THE SHIFT OF RUSSIAN FOREIGN POLICY FROM EUROPE

TO THE ASIA PACIFIC FROM 2008 TO 2013

LTC Rozelle Salvosa Gadin PAF was an aviation cadet commissioned into the
Philippine Air Force on 31 August 1995. She is an instructor pilot and has served in
various key positions from tactical to the organizational level. She holds a degree in
Bachelor of Science in Nursing (Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila), Masters of
Arts in Management Major in Public Administration (Phil Christian University) and
Masters in Public Management Major in Development and Security (Development
Academy of the Phils).

ABSTRACT
Russias Foreign Policy in 2008 saw the leadership of President Medvedev with the
security concept remains to be the same, which is focusing on internal economic
recovery. When President Vladimir Putin came to power in 2012, he signed the
Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation on February 12, 2013,
replacing the endorsement of Dmitry Medvedev in July 2008, shifting Russias focus
towards the Asia Pacific. This research paper analysed the reasons as to why Russia
had shifted its focus from Europe, to the Asia Pacific through its foreign policy in
2013 despite its established economic and strategic relations with the European
community. The three research objectives are to analyze the effects of the shift of
Russias focus from Europe to the Asia Pacific with its economic interests; with its
strategic interest to become a dominant power, and to the United States as a global
power. There were three findings from this research. Firstly, Russia was shifting its
focus to the Asia-Pacific to prosper its economic interests. Secondly, Russia was
pouring its effort towards the Asia Pacific to achieve its strategic interest in order to
become a dominant power. Thirdly, Russia shifted its focus in order to balance the
United States. In conclusion, the shift of Russias focus from Europe to the Asia-
Pacific through it foreign policy from 2008 to 2013 was due to the international
system. As presented, the empirical evidence has shown that the international system
plays an important role in influencing a states behaviour in determining their foreign

1
policy. This is in tandem and in coordination with the theory of neorealism. This
research hopes to contribute to the field of strategic studies by explaining the
geopolitics in the region, and the formulation of foreign policy that was primarily due
to the international system.

INTRODUCTION

In international relations, interdependence in world politics implies that actors are

interrelated or connected such that something that happens to at least one actor, will
have the potential to affect the other actors. 1 Modern day Russia and the former Soviet
states have experienced such plight and are refocusing towards economic recovery. By
increasing and fostering its interaction with other states, Russia's alternative is to
engage the Russian Far East, China and Southeast Asia, which are the determining
factors necessary for Putin to achieve his long-term goals.

According to an article written by Dr. Bhavna Dave, Russias pivot which can
be generally considered as a shift towards the Asia-Pacific Region was Moscows
move to assert Russias geopolitical status as a Euro-Pacific as well as an Asia-Pacific
power.2 Another issue yet waiting to be seen is whether the change would proceed
towards Russias strategic interest of emerging as the dominant power, challenging the
United States as a global power. Neil Macfarlane in his article assessed the role of
Russia as an emerging power by raising questions such as, How do Russians
interpret the international system in which they operate? What kind of system would
they prefer? What are they trying to do in the current system and why? How do these
considerations affect their relations with the hegemon, with other centers of power
such as the European Union and with other emerging powers? 3 There are questions
whether Russia is concentrating its effort towards becoming a dominant power in the
Asia-Pacific region, or on a global scale. This leads to the question, will Russia
independently rebrand itself from being one of the former fifteen Soviet States, to rise
up again as another great civilization. Russia loses and unpopularity in the West are
observed in its focus shift towards the Asia-Pacific. In light of these observations, the
relevant question that need to be answered is why Russia has shifted its focus from
Europe to the Asia-Pacific through its foreign policy in 2013, despite its established
economic and strategic interests with the European community.

1
Evans, G. & Newnham, J. 1998. The Penguin Dictionary of Foreign Relations.
The Penguin Dictionary of Foreign Relations, 256.
2
Dave, B. Russias Asia Pivot: Engaging the Russian Far East, China and Southeast Asia.
Singapore.
3
MacFarlane, S. N. The R in BRICs: Is Russia an Emerging Power? International Affairs
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 82(1), 4147.

2
THE COMPARISON OF RUSSIAS FOREIGN POLICY FROM 2008 TO 2013
The foreign policy of Russia has shown significant changes since the 2012
Presidential election. Though the Russian 2008 foreign policy has similarities with the
new Russian foreign policy of 2013, with the latter also defined its peculiarities in
terms of its regional relations and priorities with its former Soviet States, to include
the European and Asian countries.
In a paper written by Francisco J. Ruiz Gonzalez entitled, The Foreign Policy
Concept of the Russian Federation: A Comparative Study, the author illustrated the
three concepts which illuminate the main plans of Russian foreign action, and how
Kremlin perceived the changes in world geopolitics.4 Gonzalez offered two
conclusions. Firstly, it can be drawn from the comparative study that there is a form of
continuity in the three concepts of each policy with identical structures of the
documents, and a consolidation of all the three models. Secondly, the issues
highlighted were very much the same such as the broad concept of security, the
identification of a wide range of threats excluding conflicts, the vision of a multipolar
world, and geopolitical axis move to the Pacific and the supremacy of the states
against their rights of interference from other countries. 5 The differentiation between
the 2008 and 2013 foreign policies are highlighted in Table 1.1

Table 1.1 A Comparison of the Concept Structure of the Russian Foreign

Policy 2008 and 2013

2008 Concept 2013 Concept

General provisions General provisions
Modern world and foreign policy of the Foreign policy of the Russian Federation
Russian Federation and modern world
Priorities for the Russian Federation to Priorities for the Russian Federation to
face global issues face global issues
Regional priorities Regional priorities
Designing and starting up the foreign Development and implementation of
policy of the Russian Federation foreign policy of the Russian Federation

(Source: Gonzales, F.J.R., The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation: A
Comparative Study)
Russias Foreign Policy 2008 and National Strategy 2009

4
Ibid.
5
Ibid.

3
The Russian foreign policy took turns in amendments and revision starting from the
Post-Cold War Period. Russia as the largest state had to evolve into being self-reliance
but not totally abandoning interdependency among its neighbours. Consequently,
Russias economic recovery was greatly affected by its foreign and defence policies.
Russias Foreign Policy of 2008 saw the leadership of President Medvedev at the
helm. This was reflected in the new foreign poli-cy concept presented on June 15,
2008. On May 12, 2009, President Medvedev approved the Russian national security
strategy until the year 2020. These documents focused on Russias economic recovery
with the main concentration being on the relations with former Soviet states and
regional interests with the European communities. The policy emphasized the
development of an international posture primarily focused on the interests and the
balance of power.6

Ziegler in his article entitled Conceptualizing Sovereignty in Russian Foreign

Policy: Realist and Constructivist Perspectives, presented that Russia has remained
adept to remain as a state of major influence with its efforts to establish relations with
other countries. According to him, after the dissolution of the Union, Central Asian
countries which have acquired independence received high attention from great
powers, inside and outside the region in terms of their important geostrategic
positions, abundant energy and resource reserves, and diversified and heterogeneous
cultural patterns.7
In the book entitled Explaining Change in the Russian Foreign Policy written
by Christian Thorun in 2009, the author discussed theories in the analysis of the
change in Russias foreign policy. The author introduced two hypotheses. Firstly, the
hypothesis raised the question what kind of Russian foreign policy behaviour should
be expected in cases where the West are lacking a clearly defined policy, or a united
position on international issues. Secondly, how foreign policy planning weighs in
relevancy in Russian foreign policy when it comes to collective ideas on the state,
international relations, and strategy.8

Russias Foreign Policy 2013 and National Strategy 2015

In an article written by Andrew Monaghan in 2013, entitled, The New Russian
Foreign Policy Concept: Evolving Continuity, the author espoused that there were
flaws in the new Russian Foreign Policy Concept, just like in some documents, but it
serves as both a marker of the countrys evolving understanding of international

6
Rumer, E. B. 2007. Russian Foreign Policy Beyond Putin First Edit., 23. New York: Routledge.
7
Ziegler, C. E. Conceptualizing Sovereignty in Russian Foreign Policy: Realist and Constructivist
Perspectives. International Politics, 49(4).
8
Thorun, C. 2009. Explaining Change in Russian Foreign Policy The Role of Ideas in Post Soviet
Russias Conduct towards the West. United Kingdom: Palgrave Macmillan.

4
affairs, and serves as a timely reminder of its intention to establish itself as an
international centre and model nation.9
Russian President Vladimir Putin approved a new national security strategy for
his country on December 31, 2015. The timing may be perfectly attuned to Russias
new military doctrine which just came out on December 25, 2014. Olga Oliker, Senior
Adviser and Director on Russia and Eurasia Program from the Center for Strategic
and International Studies (CSIS) presented her views that the new security strategy,
which depicted how Russia is focused on increasing its influence and prestige by
focusing on cementing its national unity; a Russia that believes that it is
accomplishing its aims, but which simultaneously feels threatened by the United
States, and its allies. 10 In short, what is present in Russias New National Security
Strategy is a document of an ambitious Russia that sees both constraints and
challenges in its national goals and interests.

Russias International Relations with the Big Powers

The word international is relatively a recent historical invention identified with the
philosopher Jeremy Bentham, who in 1780 introduced the term in his book
Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation.11 According to Bentham,
international relations is the term used to identify all interactions between state-based
actors across state boundaries. It is most correlated with international regimes which
are further expanded into notions of international cooperation.12
Arkady Moses in his article written in 2012 entitled Russia's European Policy
Under Medvedev: How Sustainable Is a New Compromise? argues that Dmitry
Medvedev's term in office in 2008, despite the continuity in Russia's foreign policy
objectives, brought about a certain change in Russia's relations with the European
Union and the countries of the Common Neighbourhood. The western perceptions of
Russia as a resurgent power able to use energy as leverage vis--vis the EU were
challenged by the global economic crisis, the emergence of a buyer's market in
Europe's gas trade, Russia's inability to start internal reforms, and the growing gap in
the development of Russia on the one hand and China on the other.13

9
Monaghan, A. The New Russian Foreign Policy Concept: Evolving Continuity. Chatham
House, 13(2013), 23.
10
Oliker, O. 2016. Unpacking Russias New National Security Strategy. Center for Strategic
and International Studies.
11
Booth, K. 2014. Chapter I -Understanding the World. International Relations- All That
Matters,.67. Hodder Stoughton, McGraw Hill Companies.
12
Morgan, P. 2013. Liberalism. Allan Collins. Contemporary Security Studies,.3334. Oxford
University Press.
13
Moshes, A. Russias European policy under Medvedev: how sustainable is a new
compromise? Chatham House The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 88(1), 1730.

5
 Steven K. Voytek, in his research paper entitled, Eurasianist Trends in Russian
Foreign Policy: A Critical Analysis, examined and illustrated the presence of a
powerful Eurasianist doctrine currently influencing Russian foreign policy. Over the
past decade, a new brand of Eurasianism has emerged which this study identifies as
Geopolitical Eurasianism.14 In the paper, Voytek argues that various external and
internal factors have led to the rise of this paradigm that now affects the formulation
and implementation of Russian foreign policy. At present, the author Voytek considers
Geopolitical Eurasianism to be the principle doctrine guiding Russian foreign policy
over the past decade.

Alina Vladimirova wrote in the July 2014 Conference Paper that the adage
Russia and China are brothers forever, and this was a popular slogan in the Soviet
Union which perfectly shows how important it is to understand the Sino-Russian
relationship since 1950 in terms of political perceptions. 15 The new Sino-Russian
friendship treaty signed on July 16, 2001, did make headlines, but most Western
observers have been indifferent to the emergence of the Sino-Russian partnership in
the 1990s, and have focused on its limitations while appreciating the international,
military, economic, and political interests, encouraging doubts.16

RUSSIAS ECONOMIC INTERESTS IN THE ASIA PACIFIC

Through the years, Russia has remained greatly focused in Europe though it has
territories mainly situated in Asia. Significantly, empirical data showed that Russia is
shifting its focus in the Asia Pacific region to develop based on its economic interests.
This is also in light of developing Russian territory located in Asia which is vastly
endowed with natural resources, but has remained undeveloped because of Russian
engagement in Europe.

14
Voytek, S. K. 2012. Eurasianist Trends in Russian Foreign Policy: A Critical
Analysis.
15
Vladimirova, A. 2014. Perceptions of Rising Powers: Are Russia and China Still Brothers
Forever? World Congress of Sociology.
16
Wishnick, E. 2001. Russia and China Brothers Again? Asian Survey, 41(5), 797821.

6
 Figure
1.2 The
Interplay of the
Factors in the
Policy
Making
Process
(Source: References and Illustration formulated by the researcher)

In international relations, the formulation of the foreign policy of all major

states actors would be critical and valuable in achieving their national and strategic
interests. Figure 1.2 is an illustration of a conceptual approach at how states formulate
their foreign policies according to sources and references compiled by the researcher.
There are six identified factors contributing to the foreign policy outputs of a state,
which are external, societal, individual, government sources. Additionally, legislation
in terms of policies and the leadership also plays a vital role. The interaction of these
factors within the state internally and externally with other factors as signified by the
arrows contribute to the formulation of a states foreign policy.

RUSSIAS EFFORTS TO BECOME A DOMINANT POWER

The early years of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), and the relationship
between the United States was said to be bipolar. This was due to both states claiming
the status as the dominant power in the West and East territories. To illustrate the
concept of polarity in that period, the following illustrations is presented:

7
 State
State State

State I
USS USA State

R
State
State E

State
State F

Figure 1.3 - The

Period of Bipolarity
The Early Years of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republic and the United
States (Pre-and Post-World War I)
(Source: Conceptual illustration by the writer)

State
State State

State I
USS USA State

R
State
State E

State
State F

Figure 1.4- The Period of Unipolarity

Post-World War II to the Cold War saw the fall of the USSR with the
dissolution of the union leaving the United States as the sole major global power
(Source: Conceptual Illustration by the writer)

8
 The Union of Soviet Socialist Republic, known as the USSR entered a period
of relative instability, vulnerability, and weaknesses during most part of the 1990s.
The once great Russian empire saw its fall after the Gorbachev reign attempted to
open its doors for Western influence. However, after the Cold War, with the advent of
Vladimir Putin as President, Russia increased their political stability and started to
show a steady economic growth. Russia made use of the policy windows of
opportunities that were opened to it as a consequence of the terrorist attacks in the
United States on September 11, 2001, and the war in Iraq in 2003. 17 These new
situations gave rise to the aspirations of Russia to assess its capabilities, resources,
policies and relations both domestically and internationally to become a dominant
power not only in Europe, but also in the Asia-Pacific region.

The turn of events precipitated the periods of unipolarity. However, as seen by

analysts in the future, with Russia aiming to claim its dominance, China as an
emerging economic power followed by India and South Korea, recent economic and
military developments in both the West and East blocks, would result to a multi-polar
world. In the next decades, it is predicted that a multipolar world will remain and
prevail and the United States will cease to become the sole hegemon. In the multipolar
world, it is also assumed that two most influential states will remain to be Russia and
the United States.

Russia has shared the status of a global power and major influence before the
collapse of the Soviet Union. Though it hopes to consolidate the former Soviet states
again to regain the Great Russian Empire, it cannot wait to see the realization of that
goal. Thus, even on its own, as the modern Russian Federation, it hopes to reign as a
great civilization. This sense of patriotism is what sets apart Russia from other
civilizations. Putin will use this to appeal to the scattered compatriots to go back to
their Russian homeland and once again rebuild its empire in the next decades. He can
only do so when a progressive Russia becomes ready to muster a stronger form of
unity amongst its people.

Russia is shifting its foreign policy to foster political relation towards the Asia
Pacific. This is while pouring its efforts to achieve its strategic interest to become a
dominant power, even though its relations has turned sour with the European
community, which was coupled with the sanctions by the West. Leadership played a
very vital role together with its foreign policy. Under the Putins administration, both
from the late 1990s, to the latter part of 2010, the Russian Federation has been slowly
17
Hedenskog, J., Vilhelm Konnander, Nygren, B., Ingmar Oldberg & Christer Pursianen 2007.
Russia as a Great Power Dimensions of Security Under Putin.3rd Edition. Routledge Taylor and
Francis Group.

9
 rebuilding its empire. Much of the criticism of many European states, and the United
States, its annexation of Crimea was not a welcomed gesture, and was viewed as
territorial expansionism. To its defense, Putin stressed that it is not by necessity, but by
its identity and its duty to gather Russian compatriots that necessitated such actions.
This resulted in an indifferent relationship with the European community. Thus, Putin
has expanded his foreign policy towards Asia. This, however, does not amount the so-
called Pivot to Asia, since Russia has been in Asia geographically ever since. This is
even though they had not focused explicitly on trade relations with the ASEAN states.
This is now the grand strategy that Putin is hoping to play which can variably change
the geopolitical landscape in the Asia Pacific Region.

RUSSIA BALANCING THE UNITED STATES

Russia plans to become deeply involved in the global and regional economic life of
the Asia-Pacific, and already has some experience interacting with the Asia-Pacific
states. The countries of the Asia-Pacific are joining global partnerships and are
capable of gaining advantages from them. This approach to the practical aspects of
globalization is quite compatible with the Russian point of view. Russian leadership
will not remain to see that the United States being the sole hegemon and remain a
global power on its own.

Russias Political Interests

A book by written by Gerald R. Watson and Jack O. Nguyen entitled Russia:
Developments and United States' Interests examines the current political, economic,
security, and U.S. interest issues facing Russia today. 18 Although Russia may not be as
central to U.S. interests as was the Soviet Union, cooperation between the two is
essential in many areas. Russia remains a nuclear superpower and still has a major
impact on U.S. national security interests in Europe, the Middle East, and Asia. Russia
has an important role in the future of arms control, the non-proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and the fight against terrorism.19 Russia is an important trading
partner and is the only country in the world with a greater range and scope of natural
resources than the United States, including vast oil and gas reserves. Many of Russia's
needs - food and food processing, oil and gas extraction technology, computers,
communications, transportation, and investment capital are in areas which the United
States is highly competitive, although bilateral trade remains relatively low.

18
Watson, G. R. & Nguyen, J. O. (Eds.). 2012. Russia: Developments and United States
Interests. Nova Science Publishers.
19
Nichol, J., Woolf, A. F. & Cooper, Wi. H. 2012. Russia: Developments and United
States Interests. (G. R. Watson & J. O. Nguyen, Eds.). Nova Science Publishers.

10
 In the global firepower power index, Russia remains as the second military
power in the world, second to the United States. A comparison of the military
firepower capabilities of the United States, Russia and China are depicted in the
following tables:
Table 1.5- Comparison of United States, Russia and Chinas Military
Firepower/Aspect

Source: Global Fire Power

http://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-comparison-detail

Table 1.6- Comparison of United States, Russia and Chinas Naval Assets, Military
Budget and Labor Force

Source: Global Fire Power

11
 http://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-comparison-detail

To date, Russia still remains the second military power in the world, after the United
States continually competing in assets and capabilities. China places second
continually upgrading and amassing its military capabilities.

Russias shift of its foreign policy is to balance the United States as a global
power. The new and modern Russia under the leadership of President Putin has really
poured efforts in the attempt to stress its role in a multi-polar world in order to achieve
near parity with the United States. These actions are evidenced in the changes in its
foreign policy in terms of domestic and international circumstances specifically in the
Ukraine Crisis and the existing restrictions and sanctions. It may not appear to be
obvious, but aside from the collaboration and cooperation between China and Russia,
the latter is balancing the United States as a dominant power primarily in the Asia
Pacific region. Russia and the United Stated are observed to be balancing and counter-
balancing each other with their bilateral ties. Russian bilateral ties with the United
States does not speak of a formal alliance nor does it prevent each state from strategic
partnerships with the other large states like China, Japan, South Korea, and India or
any other state that is not an ally or partner with the other. This is to Russias
advantage as it balances and consequently competes with the United States as a global
power. Also, with China as an emerging power in terms of economy and hoping to
become one militarily, Russia will have to balance the former in order to gain
significance and dominance in the region again.

CONCLUSION
What does it take to be a global power in todays world? As discussed, global power is
a more contemporary term for great power, as it is traditionally employed in
international relations. The term superpower was a result of the 20th century politics of
nuclear weapons technology, though the term did not fully transform into the nuclear
dimension in 1944. In context, the classification of a superpower came about during
the Cold War, with the possession of weapons of ultimate destruction and nuclear
superpower capability with the deterrence that comes with it. It was then broadened
by globalization that a global superpower does not merely denote nuclear power but
must attain and maintain sufficient diplomatic, economic and military resources for
preserving the international order in which great powers presume and assume
themselves as the main actors. To sum it all up, a global power is required to promote
international order, possess the formidable military capability and the communicated
will to use it as necessary, engage productivity in transnational projects such as global
justice as well as combat transnational threats such as terrorists and violent extremists.

12
In this context, the question now remain, does Russia fulfill the criteria? As shown in
this paper, Russia shifted its focus from Europe to the Asia-Pacific through its foreign
policy in 2013 to maintain its economic interests, to achieve its strategic interest to
become a dominant power and to balance the United States. In conclusion, the shift of
Russias focus from Europe to the Asia-Pacific through it foreign policy from 2008 to
2013 is due to the international system, as Russia aims to maintain its economic
interests, to achieve its strategic interest to become a dominant power and to balance
the United States. As presented, empirical evidence has shown that the international
system plays an important role in influencing a states behavior in determining their
foreign policy. This is in tandem and in coordination with the theory of neorealism.

REFERENCES

Booth, K. 2014. Understanding the World. International Relations- All That Matters.
Hodder Stoughton, McGraw-Hill.

Dellios, R. 2005. The rise of China as a global power. Culture Mandala: The Bulletin
of the Centre for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies, 6(2), 10.

Evans, G. & Newnham, J. 1990. The Dictionary of World Politics-A Reference Guide
to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions. Evans & Newnham The Dictionary of World
Politics-A Reference Guide to Concepts, Ideas and Institutions, First Edition., 14.
Hertfordshire: Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Garnett, J. 2013. The Causes of War and the Conditions of Peace. Baylis, Wirtz, &
Gray. Strategy in the Contemporary World,.4th Edition., United Kingdom: Oxford
University Press.

Hedenskog, J., Konnander, V., Nygren, B., Oldberg, I. & Pursianen, C. 2007. Russia
as a Great Power Dimensions of Security Under Putin. (J. Hedenskog, Vilhelm
Konnander, B. Nygren, Ingmar Oldberg, & Christer Pursianen, Eds.)3rd Edition.
Routledge Tayor and Francis Group.

Huntington, S. P. 1996. Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New
York: Simon and Schuster.

MacFarlane, N. S. The R in BRICs: Is Russia an Emerging Power? International

Affairs Royal Institute of International Affairs, 82(1), 4147.

Monaghan, A. The New Russian Foreign Policy Concept: Evolving Continuity.

Chatham House, 13(2013), 23.

13
Morgan, P. 2013. Liberalism. Allan Collins Contemporary Security Studies, 3334.
Oxford University Press.

Moshes, A. Russias European policy under Medvedev: how sustainable is a new

compromise? Chatham House the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 88(1),
1730.

Nichol, J., Woolf, A. F. & Cooper, W. H. 2012. Russia: Developments and United
States Interests. (G. R. Watson & J. O. Nguyen, Eds.). Nova Science Publishers.

Rumer, E. B. 2007. Russian Foreign Policy Beyond Putin First Edition., 23. New
York: Routledge.

Oliker, O. 2016. Unpacking Russias New National Security Strategy. Center for
Strategic and International Studies,.

Thorun, C. 2009. Explaining Change in Russian Foreign Policy The Role of Ideas in
Post-Soviet Russias Conduct towards the West. United Kingdom: Palgrave
Macmillan.

Voytek, S. K. 2012. Eurasianist Trends in Russian Foreign Policy: A Critical Analysis.

Vladimirova, A. 2014. Perceptions of Rising Powers: Are Russia and China Still
Brothers Forever? World Congress of Sociology.

Wishnick, E. 2001. Russia and China Brothers Again? Asian Survey, 41(5), 797821.

Watson, G. R. & Nguyen, J. O. (Eds.). 2012. Russia: Developments and United

States Interests. Nova Science Publishers.

Ziegler, C. E. Conceptualizing Sovereignty in Russian Foreign Policy: Realist and

Constructivist Perspectives. International Politics, 49(4).

14
SUPERVISOR

Associate Professor Dr Zarina Othman

Associate Professor Dr Zarina (Zairina) Othman earned her Ph.D. in International
Relations and Comparative Politics from the Graduate School of International Studies,
University of Denver, Colorado, USA. Her specialization is in Security Studies. She
was formerly the Head of the Program, 2010-2015 (Strategic Studies and International
Relations), National University of Malaysia (Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia), the
First Woman Coordinator (2005-2007) for UKM-Malaysia Armed Forces Defence
College. She has published extensively and presented many research papers at
various national and international conferences. Her research interests focus on human
security, non-traditional security issues, regional security, political Islam and peace
studies. She can be contacted at: zaiothman02@gmail.com.

15
 PALESTINIAN ISRAELI CONFLICT AND TWO STATE SOLUTIONS

Brig Gen Ali Mohammad Ali Al-Mufleh was commissioned into the Jordan Army
on 14 Nov 1984. He has served in various appointments in Jordanian Special Forces
as well as in different positions in Jordan army. He holds a Master Degree in
Management and Strategic Studies (Mutah University, Jordan)

ABSTRACT

This research is about one of the most likely scenarios in reaching an agreeable
solution to the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict, a two-state option, and how the
two-state solution would impact Jordans national security from a political, security,
economic, and social perspective. The research problem was to examine the reason
why Palestine and the rest of Arab states prefer the two-state solutions. This research
argues that the establishment of a sovereign, independent, Palestinian state under a
two-state solution will achieve security and stability, also end the struggle of the
Palestinian for a long time. In addition, it offers the best solution for Jordans
national security. This research focuses on achieving three objectives, which are to
examine how the Palestine- Israel conflict started since 1947, secondly, to identify
why Jordan and Palestine prefer the two-state solutions recently. Finally, it is to
examine how the Palestine Israel conflict impacts Jordans national security. In
order to answer the purpose of this research, the primary and secondary data
collected were from Arabic and English based resources. The theory of neorealism
was used to identify the national interests and how the international system shapes
other countries national interests based on this conflict. Findings of this research
suggested that the two-state solution is better for both Palestine and Israel because
they both can attain their sovereignty, while Jordan national security is protected.
Therefore, the two-state solutions will contribute to the stability of the region due to
the sovereign Palestine state while not neglecting the Israel existence.

16
INTRODUCTION
At the end of World War I, just as the Ottoman rule in the region ended, the League of
Nations (the precursor body to the United Nations) and the occupying powers chose to
redraw the borders of the Middle East. Consequently, the territory of Transjordan and
Palestine historically and geographically was known as the southern part of Levant
Bilad Al-Sham, and this was under the British mandate that continued until the end
of World War II.20
Since the British mandate was in place in the early 1920s, Jordan faced
numerous challenges that threatened its political existence. The 1917 Balfour
Declaration recognised a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine. In this
Declaration, the British government pledged two things. Firstly, was to use their best
endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this objective. Secondly, is that nothing
should be done to interfere with the civil and religious rights of non-Jewish
communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any
other country.21 Despite the promise, it seemed impossible in due time to reconcile the
new Jewish state and, while maintaining the civil and religious rights of the
Palestinian Arabs living on the land. In fact, there was a long-standing question
regarding Britain's decision to carve Transjordan out of the mandatory territory.
Firstly, it was the decision itself. Secondly, the decision to prevent the Jewish
community from residing or moving into the area. The late King Abdullah succeeded,
along with the British government in excluding the Transjordan from the Balfour
Declaration.22 The British finally asked the United Nations to approve an end to
British Mandate rule in Transjordan. With that, King Abdullah was declared as the
first governor of Transjordan
The Palestine-Israel conflict is one of the longest conflict, the most notorious
and ingrained conflict of the twentieth,23 this conflict impact all region from many
dimensions, security, economy, socially, and politically, the region becomes instability,
low economic grow and increase the militate and Jihadist groups in the region. Jordan
national security was threatened as a result of their geopolitics position, and the
historical relationship between Jordanian-Palestinian. The Palestinian issue is a
sensitive one for Jordan, and the government builds its relation based on its interest at

20
Khalidi, R. 2006. The Iron Gage - The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood.
Boston: Beacon Press: p. 31.

21
Shlomo, S. 2010. The Invention of the Jewish People. Tel Aviv: University of
Tel Aviv: p. 55.

22
Mishal, S. 1978. West Bank/ East Bank - The Palestinians in Jordan. Yale: University Press:
p.13.
23
Harms, G. 2012. The Palestine-Israel Conflict: A Basic Introduction: p. 288

17
the international level, Jordan has played a pioneering role in activating dialogues, and
the peace initiatives with the Israeli side.

PROBLEM STATEMENT
The Arab-Israel conflict has seen, since Israel occupied Palestine, many wars. Since
1967 war, there were several peace plans and negotiations which have taken place.
There were some successful negotiating precedents, including the negotiations
between Egypt and Israel, and between Israel and Jordan. However, there was no
agreement was reached regarding the fundamental conflict between Palestinians and
Israelis. Peace in the Middle East is important for stability and security of the region
and the entire world. However, Jordan faces many challenges and threats to its
national security from many dimensions according to the geopolitical situation.
The anticipated change from Jordan's 1994 Peace Treaty with Israel has
disappointingly not calmed the state of affairs in Jordan. This decades-long conflict
bears a mass of deeply intertwined problems, such as the question of the occupied
territories, the establishment of a sovereign Palestinian State, the Israeli settlements,
the border placement, the water disputes, the refugees' right of return, the rise of
Hamas and the status of the City of Jerusalem. These issues constitute a direct threat
to Jordan's national security. Security Council resolution 242 in 1967 asked Israel to
withdraw from the West Bank, and respect the sovereignty of all states in the region.
This solution was proposed since 1947 by United Nations General Assembly
that voted to establish two states for the Arabs and Jews when Palestine was under the
British Mandate. However, the Arab countries rejected this solution while Israel
accepted it. During the peace talks, Israel has made it difficult, and the negotiations
could not reach any significant decisions to make peace. The situation has since then,
changed now. The two-state solution is considered to be the viable solution for all
parties. From time to time, Israel had proposed that Jordan to be the alternative
homeland for Palestinians. This solution is advertised by the Israeli Right Wing but
rejected absolutely by both Jordanians and Palestinians. The intriguing issue would be
in the understanding as to why the Palestinians and the rest of Arab states are in
preference of a two-state solution.

