1.

Rule 40 (MTC to RTC)

Provost vs. CA, G.R. No. 160406, June 26, 2006
Petitioners : Spouses Dolores Miranda Provost
Respondents: CA ; Spouses Victor Ramos ; FE A. Ramos

FACTS :
Private respondents are owners of a parcel of land (Camiguin). The lot was donated to them by Yap
adjacent to the land owned by the petitioner. The petitioner constructed a fence separating the two lots.
The respondents, believing that the petitioners encroaches area but the latter refused. The respondents
thus had a relocation survey and the relocation showed that the fence was indeed on their land.
Petitioners denied alleging that the survey plan used had been disapproved by the DENR Regional Office
for being defective and was replaced with a correction survey. Upon request of petitioners, another
relocation survey was done using the approved cadastral survey. The survey showed that the fence was
within petitioners property.
Respondents filed a complaint for recovery of ownership and possession with damages and a prayer for
preliminary injunction before the MTC. They alleged that petitioners encroached on 314 sq. meters of
their lot. MTC DENIED and held that the respondents failed to prove their ownership and possession.
On appeal, RTC AFFIRMED MTCs decision saying that the respondents claim is only based on
disapproved survey plan.
Respondents appealed to CA. CA REVERSED RTCs decision and ordered petitioners to vacate area, pay
damages, remove fence.
At the outset, we not that this case involves an error of judgment and NOT in jurisdiction. Petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 is NOT PROPER. Nevertheless, we shall give due course to the instant petition
as one proper for review under Rule 45.

ISSUE :
W/N RTC can decide cases brought on appeal from MTC even without jurisdiction over subject matter.

HELD :

Regional Trial Courts have jurisdiction over complaints for recovery of ownership or accion
reinvindicatoria.
Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Civil Procedure nonetheless allows RTC to decide the case brought on
appeal from the MTC which, even without jurisdiction over subject matter, may decide case on merits.
In the instant case, the MTC Mambajao, should have dismissed the complaint outright for lack of
jurisdiction but since it decided the case on its merits, the RTC rendered a decision based on the findings
of MTC.

Encarnacion vs. Amigo, G.R. No. 169793, September 15, 2006

G.R. No. 169793 September 15, 2006
VICTORIANO M. ENCARNACION, petitioner, vs. NIEVES AMIGO, respondent.
FACTS
Petitioner Victoriano M. Encarnacion is the registered owner of Lot consisting of 100 square meters and
another Lot consisting of 607 square meters located at Cauayan, Isabela. Said two lots originally form
part of Lot No. 2121, owned by Rogelio Valiente who sold the same to Nicasio Mallapitan. Mallapitan
sold the land to Victoriano Magpantay. After the death of the latter in 1992, his widow, Anita N.
Magpantay executed an Affidavit of Waiver waving her right over the property in favor of her son-in-law,
herein petitioner, Victoriano Encarnacion. Thereafter, the latter caused the subdivision of the land into two
lots and the issuance of titles in his name

Nieves Amigo allegedly entered the premises and took possession of a portion of the property without the
permission of the owner, Victoriano Magpantay. Petitioner demanded that the respondent vacate the
subject property.
The Municipal Trial Court in Cities rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff VICTORIANO M.
ENCARNACION.
On appeal, the RTC ruled that as the Municipal Court had no jurisdiction over the case, it (RTC) Court
acquired no appellate jurisdiction thereof.
Petitioner filed a petition for review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court before the CA which
promulgated the assailed Decision remanding the case to the Regional Trial Court.

Issue
Whether the RTC erred in dismissing the case.

Held
The RTC should have not dismissed the case.
Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial; lack of jurisdiction. If an appeal is
taken from an order of the lower court dismissing the case without a trial on the merits, the Regional Trial
Court may affirm or reverse it, as the case may be. In case of affirmance and the ground of dismissal is
lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court, if it has jurisdiction thereover, shall
try the case on the merits as if the case was originally filed with it. In case of reversal, the case shall be
remanded for further proceedings.
The RTC should have taken cognizance of the case. If the case is tried on the merits by the Municipal
Court without jurisdiction over the subject matter, the RTC on appeal may no longer dismiss the case if it
has original jurisdiction thereof. Moreover, the RTC shall no longer try the case on the merits, but shall
decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented in the lower court, without prejudice to the
admission of the amended pleadings and additional evidence in the interest of justice.

2. Rule 41 (RTC to CA)

Manila Memorial Park vs. CA, 344 SCRA 769 (2001)
MANILA MEMORIAL PARK vs. CA, 344 SCRA 769 (2000)
PETITIONERS: Manila Memorial Park Cemetery Inc
RESPONDENTS: Court of Appeals, Bernardo, Dominador, Hermogena Lucia and Maria Gatchalian and
the Heirs of Gregorio Gatchalian, Rolando, Conrado and Arturo, all surnamed Gacthalian
PONENTE: Vitug. J
FACTS:
Respondents = filed an action for reconveyance and recovery of parcels of land against petitioner and its
co-defendants United Housing Corporation, Victorino Hernandez, Heurs of de Leon and Heirs of Nicolas
Gatchalian.
TC = through Judge Acosta, dismissed the complaint for lack of merit and habing been barred by statute
of limitations and by laches. The counterclaim of the defendants were also dismissed for lack of evidence.
Respondents = received a copy of the decision
Private respondents = on the last of the prescribed 15-day period to appea, filed a motion for new trial
and/or reconsideration.
TC = denied the motion and order was received by the respondents
Respondents = filed a notice of appeal
TC = gave due course to the appeal and directed the transmittal of the records of the case to the CA.
However, the records of the case was not transmitted to CA due to missing transcript of stenographic
notes.
TC = required the parties to appear in conference.
**Almost a year had lapsed but the missing stenographic notes were still not submitted to the trial court.
Respondents = filed a motion for new trial for retaking and presentation of testimonial and documentary
evidence on the ground that the reconstitution of the missing stenographic notes was no longer possible
considering that the court stenographers who had transcribed the testimony of witnesses by then since
retired from the service, their whereabouts unknown.
Petitioner = filed a motion to dimiss the appeal and an opposition to the motion for new trial contending
that the appeal was filed out of time hence, remedy for new trial cannot be availed of.
TC = motion for new trial is granted thus notice of appeal is declared mooted, motion to dismiss is
denied.
Petitioner = filed a Motion for Reconsideration
TC = dismissed the same
Petitioner = elevated the matter via petition for certiorari to the CA on the ground that the trial court had
acted capriciously and whimsically, as well as with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction, in holding that it was barred from assailing the timeliness of the appeal and in granting
respondent's motion for new trial long after the decision of the trial court had already become final and
executory.
CA = dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioner was estopped by laches from assailing the
notice of appeal. Thus, It is undisputed that petitioner filed the motion to dismiss appeal after almost
eight years the respondent court gave due course to respondent's notice of appeal. Petitioner did not raise
the issue of the timeliness of the appeal at the time the notice of appeal was filed by respondents. During
the conference on April 23, 1996 for the completion of the record, petitioner remained silent on the issue.
Instead, it voluntarily asked for time to locate the missing transcript of records to be submitted to
respondent court, which petitioner never accomplished without explanation. It was only after respondents
filed on February 28, 1997 a motion for new trial for the retaking or presentation of testimonial evidence
that petitioner started questioning the appeal essayed by respondents. Obviously, petitioner is estopped by
laches from assailing the notice of appeal which has long been given due course by respondent court. The
motion to dismiss appeal was filed too late.

ISSUE:
WON an ordinary appeal from RTC to CA is suspended or interrupted by motion for new trial or
reconsideration.

HELD: YES
RATIO DECIDENDI:

General Rule:
In Lacsamana vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, the Court has ruled that in an ordinary appeal from
the final judgment or order of a metropolitan or municipal trial court to the regional trial court, and from
the regional trial court to the Court of Appeals in actions or proceedings originally filed in the regional
trial court, the fifteen-day period for appeal prescribed by Section 39 of B.P. 129 and Section 19(a) of the
Interim Rules is interrupted or suspended by a motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed. If the
motion for new trial or reconsideration is denied, the moving party has only the remaining period from
notice of denial within which to file a notice of appeal. No motion for extension of time to file such a
notice of appeal is neither required nor allowed. This rule has been substantially reproduced in Section 3,
Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; thus:

"Sec. 3. Period of Ordinary Appeal - The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the
judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a
notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from notice of the judgment or final order.
The period of appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration. No motion
for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be allowed."

Accordingly, when respondents filed their motion for reconsideration on the last day of the fifteen day
prescribed period for taking an appeal, which motion was subsequently denied, they only had one (1) day
from receipt of a copy of the order denying the motion for reconsideration, within which to perfect their
appeal, i.e., excluding the day of receipt and including the next day. Since respondents had received a
copy of the order denying their motion for reconsideration on 28 November 1989, the filing of the
notice of appeal on 07 December 1989 came much too late for by then the judgment had already
become final and executory.

The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory
but jurisdictional upon the court a quo, and the failure to perfect that appeal renders its judgment final and
executory. A fundamental precept is that the reglementary periods under the Rules are to be strictly
observed for being considered indispensable interdictions against needless delays and an orderly
discharge of judicial business. The strict compliance with such periods has more than once been held to
be imperative, particularly and most significantly in respect to the perfection of appeals. The finality of a
judgment becomes a fact upon the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal if no appeal is perfected,
and the court loses all jurisdiction over the case, and it becomes the ministerial duty of the court
concerned to order execution of the judgment. After the judgment has become final and executory, vested
rights are acquired by the winning party. Just as the losing party has the right to file an appeal within the
prescribed period, so also the winning party has the correlative right to enjoy the finality of the resolution
of the case.

Exceptions to the general rule:

1. In Ramos vs. Bagasao, the Court excused the delay of four days in the filing of the notice of appeal
because the questioned decision of the trial court had been served upon appellant Ramos at a time when
her counsel of record was already dead. The new counsel could only file the appeal four days after the
presecribed reglementary period was over.
2. InRepublic vs. Court of Appeals, the Court allowed the perfection of an appeal by the Republic
despite the delay of six days to prevent a gross miscarriage of justice since the Republic stood to lose
hundreds of hectares of land already titled in its name and had since then been devoted for public
purposes.
3. In Olacao vs. National Labor Relations Commission, a tardy appeal was accepted considering that
the subject matter in issue had theretofore been judiciallly settled with finality in another case, and a
dismissal of the appeal would have had the effect of the appellant being ordered twice to make the same
reparation to the appellee.

DOCTRINE:
The legality of the appeal may be raised at any stage of the proceedings in the appellate court, and the
latter is not precluded from dismissing the petition on the ground of its being out of time. A recognition of
the merit of the petition does not necessarily carry with it any assumption or conclusion that it has been
timely filed.

Neypes vs. CA, 469 SCRA 633 (2005)

FACTS:
Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino, Lolito Victoriano, Jacob Obania and
Domingo Cabacungan filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance
and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before RTC Oriental Mindoro, against the Bureau of Forest
Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo,
namely, Fe, Corazon, Josefa, Salvador and Carmen.
Both petitioners and respondents: filed various motions with the trial court
(1) the motion filed by petitioners to declare the respondent heirs, the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of
Forest Development in default and
(2) the motions to dismiss filed by the respondent heirs and the Land Bank of the Philippines,
respectively.
TC: presided by public respondent Judge Antonio N. Rosales, resolved the foregoing motions as follows:
(1) the petitioners' motion to declare respondents Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest Development in
default was granted for their failure to file an answer, but denied as against the respondent heirs of del
Mundo because the substituted service of summons on them was improper;
(2) the Land Bank's motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action was denied because there were
hypothetical admissions and matters that could be determined only after trial, and
(3) the motion to dismiss filed by respondent heirsof del Mundo, based on prescription, was also denied
because there were factual matters that could be determined only after trial. 1
Respondent heirs: filed MR of the order denying their MTD on the ground that the TC could very well
resolve the issue of prescription from the bare allegations of the complaint itself without waiting for the
trial proper.
TC: dated February 12, 1998, dismissed petitioners' complaint on the ground that the action had already
prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the
15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed MR; On July 1, 1998, TC issued another order dismissing
the MR which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a
notice of appeal and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.
Court a quo: On August 4, 1998, denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late.
This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed MR but this too was denied in an
order dated September 3, 1998.
Petitioners: Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before CA
Petitioners claim: that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal arguing that the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the
final order of the trial court denying their MR; When they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998,
only five days had elapsed and they were well within the reglementary period for appeal.
CA: On September 16, 1999, dismissed the petition ruling that the 15-day period to appeal should have
been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their
complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was the "final order" appealable under the Rules. It
held further that petitioners' tardy appeal was correctly dismissed for the perfection of an appeal within
the reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-compliance with
such legal requirement is fatal and effectively renders the judgment final and executory
Petitioners: filed MR of the aforementioned decision.
CA: denied on January 6, 2000.
Hence this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules.
ISSUE:
Period within which petitioners should have filed their notice of appeal.
HELD:ESAIT
Right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and
may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks
to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads
to the loss of the right to appeal. The period to appeal is fixed by both statute and procedural rules. BP
129, as amended, provides:
Sec. 39. Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments,
or decisions of any court in all these cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of
the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from. Provided, however, that
in habeas corpus cases, the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the notice of
judgment appealed from. . . .
 Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from
the notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where a record on appeal is required,
the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from the
notice of judgment or final order.
The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or reconsideration.
No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or reconsideration shall be
allowed. (emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final
order appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more
for the court to do with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence
presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be
an order or judgment that dismisses an action.
We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days,
counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This
pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall
be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive
word "or" signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be
construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of "or" in the above provision
supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15
days from notice of the "final order," which we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order
denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.
Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which shortened the appeal
period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period of appeal (in this
case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The fresh period
of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for
reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is given another
opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of judgment. While
we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts become final at some definite time,
we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly.
In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period
should be counted from receipt of notice of judgment (March 3, 1998) or from receipt of notice of
"final order" appealed from (July 22, 1998).
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the
Regional Trial Court's decision or file it within 15 days from receiptof the order (the "final order")
denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be
availed of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the
lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41, Section 3.
Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from receipt of the order denying
their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh
appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed.
Petition GRANTED and CA decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Other important details:
PERIOD TO APPEAL; ORDER OR JUDGMENT WHEN DEEMED FINAL. An appeal should be
taken within 15 days from the notice of judgment or final order appealed from. A final judgment or order
is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with respect to it. It is an
adjudication on the merits which, considering the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically
what the rights and obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an
action.
ORDER DENYING THE PARTIES' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION CONSTITUTES THE
FINAL ORDER WHICH FINALLY DISPOSED OF THE ISSUES INVOLVED IN A CASE; CASE AT
BAR. In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc., the trial court declared petitioner
Quelnan non-suited and accordingly dismissed his complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he
filed an omnibus motion to set it aside. When the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period
to appeal the order had lapsed. He later on received another order, this time dismissing his omnibus
motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was likewise dismissed for having been filed out of
time. The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15 days after the dismissal of his
complaint since this was the final order that was appealable under the Rules. We reversed the trial court
and declared that it was the denial of the motion for reconsideration ofan order of dismissal of a
complaint which constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues raised there. This
pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v. Haldeman, et al. where we again
considered the order denying petitioner Apuyan's motion for reconsideration as the final order which
finally disposed of the issues involved in the case. Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain
petitioners' view that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration was the final
order contemplated in the Rules.
RULE; DELAY IN THE FILING OF AN APPEAL; WHEN MAY BE EXCUSED. In National
Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and Authority v. Municipality of Libmanan, however, we declared
that appeal is an essential part of our judicial system and the rules of procedure should not be applied
rigidly. ThisCourt has on occasion advised the lower courts to be cautious about not depriving a party of
the right to appeal and that every party litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper
and just disposition of his cause, free from the constraint of technicalities. In de la Rosa v. Court of
Appeals, we stated that, as a rule, periods which require litigants to do certain acts must be followed
unless, under exceptional circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of
substantial justice. There, we condoned the delay incurred by the appealing party due to strong
considerations of fairness and justice. In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course
to tardy appeals, we have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit
liberal application of the Rules. In those situations where technicalities were dispensed with, our
decisions were not meant to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. But we hasten
to add that in those rare cases where procedural rules were not stringently applied, there always existed a
clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always
tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee
that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause.
15-DAY APPEAL PERIOD COUNTED FROM RECEIPT OF NOTICE OF JUDGMENT OR FROM
RECEIPT OF NOTICE OF FINAL ORDER APPEALED FROM. We thus hold that petitioners
seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the
date of receipt of notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent
with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken within 15 days from notice
of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of the disjunctive word "or" signifies disassociation
and independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it
ordinarily implies. Hence, the use of "or" in the above provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be
filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final order," which
we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or
reconsideration. Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129 which
shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the disposition of cases. The original period
of appeal (in this case March 3-18, 1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance still applies.
The fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is given
another opportunity to review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error ofjudgment.
While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have judgments of courts become final at some
definite time, we likewise aspire to deliver justice fairly. In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates
the confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be counted from receipt of notice of
judgment (March 3, 1998) or from receipt of notice of "final order" appealed from (July 22, 1998).
NEW 15-DAY PERIOD MAY BE AVAILED OF ONLY WHEN EITHER A MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
OR MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS FILED; CASE AT BAR. To recapitulate, a party litigant
may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Court's decision or
file it within 15 days from receipt of the order (the "final order") denying his motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed ofonly if either motion is
filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal period
provided in Rule 41, Section 3. Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days
from receipt of the order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998. Hence, the notice
ofappeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as already discussed.
DOCTRINE:
FRESH PERIOD RULE. The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It
has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and
inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to
the Court of Appeals, particularly Rules 42, 43 and 45, the Court allows extensions of time, based
on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist
of 15 days or more. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within
which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order
dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Henceforth, this "fresh period
rule" shall also apply to Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional
Trial Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of
Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Courtof Appeals and Rule 45
governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The new rule aims to regiment or make the
appeal period uniform, to be counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial,
motion for reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.

