http://actalliance.eu/news-
post/paris-climate-agreement-a-good-but-insufficient-step-forward/
There is a deal! This might sound very weak to cheer but it was by no means sure that all countries, and in
particular the current biggest emitters, would agree to a deal until the very last day of the negotiations. Every
politician, negotiator and other advocacy expert had still in mind the failure of the nightmarish conference held in
Copenhagen in 2009. But reality had changed with more and more people around the globe aware of the threat of
climate change and eager to act. Renewable and energy-efficient solutions are now
considered viable alternatives, and nearly all sectors of our societies, from companies, to churches, to
local public authorities have started acting voluntarily without regulatory pressure. Politicians, who are often
influenced by corporate interests could not ignore the critical mass of people and other
stakeholders. Additionally to these determining factors, the French presidency of this COP21
acted wisely to ensure an inclusive and party-driven process where all countries felt
at ease to negotiate. In these diplomatic environments, delicate attention is key to find the
best possible compromise without leaving anyone behind.
The Paris agreement to tackle climate change is universal in that it is applicable to all
countries. It creates a new international climate regime, moving from the Kyoto Protocol
which targeted only historical emitters and applied a top-down approach. Even most countries have not contributed
to the great threat to human life which climate change is, but now all countries not just the greatest historical
emitters must play their part; the remaining space in the atmosphere for greenhouse gases (also called carbon
budget) is now too little to continue emissions if we want to prevent dangerous climate-induced impacts and
irreversible consequences. The need to act is so high and urgent that no one on this earth can continue or wish
living the fossil-fuel based and a Western consumerist lifestyle. And developing economies must avoid repeating the
ecological mistakes of the historical emitters.

In Paris, countries adopted two long term goals . One temperature goal to limit
Concretely.
global warming to less than 2C, and striving for 1.5C. A difference of 0.5C is significant and
exceeding a 1.5C increase could for many countries mean their land or part of it becoming inhabitable before the
end of this century. And a second goal of net zero emissions by the second half of this century, between 2050 and
a mechanism was agreed upon whereby from 2020
2100. To achieve these two long term goals,
onwards every five years, all countries will present their strategies for reducing
greenhouse gas emissions. Five years is short enough to ensure governments will act as often they are
caught by short-term solutions coinciding with elections cycles. Language in the agreement allows developing
countries to continue increasing their emissions but at a lower level than business-as-usual, depending also on the
support they will receive from rich countries.

The adaptation section is perhaps one of the best outcomes with the creation of a
qualitative goal to review the actions undertaken and the needs of improving resilience
of the poorest and most vulnerable countries, in combination with the 5-year mitigation cycle. The agreement
acknowledges the strong link to mitigation action as the main solution to reduce the need to
adapt to climate change. Several fundamental rights are also explicitly mentioned in order
to ensure adaptation actions are shaped to the specificities of each countries , to be
gender-responsive and to take into consideration vulnerable and indigenous communities.
Bilateral US-China climate cooperation undermines the
multilateral climate process---specifically alienates India and
the EU, and undermines climate financing
Joanna Lewis 11, assistant professor of science, technology and international
affairs at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University,
The State of U.S.-China Relations on Climate Change: Examining the Bilateral and
Multilateral Relationship, 2011,
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Feature%20Article%20The%20State
%20of%20U.S.-China%20Relations%20on%20Climate%20Change.pdf
The tendency of the United States to deal directly with or in small groups of
countries, rather than via the UN process, has led to a discussion of a new global
group being formed: the G2, consisting of the United States and China. Since the United States is seen
as the leader of today, and China as the leader of tomorrow, many believe such a grouping is well suited.

President Obama has called the relationship between the United States and China as important as any bilateral
From a U.S. perspective, it could be much
relationship in the world (White House, 2009a).
simpler to work out a deal on climate change with China directly, and in doing so could
ensure that it is on the same page with its major global trading partner and the worlds largest emitter. There are
many commonalities in dealing with climate change that the United States and China face, as discussed previously,
that lend to fruitful opportunities for collaboration. In addition, direct bilateral agreements eliminate some of the
concerns about trust and transparency that emerge in larger groupings.

