Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
(An Assent-Dissent
on Hilarion L. Aquinos Revisiting Legal and Judicial Ethics: Challenges and Perspectives)
By Anton John Vincent M. Frias
Legal ethics. It shall not only be revisited. It shall also be lived out the door.
On the Introduction
I assent to the internet post, Legal ethics is an oxymoron. Dictionaries would define
oxymoron as a compressed paradox, or in other words, a concept that includes opposites like,
cruel kindness, hot but cold.
Legal ethics, as Mr. Aquino said in his paper, consists of problems: The Bar and the Bench
have their shares of problems. Notwithstanding that reality, I submit that there is an implicit reality
in between those lines: that the Bar and the Bench have their shares of solutions or blessings. Mr.
Aquino, however, focused only on the other side of the coin, only the problems.
Is it not lawyers would better realize their problems, and think of more solutions, if they are
first reminded of how blessed they are of being lawyers, that they passed a very difficult
examination in the Philippines, if not the most difficult?
At the same time, therefore, I dissent to how Mr. Aquino put it or used words in his
Introduction: that the profession is suffering, a poor public image, negative, etc. He forgot that
the legal profession is in the first place is a noble calling (Linsangan v. Atty. Tolentino, AC 6672,
September 4, 2009). It is a duty to public service is the primary consideration (Brunet v. Atty.
Guaren, AC 10164, March 10, 2014).
In the first place, morality, which is part and parcel of legal ethics, consists of the good, not
only the bad. Lawyers are good. Lawyers are good persons. Thus, I submit that good persons can
really become lawyers, since becoming a lawyer requires utmost diligence, and diligence requires
good attitude. Diligence is a good characteristic. Again, in the first place, a lawyer cannot become
one if he did not exert diligence in his studies, or love what he is studying.
Considering a word in the title of Mr. Aquinos paper, Challenges, I submit that, every
lawyer will be more challenged, and would better realize the problems of the Bar and the Bench, if
he recalls how much effort he exerted to become a lawyer. He started good in becoming a lawyer.
Why do the Bar and the Bench have these problems? Why is the Bar suffering from such
poor public image? Why are lawyers perceived as generally self-seeking? Why are lawyers
liars to some, if not really many, of the public?
As law students, they surely started well, without too much problem in their first year in law
school until the lessons had started piling up for finals. But is it not that they had started wearing a
rich public image, and not a poor one? Relatives and friends would be proudly share with others
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that their son, cousin, or barkada, will be a lawyer and file a case for them in the future. That,
as students, they would sometimes forget about themselves when preparing for exams? Is that
self-seeking? Most would study for the grades, or for their family, or for the future, but not exactly
for themselves. That they cannot be liars when taking the quizzes or exams or even the Bar,
otherwise they would not become lawyers.
But how come, after signing the Roll and taking the Oath, there are these problems, poor
public image and stereotypes of self-seeking and liars?
I submit that they might have forgotten how it all started. That at the outset, they were good
and were doing well. But now, they appear or actually act bad.
The legal profession is a noble and a good one. It does not create problems. It solves them.
I further submit that a suggested answer is also an oxymoron. It is simply said, but difficultly
done simple but difficult. The answer I suggest is for every member of the profession to start
from what he has, the good reputation he has, and not otherwise, to do what he can and not what
he cannot. But it would seem difficult because of what the public holds of each of them. I submit
that it only takes courage. It is the courage or determination that pushed them to take the entrance
exam or apply for law school or attend the first day of class in law school. That is the challenge.
I further submit that, goodness or badness is synonymous with justice or injustice. If one
does goodness, he is just. Otherwise, unjust. Again, another oxymoron: it is simply said, but
difficultly done.
However, the reality is that, with the existence of some unjust laws, law itself does not bring
about order, but rather chaos. Thus, a person is tilted to do more injustice than justice. In the latter
parts of the paper of Mr. Aquino, he discusses that judges, by following the letter of some unjust
laws, guided by stare decisis principle, do not have choice but follow the unjust law.
In sum, justice is innate. Its opposite which is injustice, is sometimes brought about by
some laws, only the unjust ones.
On Legal Ethics
a. The Ethos of the Legal Profession
I dissent to the theory of Mr. Aquino that a lawyer is basically client-centered.
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I rather submit that a lawyer is not as such. Instead, it really depends. There are many
angles to look upon. This is justified by the catena of administrative cases decided upon by the
Supreme Court. A good number of such cases would contradict the said theory: that a lawyer is
more of self-centered or family-centered or money-centered. The Court would often remind lawyers
in the cases: That he shall always act fully as a professional, because lacking professionalism, or
entertaining his personal interests and principles would lead to his suspension (Dominquez v. Atty.
Agleron, A.C. No. 5359, March 10, 2014); That the profession is not primarily meant to be a
money-making venture (Atty. Guaren, supra).
On Judicial Ethics
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I wonder why justice is a very difficult concept for Mr. Aquino, whereas he had said earlier
in his paper that it is principally a moral concept. And by that, it means that justice is innate.
Morality is innate in every person. It is either we do good or just acts, or otherwise. In this section,
he contradicts himself again, when he reiterated that it in fact a moral concept. In In the Matter of
Disqualification of Haron Meling, the Court said that good moral character is what a person really
is and it corresponds to objective reality (B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004). Therefore, by innate, it
means that it is already there. It is not given by somebody else. It is what a person really is.
Accordingly, if he is just, he cannot be otherwise because it is what he really is.
Moreover, I submit that the concept of justice is in between the lines of the Constitution
despite the fact that it is only stated twice therein. One is in the Preamble. And it is a principle in
Statutory Construction that the Preamble is an introduction of a law show its intent or purposes
(Philippine Savings Bank v. Senate Impeachment Court, G.R. No. 200238, February 9, 2012).
Therefore, though not explained therein, justice permeates throughout the fundamental law. It may
be said that it is a guiding principle in every rule therein.
Lastly, I assent to the submission of Mr. Aquino that under circumstances, public welfare
should be factored in the decisional process. I submit that judges shall consider every fact and law
for the benefit of upholding justice, of who rightfully has to recover more and who has less, or who
shall pay for the injury through imprisonment or damages. And if the law is so strict, jurisprudence
is the evidence that equity is always permitted so that justice will not be defeated. Many cases
would relax the strict laws, just or unjust.
b. The Ethos of the Judge vis-a-vis the Shift to Inquisitorial System of Trial
I submit that the passage of the Judicial Affidavit Rule and revision of various procedural
rules would really remove the said passivity. At these times, the judge would have control over the
proceedings, and not over any party.
On Conclusion
I dissent to how Mr. Aquino concluded his paper. Actually, it shows how he is on to what is
close to his heart, instead of making a final say to what he had said in his introduction. He said at
the outset about his ethical propositions, but nowhere in the conclusion shows his final
recommendation. Will a legal academia address the long-time controversies of the profession? Will
passing the reflections answer those controversies?
I submit that legal ethics is principally an action, not merely a theory. This time, in this view,
it is not an oxymoron. It must only be an action, not both theory and action. It shall be practiced,
and must be left as a theory. It must not remain in the dark.
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It shall not only be revisited. It shall also be lived out the door. That should be legal ethics.