TWO STATES SOLUTION

The two-state solutions refer to a solution for the conflict between the Israelis and the
Palestinians, which envisages an independent state of Palestine along the state of
Israel. The main idea of the two-state solution calls for two state for two groups of
people which divides the land on the western part of the Jordan river into two states
for two different communities as per this context. This would specifically be for the

18
Jews and the Arab Palestinians who are living side by side with mutual respect, and
acknowledgment of sovereignty between one another as independent states.
The conflict between the Palestinians and the Israeli is not an easily resolved
problem. This is due to the complexity of the socio-psychological barriers either
cognitively, emotionally, and motivationally that exists within this context. 24 In
addition to the complexities of the problem due to the barriers, there are influential
players involved in this conflict besides the Israel and the PLO, namely the USA, the
European Union, Iran, the Arab countries, and the international community. Jordan is
one of the Arab countries that was heavily affected, and directly involved in the
conflict due to her historical relationship to Palestine. The matter became even more
complex and complicated when the non-state actors such as Hamas (another Palestine
group) and Hezbollah in Lebanon got involved in this conflict. These players had a
different agenda in addressing the conflict which inherently based on their political
ideologies and specific interests. These made the already complicated problem even
more complex which understandably impacted negatively the progress of the peace
process.
The Israelis have exploited the complexity of the conflict by not respecting the
agreement that they agreed with the Palestinians. For the last 20 years, none of the
pledges made by the Israelis in the Oslo peace accords were honoured. For example,
the Israelis had pledged to carry out further withdrawals from the West Bank in stages,
but it was never implemented. The Israeli army is still occupying the regions,
harassing and arresting Palestinians profusely. The main contention by the Israelis for
occupying the territories is mainly for security reason, with the occupation is to
prevent the attacks by the Palestinians against Israeli targets in the West Bank and
inside the green line, such as the situation during the second intifada. Nonetheless, the
idea of having two-state solutions to the conflict remains a valid and plausible option.
The opinion polls conducted by the Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research
(Ramallah), and the Truman Institute for Peace Research (Hebrew University,
Jerusalem) which published on 31 December 2013, showed that the majority from
both sides of populations supported the two-state solutions, when 63% of Palestinians
and 53% of Israelis respectively.25

DEFINING A SOVEREIGN PALESTINE

During the early 1980s, the PLO shifted its strategy aiming for a sovereign
independent State in the West Bank and Gaza, with East Jerusalem as its capital, 26 The

24
Bar, D., Tal, Halperin, E. & Oren, N. 2010. Socio-Psychological Barriers to Peace Making:
The Case of The Israeli Jewish Society: p. 28.
25
Zahir, B. 2014. Decline Realistic Two-State Solution. (January).
http://palestine.assafir.com/Article.aspx?ArticleID=2728. [12 Aug 2016].
26
Camille, M. 2013. The Palestinian Policy Network, How Sovereign A State.
Al-Shabaka (31 July). http://al-shabaka.org/. [23 sep 2016].

19
four elements of an independent Palestinian state are namely territory, sovereignty,
people, and governance. Even though if they are subject to controversy, their
sovereignty, in particular, is a core issue which can be defined as a governments
control over a territory and a people. This would include monopoly over the use of
force.27 The elements of sovereignty entail control over land, territorial waters,
borders, natural resources, and population.
The Palestinian vision coincides with this definition of sovereignty. While on
the Israeli side the interpretation of sovereignty is at odds not only with the Palestinian
vision but with concepts that are well established and accepted worldwide.
Disagreements between Israel and the Palestinians concern are as such;

Territory - here the issue concerns secure borders and modification of the pre-
1967 borders, the Israelis security concerns not the return of all land.
Right of Return - Israeli rejected the right of return for all but, it may allow
some of them to come back to their homeland in due to consideration.
Compensation to refugees should be the best solution for those who want to
stay in their exile. Note that the UN resolutions guarantee the right of return
for the refugees.
Military forces - due to the Israeli concerns of security they allow police
forces for the Palestinians but with limited arms. This lead to a weak state
cannot able to secure its borders, and lack of the basic necessities of security.
Sovereignty - will not negotiate or acknowledge groups that call for Israels
extinction. Thus, the Palestinian state must meet the responsibility of
sovereignty without allowing any armed of none state actors to challenge its
authority in West Bank and Gaza.
Jerusalem - a complicated issue that each part must ensure the pre-1967 status
should be re-established without conditions, although Israel has been trying for
a long time to create a Judaism Jerusalem, and claim to build the alleged
temple.

JORDANS AND PALESTINIANS PREFER TWO-STATES SOLUTION

Arab states and regional political life have seen a series of changes and challenges in
the last decade. It formed what could indicate a dramatic change in the course of the
entire region. Despite the constant flux in the course of events, and the speed of

27
Diana, B. 2010. The Dangers of Disaggregating Sovereignty. Al-Shabaka -
The Palestinian Policy Network. (6 November). http://al-shabaka.org/. [25 July
2016].

20
transition from one situation to another, which complicates the ability to predict the
causes of change in various areas, this is because overall these changes have impacted
the nature and course of the Arab-Israeli conflict. These changes affected the
Palestinians and their vision to build a sovereign state in West Bank after the military
resistance failed to achieve their objectives.
On the Palestinian issue, Jordan is an active player both at the regional and
international levels. The Jordanian top national vital interest is the establishment of
an independent viable Palestinian state with east Jerusalem as a capital. This state
should coexist with Israel. The Jordanian- Israeli peace treaty should serve as a model
for peace which should have been emulated. Jordan's policy calls upon the
Palestinians to hold on to their land despite the Israeli aggressive policy, as Jordans
land and resources are not capable of accommodating any further migration waves.
Meanwhile, Jordan sticks to its own policy of extending political, economic, and
humanitarian support for the Palestinians aspiration. Jordans foreign policy continues
to exercise its ultimate diplomatic efforts with the Israeli government. Jordan is
perhaps the only Arab state that has close relations with both the Labor and Likud
parties in Israel. Jordans good relations across the mainstream Israeli political
spectrum basically emerged from the trust developed throughout years of interaction
and cooperation.
Palestinians have succeeded in moving the uprising and called the land for
peace, but the ideology of Zionism is an obstacle to the Palestinians way to get their
rights besides the international community has been unable to find a solution to the
Palestinian issue. It does not seem that the Zionist way of negotiation has no changed
so far because of negotiable change at least in the near future, not only because of
convictions ideological and political various political leaders; it is also attributed to
the construction of new settlements bloc, these settlements make it impossible to have
any progress in negotiations of peace.
Jordans main reason for postponing full democratic reforms, with its majority
Palestinian population, is to see whether they would return or be reimbursed by Israel
and the rich Arab countries. Jordan should nevertheless move forward in its
democratic reform process without waiting for the end of the Palestinian-Israeli
conflict, given the enormous internal political facing the Hashemite monarchy. The
regime would therefore need to postpone the fully democratic elections until the rights
of the native Jordanians are fully guaranteed. Jordan knows today, that it cannot fully
disengage from Palestine. It is situated at the geopolitical core of Palestine and has a
large number of citizens of Palestine origin citizens. Jordan would be deeply affected
by whatever developments that take place in the West Bank, whether peaceful or
otherwise. Jordanian nationalists strongly support the two-state solution because they
are eager to see Palestinian refugees make their return to the West Bank and Gaza
Strip. They view this as a means to eliminate the threat of Jordan becoming a
Palestinian republic that would turn the native Jordanians into second-class citizens.

21
ISRAEL RELUCTANT TO ACCEPT TWO STATES SOLUTION
Thus, the study of the variables surrounding the condition of the Arab-Israeli conflict,
whether Arab and regional factors could lead to the possibility of exploring future
variables that may occur on the conflict in the future. This affects the components and
the nature of trends within this context. Through the study, there were findings on the
possible changes which may have affected directly towards the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Firstly, the process of settlement of the Palestinian Israeli, and secondly was the
Palestinian resistance with their internal and external problems facing the Palestinian
political life today. To a certain extent, this includes the weakness of various
Palestinian communities, such as on the domestic front, as well as the weakness of the
Arab axis which is supposed to be supporting the Palestinian cause on the external
level. Therefore; the two-state solution is a project that will not bring an end to the
conflict. This is not because of Israeli leaders direction with the Israeli right-wing
camp, but because of the Zionist discourse through the silence and absence of
international intervention, and contributed further by the complicity and fragility of
the Palestinian case.
The Zionist political discourse was clear in refusing to any solution the conflict
by the two states, and it appears to be evident that the political common denominator
for all Israeli governments from Oslo until today revolved on two factors. Firstly, was
the continuation of the settlements, such as plundering off the land, and recently the
Judaization of Jerusalem. Secondly, was the absolute rejection of the idea of the
sovereign of a Palestinian state based on the '1967 borders. This is a concern and has
instilled fear for nations security in general, and in particularly on the threat by
Hamas and Jihadists which are not under PLOs control. Every speech of the two-state
solution is seen a maneuver and misleading, and any peace agreement for their side
must be an official recognition from Palestinians of the results of the defeat and
surrender in 19 67 and recognizing the logic of the occupation force.
Peter (2009) discussed the Israel perspective for peace. There was an Israeli
proposal to make Jordan the official homeland for the Palestinians living in the West
Bank. Nearly half of the Knessets 120 members had agreed on the proposal. This is
within the context of having the two states, for two people, on the two banks of the
River Jordan.28 The idea of Jordan to become as a homeland to Palestinian has been
founded since a long time in Israel, but this has never obtained the support from the
international community. This proposal led to more instability in the region, which has
in turned increased the spread of extremism and threatened Jordans national security.
The Israelis dream was not just with Palestine. Shlomo Sand (2003) explains that
Palestine is holy land, rather than a homeland to the Jewish community. These borders
were deemed to be expanding, and yet untenable, while the borders of the Talmudic
commandment were considered to be too narrow. In the east, the Syrian Desert, the

28
Tom, A. P. 2009. Israeli Proposal: Make Jordan The Official Palestinian Homeland. Christian
Science Monitor Ilene R: Prusher.

22
eastern border of the Land of Israel should not be precisely demarcated. The Lands
eastern borders will be diverted eastwards, and the area of the Land of Israel will be
expanded.29 From Israelis perspective, a key concern was security. This was due to the
major Palestinian figures and institutions were trying to fight terrorism, promoting
tolerance, and encouraging co-existence with Israel, especially after the second
intifada and political success of Hamas. The outcome has convinced many Israelis that
peace and negotiations were not possible, and a two-state system is not the answer.30

CONCLUSION
It is concluded that the two-state solution will be the best-case scenario from the
Jordanian national interests, as well as both of the Palestinians and Israelis. In the
anarchic international system, as proposed by the neorealist, states have to be on their
own to survive. This scenario also assumes a broad international intervention, namely
from the US, are in support of the peaceful process. The interest of the external actors
and non-state actors does have an impact for this solution to be achieved. This
scenario depends on what was done in the context of peace agreements, agreement
building, with charters and treaties serving as the guiding principles. The final solution
of the conflict from the perspective of this scenario requires Israels to adopt a two-
state solution. This would be based on the borders of the Fourth of June 1967. The
Palestinian refugee issue must be taken into account especially on their right of return,
and the same can be said on the Jerusalem issue. On the other hand, the prospect of a
Jordanian-Palestinian confederation has never been clearly defined, and at times has
raised objections from nationalists in both countries. For some, it implies that there
has been less than full sovereignty for either people in this context. For others, it raises
the spectre of the alternative homeland solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
which the Israeli Right Wing had frequently brought it up. This was considered to be
absolutely unacceptable to Jordan. Furthermore, some Palestinians feared that a
confederation would be the mark of the end for their hope of an independent
Palestinian State.

REFERENCES
Bar, D., Tal, Halperin, E. & Oren, N. 2010. Socio-Psychological Barriers to
Peace Making: The Case of the Israeli Jewish Society.
Camille, M. 2013. The Palestinian Policy Network, How Sovereign A State.
Al-Shabaka (31 July). http://al-shabaka.org/. [23 sep 2016].

29
Shlomo, S. 2003. The Invention Of The Land Of Israel From Holy Land To Homeland: p. 217.
30
Slater, J. 2001. What Went Wrong? The Collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process.
Political Science. Vol. 116. Issue 2: p.p. 171-199.

23
 Diana, B. 2010. The Dangers of Disaggregating Sovereignty. Al-Shabaka
The Palestinian Policy Network. (6 November). http://al-shabaka.org/. [25 July 2016].
Harms, G. 2012. The Palestine-Israel Conflict: A Basic Introduction
Geraldine, C. 2010. Jordan: A Refugee Haven. Migration Policy Institute.
Lynch, M. 1999. State Interests and Public Spheres: The International Politics of
Jordan's Identity. Columbia: University Press.
Khalidi, R. 2006. The Iron Gage The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for
Statehood. Boston: Beacon Press.
Mishal, S. 1978. West Bank/ East Bank - The Palestinians in Jordan. Yale:
University Press.
Morris, B. 2008. 1948 A History of The First Arab-Israeli War. Yale:
University Press:
Mishal, S. 1978. West Bank/ East Bank The Palestinians in Jordan. Yale:
University Press.
Shlomo, S. 2003. The Invention of the Land Of Israel from Holy Land to
Homeland.
Slater, J. 2001. What Went Wrong? The Collapse of the Israeli-Palestinian
Peace Process. Political Science. Vol. 116. Issue 2. (pp.: ???)
Shlomo, S. 2010. The Invention of the Jewish People. Tel Aviv:
University of Tel Aviv.
Tom, A. P. 2009. Israeli Proposal: Make Jordan the Official Palestinian
Homeland. Christian Science Monitor Ilene R: Prusher.
Zahir, B. 2014. Decline Realistic Two-State Solution. (January).
http://palestine.assafir.com/Article.aspx?ArticleID=2728. [12 Aug 2016].

24
SUPERVISOR

Associate Professor Dr Zarina Othman

Associate Professor Dr Zarina (Zarina) Othman earned her Ph.D. in International

Relations and Comparative Politics from the Graduate School of International Studies,
University of Denver, Colorado, USA. Her specialization is in Security Studies. She
was formerly the Head of the Program, 2010-2015 (Strategic Studies and International
Relations), National University of Malaysia (Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia), the
First Woman Coordinator (2005-2007) for UKM-Malaysia Armed Forces Defence
College. She has published extensively and presented many research papers at
various national and international conferences. Her research interests focus on human
security, non-traditional security issues, regional security, political Islam and peace
studies. She can be contacted at: zaiothman02@gmail.com.

25
 EXAMINING COUNTER-TERRORISM COOPERATION AMONGST
AFFECTED SOUTHEAST ASIAN STATES:
A CASE STUDY ON THE PHILIPPINES AND MALAYSIA

Senior Lieutenant-Colonel (SLTC) Lim Lit Lam is from the Singapore Armed
Forces (SAF) and attended the MPAT Serial Number 36/2016. He holds a Bachelor of
Science in Government and Economics, and a Master of Science in Development
Studies, both from London School of Economics and Political Science.

ABSTRACT
This paper examined the reasons why counter-terrorism cooperation amongst
Southeast Asian states had remained at low levels, despite the region experiencing an
increase of exploitation of transnational weaknesses by terrorist groups. This was
studied against the espoused vision of ASEAN to be a Political-Security Community
by 2025. The study was done through a qualitative analysis of relevant incidents and
supported by documents within the context of inter-state cooperation. The extent of
the research was done through interviews with selected experts in the field of
international relations and terrorism. The study traced counter-terrorism cooperation
between the Philippines and Malaysia in recent times, anchored on their internal and
external factors. The external factors are comprised of factors pertaining to the
dynamics of international relations covering security dilemma, ethnoreligious
sensitivities, and ASEAN. The internal factors are focused on the idea of national
approaches, such as how the states are defined and approached the problem and how
domestic considerations helped to shape the decisions on counter-terrorism
cooperation with other states. The insights were are drawn from the policy-makers
and interested parties on the limits of cooperation. They were also based on how it
complements what was available at the regional level with state-centric policies to
counter the growing security threats. The study concluded that while international
relations dynamics between the two states which revolved around the longstanding
territorial dispute and ethnoreligious complexities, had created difficulties in

26
identifying the common grounds for cooperation. This is because it was primarily
focusing on framing the security problem and solutions, shaped by domestic factors,
that has had a predominant effect on shaping the nature of counter-terrorism
cooperation that existed. The study further concluded that similar conditions were
present in different forms in Southeast Asia. This would result in a continued state of
affairs, particularly as states had assigned more value to state-centric approaches,
and this was complemented with national and specific efforts to find common ground
to cooperate with other states. Given this situation, Southeast Asia would continue to
remain weak in countering transnational terrorism, and states might face more terror
attacks in the near future.

INTRODUCTION
In recent times, Southeast Asia had experienced a number of terrorist attacks,
specifically in Indonesia (2002, 2003, 2005, 2009, 2016), Thailand (2006, 2015),
Malaysia (2016) and the Philippines (2016). These attacks were claimed by
transnational groups such as Al-Qaeda, and more recently by the DAESH (also known
as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS)). For the DAESH, known affiliates to
them included local groups within Southeast Asia such as the Abu Sayyaf Group
(ASG), Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF) based in the Philippines, and
Mujahideen Indonesia Timor and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) based in Indonesia. In the
Philippines, Al-Qaeda and the DAESH were previously known to have connections
with militant groups such as the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and the
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). For JI, it was also known to have established
terror cells in the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand. In recent times,
direct franchises of the DAESH appeared to have penetrated Southeast Asian society,
with the Puchong incident (2016) in Malaysia allegedly executed by local Malaysian
militants directly in touch with their DAESH counterparts31.
This threat had been looming for a while, in the form of an extremist vision
perpetuated by these terrorist groups, with the aim of militarily creating an Islamic
Caliphate in Southeast Asia. Some common features of these terror groups were
identified: (1) a close relationship with terror organisations in the Middle East,
especially for training and support; (2) the growth in scope and scale in some
Southeast Asian countries because of chronic poverty, inadequate education, perceived
injustice and the Muslim demographic in these countries which provided fertile
recruitment grounds for anti-government activities; (3) perpetrators and leaders of
these movements exploiting the porous international boundaries of Southeast Asia
nations to evade from being captured, and planning for their activities 32; (4) a rapidly
31
Ramechandran, C., 2016, Puchong Bomb Attack directly related to local IS Militants: IGP,
the Sun Daily (4 Jul 2016).
32
Until his arrest, Hambali had been actively using safe-houses in Cambodia and Thailand
to remain elusive. The presence of a sizeable group of sympathisers to radical Islam in Indonesia had

27
evolving mode of operations, with radicalisation through propagandas on new media
platforms, and lone wolf attacks are practiced to achieve terror goals; and (5) an
expected buildup of fighters returning from the Middle East, over time, to continue the
DAESHs intentions in this region.
These features called for a strong cooperation on counter-terrorism amongst
the states to complement their domestic measures. This is also to prevent the festering
of terrorism planning and operations. Examples of such cooperation may include the
joint operations to target known terrorist strongholds or training bases in South
Philippines and Indonesia. What had been observed in Southeast Asia however, was a
bleak picture that did not correlate to the need. Even as the conditions in the second
front33 in the Global War on Terror were ripe for transnational terrorism to be
exploited, the regional initiatives and inter-state cooperation are still undeveloped.
While it was acknowledged that there had been gradual increase of emphasis in
intelligence sharing, in joint-patrols of shared borders and in dealing with
transnational crime (such as illegal movement of weapons), one observed that the
realm of cooperation had not been sufficiently substantial in dealing with this growing
threat that had operated with growing efficiency in the region, as evident in the many
recent attacks.
In contrast, measures taken by the Southeast Asian states had been far more
concrete: the Malaysian Government introduced two new anti-terror bills (the
Prevention of Terrorism Act, and the Special Measures against Terrorism in Foreign
Countries Act) in 2015 and established the National Special Operations Force in Oct
201634. This is followed through by the Indonesian Government, as they established
the Detachment 88 (a counter-terrorism squad) as part of the Indonesian National
Police. Many other examples in Singapore and Thailand could be made to this end.
The reality appeared to be that apart from the cursory cooperation amongst Southeast
Asian states, as counter-terrorism initiatives in Southeast Asia had been largely state-
led and confined to within national boundaries.
The question to address was thus: why had counter-terrorism cooperation
amongst affected Southeast Asian states are not comprehensive, despite the need to
operate transnationally to deal with an evolving and continually effective terrorism
threat exploiting transnational weaknesses? The answers may shed light on the
geopolitical realities of the region. A more immediate aim of this study was to inform
the policy-makers on the existing limits to and prospects for greater cooperation on

also made arrest and conviction of Jemaah Islamiyah members extremely challenging in the last
decade.
33
Declared by then-US President George Bush after 11 Sep 2001, referring more specifically
to the Philippines then and thereafter applied to wider Southeast Asia.
34
Malaysia Launches Special Ops Force to Counter Terror Threats, 2016, AsiaOne (27 Oct
2016).

28
counter-terrorism, in line with the ASEAN Vision to be a Political-Security
Community by 2025.

FINDINGS
The study looked at two broad domains of factors: (1) dynamics of international
relations; and (2) national approaches. The study used the case study of the
Philippines and Malaysia to appreciate the weight of these factors in shaping the
present outcome of low levels of tangible counter-terrorism cooperation between the
states in Southeast Asia.

Based on State-on-State Interactions

When looking at the dynamics of international relations, this study considered if there
was an existing security dilemma between the states, which may have led to arms-
length dealings in order to deny an adversarial state an understanding of security
capabilities or operational systems that may be used against such state. The finding
was that even though the territorial dispute over Sabah persisted over decades, both
the Philippines and Malaysia did not appear to be targeting each other in terms of
military build-up, but were instead more distracted by other issues. For the
Philippines, this was in the form of the ongoing fight in the Southern Philippines
against secessionist movements (including the communists). For Malaysia, the
transformation and reorganisation of its military were more toward enabling the
Malaysian Armed Forces to become a full spectrum force and away from the narrow
counter-insurgency form that it had in the 1960s to 1980s.
However, this did not preclude the existence of contextual distrust between the
two states. The study found that the ethnoreligious mix of Southern Philippines
approximates toward that of Malaysia and created particular sensitivities for greater
Malaysian participation in the alleged transnational terrorism-friendly regions in
South Philippines. This idea had been alluded to by scholars like Ramakrishna and
Tan (2003) in their works, as to how the management of different and delicate Muslim
components within the societies and politics of many Southeast Asian states have had
an impact on the pace and type of cooperation35.
This had been worsened by historical episodes of Operation Merdeka, a
clandestine plan conceived by the administration of then-Filipino President Marcos to
destabilise Sabah with a group of Muslim commandos in order to create the conditions
for the Philippines to claim Sabah as its own 36. This led to what was known as the

35

Ramakrishna, K., and Tan, S.S. (eds.), 2003, After Bali: The Threat of Terrorism in
Southeast Asia.
36
Marcos Order: Destablize, take Sabah, 2000, Philippine Daily Inquirer (2 Apr 2000).

29
Jabidah Massacre37 when the commandos refused to obey orders after discovering
the plan and were allegedly killed by the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).
Eventually, the ensuing anger in the Filipino Muslim community based largely in
South Philippines manifested in the formation of a secessionist political organisation
called the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM) in 1968, which had an agenda to
create an independent Muslim state comprising Mindanao, Sulu and Palawan
regions38. The MIM led to the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF), the militant
group which started the separatist fight against the AFP in South Philippines, enduring
even till the present day. Operation Merdeka drew a response from the Malaysian
authorities: in 2001, a statement by then-Prime Minister Mahathir admitted that
Malaysia had previously provided support to MNLF insurgents in Mindanao, but
qualified that it had already ceased to do so (by 2001) 39. This exchange would likely
be a source of distrust between the two states in dealing with specific territorial space
South Philippines and also Sabah.
The third factor in the domain of the international relation, aside from security
dilemma and ethnoreligious sensitivities, was ASEAN. ASEAN had been the driver
for greater inter-state cooperation within the region, especially in purporting the
aspiration of the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) by 2025. Regarding
non-traditional security issues such as transnational terrorism, the APSC framework
had identified a few thrusts of which two relevant ones would be highlighted, namely
(1) strengthening cooperation in addressing (non-traditional) security issues,
particularly in combating transnational crimes and other transboundary challenges;
and (2) intensifying counter-terrorism efforts by early ratification and full
implementation of the ASEAN Convention on Counter-Terrorism.
In taking a holistic look at ASEANs initiatives, three observations were made.
First, these had a policing and legal slant toward transnational terrorism and had
distilled terrorism activities into criminal ones, as a way of seeking to address them in
a tangible manner. This also suggested the continued strong influence of the principles
of non-intervention and respect for sovereignty. Second, transnational terrorism was
not elevated position above other transnational crimes despite being the impetus for
increased security cooperation (via the ASEAN Concord II), in the backdrop of the
Bali bombings in 2002. Third, the approach adopted by ASEAN as a regional body
had focused on rehabilitation and reform, as well as addressing conditions such as
economic and educational development, rather than tackling the urgent issues like
terrorism training. Together, these three points suggested that ASEANs influence on
37
Noble, L. G., 1976, The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines, Pacific
Affairs, 405 424.
38
Gowing, P. G., 1979, Muslim Filipinos - Heritage and Horizon. 190192.
39
The context was the arrest of MNLF leader Misuari in Sabah in 2001. Malaysia had
decided to hand him over to the Philippines. Then-Malaysian PM Mahathir Mohamad said that
although his country had provided support to (MNLF) in the past in its bid for autonomy, Mr Misuari
had not used his powers correctly. Therefore, we no longer feel responsible to provide him with any
assistance. From: Philippines Rebel Leader Arrested, 2001, BBC News (25 Nov 2001).

30
counter-terrorism cooperation between the Philippines and Malaysia would not be to
foster the much needed joint operations, but to tackle the crimes at the borders and
develop the legal and policing frameworks. This was assessed to have continued along
the tracks of intelligence sharing and joint border patrols, but had moved less toward
taking decisive actions to weed out terror bases, such as those in the Philippines.

Based on National Approaches

Little had been written in academic literature to define the concept of a national
approach. This paper attempted to provide an operational definition for the purpose of
the study. The concept of national approach looked inwardly at the political climate,
culture, perceptions and processes of the states and at how these acted to determine
the solutions (on counter-terrorism) that had been eventually adopted. This includes:
(1) the definition of the terrorist issue, (2) domestic political pressures/dynamics
(which were not entirely divorced from geostrategic realities); and even (3) historical
experiences.
When looking at the Philippines, this study found that the Philippines
government had at different times regarded the various militant groups (MNLF, Moro
Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and Abu Sayyaf Group(ASG)) as terror
organisations. Hence, its definition of terrorism and the alignment with what had
been understood (as a transnational terrorist affiliated to the DAESH) became unclear.
The nature of terrorism in the Philippines, based on the historical starting point of
Jabidah Massacre in the 1960s, contained a mix of the transnational and local essence,
with the goal of an Islamic caliphate in Southeast Asia mixed with the desire for
autonomy or independence among a demographic minority. With such ambiguity, it
became clearer how the transnational nature of the terror activities had often been
accentuated by the government, where relevant, in order to gain international support
for its military operations against secessionist movements. It had also been noted that
the Philippines, riding on the momentum of the September 11 attacks on the United
States, had adopted a military approach to dealing with the terrorist problem in its
South. This had brought with it support from external states and international
organisations such as Japan, US, and the European Union which had been
employed to strengthen the states security apparatus. This would partly explain why
cooperation, especially by Southeast Asian states, might have been problematic.
For Malaysia, the terror organisations believed to be active in Malaysia were
more conventional in nature in that these were primarily driven by ideology and had
adopted terror methods (such as bomb attacks) based on the larger politico-religious
ideologies espoused by Al-Qaeda and DAESH. The Malaysian governments response
to terrorism had been shaped by its history. Compared with the Philippines hard-line
military stance, there had been greater emphasis on winning the war of the narrative.
The Malaysian response had a few reasons driving it. First, it was considered as a

31
success formula when fighting the communists in the 1970s to 1980s. Second, it
recognised the danger of radicalisation of a majority ethnoreligious demographic in
Malaysia, especially of the young and those who were ill-informed about the religion.
Third, this would be more palatable in the eyes of the international Islamic
community, as compared to kinetic operations.
Hence, in Malaysia, the response to terrorism had three key thrusts. The first
was to have an extensive counter-terrorism narrative campaign. The second was to
enhance prevention and response mechanism. This had been enhanced by the passing
of two Counter-Terrorism Acts in Parliament, which had provided the police with the
greater mandate and power to investigate. The third thrust of counter-terrorism was to
emphasise tighter immigration and border controls to prevent potential terror
perpetrators from entering the state, and also to be able to apprehend aspiring freedom
fighters seeking to participate in the Syrian crisis and those returning from fighting in
the Middle East.
The table is the summarized analysis of the differences in counter-terrorism
approaches between the two states. In understanding how the various efforts fit
together, especially with regard to the terrorist havens continuing in South Philippines,
one can, therefore, understand that the Malaysian approach had been out of
pragmatism. It recognised that it would be politically unviable to consider
participating in offensive military actions based on the various reasons stated. The
Philippines itself has had major challenges separating terrorist movements from
criminal and separatists ones if that was even possible.

32
 TABLE 1 Comparison of Counter-Terrorism Approaches

Malaysia The Philippines

Problem Definition The DAESHs ideology based A complex mix of
for Transnational on religious rally call might separatist, extremist
Terrorism penetrate into Muslim majority ideology (terrorist) and
demographic. Anti- crime; coupled with drug
establishment combatants are and weapons control issues
covert and seek to disrupt in South Philippines. Anti-
normalcy of life through bomb government combatants
attacks. This threat shares are armed and in direct
similarities with the communist conflict with the
insurgency in the 1970s government.
1980s.
Adopted Solutions (1) Border Control (1) Military approach to
or Strategies (2) Counter-narrative remove bomb and weapon
(winning hearts and threats
minds) as a (2) Ensuring peace to foster
comprehensive and prosperity and to remove
balanced control the anti-government
(3) Addressing root cause of sentiments
the recruitment, such as
sense of injustice, lack
of education and poverty
(4) Develop better
capability to respond,
especially through
integration of national
agencies

The result was that there had been very limited scope for cooperation apart
from those already in motion: (1) intelligence sharing; (2) joint patrols which would
physically deny the movements of terror perpetrators (such as ASG) from South
Philippines to Malaysia; and (3) support efforts to bring peace, development and
prosperity to South Philippines, such as through the commitment of international
monitoring teams.

