PressInformationBureau

GovernmentofIndia
MinistryofFinance
28December201515:05IST
ReportoftheCommitteeonRevisiting&RevitalisingthePPPModelofInfrastructureDevelopmentChairedbyDr.
V.KelkarReleased

TheReportoftheCommitteeonRevisiting&RevitalisingthePPPmodelofInfrastructureDevelopmentchairedby
Dr.V.KelkarhasbeenissuedandalsouploadedontheMinistryofFinanceswebsite(finmin.nic.in).
IntheUnionBudget201516,theFinanceMinisterShriArunJaitleyhadannouncedthatthePPPmodeofinfrastructure
development has to be revisited and revitalised. In pursuance of this announcement, a Committee on Revisiting &
RevitalisingthePPPmodelofInfrastructureDevelopmentwassetupwhichwaschairedbyDr.VijayKelkar.TheReportof
theCommitteesubmittedtotheGovernmenthasbeenuploadedontheMinistryofFinanceswebsite.

(http://finmin.nic.in/reports/ReportRevisitingRevitalisingPPPModel.pdf).

TheExecutiveSummaryoftheReportisasfollows:

HighlightsoftheReport

1.PublicPrivatePartnerships(PPPs)ininfrastructurerefertotheprovisionofapublicassetandservicebyaprivatepartner
whohasbeenconcededtheright(theConcession)forthepurpose,foraspecifiedperiodoftime,onthebasisofmarket
determinedrevenuestreams,thatallowforcommercialreturnoninvestment.

2.PPPsininfrastructurerepresentavaluableinstrumenttospeedupinfrastructuredevelopmentinIndia.Thisspeedingupis
urgentlyrequiredforIndiatogrowrapidlyandgenerateademographicdividendforitselfandalsototapintothelargepool
ofpensionandinstitutionalfundsfromagingpopulationsinthedevelopedcountries.

3. India offers today the worlds largest market for PPPs. It has accumulated a wealth of experience in getting to this
premiereposition.AsthePPPmarketininfrastructurematuresinIndia,newchallengesandopportunitieshaveemergedand
will continue to emerge. Periodic review of PPPs, as in the present Committee's remit, are a must to help address issues
beforetheybecomeendemicandtomainstreaminnovationsandfosternewonesthatimprovethesuccessfuldeliveryofPPP
projects.
4.IndiassuccessindeployingPPPsasanimportantinstrumentforcreatinginfrastructureinIndiawilldependonachange
in attitude and in the mindset of all authorities dealing with PPPs, including public agencies partnering with the private
sector,governmentdepartmentssupervisingPPPs,andauditingandlegislativeinstitutionsprovidingoversightofPPPs.

5. The Government may take early action to amend the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 which does not distinguish
betweengenuineerrorsindecisionmakingandactsReportoftheCommitteeonRevisitingandRevitalisingthePPPModel
ofInfrastructure.Measuresmaybetakenimmediatelytomakeonlymalafideactionbypublicservantspunishable,andnot
errors, and to guard against witch hunt against government officers and bureaucrats for decisions taken with bonafide
intention. The government may speed up amendment of the Prevention of Corruption Act, Vigilance and Conduct rules
applicabletogovernmentofficers.

6. Experience has also underlined the need to further strengthen the three key pillars of PPP frameworks namely
Governance,InstitutionsandCapacity,tobuildontheestablishedfoundationforthenextwaveofimplementation.

7.Inadditiontochangingmindsets,thereisanurgentneedtorebuildIndiasPPPcapacities.Structuredcapacitybuilding
programmes for different stakeholders including implementing agencies and customized programmes for banks and
financialinstitutionsandprivatesectorneedtobeevolved.Theneedforanationallevelinstitutiontosupportinstitutional
capacitybuildingactivitiesmustbeexplored.Everystakeholderwithoutexceptionhasstronglyemphasisedtheurgentneed
for a dedicated institute for PPPs as was announced in the previous Budget. The Committee strongly endorses the 3PI
whichcan,inadditiontofunctioningasacentreofexcellenceinPPPs,enableresearch,review,rolloutactivitiestobuild
capacity,andsupportmorenuancedandsophisticatedmodelsofcontractinganddisputeredressalmechanisms(Chapter6,
paragraph 6.1.4). A dynamic 3PI can support a dynamic process of infrastructure design, build, and operate in India and
therebyhelpdeliveronthepromiseofreliableinfrastructureservicesforallcitizens.

