Imperial Policies and Nationalism in The Decolonization of Somaliland

Imperial Policies and Nationalism in The Decolonization of Somaliland, 1954-1960
Author(s): Jama Mohamed

Source: The English Historical Review, Vol. 117, No. 474 (Nov., 2002), pp. 1177-1203
Published by: Oxford University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3490801
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English Historical Review
? Oxford University Press 2002
Imperial Policies and Nationalism in The

Decolonization of Somaliland, 1954-196o
IN 1949, the British Cabinet discussed constitutional development in

twenty-four small territories, and decided that, unlike large territories with
the potential to build viable economies and achieve independence, or
small territories likely to form federations and thus capable of achieving
self-government and independence, small territories such as Somaliland
must remain for the foreseeable future under British rule.' In 1954, the
Cabinet decided that territories such as Somaliland were 'never likely to
achieve full independence'.2 In 1956, the Cabinet reiterated its earlier
decisions about Somaliland.3 In 1958, the Cabinet reversed its policy, and
decided to grant independence to Somaliland. Two years later the country
became independent. The historiography of decolonization4 privileges
two factors in the end of the empire: the shift in the balance of power
between the great powers and the development of nationalist politics
during the Second World War.5 But such meta-narrative ignores the
specificity of decolonization in the different regions of the empire. The
Cabinet made sharp distinctions between the political futures of different
regions, colonies and protectorates. Moreover, the final decision to
decolonize was often disconcertingly rapid and even chaotic. Somaliland is
a case in point. The context of the decolonization of Somaliland was local
and regional rather than global, the late 195os rather than the 1940s.
I. P[ublic]R[ecord]O[ffice], CAB 129/33/2, Constitutional Development in Smaller Territories,

Cabinet memorandum by Creech Jones, Io March 1949.
2. PRO, CAB 129/I129/71, Commonwealth Membership, Cabinet memorandum by Lord
Swinton, 1I October 1954.
3. PRO, CAB 134/1203, Small Colonial Territories, Cabinet Memorandum by Lennox-Boyd,
27 September 1956.
4. Bethwell A. Ogot and Tiyambe Zeleza, 'Kenya: The Road to Independence and After,' in
Prosser Gifford and Wm. Roger Louis (ed.), Decolonization and African Independence: The
Transfers ofPower, I96o-p18o (New Haven, 1988), pp. 401-426; John Darwin, 'Decolonization and
the End of Empire,' in Robin W. Winks (ed.), Oxford History of the British Empire: Vol. V:
Historiography (Oxford, 1999), pp. 541-557; John Darwin, Britain and Decolonization (London,
1988); J. D. Hargreaves, Decolonization in Africa (London, 1988); Prosser Gifford and W. Roger
Louis (ed.), The Transfer ofPower in Africa: Decolonization, 1940-196o (New Haven, CT, 1982);
Thomas Hogdkin, Nationalism in Colonial Africa (London, 1956); Edward Said, Culture and
Imperialism (New York, 1993); W. Roger Louis, Empire at Bay (Oxford, 1978); R. H. Holland,
European Decolonization, p918-I981 (London, 1994). For brief discussions on the decolonization of
Somaliland see Abdi Ismail Samatar, The State and Rural Transformation in Northern Somalia,
1886-1986 (Madison, WI, 1989); I. M. Lewis, The Modern History ofSomaliland (New York, 1965);
Sadia Touval, Somali Nationalism (Cambridge, MA, 1967).
5. Wm Roger Louis, 'The Dissolution of the British Empire,' in Judith M. Brown (ed.), The
Oxford History of the British Empire: The Twentieth Century (Oxford, 1999), vol. 4, p. 332; Wm.
Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson, 'The Imperialism of Decolonization,' Journal ofImperial and
Commonwealth History, xxii, no. 3 (1994), 467; A. J. Stockwell, 'Imperialism and Nationalism in
South-East Asia,' in Judith M. Brown (ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire: The
Twentieth Century, vol. 4, p. 485.
EHR, cxvii. 474 (Nov. 2oo2)
1178 IMPERIAL POLICIES AND NATIONALISM IN
In 1954 the Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement was concluded under which
one-third of the territory of Somaliland was ceded to Ethiopia. When
the agreement was announced in the country in January 1955, the Somali
people took the news very badly. Demonstrations were organized
throughout the territory, and elite nationalist parties gained public
following and support that they had hitherto lacked. The growth o
nationalist politics threatened the stability of the whole region. Yet the
Cabinet was willing to ride the storm and maintain control over the
territory, until 1958, when the decision to decolonize was suddenly
reached. But why the sudden change of policy? In order to answer the
question, this paper first reconstructs the history of the Anglo-Ethiopian
agreements from 1897 to 1954, it then examines the various diplomatic
means the Somali elite employed to recover the lost territories, and
finally it retraces the evolution of imperial decisions from 1954 to 1958,
and from 1958 to I96o. Between 1954 and 1958, the Cabinet wa
concerned about various issues such as the management of Somali
nationalism, the settlement of the dispute over land between Somaliland
and Ethiopia, the incorporation of both Somaliland and Ethiopia into
the western alliance, and the containment of Egyptian and Soviet
influences in the region. These considerations, some of which had
geopolitical implications while others were specific to Somaliland and
Britain, were of great significance in the decolonization of Somaliland.
The 1884 Egyptian withdrawal from Berbera, Zeyla, Bulhar, Harar
and the Sudan unleashed a scramble over the evacuated areas between
Great Britain, France and Ethiopia. The race was to three areas: Fashoda,
Harar, and the Somali country. By 1885, the British had won the race to
the Somali country, and had signed various treaties with Somali elders in
which they agreed 'never to cede, sell, mortgage, or otherwise give for
occupation - save to the British Government - any portion of the
territory presently inhabited by them, or being under their control'.6 By
1885, the Ethiopians had won the race to Harar. The race to Fashoda was
not yet settled. It was unleashed by Anglo-French rivalry over the Sudan.
The British invaded the Sudan from the north, and straight down the
Nile; while the French decided to invade it from the south, across the
Congo and up the Nile.7 The British viewed the French invasion as a
threat to British interests from Cairo to the Cape.8 'At the end of the last
century', according to James Rennell Rodd, 'the issue which stood out
above all others in the African problem was whether a line of cleavage in
the great continent should run south to north, or from west to east.'9
The Somalis were caught between these competing imperial interests.
6. PRO, F.O.78/3857, James Blair, Secretary of State for the Colonies, 1885.
7. The story has been told brilliantly in David Levering Lewis, The Race to Fashoda: European
Colonialism and African Resistance in the Scramble for Africa (New York, 1987).
8. Ibid., pp. 7-8.
9. James Rennell Rodd, Social and Diplomatic Memories (Second Series), I89r-19po: Egypt and
Abyssinia (London, 1923), P. vi.
EHR, cxvii. 474 (Nov. 2ooz)
THE DECOLONIZATION OF SOMALILAND, 1954-1960 1179
For the British as for the French, Menilek II, the Emperor of Ethiopia
was an indispensable ally; or, as David Levering Lewis put it, he mad
himself indispensable to both powers.' Ethiopia was sited at a strategic
location, holding the southern gateway to the Nile and to Fashoda. I
their quest for Fashoda, both the British and the French made specific
demands on Menilek. In return for arms, munitions and the training of
the Ethiopian army,)" the French demanded direct assistance in th
invasion of the Sudan in terms of soldiers and other logistical support.
The British, in contrast, required only Ethiopian neutrality. Unlike the
French, the British had an easier task. After all, they were starting their
invasion from Egypt, rather than from the Congo. If the French offered
arms, the British offered something more urgent, in particular lan
concessions, and they probably promised to respect Ethiopian sover
eignty.'2 Sir Rennell Rodd led the British diplomatic mission to Ethiopi
with the aim of regulating the eastern frontier of the Protectorate and
safeguarding British commercial and strategic interests.13 To achiev
these objectives, the 'conciliation of Ethiopia during the last phase of the
Khartoum campaign'"4 was considered of great necessity. Menilek was
pleased with the conciliatory gestures of the mission, as well as with it
no-nonsense proposals and the logic of British non-involvement in
Ethiopia'.'5 The pawn in the 'conciliation' of Ethiopia was British
Somaliland, a territory in which Lord Salisbury had little interes
because he considered it as part of the 'light lands of Africa'.16 For
his neutrality, Menilek, who was at the time 'reconstit(uting) the
ancient limits of Ethiopia',"7 demanded 'nearly half of our Somali
Protectorate'.18 After much haggling, he settled for a 'hefty third','9
which was ratified in the 1897 Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty.20
The treaty consisted of six articles. The first article endorsed trade
across the borders of Ethiopia and British Somaliland. The second article
called for the demarcation of the frontiers of British Somaliland through
negotiations between Rennell Rodd and the governor of Harar, Ras
Maconen. Articles three, four, five and six dealt with the opening of the
caravan route between Harar and Zeila, gave both nations 'advantage' in
duties and taxes, allowed for the transit of arms and ammunition for
Ethiopia through Somaliland, and prohibited the passage of arms for th
Io. David Levering Lewis, Race to Fashoda, p. 12.