CONCLUSION

33
The study concluded that there is scope for a greater inter-state cooperation between
the Philippines and Malaysia beyond intelligence sharing and joint sea border patrols.
Theoretically, this could include the possibility of joint military operations against the
ASG, and to deny the DAESH of utilizing safe areas for their operations. The
conclusion was that while the dynamics of international relations and the national
approach both shape the levels of counter-terrorism cooperation toward low levels, the
national approach factor appeared to be more dominant in shaping the outcome,
especially in terms of how it defined terrorism problem and the solution towards it.
With this, such low levels of counter-terrorism cooperation would be expected
to change only if the situation had become dire, such as if one of the states had failed
and fallen into the arms of the DAESH caliphate. Otherwise, a primarily state-centric
and a response-based approach would be expected. Cooperation would exist insofar as
to prevent an incident in their territories, or as it did not negate or undermine key
national interests.
Based on the case study of the Philippines and Malaysia, because of the
significant difference in the perception of the problem and the solution required, inter-
state cooperation would be cursory and slow moving even as the threat of terror
attacks became more real and present. One is left with a bleak picture that the DAESH
would continue to grow its influence from its base in Southern Philippines and
continue to export its brand of terror to the other states in Southeast Asia, having to
deal primarily with the Filipino authorities through its affiliates as part of the
continuing civil strife. The Philippines would be expected to continue to be the main
terrorist hub of Southeast Asia, with the weak inter-state cooperation being exploited
by the DAESH for training, logistics, and finance of its operations.
Malaysias efforts would primarily be to contain the effects through counter-
radicalisation efforts (i.e. providing counter-narratives and emphasising on tight
control of its borders nationally. It would be expected to be pre-occupied with
controlling the incidents of kidnapping of its citizens associated with the crime-
terrorist nexus of the Philippines dimension, given the political necessity of doing so.
The balance would also be expected to remain firmly with the state-centric approach
and measures, rather than shifting it towards a regional based solution. From another
perspective, the lack of common space for cooperation would almost make discussion
on cooperation a non-event, as states focus nationally on other security issues (such as
the South China Sea disputes) in a more urgent, but equally state-centric, way.
When extending the analysis to the other affected states in Southeast Asia, one
might observe that the conditions affecting the Philippines and Malaysia cooperation
would also be present in other state-on-state dynamics. Ethno-religious sensitivities
exist between Malaysian and Patani South Thailand. The confrontational history
between Malaysia and Indonesia would expect similar longstanding trust issues in

34
joint operations beyond the borders to address terrorism issues should this be
required40. Between Singapore and Malaysia, the lack of extensive shared borders
would mean that there are the even lesser amount of state-on-state cooperation,
particularly in the limited current form of the venture of joint border patrols. The
historical episode of separation between Singapore and Malaysia in 1965 and the
subsequent different approaches in managing ethnicities between the two states would
also create sensitivities in such cooperation. Hence, the factors affecting the
Philippines and Malaysia in their counter-terrorism cooperation would appear to
manifest themselves in a contextualised form, some more than others, in Southeast
Asia.
The study identified three possible insights for the prospects of the ASEAN
Political-Security Community (APSC). First, for issues and programs that were related
to crime, border and policing, these would most likely be able to advance through
smoothly without the dynamics of international relations or the national approach
getting in their way. Second, for issues that concerning Southeast Asia solidarity, such
as that of the South China Sea, the external and internal factors discussed in this paper
would not likely interfere. Finally, for issues with strong domestic impact or where
states would not see the value of cooperation either because of difficulties in
reconciling the internal and external perspectives or because the common ground
would be hard to find, these would be expected not to make it to the agenda of the
APSC. APSC would be expected to contain some of these characteristics moving
forward.
To allow policy makers to draw insights from the Philippines and Malaysia
case study, four further points would be made. First, there would be a need to carefully
define and contextualise the terrorist problem in the state vis-a-vis other states where
cooperation might be desired. This should be studied deeply from the historical
perspectives and to recognise the complexities that exist, such as for the Philippines
case. Secondly, policymakers should seek to deal or invest in dealing primarily at the
national level as the issues highlighted are expected to persist over time, even as
ASEAN matures as an organisation. Thirdly, policy makers in Southeast Asia should
continue to be resilience because the DAESH is likely to continue to enjoy the safe
haven in South Philippines which are utilized to plan and organise its operations,
especially when the DAESH would only need to deal with the Philippines authorities
instead of a larger collective effort. Fourthly, policy makers should note that security
issues might be rallied at the ASEAN level, but might succeed only based on the
identification of common ground. This might be limited due to the unique security
contexts and perspectives that Southeast Asian states have individually.

40
Current military to military arrangements are largely restricted to joint border patrols in
Borneo, and the Eyes-in-the-sky multilateral arrangement which included also Singapore.

35
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Counter-Strategies. Eastern University Press.
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Weatherbee, D. E., Emmers, R., Pangestu, M., and Sebastian, L. C., 2005,
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36
Wilkinson, P., 2011, Terrorism vs Democracy: The Liberal State Response. London
and New York: Routledge.
Yegar, M., 2002, Between Integration and Secession: The Muslim Communities of the
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New York, Oxford, Lanham and Boulder: Lexington Books.

JOURNALS / MONOGRAPHS

Caballero-Anthony, M., 2002, Partnership for Peace in Asia: ASEAN, the ARF and
the United Nations, Contemporary Southeast Asia, Vol 23, No 3, Dec 2002.
Cassman, D., 2015, Moro National Liberation Front, Mapping Militant Organisations
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Cohen, R., 1978, Ethnicity: Problem and Focus in Anthropology, Annual Review of
Anthropology 7.
Emmers, R., 2003, ASEAN and the securitisation of transnational crime in Southeast
Asia, The Pacific Review, Vol 16, No 3, 2003.
Emmers, R., 2009, Comprehensive Security and Resilience in Southeast Asia:
ASEANs Approach to Terrorism, The Pacific Review, Vol 22, No 2, 2009.
Emmerson, D., 2009, Three Contexts of Terror in Indonesia: Economic, Political and
Personal, East Asia Forum, 22 Jul 2009.
Febrica, S., 2015, Why Cooperate? Indonesia and Anti-Maritime Terrorism
Cooperation, Asian Politics and Policy, Vol 7, No 1, 2015
Hafidz, T. S., 2009, A Long Row to Hoe: A Critical Assessment of ASEAN
Cooperation on Counter-Terrorism, Kyoto Review of Southeast Asia, Issue 11,
Dec 2009.
Hassan, M. H., and Mostarom, T. R., 2011, A Decade of Combating Radical Ideology:
Learning from the Singapore Experience (2001 2011), RSIS Monograph No
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Herz, J., 1950, Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma, World Politics vol.
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Mohamedou, M. O., 2014, ISIS and the Deceptive Rebooting of Al-Qaeda, Geneve
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Muhammad, A., 2012, International Context of Indonesias Counter-Terrorism Policy
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Affairs, 405 424.
Pushpanathan, S., 2013, ASEAN Efforts to Combat Terrorism, asean.org, 20 Aug 2013.
Ramakrishna, K., 2015, The Paris Attacks: Ramping Up of ISIS Indirect Strategy?,
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37
Vaughn, B., Chamlett-Avery, E., Cronin, R., Manyin, M., Niksch, L., 2005, Terrorism
in Southeast Asia, Library of Congress Washington DC Congressional
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NEWS ARTICLES
Carbreza, V., 2013, Aquino: Lets talk on Sabah, Inquirer (18 Mar 2013). Retrieved on
1 Oct 2016.
FlorCruz, M., 2014, Philippine Terror Group Abu Sayyaf May Be Using ISIS Link For
Own Agenda, International Business Times (25 Sep 2014). Retrieved on 1 Oct
2016.
Koike, Y., 2014, How to end the Philippines Moro insurgency, the Japan Times (27
Jun 2014). Retrieved on 1 Oct 2016.
Lapena, C., 2013, MNLF attacks Zambo City, using 20 hostages as human shields; six
killed, Reuters (10 Sep 2013). Retrieved on 1 Oct 2016.
Parameswaran, P., 2015, The Truth about Philippine Military Modernization and the
China Threat, The Diplomat (8 Jul 2015). Retrieved on 1 Sep 2016.
Tarmizi, J.A., 2015, Hisham: Malaysia and Philippines considering increased
security cooperation in the Sulu Sea, The Star Online (11 Mar 2015).
Retrieved on 1 Oct 2016.
Malaysia Launches Special Ops Force to Counter Terror Threats, 2016, Asiaone (27
Oct 2016). Retrieved on 3 Nov 2016.
Marcos Order: Destablize, Take Sabah, Philippine Daily Inquirer (2 Apr 2000).
Retrieved on 7 Oct 2016.
Philippines Rebel Leader Arrested, 2001, BBC News (25 Nov 2001). Retrieved on 1
Oct 2016.
Philippines under Duterte to stake a claim on Sabah despite Malaysias Warning,
2016, Asia Times (6 Jun 2016). Retrieved on 1 Oct 2016.
Puchong Bomb Blast linked to IS?, FMT News (28 Jun 2016). Retrieved on 1 Oct
2016.
Sabah Claim Handicap, 2016, Daily Express (20 Nov 2015). Retrieved on 1 Oct
2016.
Six-state swoop cripples IS terror cell: Bank Staff and School Counsellor among 16
working for Mohamad Wanndy, 2016, The Star (10 Oct 2016)). Retrieved on
11 Oct 2016.

GOVERNMENT / ORGANISATIONS

An Act to Amend Section One of Republic Act Numbered Thirty Hundred and Forty-
Six Entitled An Act to Define the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the
Philippines. Retrieved on 1 Oct 2016.
38
G. R. No. 187167. Supreme Court of the Philippines. 16 Jul 2011. Retrieved on 1
Oct 2016.
PUIC. Retrieved on 1 Oct 2016.
Malaysian Prime Ministers Office website
Philippines Embassy Website: Philippine Malaysia Agreements
Philippine Statistical Yearbook, East Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City, Philippines:
Philippines Statistics Authority: 1 30. October 2015. Retrieved on 1 Oct
2016.

WEBSITES

Wikipedia: North Borneo Dispute. Retrieved on 1 Oct 2016.

Wikipedia: Al-Maunah. Retrieved on 1 Oct 2016.
Wikipedia: Kumpulan Mujahidin Malaysia. Retrieved on 1 Oct 2016.
Wikipedia: Abu Sayyaf Group. Retrieved on 1 Oct 2016.
Wikipedia: Malaysia-Philippines Relations. Retrieved on 1 Oct 2016.
Wikipedia: Jemaah Islamiyah. Retrieved on 1 Nov 2016.
Wikipedia: Jabidah Massacre. Retrieved on 1 Oct 2016.
Wikipedia: Moro Islamic Liberation Front. Retrieved on 1 Oct 2016.
Wikipedia: Moro National Liberation Front. Retrieved on 1 Oct 2016.
Wikipedia: Cross Border attacks in Sabah. Retrieved on 1 Oct 2016.
Wikipedia: Sabah. Retrieved on 1 Oct 2016.

LECTURES / SPEECHES

Lecture by Thomas Koruth Samuel, Director of Research and Publication, Southeast

Asian Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism, to MAF DC on 26 May 2016,
Countering Terrorism: A Counter-Narrative Focus.
MAF DC Dinerss Club talk by YB Khairy Jamaluddin, Minister for Youth and Sports
on Nation Transformation: Strategies and Challenges.

SUPERVISOR

Prof. Dato Dr. Rashila Ramli is Principal Fellow, Professor of Political Science and
Director at the Institute of Malaysian and International Studies (IKMAS,) Universiti

39
Kebangsaan Malaysia. Her areas of specialization are Political Development, Gender
and Politics, and Human Security. Her current research is on the Governance of the
South China Sea and its implication on ASEAN, and Promoting Social Inclusion
through Public Policies. Two selected publications are: Human Security in
Archipelagic Southeast Asia, 2015 (with Sity Daud and Zarina Othman), and Social
Constructivism and Malaysias International Relations. Akademika Vol 8 No. 1. 39-51
2011 (with Nor Azizan Idris dan Zarina Othman). Her professional engagement
includes, among others, as President, Malaysian Social Science Association (PSSM),
member of the Council of Security Cooperation in Asia Pacific (CSCAP) Malaysia,
and Asst. Sec-General, National Council for Womens Organizations (NCWO),
Malaysia.

40
CHANGES IN EUROPEAN UNION POSTURE IN DEFUSING THE HUMAN
RIGHT VIOLATION ISSUES IN MYANMAR

Lt Kol Suhaimi Hj Shamsuddin

Lt Col Suhaimi Hj Shamsuddin was commissioned into the Malaysian Army as an

Infantry Officer in the Royal Malay Regiment on 20th Dec 1991. He has a Diploma in
Strategic and Defence Studies from University Malaya, Bachelor (with Honors) in
Law from University Technology Mara Malaysia and Master in Law (with
Distinction) from University Malaya. He has served in various fields as an infantry
officer and had been with the Army legal department for more than 16 years as
military prosecutor, legal advisor and Judge Advocate. His last appointment prior to
MAFDC was as the Chief of Staff in 12th Brigade HQ in Wardieburn Camp Kuala
Lumpur. Previously he was the Commanding Officer of 21st Royal Malay Regiment
and the Staff Officer Grade 1 in the Army HQ in the Ministry of Defence.

ABSTRACT

Myanmar has embarked into a remarkable change since their democratization and
reforms in 2011. The arrival of the countrys first civil-democratic elected government
after more than five decades in April 2016 presented themselves with a historic
opportunity to consolidate the democratization process and reformative programs,
encouraging ethnic peace and reconciliation, and promoting the rule of law and
human rights. However, since Myanmar had been plagued by decades of armed
conflict between the Tatmadaw (Armed Forces), and ethnic groups, establishing peace
process and addressing human rights violation issues among the stakeholders have
been the biggest challenge of the present government. EU, who initially was assertive
on the issue of human right issues, imposing economic sanctions, and political
isolation on Myanmar for the last two decades due to the rampant violation, had
finally lifted the sanction and isolation in 2012. Despite the recurring human rights
violation reports, EU decided to re-engage Myanmar constructively through soft

41
power approach in order to support and financially assist Myanmars reformative
programs, and development. EUs perplexing posture had invited criticism among
scholars and member states alike since the approach which was adopted neither
would guarantee the peace process, nor would it consolidate the multi-ethnic
nationalities in defusing the human right violation issues in Myanmar. Thus, the
objective of this project paper is to examine and analysed the causes of the changing
of posture by EU, the impact of the constructive engagement approach towards the
peace process, the political and socio-economic reforms and development; and the
accomplishment of this approach in defusing the human right violation issues in
Myanmar. To achieve these objectives, this qualitative study adopted the conceptual
framework based on neo-realist theory by understanding the current geo-politic
posture of Myanmar, and what are the intervening factors that triggered its
behavioural changes that had indirectly allured EU to change their posture in re-
engaging Myanmar instead of pursuing the economic sanctions and political isolation
adopted earlier. This paper also discussed about the impact, effectiveness, and
challenges of the current approach adopted by EU, and the capacity of EU itself as a
new global player especially in fostering human right values. The conclusion of this
paper will proof the theoretical analysis adopted, and the findings based on approach
adhered, and how much it has succeeded in defusing the human right abuses in
Myanmar.

INTRODUCTION
The growing awareness of human rights violations around the world has become a
dominant phenomenon attracting attention in international communities, regional
organization and non-state actors including Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO).
Human rights are widely considered to be the fundamental moral obligation required
as a person and are a useful means to help achieve human dignity in contemporary
international relations. Prior to 1945, despite the rhetoric of universality, the relation
between an individual and the state was a matter for that state alone. The state is
sovereign in an almost absolute sense, exercising supreme legal authority within its
jurisdiction.
Human rights abuse is a term used when an actor violates any fundamental
human rights related to the protection of human rights under the national or
international law. The issue of abuse and violation of human rights in Myanmar under
the governance of Military Junta Regime (later referred as the Regime) have long
been considered as among the worst in the world. For decades, minority ethnic
groups in Myanmar had faced persecution and been subjected to discrimination and
abused. Thousands of villages comprised of minority ethnic groups have been
destroyed, many burnt, razed to the ground, and their inhabitants displaced. Despite

42
the condemned and warning by international communities for Myanmar to urgently
pursue legal and institutional reforms that discriminate ethnicity and religion, the
Regime had failed to adhere and had even ignored any actions to prosecute or punish
the individuals responsible for hindering further human rights violations from
escalating. Such posture emulates the Regimes unwillingness to defuse the issue since
they have been succumbing to international pressure; thus, rampant violations
continued without impunity. After five decades of intimidation and human rights
violations, Myanmar has received little attention from the international communities.
For more than two decades, European Union (EU) had been imposing the
hard power approach by implementing the traditional punitive mechanism such as
economic sanctions and political isolation against Myanmars government for failing
to adhere to the basic principles governing human rights values as governed under the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). EU had even recommended the
same approach by sponsoring the Myanmars Human Right Resolution against abuse
of human rights by Myanmars regime through UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC)
and UN General Assembly (UNGA) since 1990. Though initially, EU was assertive
and their resolutions were widely adopted by the majority of member states including
the United States (US), but the implementation was not collectively imposed by all
member states. By late 2006, EU again officially urged the UNGA to collectively
impose international sanctions and isolations towards Myanmar since the present
autonomous sanction and isolation imposed by EU member states were ineffective as
it was not unanimously implemented. China and Russia, however, threat to veto the
resolutions since they claimed that Myanmar was not a threat to international peace
and security, and such action had a significant effect on Myanmars economic and
social security. In addition, they argued that the resolution violates the principles of
non-interference in internal affairs and national sovereignty of a nation.
Since then, EUs hard power promotion began to deteriorate when majority
of the states that initially support the initiative realized that the hard power approach
of economic and political sanctions and isolations were not effective since its
implementation was not unanimous and other powerful nations who were reluctance
to impose the sanction had continuously exploit Myanmars resources in pursuit of
their own national interest. Thus, political and economic interest seems to take
precedence over human rights concerns. By early 2012, due to the current posture of
world communities, coupled with regional states approach to embrace Myanmar
through the ASEAN-Way by not directly encroaching into Myanmars domestic
affair but instead engaging the Regime through liberal constructive engagement;
finally in May 2012 after some successful efforts by the ruling government towards
political reforms in Myanmar, EU decided to change their posture by embracing the
liberal approach of constructive engagement and suspending the diplomatic isolation
and economic sanctions imposed earlier.

43
 After the tragedy in Rwanda and the Balkans, the international communities
began to seriously debate whether the traditional hard power approach by imposing
total economic sanctions and political isolation are still relevant. There were also
growing concerns over how to react effectively when citizens human rights are
grossly and systematically violated. Finally, in 2011, the United Nations formulated
and pronounced the Doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P). Under the doctrine, it
was stated that if a state had violated the human rights of its citizens, other states not
only have a right, but an actual duty to intervene to protect the rights of the
oppressed. This was vigorously embraced by the United Nations in justifying the
decision to invade Libya to topple Colonel Gaddafis regime on the ground of human
rights in 2011. Thus, alternatively human right violation in Myanmar could be
engaged under different mechanism that could be considered effective such as the
Doctrine of Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as imposed on Libya or prescribing to
International Law governing human rights protection (through International Court of
Justice as applied in the Balkans against individuals who violated the principles of
human rights, or consented such abuses) if the political isolation and economic
sanctions imposed had failed to deliver the expected outcome. Thus, despite the
reports of human right violations in Myanmar, EUs decision in 2012 to change their
posture by actively engage Myanmar through liberal constructive engagement (later
referred as soft power approach) was due to some positive political reforms in
Myanmar, was considered as perplexing since the effective mechanism such as
Doctrine of R2P and International Law could have been adopted. Since 1990, EU had
been seen to be assertive and refuse to compromise in mitigating the human right
issues, and these divine values had been embedded in their foreign and trade policy.

OBJECTIVES
The following objectives have been set in order to study, understand and analyze the
changes in EUs posture especially after 2012 in defusing the human right violations
in Myanmar.
a. To evaluate and understand the reasons that influences and encourages the EU
to change their posture, and choose to embrace the soft power approach
toward Myanmars government.
b. To examine the impact of the soft power approach by EU and other International
communities on Myanmars politic, economy and social issues.
c. To analyze the effectiveness of the soft power approach adopted, and to
suggest the alternative plans to any shortcoming of the approach embraced.

44
MYANMARS SOCIAL BACKGROUND
Myanmar had long been plagued by ethnoreligious tensions, riots, and armed
conflicts. Her history is quite complicated due to the ethnic diversity in all the
provinces. Due to the multiplicity, their citizens, especially because the record of those
peoples has largely been effaced, western scholars had frequently deliver inaccurate
historical perspective of the nation. The Burmans was considered historically to be
the countrys most powerful ethnic group, in which they are in control the politics, and
central ruling government. The term Burmanization refers to the centuries-old,
ongoing effort by majority rulers to create a unified or homogeneous Burma through
policies that rewards assimilation, and punishes the expression of cultural, linguistic,
and religious difference. The continuous animosity towards other ethnic minority
groups, especially Rohingya was due to religion and ethnicity. The Rohingya were
denied their citizenship because the military regimes distrusted the Rohingyas
integrity towards the country. This happened during the period when Japanese were
occupying Arakan (now known as Rakhine) in 1942 from the British government,
where the Rohingya supported the British and the Rakhine Buddhist were supporting
the Japanese. During Myanmars independence, the Rohingya sought for Muhammad
Ali Jinnah to incorporate the Rakhine into East Pakistan (now known as Bangladesh).
The differences in political ideologies gave them negative impact to the Rohingya
which had distant them from the Rakhine Buddhist community.
When EU decided to change their posture in 2012 by constructively engaging
with the current ruling government through soft power approach, in order to support
and assist the reformative programs, many scholars feared that EUs current posture in
assisting Myanmars political, economic, and social reforms would not deliver the
expected promise of consolidating ethnic nationalities, and federalism with the aim to
defuse the human rights violation issues in Myanmar. Till date, since EU had changed
their posture towards Myanmar, the approach had yet to deliver any fruitful outcome
as timely expected; and reports of human right violation towards the ethnic minority
groups had even escalated, especially in Rakhine state towards the Rohingya.

FAILURE OF WORLD COMMUNITIES

Ineffectiveness of the UN, especially the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) in
interfering and preventing any violation of human rights, and providing protection
against those being abused, were vocally questioned by world leaders especially after
the Rwandas and Kosovos tragedy. Despite the rest of the worlds devotion to accept
the Doctrine of R2P towards the protection of its population from genocide, war
crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity, the failure of the UNSC and
UNGA to achieve a collective consensus on Myanmars human right abuses had
lamented the worlds obliviousness to the situation. Due to the failure of the
international communities to achieve a unanimous decision, any attempt to impose

45
political and economic sanctions effectively to pressure Myanmars government to
improve the human rights situation remained faltered.
Though the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR) and
Human right NGOs are gravely concerned at the systematic and increasingly severe
violations of individual, political, economic, social, and religious rights in Myanmar;
no one in the international arena had directly reacted to the out-cry compared to the
actions taken towards Muammar Gaddafi (UN imposed unanimous sanctions against
Libya from 19922003, and later invaded Libya in 2011 which was led by US, and its
coalition forces under the R2P doctrine to topple Gaddafis regime) . Through the rise
of International Justice, a fresh approach had emerged, which acted as an alternative to
the sanctions. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has the jurisdiction to decide the
case of human rights violation brought before them. However, in the case of
Myanmar, the major powerful nations have been seen interfering and reluctant to
allow ICJ to adjudicate. This was due to the enormous political and economic interest
that existed towards Myanmars rich natural resources. UN were shadowed by its own
Security Councils decision and the veto votes by the permanent members, especially
China and Russia. This seemed to be ineffective, and they had fail to be impartial to
serve its member states due to the veto power vested to these selective states. It
seems that there was a form of inconsistencies in action by the UN and the
international communities on nations that had violated human rights in their respective
states. These led to a situation where human security challenges in Post-Cold War era
had become more complex and ambiguous.

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND HUMAN RIGHTS

The European Union (EU) was founded on a shared determination to promote peace
and stability, and to build a world founded on respect for human rights, democracy
and the rule of law. This universal and indivisible value were the cornerstone of the
EU, and recently was strengthened by the ratification of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the EU. This was done in order to promote the principles of fundamental
freedoms, democracy, and rule of law. The member states of the EU are convinced
that the primary duty of the international community is to promote and uphold this
divine concern. For this reason, the EU pays special attention to respecting human
right both inside and outside the boundaries of the union. Adhering to human rights is
expected not only from a state that wishes to join the EU but also from all EU trade
and cooperation relationship with third countries. In order to prevent violations of
human rights, the European Union not only prioritizes dialogues, cooperation, and
sanctions but also supports an immediate intervention, if needed.
As the EU considers all human rights to be universal, they had translated that
promotion of human rights should be universal in nature. Respect for human rights
and fundamental freedom is at the core of the European Union. According to the

46
EU Strategic Framework and Action Plan on Human Rights and Democracy, The
European Union was founded on a shared determination to promote peace and
stability and to build a world founded on respect for human rights, democracy and the
rule of law. Without exceptions, the EU aims to promote human rights in all areas of
its external relationship, and it will particularly integrate the promotion of human
rights into trade. The entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2009
provided several radical changes in EUs approach to human rights, arguably
transforming the EU into a new type of human rights actor. EU is now considered to
have reached the high point of its engagement with human rights as it codified its
commitment to put human rights, democracy, and the rule of law at the heart of its
internal and external policies. Thus, EUs approach towards third world country like
Myanmar either political or trade relationship appears to adhere to the spirit of abiding
by the human rights principles, values, and norms. For decades Myanmar has been
subjected to a vast range of restrictive measures due to failure to uphold certain human
rights standards.

THE EUROPEAN UNION POSTURE TOWARDS MYANMAR

The European Community imposed the first Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) sanctions on Myanmar in 1991. This was based on the coordinated EU
member states foreign policies and following the report of Human Rights Watch
(HRW) on the failure of Myanmars military junta to respect the result of the
democratic elections in that year. The report expresses concern over the continuing
detention of prisoners and political activist without proper trial, human rights
violations on ethnic minorities, as well as the violence in the Rakhine State that
involved the Rohingya and Buddhist minority groups. The sanctions imposed were all
in-line with the United States decision to impose trade embargoes in response to the
Myanmars military juntas suppression towards protesters, and detention of political
prisoners. EUs posture in dealing with human rights violation issues in Myanmar
reflected its commitment and devotion as a new international actor in promoting the
human rights norms and practice among nation-states in international relations.
Initially, EU was very robust in its approach towards Myanmar on the issue of
human rights violation, and refused to compromise on the issues. They had continued
to impose restrictive measures on Myanmars government; even after Myanmar had
gained their ASEAN membership in 1997. However, from 2006 onwards, the hard
power approach started to ease and had been more relaxing, especially after Cyclone
Nargis which saw over 140,000 people died, and affected 2.4 million people in May
2008. Nargis was taken as a major turning point towards the end of military rule and
beginning of the reform process. Since then, Myanmar had continued to demonstrate
its disdain for political reforms and fundamental human rights guarantees and the rule
of law. Undeniably, ASEAN self- determination approach of non-interference and
engaging the member state through constructive engagement saw significant changes

47
in Myanmars geo-politic. In response to the positive attitude portrayed by the new
civil government under President Thein Sein since 2011, EU finally decided to
suspend and later lift the economic sanctions and political isolation imposed earlier as
a sign of welcome and to promote political and economic reforms in Myanmar.
Another reason for EUs changing posture was due to lack of unanimous support in
UNGA to promote collective restrictive actions against Myanmar by all member
states, thus causing the sanctions and isolation practices imposed by EU to be
ineffective in the long run. However, despite EUs noble commitment to put human
rights, democracy, and the rule of law at the heart of its internal and external policies,
commercial and trade seem to take precedence over human rights concerns base on
EUs economic interest. Due to Myanmars rising relative economic and political
importance, EU member states became more reluctant to pursue the human rights
agenda, since other nation states who continued to embrace Myanmar had exploited
Myanmars resources for their national economic interest. Thus, findings on economic
and political interests supports the idea that it does possess a significant amount of
influence on EUs approach in promoting human rights on third countries.
Western democracy and EUs human rights approach in solving Myanmars
human right issues initially seem rhetoric and had not supplied the solution to these
problems. Years of escalating isolations and sanctions have instead left the regime
firmly entrenched in power and the general population was still suffering from
deepening poverty. Each year, Myanmar's human and natural resources are further
eroding, and the prospect of turning the situation around is becoming less likely.
Sanctions and isolations alone when applied in tandem do not guarantee any
significant outcome as predicted. This is because it was not imposed consensually by
all nations. An alternative approach that emphasizes a more pragmatic effort to bring
together a deeply divided society and promote socio-economic development as the
basis for longer-term political change should be considered. Sanctions and isolations
seem to do more harm to the population, especially if the effect of the sanctions and
isolation directly had deprived the populations right too proper livelihood and
increased the poverty level among the discriminate ethnic groups. Thus, imposing
sanctions and isolations without unanimous consensus and enforcement by the whole
international communities is not effective especially if the nation imposed
continuously received economic and political assistance from other powerful nation
to maintain its survivability.
EU realizes they need to change their traditional posture and invest in soft
power; the power of enticement to persuade other actors to follow their examples and
a policy of universal human rights; through constructive engagement in order to foster
democracy and respect for human rights in Myanmar. Due to the complex
ethnopolitical situation on Myanmar, any aggressive action (such as imposing the R2P
Doctrine) towards Myanmar will bring more harm to the population in the long run.
Thus, being a new global player, EU needs to firstly enhance trust and unity of action
among the member states in order to earn the acceptance by external actors and other

48
international organizations. The effectiveness of EUs posture depends not only on its
resources and capabilities but also by the level of influence and enforcement it can
impose within its organization structures to ensure unification of actions within its
member states. EU too must ensure the coherence of their actions, both internally and
externally to avoid the negative perception being seen impartial in their actions
towards any third countries in promoting human rights. Thus, EUs decision to change
their posture towards Myanmar should be seen as a strategic move in order to assist
and encourage Myanmars government to pursue democratization and reforms with
the aim of defusing the human right violation issues that had been plaguing Myanmar
for decades. EUs noble commitment and focus to promote peace and stability and to
build a world founded on respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law;
denotes EUs desire to be an efficient global player in promoting human right values
in international relations.