8. The Committee cannot overstate the criticality of setting up of independent regulators in sectors that are going in for
PPPs. The Committee recommends setting up these independent regulators with a unified mandate that encompasses
activitiesindifferentinfrastructuresubsectorstoensureharmonizedperformancebytheregulators(Chapter6,paragraph
6.1.8).

9.TheCommitteewelcomesthecurrentreviewandamendmentoftheArbitrationAct,andstronglyendorsestheneedfor
timelimitsonhearings.

10.Thedominant,primaryconcernoftheCommitteewastheoptimalallocationofrisksacrossPPPstakeholders.Inefficient
andinequitableallocationofriskinPPPscanbeamajorfactorinPPPfailures,ultimatelyhurtingthecitizensofIndia.The
Committee notes that the adoption of the Model Concession Agreement (MCA) has meant that project specific risks are
rarelyaddressedbyprojectimplementationauthoritiesinthisOnesizefitsallapproach.Arationalallocationofriskscan
onlybeundertakeninsectorandprojectspecificcontexts.
.
11.ForthenextgenerationofPPPContracts,theCommitteesuggeststhefollowingbroadguidelineswhileallocatingand
managingrisks:1)anentityshouldbeartheriskthatisinitsnormalcourseofitsbusiness2)anassessmentneedstobe
carriedoutregardingtherelativeeaseandefficiencyofmanagingtheriskbytheentityconcerned3)thecosteffectiveness
ofmanagingtheriskneedstobeevaluated4)anyoverridingconsiderations/stipulationsofaparticularentityneedtobe
factoredinpriortoimplementingtheriskmanagementstructure.
5)DEA,orpreferablythe3PI,shoulddeploysophisticatedmodelingtechniquesthatexisttoassessriskprobabilitiesandthe
needtoprovisionforthemand(6)thereshouldbeexanteprovisioningforarenegotiationframeworkinthebiddocument
itself(Chapter4,paragraph4.1.6).

12. Typically infrastructure PPP projects span over 2030 years and a developer often loses bargaining power related to
tariffs and other matters in case there are abrupt changes in the economic or policy environment which are beyond his
control.TheCommitteefeelsstronglythattheprivatesectormustbeprotectedagainstwhathavebeencalledObsolescing
Bargainthe loss of bargaining power over time by private player in PPPsthrough the four mechanisms discussed in
Chapter4includingthesettingupofIndependentSectorRegulators.

13.PPPprojectscanbecomedistressedwhenrisksemergethatmaynothavebeencontemplatedatthetimeofsigning.This
couldgiverisetoacallforamendingthetermsoftheConcessionAgreementtoreflectnewprojectrealitiesbetter(Chapter
4,paragraph4.3.2).TheCommitteehassuggestedbenchmarksinChapter4tobeappliedtoeachproposedrenegotiationas
wellassetoutasetofconditionsthatshouldnotbeacceptedasvalidreasonsforarequestforamendmentofaconcession
agreement(Chapter4,paragraphs4.3.6and4.3.7).

14. The final decision on a renegotiated concession agreement must be based on 1) full disclosure of the renegotiated
estimatedlongtermcosts,risksandpotentialbenefits2)comparisonwiththefinancialpositionforgovernmentatthetime
of signing the concession agreement and 3) comparison with the existing financial position for government just prior to
renegotiation.ThiswillpermittheauthorityregulatingtheReportoftheCommitteeonRevisitingandRevitalisingthePPP
ModelofInfrastructurexiconcessiontotakeadecisionbasedonafullcomparisonofthelikelyoutcomesoverthefutureof
theconcession(Chapter4,paragraphs4.3.8and4.3.9).

15. The Committee notes that there a number of stalled PPP projects need to be kick started. There is an urgent need to
evolve a suitable mechanism that evaluates and addresses actionable stressusing stress and adversity to deal with the
underlyingsystemicproblems(Chapter5,paragraph5.3.3).Sectorspecificinstitutionalframeworksshouldbedevelopedto
address these stalled infrastructure projects. The proposed Tribunal and IPAT approach, in the Committee's view are the
possiblesolution(Chapter5,paragraphs5.3.15and5.3.16).TheCommitteeisoftheviewthatonlyastatutorilyestablished
credibleempoweredmultidisciplinaryexpertinstitutionalmechanismmaybeabletodealwiththecomplexissuesinvolved
(Chapter5,paragraph5.3.4).