One key problem with the G2 approach, however, is Chinas aversion to the idea. As
one Chinese scholar stated recently, a Pax Chimericana would invite international
hostility, be impossible for China to sustain politically , undermine the United
Nations and contradict its governments commitment to multilateralism (Jian, 2009;
Gillespie, 2009). While the U.S.-China relationship is symbiotic, it is asymmetrical, as China is an unevenly
developed state. The G2 approach to climate change in particular conflicts with Chinas aversion to being singled
out as a major emitter.

many in the EU have expressed concern

China is not the only country opposed to the G2 concept;
with being left out of such discussions, particularly as they relate to climate change,
fearing that the United States and China will negotiate their own climate agreement
and leave the rest of the world behind. The United States and EU are also aware that too much
focus on China risks alienating other Asian states, including India. China is also a
constructive participant in the ASEAN networks that have served to enhance Asian autonomy from the United
The majority of the developing world is also averse to a G2
States (Gillespie, 2009).
approach to climate change, recognizing that the success of an international climate
regime that includes financing for mitigation and adaptation will require the
active engagement of the United States and China.

Multilateral cooperation under UN is the only way to organize

effective responses to climate change---no other forum or
organization is legitimate or effective
Howard Bamsey 15, Adjunct Professor in the Regulatory Institutions Network at
the Australian National University, former director of the Green Growth Institute,
with Kath Rowley, General Manager, Reviews at the Climate Change Authority,
Australia and Climate Change Negotiations: At the Table, or on the Menu? 3/25/15,
http://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/australia-and-climate-change-negotiations
The UNFCCC may be central to the global response to climate change but it does
not enjoy a good press. It is widely seen as a talk-fest, and a polarised one at that. Progress is
certainly slow, as is inevitable for any group of 195 where all decisions require consensus. It suffers from other
failings as well; but the fact is the UNFCCC negotiations shape national and global
climate action and associated economic activity through both formal and informal channels. Climate
discussions in other forums come and go, but the UNFCCC has proven resilient, and
remains the only universal forum for negotiating the rules. It thus retains a unique
legitimacy.[15]
That is not to say it dictates national obligations. To be clear: the negotiations are an activity of the UN, so the
conventional view of national sovereignty is always respected . No country can be compelled
to do anything. Given that decisions are made only by consensus, countries have scope to prevent decisions they
object to strongly. Ultimately, any country can choose not to become a party to an agreement as the United
States (and, originally, Australia) did with the Kyoto Protocol and any party can later withdraw if it chooses as
Canada did from the Protocol in 2011.

the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol boast almost universal membership (the
Still,
Convention has 195 member states; the Protocol 191).[16] Being party to either agreement entails
legal obligations, primarily about reducing emissions of greenhouse gases within the country concerned, and
reporting on the actions taken.[17] These obligations are not specific as to the particular policies and
measures to be adopted, but they form part of a broader and interconnected global regime
that is, slowly but inexorably, having an impact on the economic activities that are the source
of emissions.

In giving operational effect to legal provisions of the two treaties, parties make formal decisions. Decisions are not
legally binding in themselves, but can, over time, construct a quasi-legal understanding. Looking back, a series of
incremental moves can be seen to establish a general accepted standard that guides
actions by individual countries and other actors .[18]
In recent years, the emphasis on legal obligations has been progressively overtaken by the demands of
universalism. In the Kyoto Protocol, legal form that is, an agreement in the form of a Protocol containing legally
binding targets was determined in 1996, before any decision on what the targets themselves would be.[19]
Targets applied to a select list of developed countries only. The move to universal action began in Bali in 2007;
following the Copenhagen meeting in 2009, over 90 developed and developing countries pledged action to reduce
their emissions. As the Paris meeting approaches, decisions on targets will precede decisions on legal form. All
countries have been invited to put forward their intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs, in negotiation
parlance) well before the meeting convenes. Many will be expressed as absolute emissions targets (as in the Kyoto
Protocol) but some will not, and some will include additional actions such as support for other countries efforts.