ii. Ibid., p. 129.
12. Sir Rennell Rodd, Social and Diplomatic Memories, p. 174. See also David Levering Lewis,
Race to Fashoda, p. 130.
13. Sir Rennell Rodd, Social and Diplomatic Memories, p. 163.
14. Ibid., p. 182.
15. David Levering Lewis, Race to Fashoda, p. 128.
16. Sir Rennell Rodd, Social and Diplomatic Memories, p. 187.
17. Ibid., p. 167.
I8. Ibid.
19. David Levering Lewis, Race to Fashoda, p. 130.
20. PRO, F.O.371IIi3459, Treaty Between Great Britain and Ethiopia, Signed by the Emperor
Menelek II, and by Her Majesty's Envoy, Addis Ababa, May 14, 1897.
EHR, cxvii. 474 (Nov. zoo2)
_UlIf Of Aden
\. orDjiboui Mapa rarda FDr El
1 _______ * H~is *Jitj *8

Bulkar - Buerbera
\.Iorma a Edr ur rEl
SHargelsa Burao.
*Jig)9\. 1Be3r . Shimber
H rr Dul Madobe * Hdi al
ooiQ--
I 9... BokoflekS~ogIa
*M)?
vallesy , /./
R -4 ; -._. . ./Fer Oi/d,
ETHIOPIA *DaaoQr Ilig
I(TALIAN
(Oga *Walwal
de. m(Somalia)
Regiov 5O M
SWardair Mudug
Sumbeiru Hils l~y
The Mullah Campaign, 09oo-zo
0 o 100 150 20o Miles Obbi
MAP I
The 'Rodd Line'.
Mahdists through Ethiopia. The negotiations between Ras Maconen

and Rennell Rodd produced three annexes to the treaty. The first annex
recognized the need of the hitherto British 'protected' peoples of
Somaliland to receive 'equitable treatment' and 'special care' from the
Ethiopian Government once it had taken over the territory. The second
annex demarcated the boundary between British Somaliland and
Ethiopia. The 'Rodd line' subsequently defined the boundary of
Somaliland. (see Map i) The third annex recognized the right of the
'tribes' of Somaliland to graze and water their livestock in their
traditional areas. In other words, the 'tribes occupying either side of the
line shall have the right to the grazing-grounds on the other side, but
during their migrations it is understood that they shall be subject to the
jurisdiction of the territorial authority.'21
The treaty was, as Rodd put it, 'criticized by travellers who had
penetrated into Somaliland on big-game expeditions and therefore laid
claim to special knowledge',22 such as Captain Swayne, who had 'former
21. Ibid., Annex 3.

22. Sir Rennell Rodd, Social and Diplomatic Memoirs, p. 182.
EHR, cxvii. 474 (Nov. 2ooz)
experience in Somaliland'.23 Swayne cautioned against the concessions
made to Ethiopia on the Haud, because the area was of central
importance to the Somali population. There were four ecological zones
in the country: the 'Guban' (coastal area), the Golis range (mountain
escarpment), the Oogo (plateau), and the Haud (southern forests and
plains). The two most important zones were the interior plateau and the
Haud. During the rainy seasons, the pastoralists moved their livestock to
the Haud because of the abundance of pastures and temporary water
(rain) reservoir. During the dry seasons, the pastoralists moved their
livestock to the plateau because it had, unlike the Haud, permanent
water. The 'pulsatory movement'24 of the pastoralists protected the
country from overgrazing, soil erosion and ecological degradation. The
loss of the Haud as a result of Anglo-Ethiopian agreements would be
considered a 'mortal blow' because of the economic importance of the
region for Somaliland. But Rodd ignored Swayne's reservations since his
objective was to gain the support of Ethiopia for the race to Fashoda
rather than to 'protect' the interests of the Somalis. The treaty was never
announced in Somaliland and Ethiopia never exercised any direct
control over the area. In the 1930s, Somalis became aware of the treaty in
an indirect way, when the joint Ethiopian-British Commission began
setting boundary marks. The rural folk responded by destroying the
marks. In 1931 the government passed the Ordinance for the Protection
of the Boundary Marks. But the Ordinance hardly deterred the people,
and in 1934 a British member of the Commission was murdered on the
frontier.25 In 1935 the Italians invaded and conquered Ethiopia, and
began for the first time the administration of the area by a foreign power.
Five years later (August 1940), Italy invaded and conquered Somaliland.
In March 1941 the British re-conquered Somaliland, Italian Somalia, and
Ethiopia. By the end of 1941, the British had control over the whole of
the Horn of Africa.
Two issues confronted British policy makers: what to do about former
Italian Somaliland, and what to do about Ethiopia. On the first issue
the British favoured the creation of 'Greater Somaliland' under which all
the Somali territories (Somaliland, Somalia, Haud, Ogaden, and the
Reserved Area) would be united under British trusteeship. The plan,
however, fuelled the suspicion that Great Britain was interested only in
'Empire-building'. World powers - the Soviet Union, United States and
France (which feared Djibouti might be absorbed into it) - managed to
scuttle the proposal. Under the 1949 United Nations Resolution, Italian
23. Ibid., p. 122. H. C. Swayne wrote a book on his experiences: Seventeen Trips Through
Somaliland (London, 1895).
24. H. B. Gilliland, 'An Approach to the Problem of the Government of Nomadic Peoples; With
Special Reference to Experience in Eastern British Somaliland', The South African Geographical
Journal, xxix (April 1947), 51.
25. PRO, C[olonial]O[ffice] 1015/1354, 'The Haud Problem: History to the End of 1956', April
1957. The rest of this and the following paragraph are based on this document.
EHR, cxvii. 474 (Nov. 2002)
II82 IMPERIAL POLICIES AND NATIONALISM IN
Somalia was returned to Italian trusteeship f

specified the date of independence of Som
second issue - what to do about Ethiopia
January 1942 to restore Ethiopian soverei
Ethiopian Emperor signed an Agreement and
Great Britain, which allowed Great Britain t
Somali-inhabited territories: the Reserve
border of Somaliland) and the Ogaden (the
the Italian-Somalia border). On 25 May 1
British three months' notice for the termina
A new agreement - the Anglo-Ethiopian
signed on I9 December 1943, and came
agreement asserted Ethiopian sovereignty ov
reduced the 'extent of the Reserved Area
Jigjiga', and allowed the Ogaden area to rem
Administration 'but without prejudice to
Emperor's sovereignty'.26 Ethiopia had t
agreement to give three months' notice f
agreement. In 1948, protocol agreements we
for the re-negotiation of the 1944 agreemen
on until 1954, 'no doubt owing to hesitati
sides'.27
Even though the protocol for the termina
was exchanged in 1948, the actual negotia
focused on land exchange. The British off
'corridor leading from that port into Eth
Haud. Ethiopia's counter-proposal called
hundred miles in width to Zeila in British S
Ogaden'.29 The British rejected the Ethiopia
1947 Ethiopia proposed giving a narrow corr
Zeila 'but offered in exchange only a relativel
area'. In December the British rejected
negotiations on the issue lapsed until 1952, w
the British with the 1947 proposal, but s
?500,000.31 The discovery of oil in th
Corporation - an American company - co
The company had concessions for oil exp
Ethiopia, particularly in the Ogaden a
company made its first drilling at Gumb
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid.
28. PRO, C.O.Io15/5o7, 'The Zeila-Haud Negotiations,' December i951.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid. See also PRO, C.O.oI05/5o7, 'Zeila-Haud Negotiations: Notes of Meeting Held at the
Colonial Office on 13 December, 1951'.
31. PRO, C.O.Io5/5o7, C. H. A. Judd to J. E. Marnham, Esq., Colonial Office, 20o June 1952.
THE DECOLONIZATION OF SOMALILAND, 1954-I960 1183
'drew blank'. Two years later the company successfully drilled Galadi,
located in British territory in the Haud.32 In September 1952, the British
Cabinet decided to re-open the negotiations over the exchange of
territories,33 but these failed. Ethiopia was unwilling to give up the
prospect of oil revenue for a corridor to Zeila, even though the Cabinet
was now willing to consider giving Ethiopia rights of revenue and
control over oil prospecting and exploitation, and even though the
northern Somali ports were essential to the export of the oil. It was to
travel on pipeline either through Obbia (in Somalia) or Berbera or Zeila
or any other accessible port in Somaliland. Obbia was considered as the
best choice because the 'oil would flow there by gravity whereas if a
northern port were chosen pumping stations would have to be
installed.'34 The discovery of oil made Ethiopia even more intransigent.
As in the I89Os, Ethiopia played one great power off against another to
wring land concessions from the British, despite the debt to the British
for liberation from Italian colonial rule in 1941. After the restoration of
its sovereignty in 1942, Ethiopia actively cultivated American political,
economic, military and diplomatic support as a counterweight to British
dominance in the region. America was more than willing to support
Ethiopia because it had strategic interests - Ethiopia was viewed as an
indispensable ally in the containment of Communism - and economic
(oil) interests in the country. Great Britain signed the 1944 Anglo-
Ethiopia Agreement and the 1954 Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement under
American pressure.35
The 1954 agreement consisted of six articles.36 The first article - the
most important - recognized the 'full and exclusive sovereignty of
Ethiopia over the territories', that is, Ogaden, Haud and the Reserved
Area. British administration was to withdraw and, from z8 February 1955
the 'Imperial Ethiopian Government shall, from that date, reassume
jurisdiction and administration of, in and over the territories.'
The second article recognized the rights of the pastoralists to 'cross
the frontier for the purpose of grazing, as originally set out in the
32. PRO, C.O.Ioi5/5o7, British Embassy to the Right Honourable Anthony Eden, M.P.,
26 May 1952.
33. PRO, C.O.Io5/15o7, Oliver Lyttelton, Colonial Office, to Governor of Somaliland, Gerlad
Reece, 18 September 1952.
34. PRO, C.O.Ioi5/5o7, 'Enclosure No.i to Mr. D. L. Busk's Addis Ababa Despatch no. 41,
dated 26 May 1952'.
35. Harold Marcus, A History ofEthiopia (Berkeley, CA, 1994), p. I54. See also Harold Marcus,
Ethiopia, Great Britain, and the United States, 194I-s947 (Berkeley, CA, 1983). For a general
discussion of the role of the United States in the decolonization of the British Empire, which stresses
global rather than local or regional themes, see Wm. Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay: The United
States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941-1945 (New York, 1978).
36. PRO, C.O.IoI5/1354, Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of Ethiopia relating to certain matters
connected with the withdrawal of British Military Administration from the territories designated as
the Reserved Area and the Ogaden, London, November 29, 1954. The rest of this paragraph is based
on this document.
Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1897 and the letters annexed th