16.TheCommitteerecognizestheneedforaquick,equitable,efficientandenforceabledisputeresolutionmechanismfor
PPP projects. It is suggested that PPP contracts have clearly articulated dispute resolution structures that demonstrate
commitmentofallstakeholdersandprovideflexibilitytorestructurewithinthecommercialandfinancialboundariesofthe
project,(Chapter8,paragraph8.2.1).

17. In the wake of new project proposals emerging in various infrastructure sectors, the Committee recommends that
appropriatelegalframeworksbedevelopedagainstwhichthesecanbeevaluated(Chapter6,paragraph6.2.1).

18.TheauthoritiesmaybeadvisedagainstadoptingPPPstructuresforverysmallprojects,sincethebenefitsofdelivering
small PPP projects may not be commensurate with the resulting costs and the complexity of managing such partnerships
overalongperiod.ThetransactioncostsofwellstructuredPPPprojectsaresignificant,includingessentialbutexpensive
expertadvisoryservices(Chapter6,paragraph6.2.6).

19.UnsolicitedProposals(SwissChallenge)maybeactivelydiscouragedastheybringinformationasymmetriesintothe
procurementprocessandresultinlackoftransparencyandfairandequaltreatmentofpotentialbiddersintheprocurement
process(Chapter6,paragraph6.2.7).

20.InherentintheconceptofPPPistheroleofaPrivateSectorPartnerthatwillimplementtheproject,basedontheneed
toleverageprivatesectorfinancingandalsothemanagerialandoperationalefficienciesoftheprivatesectorparty.Itisin
thiscontextthattheCommitteeisoftheviewthatsincestateownedentitiesSoEs/PSUsareessentiallyGovernmententities
andworkwithinthegovernmentframework,theyshouldnotbeallowedtobidforPPPprojects.

21. The authorities should not treat PPPs as an offbalance sheet funding method for the governments responsibility of
providing reliable infrastructure services to its citizens. PPPs should not be used as the first delivery mechanism without
checkingitssuitabilityforaparticularproject.StatesandotheragenciesshouldalsonottreatCentralPPPVGFasasource
ofadditionalgrantsthatcanbeaccessedbyadoptingaPPPdeliverymodeforprojectsthatarenotsuitableforsuchalong
termfinancingstructure(Chapter6,paragraph6.2.8).

22.Therehavebeenconcernsraisedbyallstakeholders(GovernmentandPrivateSectoralike)onthedemandfordeveloper
booksofaccountbeingsubjectedtogovernmentauditandforaccessunderRTIandArticle12ofConstitution.Conventional
auditbyauthorityofprivatepartnersbooksasperstandardprocurementprocessrisksdeliveryofpoorqualityofservice/
publicassetprovisionifthereisnocertaintyofprocessesinthemediumterm.Toaddressthis,theCommitteerecommends
that the government notify comprehensive guidelines on the applicability and scope of such activities. The laid down
processwouldenablereviewonlyofgovernmentinternalsystems,andnotthatofSPVsbutSPVswouldneedtofollowbest
practiceincorporategovernancesystemsincludingthoserelatedtorelatedpartytransactions,financialdisclosuresetcasin
theCompaniesAct,2013.

23. Monetisation of viable projects that have stable revenue flows after EPC delivery may be considered. This should be
seenasamonetisationopportunitythatcanattractriskaverselongtermfundinglikepensionandinstitutionalinvestors.By
providingO&MPPPopportunities,theauthoritywillbeabletofreeupbudgetaryfundsforfreshEPCandstartavirtuous
cycleoffreshinvestmentfedbyadditionalrevenues(Chapter7,paragraph7.1.8).

24. Equity in completed, successful infrastructure projects may be divested by offering to longterm investors, including
overseasinstitutionalinvestorsasdomesticandforeigninstitutionalinvestorswithlongtermliabilitiesarebestsuitedfor
providingsuchlongtermfinancing,buthavealimitedappetiteforrisk.Cashgeneratedoutofdivestmentofequitywould
beavailableforthecreationofnewinfrastructureprojectsinthecountry

25.ImprovingaPPPprojectsriskprofilesothatitismoresuitableforoverseasanddomesticlongterminvestorscanbe
accomplishedthroughpartialrecoursetocrediblethirdpartyinstitutions.Thiscouldbeimplementedthroughapartialcredit
guaranteeorcashflowsupportmechanisms(Chapter6,paragraph6.2.12).

26.Itisnecessarytoexploreoptionsforsourcinglongtermcapitalatlowcost.Towardsthis,theCommitteerecommends,
encouraging the banks and financial institution to issue Deep Discount Bonds or Zero Coupon Bonds (ZCB) (Chapter 7,
paragraph7.1.15).Thesewillnotonlylowerdebtservicingcostsinaninitialphaseofprojectbutalsoenabletheauthorities
tochargeloweruserchargesininitialyears.