Many developing and some developed countries have insisted that their commitments be recorded as voluntary as
the quid pro quo for making them. This reflects the same concern Australia has long expressed: that differences in
national circumstances mean commitments should be different in scope, nature, and degree.[20] As a result, while
Paris may yet deliver an outcome with legal force,[21] it is highly unlikely that the national mitigation targets
themselves will be legally binding. Australias initial insistence at Lima that the Paris outcome had to be legally
binding was probably just a misstep, underlining how remote Australian ministers had been from the negotiations to
that point. (Some observers suspect though that it was an attempt by the Government to set the bar for Paris so
high that Australia could label the meeting a failure and withdraw even further.)[22]

many countries are concerned with maintaining

Regardless of the legal form of the Paris outcome,
the capacity to evaluate what national commitments mean in terms of emissions,
and to monitor implementation. The UNFCCCs central reporting and review
framework will therefore remain crucial, and it will be important for Australia to be able to influence
the design of those mechanisms in detail.[23]

Beyond the formal process, informal channels of influence operate too . The negotiations are,
to a large extent, the global locus of debate on climate change. At the Lima COP in
2014, for example, about 180 official side-events were held.[24] These were sponsored by some
of the thousands attending the COP who do not represent governments but speak for intergovernmental,
environment, civil society and business organisations, academic institutions, and other groups of varying influence
the COP is a marketplace for the
in their communities. While not all follow the negotiations in detail,
intense exchange of ideas and opinions among delegates and observers . Connections
are made and, over time, strands of different ideas intertwine, mature, and emerge into practice. Collaboration can,
and of course does, occur outside the COPs, but the COP and to a lesser extent, the few weeks of
intersessional negotiations throughout the year is the annual point of convergence and the
deadline for next steps.
Case
 Plan
Fiat only guarantees that the plan will be passed. They dont know their case and
always just fall back on fiat as ananswer. Fine on this end we have fiat, the
government will pass but there are a few very critical flaws in their affirmative. 1)
they dont know who this bilateral engagement is even with. 2) even if fiat allows
their plan to be passed trump rollback

Trump means disaster for climate change efforts

Meyer, Nov 9 2016 (Robinson Meyer, 11/9/16, The Atlantic, What President Trump Will Mean for Earths Climate
http://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2016/11/what-president-trump-could-mean-for-climate-change/507098/)

Trump and his future administration could prove cataclysmic for the
If he fulfills his campaign promises, President-Elect Donald J.

planets climate. Trumps policies will likely ensure that the global mean temperature rises higher than 1.5 degrees Celsius. While
that may seem like a small amount of warming, it would have devastating effects on a planetary scale, pushing weather patterns far

outside what human civilization has previously experienced and ensuring mass
extinctions.How could one president have so massive an effect?First, because Trump said he would withdraw the United States
from the Paris Agreement, the first international treaty to mitigate global warming. This could shatter the international consensus on reducing
greenhouse-gas emissions, similar to how the second Bush administrations withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol effectively ended that treatys functional life within the United

States. It could enable other countries to abandon their commitments and emit greenhouse gases at much higher rates.China, Europe, Brazil, India and other countries will
continue to move ahead with the climate commitments they made under Paris no matter what the next president does, because these commitments are in their own national
interest, said Alden Meyer, the director of policy and strategy at the Union of Concerned Scientists, in an email.While the Paris Agreement became international law this week
making it technically impossible for a president to withdraw before 2019 or 2020Trump could simply refuse to recognize the agreements obligations, the vast majority of which

are non-binding. Trump also said, late in the campaign, that hewould cut off American support for UN climate science.
,
Second Trump will almost certainly terminate President Obamas Clean Power Plan, a set of EPA regulations meant to reduce emissions
from the power sector. Lux Research, a global energy consulting group, estimated before the election that Trumps policies would lead to the emission of