The third article made 'special arrangements designed to m
circumstances under which tribes from the Somaliland Prot
utilise the territories for the purpose of grazing'. Special arrang
were made in the agreement, for instance, for the Aqils, tri
(Illalo) and elders of the 'tribes' to move with the pastoralists in
pasture area in the Haud and the Reserved Area. The tribal polic
would not exceed 700 and had the power of arrest over cit
Ethiopia and Somaliland. If they arrested Ethiopians they were
them quickly to the Ethiopian authorities. But if they arrested
of Somaliland, the case was to be tried in courts in Som
except where there was a dispute between Ethiopian citizens
'tribesmen', when the trial would take place in Ethiopian c
However, the British liaison officer and his staff might be prese
trial. The agreement specified the right of the Somaliland admin
to appoint a liaison officer and his staff to 'reside' and to 'move
the territories'. The officer and his staff could hold periodi
tations with the Ethiopian Government, and transmit to the 'tr
instructions of the Government of Somaliland Protectorate'. The
Protectorate Government, moreover, would continue to extend edu-
cation, medical and veterinary services to the pastoralists during their
seasonal migration to the territories. The annex to the treaty yet again
recognized the boundary between Somaliland and Ethiopia as it was
demarcated under the 1897 treaty.
The 1954 Anglo-Ethiopian Agreement was concluded in November,
and announced in Somaliland on 5 January 1955. The Somali people
took the news very badly',37 and 'as a whole took action to protest
against the handover'.38 Spontaneous demonstrations were held
throughout the Protectorate as well as in Somalia and particularly in
Mogadisho. The dominant party in Somaliland politics up to 1955 was
the Somali National League (S.N.L.), which was founded as a society
(Somali National Society) in Burao in 1944, and registered as a political
party in 1947. In 1955 the National United Front For Retaining Reserve
Area and Haud (N.U.ER.R.H.)39 was created by Michael Mariano. As
its name clearly indicates, the N.U.E focused completely on the recovery
of the lost territories. Since this issue concerned all Somalis (in
Somaliland, Somalia and Ethiopia), the N.U.E received popular as well
as elite support, and so dominated the politics of the country from 1955
37. Colonial Office, The Haud Problem: History to the End of 1956, April 1957.
38. Colonial Office, Colonial Office Annual Reports on the Somaliland Protectorate, -954 and -955
(London, 1957), p. 3.
39. It was an organization, not a party. Henceforth it will be referred to as N.U.F.- the short and
more widely known acronym. The N.U.F. became a registered party in 1958. No extended analysis
of the form (parties) and content (ideology) of nationalism can be made here for lack of space. For
a brief discussion on these issues see I. M. Lewis, Modern History of Somaliland; Sadia Touval,
Somali Nationalism; and Abdi Samatar, State and Rural Transformation.
THE DECOLONIZATION OF SOMALILAND, 1954-1960 II85
to 1958. The N.U.E campaigned for the return of the territories both in
Somaliland and abroad. In March 1955, for instance, a delegation
consisting of Michael Mariano, Abokor Haji Farah and Abdi Dahir went
to Mogadisho to win the support and co-operation of the nationalist
groups in Somalia. And in February and May 1955 another delegation
consisting of two traditional Sultans (Sultan Abdillahi Sultan Deria,
and Sultan Abdulrahman Sultan Deria), and two Western-educated
moderate politicians (Michael Mariano, Abdirahman Ali Mohamed
Dubeh) visited London and New York. During their tour of London,
they formally met and discussed the issue with the Secretary of State for
the Colonies, Alan Lennox-Boyd.
They told Lennox-Boyd about the 1885 Anglo-Somali treaties. Under
the agreements, Michael Mariano stated, the British Government
'undertook never to cede, sell, mortage or otherwise give for occupation,
save to the British Government, any portion of the territory inhabited by
them or being under their control'.40 But now the Somali people 'have
heard that their land was being given to Ethiopia under an Anglo-
Ethiopian Treaty of 1897'. That treaty, however, was 'in conflict' with the
Anglo-Somali treaties 'which took precedence in time' over the 1897
Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty. The British Government had 'exceeded its
powers when it concluded the 1897 Treaty and ... the 1897 Treaty was
not binding on the tribes.' Sultan Abdullahi also added that the 1954
agreement was a 'great shock to the Somali people' since they had not
been told about the negotiations, and since the British Government had
been administering the area since 1941. The delegates requested, as
Sultan Abdulrahman put it, the postponement of the implementation of
the agreement to 'grant the delegation time to put up their case' in
Parliament and in international organizations.
Lennox-Boyd was not swayed. He told them that in 1897 Great
Britain could not have done anything to stop Ethiopian expansion. 'The
Ethiopian Empire at the time was expanding and it might well have been
that, without the treaty, the Ethiopians would have extended still further
in to the Protectorate territory.' The treaty 'was unfortunate in many
ways'. However nothing could be done about it. The 'strength of the
British nation had been built up on a regard for international
agreements'. If the law was on the British side, the British Government
was not 'afraid of force', but in this case the 'law' was against her. The
reason that the Government never told the Somali leaders and public
about the negotiations with Ethiopia in the post-war period was rather
simple: 'It would hardly have been possible for any Somali to share
responsibility for what would have been a very unpopular treaty. It was
the duty of the protecting power to undertake the pleasant as well as
unpleasant work of government and not to pass on to other people a
40. PRO, F.O.37I/II3458, Record of meeting with Somaliland delegation over the Haud
Agreement held in the Secretary of State's room at the Colonial Office, 14 February, 1955.
share of responsibility for unwelcome steps.' Sultan Abdullahi stated
that the refusal of Great Britain to change its policy 'would be a very
great disappointment to the Somali people and it might no longer be
possible to keep their protests in constitutional channels'.41 The use of
the term 'constitutional channels' was pertinent. The delegates were
convinced that it was possible through constitutional and formal
channels to persuade the British Government and world opinion that
the Anglo-Somali treaties took precedence over the Anglo-Ethiopian
treaties, and hence that the later treaties were illegal and must be
abrogated. There was also a hint of a threat. After all, the failure to keep
protest in constitutional channels implied forceful popular resistance.
In May 1955, the Somali delegation again tried to persuade Lennox-
Boyd to change British policy. But by then they realized that he could
not be persuaded. And so their brief to him was perfunctory.42 It stated
that they would take their case to the United Nations General Assembly
for referral to the International Court of Justice 'for an advisory opinion
on the legal validity' of the Anglo-Ethiopian treaties. They commended
Lennox-Boyd's respect for international agreements and law. They
expected as much from the British Government. Again they stated that
the Anglo-Somali agreements under which Somaliland became a
protectorate, and under which Great Britain pledged not to cede or sell
or transfer any Somali territory to any power, took precedence over the
1897 Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty. Indeed, the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of
1897 was a violation of the Anglo-Somali Treaties. But since they could
not - as they had been advised - challenge the legal validity of the
Anglo-Ethiopian agreements in the British domestic courts, they would
challenge them in the International Court of Justice.
They composed a petition addressed to the General Assembly with
the aim of persuading the assembly to hear their case, and then to refer it
to the International Court.43 Unlike the brief to the Secretary of State for
the Colonies, the petition to the General Assembly was long. But like the
brief, it was legalistic. The petition claimed, first, that the land which the
British ceded to Ethiopia in 1897 was Somali country. The evidence
produced to support the argument was in part textual. They reproduced
a map published in Richard Burton's book44 to support their argument,
in which Burton represented the land from the coast to twenty miles
of Harar as Somali country (see Map 2). Then they demonstrated
that the treaties signed by Somali elders and Great Britain prohibited
Great Britain from selling or ceding any part of the Somali country
to any other power. Those treaties took precedence over the 1897
41. Ibid.
42. PRO, F.O.371/II3458, Somali Delegation to Secretary of State for the Colonies, 5 May 1955.
43. PRO, F.O.371/II3458, Somali Delegation to the Secretary General of the United Nations,
1955.
44. Richard Burton, First Footsteps in East Africa (London, i856), 2 volumes. The narrative was
based on his 1854 travels from Zeila to Harar to Berbera.
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II88 IMPERIAL POLICIES AND NATIONALISM IN
Anglo-Ethiopian treaty. The most recent Anglo-Ethiop