27.SomecountrieshavealegalframeworkforPPPsintheformofPPPAct/Law/Policy.MoFmaydevelopandpublisha
nationalPPPPolicydocument.Ideally,suchapolicyReportoftheCommitteeonRevisitingandRevitalisingthePPPModel
of Infrastructure xiii document should be endorsed by the Parliament as a policy resolution to impart an authoritative
framework to implementing executive agencies as well as to legislative and regulatory agencies charged with oversight
responsibilities (Chapter 6, paragraph 6.2.2). The Committee recommends an assessment of whether formulating and
enactingaPPPLawwillfacilitatesuccessfulexpansionofPPPintonewsectors,includinghealth,othersocialsectors,and
urbantransport(Chapter10,paragraph10.1.1).

28.Inthefinalanalysis,thesuccessofdeployingPPPasanadditionalpolicyinstrumentforcreatinginfrastructureinIndia
willdependonthechangeinattitudesandmindsetsofalltheauthoritiesincludingpublicagenciespartneringtheprivate
sector, government departments supervising the PPPs, and auditing and legislative institutions providing oversight of the
PPPs. The PPP reflects a paradigm shift involving the private sector. It means moving away from transaction to
relationship,accommodatinggiveandtakebetweenprivateandpublicsectorpartners,andfinallyacceptinguncertainties
and appropriate adjustments inherent in implementing longtime contracts. The Committee urges all parties concerned to
fostertrustbetweentheprivatesectorandpublicsectorpartnersinimplementingPPP.Asmentionedearlierinthereport,
PPPisanadditionalpolicyinstrumenttoenableIndiatosavetime.Sincethedemographicdeadlinesarestaringatus,
there is need to accelerate growth. By all accounts, there are only two or three decades left for India to complete the
transitionfromalowincomecountrytoahighincomeanddevelopedeconomybyovercomingthemiddleincometrap
(Chapter 10, paragraph 10.2.1). a. Contracts need to focus more on service delivery instead of fiscal benefits (Paragraph
2.5.5,viii).b.Betteridentificationandallocationofrisksbetweenstakeholders(Paragraph2.5.5,viii).c.Prudentutilization
of viability gap funds where user charges cannot guarantee a robust revenue stream (Paragraph 2.5.5, viii). d. Improved
fiscal reporting practices and careful monitoring of performance (Paragraph 2.5.5, viii). a. Given the urgency of Indias
demographictransition,andtheexperienceIndiahasalreadygatheredinmanagingPPPs,thegovernmentmustmovethe
PPPmodeltothenextlevelofmaturityandsophistication(Paragraph3.1.7).

B.KEYRECOMMENDATIONS

1.RevisitingPPPs:AchievementsandChallenges

a.Contractsneedtofocusmoreonservicedeliveryinsteadoffiscalbenefits
b.Betteridentificationandallocationofrisksbetweenstakeholders
c.Prudentutilizationofviabilitygapfundswhereuserchargescannotguaranteearobustrevenuestream.
d.Improvedfiscalreportingpracticesandcarefulmonitoringofperformancea.GiventheurgencyofIndiasdemographic
transition,andtheexperienceIndiahasalreadygatheredinmanagingPPPs,thegovernmentmustmovethePPPmodelto
thenextlevelofmaturityandsophistication.
2.WhyitisUrgentforIndiatogetInfrastructurePPPs.

a.GiventheurgencyofIndiasdemographictransition,andtheexperienceIndiahasalreadygatheredinmanagingPPPs,the
governmentmustmovethePPPmodeltothenextlevelofmaturityandsophistication(Paragraph3.1.7).
b.TheCommitteefeelsstronglythatmaturingthePPPmodelinIndiaisanurgentpriorityalsototakeadvantageofthis
historicalconjunctionofIndiasinfrastructureneedsandtheavailabilityoflongtermfunding
c.PPPshavethepotentialtodeliverinfrastructureprojectsbothfasterandbetter.BuildingonIndias15yearsofexperience
with PPPs, there is need to iron out the difficulties in the performance of PPP at every stage of the contract (Paragraph
3.5.2).