an additional 3.4 billion tons of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, as compared to Clintons. These two factors alone could push
the world over the edge. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimated that the planet could only stand another five years of emissions at
current rates before it would become impossible to keep the global mean temperature from rising 1.5 degrees Celsius. If emissions increased under a Trump administration, as
Lux projects, then the world could overshoot that carbon budget well before 2021. Trump appears to doubt the existence of climate change itself. Though he later denied saying it,
Trump tweeted before the campaign began that climate change was a hoax invented by the Chinese government to depress American industry.The Paris Agreement was signed
and ratified not by a President, but by the United States itself. As a matter of international law, and as a matter of human survival, the nations of the world can, must, and will hold
the United States to its climate commitments, said Carroll Muffett, the president and CEO of the Center for International Climate Law.Donald Trump now has the unflattering
distinction of being the only head of state in the entire world to reject the scientific consensus that mankind is driving climate change, said Michael Brune, the executive director
of the Sierra Club, in a statement. No matter what happens, Donald Trump cant change the fact that wind and solar energy are rapidly becoming more affordable and accessible
than dirty fossil fuels. With both the market and grassroots environmental advocacy moving us toward clean energy, there is still a strong path forward for reducing climate
pollution even under a Trump presidency.Indeed, Brunes statement hints at the next steps for climate activists. The Sierra Club has successfully retired more than 190
coal plants since 2003, leading a campaign that has relied more on local activism than federal support. Even if Trump seeks to expand the construction of coal-burning plants,
those campaigns will likely continue.Activists are also likely to seek the creation of emissions-restriction plans in individual states. While Washington defeated a carbon-tax
referendum last night,that measure was opposed by the states left. Other state efforts at mitigating climate change have found more success. Earlier this year,
California passed a series of state laws that will dramatically alter that states energy profile, granting its state agency the freedom to cut emissions by 40 percent by
2030. It seems likely that environmental leaders will seek similar measures in other states.As Brune mentioned, wind energy and solar energy are also increasingly price-
competitive with fossil fuels, especially in the sunny southwest and on the coast. If the United States embarks on the major round of new infrastructure construction that
Trump has promised, then it would make economic sense for the country to build huge new wind and solar power plants.

While there are divisions between the Democrats and Republicans on climate policy, there is bipartisan support for investments in clean energy and climate resilience. The
infrastructure initiatives that both Trump and Clinton put forward during the campaign present the opportunity to address both of these needs, said Meyer. Indeed, a recent Pew
poll found that 89 percent of Americans approve of expanding solar power. Eighty-three percent want to expand wind farms. Constructing renewable-energy
infrastructure across the country would increase U.S. manufacturings skill at building new solar and wind technologies, help reduce the cost of electricity for ratepayers, and
entrench support for clean power among both parties.Whether Trump, Paul Ryan, and Mitch McConnell sign on to such a plan, though, may be another story.

Donald Trumps Chinese policies antagonize the PRC

Phillips 2017 (1/27/2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/27/donald-
trumps-plan-for-china-relations-is-to-be-unpredictable-adviser-says)
Donald Trumps game plan for relations with China is to use unpredictability as
a means of wrong-footing the countrys Communist party leaders and extracting economic concessions, a prominent adviser has said, Since his election,

series of interventions on
Trump and his team have repeatedly discombobulated the Chinese government with a

sensitive issues such as the South China Sea, US relations with Taiwan and
Chinas alleged manipulation of its currency, the yuan . Those moves have
unsettled and angered Beijing, which had expected Trump to tone down
his anti-China rhetoric after his victory. In an interview with Chinas state-run broadcaster, Michael Pillsbury, a former Pentagon
official and longtime China scholar, suggested Trumps decision to repeatedly tweak Beijings nose was part of a calculated strategy. China shows restraint as it
tries to work out if US president-elect is being deliberately confrontational or just out of his depth The US president believed the Chinese were the best
negotiators in the whole world, so to get an advantage he wants to be unpredictable in the eyes of the Chinese government, Pillsbury told CGTN, an
international mouthpiece for the Chinese government that was formerly called CCTV. I think he has succeeded in this, dont you? Pillsbury, a fluent
Mandarin speaker who is known for his contacts within Chinas Peoples Liberation Army and has been advising Trumps team, said the president had
outlined this strategy in his most recent book, Great Again: How To Fix Our Crippled America. In it Trump writes: The element of surprise wins battles. So I
dont tell the other side what Im doing, I dont warn them, and I dont let them fit me comfortably into a predictable pattern I like being unpredictable. It
keeps them off balance. In a chapter on foreign policy, Trump accuses his predecessors of rolling over for Beijing and hints it will be one of the main

There are people who wish I wouldnt refer to China as our

targets of his strategy.