(1954) 'purports to affirm the alleged sovereignty of Eth
territories'. But such sovereignty over the territori
Ethiopia's. They concluded by asserting that the Somali p
right of self-determination and they 'protest against
transfer to Ethiopia of the disputed territories which has
they are confident it will continue to remain, part of
Their argument, however, was never heard in the General
the case was never referred to the International Court. No member
country would sponsor their petition, not even Egypt, which the
delegation had assumed would do so since it had radical pretensions.
The British Government was rather pleased about Egypt's failure to
sponsor the bill. It spared Great Britain a discussion in the Assembly
about its treaties in the Horn of Africa, and perhaps even a court battle.
Furthermore, the Government believed that Egypt's failure to sponsor
the delegation's petition would make it unpopular in Somaliland.
The delegation also courted public opinion through the press. In one
news conference in London, Michael Mariano, the spokesman of the
group, summarized the concerns of the delegation. He stated that, since
the transfer of the territories, the people of Somaliland had become
'guests in our own house' in the Haud and the Reserved Area, and
complained bitterly about the British role in the whole fiasco. 'Our
land', he protested, 'had been handed [by Great Britain] to Ethiopia on
a plate.'46 Papers such as the Daily Mail, the Daily Express, and the
Observer covered the story. The Daily Mail discussed the issue the day
Great Britain was to hand the Haud and the Reserve Area to Ethiopia
(28 February). It stated Britain was handing a 'slice' of the disputed areas
to Ethiopia, and the Somalis were 'protesting bitterly'.47 For the Somalis
this was a matter of 'justice'. But was it? Ethiopia insisted on its rights
over the land on the basis of the Anglo-Ethiopian agreements. And
Britain must honour her obligations. Britain, of course, could 'tell
Ethiopia, a weak country, to take a running jump'. But Britain was 'on
the side of the law. Our name and fame depend upon it, and if we ever
repudiate it we are finished.'48 The Daily Express referred to the 'four
men from a nomad land' who came to London 'with a disturbing tale'.49
As a result of the Anglo-Ethiopian agreements, their land had been ceded
to Ethiopia. Yet the Anglo-Ethiopian treaties 'dishonoured' prior
Anglo-Somali agreements. The paper quoted the 'envoy's spokesman,
41-year-old Michael Mariano,' who stated: ' "It is our intention to take
this matter to the UNO [United Nations Organization] by any and
45. PRO, F.O.371/II3458, Somali Delegation to the Secretary General of the United Nations,
1955-
46. 'Somaliland: Background to a Grievance', Africa Digest, cxi, (i) (May-June 1955), p. 14.
47. 'The Moving Caravan,' Daily Mail, Monday, February 28, 1955.
48. Ibid.
49. 'The Somali's Plea', Daily Express, 25 February 1955.
every available means. We demand justice and we intend to get it."'
'The British people,' the paper stated, 'cannot be satisfied with the way
Mr. Lennox-Boyd has treated this appeal'. Besides giving away their
land, Lennox-Boyd had never informed the Somalis about the British-
Ethiopian negotiations over their land in 1954. 'And the same thing
happened, they charge, when the original treaty with Ethiopia was
concluded 58 years ago.' The paper concluded that Lennox-Boyd 'should
give earnest and urgent reconsideration to the Somali protest ... An
unjust treaty is not something to be upheld but to be revised.'50 The
Observer51 story, which was written by Colin Legum, related the now
familiar story of the signing of the Anglo-Somali agreements, and how
eleven years later the British signed another with Ethiopia. The
Anglo-Ethiopian agreement ofi 897 was 'invalid because it automatically
abrogated the terms of the Protectorate Agreements of 1884 and 1886.'
Lennox-Boyd expressed to Legum some 'misgivings' on the issue as it
affected Somalis. Nonetheless, he was adamant that Great Britain must
recognize its obligations to the Anglo-Ethiopian treaties.
The issue was also debated in Parliament. Three main questions were
raised: the legality of the agreement, the reason for the British
government signing an agreement with Ethiopia in 1954, and whether
the British government would support or oppose the petition the
Somaliland delegation presented at the United Nations General
Assembly. Callaghan asked 'why the Government entered into this
Agreement in this time' and whether there was any truth to the
allegation that the signing of the 1954 agreement was motivated by
British and American oil interests in the disputed territories. Callaghan
also asked whether the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 'will instruct
the United Kingdom delegate to the United Nations to refrain from
voting against the proposal to test the validity of the 1897 Anglo-
Ethiopian Treaty in the International Court of Justice'. The Foreign
Secretary refused to answer the first question; as for the second, he stated
that Britain would oppose any such motion, and that he had already
informed the Somali delegation of this. 'In view of the Legal advisers, we
are likely to be on weak ground if this question were to be referred to an
International tribunal.' Besides, it would 'open the door to unlimited
interference by busybodies for ideological or other reasons in all sorts
and kinds of treaties and agreements'.52 The debate in the end did not
persuade the British Cabinet to change its policy or to revise the treaty.
Meanwhile, the implementation of the treaty on the ground pro-
ceeded. Ethiopia took over the country in February 1955. And shortly
thereafter 'disturbing reports were received from the Territories of
improper Ethiopian activities, and of clashes between the Ethiopians
o50. Ibid.
51. 'Somalis May Seek U.N. Intervention', Sunday Observer, 27 February 1955.
52. PRO, F.O.37I/1346I, Parliamentary Question, October and November 1955.
and the Somalis.'5" This was inevitable. The agreement ga