3.RebalancingofriskSharing:

a. An assessment needs to be carried out regarding the relative ease and efficiency of managing the risks by the entity
concerned(Paragraph4.1.6).
b.Costeffectivenessofmanagingtheriskneedstobeevaluated(Paragraph4.1.6).
c.Sophisticatedmodellingtechniquesareprevalenttoassessprobabilitiesofrisksandtheneedtoprovisionforthem.DEA
mayhoneitsskillsinthisandprovideguidancetoprojectauthorities(Paragraph4.1.6).
d.ThefinaldecisionforarenegotiatedConcessionAgreementmustbebasedon(Paragraph4.3.8):
Fulldisclosureoflongtermcosts,risksandpotentialbenefits
ComparisonwiththefinancialpositionforgovernmentatthetimeofsigningtheConcessionAgreement
Comparisonwiththefinancialpositionforgovernmentatthetimepriortorenegotiation.

4.ResolvingLegacyIssues

a. Only a statutorily established credible empowered multidisciplinary expert institutional mechanism can deal with the
complexissuesinvolved(Paragraph5.3.4):
AnInfrastructurePPPProjectReviewCommittee(IPRC)maybeconstitutedtoevaluateandsenditsrecommendations
inatimeboundmanneruponareferencebeingmadeofActionableStressinanyInfrastructureProjectdevelopedinPPP
modebeyondanotifiedthresholdvalue.
AnInfrastructurePPPAdjudicationTribunal(IPAT)chairedbyaJudicialMember(formerJudgeSC/ChiefJusticeHC)
withaTechnicaland/oraFinancialmember,wherebencheswillbeconstitutedbytheChairpersonasperneedsofthematter
inquestion
b. In case procurement of land or clearance is pending from government authorities for more than prescribed number of
days, the outstanding work should be descoped (under the provisions of Change in Law of ConcessionAgreement), and
allowrestofactivitiesforcompletedwork.Balanceworkcouldbecompletedonacashcontractbasis,providedlandand
requiredclearancesareinplace(Box6).
c.Cancelprojectsthathavenotachievedaprescribedpercentageofprogressontheground.Rebidthemonceissueshave
beenresolvedorcompletethemthroughpublicfundsandifviable,bidoutforOperationsandMaintenance(Box6).

5.Generic,IncludingLegacyProjects

a.SectorspecificinstitutionalframeworksmaybedevelopedtoaddressissuesforPPPinfrastructureprojects(Chapter5,
paragraph5.3.15).Anentityshouldbeartheriskthatisinitsnormalcourseofitsbusiness(forinstance,acquisitionofland
is a normal course of business for public entities).Overriding considerations/ stipulations of each entity to be factored in
priortoimplementationofriskmanagementstructure(Chapter4,paragraph4.1.6).
b.LearningsfromtheHighwayssectortobeutilizedforothersectorstocustomizeandadoptsuchframeworks(Chapter5,
paragraph5.3.15).
c. Umbrella guidelines may be developed for stressed projects that provide an overall framework for development and
functioningofthesectorspecificframeworks(Chapter5,paragraph5.3.16).
d.DEAtofinalizeanationalPPPPolicydocument(Chapter6,paragraph6.2.2).
e.UnsolicitedProposals(SwissChallenge)tobediscouragedtoavoidinformationasymmetriesandlackoftransparency
(Chapter6,paragraph6.2.7).
f.PPPstructuresnottobeadoptedforverysmallprojectsinviewofthetransactioncostsinvolved.DEAtoissueathreshold
guidance(Chapter6,paragraph6.2.6).