Trans International vs. CA, 285 SCRA 49 (1998)

TRANS INTERNATIONAL, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS; NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION; PERLA A. SEGOVIA and GILBERTO PASTORAL, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
MARTINEZ, J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner Trans International filed a complaint for damages against respondent National Power
Corporation (NAPOCOR for brevity) and two of its principal officers arising from the rescission of a
contract for the supply and delivery of woodpoles before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which
was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-94-20960.

On May 22, l996, the trial court rendered a decision sustaining the claim of petitioner. A copy of the
aforesaid decision was received by respondents on June 6, l996. On June 19, l996, respondents filed their
motion for reconsideration alleging in the main that certain facts were overlooked, ignored or wrongly
appreciated by the trial court. An opposition to said motion was filed by petitioner on July 11, l996. On
August 2, l996, the trial court issued an order denying the motion for reconsideration. A copy of the
aforesaid order was personally delivered to respondent NAPOCORS office on August 23, l996 (Friday)
and was received by Ronald T. Lapuz, a clerk assigned at the office of the VP-General Counsel.

Considering that it was almost 5:00 p.m., Lapuz placed the said order inside the drawer of his table.
However, on August 26 and 27, l996 (Monday and Tuesday, respectively) said clerk was unable to report
for work due to an illness he suffered as a result of the extraction of his three front teeth. Said order was
retrieved from his drawer only in the afternoon of the 27th and was immediately forwarded to the
secretary of Atty. Wilfredo J. Collado, counsel for the respondents. At 3:10 p.m. that same day,
respondents thru counsel filed their notice of appeal.

On August 29, l996, petitioner filed a motion for execution before the trial court contending that its
decision dated May 22, l996 had become final and executory since respondents failed to make a timely
appeal and praying for the issuance of an order granting the writ of execution. On the other hand,
respondents filed an opposition thereto alleging therein that the cause of their failure to make a timely
appeal was due to unforeseeable oversight and accident on the part of their employee who was unable to
report for work because of illness. On September 9, l996 petitioner filed a reply to said opposition. On
September 11, l996 respondents counsel filed a supplemental opposition to the motion for execution
attaching thereto the affidavit of Lapuz. Finally, on September 18, l996, respondents filed their rejoinder
to said reply.

RTC's RULING:

On September 13, l996, the trial court issued an order denying respondents notice of appeal and granting
the motion for execution filed by petitioner.

On September 20, l996, respondents filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals questioning
the validity of the issuance of the aforesaid order on the ground that the denial of their notice of appeal
was on the basis of a mere technicality and that the writ of execution should not have been issued since
there are strong considerations which militate the strict application of the rules on procedure. Petitioner
corporation filed its comment to the petition dated September 25, l996 claiming that the event which
happened in respondents office does not amount to an honest mistake nor an unavoidable accident that
would legally excuse their neglect.

CA's RULING:

The CA granted the petition and annulled the order of the RTC. The RTC was ordered to give due course
to petitioners appeal.
The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner corporation was denied for lack of merit.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess in jurisdiction
when it gave due course to the petition of respondents considering their admission that the notice of
appeal was belatedly filed before the trial court.

SC's RULING:

NO. The general rule holds that the appellate jurisdiction of the courts is conferred by law, and must be
exercised in the manner and in accordance with the provisions thereof and such jurisdiction is acquired by
the appellate court over the subject matter and parties by the perfection of the appeal. The party who
seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of the rules. Failing to do so, the right to
appeal is lost. In fact, it has been long recognized that strict compliance with the Rules of Court is
indispensable for the prevention of needless delays and for the orderly and expeditious dispatch of
judicial business.

Nonetheless, the court has on several occasions relaxed this strict requirement. In the case of Toledo, et al.
vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., the Court allowed the filing of an appeal where a stringent
application of the rules would have denied it, but only when to do so would serve the demands of
substantial justice and in the exercise of our equity jurisdiction. Thus, for a party to seek exception for its
failure to comply strictly with the statutory requirements for perfecting its appeal, strong compelling
reasons such as serving the ends of justice and preventing a grave miscarriage thereof must be shown, in
order to warrant the Courts suspension of the rules.[21] Indeed, the court is confronted with the need to
balance stringent application of technical rules vis-a-vis strong policy considerations of substantial
significance to relax said rules based on equity and justice.

The case at bench squarely meets the requisites postulated by the aforequoted rule. If respondents right to
appeal would be curtailed by the mere expediency of holding that they had belatedly filed their notice of
appeal, then the Court as the final arbiter of justice would be deserting its avowed objective, that is to
dispense justice based on the merits of the case and not on a mere technicality.

In this case, the one-day delay in filing the notice of appeal was due to an unforeseen illness of the
receiving clerk Ronald Lapuz in the office of the General Counsel of petitioner NAPOCOR. The delay
was properly explained and sufficiently justified; considerations of substantial justice and equity strongly
argue against a rigid enforcement of the technical rules of procedure, considering not only that the delay
was only for one day, and the petitioners have pleaded an unforeseeable oversight and illness on the part
of the receiving clerk, as an excuse. To insist that the one-day delay in filing the appeal despite the
plausible reason adduced therefor is a fatal mistake due alone to the negligence of counsel is to insist on a
rigid application of the rules, which as repeatedly enunciated by the Supreme court, should help secure,
not override substantial justice. In essence, the court is convinced that the test for substantial justice and
equity considerations have been adequately met by respondents to overcome the one day delay in the
perfection of their appeal. Considering the factual and legal milieu obtaining in the case at bench, the
petition must be denied.

DOCTRINE:
The rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. The rules of procedure are
used only to help secure, not override substantial justice. The emerging trend in the rulings of the Court is
to afford every party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause,
free from the constraints of technicalities. The court may extend the time or allow the perfection of the
appeal beyond the prescribed period if it be satisfactorily shown that there is justifiable reason, such as
fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, or similar supervening casualty, without fault of the
appellant, which the court may deem sufficient reason for relieving him from the consequences of his
failure to comply strictly with the law. In such case the appeal is deemed taken and perfected on time, and
the appellate court acquires appellate jurisdiction.
3. Rule 42 (RTC to CA)
Ross Rica Sales Center, Inc. vs. Ong, G.R. No. 132197, August 16, 2005
ROSS RICA SALES CENTER VS ONG
GR No. 132197 (August 16, 2005)
PETITIONERS: Ross Rica Sales Center Inc and Juanito King and Sons, Inc
RESPONDENTS: Spouses Gerry and Elizabeth Ong
PONENTE: Tinga, J.

FACTS:
Petitioner = filed a complaint for ejectment against respondents before MTC- Mandaue City. In the
complaint, petitioners alleged the fact of their ownership of 3 parcels of land. Petitioners likewise
acknowledged respondent Elizabeth Ongs ownership of the lots previous to theirs.
Atty. Joseph M. Baduel = representing Mandaue Prime Estate Realty, wrote respondents informing
them of its intent to use the lots and asking them to vacate within thirty (30) days from receipt of
the letter. But respondents refused to vacate, thereby unlawfully withholding possession of said lots,
so petitioners alleged.
Petitioners = acquired the lands from Mandaue Prime Estate Realty through a sale. It appears that
Mandaue Prime Estate Realty had acquired the properties from the respondents through a Deed of
Absolute Sale. However, this latter deed of sale and the transfers of title consequential thereto were
subsequently sought to be annulled by respondents in a complaint filed on 13 February 1995 before
the Mandaue RTC against Mandaue Prime Estate Realty. Per record, this case is still pending
resolution.
MTC = ordering respondents to vacate the premises in question and to peacefully turn over
possession to petitioners.
On appeal, RTC = affirming MTCs decision
Respondents = filed a notice of appeal, and on the following day, they filed a motion for
reconsideration.
RTC = issued an order which concurrently gave due course to respondents notice of appeal, denied
the MR and granted petitioners motion for immediate execution pending appeal.
**In a Petition for Certiorari with Injunction filed with the Court of Appeals and treated as a
Petition for Review, the appellate court ruled that the MTC had no jurisdiction over said case as
there was no contract between the parties, express or implied, as would qualify the same as one for
unlawful detainer. Thus, the assailed Orders of the MTC and RTC were set aside.
Petitioners = filed a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

ISSUE:
WON the RTC decision has already become final and executory at the time the petition for review
was filed.

HELD: NO
RATIO DECIDENDI:
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 42 of the Rules of Court governs the mode of appeal in this case.

Section 1. How appeal taken; time for filing. -- A party desiring to appeal from a decision of the RTC
rendered in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction may file a verified petition for review with the
Court of Appeals, paying at the same time to the clerk of said court the corresponding docket and
other lawful fees, depositing the amount ofP500.00 for costs, and furnishing the Regional Trial
Court and the adverse party with a copy of the petition. The petition shall be filed and served
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the decision sought to be reviewed or of the denial of
petitioners motion for new trial or reconsideration filed in due time after judgment. Upon proper
motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket and other lawful fees and the deposit for
costs before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an
additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further
extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen
(15) days.

Since the unlawful detainer case was filed with the MTC and affirmed by the RTC, petitioners
should have filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals and not a Notice of Appeal with the
RTC. However, we consider this to have been remedied by the timely filing of the Motion for
Reconsideration on the following day. Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court allows the withdrawal
of appeal at any time, as a matter of right, before the filing of the appellees brief. Applying this rule
contextually, the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration may be deemed as an effective withdrawal
of the defective Notice of Appeal.

Perforce, the period of appeal was tolled by the Motion for Reconsideration and started to run again
from the receipt of the order denying the Motion for Reconsideration. A Motion for Additional Time
to File the Petition was likewise filed with the Court of Appeals. Counting fifteen (15) days from
receipt of the denial of the Motion for Reconsideration and the ten (10)-day request for additional
period, it is clear that respondents filed their Petition for Review on time.

DOCTRINE:
In the case at bar, a petition for review before the CA is the proper mode of appeal from a decision
of the RTC. Since the filing of the notice of appeal is erroneous, it is considered as if no appeal was
interposed.

Macawiwili Gold Mining and Devt. Co, Inc. vs. CA, 297 SCRA 602 (1998)
Facts: Philex Mining Corporation filed a complaint for expropriation against petitioners Macawiwili Gold
Mining and Development Co., Inc. and Omico Mining & Industrial Corporation. It was filed before the
Regional Trial Court of La Trinidad, Benguet

Based on 53 of P.D. No. 463, Philex Mining sought to expropriate 21.9 hectares of petitioners mining
areas where the latters Macawiwili claims are located. Philex Mining likewise moved for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin petitioners from ejecting it (Philex Mining) from the mining areas
sought to be expropriated.