rights in the area which necessarily contradicted Ethiopia
rights. Somalis could cross the border, pasture their lives
Haud and Reserve Area, maintain their own tribal authoritie
their own police force (the Tribal Police), schools and oth
Ethiopia sought to settle the pastoralists in the country, ext
Ethiopian citizenship and impose its own Tribal Authority ov
According to a report by the National United Front, there 'h
less than nine occasions on which the Akils and Elders of the Tribal
Organisation have been arrested and detained in custody by the
Ethiopian Authorities.'54 The Ethiopian authorities also closed down
the Aw Barreh elementary school. On 6 September 1954, a brawl took
place between Somalis in Gooti, where one man was seriously injured.
Ethiopian soldiers promptly arrested those involved, even though under
the agreement only the Tribal Police were entitled to arrest Somalis so
long as Ethiopian citizens were not involved. On 7 September, the
Assistant Liaison Officer, Abdulrahman Abby Farah, requested the
release of the arrested men, but to no avail. Then on 28 September,
ninety Ethiopian soldiers went to Harti Sheikh and 'seized camels
belonging to the Protectorate tribesmen who were in the area'.55
In response to the crisis in the territories, a conference was held
in Harar between the Protectorate Government and the Ethiopian
Government that lasted from 12 December 1955 to 19 January
1956.56 The two delegations were concerned with similar issues but in
diametrically opposite ways. The Somaliland delegation brought up the
following issues: the increasing transformation of the grazing area in the
territories into areas for cultivation and 'other uses'; the undermining of
the Tribal Organisation of the Protectorate tribes by the appointment of
Ethiopian paid Aqils; the arrest and harassment of the Aqils of the
Protectorate tribes; the detaining and disarming of the Tribal Police; the
arrest of the Protectorate tribes by Ethiopian security forces; the closing
of the Aw Barreh school and the prevention of the Liaison Staff from
moving freely in the territories in the 'performance of their duties'. The
Ethiopian delegation presented the following issues: the intervention of
the Liaison Staff in the 'settlement of farm land problems concerning
Ethiopian tribes of Esa and Gadabursi'; its attempt to 'administer
Ethiopian inhabitants and non-grazing areas'; the involvement of Mr.
Abdulrahman Abby 'in political agitation in the Territories' and Aqil
Mohamed Bogorreh's attempt to 'collect funds in the Territories for
political agitation'. The Ethiopian delegation also protested against the
53. Colonial Office, The Haud Problem: History to the End of I956.
54. PRO, F.O.371/1I3641, The National United Front, (Report), 1955.
55. Ibid.
56. The Ethiopian delegation was led by Colonel Kefle Erguetou, Deputy Governor General,
Harar Province, while the Somaliland delegation was led by J. R. Stebbing, Chief Secretary to the
Somaliland Protectorate Government. The two delegates met fifteen times during the conference.
EHR, cxvii. 474 (Nov. 2zoo2)
unlawful activities of the Tribal Police which provoked disorder and
moved 'without their tribes', and the armed attacks by Somalis on the
Sinclair Camp and the Governor of Awareh. The Somaliland delegation
attempted to bring Ethiopian activities in the territories in line with the
1954 agreement, while the Ethiopian delegation insisted on Ethiopian
sovereignty.57
By way of illustration, the Somaliland delegation stated that under the
terms of Article II of the 1954 Agreement the contracting parties share
both the right to the grazing for their tribes and the obligation to
preserve it as far as possible'. The term 'grazing rights covers access to,
and full use of, all the grazing which existed in' all the territories. The
Ethiopian delegation in contrast insisted that 'there can be no question
of grazing rights of the contracting parties, as alleged'. In addition,
neither the 1897 Agreement nor the 1954 Agreement prevented Ethiopia
from transforming grazing areas into 'agricultural, farm, industrial' or
any 'other uses'. Article II, as alleged by the Somaliland delegation,
'contains no language referring to 'traditional grazing rights'. It refers
only to the idea that 'grazing might take place'. The delegates were
essentially contesting the language of the agreements. With respect to
Article II of the 1954 Agreement, the Ethiopian delegation was correct
because the article made no reference to any 'rights' of the Somalis to the
Haud, only stipulating that the pastoralists might 'cross the frontier for
the purpose of grazing'. However, the article also referred to the 1897
Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty which recognized the 'right to the grazing-
grounds' of the pastoralists. The Somaliland delegation was unable to
make the Ethiopian delegation acknowledge such a 'right'.58
To take another example: the two delegations discussed the issue of
the tribal organization of the Somalis. The Somaliland delegation
referred to Article III of the 1954 agreement under which it was agreed
that 'tribal organisation consisting of the system of Local Authorities
(Akils), tribal police (Illaloes) and elders, as set up and recognised by the
Government of the Somaliland Protectorate shall continue to function.'
The Ethiopian Government had violated the agreement by appointing
their own Tribal Authorities over the pastoralists. The Ethiopian
delegation insisted that the Ethiopian Government never sought to
appoint Akils for the 'tribes' from Somaliland, only for Ethiopians.
Ethiopia had the right to make such appointments since it was a
sovereign nation, and since many of the Somalis were 'Ethiopian'. Here
the argument was about the identity of the people of the areas. They were
all Somalis of course. But under colonial rule, they had been divided
57- Oxford University, Rhodes House Library, Mss.Afr.S.21o9, Box 2, J. R. Stebbing, Harar
Conference: 12 December 1955 to zo December 1955 and 2 January 1956 to 21 January 1956. The box
contains all the agenda of the conference, and the discussions that took place. The perspective,
nonetheless, is limited since no direct archival research in Ethiopia has been undertaken for the
writing of this paper.
58. Ibid., pp. 15-20.
between 'British-Somalis' and 'Ethiopian-Somalis'. The

who was 'Ethiopian-Somali', who was 'British-Somali' an
on such distinction? For Ethiopia 'if a tribe so much prefe
to remain there through the greater part of the year, it
Ethiopian Government rather than the Protectorate Gover
is entitled to lay claim to nationality and jurisdiction over
Nationality was for Ethiopia a central concern. And it sough
this in two ways: by encouraging agricultural settlement, a
grazing. The limitations on grazing were supposed
pastoralists to settle down as agriculturists, and thus to ma
Ethiopia to claim them as Ethiopian citizens. The two
disagreed on every other issue.
The negotiations failed because, according to J. R. S
Chief Secretary to the Somaliland Administration,60 Et
was to 'reduce grazing rights by cultivation' and then
Ethiopian citizen any person who settled to cultivate the l
the most rudimentary and temporary fashion'. Ethiopia w
to appoint its own tribal chiefs over the pastoralists, whil
the traditional elders, and even used the tribal system to cr
among the Somalis in order to 'split' them and prevent
alliance' against Ethiopia. It was also intent on underminin
Police created under the agreement. These policies
indication of Ethiopia's 'undoubtedly expansionist and
policy towards Somaliland. Stebbing recommended to
Cabinet that it should 'make a fresh and most determined b
outright, the essential grazing areas of the Territories'. 'I f
'that H.M.G. should be prepared to pay a high price and th
only be abandoned if it is completely impossible on groun
proves quite unacceptable to the Ethiopians.'61 Sir Theo
governor of Somaliland from 1954 to 1958, agreed.62 He s
the British Cabinet should appoint a high-level delega
Mr. Dodds Parker (Parliamentary Under Secretary of State
Affairs) to Ethiopia to discuss the problem of the territori
the preservation of the grazing rights of the pastoralists, t
movement, the protection of the Tribal Authorities, the Tr
the Liasion Staff. But above all, the British Cabinet m
with every means in its power to acquire the area outr
political unrest in the Territories will steadily increase
produce repercussions throughout the whole region.'
however, had to be carefully handled since British eff
'construed as evidence of a desire for colonial expansion'.63
59. Ibid., p. 23.

6o. Ibid., J. R. Stebbing to Sir Theodore Pike, Governor of Somaliland, 27 Jan
6i. Ibid.
62. Ibid., Theodore Pike to Alan Lennox-Boyd, Secretary State for the Colonies, 28 January 1956.
63. Ibid.
The instability in the territories, the development of militant
nationalist activities in Somaliland, and the threat it posed to the security
of the region - the Horn of Africa as well as the Middle East - alarmed
the Cabinet. According to a memorandum by the Secretary of State for
the Colonies, the increasing militancy of nationalist politics since the
signing of the 1954 agreement had opened the country to the 'subversive
activities of the Egyptians' and the Soviets.64 It was necessary to preserve
the Protectorate from 'any potential enemy', but at the same time the
concerns of the Somalis had to be addressed; otherwise British strategic
interests could not be protected. There were two possible solutions to the
crisis. First, the creation of Greater Somalia, and second, the granting of
independence to the Protectorate. Both solutions were unacceptable:
On the one hand the Greater Somalia policy had been abandoned in
1949, and on the other the Cabinet already decided that Somaliland
should remain under British rule for the foreseeable future. The
Secretary of State for the Colonies stated that it was necessary to
continue with 'our general Colonial policy', that is, 'the economic and
political development of the Protectorate at a reasonable pace, acknowl-
edging our eventual aim of self-government but realising and admitting
that it is likely to take a very long time to achieve'. After all, the poverty
of the country - the 'facts of economics' - 'rule out any prospect of
genuine self-government on a reasonable standard of living within the
foreseeable future'. Besides, if self-government or independence were to
be granted 'it is never possible, once political control of a territory has
been abandoned, to be certain of retaining sufficient influence to secure
our strategic needs in it.' The continuation of the 'general colonial
policy', however, faced many difficulties, among them, the growth of
Somali nationalism and the threat from the Egyptians and the Soviet
Union. These concerns had to be addressed, otherwise Somalis 'may
quickly become estranged and it is likely that before long we shall find
ourselves having to hold the Protectorate by force - by no means an
impossible operation but one not likely to be either inexpensive or
palatable to the British people'.65
The Chiefs of Staff were more than willing to endorse a policy whose
main objective was the maintenance of British rule over the territory,
whether such occupation was expensive or not. They argued
that Somaliland was essential to the defence of Western interests in
the Middle East, the Indian Ocean and the Horn of Africa, just as the
United States considered Ethiopia as central to the defences of the
Western alliance.66 Somaliland, the Chiefs of Staffwrote, 'offers strategic
64. PRO, CAB 129/80, Cabinet: The Somaliland Protectorate: Memorandum by the Secretary of
the State for the Colonies, 23 March 1956. The rest of this paragraph is based on this document.
65. Ibid.
66. Harold G. Marcus, Ethiopia, Great Britain, and the United States, [941-1947 (Berkeley, CA,
1983); Wm. Roger Louis, Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization ofthe British
Empire, 1941-1945 (New York, 1978).
advantages similar to those ofAden'.67 But there were ma