enemy. But thats exactly what they are, Trump writes. China specialists on
both sides of the Pacific fear relations between Beijing and Washington could
deteriorate rapidly under Trump, increasing the risks of a potentially
calamitous great power conflict. However, Pillsbury, who has written a book about a supposed Chinese plot to become the worlds
preeminent military, political and economic power by 2049, claimed ties could warm. I say the road to making America great again runs through
Beijing, he told CGTN, calling for greater Chinese investment in the US. It can be win-win. I think it will be win-win, Pillsbury said, using one of the
favourite phrases of Chinese diplomats. Another China scholar who is understood to have offered advice to Trumps team also said this week that he
believed an improved relationship was on the cards. I dont quite understand why people seem to be operating under the assumption that the
relationship with China was good and now all of a sudden it is going to change to be less good, Daniel Blumenthal, the director of Asian Studies at the
American Enterprise Institute, a conservative Washington-based thinktank, told the Guardian. Theres going to be new areas of cooperation that couldnt
have occurred under President Obama for domestic political reasons. [For example] it seems that the United States is going to deregulate once again its oil
and gas sectors and theres cooperation that can happen there with China in terms of even becoming a supplier or China becoming an investor, he
added. Columbia University China specialist Andrew Nathan said Pillsbury was known for writing an influential article in the mid-1970s that called for US
cooperation with China as a way of pressuring Moscow. Im not sure Pillsbury would be adverse to some kinds of bargains with China over issues of
potential cooperation, he said. I wouldnt rule out various kinds of bargains as a potential direction.
 Solvency
No coop china wont agree

Lewis 11
(Joanna Lewis is an assistant professor of science, technology and international
affairs at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown
University. She has been conducting research on energy and climate issues in
China for ten years focusing on renewable energy industry and policy
development, The State of U.S.-China Relations on Climate Change: Examining
the Bilateral and Multilateral Relationship, pg online @
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/Feature%20Article%20The
%20State%20of%20U.S.-China%20Relations%20on%20Climate%20Change.pdf
//um-ef)

Funding and Follow Through While the list of agreements signed has been well
documented by both governments, less attention has been paid to the results of
these programs. The level of funding support provided to each initiative is generally
also quite difficult to track, in many cases because the MOUs or initiatives signed
were not backed by secure funding commitments. As a result, there has been some
skepticism surrounding government agreements for bilateral cooperation that are
not accompanied by both high-level political support and dedicated funding
commitments. This skepticism has played a role in U.S.-China bilateral
relations, and has contributed to some mistrust, or at the very least to
reluctance to pursue future cooperation initiatives. The cancellation or downscaling
by the United States of several key clean energy projects has led to an
understandable skepticism in China on the prospects for stronger longterm
cooperation. Recent examples include the two-plus year expiration and eventual
renewal of the U.S.-China Protocol on Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy, and
the postponement and significant restructuring of the FutureGen project to build, in
partnership with China, a commercial-scale advanced generation coal plant with
carbon capture and storage.2 It is particularly notable that more U.S.- China
bilateral clean energy and climate change agreements were signed in the year 2009
than in any prior year. The fact that the majority of these agreements were signed
by the President of each country illustrates political support at the highest level on
both sides. Many of the details regarding the implementation of these agreements
are yet to be worked out, but real challenges remain, particularly regarding stable
funding resources. The agreements outlining the new China-U.S. Clean Energy
Center and the Renewable Energy Partnership, for example, both point to existing
funding sources for implementing domestic actions in both countries, with minimal
additional funding sources for collaborative projects. While it is clearly important
that both sides bring some form of resources to the table, if nothing new is allocated
for these agreements, it is unclear how they will result in any deviation from current
practices. In addition, if both sides are paying their own way and there is no
financial incentive for cooperation, activities must be in the clear interest of both
sides or there is little reason for either to come to the table.
Doesnt solve no unity and China will just find new ways to
meddle this is the best three sentence card of all time
Cronin and Krejsa, 6-26 Dr. Patrick M. Cronin is Senior Director and Harry
Krejsa is Research Associate at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS).
How Will China React to the Gavel Coming Down in the South China Sea? War on
the Rocks diplomats, officers, NCOs, intelligence professionals, and some of the
most established scholars in the world studying war, conflict, and international
politics, http://warontherocks.com/2016/06/how-will-china-react-to-the-gavel-
coming-down-in-the-south-china-sea/ --br
Nonetheless, regardless of how the courts verdict does or does not change
facts on the ground, we should not expect Chinas boundary-pushing
behavior to change anytime soon. Even in the face of The Hagues legal
rebuke, China is likely to continue trying to discredit those international laws and
norms impinging on its creeping assertions of sovereignty in the South China Sea
and elsewhere. International law should matter. ASEANs voice must be crystal clear
about at least the core principles at stake, something that is impossible without
unity from the key maritime states. Alas, Chinas diplomatic strategy is designed to
ensure that Americas heavy investment in a rules-based order does not yield big
dividends at Beijings expense.