RTC denied the complaint of respondent and the writ of preliminary injunction.
In Poe Mining Association vs. Garcia, the SC, recognized the possessory rights of defendants
Macawiwili and Omico over their mining claims.
Nevertheless, Philex asserts that its right to expropriate is distinct and separate from the rights of
Macawiwili and Omico under the Supreme Court decision, anchoring said right on Section 59 of
Presidential Decree No. 463 which states:
SEC. 59. Eminent Domain. - When the claim owner or an occupant or owner of private lands
refuses to grant to another claim owner or lessee the right to build, construct or install any of the facilities
mentioned in the next preceding section, the claim owner or lessee may prosecute an action for eminent
domain under the Rules of Court in the Court of First Instance of the province where the mining claims
involved are situated. In the determination of the just compensation due the claim owner or owner or
occupant of the land, the court shall appoint at least one duly qualified mining engineer or geologist to be
recommended by the Director as one of the commissioners.
SC:Expropriation demands that the land be private land. When the Supreme Court awarded the
possessory rights over the land subject of this case to defendants Macawiwili and Omico, it has stripped
said land of its private character and gave its private character and gave it its public character, that is, to
be utilized for mining operations. Although property already devoted to public use is still or under a
specific grant of authority to the delegate (Constitutional Law by subject to expropriation, this must be
done directly by the national legislature Isagani Cruz, 1989 edition, page 64). Section 59 of Presidential
Decree No. 463 is not a specific grant of authority given to plaintiff but a mere general authority which
will not suffice to allow plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain.

Philex Mining moved for a reconsideration, but its motion was denied. It then appealed to the Court of
Appeals.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal on the ground that only questions of law were involved and,
therefore, the appeal should be to the Supreme Court. However, the appellate court denied petitioners
motion in a resolution. Without filing a motion for reconsideration, petitioners filed the instant petition for
certiorari.
Respondent Philex Mining seeks the dismissal of the petition on the ground that petitioner should have
filed a motion for reconsideration giving the appellate court an opportunity to correct itself.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA commit grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners Motion to
Dismiss Appeal.

Ruling: YES,

Judgments of the regional trial courts in the exercise of their original jurisdiction are to be elevated to the
Court of Appeals in cases where the appellant raises questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law.
On the other hand, appeals from judgments of the regional trial courts in the exercise of their original
jurisdiction must be brought directly to the Supreme Court in cases where the appellant raises only
questions of law.

The question is whether the issues raised in the appeal of respondent Philex Mining are questions of law
or of fact.
[F]or a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. And the distinction is well-known: There is a question
of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts;
there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged
facts.

The respondents arguments may be summarized as follows:

(1) Section 59, in relation to Section 53 of Presidential Decree No. 463, expressly grants respondent the
right to expropriate mining claims or lands owned, occupied, or leased by other persons once the
conditions justifying expropriation are present. The power of eminent domain expressly granted under
Sections 58 and 59 of P.D. No. 463 is not inferior to the possessory right of other claimowners. [12]
2) There is nothing absurd in allowing a mining company to expropriate land belonging to
another mining company. Pursuant to the ruling laid down in Benguet Consolidated, Inc. v. Republic,[13]
land covered by mining claims may be the subject of expropriation. Moreover, a general grant of the
power of eminent domain only means that the court may inquire into the necessity of the expropriation. [14]
(3) Respondent could not be held guilty of forum-shopping or subverting the Supreme Courts decision in
Poe Mining v. Garcia.[15] Forum-shopping, which refers to filing the same or repetitious suits, is not
resorted to in the present case since respondent seeks to expropriate petitioners mining areas, not as
operator of the Poe mining claims, but as operator of the Nevada mining claims. [16]
(4) Respondents expropriation of the land will not divide the surface from the subsurface for the reason
that respondent seeks to expropriate all rights that petitioners, as well as the Pigoro heirs, have over the
21.9 hectare area.[17]
(5) The trial court erred in disregarding respondents alternative cause of action, even on the assumption
that respondent does not have the right to expropriate, for the reason that an alternative statement in a
pleading, if sufficient, is not vitiated by the insufficiency of the other alternative statements. [18]
The first four arguments advanced by respondent Philex Mining raise the sole issue of whether it has,
under Presidential Decree No. 463, the right to expropriate the 21.9 hectare mining areas where
petitioners mining claims are located. On the other hand, its final argument raises the issue of whether the
rules on the allegation of alternative causes of action in one pleading under Rule 8, 1 of the Rules of
Court are applicable to special civil actions. These are legal questions whose resolution does not require
an examination of the probative weight of the evidence presented by the parties but a determination of
what the law is on the given state of facts. These issues raise questions of law which should be the subject
of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed directly with this Court. The Court of Appeals
committed a grave error in ruling otherwise.

Doctrine:

Judgments of the regional trial courts in the exercise of their original jurisdiction are to be elevated
to the Court of Appeals in cases where the appellant raises questions of fact or mixed questions of
fact and law. On the other hand, appeals from judgments of the regional trial courts in the exercise
of their original jurisdiction must be brought directly to the Supreme Court in cases where the
appellant raises only questions of law.
[F]or a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an examination of the probative value
of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. And the distinction is well-known: There is
a question of law in a given case when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts; there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth
or the falsehood

Ditching vs. CA, 263 SCRA 343 (1996)

Petitioner: Cecile San Juan Ditching and Zonette San Juan Bacani
Respondent: Adriano Motas and Vidal Batalla
PANGANIBAN, J.:
DOCTRINE: (Rule 42 Appeal from RTC to CA) UNDER THE OLD RULES ON SUMMARY
PROCEDURE
Motions for Extension of time to file a petition should be filed prior to the
expiration or lapse of the period fixed by law, and if the motion is filed after the expiration of the
period sought to be extended, then there is no longer any period to extend, and the judgment or
order to be appealed from will have become final and executory.
A lawyer has the responsibility of monitoring and keeping track of the period time left to
file and appeal. The miscalculation by counsel of the appeal period will not arrest the course of
the same nor precent the finality of the judgment.
Perfection of an appeal within the statutory period is a jurisdictional requirement
The legality of the allowance of the appeal may be raised at any stage of the proceedings
in the appellate court the court is not precluded from dismissing the petition on the ground that
it was filed late inasmuch as the recognition of the merit of the petition does not carry with it any
assumption or conclusion that it was timely filed.
FACTS:
Petitioners were co-owners of a parcel of land in Barangay Pansol, Calamba, Laguna
which was covered by various TCT.
1975 a contract of tenancy - Kasunduan Buwisan sa Sakahan was entered into by
Motas and Dr. Eduardo San Juan (predecessor in interest of petitioners)
1978 Motas constructed a house in the said lot without the consent of petitioners.

Upon learning of such construction, petitioners demanded that he vacate the property.
The last demand was made in September 1988.
BARANGAY
Respondent's refusal to vacate upon the final demand, petitioner filed a complaint at the
barangay level.
No amicable settlement was reached
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT
 An EJECTMENT CASE filed in July 1989 with the Municipal Trial Court in
Calamba, Laguna by herein petitioner Ditching and Zonette San Juan Bacani, seeking to eject
herein private respondent Motas and another occupant named Vidal Batalla from the lot
owned by the petitioner and her co-owners. Said case was tried under the old Rules on
Summary Procedure.
The MTC found that there existed a tenancy relationship under Section 24 of RA 3844
(the Agricultural Reform Code) - (t)he agricultural lessee shall have the right to continue in the
exclusive possession and enjoyment of any home lot he may have occupied upon the effectivity
of (RA 3844), which shall be considered as included in the leasehold.
The court held that the house of Motas was within the leasehold hence cannot be ejected
and that since it was a tenancy case it had no jurisdiction.

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

Petitioners APPEALED to the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna affirmed the
MTC's decision
Plaintiffs never denied, much less controverted the fact that defendants
have occupied a much bigger parcel of land belonging to Dr. Eduardo San Juan as tenants
of the latter. Neither did plaintiffs dispute the defendants' claim that the land in question
was a part and parcel of Dr. Eduardo San Juans land being tenanted by defendants (As
shown by the Contract of Tenancy)
There was sufficient and uncontroverted proof offered by defendants that
they have been tenants of Dr. San Juans land since 1972;
Having succeeded Dr. Eduardo San Juan on the same property, they are
bound to observe and respect the rights of defendants as tenant. Their claim that they
never intended defendants to be their tenants cannot be given merit.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION BY PETITIONERS - Judge Eleuterio
Guerrero set the case for clarificatory hearing on August 30, 1991, on which date a
representative from the Register of Deeds of Laguna (Calamba Branch) appeared and testified on
the records. The Motion for Reconsideration was granted and accordingly said Judge
ordered: vacation of the premises and surrender possession of the land, Defendants to pay costs.

March 9, 1992 JUDGE FRANCISCO MA. GUERRERO took over JUDGE

ELEUTERIO GUERRERO as presiding judge. Said judge REVERSE THE DECISION of
Judge Eleuterio and ruled that Appellate Jurisdiction by Regional Trial Court mandates that cases
appealed from the Metropolitan Trial Court be decided on the basis of the entire record of the
proceeding had in the Court of origin and such memoranda and/or briefs as may be submitted
by the parties the setting for clarificatory hearing is beyond the purview of the rule.
Affirmed the MTC's decision.
COURT OF APPEALS
APRIL 13, 1992 Petitioner filed a MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF 15
DAYS from April 18, 1992 up to May 3, 1992 within which to file a PETITION FOR REVIEW
because:
March 5, 1992 court issued an order adverse to petitioners
March 17, 1992 petitioner received a copy of said decision
March 27, 1992 Motion for reconsideration was denied
April 3, 1992 order denying Motion for reconsideration was received
by petitioners
 April 13 1992 Petitioner filed a motion for extension of 15 days
April 18,1992 Petitioners have until this day to file a Petition for
Review on Certiorari if the Extension was not granted
The Court of Appeals granted the extension and they have until May 3, 1992 to file a
petition for review
Petitioner filed their petition on April 29, 1992 but the CA dismissed said decision
because it was filed late. The CA Stated that 10 days have lapsed from March 17 when petitioner
received the order to March 27 when MR was denied. Another 10 days have lapsed fro April 3
when MR order was denied to April 13 when petition for extension was denied. A total of 20 days
had already from from the time petitioners received copy of the questioned order up the time they
actually filed on April 13. For this reason, this Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the petition
for review except to dismiss it.
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION was denied by the CA
ISSUE:
Whether or not the dismissal of the case on sheer technicality by the Court of Appeals notwithstanding its
merit is valid (NO MERIT)
HELD:
This Court had set the allowable extension to file petition for review with the Court of
Appeals at fifteen (15) days - If a motion for reconsideration is filed with and denied by a
regional trial court, the movant has only (the) remaining period within which to file a petition for
review
The motion for extension of time must be filed and the corresponding docket fee paid
within the reglementary period of appeal.
In this case, it was not only the petition which was filed late, but also the motion for
extension of time
if the motion for extension is filed after the expiration of the period sought to be extended
(i.e., the reglementary period to appeal), then there is no longer any period to extend, and
the judgment or order to be appealed from will have become final and executory.
The statutory requirement for perfecting an appeal within the reglementary period laid
down by law, must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions against
needless delays and for orderly discharge of judicial business.Perfection of an appeal within the
statutory period is a jurisdictional requirement.
the delay incurred by petitioners counsel was simply inexcusable. As correctly cited by
private respondent, this Court has already held that (a)n erroneous application of the law or rules
is not excusable error. - the miscomputation by counsel of the appeal period will not arrest the
course of the same nor prevent the finality of the judgment
Where no timely appeal was taken, the judgment becomes final, and the legality of the
allowance of the appeal may be raised at any stage of the proceedings in the appellate court.
Further, the respondent Court was not precluded from dismissing the petition on the ground
that it was filed late, inasmuch as the recognition of the merit of the petition did not
carry with it any assumption or conclusion that it was timely filed. Under Section 1 (a) Rule 50 of
the Revised Rules of Court, the Court of Appeals motu proprio or on motion of the appellee
may dismiss the appeal for inter alia: (a) Failure of the record on appeal to show on its face that
the appeal was perfected within the period fixed by these rules.
ISSUE #2:Whether or not respondent Motas is a tenant of the parcel owned by petitioners
HELD:The determination that a person is a tenant is a factual finding made by the trial court on the basis
of evidence directly available to it and such finding will not be reversed on appeal except for the most
compelling reasons.
4. Rule 43 (Quasi-Judicial Agencies to CA)
Fabian vs. Desierto, 295 SCRA 440 (1998)
REGALADO, J:
DOCTRINE:
Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now
required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the
requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to
provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies
The jurisdiction of a court is not a question of acquiescence (reluctant acceptance of
something without protest) as a matter of fact but an issue of conferment as a matter of law.