IMPACT AND EFFECTIVENESS OF EUS CHANGES OF POSTURE

Myanmar has commenced on an impressive path of political and economic reforms,
deflecting from five decades of the tyrannical rule of the civil government, Union
Solidarity and Development Party (USDP) under President U Thein Sein came to
power in early 2011. The government intend to introduce a bona fide democracy and
thus, some prudent steps have been undertaken towards establishing a more open and
equitable society. The government desire and commitment to advance towards the
spirit of national openness and reconciliation in the country's multi-ethnic society was
reflected through the three-pronged reform programs and a comprehensive process
that comprises of democratic (political), economic and social reforms, and long term
multi-ethnic peace process. However, Myanmar knew to overcome the legacy of
conflict, poverty, oppression and weak institutions will be a long painful process.
Decades of economic mismanagement and isolation have led to deep-rooted economic
and social breakdown. Citizens' confidence in the state's capacity to deliver have
eroded and been undermined due to the vicious political malpractice. Thus, the peace
process and ceasefires need to be expedited to re-build confidence and trust among the
population to facilitate sustainable development in remote minority areas since it
would be the key drivers for economic and social development in Myanmar.
EU is strongly supportive of Myanmar's democratic and economic reforms and
is committed to safeguard this progress and extend the cooperation with the
Myanmars government on human rights reforms process. To ensure that the best
international standards are met, EU launches the EU-Myanmar Task Force in
November 2013, to allow a structured regular Human Rights dialogue, especially on
issues of mutual interest to be discussed openly and constructively between the
conflicting parties. EU has allocated USD 757 million in development aid to assist the
economic and social development and encourage peacebuilding support, making the
EU one of the biggest donors to Myanmar during the transition period. In July 2013,

49
Myanmar was reinstated as a beneficiary of the "Everything but Arms" initiative under
the EUs Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), which allows Myanmars traders
to enjoy free access to a European market. EU too had been working in tandem with
the government to combat human right abuses and had been providing huge
humanitarian assistance either financially or through active participation in political
dialogue with ethnic groups in order to facilitate the peace process and improved the
independence of the judiciary and access to justice.
EU had been encouraging the government to adopt a more constructive
approach, and had been providing advisory and financial assistance since 2012 to
address the problem of poverty and sustainable development in other minority ethnic
areas, This strategic effort by EU was planned based on the assumption that by
eradicating poverty, improving sustainable development, building human capital
through sound education system and good governance, it could indirectly win the trust
and the heart and mind of the population, thus awareness on human right issues that
had been dwelling for decades could be inculcated among the population effectively.
However, since EUs intervention and support towards Myanmar in 2012, the changes
and reduction in the human right violation cases were not significant as expected as
reported either by UN official agencies or NGOs. Soft power approach adopted by
EU on Myanmar although does have a significant impact on Myanmars politic,
economic and social affair but however, little was achieved in the development in
defusing human rights violation issues especially towards minority ethnic groups.
Thus, EU should continue to engage the stakeholders in a more robust and direct
manner to ensure the effectiveness of the current approach adopted in order to achieve
its ultimate objective; resolving the human right issues permanently in Myanmar. EU
too should diligently utilize the financial assistance and political influence as a tool to
allure the Myanmars government to abide by the spirit of rule of law and principles of
UDHR.

CONCLUSION
Myanmar has traveled a long way towards democratization, but the journey is far from
success. The transitions in Myanmars political reforms and the democratization
process in recent years can be seen as a positive development towards peace and as a
catalyst towards ending ethnic conflicts. However, this political reform is at great risk
of deteriorating if human rights and the right to equal treatment under the law are not
honored and protected. Due to this unprecedented development and to avoid
Myanmars democratic reform from deteriorated; EU has opened a new chapter in its
relations to assist Myanmar into a modern democracy. The assumption democracy will
be the solution of Myanmars ethnic conflicts that causes human right violations had
been widely debated and criticized by scholars. Democratization, if not prudently
practice may also trigger new conflicts through political competition between political
rivalry that subsequently produced winners and losers during the election. Thus,

50
democratization alone does not guarantee a viable solution to Myanmars ethnic
conflicts.
As long as Myanmars persistent ethnic conflicts remain unsolved, it will
linger as Myanmars main political challenge. It is unlikely to see an ethnically
divided country like Myanmar to achieve democratic transitions without conflict.
Without a political compromise that involves all ethnic groups, there will be little
hope for lasting peace. In order to accommodate the aspirations and demand of the
ethnic groups, the preconditions with regards to self-determination of minority
populations, equal fundamental rights and the establishment of a federal union with
genuine political representation; need to be considered urgently. In order to achieve
this, an inclusive political process which includes active participation of three power
centres that include the present ruling government and the Tatmadaw (Armed Forces),
the ethnic and rebel armed groups and the civil society including the opposition
parties. All these stakeholders need to negotiate and consolidate the issues and
demand without prejudice.
The militarys failure to abide by President Thein Sein ceasefire orders in
Kachin State in 2012 had tarnished the peace initiatives with the ethnic armed groups
causing mistrust and skeptical view towards the government efforts and commitment
to the peace dialogue. Thus, the ability of the ethnic groups and the present democratic
government to reach a peace understanding and unite on a common platform for the
future of Myanmar is therefore in doubt. Regime survivability of the Tatmadaw is the
main reason for the failure since they are wary of the competency of civil politics.
There is a fear of the disintegration of the union if the ethnic groups achieved
extensive concessions on the issue of federalism and self-determination in political
negotiations from the present government. The Tatmadaw believed that this will affect
their present prerogative and legislative power in Myanmars parliament. Presently,
the Tatmadaw who occupied 25 % of the parliamentary seats, and has a veto on
constitutional changes and retains three key ministerial posts (Home, Defence, and
Border Affairs). The Constitution even guarantees the impunity of the previous
Tatmadaw leadership since it stipulates that no proceeding may be instituted against
them in all circumstances. Thus, the succession of the reforms and democratic
progress rely on the understanding and cordial relationship between the ruling
government and the Tatmadaws regime survivability.
In general, though the outlook for total peace is uncertain, but democratic and
economic progress in Myanmar seems to be relatively good. The reforms since 2012
has brought some impact on Myanmars democratic and socio- economic progress in
most parts of Myanmar. Thus, the current political opening and dialogue is the best
opportunity since last five decades for ethnic minorities to achieve political
concessions. By engaging in the political dialogues and peace negotiation, they would
have the chance to raise ethnic grievances, improved the socio-economic conditions
and take part in defining Myanmars political future. Hence, current reforms must be

51
taken into consideration and without democratization, the likelihood of peace and
prosperity can never be achieved, and repeated human right violence and ethnic
conflict will continue to plague Myanmar forever.

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SUPERVISOR

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Mohd Suhaimi Mohamad (PhD) is a Senior Lecturer in the Centre of Psychology and
Human Wellbeing as well as Associate Dean at the Faculty of Social Sciences and
Humanities, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia. He received his PH.D. in Mental Health Social
Work from the University of Bristol, United Kingdom (2006-2010). His current research
interests are related to the fields of social security, community development, family wellbeing
and mental health care. His research focus includes mental health literacy, marginal
community development, rural transformation policy, equality in education, family
empowerment, drug prevention-treatment and care as well as development of Orang Asli
community. He has published articles on various issues pertaining to mental health literacy in
Malaysia, family caregiving to schizophrenia patients, wellbeing of drug survivors, mental
health among male prison inmates, issues of the bottom 40, competency-based social work
practice, social capital and disaster preparedness. His chapters in book entitled the Bottom 40
Issues: Homeless and Mental Health in Kuala Lumpur is published in 2015. The upcoming
books are Tasik Chini Lifeblood of Orang Asli (2017), and Run Away Children in Malaysia
(2017).

56
 SELECTIVE DIPLOMACY: A COMPARISON OF US FOREIGN POLICY
TOWARDS MYANMAR AND NORTH KOREA

Lt Col Sebastian Arokiaraj William RMAF was commissioned into the Royal
Malaysian Air Force as a General Duty Pilot (GDP) on 25th February 1992. He has
served in various RMAF squadrons as an operational fighter pilot as well as an
Instructor Pilot and Fighter Weapons Instructor (FWI). His last assignment prior to
MAFDC was as the Commanding Officer of No 17 Squadron in Kuantan Airbase,
having flown the MiG29 for 15 years. He has a Diploma in Information Technology
from UNITAR and Diploma in Defence and Strategic Studies from University
Malaya.

ABSTRACT

This study explores the behaviour of big states towards small states in favour of their
own interests as prescribed by Kenneth Waltzs definition of Neo-Realist Theory where
the behaviour of states is explained by their need for survival in the international
system and the environment surrounding them. This paper uses a qualitative research
method and makes a comparison study using Myanmar and North Korea as units of
comparison to explain how the US Foreign Policy differs in treatment of Myanmar
and North Korea although both once were in the same pariah state category in
Washingtons perception. The puzzle that drove this research is to explore the reasons
why the US Foreign Policy is more accommodative towards Myanmar, but
antagonistic towards North Korea although both states showed similar negative traits
and behaviour towards the preservation of human rights and democracy, which is part
of the US Foreign Policys core tenets. The assumption made through this research is
that China plays a significant role in the decisions made by the US in its Foreign
Policy towards Myanmar and North Korea, resulting in the differential approach
towards these two states. This study found that the US realizes that it is losing its grip
on the Asia-Pacific region and is fighting hard to recover lost ground through its
rebalancing policy, and Myanmar has directly benefitted from US rapprochement
efforts. However, North Korea still does not seem to attract any favour or interest of
the US or China to either reforms or economic assistance. Apart from Pyongyangs
pursuit of nuclear weapons capability that has been condemned by the world
community, its deplorable human rights violations and authoritarian governance is
very much similar to that of Myanmar prior to 2009. This research finds that China
plays a major role in the US decision to pivot back to Asia and Chinas growing
influence in the region has resulted in Washington having to selectively create new
partnerships with states, especially those with geo-strategic importance such as
Myanmar. Thus, the differential treatment between Myanmar and North Korea by
Washington in its foreign policy is a direct result of Chinas rise in the region.

BACKGROUND
The paradox of how the US approaches the two different states in the same region is
perplexing to say the least. Considering that as recent as 2010, Myanmar (Burma as
referred to by the US41) had faced more restrictions and opposition from the US in
comparison to North Korea42. Both states have displayed blatant practices disregarding
human rights and democracy which are among the main pillars of the US Foreign
Policy, namely to promote human rights and democracy in every state they attempt to
engage politically or diplomatically.
The politics of Myanmar (Burma before 1989) has been a tumultuous affair.
Since the military junta had assumed their power in 1962, the oppressive regime
became constantly embroiled in cases of international outcry related to human rights
violations. Washington has been showing great concern towards the governance of
Myanmar since the early 1990s.43 The US had also protested the inclusion of
Myanmar as a member of ASEAN on 23rd July 1997.
In 2006, Myanmar was projected to take over the chair of ASEAN, but due to
overwhelming disputes by the US, European Union and Britain, Myanmar was held
off from holding that appointment.44 However, after US Secretary of State Hillary
Rodham Clintons visit to Naypyidaw in 2011, followed by President Barack Obamas
visit in 2012, the US went through a complete shift in its policies towards Myanmar.
This turnaround in policy includes the increased trade and foreign aid in rebuilding
41
The US, UK and the EU have refused to accept the name change from
Burma to Myanmar in 1989 as a sign of defiance to the policies of the Military
Junta. Therefore, all references to Myanmar by these three entities especially in
official documents are commonly seen as Burma.
42
Seth, A. 2012. United States Relations With Burma: From Hostility to Hope.
Regional Outlook Paper. 1(36)
43
Hadar, L. T. 1998. US Sanctions Against Burma: A Failure on All Fronts.
http://www.cato.org/pubs/trade/tpa-001.html (27 February 2016).
44
Than. T.M.M. 2006. Myanmar: Challenges Galore But Opposition Failed To
Score. Southeast Asian Affairs, 183-207.
Myanmars economy and infrastructure whilst promoting democracy to the ruling
Myanmar government.45 As a result of this shift in the US policy, the US was able to
accept Myanmar as Chair of ASEAN on 1st January 2014, thus directly helping it to
gain political legitimacy both globally and regionally, as a member of ASEAN in a
stark contrast to the protests by the US against its candidacy as the regional bodys
chair in 2006.46
North Korea on the other hand continues to be in the black book of the US and
its allies. Historically, US and North Korea have fought against each other during the
Korean War that lasted from 1950 to 1953. Both sides suffered heavy losses during the
conflict. Although an armistice is currently in place, the Korean Peninsula is still
technically at war with minor skirmishes and border tit-for-tats which occurs
occasionally. The Problem Statement put forward for this research is that compared to
North Korea, US foreign policy towards Myanmar is considered to be more
accommodative due to differing strategic interests that the US has in the two regions
(Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia). This is despite both Myanmar and North Korea
displaying similar traits of human rights violations, non-democratic governance, and
the way both these states reacted towards Washingtons reconciliatory attempts.
As a dominant global economic and military powerhouse, the US has always
sought to use its capability and capacity to influence how smaller states behave
towards its policies. Waltzs contention that a states behavior can be a product of
competition among other states, and this can explain the US cautiousness towards
Chinas increasing influence in the Asia-Pacific region, and its increasing economic
support for Myanmar. This also explains why the US has decided to forego its earlier
hard stance towards Myanmar and adopted a soft power approach in competition to
Chinas approach.

THE US PIVOT OR REBALANCING POLICY IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC

REGION
The events of September 11, 2001 shifted the attention of the US towards a new
dimension of global threat in the Central and South Asia, particularly in Afghanistan,
Iraq and Pakistan. Driven to sought for justice on the attacks in New York, the
Pentagon, and the intended attack on Washington DC took the US through a decade of
military and economic intervention under the pretext of combatting terrorism in the
above-mentioned regions. Within the decade, the US strategic influence in the Asia-
Pacific region appeared to dwindle and became overshadowed by the increasing

45
US Department of State. 2014. Diplomacy In Action: US Assistance to
Burma. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ ps/2014/230463.htm (29 May 2016)
46
Brandon, John J. 2014. ASEAN Chairmanship Offers Opportunity for Myanmar -
The Asia Foundation. The Asia Foundation. http://asiafoundation.org/
2014/01/08/asean-chairmanship-offers-opportunity-for-myanmar/. (12 Nov 2016)
dominance of China and India in the economy and diplomatic relations with regional
states, especially in Southeast Asia.
Considering the increasing importance of retaining its influence and diplomacy
in the Asia Pacific, Washington embarked to rebrand its approach to the region, under
the moniker of Pivot to Asia or Rebalancing towards Asia. This policy has been
widely described as a significant shift in Washingtons approach to the region and
depicted its commitment to foster a deeper engagement with regional states. 47 The
Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton coined the term Pivot to Asia in an October 2011
article when she described it as Americas prologue to its Asia Pacific Century. 48
She reiterated her stand a month later by saying that the future of politics will be
decided in Asia, not Afghanistan or Iraq, and the United States will be right at the
center of the action.49

TENETS OF US PIVOT POLICY

The US realises that the Asia Pacific is a region of big economic potential and also a
region it has been actively involved in for more than a century. Therefore, it is only
logical for the biggest economy in the world to refocus its attention into rebuilding
extensive ties in diplomacy, economy, and security areas with its friends in the region
while seeking to mend or reconcile the ties which were lost through the years.
The Obama Administration saw the lack of strategic focus and gradual decline
in influence in an era, especially when many Asia Pacific states were seeking for a
greater involvement of the US in the region.50 The decision to rebalance or pivot to
Asia came about at a time when the US was re-evaluating its military commitments in
the Middle East and South Asia, with a gradual reduction in force level looming and
increasing calls for a pull-out of US military troops from conflict areas. Seizing this
window of opportunity to re-focus its attention towards Asia, six key efforts or areas
of interest were drawn up for the US to concentrate on for its pivot to Asia.
Alliances
The US has existing alliances in Asia Pacific that it strives to preserve in order to
retain its presence in the region. Therefore, it is not surprising that a strong priority

47
Mishra, R. 2015. The US Rebalancing Strategy: Responses from Southeast
Asia. Asian Strategic Review 2014.
https://www.academia.edu/6505539/The_US_Rebalancing_Strategy_Pivot_to_Asia_
Responses_from_Southeast_Asia?auto=download. (10 June 16).
48
Clinton, Hillary. Americas Pacific Century.
49
Turner, Oliver. Parmar et al (eds). 2014. The US Pivot to the Asia Pacific.
In Obama and the World. New York: Routledge. 219.
50
Campbell and Andrews. 2013. Explaining the US Pivot to Asia. Chatham
House, 2. https://www.chathamhouse.org/
sites/files/chathamhouse/public/Research/Americas/ 0813pp_pivottoasia.pdf. (12
June 16).
was given by Washington in renewing its commitment to existing allies and looking at
the possibility of other potential allies.

Improving Relationships with Emerging Powers

The second priority in the Pivot is to improve the relationship between the US and
other friendly states or partners, and emerging regional powers such as India and
China, though the US is much more concerned with the rapid accession of China
turning into the second biggest economy in the world, and the increasing influence
that it has in the region. The greatest challenge for the US at this moment is to regain
its own sphere of influence within the Asia-Pacific region whilst building rapport with
China and finding ways to cement a strong and robust relationship with them.

Economic Relationship
Recognising that the Asia-Pacific region is fast becoming a major player in global
economics, the Pivots third priority focuses on economic relationships as an
important element in US Foreign Policy. This is in order to strengthen its economic
recovery post 2007 economic crisis. While the existing trade partnerships such as the
US-Korea Free Trade Agreement has already elevated US trade in the region, the
recent launched of Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) has further enhanced
the economic relationship between US and other economies into a single trading
entity.

Engaging Multinational Institutions

The US recognises the importance of a strong regional body like ASEAN and the
commitment its member states bring along towards preserving its fundamentals.
Washington sees that the active engagement of multinational institutions like ASEAN
could pave a smooth path to establish or strengthening the ties with its member states,
especially the developing ones such as Myanmar.51 This engagement initiative forms
the fourth element of the Pivot, and the US has established itself as the first non-
member with a permanent mission representative in ASEAN. A well-integrated and
strong ASEAN will ease the US Foreign Policy implementation in the region with
ASEAN playing the role of mediator between its members and Washington when
necessary.

51
Interview with Tan Sri Razali Ismail, former Chairman of the UN General
Assembly and UN Special Envoy to Myanmar at his residence on 15 April 2016.
Support for Universal Values
The US wants to be seen as a champion of human rights and democracy, and these
values are at the heart of every diplomatic engagement the US has embarked on in the
Asia Pacific. They are considered as an intrinsic part of Americas national identity
and Washington has never been shy of highlighting human rights violations and
undemocratic practices in states it has vested interest in.

Increasing US Military Presence

The sixth element of the Pivot is the restoration of US military representation in the
Asia Pacific region. Not wanting to be misinterpreted as trouble makers, the US has
tailored its security engagements towards broader national agendas such as diplomacy,
enhancing trade, economic and social development, promoting values, and increasing
collaborations with regional multinational institutions.52

PERCEPTIONS AND PERSPECTIVES ABOUT US PIVOT POLICY

Amitav Acharya views that China has always seen the practice of Rebalancing
towards Asia as squeezing and tightening its own space. It was also seen as a form of
containment by the US in order to balance out Chinese influence in the region. He
adds that Chinese officials will always be wary of US initiatives to renew their ties
with regional states and regarded them as detrimental to Chinas interests.53
President Obama is aware of the fact that the US is still viewed by many Asian
states as their primary partner in security while they also view China as their primary
source for economic prosperity. Therefore, Washington is aware that most Asian
governments would be willing to defer their commitments to the US in favour of
China, especially when the management of the global economic matters is taken into
consideration.54 It is this cautionary matter that drives the US in its rigourous
campaign to recoup its influence especially among growing economies in the region
such as Myanmar. These growing economies are still looking for a sense of economic
security through foreign direct investments, and nations such as Myanmar are the
prospective targets.
Kim Changsus opinion enlightened the study through the South Korean
perspective on the Pivot by concluding that six decades of existential threats from

52
Ibid.

53
Acharya, A. 2013. Why Two Asias May Be Better Than None. World Politics Review, 810.
(18 June 2016).

54
Chan et al. 2010. Obamas Trade Strategy Runs into Stiff Resistance. New
York Times. 11 November.
North Korea, existing close ties with Washington since the Korean War, geographic
proximity and increasing interdependence in economy with an increasingly powerful
China, and unresolved disputes with Japan which goes back more than a century are
good enough reasons to have a powerful US presence in the region.55 While most
South Korean scholars view the pivot as having very little effect on them due to the
existing strong partnership with the US, they do agree that a strategic realignment by
the US towards this region will be supported.56
Much has been speculated about the true intentions and objectives of the US
decision to rebalance or pivot to Asia. Some of these questions hang around the
expected time frame for the US commitment to the rebalance or if it is merely
ephemeral in nature due to the current domination of China in the Asia Pacific region.
Whilst the increased involvement of the US spells a sense of security for some
regional states who are in contention with China for territorial ownership, others
questioned the need for Washington to meddle in the geo-politics of Southeast Asia,
and the Asia Pacific region in fear of igniting a race for power and dominance.
While Washington insists that its motives are innocent and was tailored to
meet the demands of a secure, stable and friendly Asia Pacific. However, China has its
own reservations as to why the US has chosen to refocus its attention to Asia at a time
when China is at the peak of securing its String of Pearls and Maritime Silk Road
through the Asia Pacific. How deep is the involvement and influence of China on
regional states and how much will it affect US own interests? President Obama
himself has embarked on an unprecedented journey to re-establish diplomatic ties with
Asian leaders through his series of official visits and involvement in regional summits,
something his predecessors did very little of. The fact remains that the US sees itself
playing a pivotal role in Asia Pacific through this century and to cement itself as a
friend and confidant to smaller states. Similarly, the depth of relationship China has
with certain states in the region also appears to affect the policies of the US towards
these states. How do they differ, and why does the US seek these different approaches
when dealing with these two states remains to be analyzed and will be deliberated in
this paper.

US FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS MYANMAR

In 2009, the US was singing to a totally different tune from its previous opposition on
Myanmars undemocratic governance and human rights violations. They had launched
55
Kim, Changsu. 2014. South Koreas Adaptation to the US Pivot to Asia. In
The New US Strategy Towards Asia: Adapting to the American Pivot, edited by
William Tow and Douglas Stuart, 91. Routledge Security in Asia Pacific Series.
London: Taylor & Francis.
56
Tow and Stuart. The New US Strategy Towards Asia: Adapting to the
American Pivot. 3
a policy of principled engagement that included direct high-level dialogues with
Myanmars authorities. This became the signs of improvements especially for the
diplomatic relations between the two states. This also paved the way for democratic
elections to be held in November 2010, and the formation of a new civil government
in March 2011. Several measures were taken by the new government to indicate its
willingness to reform. This included the release of political prisoners, removal of
media censorship, ceasefire talks with ethnic minority rebels, and having
parliamentary by-elections.57 The current status of Myanmar is keen to be portrayed as
a civil government and wants to be recognised by other global states. Undoubtedly the
renewed relationship between the US and Myanmar has improved the way Myanmar
is viewed globally and as expectations are high for the elected government to continue
its progress towards establishing an ethical and democratic development.
China views Southeast Asia as its Southwest doorstep, and a potential source
of security threat if it is not managed effectively. Because of this, China viewed US
involvement with any Southeast Asian states as a thorn on its side especially when
Chinese leaders have long considered Myanmar as one of the solutions to its Malacca
Dilemma apart from the proposed Kra Isthmus Canal that has met with much
opposition from other Southeast Asian states.
The US strategy of containment towards China could also be attributed to
Chinas String of Pearls development programme that sees major investments by the
Chinese in port infrastructure along its major maritime trade route. Myanmar is
included in this programme, expected to play a big role in it as well. 58 Jrgen Haacke
in 2012 pointed out that while the US welcomes Chinas economic growth and as its
major economic trading partner, the latters growing military power and increasing
influence in the region is becoming a major concern for the US.59
The US response to Myanmars effort was to ease the selected economic and
financial restrictions or sanctions in July 11, 2012 with the aim to spur more reforms
and changes while contributing to the development of the countrys economy. This in
essence was done to promote democratic governance and practices while being fully
aware of the increasing role of China in the region and existing influences in
Myanmar. The new Myanmar government that was formed on March 30, 2011, and
they have embarked on a path to firmly capitalising on the rapprochement with the
US. It also presents an opportunity for Myanmar to reform its education and
institutional capacities in forms of a wider prospects for development opportunities,

57
Hill, C. 2012. Burma: Domestic Reforms and International Responses. Parliamentary
Library, no. 22 May 2012. http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/ParliamentaryDepartments/
Parliamentary_Library/pubs/BN/2011-2012/Burma. (26 July 2016)
58
Marantidou, V. 2014. Revisiting Chinas String of Pearls Strategy: Places
with Chinese Characteristics and Their Security Implications. Issues & Insights
14 (7).
59
Haacke, J. Myanmar: Now a Site for SinoUS Geopolitical Competition?
and humanitarian aid. At the same time, they envisioned to help improving
Myanmars standing among the international community.

US FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS NORTH KOREA

When President Obama took over his first term in office in 2009, he extended North
Korea an offer of reconciliation during his inaugural speech with hope of breaking the
long standoff over the latters nuclear program. Instead of showing any signs of
appreciation, Kim Jong-Ill conducted several multi-stage rocket and nuclear tests
between April and May of 2009. Secretary Clinton described the Obama
administrations first principle in approaching North Korea will be on a strategic
patience basis as they believed that North Koreas constant provocation act would
only lead them to self-isolation from its neighbours.
Washington has to thread on a fine line when trying to attempt a re-
engagement with Kim Jong-Uns regime. Its closest allies in East Asia, Japan and
South Korea are ever cautious with the recalcitrant Kim and his constant provocative
acts against his immediate neighbours. Washington would not want to upset these two
close allies for the sake of renewing ties with a regime that has even directly
threatened the security of the continental United States of America through numerous
media outbursts and propaganda news.
The US Pivot policy to Asia also details a more comprehensive economic and
strategic collaboration with China, though many views the US motives to be more of
competitiveness and containment of Chinas expansion in regional influence.60
However, this Sino-US cooperation, if it works according to the aspirations of the US,
can be a platform of mediation in approaching North Korea as it appears that the US
does intend to use China as a cushion for its policies towards Pyongyang. After all,
China has been a supportive ally and one of the economic pillars to North Korea
amidst the extensive sanctions imposed on it through the years. If Pyongyang was to
look for a shoulder to rely on, Beijing would be the closest and dearest, if historical
accounts are to be taken into account.

STRATEGIC MONOPOLY OR STRANGE BEDFELLOWS

The importance of the Asia-Pacific regions economic capacity to the US and China
has been very evident in the last decade. However, active engagement of ASEAN by
China in recent years has shed a new light on the potential China brings to regional
states. Through ASEAN, China has enjoyed close to USD500 billion of two-way trade
in 2014. This was thanks to the Chinese Premier Zhu Rongjis initiative which was

60
Swaine, M. 2012. Chinese Leadership and Elite Responses to the US Pacific
Pivot. China Leadership Monitor 38: 126.
done through the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area.61 This collaborative effort also
include Chinas expansion of its Official Development Assistance programme for
ASEAN member states and this has largely benefited Myanmar in infrastructure
upgrades and their developments.62 Chinas One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative
was launched during the APEC Summit in Beijing in October 2014 by Chinese
President Xi JinPing. This had included a USD40bil assistance scheme, and the setting
up of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in which China would be
coughing up more than half of its USD50bil capital 63 which will serve as a strong
magnet for Myanmar to rope itself into Chinas circle of friends.
However, Myanmar has also been playing it smart not to be seen to be too
dependent on Chinas handout. This is because Myanmar also sees the importance of
keeping a safe distance from China in order to continue attracting the US interest in
developing its economy and also forging their military relationship. Myanmar will be
smart to exploit the USs desperation to garner more diplomatic mileage in the region
to compete with China. Since 2009, Washington has been gradually reducing its
sanctions towards Naypyidaw in light of the latters perceived move towards reforms
and economic investments by US firms has increased significantly. 64 Although some
conditions were set by Washington to ensure the ruling Myanmar government keeps to
its reform efforts, the significance of the US presence in Myanmar goes beyond just
economic assistance from a big state to a small state, but also a stage for keeping
Chinas relationship with Myanmar in check. Chinas OBOR initiative includes a
massive instrastructure development in Myanmars main ports which in turn will serve
as staging ports for the Peoples Liberation Armys Naval vessels plying the IOR
under the pretext of keeping vigilance over its trade routes. This increased Chinese
Naval presence in the IOR puts creates another dent in US ambitions to regain its
military prowess in the region, in addition to the increased tension between China and
the US in the South China Sea.
Both China and the US have been quick to dismiss any notion of strategic
competition in the Asia-Pacific region. Although both seemed obviously irate over
whatever action the other makes, they prefered to portray a perception of co-existence
for mutual benefit. In 2014, US Ambassador to China, Gary Locke spared no efforts to
reiterate US policy towards collaborative engagements with China in Asia. He stressed
that the US looks forward to share the same fundamental goals in the development of

61
Interview with Senior Colonel Zhang Zhing Min PLA, Defence Attache of
China to Malaysia at his residence on 13 September 2016.
62
Wong, John. 2015. Chinas One Belt, One Road Initiative: Economic
Diplomacy With Chinese Characteristics. Silk Road Forum 2015, 18. Singapore.
http://en.drc.gov.cn/ JohnWong.pdf. (4 October 2016).
63
Ibid.
64
US Companies Investing in Burma. 2014. Houston.
http://www.uscampaignforburma.org/
images/USCB_Report_Card_US_Companies_Investing_In_Burma.pdf. (4 October
2016).
the Asia Pacific because the region presents a significant economic vitality for both.
He called for more open and frank dialogues towards sustained engagements and to
foster cooperation to avoid unnecessary friction through amicable problem solving
efforts and look forward to a more prosperous mutual future. 65 In fact, the US has
been selling this idea of mutual co-existence with China since 2012 when its
rebalancing strategy first resurfaced. Chinas cautious stance towards US intentions in
its rebalancing or pivot to Asia was not unfounded. Asia is home to over 40 percent of
the worlds population and contributes to almost 60 percent of global GDP.66 Asia will
undoubtedly have a profound effect on the world economy as a whole and anyone
who owns Asia will systematically own the world. The US Trans Pacific
Partnership (TPP) initiative to gather more economic partners in the region closely
mirrors Chinas AIIB in terms of motive and strategic values.
As far as North Korea is concerned, it appears to be a game of pushing the
responsibility to the other for several obvious reasons. Firstly, the Kim family regime
will not back down from its current aggressive stance. Only a regime change will be
able to bring about rehabilitation. Secondly, the cost of North Korean economic
rehabilitation is expected to be enormous after decades of economic neglection and
mismanagement, too much for either one of the superpowers to manage by themselves
and as such, only a joint effort is logical. Thirdly, North Koreas nuclear development
programme is a thorn on the side of both US and China. The constant threats of
nuclear weapon tests has irked both China and US as well a other regional states. A
solution to this problem does not seem to be anywhere near the horizon and will take
great commitment from both US and China to handle this matter.