5.Chapter6StrengtheningPolicy,GovernanceandInstitutionalCapacity

a. Amend the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 to distinguish between genuine errors in decisionmaking and acts of
corruption(Paragraph6.1.6).
b. Build up capacity in all stakeholders, including regulators, authority, consultants, financing agencies, developers
(Paragraph6.1.2).
c.Setupaninstitutionforinvigoratingprivateinvestmentsininfrastructure,providingguidanceforanationalPPPpolicy
and developments in PPP, developing a mechanism to capture and collate data for decision making, undertaking capacity
buildingactivities.The3PIinstituteforPPPsannouncedin2014maybesetupwithoutdelay(Paragraph6.1.4).
d.PrequalifiedPPPconsultanciescouldbeempanelledbyDEAasearlierwhichcouldbetappedatshortnotice(Paragraph
6.4.3).
e. Revive the PPP Cells supported by the DEA over the last decade in Infrastructure Ministries and State Governments
(Paragraph6.1.5).
f.AninstitutionalizedmechanismliketheNationalFacilitationCommittee(NFC)toensuretimeboundresolutionofissues
including getting timely clearances/approvals during implementation of projects for smooth running of such projects
(Paragraph6.2.5).
g.MinistryofFinancetocoordinatewithotherimplementingministriesmaydevelopapolicytopromotesecondarymarket
foroperationalassets(Paragraph6.1.9).
h. Disallow statutory audit to books of SPVs governed by the provisions of the Companies Act. Ensure adoption of
principles of good governance by the SPVs (Paragraph 6.2.3). 5) Generic, Including Legacy Projects 6. Chapter 6
Strengthening Policy, Governance and Institutional Capacity Report of the Committee on Revisiting and Revitalising the
PPPModelofInfrastructurexvi
i. Standard public authority requirements of audit till point of award (public books) and postconstruction discharge by
Authority of monitoring and oversight of project operations as per the concession agreement (public books) to be in the
purviewofstatutory/governmentauditagencies(Paragraph6.2.3).
j.EssentialtosetupindependentRegulatorsinsectorsgoinginforPPP(Paragraph6.1.8).
k.DiscouragegovernmentparticipationinSPVsthatimplementPPPprojectsunlessstrategicallyessential.
7.ScalingUpFinance
a.Restrictthenumberofbanksinaconsortium(Paragraph7.2.3).
b.Bankstobuilduptheirownriskassessment/appraisalcapabilities(Paragraph7.2.3).
c.Checklistofitemslistedasaguidanceforlenders.
d.RBImayprovideguidelinestolendersonencashmentofbankguaranteesinlinewithICCnorms(Paragraph7.1.3).
e.MonetisationofviableprojectsthathavestablerevenueflowsafterEPCdeliveryshouldbeconsidered(Paragraph7.1.8).
f.Equityincompleted,successfulinfrastructureprojectsmaybedivestedbyofferingtolongterminvestors.
g.MinistryofFinancetoallowbanksandfinancialinstitutionstoissueZeroCouponBondswhichwillalsohelptoachieve
softlandingforuserchargesininfrastructuresector(Paragraph7.1.5).
8.RevitalisingContractualProcesses
a)NeedforreviewoftheMCAs(Paragraph8.1.1).
b)Samplesuggestionsforgenericchanges,includingforresolutionofdisputes,andsectorspecificchanges(Paragraph8.1.4
and8.2.1)
9.ReinvigoratingtheSectors:
a.Independentsectorregulatorsessential(Paragraph9.2.5).
b. Build upon maturing landscape in Roads and Ports PPP and move into the next phase: Roads: avoiding delays,
institutionalized dispute resolution, improved project development activity, monetization of operational assets, efficiency
andtransparencybyelectronictolling,etc(Paragraph9.3.6).
c. Ports: review of role and need of Tariff Authority for Major Ports (TAMP), review of MCA, quicker clearances,
rationalizedleasesandstampduties(Paragraphs9.3.19.3.5).
d.Airport:PPPstobeencouragedwhereviableinGreenfieldandbrownfieldprojects,havepolicythataddressespotential
demandforairportservicesinthecountry,notifyaunifiedregulatorystructure,clarityindelineationofTillpolicy,
e. Encourage use of PPPs in sectors like Railways, Urban, etc. Railways to have an independent tariff regulator, tap
potentiallyusefulPPPopportunitiesincludingbrownfieldassets(Paragraph9.5.19.5.4).

10.FastForwardPPPs

a.SetupaninstituteofexcellenceinPPPtointeraliaguidethesector,providepolicyinput,timelyadviceandundertake
sustainablecapacitybuilding(Paragraph10.1.3).
b.Ensureintegrateddevelopmentofinfrastructurewithroadmapsfordeliveryofprojects(Paragraph10.1.5).
c.Indiasdemographicdeadlinesarestaringatus.Thereareonlytwoorthreedecadeslefttocompletethetransitionfroma
country that has just attained middleincome status to that of a highincome and developed economy. Besides the basic
problems for provision of adequate infrastructure, the middleincome trap is also to be averted. Without adequate
infrastructure,thiswillsimplynotbepossible.Indiaiscurrentlyinaglobalwinwinsituationwithalargeyoungpopulation
thatwillneedgoodjobsandahugepoolofglobalsavingsthatcanbetappedforbuildingoutourinfrastructure.PPPsarean
important policy instrument that will enable India to compress time in this journey towards economic growth and
development.AsuccessfulandgrowingstreamofPPPsininfrastructurewillgoalongwayinacceleratingthecountrys
developmentprocess(Paragraph10.2.1)

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