Section 27 of RA 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to the SC from decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in the administrative disciplinary case it consequently violates the
proscription in Section 30 Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the
appellate jurisdiction of the SC
Transfer by the SC, in its rulemaking power of pending cases involving a review
of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary actions to the CA
which shall now be vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction thereover, relates to procedure
only
FACTS:
Petitioner Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT
Construction Development Corporation (PROMAT) which was engaged in the construction
business.
Private respondents Nestor V. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineering District
(FMED)
Promat participated in the bidding for government construction project including those
under the FMED, and private respondent, reportedly taking advantage of his official position,
inveigled petitioner into an amorous relationship. Their affair lasted for some time, in the course
of which private respondents gifted PROMAT with public works contracts and interceded for it in
problems concerning the same in his office.
Misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between the parties and when
petitioner tried to terminate their relationship, private respondent refused and resisted her
attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats.
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE
She eventually filed an administrative case against him in July 24, 1995.
The said complaint sought the dismissal of private respondent for violation of Section
19, Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Section 36 of Presidential Decree
No. 807 (Civil Service Decree), with an ancillary prayer for his preventive suspension. For
purposes of this case, the charges referred to may be subsumed under the category of oppression,
misconduct, and disgraceful or immoral conduct.
GRAFT INVESTIGATOR/ DIRECTOR/ASSISTANT OMBUDSMAN: On
January 31, 1996, Graft Investigator Eduardo R. Benitez issued a resolution finding private
respondents guilty of grave misconduct and ordering his dismissal from the service with
forfeiture of all benefits under the law. His resolution bore the approval of Director Napoleon
Baldrias and Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo Aportadera of their office.
 OMBUDSMAN: in an Order dated February 26, 1996, approved the aforesaid resolution
with modifications, by finding private respondent guilty of misconduct and meting out the
penalty of suspension without pay for one year.
RECONSIDERATION: Ombudsman inhibited himself since the new counsel was a
classmate and close associate
DEPUTY OMBUDSMAN: case was transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman
Jesus F. Guerrero who, in the now challenged Joint Order of June 18, 1997, set aside the February
26, 1997 Order of respondent Ombudsman and exonerated private respondents from the
administrative charges.
SUPREME COURT
Petitioner has appealed to us by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court from the
"Joint Order" issued by public respondents on June 18, 1997 in OMB-Adm. Case No. 0-95-0411
which granted the motion for reconsideration of and absolved private respondents from
administrative charges for inter alia grave misconduct committed by him as then Assistant
Regional Director, Region IV-A, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Section 27 RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act) together with Sec 7 Rule III of Administrative
Order no 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman) insofar as they provide for appeals in
administrative cases are valid
HELD:
This court held Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal
to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
cases. It consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution
against a law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument
has been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition.
Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate jurisdiction would
unnecessarily burden the Court
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), together with Section 7,
Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman),
and any other provision of law or issuance implementing the aforesaid Act and insofar as they
provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the Ombudsman to the
Supreme Court, are hereby declared INVALID and of no further force and effect.
Also, the very provision (Section 5.2 Article 8 of the Constitution) cited by petitioner
specifies that the appellate jurisdiction of this Court contemplated therein is to be exercised over
"final judgements and orders of lower courts," that is, the courts composing the integrated judicial
system. It does not include the quasi-judicial bodies or agencies, hence whenever the legislature
intends that the decisions or resolutions of the quasi-judicial agency shall be reviewable by
the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals, a specific provision to that effect is included in the
law creating that quasi-judicial agency and, for that matter, any special statutory court. No
such provision on appellate procedure is required for the regular courts of the integrated judicial
system because they are what are referred to and already provided for in Section 5, Article VIII
of the Constitution. The revised Rules of Civil Procedure preclude appeals from quasi-judicial
agencies to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
(SECTION 1 . Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A person desiring to appeal by
certiorari from a judgement or final order or Resolution of the Court of Appeals, the
Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other court whenever authorized by law, may file
with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise only
 question of law which must be distinctly set forth. (Italics ours)) This differs from the former
Rule 45 of the 1964 Rules of Court which made mention only of the Court of Appeals.
The instant petition is hereby referred and transferred to the Court of Appeals for final
disposition, with said petition to be considered by the Court of Appeals pro hac vice as a
petition for review under Rule 43, without prejudice to its requiring the parties to submit such
amended or supplemental pleadings and additional documents or records as it may deem
necessary and proper.
RATIONALE:
2 conflicting laws : legal consideration appear to impugn the constitutionality and
validity of the grant of said appellate jurisdiction to the SC (RA 6770)
1. the present appeal to this Court is allowed under Section 27 of the
Ombudsman Act of 1987 (R.A. No. 6770) and, pursuant thereto, the Office of the
Ombudsman issued its Rules of Procedure, Section 7 whereof is assailed by petitioner in
this proceeding. It will be recalled that R.A. No. 6770 was enacted on November
17, 1989, with Section 27 thereof pertinently providing that all administrative
disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be
appealed to this Court (Supreme Court) in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
- this is being questioned
2. Section 30, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that "(n)o law shall be
passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in
this Constitution without its advise and consent.
we will merely observe and lay down the rule at this juncture that Section 27 of Republic
Act No. 6770 is involved only whenever an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 is taken from a
decision in an administrative diciplinary action. It cannot be taken into account where an
original action for certiorari under Rule 65 is resorted to as a remedy for judicial review, such as
from an incident in a criminal action.
Administrative liability of a public official could fall under the jurisdiction of both the
Civil Service Commission and the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, the offenses imputed to
herein private respondent were based on both Section 19 of Republic Act. No. 6770 and
Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807. Yet, pursuant to the amendment of section 9, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 by Republic Act No. 7902, all adjudications by Civil Service
Commission in administrative disciplinary cases were made appealable to the Court of Appeals
effective March 18, 1995, while those of the Office of the Ombudsman are appealable to this
Court. Yet systematic and efficient case management would dictate the consolidation of those
cases in the Court of Appeals, both for expediency and to avoid possible conflicting decisions.
Under the present Rule 45, appeals may be brought through a petition for review
on certiorari but only from judgments and final orders of the courts enumerated in Section
1 thereof. Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now
required to be brought to the Court of Appeals on a verified petition for review, under the
requirements and conditions in Rule 43 which was precisely formulated and adopted to
provide for a uniform rule of appellate procedure for quasi-judicial agencies .
Private respondent invokes the rule that courts generally avoid having to decide a
constitutional question, especially when the case can be decided on other grounds. Here, however,
the resolution of the constitutional issue here is obviously necessary for the resolution of the
present case.
As a consequence of our ratiocination that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
should be struck down as unconstitutional, and in line with the regulatory philosophy adopted in
appeals from quasi-judicial agencies in the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, appeals from
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to
the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43.
 DOESN'T IT AFFECT SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT? REMOVES VESTED RIGHT? a
transfer by the Supreme Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, of pending cases
involving a review of decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary
actions to the Court of Appeals which shall now be vested with exclusive appellate jurisdiction
thereover, relates to procedure only. This is so because it is not the right to appeal of an aggrieved
party which is affected by the law. That right has been preserved. Only the procedure by which
the appeal is to be made or decided has been changed. The rationale for this is that litigant has a
vested right in a particular remedy, which may be changed by substitution without impairing
vested rights, hence he can have none in rules of procedure which relate to the remedy.

Santos vs. Go, 473 SCRA 350 (2005)

G.R. No. 156081 October 19, 2005
FERDINAND T. SANTOS, ROBERT JOHN SOBREPEA, and RAFAEL PEREZ DE TAGLE,
JR., Petitioners, vs. WILSON GO, Respondent.
Facts : The petitioners are corporate directors and officers of Fil-Estate Properties, Inc. (FEPI). FEPI
allegedly entered into a Project Agreement with Manila Southcoast Development Corporation (MSDC),
whereby FEPI undertook to develop several parcels of land in Nasugbu, Batangas allegedly owned by
MSDC. Under the terms of the Agreement, FEPI was to convert an approximate area of 1,269 hectares
into a first-class residential, commercial, resort, leisure, and recreational complex. The said Project
Agreement clothed FEPI with authority to market and sell the subdivision lots to the public.
Respondent Wilson Go offered to buy Lot 17, Block 38 from FEPI. It is measured 1079square meters and
the purchase price was agreed upon 4,304,000php. The Contract to Sell signed by the parties was the
standard, printed form prepared by FEPI. Under the terms of said contract of adhesion, Go agreed to pay a
downpayment of P1,291,200 and a last installment of P840,000 on the balance due on April 7, 1997. In
turn, FEPI would execute a final Deed of Sale in favor of Go and deliver to Go the owners duplicate
copy of TCT upon complete payment of the purchase price.
Go fully complied with the terms of the contract. However FEPI failed to develop the property neither did
it release the TCT to Go. Go demanded for the fulfillment but FEPI hesitated. FEPI explained that the
project was temporarily halted due to some claimants who opposed FEPIs application for exclusion of
the subject properties from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and there was as a
cease and desist order from the DAR. Said order was the subject of several appeals now pending before
this Court. FEPI assured its clients that it had no intention to abandon the project and would resume
developing the properties once the disputes had been settled in its favor.
Go was not satisfied by the statements made by FEPI so respondent made several demand to return his
payment of the purchase price in full. FEPI failed to heed his demands. Respondent now filed a case
before HLURB and a separate Complaint-Affidavit for estafa under Articles 316 and 318 of the RPC
before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig City against petitioners as officers of FEPI and stated
that the owner of the land was FEPI. However, in the HLURB, FEPI denied ownership of the realty. Go
alleged that the petitioners committed estafa when they offered the subject property for sale since they
knew fully well that the development of the property and issuance of its corresponding title were
impossible to accomplish, as the ownership and title thereto had not yet been acquired and registered
under the name of FEPI at the time of sale. Thus, FEPI had grossly misrepresented itself as owner at the
time of the sale of the subject property to him and when it received from him the full payment, despite
being aware that it was not yet the owner.
Petitioner challenged the jurisdiction of the City Prosecutor of Pasig because the contract was not
executed nor the payments. Also they contended that none of the elements of Estafa were present. They
averred that FEPI was not the owner of the project but the developer with authority to sell under a joint
venture with MSDC, who is the real owner. Petitioners likewise insisted that they could not be held
criminally liable for abiding with a cease-and-desist order of the DAR.
Respondent stressed that the City Prosecutor of Pasig City had jurisdiction over the case. He argued that
the Contract to Sell specifically provided that payment be made at FEPIs office at Pasig City and the
demand letters bore the Pasig City address. He averred that FEPI could not disclaim ownership of the
project since the contract described FEPI as owner without mentioning MSDC. Additionally, the acts
executed by FEPI appearing in the contract were the acts of an owner and not a mere developer.
The city prosecutor of Pasig found no misrepresentation made by FEPI, that there was no Deed of Sale
executed thus the parties are not bound to deliver, and that it is the HLURB that has jurisdiction over the
case, so the estafa was dismissed.
Go appealed the City Prosecutors Resolution to the Department of Justice (DOJ), which, in turn reversed
the City Prosecutors findings. It ruled that under the Contract, the petitioners sold the property to Go
despite full knowledge that FEPI was not its owner. The DOJ noted that petitioners did not deny the due
execution of the contract and had accepted payments of the purchase price as evidenced by the receipts.
Thus, FEPI was exercising acts of ownership when it conveyed the property to respondent Go. Acts to
convey, sell, encumber or mortgage real property are acts of strict ownership. Furthermore, nowhere did
FEPI mention that it had a joint venture with MSDC, the alleged true owner of the property. Clearly,
petitioners committed acts of misrepresentation when FEPI denied ownership after the perfection of the
contract and the payment of the purchase price. Since a corporation can only act through its agents or
officers, then all the participants in a fraudulent transaction are deemed liable.
Accordingly, an Information for estafa was filed against petitioners and Federico Campos and Polo
Pantaleon before the MTC of Pasig City. However, the arraignment was deferred since Campos and
Pantaleon filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause, which was granted by the trial
court. Meanwhile petitioners herein filed with the Court of Appeals, a petition for review docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 67388. Accordingly, the trial court deferred the arraignment of petitioners until the petition
for review was resolved. The appellate court disposed of CA-G.R. SP No. 67388, having no merit, costs
against petitioner.
Issue : Whether a petition for review under Rule 43 is a proper mode of appeal from a resolution of the
Secretary of Justice directing the prosecutor to file an information in a criminal case.
Held : NO. Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure clearly shows that it governs appeals to the
Court of Appeals from decisions and final orders or resolutions of the Court of Tax Appeals or quasi-
judicial agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial functions. The Department of Justice is not among
the agencies enumerated in Section 1 of Rule 43. Inclusio unius est exclusio alterius.
We cannot agree with petitioners submission that a preliminary investigation is a quasi-judicial
proceeding, and that the DOJ is a quasi-judicial agency exercising a quasi-judicial function when it
reviews the findings of a public prosecutor regarding the presence of probable cause.
As provided in the case of Bautista vs CA, a preliminary investigation does not determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused. He does not exercise adjudication nor rule-making functions. Preliminary
investigation is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be
reasonably charged with a crime and to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information. It is not
a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been
committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. While the
fiscal makes that determination, he cannot be said to be acting as a quasi-court, for it is the courts,
ultimately, that pass judgment on the accused, not the fiscal.
The public prosecutors power to conduct a preliminary investigation as quasi-judicial in nature, this is
true only to the extent that, like quasi-judicial bodies, the prosecutor is an officer of the executive
department exercising powers akin to those of a court, and the similarity ends at this point. A quasi-
judicial body is as an organ of government other than a court and other than a legislature which affects
the rights of private parties through either adjudication or rule-making. A quasi-judicial agency performs
adjudicatory functions such that its awards, determine the rights of parties, and their decisions have the
same effect as judgments of a court. Such is not the case when a public prosecutor conducts a preliminary
investigation to determine probable cause to file an information against a person charged with a criminal
offense, or when the Secretary of Justice is reviewing the formers order or resolutions.
Findings of the Secretary of Justice are not subject to review unless made with grave abuse of discretion.
In this case, petitioners have not shown sufficient nor convincing reason for us to deviate from prevailing
jurisprudence.
Doctrine : The DOJ is not a quasi-judicial body and it is not one of those agencies whose decisions,
orders or resolutions are appealable to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43, the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice finding probable cause to indict petitioners for estafa is, therefore, not
appealable to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review under Rule 43. Accordingly, the Court
of Appeals correctly dismissed petitioners petition for review.

Fortich vs. Corona, 289 SCRA 624 (1998)