the Western alliance should not rely too heavily on A
Soviet Union was threatening and undermining Western
northern tier system of British defences in the Middle Eas
Arab States in its rear. Second, as a result of the sub
Southern Red Sea, the Aden base was becoming less s
appeared. Third, the situation would become even wo
independence Somalia fell under Egyptian or Soviet in
development would pose a direct threat to the security
Kenya and all other British territories in East Africa. Th
Somaliland and Somalia in the Western alliance, therefore
the maintenance of stability in north-east Africa.
prospecting was being carried out in the Protectorate,
successful, the strategic value of the Protectorate would
short, 'in view of recent events in the Middle East t
importance of the Somaliland Protectorate has increased'.
The Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Secreta
Foreign Affairs took a similar position. They too viewed
of the country in geopolitical terms. But, unlike the Chief
addressed the implications of the policy on the groun
tained that Egypt was gaining increasing influence i
Somaliland. There were many Egyptian teachers worki
The Egyptians were also represented in the United Na
Council for Somalia. So they were 'in a good position
intensive propaganda among the Somalis'. If, moreover, a
Somalia fell under Egyptian influence, and the Russians i
country, then British territories in East Africa (from the
would face 'a pincer movement'.69 The central problem in
the Haud question, since it was the cause of Somali res
resentment might be mitigated only if Ethiopia chang
towards the implementation of the 1954 agreement, and
British got 'a lease of the territories'.70
In April 1956 the Cabinet dispatched Mr. Dodds-Park
tary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to the
to 'persuade Ethiopia to cede the Territories'.71 Like th
over the exchange of territories in the 1940s, Mr. Dodds-
mission failed. He 'met with so vehement a refusal t
67. PRO, CAB 129/8I, Strategic Importance of the Somaliland Protectorate, 3

paragraph is based on this document.
68. Ibid. See also CAB 129/80, The Horn of Africa: Joint Cabinet Memor
Lloyd and Lennox-Boyd on Security Problems, 25 March 1956.
69. PRO, CAB i29/8o, Cabinet: Horn of Africa: Memorandum by the Secr
Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 24 March 1956. Th
on this document.
70. Ibid.
71. PRO, CAB 129/82, Cabinet: Somaliland Protectorate and the Horn of Africa: Memorandum
by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 25 July 1956.
conclude that no attempt on our part to obtain the Territories by lease,
barter or purchase at any price which would be considered possible is
ever likely to succeed.'72 After the failure of Dodd-Parker's mission,
in May 1956 the Cabinet dispatched Lord Lloyd, Parliamentary
Under-Secretary of State, to Somaliland to assess the mood of the
country. Lord Lloyd stayed in Somaliland for ten days, saw 'a fair
amount of the country' and met a 'large number of Somalis
from different sections of the community'.73 Two factors, he stated,
dominated politics in the country: the loss of the Haud and the
approaching independence of Somalia. The loss of the Haud and the
Reserved Area was bitterly felt because it caused a 'mortal economic blow
to the Somalis'. But apart from the economic issues created by the loss of
the territories, 'Somalis feel a real sense of injustice over this matter.
Rightly or wrongly they have always regarded these territories as an
integral part of the Protectorate.' The main political party leading the
nationalist campaign was the National United Front, which had for a
while dominated the political scene to such an extent that it had more or
less absorbed the other major political parties, such as the Somali Youth
League and Somali National League. The aim of the party was the return
of the lost territories, the independence of the country and association
between Somaliland and Somalia. If the British government did not
address these concerns of the Somalis, then there was a danger of the
radicalization of Somali nationalism. The Somalis, Lord Lloyd stated,
might be driven to seek the help of states, such as Egypt and the Soviet
Union. 'If this should happen', he added, 'we shall be faced in the I96os
or before with an extremely serious situation in the Horn of Africa.' It
would 'constitute a grave threat to our strategic interests in East African
and of course Aden; similarly it will constitute a great threat to our
potential oil interest in the Somaliland Protectorate, Somalia and even in
the Ethiopian Ogaden.' There were two alternatives to managing the
problem of Somali nationalism. One was to 'back the Ethiopians
wholeheartedly and to allow and even assist them to absorb the Somalis,
which is what they themselves would like to do'. The second was to 'assist
the Somalis to achieve their own real ambition which is a united Somali
State'. Both solutions were, however, fraught with problems. The first
would only further inflame Somali nationalism and pose a threat to the
whole region, and the second would be opposed by Ethiopia, the United
States, and France. Lord Lloyd again raised the issue of land exchange
and specifically the exchange of an area in northern Kenya (Mandera
quadrilateral) for the Haud and the Reserved Area. But the suggestion
was pointless. Ethiopia, as the Cabinet understood, would never agree to
72. Cabinet: Somaliland Protectorate and the Horn of Africa: Memorandum by the Secretary of
State for the Colonies, 25 July 1956.
73. PRO, CAB 129/82, Appendix A: Report by Lord Lloyd on his Visit to Somaliland,
20-31 May, 1956. The rest of this paragraph is based on this document.
such an exchange, particularly after the discovery of oil in the Haud
Lord Lloyd's final recommendation to the Cabinet was the adoption of
a policy that would 'keep both the Somalis and Ethiopians within th
sphere of Western influence'.74 But he was not able to specify what shape
such a policy would take.
One such policy was suggested by the Secretary of State for the
Colonies and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.75 In a join
memorandum, they called for the formation of'a consortium of Powers
over a unified Somali society. The consortium would consist of the
powers responsible for the Somali population, namely the United
Kingdom, France, Italy, Ethiopia, the United States (as a major financial
power) as well as Pakistan as a 'respectable and nearby Moslem power
The aim of the consortium was not so much to govern Somalis, but to
provide financial and technical assistance, and manage the 'problem
posed by expanding Somali nationalism'. There was, however, one
difficulty: Somalis would resent any Ethiopian participation in the
consortium unless Ethiopia made major concessions on the land
question. But Ethiopia was unlikely to do so. In addition, Ethiopia
would oppose any 'progressive policy' towards the Somalis unless it was
included in the consortium. The consortium, in other words, would
alienate either the Somalis or the Ethiopians.
Selywn Lloyd, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, suggested
another, albeit impractical, solution to the Somali crisis: the postpone-
ment of the independence of Somalia76 which had already been
determined under the 1949 United Nations Resolution. The Cabine
believed that the approaching independence of Somalia set a bad
precedent for Somaliland; therefore Selwyn Lloyd attempted to persuade
the Italians to postpone it to a later and unspecified date. Although Italy
was receptive to the idea, the problem was how to rescind the U.N.
resolution that had determined that date.77 On 15 May 1956 the Cabinet
was invited to 'consider what prospect there might be of securing an
extension of Italian trusteeship for Somalia'. The suggestion was rejected
because it was 'fraught with difficulty'.78 Any extension of the Italian
trusteeship required the rescinding of the 1949 U.N. resolution by
two-thirds majority. Such an attempt would 'involve a full-debate in the
United Nations and our Permanent Representative reports that a
majority of members would undoubtedly oppose any attempt to repeal
the 1949 resolution. Without succeeding, we should provoke accusations
74. Ibid.
75. Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the Secretary of State for the
Colonies, 24 March 1956.
76. PRO, CAB 129/81, Cabinet: Somalia: Memorandum by Selwyn Lloyd on the Prospects of
Extending Italian Trusteeship, 29 May 1956.
77. Ibid.
78. PRO, CAB I29/81, Cabinet: Somalia: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign
Affairs, 29 May 1956.
of suppression of national aspirations.'79 By 1956, then, the Cabinet had
reached an impasse about how to respond to some key policy questions:
how to control Somali nationalism and prevent Egyptian and Soviet
penetration into Somaliland and Somalia; how to persuade Ethiopia to
make concessions on the land question; and how to keep the region
within the Western sphere of influence.
Hitherto the object of British policy was to keep Somaliland as a
Protectorate for the foreseeable future. In 1957, however, a measure of
flexibility was introduced into British policy. The Cabinet decided to
pursue two options: on the one hand to persuade Ethiopia to make
concessions to the Somalis, and to persuade both the Ethiopians and the
Somalis to work together in implementing the 1954 agreement; and on
the other to promote (if the first option failed) the union of Somalia and
Somaliland soon after i96o.80 For Morgan (Colonial Office), the first
option was a short-term policy since it would contribute nothing to
solving the 'long-term problems which would arise when Somalia
attained its independence in 1960'.81 The second option, in contrast, was
a long-term alternative. The first option must be tried, but when it failed
then the second must be pursued.82 British policy, he maintained, must
not 'remain immutable until 196o'.83 By 1958, the Cabinet realized the
hopelessness of the first option: Ethiopians and Somalis were not likely
amicably to settle the issue, and certainly they would not amicably
implement the 1954 agreement. The failure of the Harar conference was
a testament to the difficulty that confronted any policy aimed to secure
the implementation of the agreement. Therefore, a switch was made to
the second option: the formation of a union between Somaliland and
Somalia once Somalia had become independent. In other words, Greater
Somalia was scaled down to a union of only two countries which
required the policy to be 'given the appearance of Somali initiative'.84
The prospect of granting independence to Somaliland was formally
discussed in a session held on 7 November 1958, by the Steering
Committee on the Horn of Africa.85 The discussion stressed the by now
familiar geopolitical significance of the region for the defence of the
interests of the Western alliance. Two interrelated points were raised: the
fostering of conditions that would lead on the one hand to stability in
the region and prevent the spread of Nasserist and communist influence
not only into the region but also into Tropical Africa, and on the other to
79. Ibid.
80. PRO, F.O.371/I31232, J. L. Morgan, Somaliland Protectorate and Somalia: Comments on