Your whole aff is proof international law is a jokevote neg on

presumption
Gewirtz 7/12 -- Paul Gewirtz is a professor of constitutional law and the director
of the Paul Tsai China Center at Yale Law School. (Paul Gewirtz, Washington Post,
"Why law cant solve the South China Sea conflict,"
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/global-opinions/why-law-cant-solve-the-
south-china-sea-conflict/2016/07/12/2c6199d4-485b-11e6-bdb9-
701687974517_story.html)//A-Sharma
While this ruling offers a significant positive contribution, law cannot solve all the
conflicts in the South China Sea. Tuesdays decision underscores the limits of
law in resolving these disputes in practice, as well as the urgent need to move
ahead with negotiations, supported by prudent power politics. The tribunals
headline conclusion limits the legal scope of Chinas notorious nine-dash line. At
most, the tribunal said, this line can be a claim to sovereignty over the islands
inside the line and maritime rights deriving from those land features as provided
under the Law of the Sea Convention. Any pretense that the sea is a Chinese lake
has been rejected, though sovereignty issues remain unresolved. Just as significant,
and potentially creating more immediate tensions, are the tribunals decisions that
certain Chinese land reclamations unlawfully infringe on the Philippines rights and
the Law of the Sea Conventions environmental rules. These are major legal
conclusions, but they will produce no immediate resolution to the conflict.
Despite being a signatory to the convention, China refused to participate in the
arbitration and has denounced the decision as null and void. China is clearly
wrong. But its sweeping rejection reveals the practical limits of law in this context
because the tribunal has no enforcement powers no police force, no
sanctions system, no ability to levy fines. Another fundamental limit is that the
tribunal lacks legal power to resolve underlying and potentially explosive
conflicts regarding sovereignty over land features, such as the
dangerously contested Scarborough Shoal, and disputes over maritime
boundaries. And of course no courts decision can fully address the core
geopolitical issues at stake: Chinas enormous new capacities, widespread
uncertainty about Chinas regional intentions, and whether China and the United
States can find terms of coexistence in the Asia-Pacific.

Long-rooted territorial disputes mean the aff fails China cant

back down
Taplin 7/9/ 2016 (Nathaniel, four years experience as a journalist and an economist
in China with Gavekal Dragonomics and Thomson Reuters. China holds combat drill
in the South China Sea Reuters http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southchinasea-
china-navy-idUSKCN0ZP036)//masonw
The Chinese navy conducted combat drills near its southern island province of
Hainan and the Paracel islands in the South China Sea, the Ministry of Defense said on Saturday. The drills
come ahead of a July 12 ruling by the Hague-based Permanent Court of Arbitration
on a case brought by the Philippines disputing several of China's territory claims in the
South China Sea. Ships from China's northern, eastern and southern fleets participated in Friday's drills, which
focused on air control, surface operations and anti-submarine warfare, among other training exercises, the ministry
said in a website statement. China claims nearly all the South China Sea, but its claims overlap
in part with those of Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam. China
has repeatedly said it does not consider any decision reached by the arbitration
court to be legally binding. "China adheres to the position of settling disputes through negotiation and
consultation with states directly concerned," state news agency Xinhua said in a commentary on Saturday. "This
has always been China's policy, and it will never change." (Reporting by Nathaniel Taplin;
Editing by Clarence Fernandez)