FACTS:
This case involves a 144-hectare land located at San Vicente, Sumilao, Bukidnon, owned by the Norberto
Quisumbing, Sr. Management and Development Corporation (NQSRMDC), one of the petitioners. The
property is covered by a Transfer Certificate of the Registry of Deeds of the Province of Bukidnon.
Land was leased as a pineapple plantation to the Philippine Packing Corporation, now Del Monte
Philippines, Inc. (DMPI), a multinational corporation, for a period of ten (10) years under the Crop
Producer and Grower's Agreement duly annotated in the certificate of title. The lease expired in April,
1994.
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR): During the existence of the lease, placed the entire 144-hectare
property under compulsory acquisition and assessed the land value at P2.38 million.
NQSRMDC: resisted the DAR's action, it sought and was granted by the DAR Adjudication Board
(DARAB), through its Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) in DARAB Case No. X-576, a
writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction which ordered the DAR Region X Director, the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of Bukidnon, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of
Sumilao, Bukidnon, the Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank), and their authorized representatives
"to desist from pursuing any activity or activities" concerning the subject land "until further orders."
DAR Regional Director: (Despite the DARAB order) issued a memorandum, dated directing the Land
Bank to open a trust account for P2.38 million in the name of NQSRMDC and to conduct summary
proceedings to determine the just compensation of the subject property.
NQSRMDC: filed an Omnibus Motion to enforce the DARAB order and to nullify the summary
proceedings undertaken by the DAR Regional Director and Land Bank on the valuation of the subject
property.
DARAB: acted favorably on the Omnibus Motion by
(a) ordering the DAR Regional Director and Land Bank "to seriously comply with the terms of the
order"
 (b) nullifying the DAR Regional Director's memorandum and the summary proceedings conducted
pursuant thereto; and (c) directing the Land Bank "to return the claim folder of Petitioner
NQSRMDC's subject property to the DAR until further orders."
Land Bank: complied with the DARAB order and cancelled the trust account it opened in the name of
petitioner NQSRMDC. 7
Provincial Development Council (PDC) of Bukidnon: headed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich, passed
Resolution No. 6, designating certain areas along Bukidnon-Sayre Highway as part of the Bukidnon
Agro-Industrial Zones where the subject property is situated.
What happened thereafter is well-narrated in the OP (TORRES) Decision of March 29, 1996, pertinent
portions of which we quote:
"Pursuant to Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, the
Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao, Bukidnon, on March 4, 1993, enacted Ordinance No. 24
converting or re-classifying 144 hectares of land in Bgy. San Vicente, said Municipality, from
agricultural to industrial/institutional with a view of providing an opportunity to attract
investors who can inject new economic vitality, provide more jobs and raise the income of its
people which includes 1.Development Academy of Mindanao
2.Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Park
3.Forest development
4.Support facilities which comprise hotel, restaurants, dormitories and a housing project
covering an area of 20 hectares.
"The said NQSRMDC Proposal was, per Certification adopted by:
DTI, Provincial Development Council of Bukidnon; the municipal, provincial and regional
office of the DAR; the DENR, Office of the President Mindanao; DILG, DECS, National
Irrigation Administration, Provincial Irrigation Office etc
However DAR: thru Secretary Garilao, invoking its powers to approve conversion of lands
under Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, issued an Order denying the instant application for the
conversion of the subject land from agricultural to agro-industrial and, instead, placed the same
under the compulsory coverage of CARP and directed the distribution thereof to all qualified
beneficiaries.
MR of the aforesaid Order was filed on January 9, 1995 by applicant but the same was denied
(in an Order dated June 7, 1995)." 9
DAR Secretary: ordered the DAR Regional Director "to proceed with the compulsory acquisition and
distribution of the property." 10
Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon: appealed the order of denial to the Office of the President and
prayed for the conversion/reclassification of the subject land as the same would be more beneficial to the
people of Bukidnon.
NQSRMDC:filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, PI
Presidential Assistant for Mindanao Honorable Paul G. Dominguez, sent a memorandum to the President
favorably endorsing the project with a recommendation that the DAR Secretary reconsider his decision in
denying the application of the province for the conversion of the land.
CA: issued a Resolution ordering the parties to observe status quo pending resolution of the petition.
At the hearing held in said case, the DAR, through the Solicitor General, manifested before the said court
that the DAR was merely "in the processing stage of the applications of farmers-claimants" and has
agreed to respect status quo pending the resolution of the petition.
OP: through then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres, issued a Decision in OP Case, reversing the DAR
Secretary's decision
DAR filed a motion for reconsideration of the OP decision.
NQSRMDC and DECS: executed a Memorandum of Agreement whereby the former donated four (4)
hectares from the subject land to DECS for the establishment of the NQSR High School.
When NQSRMDC was about to transfer the title over the 4-hectare donated to DECS, it discovered that
the title over the subject property was no longer in its name. It soon found out that during the pendency of
both the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, with Preliminary Injunction it filed against DAR in the Court
of Appeals and the appeal to the President filed by Governor Carlos O. Fortich, the DAR, without giving
just compensation, caused the cancellation of NQSRMDC's title on August 11, 1995 and had it transferred
in the name of the Republic of the Philippines under TCT No. T-50264 19 of the Registry of Deeds of
Bukidnon. Thereafter, on September 25, 1995, DAR caused the issuance of Certificates of Land
Ownership Award (CLOA) No. 00240227 and had it registered in the name of 137 farmer-beneficiaries
under TCT No. AT-3536 20 of the Registry of Deeds of Bukidnon.
NQSRMDC: filed a complaint with the RTC of Malaybalay, Bukidnon for annulment and cancellation of
title, damages and injunction against DAR and 141 others.
RTC: issued a Temporary Restraining Order on April 30, 1997 and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
restraining the DAR and 141 others from entering, occupying and/or wresting from NQSRMDC the
possession of the subject land.
Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres: denying DAR's motion for reconsideration for having been filed
beyond the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days. The said order further declared that the March 29,
1996 OP decision had already become final and executory.
DAR: filed on July 11, 1997 a second motion for reconsideration of the June 23, 1997 Order of the
President.
Writ of preliminary injunction issued by the RTC was challenged by some alleged farmers before the
Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari and prohibition, praying for the lifting of the injunction
and for the issuance of a writ of prohibition from further trying the RTC case.
Alleged farmer-beneficiaries began their hunger strike in front of the DAR Compound in Quezon City to
protest the OP Decision.
Persons claiming to be farmer-beneficiaries of the NQSRMDC: property filed a motion for intervention
(styled as Memorandum In Intervention) in O.P., asking that the OP Decision allowing the conversion of
the entire 144-hectare property be set aside.
President Fidel V. Ramos: then held a dialogue with the strikers and promised to resolve their grievance
within the framework of the law. He created an eight (8)-man Fact Finding Task Force (FFTF) chaired by
Agriculture Secretary Salvador Escudero to look into the controversy and recommend possible solutions
to the problem.
OP: resolved the strikers' protest by issuing the so-called "Win/Win" Resolution penned by then Deputy
Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, the dispositive portion of which reads:
 "1.NQSRMDC's application for conversion is APPROVED only with respect
to the approximately forty-four (44) hectare portion of the land adjacent to the
highway, as recommended by the Department of Agriculture.
"2.The remaining approximately one hundred (100) hectares traversed by an
irrigation canal and found to be suitable for agriculture shall be distributed to
qualified farmer-beneficiaries in accordance with RA 6657 or the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law with a right of way to said portion from
the highway provided in the portion fronting the highway. For this purpose, the
DAR and other concerned government agencies are directed to immediately
conduct the segregation survey of the area, valuation of the property and
generation of titles in the name of the identified farmer-beneficiaries.
A copy of the "Win-Win" Resolution was received by Governor Carlos O. Fortich of Bukidnon, Mayor
Rey B. Baula of Sumilao, Bukidnon, and NQSRMDC on November 24, 1997, they filed the present
petition for certiorari, prohibition (under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court) and injunction with
urgent prayer for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction (under Rule 58,
ibid.), against then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona and DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao.
Motion For Leave To Intervene was filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries, through counsel, claiming that
they are real parties in interest as they were "previously identified by respondent DAR as agrarian reform
beneficiaries on the 144-hectare" property subject of this case. The motion was vehemently opposed by
the petitioners.
Petitioners: claim that the OP was prompted to issue the said resolution "after a very well-managed
hunger strike led by fake farmer-beneficiary Linda Ligmon succeeded in pressuring and/or politically
blackmailing the Office of the President to come up with this purely political decision to appease the
'farmers,' by reviving and modifying the Decision of 29 March 1996 which has been declared final and
executory in an Order of 23 June 1997 . . ." Thus, petitioners further allege, respondent then Deputy
Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona "committed grave abuse of discretion and acted beyond his
jurisdiction; They availed of this extraordinary writ of certiorari "because there is no other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." They never filed a motion for reconsideration of the
subject Resolution "because (it) is patently illegal or contrary to law and it would be a futile exercise to
seek a reconsideration . . ."
The respondents: through the Solicitor General, opposed the petition and prayed that it be dismissed
outright on the following grounds:
(1)The proper remedy of petitioners should have been to file a petition for review
directly with the Court of Appeals in accordance with Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of
Court;
(2)The petitioners failed to file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed "Win-Win"
Resolution before filing the present petition; and
(3)Petitioner NQSRMDC is guilty of forum-shopping.
Anent the first issue, the remedy prescribed in Rule 43 is inapplicable considering that the present
petition contains an allegation that the challenged resolution is "patently illegal" and was issued with
"grave abuse of discretion" and "beyond his (respondent Secretary Renato C. Corona's) jurisdiction" when
said resolution substantially modified the earlier OP Decision of March 29, 1996 which had long become
final and executory. In other words, the crucial issue raised here involves an error of jurisdiction, not an
error of judgment which is reviewable by an appeal under Rule 43. Thus, the appropriate remedy to annul
and set aside the assailed resolution is an original special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, as what
the petitioners have correctly done. The Court resolve to take primary jurisdiction over the present
petition in the interest of speedy justice and to avoid future litigations so as to promptly put an end to the
present controversy which, as correctly observed by petitioners, has sparked national interest because of
the magnitude of the problem created by the issuance of the assailed resolution. Moreover, as will be
discussed later, we find the assailed resolution wholly void and requiring the petitioners to file their
petition first with the Court of Appeals would only result in a waste of time and money.
That the Court has the power to set aside its own rules in the higher interests of justice is well-entrenched
in our jurisprudence.
As to the second issue of whether the petitioners committed a fatal procedural lapse when they failed to
file a motion for reconsideration of the assailed resolution before seeking judicial recourse, suffice it to
state that the said motion is not necessary when the questioned resolution is a patent nullity, 57 as will be
taken up later.
With respect to the third issue, the respondents claim that the filing by the petitioners of: (a) a petition
for certiorari, prohibition with preliminary injunction with the Court of Appeals; (b) a complaint for
annulment and cancellation of title, damages and injunction against DAR and 141 others (Civil Case No.
2687-97) with the Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay, Bukidnon; and (c) the present petition, constitute
forum shopping.
We disagree.
The rule is that:
It is clear from the above-quoted rule that the petitioners are not guilty of forum shopping. The test for
determining whether a party has violated the rule against forum shopping is where a final judgment in one
case will amount to res adjudicata in the action under consideration. A cursory examination of the cases
filed by the petitioners does not show that the said cases are similar with each other. The petition for
certiorari in the Court of Appeals sought the nullification of the DAR Secretary's order to proceed with
the compulsory acquisition and distribution of the subject property. On the other hand, the civil case in
RTC of Malaybalay, Bukidnon for the annulment and cancellation of title issued in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines, with damages, was based on the following grounds: (1) the DAR, in applying
for cancellation of petitioner NQSRMDC's title, used documents which were earlier declared null and
void by the DARAB; (2) the cancellation of NQSRMDC's title was made without payment of just
compensation; and (3) without notice to NQSRMDC for the surrender of its title. The present petition is
entirely different from the said two cases as it seeks the nullification of the assailed "Win-Win"
Resolution of the Office of the President dated November 7, 1997, which resolution was issued long after
the previous two cases were instituted.
The fourth and final preliminary issue to be resolved is the motion for intervention filed by alleged
farmer-beneficiaries, which we have to deny for lack of merit. In their motion, movants contend that they
are the farmer-beneficiaries of the land in question, hence, are real parties in interest. To prove this, they
attached as Annex "I" in their motion a Master List of Farmer-Beneficiaries. Apparently, the alleged
master list was made pursuant to the directive in the dispositive portion of the assailed "Win-Win"
Resolution which directs the DAR "to carefully and meticulously determine who among the claimants are
qualified farmer-beneficiaries." However, a perusal of the said document reveals that movants are those
purportedly "Found Qualified and Recommended for Approval." In other words, movants are merely
recommendeefarmer-beneficiaries.
The rule in this jurisdiction is that a real party in interest is a party who would be benefited or injured by
the judgment or is the party entitled to the avails of the suit.Real interest means a present substantial
interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent, subordinate or consequential
interest. Undoubtedly, movants' interest over the land in question is a mere expectancy. Ergo, they are not
real parties in interest.
Furthermore, the challenged resolution upon which movants based their motion is, as intimated earlier,
null and void. Hence, their motion for intervention has no leg to stand on.
ISSUE:
Whether the final and executory Decision can still be substantially modified by the "Win-Win"
Resolution.
HELD:
We rule in the negative.
The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the President of the Philippines are embodied
in Administrative Order No. 18. Section 7 thereof provides:
"SEC. 7.Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as otherwise
provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a
copy thereof by the parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such
period.
"Only one motion for reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and entertained, save
in exceptionally meritorious cases." (Emphasis ours)
It is further provided for in Section 9 that "The Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory character
whenever practicable."
When the Office of the President issued the Order dated June 23, 1997 declaring the Decision of March
29, 1996 final and executory, as no one has seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration thereto, the said
Office had lost its jurisdiction to re-open the case, more so modify its Decision. Having lost its
jurisdiction, the Office of the President has no more authority to entertain the second motion for
reconsideration filed by respondent DAR Secretary, which second motion became the basis of the assailed
"Win-Win" Resolution. Section 7 of Administrative Order No. 18 and Section 4, Rule 43 of the Revised
Rules of Court mandate that only one (1) motion for reconsideration is allowed to be taken from the
Decision of March 29, 1996. And even if a second motion for reconsideration was permitted to be filed in
"exceptionally meritorious cases," as provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 of AO 18, still the
said motion should not have been entertained considering that the first motion for reconsideration was not
seasonably filed, thereby allowing the Decision of March 29, 1996 to lapse into finality. Thus, the act of
the Office of the President in re-opening the case and substantially modifying its March 29, 1996
Decision which had already become final and executory, was in gross disregard of the rules and basic
legal precept that accord finality to administrative determinations.
The orderly administration of justice requires that the judgments/resolutions of a court or quasi-judicial
body must reach a point of finality set by the law, rules and regulations. The noble purpose is to write
finis to disputes once and for all. This is a fundamental principle in our justice system, without which
there would be no end to litigations. Utmost respect and adherence to this principle must always be
maintained by those who wield the power of adjudication. Any act which violates such principle must
immediately be struck down.
Therefore, the assailed "Win-Win" Resolution which substantially modified the Decision of March 29,
1996 after it has attained finality, is utterly void. Such void resolution, as aptly stressed by Justice Thomas
A. Street in a 1918 case, is "a lawless thing, which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or
ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head."
WHEREFORE, the present petition is hereby GRANTED. The challenged Resolution issued by the
Office of the President in OP Case is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. The Motion For Leave To
Intervene filed by alleged farmer-beneficiaries is hereby DENIED.
DOCTRINE:
The rules and regulations governing appeals to the Office of the President of the Philippines are
embodied in Administrative Order No 18. Section 7 thereof provides: "SEC. 7.
Decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as otherwise provided for by
special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the
parties, unless a motion for reconsideration thereof is filed within such period. Only one motion for
reconsideration by any one party shall be allowed and entertained, save in exceptionally meritorious
cases." It is further provided for in Section 9 that "The Rules of Court shall apply in a suppletory
character whenever practicable."

Lapid vs. CA, 334 SCRA 738 (2000)

LAPID VS. CA - G.R. No. 142261, June 29, 2000
FACTS:
On the basis of an unsigned letter allegedly originating from the "Mga Mamamayan ng Lalawigan ng
Pampanga," the NBI initiated an "open probe" on the alleged illegal quarrying in Pampanga & exaction of
exorbitant fees purportedly perpetrated by unscrupulous individuals with the connivance of high-ranking
government officials. The NBI report was endorsed to the respondent Ombudsman.

A complaint was filed charging petitioner Gov. Manuel M. Lapid, with alleged "Dishonesty, Grave
Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service" for allegedly "having conspired
between and among themselves in demanding and collecting from various quarrying operators in
Pampanga a control fee, control slip, or monitoring fee of P120.00 per truckload of sand, travel, or other
quarry material, without a duly enacted provincial ordinance authorizing the collection thereof and
without issuing receipts for its collection.

The Ombudsman issued an Order suspending petitioner Lapid for a period of six (6) months without pay
pursuant to Sec. 24 of RA 6770. The DILG implemented the suspension of petitioner Lapid.