CONCLUSION
The 2011 announcement by Washington of its intention to refocus its attention from
the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific region certainly caused a conundrum to all states
in this region. It had received mixed feelings of elation for those looking for a bigger
US involvement in the regions economy and security, and a sense of distrust for those
wary of the actual intentions of the US shift. Myanmar is one state which had
identified in this research that has both US and Chinas interest in terms of economy,
diplomatic and military. More significantly, the US is more than willing to put its
earlier condemnation of the ruling Myanmar military regimes past practices through
relaxation of sanctions under the pretext of moving forward with the juntas promise
of human rights reform and democratic governance, two of the most prominent focus
in any the US foreign policy towards other states. North Korea however, poses a
challenge for both the US and China because of its stubborn ruling regime that has
65
Locke, G. 2014. Partnerships For Prosperity in the Asia-Pacific. In , 14.
Shanghai: Consulate General of the United States. http://shanghai.usembassy-
china.org.cn/123112amb.html. (4 October 2016).
66
Ibid.
repeatedly refused to bow to international pressure in reforming its governance and
human right practices. Even decades of sanctions has not dented the North Korean
ruling regimes to resolve the situation, even if it means that their population will
suffer in the process.
The US realized that its negligence of this region has resulted in it giving away
a valuable pot of influence to other emerging powers such as China. More
significantly, China was gaining influence among the Asian states quickly with its
economic prowess and promises of assistance in developing infrastructure and
massive investments. Washington was too engrossed in carrying out its global war on
terror that it overlooked the importance of its main economic hotspot, Asia.
The US Secretary of State Hillary Clintons visit to Naypyidaw in 2011, and
the subsequent state visit by President Obama in 2012 marked to be the turning point
in the history of Myanmar because it was from this point that Washington declared its
willingness to close an eye to the past turbulent records of the military junta and seek
a path of reconciliation for the betterment of Myanmars economy and its people.
Myanmar held the key to a new and vast pool of natural resources, and also sat pretty
at the mouth of the most important and economically lucrative commercial waterway
in the world, the Straits of Malacca. In essence, Myanmar also was the key to the
Indian Ocean for Chinas commercial and naval vessels. To allow China in taking total
control of this would be considered as a strategic suicide for the US. This is because
China will be able to overcome its Malacca Straits Dilemma and monitor all
shipping from its point of operations in Myanmar.
To the question as to why North Korea does not garner the same interest from
US in comparison to Myanmar, the current regimes unwillingness to reform or
negotiate a peaceful end to its aggression appears to be the biggest stumbling block.
Both the US and China would like to see North Korea reforming, but they know that it
will not happen with the current regime. Thus, it is becoming a game of pushing the
responsibility to the other. Another issue that the US is well aware of is that
economically, North Korea does not possess much natural resources, or serving as a
potentially lucrative market to offer for investment. It has been a failed state for too
long and its hermit like presence puts a doubt on what it has to offer for further
growth. Even if there was a miraculous reform by Pyongyang, the cost of rebuilding
North Korea will be enormous and too costly for either the US or China to bear.
Scholars opined that the regimes themselves play an important part in
determining the mind-set of the population. While the Myanmar ruling military
regime came on hard against anti-government and pro-democracy movements prior to
2009, a shift in their way of looking at the future of the state and its then President
Thein Seins decision to move towards reform has definitely reaped the benefits for
now, and in the long run. Myanmars new acceptance of foreign assistance and
investment, and improvements in human rights and democratic reforms are certainly
major contributing factor towards the shift in US Foreign Policy towards being more
accommodating instead of continuing to be antagonistic.
North Koreas ruling regime however is more concerned about its own
regimes survival and fear of being opposed by its own people, has led to a system of
harsh governance and total disregard for human rights. Fear of the regimes harsh
crackdown and punishment of death has resulted in a timid and compliant population.
Externally, North Korea continues to be thorn in the side to its neighbours and
regional states. Its constant threats and display of aggression irks its neighbouring
nations and has drawn worldwide criticisms especially in its open development of
nuclear weapons. North Korea is commonly seen as a very risky investment to any
willing state, what more to a distrusting superpower such as the US.
In conclusion, it is understandable that the US expects Myanmar to be a more
lucrative and beneficial investment in political, economic and military engagements in
comparison to North Korea. Competition for influence in Myanmar between the US
and China is also a major factor for Washington to go all out in Myanmar. This is due
to the potential of gaining new grounds for investment, and to be able to include
Myanmar into the US pool of friendly ASEAN states, thus providing a platform for
regional collaboration through ASEAN in maintaining a presence and balance of
power. As far as North Korea is concerned, there is nothing much to gain from
engaging it at the moment except to keep Pyongyang in check with its military
activities and nuclear weapon development. This however, can be a very daunting
task, and a heavy responsibility. The US in the meantime will continue to shape its
foreign policy towards other states the way it deems best for its own agendas and
benefit, for the purpose of maintaining its influence globally and to remain as a
significant power in the global game of thrones.
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Malaysia.
SUPERVISOR

PROF. DR. K.S. NATHAN

K.S. Nathan is currently a senior researcher at the Institute of Ethnic Studies (KITA)
in the National University of Malaysia (UKM), Bangi, Selangor. He served as
Director of the Institute of Malaysian & International Studies (IKMAS) in UKM from
1st January 2011 until 1st April 2013. Previously, he was Professor of International
Relations at the University of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur. Professor Nathan has several
publications including eleven books (one as author, and ten as editor), and and
numerous articles in local, regional, and international journals. His teaching, research,
and publications are largely in the area of international relations and strategic studies
including civil-military relations in Malaysia, big power relations in the Asia-Pacific
region, U.S. foreign policy, ASEANs relations with major external powers (USA,
China, Japan, India and EU), Malaysian politics and foreign policy, and regional
security. He has also just completed writing a book entitled Tun Abdul Razaks
Foreign Policy, 1970-1976 a work commissioned by the Institute of Diplomacy &
Foreign Relations (IDFR, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia), under the
Diplomatic Profiles Series: Profiles of Malaysias Foreign Ministers. The book
was published in November 2016. Prof. Nathan is currently also a Distinguished
Fellow at the Institute of Diplomacy & Foreign Relations (IDFR), and the Malaysian
Institute of Defence and Security (MIDAS). Email: nathan200846@yahoo.com
 MYANMAR - CHINA MILITARY COOPERATION POST 2010
POLITICAL REFORM

Lt Col Asri bin Shukor was commissioned into the Royal Malay Regiment on 5
August 1993. He has served in various key appointments at unit as well as formation
levels. He holds a Diploma in Strategic and Defence Studies (UM) and Diploma in
Logistic Science Management (UKM).

ABSTRACT

The long-standing bilateral relations between Myanmar-China has its ups and downs.
While many analysts believed that it is a close relationship covering political,
economic and military aspects where both states enjoy mutual benefits, some have
observed that the relations are asymmetric and imbalanced, thus making it a dilemma
for Myanmar. This research was intended to analyse the impact of Myanmars 2010
political reform on the Myanmar-China military cooperation through understanding
whether the shift from military rule to a civilian elected government had any effects on
the level of military cooperation. There are no specific studies previously conducted
on the subject, thus allowing this research to bring into open discussion factors that
influence the level of cooperation. The study confirmed that Myanmar has established
military cooperation with China since 1988, which gave her access to the
procurement of military platforms and weapon systems. The research also found that
the level of military cooperation between Myanmar and China after the 2010 political
reform remained cordial, proven in the incremental procurements of arms. In the same
tone, the democratization and economic liberalization process in 2010 had
subsequently obliged the Western community to remove the sanctions against
Myanmar. This had directly affected the military cooperation as Myanmar started
diversifying its arms suppliers. However, since the process of democratization is still
going on, Myanmars China policy is likely to remain, considering that Tatmadaw still
have an influence on the 2010, and 2015 government. The internal insurgency,
modernisation of Tatmadaw, and external threat perception have all indirectly
influenced the military cooperation. This research contributes to a new perspective on
the Myanmar-China military cooperation and tests the closeness of the bilateral
relations established.

INTRODUCTION
Relations between Myanmar and China are considerably cordial since the
establishment of bilateral relations in 1950. For years since the official establishment
of diplomatic ties, the relationship between Myanmar and China has always been
considered as a close relationship, and yet highly complex in nature. According to
Clapp (2015), the relations are complex in the sense that both states share a lenghty
history of coexistence and interaction due to their linked geography, history, cultures,
ethnicity, and economy, thus causing the relations to have its ups and downs.
Steinburg and Fan (2012) expounded that during the early stages of the bilateral
relationship, Myanmars relation with China was cautious, but it improved later
through numerous high-level visits by both states leader and officials, labelled as the
act of cementing the relationship, or paukphaw (variously translated to mean
brotherhood or relations based on kinship).
Myanmar for the past 65 years has benefited economically and militarily from the
bilateral relations with its giant neighbour China. Myanmars historical trade links
with China, especially their trade at a people-to-people level are mainly concentrated
in the Shan and Kachin states bordering the Yunnan Province. As Clapp (2015)
explained, since the late 1980s, China has been Myanmars major source of military
equipments and training, a major investor in the Myanmar economy, and a major
export market for Myanmars wealth of natural resources. Military cooperation
between Myanmar and China can be traced back to 1988 when the State Law and
Order Restoration Council (SLORC) had looked to China for regime support and
economic cooperation as a result of Deng Xiaopings policies of opening up and
economic reform (Lixin Geng 2006, Haacke 2006). The decision to turn to China for
assistance delivered almost immediate benefits, as two substantial arms deals were
secured with China in 1990 and 1994.
The military cooperation between the two states was further strengthened by a
visit by the Chinese President, Jiang Zemin to Myanmar in December 2001. It was the
first visit by a Chinese President since the military took over the power in Myanmar in
September 1988. The bilateral ties in the following decade were characterised as
mutual dependence as suggested by Haacke (2015) who views this as a result of
diplomatic and economic pressure from Washington which starved Myanmar of
Western investments and deprived the state of valuable export markets since 2003.
Interestingly, it coincided with Chinas go-abroad strategy which encourages the
extension of economic connectivity with its regional neighbours through trade,
investment, and infrastructure development. This situation had subsequently
encouraged Myanmar-China economic ties and included military cooperation which
has further grew and deepened until the present day.

However, the push for democratization and economic liberalisation in 2010 posed
questions over the continued strength of the Myanmar-China military cooperation.
The puzzle of this study lies in recognising the extent of the political and economic
changes in Myanmar post-2010 political reform which have affected the military
cooperation between Myanmar and China. Thus, this research intends to analyse the
impact of Myanmars 2010 political reform on the Myanmar-China military
cooperation by understanding whether the shift from military rule to a civilian
government has had any effects on the level of military cooperation. It is therefore
imperative to study the Myanmar-China military cooperation before and after the 2010
political reform to ascertain any variances or changes. The research will then analyse
the aggravating factors that influence the said cooperation during that period.

MILITARY COOPERATION
One of the most prominent features in the Myanmar-China relationship especially
since 1988 is the closer cooperation between the Tatmadaw (Myanmar Armed Forces)
and the PLA. Overall, there were 23 exchanges of high level military visits and calls
between the two armed forces from 1988 to 2009 and 2010 to 2015. This has helped
to justify that military relations have become increasingly significant (see Table 1 and
2). Understandably, it is an annual military reciprocal activity that is maintained to
further strengthen the military ties between the two armed forces. Although Myanmar
is still in the process of political reform, visits by PLA delegations portray that China
still has influence especially in terms of economy and investment as well as strategic
political and security interests on Myanmar, a fact which should be considered by
Myanmars new government in the future.
Since its independence in 1948 until 1989, Myanmar has attempted to maintain a
public stance of neutrality to avoid being drawn into tensions between the two
competing powers in the region, China, and India. However, as a result of the 1988
military coup, Myanmar has chosen to further strengthen its military cooperation with
China. In 1989, the first military delegation from Myanmar had arrived in Beijing to
purchase military equipment and weapon systems in order to upgrade its military
capability and use them to defeat the minority separatist insurgencies. A deal worth
about US$ 1.4 billion was finalised with China agreeing to supply jet fighters, tanks,
and naval ships, as well as train Myanmars Tatmadaw personnel. The second
procurement materialised in 1994 when Myanmar bought US$ 400 million worth of
arms from China (Poon 2002). General Maung Ayes visit to Beijing in October 1996
had resulted in further military and intelligence cooperation as China had agreed to
train 300 Myanmar Air Force and Naval officers as well as provide additional places
for the Myanmar military in the Chinese Staff Colleges (Poon 2002). The closer
military cooperation between the two states as Poon (2002) reiterated was Chinas
willingness to offer of favourable terms for Myanmars arms purchases by offering
free loans and granting credit to the military regime, as well as economic aid and
investments for the construction of Myanmars basic infrastructure such as dams,
bridges, roads and ports. The overall recorded transfer of major conventional military
platforms and weapon systems from China and other states to Myanmar is shown in
Table 3, 4 and 5 respectively. The involvement of Myanmars military personnel in
various PLA training institutions, including Defence College is shown in Table 6.

Table 1. Exchange of bilateral military calls and high-level visits,

1988 to 2009

Military Call/Visits

To China To Myanmar

18 - 29 October 1989
7 - 8 December 1990
12 - 16 December 1991
7 - 14 September 1994
5 - 12 July 1995
28 April - 3 May 1996
22 - 29 October 1996
16 October 1997
7 - 12 November 1997
9 June 1998

24 - 25 May 2000
25 - 29 April 2001
18 September 2001
21 - 28 July 2004
1 - 5 December 2004
22 October 2006
31 January - 2 February 2007
14 - 18 August 2007

21 August 2008
27 October 2008
29 November 2008
18 March 2009
20 April 2009

Source: Steinberg and Fan (2012)

Table 2. Exchange of bilateral military calls and high-level visits,

2010 to 2015

To China To Myanmar
5 - 9 June 2010
29 August 2010. A port call of
two Chinese destroyers from
the 5th Escort Task Group of
the PLA Navy visited Yangons
Thilawa port
2 - 16 March 2011

12 - 15 May 2011

27 November -
2 December 2011

Source: Steinberg and Fan (2012).

 Table 3. Transfer of major conventional weapons from China to Myanmar,
2000 to 2010

Recipien No Weapon Weapon Year Years of No

t/ Order Designati Descript of Deliveri Deliver
Supplier ed on ion Order es ed/Prod
(S) or / uced
Licenser
(L) Licenc
e
L: China 2 Anawrath Corvette (1997) 2001 2
a 2003
S: China 5 EFR-1 Fire (1991) 2002 5
control 2003
radar
5 Type- 37mm (1991) 1998 5
76A Naval 2002
gun
3 Type-344 Fire (1996) 2004 3
control 2005
radar
8 AK-230 Naval 2001 2004 8
30mm gun 2007
30 C- Anti-ship (2001) 2004 30
801/CSS- missile 2005
N-4
25 Type- Tank (2002) 2004 25
59D

2 BT-6 Trainer (2005) 2006 2

aircraft

6 SH-1 155mm (2008) 2009 6

Self-
propelled
gun

5 TH-5711 Air 2008 2010 5

Smart search
Hunter radar
 Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (2016)

Table 4. Transfer of major conventional weapons from China to Myanmar,

2010 to 2014

Recipien No Weapon Weapon Year Years of No

t/ Order Designati Descripti of Deliveri Delivere
Supplier ed on on Order es d/
(S) or /
Licenser Produce
(L) Licen d
ce

L: China 1 Aung Frigate 2006 2011 1

Zeya

1 FAC-491 FAC (2009) 2012 1

Type
2 Aung Frigate (2010) - -
Zeya

S: China 10 C- Anti-ship (2009) 2012 10

802/CSS- missile
N-8 (10)
50 K-8 Trainer/ 2009 2011 50
Karakoru 2013
m-8 combat
aircraft

50 Type-90- Tank 2009 2012 50

2/MBT- 2013
2000

100 WMA- AFSV (2010) 2012 75

301 2014
Assaulter

10 ZFB-05 APC (2010) 2011 10

 25 HY-2/SY- Anti-ship (2011) 2012 25
1A/CSS- missile
N-2

2 Type- Frigate 2011 2012 2

53/Jiangh
u-1

76 WZ-551/ IFV (2011) 2012 76

2013
Type-92

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (2016).

According to Storer (2007), while exact figures for Myanmar are inconsistent and
unreliable, it has been reported that it possesses significant military hardware assets
ranging from radio equipment, missiles to aircraft and naval ships, all which came
from China. Beyond military equipment, China has contributed largely to the
development of Myanmars infrastructure through the rebuilding and upgrading of rail
and roadway systems from Yunnan in South China to several ports along the Myanmar
coast. As Kuppuswamy (2011) describes, The strategic location of Myanmar as an
entry point to the Indian Ocean and the ostracization of this nation by the West since
the military takeover in 1988 has been taken full advantage of by China to make it
virtually a China satellite in the Indian Ocean.
Their military to military network and overall defence relations between
Myanmar and China over the past few years has appeared neither to be very extensive
nor very deep (Haacke 2012). It is because there were no regular jointly undertaken
military exercises of note - the last port call in Myanmar by two Chinese navy vessels
to include a naval exercise was in May 2014 by ships that were also making goodwill
visits to India and Vietnam. However, various exchanges of military high level visits
and calls are still maintained, as well as some multilateral settings such as the ARF
Conference on Security Policy. It is noted that China has remained to be a destination
for military education and training for Myanmar. Over the years, China has become a
major weapons supplier to Myanmar, including transfers of modern frigates, main
battle tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery pieces, trainer and combat aircraft,
and anti-ship missiles. Some items were acquired only fairly recently, such as the 053
H1 Jianghu frigates. It was reported in November 2013 that Myanmar had purchased
HQ-12 medium range air-defence missiles from China (Haacke 2015). Interestingly,
Beijing has remained a source of the Tatmadaws acquisition of military platforms and
 weapon systems, even when the overall political-military relationship has weakened
as a result of Myanmars 2010 political reform.
Although Myanmar often purchases military equipment from a variety of sources,
Clapp (2015) suggested that Beijing has remained the single largest prime source of
equipment and training for Myanmars Tatmadaw, especially when the Western states
imposed sanctions on Myanmars military government in response to the harsh
military repressions of 1988 and the regimes failure to follow through on the results
of their 1990 General Elections. To minimize Myanmars military dependence on
China, in August 2001 Naypyitaw decided to purchase 12 MIG-29 fighters from
Russia, and sent 300 military personnel to Moscow for training and acquiring rocket
technology (Poon 2002). Undoubtedly, Myanmar has gained from its military
cooperation with China, and its motivation for the interaction can be explained by the
gains in the forms of financial and developmental support. Chinas offering of
financial and military aid allows for its increased involvement in Myanmars economy
and development which in turn allows indirect Chinese expansion.

Table 5. Transfer of major conventional weapons by other states to Myanmar,

2010 to 2014

Recipient/ No Weapon Weapon Year of Years of No

Ordere Designation Description Order/ Deliveries Delivered/
Supplier d
(S) or Licence Produced
Licenser
(L)
20 G-120TP Trainer (2014) 2015 (20)
aircraft
3 HMS-X ASW sonar 2013 2015 (3)

3 LW-04 Air search 2013

radar
1 Compact Naval gun (2006) 2011 1
76mm
(120) EE-9 Armoured (2007) 2008-2010 (120)
Cascavel car
6 Super Dvora Patrol craft (2015)
Pakistan (16) JF-17 FGA aircraft (2015)
Thunder/FC-
1
(2000) Igla-S-125 Portable (2000) 2004-2014 (2000)
SAM
 1 Pechora- SAM system (2008) 2012 (1)
2M1/SA-16
(50) V-600/SA-3B SAM (2008) 2012 (50)
(10) Mi-24P/Mi- Combat 2009 2010-2015 (10)
35P helicopter
(14) MiG-29 Fighter 2009 2011-2014 (14)
aircraft
(6) MiG-29S FGA aircraft 2009 2011-2012 (6)
12 Mi-2 Light (2010) 2012-2013 (12)
helicopter
(80) R-27/AA-10 BVRAAM (2010) 2011-2012 (80)
(150) R-73/AA-11 SRAAM (2010) 2011-2012 (150)
16 RD-33 Turbofan (2015) - -
Ukraine (50) AI-25 Turbofan 2009 2011-2015 (18)

Source: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database (2016)

Table 6. Involvement of Tatmadaw personnel in PLAs training institutions,

1990 to 2005
Year PLA Training Institution
Army Navy Air Force

1990 - 1999 389 98 455

1990 - 2005 665 officers and 249 other ranks for 163 different courses
2006 - 2010 No data available
Source: Myoe (2011)

MYANMARS POLITICAL REFORM

Democratization
Myanmars constitutional democratic government soon began after achieving their
independence in 1948 under its first president, U Nu, but it had only lasted for 14
years. The first military coup detat in 1962 by Ne Win marked the end of
constitutional democracy in Myanmar. According to Dewi (2015), U Nus policy such
as declaring Buddhism as the states official religion was found to be irrelevant, and
there were demonstrations from minority ethnic groups against the government in this
issue. The failure of the democratic government to unite the people and eradicate
poverty further led to the prolonging of the resistance. Since then, a succession of
military and quasi-military governments have steadily and inexorably brought almost
all of Myanmars political, social, and economic life under strict military control
(Clapp 2007).
The process of reform has been underway in Myanmar since November 2010.
However, its initial processes had emerged as early as in 2003. The military regime
which rejected the outcome of the May 1990 elections had initiated a process of
constitutional development which it claims will lead to re-development and
democratic order. In 2003, the regime outlined a Roadmap to Democracy involving
seven stages. This process however involved hardly any input from the opposition
party or any other ethnic groups and was completely dominated by the military
regime. The militarys predominant position was institutionalized in a political system
that balances military hard-liners and soft-liners from the former SPDC in a new
electoral authoritarian setting (Bunte 2011). After a new constitution was drafted, a
referendum was held in 2008, and two other General Elections took place in 2010 and
2015.
Thein Sein, a former military general and a member of the SPDC military
government had introduced some major political, regulation of currency practices, and
administrative reforms soon after being elected as President following his victory in
the 2010 General Elections. The reforms, according to Bunte and Portela (2012), had
changed Myanmar dramatically, where over 700 political prisoners were released in
October 2011 and January 2012, the states strict media regulations were relaxed, and
the government relaxed on their internal censorship laws and unblocked the websites
of exiled radio and TV stations, as well as establishing the independent National
Human Rights Commission, passing a new legislation that allows for labour unions,
and allowed the right to strike. He also signed several peace agreements with ethnic
minorities and increased their budget of spending for health and education. The
consequence, as reiterated by Bunte and Portela, was a much freer press, who now
also covers the activities of the main opposition party. Moreover, President Thein Sein
had also initiated a political dialogue with both political opposition and ethnic groups,
consequently resulting in the main opposition party (NLD) which had boycotted the
2010 General Elections to re-register as a political party in order to contest in the by-
elections on 1 April 2012. The by-elections, which were won by the NLD, were
regarded as a free and fair by many international observers. As a result, the opposition
movement in Myanmar had strengthened. The president also had signed peace
agreements with most of the ethnic groups that have fought against the central
government for decades.
Economic Liberalization
Myanmar had initiated a series of gradual changes in its economy since 2011 which
were aimed to achieve a comprehensive economic development and reintegration into
the global economy following five decades of international isolation and economic
stagnation. The economic liberalization constituted the second stage of the 2010
political reform, whereas the first stage was composed of the democratization process
which was aimed to build up national reconciliation and inclusiveness. The major
policy reforms included the liberalization of its exchange rate, fiscal reforms, changes
in trade policies including non-tariff barriers and customs procedures, the removal of
state monopoly in international trade, reduction or exemption in certain taxes for
exports, and changes in investment policies (Daw 2014).
Myanmars economic liberalization had both positive and negative impacts on its
economic and military cooperation with China. According to Shiang (2013), their
economic relations had reached its height in 2010, with China overtaking Thailand as
the largest investor in Myanmar mainly through the power, natural resources, and oil
and gas sectors. But even when the new quasi-military government took over from
SPDC in 2011, investments from China kept pouring in. The economic recovery was
helped by international assistance and this had improved the economic, social and
cultural situation in Myanmar. Eventually, the lift-up of arms embargo and economic
sanction allowed the Naypyitaw to import arms, spares, ammunitions, technologies
and training from the US and other states.

Myanmars Domestic Security Affairs

Domestic security affairs, especially the rebellion by Myanmars armed ethnic
organisations have always been an important factor that affected the economic and
military relations of Myanmar and China. In 1989, the UWSA, MNDAA, NDA-K and
ESSA, which were separated from the BCP, signed peace agreements with the military
government but still remained independent and maintained their own army and
territory (Bi 2014). The KIA was still fighting the government, while the KDA and the
PSLA had accepted the governments re-composition schedule. Economic and social
interactions of armed ethnic groups in Northern Myanmar with the neighbouring area
of Yunnan cannot be forbid completely because of their historical origin and ethnic
relationship with the Chinese relative minorities (Bi 2014). In order to maintain
security and stability along the border areas, both Myanmar and China repeatedly
negotiated on the issue as it involves mutual economic relations.
Throughout the first 40 years of independence, the Tatmadaw was continually
engaged in Counter Insurgency Operations (CIO) against ethnic insurgencies. The
Tatmadaws force capabilities remained unchanged, with very little upgrading.
However, after the SLORC government came to power in September 1988, there has
been significant expansion in force size, structure as well as substantial modernization
through acquisitions of more modern weapons. As discussed earlier, arms
procurement during the said period was mostly supplied by China to combat the
insurgencies. It is noted that the Tatmadaws expansionary trend and force
modernization efforts have continued under the SPDC even as Myanmar prepared
itself for a constitutional government in 2010. Thus, Myanmars domestic security
issues, particularly the fights against armed ethnic insurgencies have influenced the
level of military cooperation between Myanmar and China.

Myanmar - China Economic Interdependence

Closer economic ties with China plays an important role in Myanmars foreign policy
plans. China is not only the biggest trading partner, but also the biggest investor,
engineering contractor, creditor and donor to Myanmar. Economic cooperation
between Myanmar and China had improved dramatically during the post-1988 period.
Bilateral trade has been beneficial for both countries and has escalated rapidly since
the 1990s (Gansen 2011). Chinas businesses are heavily involved in Myanmars
industrial, infrastructure and energy development through economic cooperation. By
the late 2002, Chinese companies had officially launched more than 800 projects with
a total value of US$ 2.1 billion (Gansen, 2011) and was focused on three main fields,
namely infrastructure development, provision to State-Owned Economic Enterprises
(SEEs), and energy exploitation. Chinese companies had built six hydropower plants,
and one thermal power station during the period between 1996 and 2005. The
Ayeyawaddy River Transportation Project which links Yunnan to Thilawa Port in
Yangon, which is the most significant economic cooperation with China in terms of
infrastructure development.
On the other hand, border trades have occupied a very significant place in the
bilateral trade between Myanmar and China for decades. Currently, Myanmar has
officially opened four border trade gates to China; Muse, Lweje, Chinshwehaw, and
Kambalti. According to Bi (2014), the volume of border trade grows year by year,
with the US$ 1.5 billion in the fiscal year 2010-2011 increasing to US$ 2.98 billion in
2011-2012 and US$ 2.9 billion in 2012-2013. Economic interdependence between
Myanmar and China reflects the close economic relationship between the two states
and further cooperation in military and security aspects. The close economic relations
have given Myanmar the chance to enhance its military cooperation with China before
and after the 2010 political reform.

Major Powers Influence in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) and South East Asia
(SEA)
China and India are competing for Myanmars favour to strengthen their strategic
interests in the northeast areas of Indian Ocean. China wishes to protect its southern
flank from possible future Indian threats and requires access to the sea for the
transportation of goods from its land-locked southern provinces. At the same time,
India is looking for an inland transportation route for the land-locked states of its
northeastern region by using the Kaladan river that flows from Myanmar into
Mizoram, and further southwards into the Bay of Bengal (Shivananda 2007). Besides
that, India also fears the encirclement by China due to its influence in Myanmar and
Pakistan. This strategic competition also worries the ASEAN members who are
concerned that a weak and vulnerable country like Myanmar will fall into Beijings
orbit and become a Chinese pawn in the region (Shivananda 2007). Chinas strategic
behaviour is guided by its national interests and defined in terms of survival, security,
power and relative capacities. China perceives India as an inferior power who is
desirous of dominating the South Asia, South East Asia and Indian Ocean regions.
Hence, India is perceived as a potential challenger to Chinas pre-dominant position in
Asia, particularly if it aligns itself with the US (Shivananda 2007).
Myanmars current external security environment is increasingly shaped by the
dynamics related to the balance of power, interests, and intentions between China and
the US (Haacke 2015). It appears that Beijing believes that Washington is seeking to
contain Chinas rise while exploiting the differences between China and other regional
states in their effort. In Washington, more and more voices speak of Chinas rise as a
regional military and global economic power, especially its rapid military
modernisation and assertive behaviour towards regional neighbours (Haacke 2015).
While the US and China in their public diplomacy remain committed to a constructive
relationship with one another, the current pattern of relations, including potentially
dangerous incidents at sea and the unrelenting defence build-up by both sides suggest
that Beijing and Washington are increasingly caught up not just in a competitive logic,
but also in a security dilemma and, arguably, in an evolving arms race.