the F.O. Draft Reply to the Conservative Commonwealth Council, I5 August 1957.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid.
84. PRO, F.O.371/I31229, The Conservative Commonwealth Council, Somaliland Protectorate,
May 1958.
85. PRO, F.O.371/31229, R. W. L. Wilding, Secretary, 'Steering Committee,' 4 November 1958.
The rest of the paragraph is based on this document.
maintenance of Western strategic interests in the Horn of Africa as well
as in the Middle East. To safeguard these interests, key issues were
identified: first, the growth of nationalist consciousness and politics
in the Somali territories; second, the approaching independence of
Somalia; third, the desire among Somalis not only to recover the los
territories but also to unify their territories; and fourth, the Ethiopian
insistence on maintaining its frontier and the equally vehement
insistence of the Somalis on maintaining their rights over their
traditional country. The key solution, the Steering Committee decided,
was the adoption of a 'more positive attitude to the question of
Somali unity' though only between Somaliland and Somalia. 'Th
main pressure', the committee stated, 'is for an association between
Somalia and the Protectorate'.86 The Foreign Office agreed. According
to J. H. A. Watson (Foreign Office), it was impossible to maintain
British rule over Somaliland once Somalia became independent. There
was an urgent need, he argued, for a rapid devolution of power to the
Protectorate.87 The pressure was already growing for association between
Somaliland and Somalia, particularly in the Protectorate, since its
independence, unlike that of Somalia, had not yet been determined.88
The Colonial Office agreed and suggested the preparation for associ
ation between the two territories.89 In December 1958 the Secretary of
State for the Colonies stated that, in light of the developments in the
region, the British should offer Somaliland independence in I960, and
then form an association between Somaliland and Somalia.90 He added,
'the important thing is that we should not be accused of something close
to forcing this union upon them (Somaliland).'91 With such a union, the
new country would remain within the Western sphere of influence, and
British 'rights of overflying and staging for both military and charter
aircraft' would be established.92 The urgent task now was to make
statement on British policy with respect to the independence of
Somaliland because 'the sooner a statement is made the better if we are
not to be faced with a considerable risk of unrest'.93
86. Ibid.
87. PRO, F.O.371/I31230, J. H. A. Watson, Foreign Office, to G. W. Furlonge Esq., Addis

Ababa, 14 November 1958.
88. Ibid.
89. J. L. Morgan, Somaliland Protectorate and Somalia: Comments on the F.O. Draft Reply to
the Conservative Commonwealth Council, I5 August 1958.
90. PRO, F.O.37I/131232, Cabinet: Colonial Policy Committee: Policy in Aden and Somaliland:
Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, December 1958.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid. Aden by then had become vulnerable to 'current trends of world opinion', British
relations with Arab states, nationalist agitation in Aden itself and Soviet subversive activities.
Despite all these problems, the 'essential Defence requirements of H.M.G' in the region must be
secured. For such 'requirements' Somaliland had become very important indeed, even more so than
in 1956, when the Chiefs of Staff considered the country of great and central importance in the
defence of Western interests in the region.
93. Ibid.
Meanwhile, Ethiopia and France were re-assured that the proposed
union was not a revival of Greater Somalia, but rather an attempt to solve
the problem of Somali nationalism in Somaliland and Somalia, and
particularly in Somaliland since Somalia was already assured of its
independence. In January 1959 the British ambassador in Addis Ababa
was instructed to begin discussions on the issue as soon as possible.
Moreover, the U.S. State Department was persuaded to reassure
Ethiopia about 'what is envisaged regarding the future association of the
Protectorate and Somalia' and to try 'to enlist Ethiopian goodwill'.94
The British ambassador in Addis Ababa was to explain to the Ethiopians
that the 'basic problem to be tackled is Somali expansionism'.95 In its
'extreme form this extends to the concept of a Greater Somalia'. But the
British Government shares the 'Ethiopian objection to Greater Somalia'.
'In practice therefore this leaves the question of relations between
Somalia and the Protectorate.'96 A union was the best that could be done
about 'Somali expansionism'. It also solved the 'danger that the
Egyptians will be able to represent themselves as the true friends of
the Somalis and will be able to establish a dominating influence in the
area'.97 Somali nationalism was to be placated with a compromise - a
union between Somaliland and Somalia - since (a) Greater Somalia was
out of the question and (b) since neither the Haud and the Reserved Area
(for Somaliland) nor the Ogaden (for Somalia) would be returned. The
Cabinet accepted Lennox-Boyd's proposal. Somaliland was to be
granted its independence in I96O, which would coincide with the date of
independence of the Trusteeship Territory.
In February 1959, Lennox-Boyd went on tour in Somaliland. He
related his experience during the visit to Harold Macmillan. 'When we
arrived,' he wrote, 'it was clear that the extremist party, the Somali
National League had succeeded in whipping up a considerable follow-
ing, certainly amongst the townspeople.'98 The Somali National
League (S.N.L.) organized various demonstrations in which crowds sat
'down with their backs to me as we passed through'. In the formal
meeting with political leaders and elders in the towns, the S.N.L. often
'put their demands in a more offensive manner'. In general, there was a
'considerable unanimity between almost all sections of opinion in
demanding very substantial constitutional advance, sometimes called
Self-Government and sometimes Independence'. In either case, they
wanted self-government or independence to 'enable them to have the
chance of joining up with Somalia by the end of 196o when that
94. PRO, F.O.371/I383I7, J. R. A. Bottomley, British Embassy, Washington D.C., Paper on

Somaliland Protectorate, 31 December 1958.
95. Ibid.
96. Ibid.
97. Ibid.
98. PRO, F.O.371/I138325, Lennox-Boyd to The Rt. Hon. Harold Macmillan, io Downing
Street, 12 February 1959. The rest of the paragraph is based on this document.
territory became independent'. He added,

their long-standing grievance at the loss o
grounds to Ethiopia under the 1954 Agree
that, because of our obligations under th
never be able to do anything for them on
with the 'moderate political leaders' and 'G
spot' confirmed for him that 'we had been a
that I should make a Statement on the
Cabinet.'99
In the prepared statement that he broa
Lennox-Boyd declared that Her Majesty's Gov
to pay special regard to the fact that the
Somalia is due to become independent
constitutional development in the Protectora
promised that the new Governor, Sir D
constitutional development immediatel
would be an elected Legislative Council wi
Somalis possessing executive responsibilities.
Government would take all the necessary
'self-government' for the Protectorate. H
exaggerated solemnity, that Her Majesty's Go
desire expressed by many Somalis in the pro
be a closer association between this territory
Majesty's Government would 'arrange for
nature' for the formation of the associat
statement was analysed by the Local Intel
predicted that the elite would applaud the sta
Britain's decision to grant Somaliland its
Lennox-Boyd, nor the Local Intelligence Com
begrudged the elite their symbolic victory. 10
On 2 May 196o the British governm
Somaliland to a constitutional conference i
delegation was led by Mohamed Haji Ibr
Government Business in the Legislative C
Government and the President of the Som
Sir Douglas Hall, the Governor of the terr
Somalia was also present as observers not
conference, the Somaliland delegation pr
99. Ibid.
Ioo. Great Britain. Colonial Office, Colonial Office Annual Reports on the Somaliland
Protectorate, 1958 and gp59 (London, I96O), pp. 6o-6i.
ioI. Ibid.
102. PRO, C.O.830/19, Constitutional Reform - Assessment of Reactions to Secretary of State's
Speech: Memorandum by the Local Intelligence Committee, 2 February 1959.
103. Sir Douglas Hall, 'Somaliland's Last Year as a Protectorate', African Affairs, (6o) (January
I96I).
EHR, cxvii. 474 (Nov. 22oo)
independence, to be followed at once by secession from the
Commonwealth and union with its larger neighbour'.104 They were
surprised by how quickly the British Government acceded to their
demands. Indeed, their call for the independence of Somaliland had
already been conceded by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Ian
Macleod, in a statement he made to the Times on 5 May.105 He
submitted the decision to the conference on 6 May. It called for the
independence of Somaliland on 26 June, and for the formation of a
union between Somaliland and Somalia on I July 196o.106 The British
Government, however, insisted on one stipulation before formally
agreeing to the independence of Somaliland: the abrogation of the
Anglo-Somali treaties under which Great Britain agreed never to cede
any Somali territory to any other power. I. M. Lewis noted the British
insistence on this stipulation with wonder. He wrote, 'What is of
particular interest here is that the British government should have felt it
appropriate and necessary to make this stipulation: earlier British
governments had shown little scruple in acting unilaterally against the
intention and content of these same treaties.'107 But the British
Government had to make this stipulation, and insist in particular that a
'Council of Elders' abrogate the treaties'08 because they feared the
examination of the treaties in the United Nations or the International
Court.109 The Somaliland delegation agreed to the stipulation. On
12 May the conference ended with the signing of a report by the
Secretary of State for the Colonies, which formally specified the date of
independence of Somaliland (26 June 1960), and its union with Somalia
(i July 196o).110 On 19 May the Somaliland delegation returned to
Hargeysa, and was met at the airport by about 3,000 people; ninety
vehicles followed them to the town; and about Io,ooo people lined the
streets of the town. They were described as 'one of the most cheerful and
peaceful crowds ever seen in Hargeisa'.'11
A conference was arranged between delegates from Somaliland and
Somalia in Mogadisho at the end of May, as Lennox-Boyd had promised
in his February 1959 statement. It lasted for sixteen days. Adan Abdulla
Osman headed the Somalia delegation, and Mohamed Ibrahim Egal the
Somaliland delegation. At the end of the conference the delegations
signed a joint communique which stated that 'Somalia and the
Somaliland Protectorate shall be united on July I, 1960.'"12 Neither
104. 'Somaliland, British: Talks in London', Africa Digest, vii (6) (17 May I960), p. 195.
105. Ibid.
o16. PRO, F.0.37I/146967, Secret, by E. B. Boothby, 6 May i96o.
107. 1. M. Lewis, The Modern History ofSomaliland, p. 164.
lo8. Ibid.
109. PRO, CAB 129/82, Somaliland Protectorate and the Horn ofAfrica, Cabinet Memorandum
by Lennox-Boyd, 1956.
Iio. 'Somali Republic: London Conference', Africa Digest, viii (I) (August 1960), p. 16.
III. PRO, F.O.37I/I46968, D. B. Hall to J. Watt, Esq., 19 May I960.
112. 'Joint Statement', Africa Digest, viii (6) (August 196o), p. 16.
EHR, cxvii. 474 (Nov. 20oz2)
Somaliland nor Somalia was prepared for