On November 22, 1999 the Ombudsman rendered a decision in the administrative case finding the Lapid
administratively liable for misconduct. The copy of the said decision was received by counsel for the
petitioner and a motion for reconsideration was filed. The Ombudsman denied the motion for
reconsideration.

Petitioner then filed a petition for review with the CA praying for the issuance of a TRO to enjoin the
Ombudsman from enforcing the questioned decision. The TRO was issued by the appellate court.

When the 60-day lifetime of the TRO lapsed without the CA resolving the prayer for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary injunction, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed with the SC.
The SC issued a Resolution requiring the respondents to comment on the petition. That same day, the CA
issued a resolution denying the petitioner's prayer for injunctive relief. The following day, the DILG
implemented the assailed decision of the Ombudsman and the highest ranking Provincial Board Member
of Pampanga, Edna David, took her oath of office as O.I.C. Governor of the Province of Pampanga.

A Motion for Leave to File Supplement to the Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus and the
Supplement to the Petition itself were filed in view of the resolution of the CA denying the petitioner's
prayer for preliminary injunction. The petitioner likewise raised in issue the apparent pre-judgment of the
case on the merits by the CA. Petitioner alleged that the decision of the Ombudsman had not yet become
final and argued that the writs of prohibition and mandamus may be issued against the respondent DILG
for prematurely implementing the assailed decision.
The Solicitor-General and the Office of the Ombudsman filed their respective comments to the petition
praying for the dismissal thereof:
- The Solicitor-Generalmaintains that the said decision is governed by Section 12, Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court and is therefore, immediately executory.
- The Ombudsmanmaintain that the Ombudsman Law and its implementing rules are silent as to the
execution of decisions rendered by the Ombudsman considering that the portion of the said law cited by
petition pertains to the finality of the decision but not to its enforcement pending appeal. They also stated
that it has uniformly adopted the provisions in the Local Government Code and Administrative Code that
decisions in administrative disciplinary cases are immediately executory.

After oral arguments before the SC, the Resolution subject of the instant Motions for Reconsideration was
issued. The OSG and the Ombudsman filed the instant motions for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether or not the decision of the Ombudsman finding herein petitioner administratively liable
for misconduct and imposing upon him a penalty of one (1) year suspension without pay is immediately
executory pending appeal.

HELD:
Section 27 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 states that all provisionary orders of the Ombudsman are
immediately effective and executory; and that any order, directive or decision of the said Office imposing
the penalty of censure or reprimand or suspension of not more than one month's salary is final and
unappealable. It is clear that the punishment imposed upon petitioner, i.e. suspension without pay
for one year, is not among those listed as final and unappealable, hence, immediately executory.

It is clear that all other decisions of the Ombudsman which impose penalties that are not enumerated in
the said section 27 are not final, unappealable and immediately executory.

An appeal timely filed, such as the one filed in the instant case, will stay the immediate implementation of
the decision.

In all these other cases therefore, the judgment imposed therein will become final after the lapse of
the reglementary period of appeal is perfected or, an appeal therefrom having been taken, the
judgment in the appellate tribunal become final. It is this final judgment which is then correctly
categorized as a "final and executory judgment" in respect to which execution shall issue as a
matter of right. In other words, the fact that the Ombudsman Act gives parties the right to appeal from its
decisions should generally carry with it the stay of these decisions pending appeal. Otherwise, the
essential nature of these judgments as being appealable would be rendered nugatory.

The general rule is that judgments by lower courts or tribunals become executory only after it has become
final and executory, execution pending appeal being an exception to this general rule. It is the contention
of respondents however that with respect to decisions of quasi-judicial agencies and administrative
bodies, the opposite is true. It is argued that the general rule with respect to quasi-judicial and
administrative agencies is that the decisions of such bodies are immediately executory even pending
appeal. The contention of respondents is misplaced. There is no general legal principle that mandates that
all decisions of quasi-judicial agencies are immediately executory.

Where the legislature has seen fit to declare that the decision of the quasi-judicial agency is
immediately final and executory pending appeal, the law expressly so provides. Sec. 12 of Rule 43
should therefore be interpreted as mandating that the appeal will not stay the award, judgment,
final order or resolution unless the law directs otherwise.

Petitioner was charged administratively before the Ombudsman and accordingly the provisions of the
Ombudsman Act should apply in his case. There is no basis in law for the proposition that the provisions
of the Administrative Code of 1987 and the Local Government Code on execution pending review should
be applied suppletorily to the provisions of the Ombudsman Act as there is nothing in the Ombudsman
Act which provides for such suppletory application.

The decision imposing a penalty of one year suspension without pay on petitioner Lapid is not
immediately executory.

5. Rule 45
Nunez vs. GSIS Family Bank, 475 SCRA 305 (2005)
FACTS:
Petitioners are the heirs of Leonilo S. Nuez (Leonilo) who, during his lifetime, obtained three loans from
the GSIS Family Bank, formerly ComSavings Bank which in turn was formerly known as Royal Savings
and Loan Association. On June 30, 1978, when the three loans were maturing, Leonilo purportedly
obtained a "fourth loan" in the amount of P1,539,135.00 to secure which he executed a Real Estate
Mortgage antedated June 28, 1978 over properties. On the maturity of the three loans or on June 30, 1978,
Leonilo executed a Promissory Note 6 in the amount of P1,539,135.00, due and payable on December 27,
1978. More than nineteen (19) years after Leonilo's June 30, 1978 Promissory Note matured or on
December 11, 1997, the bank undertook to extrajudicially foreclose the properties. In its petition for
extrajudicial foreclosure, the bank alleged that Leonilo violated the terms and conditions of the loans
secured by the Real Estate Mortgages since June 30, 1978 when he failed, despite repeated demands, to
pay his principal obligations, and interest due thereon from December 27, 1978, up to the time that the
petition was filed. Acting on the bank's petition for Extra-judicial Foreclosure of Mortgage, the Ex-
Officio Sheriff of Gapan, Nueva Ecija issued a Notice of Extra-judicial Sale setting the sale of the
properties involved at public auction on January 9, 1998. The auction took place as scheduled, with the
bank as the highest and only bidder in the amount of P33,026,100.00. A Certificate of Sale was thus
issued in favor of the bank. On September 1, 1999, on petition of the bank, the mortgage over properties
two of the six parcels of land which secured the "fourth loan" that matured on December 27, 1978, was
extrajudicially foreclosed. At the public auction, the bank was the highest bidder and a Certificate of Sale
dated February 18, 2000 was issued in its name.

Leonilo later filed on June 20, 2000 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Gapan, Nueva Ecija a
complaint against the GSIS Family Bank for Annulment of Extrajudicial Foreclosure Sale, Reconveyance
and Cancellation of Encumbrances. In his complaint, Leonilo denied securing a "fourth loan" but
nevertheless alleged that "for purposes of the action, the same shall be assumed to have been validly
secured. Invoking prescription, Leonilo contended that his first three loans and the "fourth loan" matured
on June 30, 1978 and December 27, 1978, hence, they had prescribed on June 28, 1988 and December 25,
1988, respectively. When, on December 11, 1997 and September 1, 1999 then, the bank filed the Petitions
for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of Mortgage, Leonilo concluded that it no longer had any right as
prescription had set in.

Leonilo invited the attention of the court to the fact that although six titles secured the purported "fourth
loan" of P1,539,135.00, only two were the subject of foreclosure sale on September 1, 1999 and the
mortgage was not annotated on the four other mortgaged titles. Moreover, he pointed out that the record
shows that the Real Estate Mortgage dated June 28, 1978 purportedly securing the "fourth loan" was
annotated on NT-143001 and NT-143007 subject of the September 1, 1999 foreclosure only on August 31,
1999 or more than 11 years after the prescriptive period to foreclose had set in.

RTC - RTC found for Leonilo who died during the pendency of the trial of the case, hence, his
substitution by his heirs herein petitioners, declaring that the bank's cause of action over the loans had
prescribed and, therefore, the proceedings for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages were null
and void.

The bank filed a motion for reconsideration on September 20, 2002, the last of the 15-day period within
which it could interpose an appeal, but it did not comply with the provision of Section 4, Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court on notice of hearing, prompting herein petitioners to file a Motion to Strike Out Motion
for Reconsideration with Motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. The bank filed an Opposition
with Motion to Admit (the Motion for Reconsideration), attributing its failure to incorporate the notice of
hearing to inadvertent deletion from its computer file of standard clauses for pleadings the required notice
of hearing and to the heavy workload of the handling counsel, Atty. George Garvida. The trial court
denied the bank's Motion for Reconsideration by Order of November 18, 2002 and accordingly ordered it
stricken off the record.

The bank filed a Notice of Appeal to which petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss for being filed late,
which motion was granted by the trial court by Order of February 10, 2003. The bank, which is owned by
the Government Service Insurance System, argued that too rigidly and strictly apply the rules of
procedure would result to injustice and irreparable damage to the government as it stands to lose a
substantial amount if not allowed to recover the proceeds of the loans.

CA - it ruled that while the right to appeal is a statutory and not a natural right, it is nevertheless an
essential part of the judicial system, hence, courts should be cautious not to deprive a party of the right to
appeal; and in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, the trial court should have given the bank's Notice of
Appeal due course to better serve the ends, and prevent a miscarriage of justice.
ISSUE:
Whether the private respondent could still appeal a judgment which has become final and executor

HELD:
NO. At the outset, clarification on petitioners' mode of appeal is in order. Petitioners and counsel confuse
their petition as one Petition for Review under Rule 45 with a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. For
while they treat it as one for Review on Certiorari, they manifest that it is filed "pursuant to Rule 65 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in relation to Rule 45 of the New Rules of Court."

In Ligon v. Court of Appeals where the therein petitioner described her petition as "an appeal under Rule
45 and at the same time as a special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court," this
Court, in frowning over what it described as a "chimera," reiterated that the remedies of appeal and
certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative nor successive.

To be sure, the distinctions between Rules 45 and 65 are far and wide. However, the most apparent is that
errors of jurisdiction are best reviewed in a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 while errors of
judgment can only be corrected by appeal in a petition for review under Rule 45. This Court, however, in
accordance with the liberal spirit which pervades the Rules of Court and in the interest of justice may
treat a petition for certiorari as having filed under Rule 45, more so if the same was filed within the
reglementary period for filing a petition for review. The records show that the petition was filed on time
both under Rules 45 and 65. Following Delsan Transport, the petition, stripped of allegations of "grave
abuse of discretion," actually avers errors of judgment which are the subject of a petition for review.

The explanations proffered by the bank behind its failure to incorporate a notice of hearing of the Motion
for Reconsideration inadvertent deletion from its computer file of the standard clauses for pleadings
during the printing of the finalized draft of the motion and the handling counsel's heavy workload are
unsatisfactory. To credit the foregoing explanations would render the mandatory rule on notice of hearing
meaningless and nugatory as lawyers would simply invoke these grounds should they fail to comply with
the rules. As to the claim that the government would suffer loss of substantial amount if not allowed to
recover the proceeds of the loans, this Court finds that any loss was caused by respondent's own doing or
undoing.