CONCLUSION
The arms procurement aspect is one of the most important component special to the
overall Myanmar-China military cooperation. Arms supply is vital for Myanmar to
continuously modernise its Tatmadaw to face any external and internal threat
perceptions. As Myoe (2011) expounded, the transformation and modernisation of the
Tatmadaw was essential as it was long overdue. Myanmars national objective as
declared by the SPDC is to create a modern, peaceful and prosperous nation in which
135 national races live in harmony (Myoe 2011). So, Myanmar required the
Tatmadaw to be strong, highly capable and modern as shown since the states
independence where the Tatmadaw has been involved in restoring and maintaining
internal security and suppressing insurgency.
 The research found supporting findings that the heightened military cooperation is
not solely caused by the economic sanctions and arms embargo imposed on Myanmar
since 1988 People Uprising incident, but also the cordial political and economic
relationship between Myanmar and China. Military cooperation between Myanmar
and China still stands with strength although political and economic changes have
taken place in Myanmar. The exchange of annual high-level military officials visits
and bilateral military calls are still going on, proving the cordial relations. It is also
during Myanmars political reform that China had supplied a huge number of weapons
and military platforms for the Tatmadaws capability expansion. At the same time,
Myanmars economic liberalization had enabled other states to lift-up their imposed
arms embargo, thus providing options to Myanmar to diversify its arms supply.
Myanmar had immediately secured huge arms deals from Germany, India, Israel,
Pakistan and Russia.
The Myanmar government does not seem to have much fear for its giant
neighbour as it did in the past, such as during Chinas support of the BCP. This might
be caused by the increase in awareness of its bargaining power against China.
Although Myanmar is dependent on income through foreign trade and investment, it
has managed to establish good relations with its neighbours while keeping its own rule
and control. In fact, there is a lot at stake for China when it comes to maintaining good
ties with Myanmar. If one day the Myanmar government decides to close its border
with China, the latter would lose its gateway to the Bay of Bengal as well as to the
Andaman Sea.
The full impact of Myanmars political reform is yet to be seen. The recent
General Elections held on 8 November 2015 offered huge opportunities for the
required changes in Myanmar. The nation does acknowledge that the road to full
democracy is still bumpy and difficult. Nonetheless, the Tatmadaws grip on
Myanmars politics should not be discounted, as the 2008 Constitution has ensured its
continuing power in the country. Decades of conflict and decline will take many years
to reverse, and even in the best-case scenario, massive efforts to address many issues
are still needed before a complete transition can take place. In view of that, the
research estimates that Myanmars China policy is likely to remain considering that
the Tatmadaw still has influence on the 2010 and 2015 government.

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SUPERVISOR

Associate Prof. Dr Faisal S. Hazis is a Senior Fellow at the Institute of Malaysian

and International Studies (IKMAS), National University of Malaysia. He is also the
Head of Centre for Asian Studies at the Institute. His research interests include
electoral politics, democratisation and rural informatics. Faisal has published quite
extensively. Among his selected publications are 'Competitive Elections and
Regime Stability in Malaysia' (2016), Patronage, Power and Prowess: Barisan
Nasionals Equilibrium Dominance in East Malaysia (2015), Malaysia in 2014: A
Year of Political and Social Ferment (2015), Politics and Local Government in
Sarawak (2013) and Domination and Contestation: Muslim Bumiputera Politics in
Sarawak (2012). He is a life member of ALIRAN, a reform movement dedicated to
justice, freedom and solidarity. Apart from that, Faisal is also a life member of the
Malaysian Social Science Association.
 AN ANALYSIS OF MALAYSIAS MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY IN
SAFEGUARDING ITS NATIONAL INTERESTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Lt Col Azman bin Jantan RMAF was commissioned as a General Duty Officer
(Pilot) on 22 August 1991. He has served in key appointments at various RMAF
tactical fighter squadrons and air bases. He holds a Post Graduate Diploma in Arts
(Defence and Strategic Studies) from Massey University, New Zealand.

ABSTRACT

This qualitative study analyses Malaysias maritime security strategy in securing its
maritime zones based on its national interests. Malaysia professes itself to be a
maritime nation and holds the maritime domain as its primary interest, but Malaysia
is yet to have a comprehensive conception of maritime security strategy to secure its
maritime interests. This study was driven by two objectives: 1) to explain the factors
influencing the perception of Malaysias maritime security strategy, 2) to examine the
capability gaps in securing Malaysias maritime domain. It is hypothesized that the
lack of general interest in maritime affairs and maritime strategic culture had reduced
Malaysias focus on its maritime security. This has resulted in the existence of the
capability gaps and disjointed strategy within the Malaysian maritime strategy.
Interviews with authority figures in the maritime security sector were conducted to
elicit information on the planning and conduct of maritime security in Malaysia.
Malaysian policies and legislations relevant to maritime security were analysed to
determine the governments direction and stance. The establishment of MMEA as the
leading agency for maritime enforcement in Malaysia was intended to be a panacea,
but there were still fierce competitions amongst the diverse maritime security agencies
of Malaysia. While there is a clear delineation between defence and law enforcement,
the maritime security is a combination of both, thus requiring a clear conception of an

97
integrated maritime security response. The following capability gaps were identified:
1) lack of an integrated maritime surveillance and monitoring system, 2) insufficient
assets to provide maritime security coverage and response. However, it is
questionable whether the conception of an integrated response would be workable
given the lack of political will and strategic culture within the context of maritime
governance. In order to optimize the scarce resources available for the development
and operation of Malaysias maritime security agencies, it is recommended that a
comprehensive conception of integrated maritime policy be promulgated with
consideration for employment of technologies such as airborne platforms and
networked operations as a part of the maritime surveillance solution. It is also
necessary to inculcate the maritime strategic culture in Malaysian citizens to increase
the buy-in for future maritime security development.

INTRODUCTION
Malaysia is a sovereign state in Southeast Asia (SEA) that straddles the geopolitically
important Straits of Malacca (SoM), South China Sea (SCS) and the Sulu Sea. It is
constituted by two landmasses that are separated more than 700 km apart by the SCS;
Peninsular Malaysia, with the southernmost landmass just off the Asian continent, and
in the west with a larger territorial landmass of Sabah and Sarawak to the east in
Borneo Island. Consequently, all the states in Malaysia are coastal states by nature,
except the Federal Territories of Kuala Lumpur and Putrajaya. Malaysia also has
longer maritime borders in comparison to its land borders, 67 whereby it shares
maritime boundaries with all the ASEAN littoral states, except for Myanmar and
Cambodia.
Compared to its landmass area of 328,657 km2, Malaysia has 449,477 km2 of
Economic Exclusive Zone (EEZ), which can be considered as a reservoir of various
economic potentials and resources.68 The SCS is the lifeline for transfer of goods by
sea between Peninsular and East Malaysia. Maritime transportation is involved with
98.4% of Malaysias total freight volume in 2014. 69 Its vibrant port economy
processed approximately 23 million twenty-foot equivalent unit (TEU) in 2014, which
ranked Malaysia in the top four container port throughout for developing/transition
economies.70 The SoM and SCS are utilized as the passage for almost 50% of global
seaborne trades and goods, and serves as the primary nexus between East and South
Asia. Malaysias maritime domain is estimated to hold proven oil reserves of 4 billion

67
Malaysia has 4675 km long coastlines against 2669 km of land borders. Central
Intelligence Agency, 2016, The World Factbook (online).
68
Pauly, D. & Zeller, D. (eds.), 2015, Sea Around Us: Concepts, Design and Data
(online).
69
Malaysia Productivity Corporation, 2016, Reducing Unnecessary Regulatory
Burden on Business: Logistics, p. 24.
70
UNCTAD, 2015, Review of Maritime Transport, pp. 67-69.

98
barrels and 83 trillion cubic feet natural gas reserves, 71 which contributed 16.7% of
Malaysias GDP in 2014,72 and this is projected to have provided more than 50,000 job
opportunities in Malaysia by 2020.73 Additionally, around 2 million tons of fisheries
were harvested from Malaysias maritime domain annually that contributed to about
1.5% of the 2010 Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 74 The scenic seascape within
Malaysias maritime domain is also a part of the attraction that sells Malaysia as a
tourist destination, which is an industry that netted RM 61 billion, or 5.7% of the GDP
in 2014.75 The aforementioned facts serves as supporting findings that by places
Malaysia to be undeniably seen as a maritime nation.76
As a maritime nation, the maritime domain surrounding Malaysia is important
for the countrys survival. Malaysias territorial integrity is constituted primarily by its
maritime domain. Its maritime domain is also a treasure trove of living and non-living
resources, as well as an important aspect for Malaysias economic growth and its
potential. Thus, the preceding fact posited that the sovereignty and security of its
maritime domain are existential issues for Malaysia. This creates the impetus for
Malaysia to secure its maritime zones in accordance with Mahanian dynamics
between the generation of wealth by maritime activities and mechanism to secure sea
commerce. Malaysia articulated this importance in the Dasar Pertahanan Negara
2010 (DPN 2010) that illustrated Malaysias area of interests which included not just
the landmass and territorial waters, but also the offshore economic interests and
strategic waterways (SoM and SCS). The policy document also articulated the
primacy of achieving superiority in maritime operations from joint operational effects
of Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) and Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF). From
another perspective, the promulgation of Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency
(MMEA) also is seen as a movement towards safeguarding littoral maritime zones that
enables the RMN to focus on core business of defence.
Malaysia acknowledges its position as a maritime nation and sees the need for
securing its maritime interests. Despite the contemporary progress in their capabilities
and developments for the three mentioned services of RMN, RMAF, and MMEA, as
exemplified by the acquisition of capital assets, there seems to be a lackadaisical
attitude among Malaysians toward the security of its maritime zones. Maritime
security awareness mainly resides among the practitioners. The general population are
lulled by a sense of security stemming from the promises and statements of maritime
71
US Department of Energy, 2014, International Energy Statistics (online).
72
Prime Minister Office Malaysia, 2015, Economic Transformation Program Annual
Report, p. 11.
73
Ibid, p. 61.
74
FAO, 2015, Global Production Statistics 1950-2013 (online).
75
WTTC, 2015, Travel & Tourism Economic Impact, p. 1.
76
Although the exact categorization of maritime nation is problematic,
Malaysian Institute of Maritime (MIMA) deems that Malaysias strategic
geolocation, higher maritime to landmass area, active economic activities using
maritime zone as well as maritime facilities available denote the attributes that
qualify Malaysia as a maritime nation. MIMA, 2016, Centre for Maritime Economic
Industry FAQ (online).

99
security developments. Open sources indicated an increase in assets and agencies for
maritime security in Malaysia, but the effectiveness of such assets and agencies are
not transparent. Maritime security assets that can operate outside of the territorial
waters are limited and among those limited assets, there are further limitations of the
equipment. This is within the context of its interoperability, and supportability that
severely restricted the capabilities of the operations. There is a different shade
altogether in the operational capabilities, which affects the desired outcomes needed to
address Malaysias intent on securing its maritime zones. This is arguably seen as a
failure in safeguarding Malaysias national interests. The common underlying
explanation is that the national economy does not allow for increased provision.
However, considering the importance of maritime security and the impact of securing
it, the attention given to this issue is questioned. The recent incident of discrepancies
in statements by differing Malaysian agencies on the foreign fishing flotilla and naval
encroachments had also reflected the capability gap that must be critically addressed.77
This leads to the problem in question. Despite Malaysia recognizing the
importance of its maritime domain, Malaysia still does not have a comprehensive
conception of maritime security strategy in securing its maritime interests.
Malaysia is seemingly focused on building maritime capabilities via various agencies
to protect its economic interest and sovereignty, but it is argued that Malaysia lacks
the drive to implement an overarching policy for the said maritime zones. There seems
to be acknowledgement for the need of safeguarding Malaysias maritime interests but
the acceptance of the need is not seen and the distribution of responsibilities is
apparently not concerted. There are possibly additional factors at play that may allude
to the attitude of Malaysians in general towards half-measures in securing the national
interests.
This study provides an insight into the state of affairs for contemporary
maritime security strategy of Malaysia through the analysis of its national interests,
threats, policies, and response mechanisms which are related to Malaysias maritime
domain. It will also explain the factors influencing the perception of maritime security
strategy in safeguarding Malaysias national interests and examining the maritime
security capability gaps in securing Malaysias maritime domain to safeguard their
national interests. Economic viability does affect the provision of national security
capabilities, but it is argued that there is a lack of general interest domestically
towards ensuring Malaysias capability to secure its maritime zones. It is also argued
that Malaysia needs to realign its maritime capabilities to benefit its need to safeguard
national interests. They would also be needed to introduce policies that enhance
security within its maritime zones. This is in light of the various threats that has come
forth recently. Based on the arguments put forth, it is hypothesised that the lack of
maritime strategic culture in Malaysia had caused the reduced focus on maritime
security strategy, which in turn causes the capability gaps to exist and subsequently
77
Syed Azahedi Syed Abdul Aziz, 2016, Heat rises over maritime dispute, New
Straits Times Online, 28 March.

100
causing disjointed operations in maritime security. Thus, this led to the introduction of
negative effects on Malaysias maritime security strategy especially in safeguarding its
national interests.
MARITIME DOMAIN IMPLICATIONS FOR MALAYSIA
It is posited through this study, that the maritime domain is an existential importance
for Malaysia as evidenced and emphasised in the preceding introduction. The natural
coastal of Malaysian states, the geographical separation between Peninsular and East
Malaysia, reliance on maritime transportation, as well as the economic activities
within its maritime zones has required Malaysia to possess credible maritime-related
capabilities and capacities. Furthermore, Malaysia has a legacy being a maritime
nation since the days of Malacca Sultanate, and has arguably remained to be as such
until pre-independence days of British Administrations.78 Although this bond as a
seafaring nation was loosened by the colonization legacy in Peninsular and East
Malaysia,79 the interests in the maritime domain are inevitable as it is a part of the
whole for Malaysia.
However, Malaysias geostrategic location at the heart of maritime SEA is both
a boon and a bane simultaneously. Malaysia has maritime boundaries with all of the
ASEAN littoral states, which in some cases are facing disputes and yet to be
adjudicated (see Table 1). As stated within DPN 2010, Malaysia does not perceive the
traditional state-on-state threats, but the possibility still exists not just from the
maritime boundary disputes but also from interactions of major powers within the
SCS. The porosity of its maritime boundaries also presented threats from non-
traditional sources due to the wide expanse of the border that can be penetrated and
exploited for cross-border illegal activities such as smuggling, piracy, and sea-robbery.
Furthermore, there exist certain possibilities of violent extremist groups to export
violence and criminal activities into Malaysia through the hijacking of ships,
kidnapping for ransoms, and even creation of a 9/11-like maritime incident.
This convergence of interests and threats clearly stated the need for Malaysia
to secure its maritime domain. There has always been outrage or criticism by the
public whenever a maritime security incident occurs, such as a ship being hijacked
and ransomed or encroachment related to Malaysias maritime zones by foreign
vessels or criminal elements. Incidents at sea such as the hijacking and robbery of MV
Orkim Harmony and MV Orkim Victory in June 2015 are evidence of clear and
present danger from said threats.80 Additionally, the Lahad Datu incident in 2013,

78
Kennedy, 1993, History of Malaya 3rd edition, pp. 1-19, Kuala Lumpur: S. Abdul
Majeed; Andaya & Andaya, 2001, A History of Malaysia 2nd edition, Hampshire:
Palgrave, pp. 44-47.
79
Hanizah Idris & Ruhanas Harun, 2004, Malaysia as a Maritime Situation:
Prospects and Challenges, JATI Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 9(1): 19-30.
80
Cheng, 2015, Najib anxious over disappearance of oil tanker, The Star (online),
14 June.

101
point towards the porosity and ease of movement along Malaysias maritime borders.81
Despite a large amount of resources made available for maritime security, such
incidents are potentially recurring, thus seeming as if nothing is being done about it.
This is the problem at hand that this study had focused on in order to establish an
understanding of what could be done better for Malaysias maritime security.
Table 1: Malaysian Maritime Territorial Disputes82

Claimant Parties Disputed Area Disputed Area

Malaysia-Indonesia Sipadan-Ligitan Ruled by ICJ in 2002 as sovereignty of Malaysia.
Malaysia-Singapore Batu Puteh- Ruled by ICJ in 2008.
Middle Rocks-
Batu Puteh sovereignty of Singapore
South Ledge
Middle Rocks and South Ledge sovereignty of Malaysia.
Malaysia-Brunei Lawas-Limbang- Letter of Exchange signed in 2009 between Malaysia and
Terusan-Rangau- Brunei reaffirming the delimitation and delineation of
Louisa reef boundaries.
Malaysia-China Spratlys Malaysia claims eleven features but effectively controls only
overlapping eight of it.
claim
China claims all of those features through promulgation of
its nine-dashed lines and routinely conducts coast guard
presence and fisheries activities up to Luconia Shoals.
Malaysia-Vietnam Spratlys Malaysia claims the Vietnam-occupied Amboyna Cay and
overlapping Barque Canada Reef (Terumbu Perahu).
claim
Vietnam claims all features occupied by Malaysia.

Joint submission of overlapping area in 2009. Status quo.

Malaysia-Philippines Spratlys Malaysia claims the Philippines occupied Commodore Reef
overlapping (Terumbu Laksamana)
claim
Philippines claims all features occupied by Malaysia up to
Swallows Reef (Terumbu Layang-Layang). Status quo.

Sabah claim Philippines claim on Sabah dates back to the formation of

Malaysia. Considered to be resolved based on ICJ rejection
of Philippines intervention of Sipadan-Ligitan submission to

81
Anon, 2013, Malaysia stand-off with Philippines group, BBC News (online), 15
February.
82
Asri Salleh, Che Hamdan Che Mohd Razali & Kamaruzaman Jusoff, 2009,
Malaysias Policy towards its 1963 - 2008 Territorial Disputes, Journal of Law and
Conflict Resolution, 1(5): 107-116.

102
 ICJ in 2001.83

Source: Authors adaptation from Asri Salleh, Che Hamdan Che Mohd Razali &
Kamaruzaman Jusoff, 2009, Malaysias Policy towards its 1963 - 2008
Territorial Disputes, Journal of Law and Conflict Resolution, 1(5): 107-116;
and Kadir Mohamad, 2009, Malaysia's Territorial Disputes Two Cases at
the ICJ, Kuala Lumpur: IDFR, pp.44-50.

CONTEMPORARY MARITIME SECURITY STRATEGY FOR MALAYSIA

Malaysias current maritime security strategy is organised through legislations that
created various entities and agencies responsible for enforcing those legislations.84 The
leadership of Malaysia understands the interdependency between national security and
socio-economic development as evidenced by the statement within the Fourth
Malaysia Plan that said,
The interdependence of socio-economic development and national security
cannot be over-emphasised. Without security, socio-economic progress will be
affected. Likewise, the maintenance and expansion of security capability will
become difficult without socio-economic progress. To withstand external
and internal threats, the nation must not only create a just society but also
strengthen its security forces to meet any potential dangers to the country.85
This exemplifies the approach that the Malaysian government envisaged for
national development since the early days of Malaysia. 86 However, despite the
acknowledgement and emphasis on security development, within the context of
maritime security, Malaysia does not have an overarching maritime policy at the
highest level to coordinate the responses for the diverse interests and threats within
Malaysias maritime zones. Although Malaysia has some semblance of maritime
security strategy through the myriad of maritime-related policies, legislations, and the
organisations that exist, the lack of an overarching maritime policy has arguably led to
a fragmented mechanism for maritime security as individual agencies are working
towards an interpretation of maritime security based on their individual interests and
agendas. While there is a clear demarcation of authority between the maritime defence
and enforcement, it must be acknowledged that security is constituted by defence and
enforcement simultaneously. Defence would hinder the transgressors while

83
Kadir Mohamad, 2009, Malaysia's Territorial Disputes Two Cases at the ICJ,
Kuala Lumpur: IDFR, pp.44-50.
84
See Table 2 for example of maritime-related agencies in Malaysia. Appendix 1
provides a compilation of the myriad of Malaysias maritime-related legislations
and enactments.
85
Malaysia, 1981, Fourth Malaysia Plan, Kuala Lumpur: National Printing, p. 11-12.
86
Interview with Vice Admiral Tan Sri Thanabalasingam RMN (Retired) provided
anecdotal evidence that Tunku Abdul Rahman and Tun Razak were very much
aware of this interdependence between security and development.

103
enforcement ensures compliance and governance, thus defence and enforcement are
two facets of the same need, which is security. However, as there are overlapping
jurisdiction and areas of responsibilities, there is a need to synchronize the efforts and
effects needed for maritime security within Malaysias maritime zones.

Table 2: Malaysian Agencies in the Maritime Domain

Ser Agency/Department Establishing Act Jurisdictional Powers

1. Royal Malaysian Federal Constitution; Constitutional jurisdiction rendered onto Armed

Navy Forces Council. Enforcement powers stated in
Armed Forces Act
Fisheries Act and seconded powers in related
1972 (Act 77)
acts.
2. Royal Malaysian Air Federal Constitution; Constitutional jurisdiction rendered onto Armed
Force Forces Council. No enforcement powers
Armed Forces Act
provided.
1972 (Act 77)
3. Royal Malaysian Federal Constitution; Established through jurisdiction of policing and
Marine Police general law enforcement up to Malaysian
Police Act 1967 (Act
territorial waters (Sect 3(3)).
344)
4. Royal Customs Customs Act 1967 Powers to enforce regulations within Act 235
Department (Act 235) including law enforcement at sea
5. Immigration Immigration Act Powers to enforce regulations within Act 155
Department 1959/63 (Act 155) including law enforcement at sea
6. Marine Department Maritime Shipping Empowered to formulate policies, coordinate
Ordinance 1952 and enforce matters regarding the commercial
use of maritime domain including ports
development, shipping industry, maritime
transport safety and security, licensing and
seafarer affairs.
7. Marine Parks National Parks Act Powers to enforce stipulated regulations within
Department 1980 (Act 226) Act 226 and Act 317, which includes law
enforcement at sea
Fisheries Act 1985

104
 (Act 317)
8. Malaysian Maritime Malaysian Maritime Powers to enforce any Acts related to maritime
Enforcement Agency Enforcement Agency domain. Integration of jurisdiction for maritime
Act 2004 (Act 633) law enforcement within Malaysias maritime
zone.

Source: Authors compilation based on Laws of Malaysia as accessed online at

Attorney Generals Chambers portal, http://www.agc.gov.my/.

The analysis of Malaysian maritime security response mechanism clearly

evidenced that there are several weaknesses in the current maritime security strategy
of Malaysia. Firstly, there is no overarching policy on maritime security, which causes
apparent competing interests instead complementary efforts, especially considering
the scarce resources available for maritime security development and operational
needs. Although, MMEA was supposed to be a panacea for the diverse maritime
enforcement agencies in Malaysia, buy-in from other agencies for MMEAs lead
agency status is lacking. The promulgation of Act 633 did not clearly provide such
exclusivity for MMEA thus resulting in the continued duplication and competing
response amongst the maritime security agencies of Malaysia. This is evidenced by
the differing nomenclature and division of maritime zones area of responsibilities
employed by the MMEA, RMN, and Marine Police.87 Additionally, the competition
for scarce resources can also be seen where MMEA and Marine Police are both eyeing
for new assets, recruitments, and renewed primacy.88 The lack of a credible mandate
is argued to be one of the causes, as there is no tangible blueprint to guide the desired
end state for Malaysias maritime security.
Secondly, although Malaysia has various assets that can be deployed for its
maritime security, the deployment of those assets is challenged by the combination of
an aging fleet and obsolescence issues. These issues are exacerbated by the lack of an
overarching policy document that can provide clear terms of reference, demarcation of
operational responsibilities, and long-term development plans for the maritime
security in Malaysia. Currently, Malaysia is reliant upon 30 vessels from the RMN,
and 54 vessels of MMEA for maritime security response that is beyond its territorial
87
RMN and MMEA area of operations extends up to Malaysian EEZ limit while the
RMP- Marine jurisdiction is within Malaysian territorial waters; RMN maritime area
of operations are divided into 3 regions that covers 7 operational areas, MMEA
divides its operations area into 5 regions constituted by 18 maritime districts while
RMP-Marine operates from its 5 operational regions into 11 operational sea
territory. Sourced from interviews with the relevant senior officials.
88
Hariz Mohd, 2016, Boosting nations maritime security, New Straits Times
Online, 9 August; Anon, 2014, Polis Marin sasar ambil 1000 anggota baru (Marine
Police targets 1000 new recruits), 12 November; Anon, 2009, Polis Marin dapat 19
kapal baru untuk tingkat keupayaan (Marine Police receives 19 new vessels to
increase capabilities), Bernama, 20 November. Interview with Commander of the
Marine Police provided insight on the rationalization for this issue.

105
waters.89 These numbers are based on the vessels that are capable of patrolling and
maintaining presence at sea for at least five days.90 Considering the need for routine
periodic maintenance as well as the increased frequency of unscheduled maintenance
due to age and obsolescence, it is rationalized that at best, only 50% of the said vessels
are available for maritime security response on daily basis.91 Additionally, the
comprehensive utilization of those assets are limited considering the lack of integrated
maritime security organisation and the fact that RMN has very limited jurisdiction in
terms of law enforcement at sea.92 Based on the preceding factors, it is argued that the
vessels available to provide maritime security response beyond Malaysias territorial
waters are limited.
However, a key enabler for such a coherent mechanism is the maritime
surveillance and monitoring capability that can provide total coverage of Malaysias
maritime domain and interests. Currently, Malaysias maritime surveillance and
monitoring are split between the Marine Departments VTMS (Vessel Tracking and
Monitoring System) and MMEAs SWASLA (Sistem Pengawasan Laut; Sea
Surveillance System). As for the Malaysian Armed Forces (MAF), there are
developments being made to integrate the data from various maritime surveillance
assets (shipborne, shore-based and airborne) into a recognized maritime picture. It
must be noted that these are individual systems that serve a specific function within
the ambit of its operator. In order to coordinate a coherent response, there must be a
recognized maritime picture.93 Without any integration and data fusion, triangulating a
single target among the different data sources requires extensive and at times lengthy
communication between the agencies. With the application of networking
technologies, the available information and data from various maritime surveillance
systems can be integrated into a single primary reference of a recognized maritime
picture. The recognized maritime picture can then be utilised at all levels but more so
at the political-strategic level to coordinate the necessary responses and collaborative
actions towards prevailing maritime security situation, not just within Malaysias
89
See Appendix 2 for list of RMN and MMEA vessels.
90
The primary criterion here is endurance rather than speed. It is also
acknowledged that speed is an important criterion for patrol vessels within EEZ so
as to enable effective response but this study considered 25 knots as an adequate
response speed based on the average speed of merchant vessels plying the EEZ is
approximately 10 to 15 knots.
91
60% of those vessels are aged more than 30 years. Routine maintenance
factored in as 30% of available fleet.
92
Only the Fisheries Act 1985 (Act 317) accord powers to the commanding officer
of RMN vessel as an authorized officer to enforce said act thus any enforcement
actions by RMN is strictly the responsibility of the RMN vessel commanding officer.
93
Maritime picture is a depiction of the maritime situational awareness resultant
from maritime surveillance and monitoring activities. Multiple instances of
maritime pictures for a singular situation can exist due to different platforms and
capabilities performing the surveillance and monitoring functions. A recognised
maritime picture is the integration of the various information and data so as to
maintain an unambiguous and timely database of relative position and
identification of all maritime tracks. The term recognised indicates that the plot
is evaluated and processed by a central authority before being disseminated.

106
maritime zones but also extending to Malaysias maritime interests which are beyond
Malaysias borders. It is also suggested by this study through its findings that such
effort can be a stop-gap measure to mitigate the issue of limited assets for maritime
patrol.

Table 3: Comparison of Radar Coverage per hour against a 15 ft high target

Platform Operating Radar Radar Ground Search Rate

Altitude Range Footprint Speed
Submarine Surface 13nm 591 nm2 10kts 791 nm2/hour
(50ft radar
(Surfaced)
mast)
Ship Surface 17nm 908 nm2 26kts 1,792 nm2/hour
(100ft radar
mast)
Helicopter 10,000 ft 128nm 51,472 nm2 120kts 82,192 nm2/hour
MPA 35,000 ft 235nm 173,494 420kts 370,894
nm2 nm2/hour

Source: Roberts, 2014, UK Maritime Patrol Aircraft an urgent requirement,

https://www.thegrowler.org.uk/downloads/20140122_UKMPA_Paper.pdf [10
November 2016].

The need for rapid projection of maritime security response beyond Malaysias
territorial waters necessitates a discussion on the utility of airborne assets. The
characteristics of speed and height associated with airborne assets provided
advantages of time, reach and space in maritime security coverage in comparison to a
surface vessel as well as the added benefit of increased search area volume as depicted

107
in Table 3. Airborne assets such as the maritime patrol aircraft are already in service
within Malaysias maritime security agencies but the utility option is still limited
considering the numbers and capabilities available. It is argued that a long-range
maritime patrol aircraft is necessary for Malaysia, considering the wide expanse of its
maritime domain and maritime interests. Additionally, incidents such as the MV
Orkim Harmony and MH 370 also emphasised the need and utility of a long-range
maritime patrol aircraft due to the efficacy of response provided.
Malaysias current maritime surveillance and monitoring system are not
reaching the level of security envisaged and needed comparatively to support its
maritime domain. Incidences of encroachment and threats to sovereignty are mostly
known as an aftermath or from post-incident reports as experienced during the MV
Orkim Harmony hijacking, sea robbery of MV Naniwa Maru and Lahad Datu 2013
incident. Therefore, there is a big gap in maritime surveillance and monitoring,
especially to monitor the whole of Malaysias maritime domain. Current coverage is
concentrated closer to coastal areas especially along heavy maritime traffic density
area as well as the specific area of interests such as the east coast of Sabah. 94 This
leaves a wide-open expanse of the maritime estate to be covered by patrol vessels and
other surveillance platforms. As discussed earlier, the available assets which are being
utilized for the purpose of coverage at sea is an issue due to the small number of
suitable patrol vessels. Within this aspect, the employment of airborne platforms for
surveillance and monitoring can increase the surveillance efficiency and provide
timely responses, thus increasing the maritime security coverage.
There are a few challenges in the solution of the capability gaps. Foremost
among the challenges is the question of financial implication and affordability. It is
argued through this study that Malaysia has the wherewithal to spend for its security
as evidenced by an immediate increase in defence and security budget in the 1980s,95
following the resurgence of threat from communist terrorists and in 2013, after the
Lahad Datu incident96. However, the actual challenge is to ensure that those limited
resources are spent right instead of being a knee-jerk reaction.