the two territories had confused ideas about what the association
between the two territories entailed, or whether it was desirable. As late
as February I96O, for instance, the leaders of the Somali National League
(S.N.L.) and the United Somali Party (which was formed in 1959) had
agreed to amalgamate their parties on the condition that the demands
for independence were halted. The leaders of the United Somali Party
insisted on the stipulation in 'order to put a brake on what they might
fear would be overhasty demands for independence by the Somali
National League'.113 The leader of the S.N.L., Mohamed Ibrahim Egal,
accepted the condition. The elite of Somaliland had no plans either for
independence or for union as late as February 1959. Lennox-Boyd's
February announcement, however, changed their programme, and
forced them to become committed to independence, and to association
with Somalia.
In Somalia, the date of independence was already set. Hence, no
notable political struggle for, or debate on, independence took place.
The main issue that the political elite debated was whether the two
territories should unite and under what conditions. The leader of the
government and the president of the Somali Youth League, Abdullahi
Issa, expressed throughout 1959 a 'luke-warm approach towards the
future association of the two territories'.114 He never changed his
attitude towards the union. He even repressed and persecuted nationalist
figures in the country,' 15among them the leader of the Greater Somalia
League, Haji Mohamed Hussein, who was committed to Greater
Somalia. The outbreak of riots in Mogadisho in 2 March 1960 and
attacks against Italian residents led to the replacement ofAbdullahi Issa
with Adan Abdulla Osman, a moderate politician who accepted the
association between Somalia and Somaliland.
The idea of union had hardly been debated or seriously thought about
in either territory. Mohamed Ibrahim Egal had what P. Carrel, the
Secretary to the Government, termed an 'imprecise' view on the subject.
He wanted, Carrel stated, to form a 'Supreme Council' which would
govern the two territories for at least five years. Both territories would
have equal members in the Council, and the Legislative Councils of the
two territories would not be amalgamated, but would function as two
separate governing bodies for the two regions. 'During this limited
period the new constitution for the united stage would be framed.'16
Such caution, was, however, swept aside by the pace of reforms and
changes introduced by early 1960. The formation of the union followed
113. PRO, F.0.371/146966, D. B. Hall, Hargeysa, to I. Watt, Esq., io February I96o.

114. PRO, F.O.371/146966, J. S. G. Drysdale, British Consulate General, Mogadisho, to the
Hon. Nigel Bruce, Research Department, Foreign Office, 4 December 1959.
115. PRO, F.O.371/146966, A. C. Kendall, British Consulate General, Mogadisho, to H. F. T.
Smith, Esq., Africa Department, Foreign Office, 19 February 1960.
116. PRO, F.O.371/146966, Sir D. Hall to Secretary of State, 13 April 1960.
THE DECOLONIZATION OF SOMALILAND, 1954-I960 I203
the schedule set up, and was devised by the Cabinet. Egal, with his
typical 'imprecise' thinking on the union, and on virtually everything
else, was simply carried on by events. Somaliland became independent
on 26 June I96o, and just four days later formed the desired union with
Somalia. It was much less than a union, however. As H. E T. Smith put
it, the 'union' marked the total 'absorption of Somaliland by Somalia'.'7
It might have solved 'Somali expansionism' during the twilight of the
British Empire, but as Margery Perham so presciently noted, it also
prepared the ground for a 'promising brew' 8 that would haunt the
post-colonial politics of the region.
Abu-Dhabi JAMA MOHAMED
117. PRO, F.O.371/I4698I, H. F. T. Smith, Britis

Office, I96o.
118. Margery Perham, 'The Horn of Africa,' Corona (June 1959).

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Imperial Policies and Nationalism in The Decolonization of Somaliland, 1954-1960

Author(s): Jama Mohamed

Imperial Policies and Nationalism in The

IN 1949, the British Cabinet discussed constitutional development in

I. P[ublic]R[ecord]O[ffice], CAB 129/33/2, Constitutional Development in Smaller Territories,

EHR, cxvii. 474 (Nov. 2oo2)

EHR, cxvii. 474 (Nov. 2ooz)

Io. David Levering Lewis, Race to Fashoda, p. 12.

EHR, cxvii. 474 (Nov. zoo2)

\. orDjiboui Mapa rarda FDr El

1 _______ * H~is *Jitj *8

The 'Rodd Line'.

Mahdists through Ethiopia. The negotiations between Ras Maconen

21. Ibid., Annex 3.

EHR, cxvii. 474 (Nov. 2ooz)

EHR, cxvii. 474 (Nov. 2002)

Somalia was returned to Italian trusteeship f

EHR, cxvii. 474 (Nov. zoo2)

EHR, cxvii. 474 (Nov. 200oo2)

Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1897 and the letters annexed th

EHR, cxvii. 474 (Nov. 2002)

EHR, cxvii. 474 (Nov. 2002)

EHR, cxvii. 474 (Nov. zoo2)

? i i . . . . . . ? " '! .., . . . . ... .. ... . . ? ?

Sii: , i . ... .i ???

. . ...? 1i ' :"::' '" l :,-.... . i i,

EHR, cxvii. 474 (Nov. 2002)

Anglo-Ethiopian treaty. The most recent Anglo-Ethiop

EHR, cxvii. 474 (Nov. 2002)

EHR, cxvii. 474 (Nov. 2002)

and the Somalis.'5" This was inevitable. The agreement ga

EHR, cxvii. 474 (Nov. 2zoo2)

EHR, cxvii. 474 (Nov. 2oo2)

between 'British-Somalis' and 'Ethiopian-Somalis'. The

59. Ibid., p. 23.

EHR, cxvii. 474 (Nov. 2002)

EHR, cxvii. 474 (Nov. 2002)

advantages similar to those ofAden'.67 But there were ma

67. PRO, CAB 129/8I, Strategic Importance of the Somaliland Protectorate, 3

EHR, cxvii. 474 (Nov. 200oo2)

EHR, cxvii. 474 (Nov. 2002)

EHR, cxvii. 474 (Nov. 2002)

80. PRO, F.O.371/I31232, J. L. Morgan, Somaliland Protectorate and Somalia: Comments on

EHR, cxvii. 474 (Nov. 2002)

87. PRO, F.O.371/I31230, J. H. A. Watson, Foreign Office, to G. W. Furlonge Esq., Addis

EHR, cxvii. 474 (Nov. 2002)

94. PRO, F.O.371/I383I7, J. R. A. Bottomley, British Embassy, Washington D.C., Paper on

EHR, cxvii. 474 (Nov. 2002)

territory became independent'. He added,

EHR, cxvii. 474 (Nov. 22oo)

EHR, cxvii. 474 (Nov. 20oz2)

Somaliland nor Somalia was prepared for

113. PRO, F.0.371/146966, D. B. Hall, Hargeysa, to I. Watt, Esq., io February I96o.

EHR, cxvii. 474 (Nov. 2oo2)

Abu-Dhabi JAMA MOHAMED

117. PRO, F.O.371/I4698I, H. F. T. Smith, Britis

EHR, cxvii. 474 (Nov. zoo2002)

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