China Road and Bridge Corp. vs. CA, 348 SCRA 401 (2000)
China Road and Bridge Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 137898, December 15, 2000, 401 PHIL 590-
604
FACTS:
CHINA ROAD AND BRIDGE CORPORATION (CRBC) is a corporation organized under the laws of
the People's Republic of China duly licensed by the Securities and Exchange Commission to do business
in the Philippines. It was awarded by the Philippine Government the contract to construct the EDSA Shaw
Boulevard Overpass in Mandaluyong, which it subcontracted to Hi-Quality Builders and Traders, Inc.
(HI-QUALITY), a domestic corporation organized under the laws of the Philippines.
Helen Ambrosio: President of HI-QUALITY, executed a Continuing Suretyship in favor of Jade
Progressive Savings and Mortgage Bank (JADEBANK) binding herself to pay the "obligations of the
Debtor (Hi-Quality) arising from all credit accommodations extended by the Bank to the Debtor . . .
presently or hereafter owing to the Bank, as appears in the accounts, books and records of the Bank
whether direct or indirect . . . "
HI-QUALITY executed a Deed of Assignment in favor of JADEBANK with the approval of CRBC where
it assigned to JADEBANK
"(a)ll monthly accomplishment billings, the sums of money, credit, or receivables assigned, be in the
position (sic) of or due or to be due from China Road and Bridge Corporation, arising from the
subcontract agreement in the construction of the EDSA/Shaw Blvd. Overpass Project . . . "
JADEBANK released to HI-QUALITY:
1. P500,000.00 as part of the loan both parties earlier contracted. As security for the loan, HI-
QUALITY executed Promissory Note promising to pay the loan on 3 April 1997. It also indorsed to
JADEBANK Check issued by CRBC on 31 March 1997 covering the amount released, drawn on United
Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB), Mandaluyong Branch.
2. P250,000.00 for which HI-QUALITY executed Promissory Note No. JB BDO 181/97 payable on
18 April 1997 and indorsed to JADEBANK Check issued by Helen Ambrosio on 18 April 1997 covering
the amount released, drawn on Allied Banking Corporation, Shaw Boulevard Branch (ALLIEDBANK).
3. P250,000.00 for which HI-QUALITY executed Promissory Note No. JB BDO 150/97 payable on
5 May 1997 and indorsed to JADEBANK ALLIEDBANK Check No. 0000126131 issued by Ambrosio
dated 30 April 1997 for the same amount.
4. P400,000.00 for which HI-QUALITY executed Promissory Note No. JB BDO 162/97 payable on
5 May 1997 and indorsed to JADEBANK Check No. 214179 issued by Ambrosio dated 30 April 1997 for
the same amount, drawn on Security Bank Corporation, Pateros Branch (SECURITYBANK).
5. Another P400,000.00 for which HI-QUALITY executed Promissory Note No. JB BDO 33/97
payable on 5 May 1997 and indorsed to JADEBANK UCPB Check No. 270144 issued by CRBC.
6. P350,000.00 for which HI-QUALITY executed Promissory Note No. JB BDO 45/97 payable on
5 May 1997 and indorsed to JADEBANK UCPB Check No. 270147 issued by CRBC.
7. Finally, on 21 February 1997 JADEBANK released P250,000.00 for which HI-QUALITY
executed Promissory Note No. JB BDO 75/97 payable on 5 May 1997 and indorsed to JADEBANK
UCPB Check No. 270551 issued by CRBC.
All the promissory notes executed by HI-QUALITY provided for twenty-five percent (25%) interest per
annum and a five percent (5%) penalty per month in case ofdefault. The amount of each check
corresponded to the amount released to HI-QUALITY on the day the check was indorsed to JADEBANK.
When JADEBANK deposited the aforementioned checks for payment, they were returned unpaid. The
checks drawn on:
1. UCPB were dishonored due to "Stop Payment" orders from the drawer.
2. ALLIEDBANK checks were dishonored because the account was closed
3. The SECURITYBANK check was dishonored because the account had been closed since the
second quarter of 1996.
JADEBANK: filed a case for collection against HI-QUALITY, Helen Ambrosio and CRBC, with an
application for a writ of attachment against their properties.
The Complaint included as cause of action the first four (4) checks indorsed by HI-QUALITY to
JADEBANK and alleging among others that the defendants conspired to commit fraudulent acts in order
to induce JADEBANK to grant the loans to HI-QUALITY. Firstly, CRBC issued to HI-QUALITY the
UCPB check for P500,000.00 dated 31 March 1997 without any intention of honoring the check.
JADEBANK alleged that CRBC knew fully well that the check was to be used by HI-QUALITY as
security for the loan from JADEBANK. However, in violation of the Deed of Assignment, CRBC gave to
HI-QUALITY sums of money without notice to or the consent of JADEBANK, thereby releasing funds
supposedly already assigned to JADEBANK for the payment of HI-QUALITY's loans. Secondly, Helen
Ambrosio, as President of HI-QUALITY, issued the checks drawn on SECURITYBANK and
ALLIEDBANK after her accounts with these banks were closed, thus revealing a fraudulent intention not
to honor her obligations even from their inception. She also executed the Suretyship Agreement in favor of
JADEBANK without any intention of fulfilling her obligations.
TC: issued a Writ of Preliminary Attachment. On the same day, a Notice of Garnishment was served on
UCPB garnishing all the moneys ofCRBC in the bank. On 23 June 1997 CRBC filed a Motion for
Discharge of Attachment. On the same day a Notice of Levy on Attachment was also served on CRBC. On
27 June 1997 the preliminary attachment was discharged after CRBC posted a counter-bond in the
amount of P1,962,458.00. JADEBANK filed an Amended Complaint to include the loans contracted on 7,
17 and 21 February 1997 increasing the total amount collectible to P3,437,424.42.
CRBC: filed a Motion to Dismiss the Complaint on the ground of lack of cause of action because the
Deed of Assignment upon which JADEBANK based its cause of action against CRBC, was subject to the
Sub-Contracting Agreement between CRBC and HI-QUALITY
Under these circumstances, until such time as Hi Quality is able to perform its obligations
pursuant to the Sub-Contract Agreement thereby entitling it to payment for services rendered,
China Road has no liability whatsoever in Hi-Quality's favor. Corollarily, until its happens, Hi-
Quality has nothing to assign in favor of the plaintiff in the form of collectibles/receivables
from China Road pursuant to the Deed of Assignment. 3 cDTaSH
CRBC also denied that the issuance of the checks to HI-QUALITY was for the purpose of facilitating the
loans in favor of the latter, claiming that the checks were for the use of HI-QUALITY alone, and not for
any other purpose and it also denied that it had been releasing money to HI-QUALITY, claiming that the
latter had failed to comply with its obligations to CRBC.
TC: granted the MTD the complaint with respect to CRBC. Its MR having been denied.
CRBC: filed with the Court of Appeals a MTD Appeal asserting that "the determination of whether the
ultimate facts in a Complaint state a cause of action against the defendant is a pure question of law and
does not involve any question of fact." because proper mode of appeal was not by way of ordinary appeal
under Rule 41 but rather by way of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
CA: issued the assailed Resolution denying CRBC's Motion to Dismiss, finding the appeal involved both
questions of fact and of law. MR denied hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
W/N CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying
petitioner's Motion to Dismiss.
HELD:
A question of law exists when there is doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a certain state of
facts, and there is a question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of
facts, or when the query necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly the
credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to
each other and to the whole and probabilities of the situation.
Ordinarily, the determination of whether an appeal involves only questions of law or both questions of
law and fact is best left to the appellate court, and all doubts as to the correctness of such conclusions will
be resolved in favor of the Court of Appeals. However, in the instant case, we find that there was grave
abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Court of Appealshence, we grant the petition.
It is well settled that in a motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action, the issue is passed upon on
the basis of the allegations assuming them to be true. The court does not inquire into the truth ofthe
allegations and declare them to be false, otherwise it would be a procedural error and a denial of due
process to the plaintiff. Only the statements in the complaint may be properly considered, and the court
cannot take cognizance of external facts or hold preliminary hearings to ascertain their existence. To put it
simply, the test for determining whether a complaint states or does not state a cause of action against the
defendants is whether or not, admitting hypothetically the truth of the allegations of fact made in the
complaint, the judge may validly grant the relief demanded in the complaint.
In a motion to dismiss based on failure to state a cause of action, there cannot be any question of fact or
"doubt or difference as to the truth or falsehood of facts," simply because there are no findings of fact in
the first place. What the trial court merely does is to apply the law to the facts as alleged in the complaint,
assuming such allegations to be true. It follows then that any appeal therefrom could only raise questions
of law or "doubt or controversy as to what the law is on a certain state of facts." Therefore, a decision
dismissing a complaint based on failure to state a cause of action necessarily precludes a review of the
same decision on questions of fact. One is the legal and logical opposite ofthe other.
The test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the
party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without
reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is a question of
fact.
Applying the test to the instant case, it is clear that private respondent raises pure questions of law which
are not proper in an ordinary appeal under Rule 41, but should be raised by way of a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45.
In a motion to dismiss due to failure to state a cause of action, the trial court can consider all the pleadings
filed, including annexes, motions and the evidence on record. However in so doing, the trial court does
not rule on the truth or falsity of such documents. It merely includes such documents in the hypothetical
admission. Any review of a finding of lack of cause of action based on these documents would not
involve a calibration of the probative value of such pieces of evidence but would only limit itself to the
inquiry of whether the law was properly applied given the facts and these supporting documents.
Therefore, what would inevitably arise from such a review are pure questions of law, and not questions of
fact.
It is apparent that JADEBANK, as well as respondent appellate court, confused situations where the
complaint does not allege a sufficient cause of actionand where the evidence does not sustain the cause of
action alleged. The first is raised in a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 before a responsive pleading is
filed and can be determined only from the allegations in the initiatory pleading and not from evidentiary
or other matter aliunde. The second is raised in a demurrer to evidence under Rule 33 after the plaintiff
has rested his case and can be resolved only on the basis of the evidence he has presented in support of his
claim. The first does not concern itself with the truth and falsity of the allegations while the second arises
precisely because the judge has determined the truth and falsity of the allegations and has found the
evidence wanting. AHSaTI
JADEBANK's appeal having been improperly brought before the Court of Appeals, it should be
dismissed outright pursuant to Sec. 2 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court.
DOCTRINE:
RULE 45 Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from
a judgment, final order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Court of Tax
Appeals, the Regional Trial Court or other courts, whenever authorized by law, may file with the Supreme
Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition may include an application for a writ of
preliminary injunction or other provisional remedies and shall raise only questions of law, which must
be distinctly set forth. The petitioner may seek the same provisional remedies by verified motion filed in
the same action or proceeding at any time during its pendency.
The test of whether a question is one of law or of fact is not the appellation given to such question by the
party raising the same; rather, it is whether the appellate court can determine the issue raised without
reviewing or evaluating the evidence, in which case, it is a question of law; otherwise, it is a question of
fact.

6. Rule 65
Day vs. RTC of Zamboanga City, 191 SCRA 610 (1999)
Victoriano Day v. RTC of Zamboanga and Go Chu
FACTs: In 1982, Petioner Victoriano Day, being reg. owner of his parcel of land at Tomas Claudio St.,
Zamboanga, asked respondent Go Chu to peacefully vacate and remove that portion of respondents
building standing on formers land. Respondent refused. So Pet instituted a formal complaint against
respondent with the Office of the Brgy. Chairman, Zone 1, Zamboanga. No amicable settlement was
reached and brgy chairman issued a certification that conciliation of the dispute at brgy level had failed
(pursuant to Sec. 6,PD 1508).
In 1984, Petitoner received from respondent P1,000 as rental for the use of his lot from 1979 to Dec.
1984. Based on this, respondent claimed the existence of a lease contract between him and petitioner
despite absence of formal or even verbal lease contract.
Petitioner made another demand on private respondent to remove latters building on his property.
Respondent again refused. In 1985, Petitioner filed an action for unlawful detainer with application for a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction with MTC. Petitioner did not use his barangay certification to
commence the suit.
MTC ruled in favor of Petitioner. MTC ordered Respondent to: 1. Vacate and remove the portion of the
building; 2. Pay P950 as compensation from 1986 till respondent vacates; and 3. Pay atty.s fees P5,000
and cost of litigation.
Without moving first for reconsideration, Respondent filed with RTC an original action for Certiorari. He
alleged that the lower court erroneously appreciated facts and evidence, issued interlocutory order, and
appreciated the issued.
So RTC issued TRO pending hearing of application for writ of PI. Parties filed their respective pleadings.
On May 27, 1986, after hearing of the application for PI, RTC issued decision in favor of Petitioner (so
court denied PI. RTC explained that the Certiorari was lacking in merit. Hence, it follows that where the
petitioner is not entitled to primary relief demanded, he cannot likewise be entitled to ancillary remedy of
injunction.However, there are still certain matters in the main petition that can only be completely
respolved after hearing thereon.
So a hearing on CERTAIN MATTERS was conducted, but parties did not submit additional arguments
and the case was submitted for decisions relying on the pleadings.
On July 8, 1986, RTC reversed itself granting the Certiorari and thus setting aside MTC decision. In
connection therewith, they were required to submit their dispute for barangay conciliation pursuant to
PD1508.
So Petitioner Day moved for recon butt denied. So Pet. filed this Pet. for Review.

Issues/ Held:
1. WoN court can modify or reverse May 27, 1986 Order by its July 8 1986 order even after the lapse of
15 days from issuance?

Pet argument Respondent SC

May. 27 Order is final Order
and all main issues in the case
have been resolved therein.
May 27 Order is interlocutory.
Hence, RTC is not precluded
from further hearing the case
after May 27 Order.
In favor of Petitioner. Test to
ascertain whether interlocutory
or not: Does it leave something
to be done in the court with
respect to the merits of the
case? If it does-interlocutory; If
it does not-final.
In the instant case, it is evident
that the respondent court
resolved no new or other
matter in the order of July 8.
Thus, May 27 is final (but
appealable.)

2. WoN Petitioner in an Unlawful Detainer case can apply for a writ of Preliminary Injunction
Yes. An inferior court has jurisdiction to grant provisional remedies in proper cases 1.Preliminary
attachement under Rule 57 provided rincipal action is within its jurisdiction; and 2. Preliminary
Injunction under Rule 58
3. WoN barangay conciliation is applicable in unlawful detainer cases (such as in this case)
No. See Sec. 6, PD 1508. The parties may go directly to court in actions coupled with provisional
remedies AND DOES NOT REQUIRE CONCILIATION PROCEEDING AS PRECONDITION for filing
in court. Action filed here is Action for unlawful detainer with application for writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction.
4. WoN RTC can entertain petition for review on certiorari filed by respondent to appeal decision of MTC
No. Applying Sec. 22, BP 129, decisions of inferior courts may be elevated to the RTC only by
ORDINARY APPEAL, that is by filing a Notice of Appeal with the inferior court. Said provision does not
allow other modes.
5. WoN RTC, in a petition for certiorari, may entertain question of facts, procedural or substance already
decided by MTC
No. In a certiorari case, RTC has no jurisdiction to Entertain such questions, because such questions
require admission of evidence and admissibility of evidence is a matter that is addressed to the discretion
of trial court (here MTC)
6. Won Writ of Certiorari can be granted other than the grounds mentioned under Sec. 1, Rule 65
No. Sec. 1, Rule 65 REDUCED THE office of the writ of certiorari to the correction of defects of
jurisdiction solely and cannot legally be used for any other purpose. In this case there is neither grave
abuse of discretion nor excess of jurisdiction on the part of MTC when it held its decision. Plus the fact
that MTC has the jurisdiction over unlawful detainer case..

Romys Freight Service vs. Castro, 490 SCRA 165 (2006)

ROMY'S FREIGHT SERVICE, represented by Roman G. Cruz, petitioner, vs. JESUS C. CASTRO,
DOMINADOR VELORIA and the FIRST DIVISION of the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

[G.R. No. 141637. June 8, 2006.]

FACTS:

This case originated from a complaint for illegal dismissal filed jointly by private respondents Jesus C.
Castro and Dominador Veloria against petitioner Romy's Freight Service, represented by Roman G. Cruz,
its owner/sole proprietor, with the Regional Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in Baguio City.
Private respondent Castro was hired by petitioner as a mechanic in April 1975. He was promoted to
supervisor in 1986. On December 31, 1994, he suffered a stroke. On his doctor's advice, he took a leave
of absence from work. Pending recovery, he extended his leave several times. While on leave, however,
petitioner Roman G. Cruz sent him several letters first urging him to return to work. The succeeding ones
assumed the nature of show cause letters requiring him to explain why he should not be disciplined for his
prolonged absence. Cruz also filed complaints for estafa and qualified theft against him. Because of these,
Castro was constrained to file a case for illegal dismissal against petitioner on the ground that Cruz's acts
constituted constructive dismissal

Labor Arbiter:

September 15, 1997, executive labor arbiter Jesselito Latoja ruled that petitioner was guilty of illegal
dismissal and ordered it to pay private respondents the total amount of P352,944.90, representing 13th
month pay, backwages, separation pay, premium pay for work rendered on rest days and holidays, and
attorney's fees.

NLRC:
NLRC which, in its October 29, 1998 decision, reversed and set aside the labor arbiter's ruling. It found
private respondents guilty of abandonment of work and dismissed their complaint for illegal dismissal
against petitioner

CA:

Aggrieved, private respondents filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the
Court of Appeals (CA). They ascribed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the NLRC for not finding that they were constructively dismissed by petitioner.
On September 9, 1999, the appellate court granted the petition. It ruled that, since the findings of the labor
arbiter were supported by substantial evidence, it should be respected by appellate tribunals. Petitioner
failed to overcome the burden of proving the existence of just cause for dismissing private respondents,
hence, it was guilty of illegal dismissal. The CA rejected petitioner's contention that private respondents
abandoned their work. It held that their failure to report for work was for justifiable reasons and that they
had no intention to sever their employment. As a consequence, the CA reversed and set aside the decision
of the NLRC and reinstated the September 15, 1997 decision of the labor arbiter as modified by the
latter's October 1, 1997 order

ISSUE:

Whether or not petition for certiorari is valid, despite failure to to file a motion for reconsideration with
NLRC

HELD:

NO. As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration is needed before a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 can be resorted to. However, there are well recognized exceptions to this rule. Private respondents'
petition for certiorari before the CA was covered by the exceptions.
The issue raised in the certiorari proceeding before the appellate court, i.e., whether private respondents
were constructively dismissed without just cause, was also the very same issue raised before the NLRC
and resolved by it. Moreover, the employer-employee relationship between petitioner and private
respondents was impressed with public interest. Thus, it was proper for the appellate court to take
cognizance of the case even if no motion for reconsideration had been filed by private respondents with
the NLRC.