94
MAF operates no less than 12 maritime surveillance radar in ESSZONE while
MMEA also operate several VTMS based surveillance systems. Combined with the
maritime picture provided by surface vessels and airborne platform, there is
sufficient data to provide a comprehensive maritime coverage of ESSZONE.
However, maritime surveillance gaps prevail as there is no overarching or
centralised authority for such purposes. Analysis confirmed through interviews
with senior officials of MIMA, MMEA, RMAF, and MIDAS.
95
RM 9.9 billion was allocated under the Fourth Malaysia Plan (1981-1985)
compared to RM 1.5 billion allocated under the Third Malaysia Plan (1976-1980);
Jaswan S. Sidhu, 2009, Malaysias Defence and Security since 1957: An Overview,
in Abdul Razak Baginda (ed), Malaysias Defence and Security Since 1957, Kuala
Lumpur: Malaysia Strategic Research Centre, pp. 22-23.
96
RM 75 million was allocated for establishment of ESSCOM followed by RM 660
million in 2015, RM 523 million in 2016 and RM 323 million in 2017. This is on top
of the operational expenditures of the MAF, MMEA and RMP within ESSZONE;
Prime Minister Office, 2013-2016, Annual Budget Speech.

108
 It is within this context that this study argued upon the two influencing factors
of strategic culture and political will towards security in Malaysia, which in turn is
reflective upon the fate of maritime security. Strategic culture is also defined as:
A distinctive and lasting set of beliefs, values and habits regarding the threat
and use of force, which have their roots in such fundamental influences as
geopolitical setting, history and political culture (that exists within a state or
politically relevant group.97
Macmillan et. al. suggested that a strategic culture helps to explain the
strategic character, attitudes, and behaviour of a nation. However, it must be taken
with caution as an analysis of strategic culture is a double-edged sword. Strategic
culture must be contextualised from a range of variables that constitute the national
tradition and identity. While the concept of strategic culture predisposes towards the
conception of defence policies and aids in accounting for a nations common sense98
of the same, its utility is argued to be universal for accounting behavioural pattern
towards security as contemporarily security is an overarching context for defence.
It is posited that Malaysias strategic culture is influenced by its legacy and
history especially that which created the Malays psyche towards the ruling elites.
Amongst the Malays, there exist a social contract between the ruling elite and its
subjects which are underwritten by the concept that the Malay rulers know what is
best for their subject and the subjects shall be subservient. This is a concept that has
historical genesis from the founding fathers of the Malay sultanates.99 Despite the
concept being constituted with monarchic reference, it evidently set the Malay psyche
for subservience to the ruler or leader with sovereign powers. This is the basis of
Malaysias general perception on policy and governance. It is the domain of ruling
elite and the general population shall abide, as long as there is no unjust occurring.
Although the multi-ethnic government of Malaysia today promotes the inclusion of
the various ethnicities, the seat of power still resides among the Malays, hence the
Malay-centric perspective of the matter. It is suggested that the Malaysian strategic
culture, in essence, is the Malay attitude towards threat perception and self-
preservation100.
This, in turn, created a dependency by the general population on the ruling
elite for strong leadership, which evolved into a vicious cycle that views security in an
apathetic manner. Malaysias policy formulations are often the domain of its
leadership, thus reliant upon the character of the leadership personality. Therefore, the
97
Macmillan, Booth & Trood, 1999, Strategic Culture, in Booth & Trood (eds.),
Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region, London: Macmillan Press, p. 8.
98
Macmillan et al, 1999, p. 14.
99
A. Samad Ahmad, 2003, Sulalatus Salatin Edisi Pelajar, Kuala Lumpur: Dewan
Bahasa Pustaka, pp. 25-26. This referred to the ancient agreement between
Demang Lebar Daun and Seri Teri Buana.
100
Chandran Jeshurun, 1999, Malaysia: the Delayed Birth of a Strategic Culture, in
Booth & Trood (eds.), Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region, London:
Macmillan Press, pp. 225-243.

109
conception of a comprehensive maritime security strategy or policy is left to the
behest of political interests and agendas, hence being dependent upon the political will
of the ruling elites. Without public awareness of the existential importance of its
maritime domain, whatever measures of conception for Malaysias maritime security
strategy will be beset with vested political and personal interests and agendas, instead
of addressing the national interests.
Stating the problem without an option is simply passing the buck back and
forth without any point of resolution. This study opines that the conception of a
comprehensive maritime security strategy must start with a National Maritime Policy
that can create buy-in from various stakeholders. It is from this overarching National
Maritime Policy that the maritime security strategy cascades, as the presence of a
higher-level document shall guide the sustainable development for not just maritime
security but also maritime industries, maritime governance, and maritime safety. A
model of the ideal maritime security organisation is visualised in Figure 1 with the
National Security Council (NSC) Maritime as the one-stop centre for maritime
security issues with buy-in and synchronisation of effort from the other maritime-
related agencies. NSC-Maritime is envisaged to be the brain that integrates and
analyses the data from the eyes and ears (surveillance sensors and intelligence data) in
order to direct the physical assets and response mechanisms to perform their duties.
The idea is not for NSC-Maritime to operate any of the assets and capabilities but
rather to coordinate the employment of available assets and facilitate collaboration
towards maritime security. The capabilities are still managed by the respective
agencies but the effect was brought about through coordination of inter-agency
collaboration and operations by NSC-Maritime. With the use of networking
technologies, near real-time information from various sources are integrated into a
recognised maritime picture of Malaysias maritime domain that is applicable for not
just maritime security but also other facets of maritime governance. It must be
reiterated that promulgation of a policy need not necessarily solve the problem. It is
but a part of the step towards realistically securing Malaysias maritime interests. A
larger part of the step includes changing the mindset of all parties involved to ensure a
sufficient buy-in to the solution, thus guaranteeing its continuity in the future.

110
 Figure 1: Maritime Security network-centric concept
Source: https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/worldwide/defence/commander-maritime

FINDINGS
There are two capability gaps which were found through this study that contributed to
the problem of securing Malaysias maritime domain. Firstly, there is a lack of an
integrated maritime surveillance and monitoring system. While Malaysia has several
maritime surveillance systems being operated by various maritime security agencies,
it is not integrated and information sharing is hindered by competing interests and
mind-set. This is argued to be a key area that must be addressed for a comprehensive
conception of maritime security strategy to be implemented. Furthermore, the
integration and fusion of maritime information and data must occur at the highest
level in order to maximize buy-in and control authority.

The second capability gap is the limited number of assets available to provide
for maritime security coverage and response. The immediate solution for most will be
to procure more assets but this study suggests that procurement of assets is not the
problem. Rather it is how the assets are utilised that is the root cause. Without an
overarching framework of maritime security strategy at the highest level, there is no
coordination of assets tasked within an area of operation. This is aggravated by the

111
first capability gap as there is no recognized maritime picture that can be used to
synchronize the efforts and effects for maritime security in Malaysia.
The underlying cause for those capability gaps is the absence of a National
Maritime Policy that can drive buy-in from the various maritime-related actors and
guide them towards a sustainable and secure utility of Malaysias maritime domain.
This lack of an overarching policy is influenced by the perception of maritime security
need within Malaysia among its general population and most importantly the ruling
elites. Based on the analysis, the hypothesis presented is proven to be valid but further
studies are necessary as this study only highlighted the tip of the iceberg.

RECOMMENDATIONS
This study recommends a holistic review of what is needed for Malaysias maritime
security in line with the proposed National Maritime Policy, to ensure the formulation
of a comprehensive maritime security strategy for Malaysia. This formulation must be
done at the highest level with the participation of maritime-related stakeholders and
consideration given for the application of networking technologies and employment of
airborne assets. Simultaneously, this study also recommends that the Malaysian public
awareness and comprehension of the existential nature that the maritime domain holds
for Malaysia be increased to increase their buy-in towards the formulation of a
comprehensive maritime security strategy. Without a broad-based and inclusive
approach towards maritime security, it will continue to be at the mercy of the ruling
elites political will. Future studies are encouraged to consider defence economics and
resource management focused on Malaysias defence and security procurement
processes so as to further generate the understanding and discussion of Malaysias
formulation of security strategy and its implications for the national interest.

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APPENDIX 1
LIST OF MALAYSIAN LAWS RELATED TO MARITIME DOMAIN

Ser Act Number and Title Maritime Domain Relevance

(a) (b) (c)

1. Act 44 Fisherman Establishes fisherman association to safeguard

Association Act 1971 Malaysian fisherman interests (indicates the
importance put by GoM to marine resources)

2. Act 49 Akta Lembaga Promulgate an authority to supervise fisheries

Kemajuan Ikan Malaysia 1971 development and fisherman association in
Malaysia (indicates the importance put by GoM to
marine resources)

117
3. Act 77 Armed Forces Act Establishes an armed forces constituted by an
1977 army, navy and air force for defence of Malaysia

4. Act 83 Continental Shelf Act Promulgates Malaysian continental shelf limits

1966 and legislates all activities surrounding it
(establishes the need of sovereignty enforcement
and security provision within Malaysian
continental shelf)

5. Act 140 Penang Port Regulates the powers for an authority to supervise
Commission Act 1955 and manage Penang Port (indicates importance put
by GoM to shipping industry development)

6. Act 144 Petroleum Establishment of an authority to supervise

Development Act 1974 development of petroleum industries in Malaysia
(indicates the importance put by GoM to maritime
based resources)

7. Act 155 Immigration Act Regulates Malaysia entry and exit procedures.
1959/63 Establishes maritime jurisdiction for the
Immigration Department.

8. Act 217 Declaration of an Declaration of an area in the Bintulu, Sarawak to

Area in the Bintulu District to be a federal port with relevant discretionary
be a Federal Port Act 1979 powers (indicates importance put by GoM to
shipping industry development)

9. Act 226 National Parks Legislates the establishment of national parks (and
Act 1980 marine parks) in Malaysia (establishing the need
of National Marine Park enforcement units)

10. Act 235 Customs Act Establishes jurisdiction of customs to enforce

1967 taxation of goods carried by sea (establishing the
need of customs maritime presence)

11. Act 243 Bintulu Port Legislates the Bintulu Port authority and
Authority Act 1981 associated powers (indicates importance put by
GoM to shipping industry development)

118
12. Act 302 Petroleum Establishes law on transport of petroleum by sea
(Safety Measures) Act 1984 (indicates the interest of GoM in ensuring safety
(Amendment 1991) of maritime transportation)

13. Act 311 Exclusive Legislates Malaysian exclusive economic zone

Economic Zone Act 1984 and regulates activities in the zone in accordance
with UNCLOS 1982 (establishes the need of
sovereignty enforcement and security provision
within Malaysian exclusive economic zone)

(a) (b) (c)

14. Act 488 Port Authorities Legislates the port authority and associated powers
Act 1963 (indicates importance put by GoM to shipping
industry development and safety of maritime
transportation)

15. Act 317 Fisheries Act Regulates Malaysian Fisheries activities and
1985 defines such activities up to Malaysian EEZ
(indicates the importance put by GoM to marine
resources and the need to provide security and
enforcement within declared zones)

16. Act 344 Police Act 1967 Establishes a Malaysian police force with policing
powers up to Malaysian territorial waters
(establishing the need of marine police force)

17. Act 515 Merchant Regulates maritime oil pollution with powers of
Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act enforcement (establishes the need for Marine
1994 (A1394 Amendment Department maritime presence and indicates GoM
2011) interest in ensuring safety at sea)

18. a. Merchant Shipping Regulates merchant shipping activities including

Ordinance 1952
b. Merchant Shipping
(Amendment) Act 1998
c. A1316 Merchant Shipping
(Amendment & Extension)
Act 2007
d. A1393 Merchant Shipping
licensing and certification of vessels and seafarers
within Malaysian maritime zones as promulgated.
Establishes the need for Marine Department
maritime presence (indicates the interests by GoM
to the safety and security of maritime merchant
activities)

119
 (Amendment & Extension)
Act 2011
e. Boat Rules 1953

19. Act 527 Carriage of Regulates carriage of goods by sea within

Goods by Sea Act 1950 Malaysia (indicates the interests by GoM for the
safety and security of maritime transportation
industry)

20. Act 633 Malaysian Establishes a maritime enforcement agency that

Maritime Enforcement Agency has jurisdictional powers over all maritime related
Act 2004 laws. (indicates the GoM intention to strengthen
security within its maritime zones)

21. Act 660 Baselines Of Promulgates the datum for determining the
Maritime Zones Act 2006 baselines of Malaysia maritime zones (indicates
GoM interest in ensuring sovereignty and
territorial limits in accordance with UNCLOS
1982. Establishes the need for sovereignty
enforcement and security provision within the
maritime zones)

22. Act 750 Territorial Sea Promulgation of Malaysian territorial waters limit
Act 2012 in accordance with UNCLOS 1982 (indicates GoM
interest in ensuring sovereignty and territorial
limits. Establishes the need for sovereignty
enforcement and security provision within the
maritime zones)

23. a. Merchant Shipping Order Regulates code of conduct at sea and rules of the
(Collision Regulations), 1984 road at sea so as to ensure safety and security of
the merchant shipping industry. Establishes the
b. Merchant Shipping
need for Marine Department maritime enforcement
(Collision Regulations) Order
presence.
1984
c. Merchant Shipping
(Collision Regulations)
(Amendment) 2000

120
 APPENDIX 2
Royal Malaysian Navy Operational Assets101

Class Year Speed /

Qty of
Ser (Vessel type) Vessels Built Endurance Range Remarks

1. PERDANA 2 2007 20.5 (12) kts 360 (6000) Data in

MENTERI nm brackets when
> 14 days
surfaced
(Submarine)

2. JEBAT 2 1994 28 kts / 5000 nm

(Frigate) 14 days

3. KASTURI 2 1983 28 kts / 5000 nm

(Corvette) 14 days

4. KEDAH 6 2003- 22 kts / 6000 nm New

2004 Generation
(Patrol Vessel) 14 days
Patrol Vessel

5. LAKSAMANA 4 1983 36 kts / 3600 nm

(Corvette) 10 days

6. PERDANA 4 1972 36 kts / 1800 nm Fast attack

craft missile
(FAC-M) 7 days

7. HANDALAN 4 1979 35 kts / 1800 nm Fast attack

craft missile
(FAC-M) 7 days

8. JERUNG 6 1972- 36 kts / 1800 nm Fast attack

1976 craft guns
(FAC-G) 7 days

101
Data sourced from Royal Malaysian Navy, 2016, Portal Rasmi TLDM: Kapal
TLDM (online), http://www.navy.mil.my/index.php/mengenai-
kami/informasi/sejarah-3 [2 August 2016] and Till & Chan (eds.), 2014, Naval
Modernisation in Southeast Asia, New York: Routledge, p. 143. Endurance data is
an estimation based on averaging of range data.

121
9. KRIS 2 1966 27 kts / 1400 nm
(Patrol Craft) 5 days

10. INDERASAKTI 2 1980 16 kts / 4000 nm

(MPCSS) 1983 > 12 days

11. SRI TIGA 2 2001 25 kts / 540 nm

(Fast Boat) n/a

12. MAHAMERU 4 1984 16 kts / 2000 nm Mine counter

measure vessel
(MCMV) 7 days

13. CB-90 17 1999- 40 kts / 240 nm

2001
(Fast Assault Craft) n/a

14. BUNGA MAS 2 2003 17 kts / 9000 nm Patrol support

vessel
(Auxiliary) 21 days

Source : Portal Rasmi TLDM: Kapal TLDM (online),

http://www.navy.mil.my/index.php /mengenai-kami/informasi/sejarah-3
and Till & Chan (eds), 2014, Naval Modernisation in Southeast Asia,
p. 143.

Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency Assets102

Class Year Speed /

Qty of
Ser (Vessel type) Vessels Built Endurance Range Remarks

1. LANGKAWI 2 1987 15 kts / 5000 nm Ex-OPV

RMN
(Patrol Vessel) 330 hrs

2. PERWIRA 2 1999 20 kts / 1000 nm Ex-Bay

102
Data sourced from Sutarji bin Kasmin, 2009, Malaysias Maritime Law
Enforcement Agencies and Auxiliary Security Agencies, in Abdul Razak Baginda
(ed.) Malaysias Defence & Security Since 1957, Kuala Lumpur: Malaysian
Strategic Research Center, p. 210, and MMEA website portal.

122
 (Patrol Boat) n/a Australia

3. SIPADAN 15 1964- 14 kts / 1600 nm Ex-PC RMN

1968
(Patrol Craft) 120 hrs

4. GAGAH 15 1980 15 kts / 1200 nm Ex-PZ RMP

(Patrol Craft) 280 hrs

5. TUGAU 15 2000 15 kts / n/a Ex-PA RMP

(Patrol Craft) n.a

6. RAMUNIA 5 1983 8 kts / 2000 nm Ex-Bahtera

Customs
(Patrol Craft) 250 hrs

7. RHU 2 1990 18 kts / 486 nm Ex-P200

Fishery
(Patrol Boat) 27 hrs

8. SEMBILANG 4 1986 16 kts / 160 nm Ex-P100

Fishery
(Patrol Boat) 10 hrs

9. PENINJAU 1 1990 20 kts / 400 nm Ex-P300

Fishery
(Patrol Boat) 20 hrs

10. MALAWALI 4 1990 35 kts / n/a Ex-Marine

Dept
(Fast Boat) n/a

11. NUSA 2 1998 35 kts / n/a Ex-Marine

Dept
(Fast Boat) n/a

12. PENYELAMAT 4 1998 25 kts / n/a Ex-Marine

Dept
(SAR Boat) n/a

13. PENGAWAL 10 1998 25 kts / n/a Ex-GRP

Fishery
(Fast Craft) n/a

14. PELINDUNG 5 1982 35 kts / n/a Ex-OBM

Fishery
(Fast Boat) n/a

15. PENGAMAN 1 1994 30 kts / n/a Ex-Marine

Dept
(Fast Boat) n/a

123
16. PENGALANG 2 2007 40 kts / n/a
(Fast Boat) n/a

17. KILAT 38 2007 45 kts / n/a

(RHIB) n/a

18. PETIR 8 2010 45 kts /

(RHIB) n/a

19. MARLIN 1 2006 17 kts / n/a

(Training Ship) n/a

124
SUPERVISOR

PROF. DR. K.S. NATHAN

K.S. Nathan is currently a senior researcher at the Institute of Ethnic Studies (KITA)
in the National University of Malaysia (UKM), Bangi, Selangor. He served as
Director of the Institute of Malaysian & International Studies (IKMAS) in UKM from
1st January 2011 until 1st April 2013. Previously, he was Professor of International
Relations at the University of Malaya in Kuala Lumpur. Professor Nathan has several
publications including eleven books (one as author, and ten as editor), and and
numerous articles in local, regional, and international journals. His teaching, research,
and publications are largely in the area of international relations and strategic studies
including civil-military relations in Malaysia, big power relations in the Asia-Pacific
region, U.S. foreign policy, ASEANs relations with major external powers (USA,
China, Japan, India and EU), Malaysian politics and foreign policy, and regional
security. He has also just completed writing a book entitled Tun Abdul Razaks
Foreign Policy, 1970-1976 a work commissioned by the Institute of Diplomacy &
Foreign Relations (IDFR, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malaysia), under the
Diplomatic Profiles Series: Profiles of Malaysias Foreign Ministers. The book
was published in November 2016. Prof. Nathan is currently also a Distinguished
Fellow at the Institute of Diplomacy & Foreign Relations (IDFR), and the Malaysian
Institute of Defence and Security (MIDAS). Email: nathan200846@yahoo.com

125
MYANMAR ECONOMIC SECURITY IN RELATION TO THE SUSPENSION
OF SINO FUNDED MEGA PROJECTS

Lt Col Ir. Azhar bin Hj Idris RMAF was commissioned into the Royal Malaysian
Air Force as an Engineer on 1st Feb 1993. He has a Diploma in Strategic and Defence
Studies from University Malaya, Bachelor in Aeronautical Engineering from
Universiti Technologi Malaysia and Master in Engineering Business Management
(with Distinction) from University of Warwick. He obtained his Professional Engineer
(Ir.) from Malaysia Board of Engineers in 2009. He has served in various squadrons,
RMAF Research and Development Agency and Directorate General of Technical
Airworthiness (DGTA). His last assignment prior to MAFDC was the Configuration
Manager for the Air Transport Fleet in Support Air Command in Kuala Lumpur
Airbase.

ABSTRACT

The sudden suspension of three largest China mega projects by Myanmars

government after the 2010 election had raised various reaction considering the big
amount of money invested in the country. This article examines a few issues such as
the reasons for Myanmar to suspend most of China mega projects, the pattern of
Myanmar foreign policy towards major powers and the geostrategic dependency
towards China. This qualitative study uses structural realism theory and Buzans
framework of security analysis in analysing the reasons behind the suspension. This
study argues that despite having the illiberal democracy, Myanmar is still able to have
an open economic system with supply and demand is central to assist its economic
growth and infrastructural development. The discussion concludes that the suspension
decision is made due to Chinas exploitation of Myanmars natural resources and now
it is gradually extended into Myanmar domestic problems. To avoid the dilemma of
over-depending on China, opening its market system is the sensible approach for
Myanmar. This approach was consistent historically because Myanmars leader had
manipulated their bilateral cooperation to their advantage. Finally, within the context
of supply and demand theory, the benefits of having natural resources and strategic
location were utilized intelligently by Myanmar as the mechanism for its foreign

126
policy to achieve its national and strategic interest.
Keyword: Sino, economy, resources, location, strategy

127
INTRODUCTION
After several years of being ruled by the authoritarian regime (Crisis Group Briefing
2015: 1), Myanmar eventually held her own general election on the 7 November 2010
(Burma Fund Office 2011: 5). To ensure a smooth political reform in Myanmar, there
are three key factors which have helped the reform process namely, the China factor,
the economic, and the security factor (Houtman 1999: 7). In addition, Myanmars
future path, civil society, the environment and political stability are very much
depending on the growth of foreign investments (Hilton 2013: 7). An effective action
or reaction by Myanmar towards foreign countries is essential in addressing the
economic security.

Although Myanmar practices an independent, active and non-aligned foreign

policy, there has been empirical evidence that indicates that they have been relying on
China for their political and economic support ever since 1990 (Constitution of the
Republic of the Union of Myanmar 2008: 11). Chinas strong economic support can
be seen from the significant amount of money invested in Myanmars mega projects
including the Myitsone dam, the Letpadaung copper mine, and the Sino-Myanmar oil
and gas pipeline. According to Sun, from 2008 to 2011 the total Chinese cumulative
investment in Myanmar jumped from USD $1 billion to USD $13 billion (Sun
2013:1).

Nevertheless, the strong economic support by China was reduced due to

President Thein Seins association with Myanmars political reform. The government
had then suspended the Myitsone dam project on 30 September 2011, followed by the
suspension of the Letpadaung copper mine in November 2012 (Sun 2013: 7). With
regards to the Sino-Myanmar oil and pipeline gas, despite the commencement of the
project in 2008, the project faced various issues (Sun 2013: 8). Although its
construction was eventually completed early 2015, the pipelines were yet to be
operationalised as there were still some unresolved issues. This had required a further
government to government discussions (Shin 2015) for them to find a solution. In a
recent development, a visit by Chinas Foreign Minister Mr. Wang Yi, Myanmar made
his stand to not discuss the mega projects as part of the talks (Ministry of Foreign
Affairs 2016).

PROBLEM STATEMENT
In the post-2010 election, the three largest China investments were suspended by the
Myanmars government. The projects were namely the Myitsone hydropower project
(suspended in Sep 2011, USD $3.6 billion) (Haacke 2015: 12), the Letpadaung
Copper Mine (operation has been suspended since November 2012, USD $1.065
billion) (Sun 2013:5), and the Sino-Myanmar oil and gas pipelines (under trial
operation in late 2015, USD $2.54 billion) (Sun 2013: 8).
 The decision to suspend these mega projects had affected Chinas investment
significantly. Following that year, there was significant reduction of Chinese
investment into Myanmar. In the fiscal year of 2012-2013, the investment from China
had dropped to only USD 407 million (Xinhua News Agency 2012). The suspension
of the highlighted projects to a certain extent was interpreted as a form of reorientation
in Myanmar foreign policy with Beijing (Haacke 2015: 12). Based on this argument,
the paper seeks to answer reasons for Myanmar to suspend most of Chinas mega
projects despite their long-standing economic relation. Apart from the risk of losing
economic support, such decision could cause China to retaliate indirectly, which could
affect Myanmars economy.

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND APPLICATION

Structural Realism
Structural realism emphasizes the importance of the structures and influences that
constrain a states behaviour. The theory outlines that states live in an anarchic system
and there is no higher authority for the states to turn to if they are facing issues. Thus,
states will do whatever they can to be as powerful as possible (Viotti and Kauppi
1999). This framework applies to Myanmars action of suspending all China mega-
projects based on domestic interest while offering new economic ventures with the
US.

Illiberal Democracy and Militarism

According to Zakaria (1997:28), Constitutional liberalism has led to democracy but
democracy does not seem to bring constitutional liberalism. He further argues that
there is a growing trend that most democratic countries today subscribe to illegal
democracy before transforming into a liberal democracy.

Fukuyama (1997) explains that the debate on illiberalism originated from an

East Asian context that includes countries such as Singapore and Malaysia on the idea
of Asian Democracy, Guided Democracy, and Asian forms of Human rights which are
advocated by political leaders. The political leaders from these countries argue that in
order to grow, there is a requirement for them to restrict democracy, particularly on
civil liberties (Engberg and Ersson 1999: 3).

In addition, although Myanmar had the general election held in 2010 and 2015,
the military is still holding for strong control over the government, state, and the
people. In fact, militarism controls people based on certain internal factors particularly
owing to unjust class and racial structures (Klare 1978: 39).103 With 25% seat reserved
103
In any society in which a small segment of the population owns (or reaps the benefits from)
a large share of the nations wealth, that privileged minority is likely to rely on the use of military force
to deter or overcome any threats to the prevailing order. This tendency results in what has been termed
a system of economic apartheid, wherein the privileged few live in sanctuaries of wealth
surrounded by and protected from the impoverished masses. Similarly, in any society wherein the
people of one race are subordinated and exploited by people of another race, the dominant racial
for the military in the parliament, they live in a nationalist environment and function
as a professional socialization that is concerned with the issues of national survival
(Fidel 1975: 5).

Capitalism, State and Economic Development

Capitalism economy seems to have at least two common denominators. First, the
existence of private enterprises which are owned and managed by private citizens who
seek for greater profits through a variety of activities on their own initiative, and
market mechanism (Bartley et al., 1993: 46). Secondly, is the market freedom that is
closely related to liberalism. Collins (2013:31) described that liberalism strongly
supports private properties, free enterprises, widespread international cooperation, and
human rights.

The results of Myanmars election in 2010 and 2015 indicated that the country
is moving towards a democratic political system. In order to ensure that democracy
prevails, Myanmar needs to create a conducive economic environment which is
closely associated with capitalism. Moreover, capitalism is about the economy, and
democracy is about governance. The gap is that, in the wake of democratization, there
is a growing concern between the type of democratic practices that Myanmar would
subscribe to, and the level of private ownership and market freedom that the state is
willing to practice.

CAUSES OF THE SUSPENSION AND IMPLICATIONS TOWARDS

MYANMAR SECURITY
The causes are divided into four main categories within the scope of safety and
security in politics, economy, social, and environment, as follows;

Myanmar Illiberal Democracy and Economic Security

The transformation of the political system adopted by Myanmar has leaned towards
illiberal democracy104 because the laws, the protection of political and civil liberties,
and the institutional separation of powers which may exist in theory but not in
practice. The transition to civilian rule remains vulnerable to other powerful state
institutions particularly the junta with the establishment of a military biased
constitution in 2008.

grouping tends to rely on military force to discourage and over- come rebellion on the part of the
oppressed (Klare 1978: 39).
104
In illiberal democracies basic democratic standards are generally met, but levels of
accountability remain low. Opposition parties can be expected to gain more seats due to freer and fairer
elections and to have more influence within the legislature; they are, however, predictably unable to
decisively defeat the incumbent. Elections only serve to back the ruling elites strategy for development
and to continue legitimising its performance, not to remove the incumbent from power. As far as
procedural issues are concerned, democracy is largely viewed as a means to justify the dominant
partys electoral victory. The individual does not fully enjoy certain liberties, such as freedom of
expression, freedom of assembly, demonstration and strike. The system of checks and balances fails to
constrain elected officials as they seek to stay in power (Zakaria 1997).
 Nevertheless, despite heavy criticism by the US and other western countries on
the transformation, Myanmar received an abundance of financial support (Nehru
2012: 3). This strong support was consistent with Obama Administration Pivot to Asia
Policy.105 The policy was closely related to the growing concerns over Chinas
emergence as an economic power and domination in Asia. The Pivot to Asia Policy
provided a great opportunity for Myanmar leaders to take advantage of the financial
support as it had previously done during the 1960s. Myanmar at this point was facing
an economic crisis, as their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) dropped from 13.57
percent in 2005 to the lowest point at 3.60 percent in 2008 (Figure 4.1). Hence, the
underlying motives for the government's shift106 in politics were less likely to be a
genuine call for democracy, but rather as a resort to pull Myanmar out of economic
despair.

Figure 4.1 GDP Growth Rate

Source: International Monetary Fund 2016

While there was an abundance of financial support from the outside world, the
puzzle remains to be revolving around the things Myanmar needs to do in order to
secure their economic status. Based on a report by Mc Kinsey, one of the four areas to
secure the economy was to increase its growth and productivity via connection to the
world (Chorr et al., 2013: 100).