DOCTRINE:

As a general rule, a motion for reconsideration is needed before a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
can be resorted to. However, there are well recognized exceptions to this rule.
Other Issue:

The other issues raised by petitioner, i.e., whether private respondents were illegally dismissed (as the CA
and the labor arbiter ruled) or abandoned their work (as the NLRC held) and whether they were entitled to
backwages, unpaid benefits, separation pay and attorney's fees, are not proper subjects of a petition for
certiorari. They involve an inquiry into factual matters.
The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, more so in the consideration of the extraordinary writ of
certiorari where neither questions of fact nor of law are entertained, but only questions of lack or excess
of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion. The sole object of the writ is to correct errors of jurisdiction
or grave abuse of discretion. The phrase 'grave abuse of discretion' has a precise meaning in law,
denoting abuse of discretion "too patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty, or a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or act in contemplation of law, or where the power is
exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility." It does not
encompass an error of law. Nor does it include a mistake in the appreciation of the contending parties'
respective evidence or the evaluation of their relative weight.
The Court cannot be tasked to go over the proofs presented by the parties and analyze, assess and weigh
them all over again to ascertain if the trial court or quasi-judicial agency and the appellate court were
correct in according superior credit to this or that piece of evidence of one party or the other. The sole
office of a writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction including the commission of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and does not include the review of public
respondent's evaluation of the evidence and the factual findings based thereon

Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank vs. CA, 334 SCRA 305 (2000)
FACTS:
The General Banking Act regulates the number of branches that a bank may operate. In 1979,
Banco Filipino had reached the allowable limit in branch site holdings but contemplated further
expansion of its operations. Consequently, it unloaded some of its holdings to Tala Realty. Banco Filipino
thereafter leased the same branch sites from Tala Realty which was conceived and organized precisely as
a transferee corporation by the major stockholders of Banco Filipino. Banco
Filipino alleges that a trust was created by virtue of the above transactions. Tala Realty was allegedly
established to serve as a corporate medium to warehouse the legal title of the said properties for the
beneficial interest of Banco Filipino and to purchase properties to be held in trust for the latter. However,
sometime in August 1992, Tala Realty demanded payment of increased rentals, deposits and goodwill
from Banco Filipino, with a threat of ejectment in case of failure to comply thereto. Due to Banco
Filipino's failure to comply with Tala Realtys terms, the latter carried out its threat by filing numerous
ejectment suits against Banco Filipino. This prompted Banco Filipino to file, on August 16, 1995, an
action for recovery of real properties before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 28, on the ground
of breach of trust.
RTC: the trial court dismissed the complaint on April 22, 1996
On June 27, 1996, the trial court denied Banco Filipinos motion for reconsideration. Banco Filipino
received a copy of said order of denial on July 5, 1996 but instead of filing an appeal, it filed, on July 24,
1996, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals. Banco Filipino alleged in its
petition that the trial courts decision was issued with grave abuse of discretion because it did not comply
with the constitutional mandate on the form of decisions.
CA: dismissed Banco Filipino's petition on the ground, among others, that the "[p]etitioner's recourse to
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court is patently malapropos." It reiterated the rule that a special civil
action for certiorari may be resorted to only when there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Banco Filipinos failure to appeal by writ of error within the
reglementary period and its belated recourse to a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 was interpreted by
the Court of Appeals as a desperate attempt by Banco Filipino to resurrect what was otherwise already a
lost appeal. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals debunked Banco Filipino's theory that the assailed order of
the RTC did not comply with the substantive requirements of the Constitution, and was thus, rendered
with grave abuse of discretion. On December 28, 1996, Banco Filipino received a copy of the Court of
Appeals decision dismissing its petition thereby prompting the latter to file a motion for reconsideration
on January 10, 1997. The Court of Appeals denied the said motion for reconsideration on December 19,
1997 in a resolution, a copy of which was received by Banco Filipino on January 7, 1998. Banco Filipino
then filed with this Court its subject petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court on
March 9, 1998.
ISSUE:
WON the Banco Filipinos filing a special civil action for certiorari instead of an ordinary appeal before
this Court is correct.
HELD:
NO. Without need of delving into the merits of the case, this Court hereby dismisses the
instant petition.
1. Banco Filipino's proper remedy from the adverse resolutions of the Court of Appeals is an ordinary
appeal to this Court via a petition for review under Rule 45 and not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Nothing in the record of this case supports Banco Filipinos bare assertion that the Court of Appeals
rendered its assailed resolutions with grave abuse of discretion. In other words, there being no grave
abuse of discretion on its part, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed resolutions in the proper
exercise of its jurisdiction. Hence, even if erroneous, the Court of Appeals resolutions can only be
assailed by means of a petition for review. The distinction is clear: a petition for certiorari seeks to correct
errors of jurisdiction while a petition for review seeks to correct errors of judgment committed by the
court. Errors of judgment include errors of procedure or mistakes in the courts findings. Where a court
has jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the decision on all other questions arising in the
case is an exercise of that jurisdiction. Consequently, all errors committed in the exercise of such
jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment.
2. The availability to Banco Filipino of the remedy of a petition for review from the decision of the
Court of Appeals effectively foreclosed its right to resort to a petition for certiorari. This Court has often
enough reminded members of the bench and bar that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies
only when there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
Certiorari is not allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that
remedy. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive. In
the case at bar, Banco Filipino has failed to show any valid reason why the issues raised in its petition for
certiorari could not have been raised on appeal. To justify its resort to a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65, it erroneously claims that an appeal is not a speedy and adequate remedy because further
delay in the disposition of this case would effectively deprive Banco Filipino of the full use and
enjoyment of its properties. However, the further delay that would inadvertently result from the dismissal
of the instant petition is one purely of Banco Filipino's own doing.
3. Certiorari cannot be used as a substitute for the lapsed or lost remedy of appeal. Banco Filipinos
recourse to a special civil action for certiorari was borne not out of the conviction that grave abuse of
discretion attended the resolution of its petition before the Court of Appeals but simply because of its
failure to file a timely appeal to this Court.
It is true that this Court may treat a petition for certiorari as having been filed under Rule 45 to serve the
higher interest of justice, but not when the petition is filed well beyond the reglementary period for filing
a petition for review and without offering any reason therefor.
Concomitant to a liberal application of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party
invoking liberality to at least explain its failure to comply with the rules. In the case at bar, Banco
Filipinos petition is bereft of any valid reason or explanation as to why it failed to properly observe the
rules of procedure. The record shows that Banco Filipino failed, not once but twice, and for an
unreasonable length of time, to file an appeal within the period required by law. From the order of the
RTC, it filed its petition for certiorari some fourteen (14) days after the lapse of the reglementary period
to appeal to the Court of Appeals. Likewise, when Banco Filipino filed its
petition for certiorari before this Court, forty five (45) days have already passed since the end of the
fifteen (15) day reglementary period for filing an appeal to the Supreme Court.

Fajardo vs. Bautista, 232 SCRA 292 (1994)

Fajardo v. Bautista
G.R. Nos. 102193-97
May 10, 1994

DOCTINE:
Generally, an order of dismissal, whether right or wrong, is a final order, and hence a proper subject of
appeal, not certiorari. 30 The remedies of appeal andcertiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative
or successive. 31 Accordingly, although the special civil action of certiorari is not proper when an
ordinary appeal is available, it may be granted where it is shown that the appeal would be inadequate,
slow, insufficient, and will not promptly relieve a party from the injurious effects of the order complained
of, or where appeal is inadequate and ineffectual. 32 Nevertheless, certiorari cannot be a substitute for the
lost or lapsed remedy of appeal, 33 where such loss is occasioned by the petitioner's own neglect or error
in the choice of remedies. 34|||

FACTS:
Private respondents Isabelo Jareo and Purita Jareo are the owners and developers of a subdivision
known as the Calamba Central Compound. They as SELLERS, and the petitioners as BUYERS signed
separate contracts ,CONTRACT TO SELL, under which, for the considerations therein stated, they bound
themselves to sell to the petitioners the lots subject thereof, and after the latter shall have paid the
purchase price and interest, to execute in favor of the petitioners the corresponding deeds of transfer of
title, free from any lien or encumbrance except those expressly provided for in the Contract to Sell||.
On the other hand, private respondent Fernando Realty and Development Corporation (hereinafter
FERNANDO) as SELLER, and petitioner Emily Yu Fajardo as BUYER signed on 22 February 1985 a
CONTRACT TO SELL under which for the considerations therein stated, FERNANDO agreed to sell to
Fajardo Lot No. 10, Block No. 3, also located at the Calamba Central Compound Subdivision, and upon
full payment of the agreed price and interest thereon, to execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of
Fajardo. cdll
It appears, however, that on 18 October 1986, the JAREOS sold the aforesaid lots subject of the
different contracts to sell to private respondent Ruben Habacon (hereinafter HABACON) under separate
documents denominated as "Kasulatan ng Bilihan." On 18 February 1991, HABACON caused the
cancellation of the certificates of title covering the said lots and the issuance of new ones in his name.
When the petitioners learned of these, they filed on 21 June 1991 separate complaints( RTC OF Calamba)
with the court a quo for annulment of the sales in favor of HABACON and of the new certificates of title
issued to him, for reinstatement of the certificates of title cancelled by those issued to HABACON, and
for accounting and damages.

MOTION TO DISMISS- filed by Habacon on the ground that the plaintiffs have no legal capacity to sue
because they were not parties to the bilihan

respondent judge directed the plaintiffs to show cause why their complaints should not be dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction pursuant to PD 957.

In their compliance with the show cause order, the petitioners maintained that it is the trial court, and not
the HLRB, which has jurisdiction over the complaint. They contend that Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal is
inapplicable because in their cases: (1) the title of the developers, the JAREOS, had already passed to a
third person, HABACON; (2) their action is for the annulment of the title of a third person; (3)
HABACON is not a developer; and (4) Section 19 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129 vests upon the Regional Trial
Court the jurisdiction to hear and decide all civil actions which involve title to or possession of any real
property or any interest therein, except actions for unlawful detainer and forcible entry
RTC- dismissed case for lack of jusridiction because the NHA now the Human Settlement Regulatory
Comission has inclusive jusridiction to hear and decide cases of unsound real estate practices.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order but the trial court denied.

Petitioners filed the instant special civil action for certiorari to annul the Orders of the trial court on the
ground that the judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing
their complaints and that they have no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. The petitioners maintain that the trial court has jurisdiction over their complaints

ISSUE: w/n the remedy of certiorari availed of is correct.

HELD:
Generally, an order of dismissal, whether right or wrong, is a final order, and hence a proper subject of
appeal, not certiorari. 30 The remedies of appeal andcertiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative
or successive. 31 Accordingly, although the special civil action of certiorari is not proper when an
ordinary appeal is available, it may be granted where it is shown that the appeal would be inadequate,
slow, insufficient, and will not promptly relieve a party from the injurious effects of the order complained
of, or where appeal is inadequate and ineffectual. 32 Nevertheless, certiorari cannot be a substitute for the
lost or lapsed remedy of appeal, 33 where such loss is occasioned by the petitioner's own neglect or error
in the choice of remedies
The petitioners admit that they received a copy of the trial court's order dismissing their complaints on 4
October 1991. 35 The instant petition was filed on 24 October 1991 or beyond the 15-day period to
appeal from the order. The petitioners have not even attempted to explain why they were unable to appeal
from the challenged order within the reglementary period. This civil action then was resorted to as a
substitute for the lost or lapsed remedy of appeal, and since none of the exceptions to the rigid rule
barring substitution of remedies was alleged to exist in this petition, or even indicated by the pleadings,
this petition must be dismissed.

Luis vs. Ca

Facts:
Private Respondent T.N Lal & Co., filed a petition for indirect contempt against petitioner Antonio San
Luis who is the administrator of the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) before the RTC of pasay city.

The action arose from alleged failure or refusal of petitioner to comply with an order directing the LRTA
to immediately restore power supply of private respondent sound system in all places, sites and locations
in its area of responsibility within 24 hours of receipt of the same.

As such, petitioner filed to dismiss the petition for indirect contempt on the ground of NO CAUSE OF
ACTION AND GUILTY OF FORUM SHOPPING

The direct contempt case was received by branch 118 presiding judge Nelson Bayot, but he directed such
matter to branch 111 who he believed was in a better position to determine whether or not the order had
been violated. (since it was in branch 111 where the controversy started)

After the transfer to branch 111, the petitioner therein moved to reconsider the order moving from branch
118 to 111, but Judge bayot already issued the records and transferred such to branch 111 and still firmly
believes that the assiled order was correct and proper

This prompted the petitioner to file with the CA a petition for certiorari and mandamus under rule 65
where he seeks to annul judge Bayots orders on the ground that the latter acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction with grave abuse of discretion when he did not act on the petitions motion to dismiss and
motion for reconsideration and INSTEAD TRANSFERRED THE CASE TO BRANCH 111.

CA denied the motion, stating it has been filed out of time.

Petitioner filed an MR and a motion to admit petition for certiorari and mandamus and to relax strict rules
on procedure BOTH WAS DENIED BY THE CA.

Issue:
WON the CA is guilty of Grave abuse of discretion in denying petition for certiorari and mandamus and
subsequently dismissed the case for failure to file on time overlooking such fact that failure was due to
honest mistake and human error in the computation of the period of the instant case.

Held:
The court on the procedural aspect rules in favor of the PETITIONER.
If the petitioner filed a motion for new trial/reconsideration in due time after notice of said judgement, the
period herin shall be INTERRUPTED. If DENIED. The aggrieved party may file petition within
remaining period but which shall not be less than 5 days in any event, reckoned from the notice of such
denial.
NO EXTENTION OF TIME TO FILE THE PETITION SHALL BE GRANTED EXCEPT FOR THE
MOST COMPELLING REASON AND IN NO CASE EXCEEDING 15 DAYS

This was however amended wherein the new law states (rule 65, sec 4 as amended in the Court resolution
in AM No. 00-2-03-SC which took effect on sep 1 2000) that the running of the 60 day period runs from
the RECEIPT OF NOTICE OF THE DENIAL OF THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. Hence
making the last day on January 7 which was when the petitioner filed his petition.