105
In the fall of 2011, the Obama Administration issued a series of announcements indicating
that the United States would be expanding and intensifying its already significant role in the Asia
Pacific, particularly in the southern part of the region. The fundamental goal underpinning the shift is to
devote more effort to influencing the development of the Asia-Pacifics norms and rules, particularly as
China emerges as an ever-more influential regional power. Given that one purpose of the pivot or
rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific is to deepen U.S. credibility in the region at a time of fiscal
constraint. The priority includes: Alliance, Improving Relationship with Emerging Powers, Elevating
the importance of economic statecraft, Engaging Multilateral Institutions, Support for Universal Values
and Increasing US Military Presence (Manyin et al., 2012).
106
The new government led by President Sein has proposed easing restrictions on basic
freedoms, rewriting laws on taxes and property ownership, passing new labour laws allowing the
formation of unions, loosening restrictions on the media, and releasing political prisoners. The proposed
political transformation in Burma is a response to the serious sanctions that have been imposed by the
United States, the European Union and others in the international community and that have tightened in
recent years (Bergen 2012)
 In the context of the mega projects, the development of the Myitsone dam,
Letpadaung Project and Oil and Gas Pipeline Project provided a substantial amount of
foreign investments and infrastructure to Myanmar. As Myanmar suspended these
mega projects, China in return issued a warning to its companies on the rising political
risk against China investment (Sun 2013:2). China felt disappointed with the
suspension treatment given by Myanmar despite the massive support given during the
junta period from 1988 to 2010. The reaction of China could be seen from the
investment trend. China investment in Myanmar peaked at USD8.3 billion in 2011 but
sharply declined after the suspension. Soon after the announcement was made, the
investment dropped to USD $4.6 billion in 2012, USD $0.4 billion in 2013 and USD
$0.3 billion in 2014 (Guangsheng 2015: 2).

Obamas foreign policy of pivot to Asia provides the opportunity for Myanmar
to engage with the western world and lessening of what is viewed as an overreliance
on China. In addition to this, an abundance of financial aids from western investors
came in as Myanmars government started to reform. Responding to the progress in
reforms, Secretary Clinton visited Myanmar in December 2011, the first U.S Secretary
of State to do so in more than 50 years (BBC News 2011). Clinton had announced that
the U.S. would ease restrictions on activities of international financial organizations
(IMF, World Bank, etc.) in Myanmar.107 The warming of bilateral ties was further
enhanced on November 2012 with a visit to Myanmar by President Obama and
President Seins visit to Washington in May 2013.

However, Myanmar was reluctant to a complete democracy its illiberal

typed of democracy raised the suspicion among the western investors of their
underlying motives. This concern was raised by President Obama during his
November 2014 visit to Myanmar, when he described the process as by no means
complete or irreversible (New York Times 2014). The concern was translated into the
drop of Myanmars Foreign Direct Investment 108 (FDI) (Figure 4.3) and GDP (Figure
4.2) after the year 2012. China again took this opportunity to fill the remaining
vacuum. Committed investments from China had suddenly rebounded, spiking to
USD3.3 billion in the fiscal year to April 2016, up from just USD56 million in 2014

107
Washington has removed most of its sanctions against Naypyidaw, except arms embargo
and a number of economic sanctions. Washington has been open to the establishment of military ties
with Myanmar on the condition of continued reforms. However, it has been also stated that the U.S. is
not even close to the arms sales or operational training of Myanmars military (McLaughlin, 2013). The
rapid development of U.S. Myanmar ties, has eroded the so far unique Chinese position in Myanmar.
China has been Myanmars biggest source of investments, largest trade partner and supplier of military
equipment (Alam, 2013: 6). In general, though, Chinese investment in Myanmar has been seriously
damaged since Sein s government ascent to power. In FY 2012/2013 the accumulative Chinese
investment accounted for only USD407 million in comparison with USD12 billion between 2008 and
2011 (Yun, 2013: 1).
108
Foreign Direct Investment can be defined in a simple way as an investment made by a
company based in one country, into a company based in another country. Normally, Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) is considered to have taken place if a company in one country makes a physical
investment, such as in buildings, factories, machinery and equipment in another country (Myint
2012:5).
(Strangio 2016). Chinas FDI eventually helped to increase Myanmars GDP which
performed consistently with an average of USD62.6 billion in comparison to
USD33.01 billion before 2012 (Figure 4.2). Although western countries started to step
in but their curiosity over the illiberal democracy adopted by Myanmar saw an
incremental behaviour (Figure 4.2) whereas China had positioned herself as the largest
trading partner and investor (Guangsheng 2015: 2).

By looking at this analysis, it is obvious that Myanmar is taking advantage of

its strength109 by manipulating the rivalry that exists between Chinas National Interest
and U.S. Foreign Policy - Pivot to Asia to secure its economic status. This is done by
utilizing the supply and demand theory. Myanmar exploited the demand for energy by
China, fuelled by their skepticism (Saunders 2014: 39) of renewed interest and
intensified involvement of the U.S. in this part of the world (U.S. Pivot to Asia
Policy). In the meantime, Myanmar also portrayed herself as shifting towards
democratization. Although Myanmar had adopted a form of limited democracy, the
country has managed to garner a certain amount of attention by the U.S as it is in line
with one of the main tiers in U.S Pivot to Asia - Support for Universal Values i.e.
human rights and democracy.

With the advantage of having the interest of these two superpowers, the
opening of her market and integrating with the world economy, Myanmar has the most
sensible mechanism to provide herself with the ability to choose the country that
offers the best financial option. The strategy adopted by Myanmar proved to be
successful as the FDI started to increase whilst the GDP reached the highest point
since 2010 (Figure 4.2). Although the GDP had dropped back in the following years, it
was still higher in comparison to the period of isolation.

80 MY A NMA R G DP74.69
70 64.33 64.87
58.65
60
51.44
50 45.38
USD Billion

40 35.23
31.37
30
20.18
20 14.5

10

0
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Year

Figure 4.2 Myanmar Booming

109
Myanmars home-grown strengths include its location at the heart of Asia; rich
endowments of natural resources; and a growing labour force. Myanmar has long been cut off from
political, economic, and trading relationships and has not been able to participate in regional integration
and capitalise on its ideal position in the worlds fastest-growing regional economy. Now that
Myanmars economy is opening up, there is potential to become a major exporter, especially of
agriculture and food products, to many of its regional neighbours that are experiencing strong demand
and rapid growth. Consider the fact that Myanmar borders with Bangladesh, China, India, Laos, and
Thailand - home to 40 percent of the worlds population. Bangladesh alone has a population of
150 million, and Thailand and Laos have a combined population of 75 million people. In addition to
this export potential, observers have often suggested that Myanmar could become a trade hub on the
crossroads of Asia (Chorr et al., 2013).
 Source: World Bank 2015

Foreign Investment by Countries

450
400
350
300

USD Million
250
200
150
100
50
0

Countries

Figure 4.3 Foreign Investment in Myanmar

Source: Directorate of Investment and Company Administration 2016

The increase of FDI (Figure 4.3) also helped the country to boost its economy
by providing a significant number of job opportunities (Myint 2015:7). This would
help the country to ameliorate the poverty problems particularly in the rural areas
where 70 percent of the population resides (UNDP 2016). Consequently, as this area is
mainly populated by Myanmars minority ethnic groups, securing Myanmars
economy would somehow minimize the ethnic conflicts (Figure 4.4).

Total FDI Inflow

3

2.5

2
USBillion

1.5

0.5

0
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Year

Figure 4.4 Myanmar Total FDI Inflow

Source: CIMB ASEAN Research Institute 2016

China Intervention and Political Security110

The cooperation between these two countries was spurred only by the fact that
Myanmar had sought for protection through the Security Council, asked support from
a large neighbour during the international isolation, and requested foreign funding or
sources of investments. In fact, Myanmars military never completely trusted any
external major power, including China because Myanmar leaders have deep seated
feelings of Sinophobia as well as xenophobia (Shee 1997:39). The Myanmar
politicians were interacting in an environment of political culture of distrust.
Myanmars suspicion on China eventually was proven to be true. The long standing of
110
Political security is about the organisational stability of social orders. Their purpose may
range from pressurising the government on a particular policy to fomenting secessionism and disrupting
the political fabric of the state. The heart of the political sector is made up of threats to state
sovereignty. Since threats can also be levelled through military means, the political sector will take care
of non-military threats to sovereignty (Buzan et al., 1998: 141).
independent China-Myanmar relationship under the premise of peaceful co-existence,
including mutual respect for each others territorial integrity and sovereignty and
mutual non-aggression was eventually violated by China (Kudo 2006: 265). Chinas
prominent role in Myanmar affairs following the 2007 Saffron monk-led anti-
government demonstrations (Oxford Myanmar Alliance 2016),111 and because of the
2008 Cyclone Nargis,112 (Myoe 2016) had given a wake-up call to the military regime.
It began to criticise the Myanmar government, which in turn had made the State Law
and Order Restoration Council (SLORC)/State Peace and Development Council
(SPDC) feeling more uncomfortable (Myoe 2016).

The feeling was further deteriorated with the involvement of China in

Myanmars ethnic militias.113 According to Chow & Easley (Chow & Easley 2016:
539), in the recent development, China was providing arms to Kachin, Wa, and Shan
militias.114 Even more, some Chinese observers have even suggested that Beijing could
use the United Wa State Army (UWSA) and other ethnic militia as leverage over
Myanmar and push them to respect Chinas national interest (Sun 2013).

Although SLORC/SPDC had a close economic cooperation with China, they

were sensitive on the countrys sovereignty and territorial integrity issues (Kudo 2006:
6). Their concern was manifested in the Republic of the Union of Myanmar Defence
White Paper 2015. The White Paper reinforced the 1999 defence policy statement,
with the assertion of the Tatmadaw's legitimate and firm stance on safeguarding the
independence, sovereignty and national interests of Myanmar (Myoe 2016). Chinas
critic over Saffron revolution, Nargis tragedy, and support over ethnics militia had
intervened with Myanmars domestic politics. Thus, Myanmar needed to find ways to
reduce its political dependence on China.
111
In August 2007 a massive increase in fuel prices sparked initial protests, which were joined
later that month by thousands of Buddhist monks, and gained the support of Burmese citizens
throughout the country. Political activists, students, monks, and ordinary citizens appeared willing to
take great risks to demand change from the military regime. Their peaceful protests were met with a
brutal crackdown as monasteries were raided, many killed and thousands arrested (Oxford Myanmar
Alliance 2016).
112
Cyclone Nargis caused the worst natural disaster in the recorded history of Myanmar during
early May 2008. The cyclone hit Myanmar on Friday, 2 May 2008, sending a storm 40 kilometres up
the densely populated Irrawaddy delta, causing catastrophic destruction and at least 138,000 fatalities.
Associated Press. Cyclone Nargis embodied the perfect storm. NBC Asia Pacific News (Myoe 2016).
113
China has long maintained close ties with the Wa and Kachin, ethnic minorities who live in
the north and have struggled for autonomy against the government since Myanmar became a country in
1948. The relationship peaked during the 1960s, when China supported the Burmese Communist Party
(which consisted primarily of Wa and Kachin, as well as Chinese nationals) in their (partially
successful) struggle against the central government. The material and human assistance from Beijing
ceased in the early 1990s, though local governments in Chinas Yunnan province have maintained
cross-border ties on issues ranging from business cooperation to drug-related crop substitution
programs. Naypyidaw reached a peace agreement with the Wa in September 2011, but the Kachin and
the Myanmar military remain at war. On Jan. 2, Myanmar admitted that it had been using aircraft to
attack the Kachin, which still boasts an army of about 15,000 (Chow & Easley 2016: 539).
114
Observers have claimed that China unofficially supplied weapons and training to the
largest of the United Wa State Army (UWSA), noting the largest USWAs unusually sophisticated
arsenal, including heavy machine guns, artillery, and Chinese-made-surface-to-air-surface missiles
(Chow & Easley 2016: 539).
 In the context of Sino mega projects (Letpadaung Copper and Myitsone Dam
project), the investigations and interviews revealed that the main reason behind the
protest is due to the way the projects were managed and developed. The businesses
were monopolised by China (Buchanan et al., 2013:36). On top of this argument,
Myanmar citizens felt like these projects were serving the Chineses national interest
and the locals had made assumptions that they were going to lose their land (Aung et
al., 2016).

Another interesting factor is the location of these mega projects. For example,
Myitsone dam project is in the politically unstable 115 area of the Kachin State (Burma
Policy Briefing 2013). In securing its interest, China openly stepped into the peace
dialogues between Myanmar government and Kachin Independence Organization
(KIO). During these negotiations, China played a crucial role in facilitating the
meetings between the Myanmar military regime and the UN. It was another episode
that led the military regime to become increasingly concerned with the perceived
growing of Chinas influence and prominent intervention in Myanmars local affairs.

Based on this analysis, from the political security standpoint, the suspension of
Sino mega projects was mainly due to Chinas growing involvement in Myanmar
domestic issues. Chinas support for ethnic militia, her intervention during Saffron and
Nargis incidents, indicated how the long standing inter-dependence with Myanmar has
been violated. Although the decision could contribute to Chinas retaliation, Myanmar
was determined to prevent herself from being politically controlled and dictated by
Chinas supremacy. Interestingly, the suspension also has lured China to persuade the
Myanmar militia ethnic (Kokang group, the Arakan Army and the Taang National
Liberation Army) to join a peace conference 116 (Strangio 2016) known as Panglong
Conference.

Chinas Interests on the Societal Security of Myanmar

115
The Kachin conflict is among the most protracted of Burmas ethnic wars. Resistance to
central government rule has continued through all four political eras since independence. The Kachin
Independence Organisation was formed in 1961, following discontent over perceived ethnic inequality
and discrimination, government neglect and plans to make Buddhism Burmas state religion. Most
Kachins are Christians and closely inter-linked by clan traditions. In subsequent years, the KIO rapidly
grew into one of the best-organised armed opposition forces in the country, with health, education and
other departments across the Kachin state and northern Shan state where an estimated 100,000 Kachins
also live (Burma Policy Briefing 2013).
116
China has also shown that it is willing to help promote peace and stability along its border
with Myanmar. During the talks in Beijing, China persuaded a number of stubborn rebel groups,
including the armed-to-the-teeth United Wa State Army, to join a peace conference that Suu Kyi will
convene in Naypyidaw on 31 August. In remarks reported by Xinhua, Xi Jinping promised Suu Kyi that
his government 'will continue to play a constructive role in promoting Myanmar's peace process and
work with the country to safeguard peace and stability in their border areas'. This came on top of a USD
$3 million donation made by China to the peace process earlier this year; a recognition that peace and
stability in Myanmar's borderlands are in both countries' interests (Strangio 2016).
China interest on Myanmar Societal Security117 can be seen through the bilateral
cooperation between two countries. This had indicated that Chinas investments in
Myanmar were mostly concentrated in the natural resource development industry such
as hydropower, minerals, and trade, but a little effort was done for local welfare and
development (Kudo 2006: 13). In substantiating this argument, a cross check with the
Sino Mega Project was carried out. The behaviour of the Chinese companies were
more interested in profit making rather than boosting Myanmars local development
(Buchanan et al., 2013: 46).

An investment such as the Myanmar-China Oil Pipelines project should

stimulate economic progress through the introduction of capital and technology, job
opportunities, and fostering strong economic ties among the stakeholders (Myint
2015:7). On the contrary, Chinas attitude towards the locals had aggravated the
situation, Sino Mega Project companies (Harvey 2011), MC Oil and Gas Pipeline
project had made little effort to develop the local labourers through job training and
knowledge-transfer, while thousands of workers from China and central Burma were
brought in as employees (Swhe Gas Movement 2011), leaving few opportunities for
locals to receive any permanent or contract employment in the project. Locals were
only given the unskilled jobs,118 and this was due to the level of skill and education
(human capital) possessed by the locals. Such argument can be substantiated with the
unemployment rate (Figure 4.4). Although the FDI recorded substantial increment it
did not commensurate with the unemployment rate.

Unemployment Rate
4.035
4.03
4.025
Unemployment Rate

4.02
4.015
4.01
4.005
4
3.995
3.99
3.985
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Year

Figure 4.4 Unemployment Rate

Source: Trading Economics 2016

According to Bi (2010, 2014) to obtain approval for a project, several Chinese

enterprises had bribed the local government officials. Although there was no evidence
to relate to the accusation towards the Sino Mega Projects, the stigma that existed was
117
Societal security concerns the sustainability of traditional patterns of language, culture, religion,
national identity and customs (Buzan et al., 1998: 119).
118
"They promised us that they would give job opportunities, especially to the people who lost their
land," Thar Zar Gyi from Ywar Ma village said. "Yes, I got some temporary jobs, like painting and
carrying bricks during the construction period (Thant 2005).
that the Chinese enterprises were acting above the law, paid no attention or respect for
local customs and the Burmese, and had a poor sense of social responsibility.

Environmental Safety and Security

The security119 and safety issues, especially on the Myitsone Dam project, had
witnessed the displacement of 15,000 people mostly being ethnic Kachin, and
destroyed the Mali-NMai confluence. The Kachin had regarded it as their cultural
heartland. Myitsone Dam offers an opportunity to acquire cheap electricity for China
while investors were not held accountable for the negative social and environmental
impacts of the dam building. The investment revenue from the sale of electricity could
provide financial and political support to the Myanmar government. It was estimated
that the dam would be able to generate USD $207 million a year (Dapice 2015:5).

The China National Petroleum Corporation started the construction of a

seaport on Maday Island in October 2009. China was also set to benefit from the oil
transport pipeline, which enabled oil to be imported to China from the Middle East
and Africa. It was estimated that the pipeline could bring in revenue of over USD30
billion in the next 30 years (Juan 2013). Myanmars long isolation from
international markets and sources of financial support historically has limited her
development. Many of its natural resources remain to be relatively intact, despite an
absence of effective environmental regulations (Raitzer et al., 2015: 1). Yet, as the
country integrates into the global economy and its economic development accelerates,
resource degradation had risen rapidly. The deforestation of closed forests in recent
years has taken place at the fastest rate among major Southeast Asian countries, with
much of it driven by concessions for plantations and other large-scale projects.

Assessing the Sino Mega Project, there was a significant connection between
the environment and economic growth that would subsequently affect the politics,
society, military and human security. For the country to progress further, there will be
a certain environmental price to be paid (Sun 2013:5). The amount of damages to the
environment was widely publicized by several NGOs. Interestingly, it revealed that
the U.S. had funded the non-governmental groups which had successfully opposed the
Chinese-financed building of the huge Myitsone dam (The Guardian 2011). The
argument was further highlighted by the Observer saying that U.S. Department of
States funding of anti-dam advocacy groups in Myanmar had led to the suspension of
the Myitsone dam in 2011 (Yun 2015:1).

Despite the allegation made on China companies, they made efforts to

compromise with the locals demand. The effort was being translated by Wanbao
(Letpadaung Mine) with an allocation of USD 2 million for the environment
protection (Sun 2013:6) in their newly revised contract. Chinas Power Investment
Corp (CPIC) on the Myitsone Project had funded and commissioned the Changjiang

119
Environmental security regards the maintenance of the local and the planetary biosphere as the
essential support system upon which all other human enterprises depend (Buzan et al., 1998: 72).
Institute of Survey, Planning, Design and Research (CISPDR) from China. This was to
conduct the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) with Burmese experts from the
Biodiversity and Nature Conservation Association (BANCA) (International Rivers
2011). In the case of oil and gas pipeline, the government had issued an environmental
guideline for mega projects to follow (Frontier Myanmar 2016). Currently, the CNPC
had issued120 several plans to minimize environmental impacts during the construction
of Myanmar-China Oil and Gas Pipelines (CNPC 2016). In other words, the
environmental security issue was eventually managed by China companies.

RESEARCH FINDINGS
The study explicated that the main reason for suspension was due to a combination of
geostrategic and domestic factors. Despite being the beneficiary of large amounts of
investments from China, Myanmars Gross Domestic Product (GDP) had dropped
from 13.57 percent in 2005 to the lowest point of 3.60 percent in 2008 (Figure 4.1).
The economic crisis was further exacerbated with Chinas exploitation over
Myanmars natural resources, which has now gradually expanded into Myanmar
domestic problems including the act of interventions during Saffrons demonstration,
Cyclone Nargis, and the support shown over the ethnic militias particularly the Wa
and the Kokang. Thus, in order to secure the economy and safeguard her sovereignty,
opening the market was considered to be the sensible approach in managing the
downturn.
By opening her market system, Myanmar took advantage of her strength by
manipulating the rivalling superpowers namely China and the U.S. This was done
by utilizing the supply and demand theory. Myanmar exploited the demand for energy
by China and their scepticism against the renewed interest and intensified involvement
of the U.S. in this part of the world (U.S. Pivot to Asia). In the meantime, although
Myanmar practices limited democracy, they managed to attract the U.S attention as it
is in line with one of the main tiers in U.S Pivot to Asia policy, especially to be in
support for Universal Values such as human rights and democracy. With the advantage
of having two superpowers, Myanmar had the ability to choose which country could
offer her the best financial packages. Hence, the suspension of these mega projects
was a strategic reason to spark the interest from both superpowers.
The strategy seems to work well considering that Myanmars FDI started to
increase whilst GDP reached the highest point since 2010 (Figure 4.2). Although the
GDP dropped back in the following years, it was still higher in comparison to what
they had during their isolation period. This is consistent with hypothesis 1 and 2, in
which it was hypothesized that Myanmar would risk their economy with Chinas
120
"Environmental Supervision Plan", "Specifications for the Administration of Environmental
Supervision", and "Detailed Implementation Rules of Environmental Supervision" (CNPC 2016).
retaliation but towards the end it will continue to bounce back due to Chinas strategic
dependency on energy and scepticism over U.S renewed interest.
Screening at the historical facts, the approach was consistent. Myanmars
leaders had actively manipulated their bilateral cooperation to their advantage. The
dissatisfaction with Chinas interference in domestic issues during Cultural Revolution
prompted Myanmar to move closer to the U.S, and this was by taking the advantage of
an economic support which was emanated from the Domino Theory. Following
Reagans foreign policy in 1980s whereby South East Asia (SEA) was regarded as an
area with low priority, Myanmar turned back to China, grabbing the opportunity from
their Open Door Policy in the mid-1980s.
The study also shows that Chinas investment in Myanmar were mostly
concentrated on the natural resource developments. A trivial effort was made on local
development. The protest against Chinese companies was a concern to China on their
interest on profit taking, rather than developing Myanmars local provisions. This can
be seen from the level of their social contribution to the local or Corporate Social
Responsibility (CSR) that is more interested in grabbing the land from local people for
project development purposes. Furthermore, the influx of workers from China and
central Burma had saturated the job market, limiting locals opportunity to work with
these Chinese companies and this aggravates the impoverished community further.
Finally, the military holds 25 percent of the legislative seats in the constitution
that enables them to manipulate the state, market, and the society to their advantage.
Apart from the perspective of economic advantage, the peace process among the
militia is attained (Panglong), and it is noted through the findings in this research that
Myanmar are strongly dependent to their military for the countrys survival. This is
particularly due to the countrys fragile situation, in sense of poverty, the low level of
education among the locals, and the chaotic nature of their plural society.

CONCLUSION
The reason behind the suspension was more than merely on environmental reason as
widely publicised in the media. In fact, Myanmar is concerned about the extent of
Chinese investment. Chinese investors are only interested in profit-making projects,
and they had even brought in their own labour force, hence diminishing the local
employment prospects. In fact, Chinese infrastructure projects, were mainly joint
ventures with companies owned by the military junta, or its cronies have disregarded
local communities development. Therefore, the suspension was a calculated risk
taken by Myanmar considering the domestic problems and geo-strategic advantages.
Additionally, as a small state, Myanmar is vulnerable to the powerful countries who
can take the benefit of her weakness. However, Myanmar has shown their willingness
to do whatever she can to boost the opportunity, and leveraging against the rivalry
between the existing superpowers, namely China and the US, to which had been used
intelligently by Myanmar to achieve its national and strategic interest.

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SUPERVISOR
Kartini Aboo Talib @ Khalid (PhD) is an Associate Professor in policy analysis and
Deputy Director at the Institute of Ethnic Studies, Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia.
She was appointed as a Country Consultant for Malaysia to the United Nations Entity
for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (2014), a grantee for Sumitomo
Foundation Japan (2011), and a Fulbright Scholar to Northeastern University Boston,
Massachusetts (2000-2005). Her research focus revolves around gender, civil society,
comparative politics, ethnicity, and consumerism. She has published chapters in books
and scholarly articles on various issues pertaining to policy including alternative
dispute resolutions and consumer rights, ethnicity and consumerism, labor law and
immigrants, gender and politics, nonprofit and policy implementation, election and
environmental policy and sustainability. Her chapters in Transnational Social Work
and Social Welfare (Routledge, London) are published in 2016, and her book Policy
Implementation and People Processing Organizations was published in 2014. The
upcoming books are Ethnicity and Consumerism in Malaysia (2017), and Assessing
the Look East Policy (2017).
 JAPANS MILITARY NORMALIZATION AND ITS EFFECT TO
ASIA PACIFIC REGION

Lt Col Khairul Anwar bin Soib was commissioned into the Royal Malay Regiment
(Para) on 16 June 1994. He has served in various key appointments at unit as well as
formation levels. He holds a Diploma in Strategic and Defence Studies (UM) and
Diploma Psychology Counselling (UKM).

ABSTRACT

The military resurgence in Japan and the reinterpretation of Article 9 of the Japanese
Constitution have elicited numerous responses from the international community
especially from the Asia Pacific region. Various factors have influenced Japan and the
Japanese government to reinterpret Article 9. External elements such as threats and
provocation from China and North Korea and internal elements from the Japanese
domestic politics have been major factors in the policy decision-making process. The
impact of the Japanese Imperial Army and its negative image during WW II have not
been overlooked by its neighbors. Countries that were invaded by Japan are
concerned with Japans military and security directions. This has invited various
responses. This paper endeavors to ascertain the main factor for Japans decision to
reinterpret Article 9 and the future direction for a normal Japan. The research
seeks to understand the influencing factors as to why Japan is pursuing military
normalization. This study also provides a coherent argument on the prospect of Japan
having a normal and active military, and the consequent reaction from the Asia
Pacific region as well as the future of the military agreement between United States
and Japan. Although Prime Minister Shinzo Abes reinterpretation of Article 9 is still
under consideration by the Japanese legal experts and lawmakers, this study focuses
on the initial phase of the reinterpretation and adopts a qualitative approach in its
research. The impact of the reinterpretation will reverberate throughout the region
and this development will inevitably effect the geostrategic and geopolitical situation
in the region. By examining all the reasons behind Japans move towards the
reinterpretation of Article 9, Tokyos response to the changes in the external security
environment are uncovered. This study asserts that the reinterpretation is not meant to
project any hostility or return Japan to the imperial ways but solely to repel and
defend itself from the threats especially from its neighbors. The threats have in return
provided an opportunity for the nationalists to intensify the level of nationalism
among the Japanese public. The political situation in Japan in which the Liberal
Democrats Party has the majority in the Diet has also assisted Abe in implementing
his plan.

INTRODUCTION
Japan is considered an economic superpower but remained as a military dwarf with
a relatively small Self Defence Force (SDF), and their reliance on the United States
for its national security. For Waltz, the country was a structural anomaly 121 and
scholars since then has attempted to explain Japans irrational security policy. In
short, Japans practices are puzzling numerous nations on the part of their security and
defence policies. More recently, this dilemma has been further complicated by
Japans shift to a more normal security posture, shown by the actions of
strengthening its international security and military roles, since the end of Cold War.
After the WW II, Japan had decided to reinterpret its Article 9 of the Constitution. The
discussions on this matter have been going for several decades internally for Japan,
and internationally with other nations. This was not the first effort of reinterpreting
Article 9. There have been three attempts prior to this. Japan may reinterpret the
article again in the future depending to their security needs at that time.
There were numerous existing literatures that delved into Japans security
policy by IR scholars either from Realist, Liberals or Constructivist perspectives. For
neo-realists such as Christopher Layne and Kenneth Waltz, they viewed Japans
disproportionate military power as relative to its renowned economic growth, which
was puzzling. Jennifer Lind contends that the conduct of Japans passive post war
security policy is consistent with the strategy of buck passing, a balancing strategy
that does a little of the required balancing possible by relying on the efforts of
others.122 On the other hand, Eric Heginbotham and Richard Samuels argued that
Japans foreign policy is consistent with mercantilist realism, which recognizes
technology based economics and its security interests as the central considerations of
state policy. This is based on the idea that technology and national wealth are as
important as military power in maintaining the states security standings as they
121
Waltz, K. 1993. The Emerging Structure of International Politics, International Security 18:
p.p. 44-79.
122
Lind, J. M. 2004. Pacifism or Passing the Buck?, International Security 29: p.p. 92-121.
increase the states political leverage and independence.123 Tsuyoshi Kawasaki
mentioned that Japans security is no puzzle for realism, and explains that the state
maximizes their security without threatening others with a security dilemma.
However, this has made them susceptible to the economic costs of defence.124

FACTORS AFFECTING MILITARY NORMALIZATION AND ITS IMPACT

GEOSTRATEGIC IMPORTANCE
There were several factors involved, including that of the geostrategic importance
which had contributed towards Japans reinterpretation of Article 9. Within this
context, countries which were involved are China, North and South Korea, the United
States, and the Southeast Asian nations. The strategic security environment could
strengthen Japan's intention to become a normal country. Undoubtedly, the rise of
China and her assertive behaviour together is one of the main external reasons for
Japan to reinterpret its constitution.

DOMESTIC POLITICS
There were many internal factors which had influenced the Japanese decision makers
to support the motion by Abe. Japanese politicians believed that Japan should develop
a political profile in line with its economic strength. In 1994, Yomiuri Shimbun, one of
the biggest newspaper organization in Japan, had released the drafted constitution
showcasing the relevance of SDF in representing Japan on a global scale. In 2005,
Keidanren, Japans principal business association had published their own report,
which recommended the exercise of collective self-defense to gain recognition of
JDSF on a bigger scale. According to a June 2004 poll, prior to the elections for the
House of Councillors, sixty-two percent (62%) of all candidates favored constitutional
revision. Another poll in July 2004, 547 Diet members from both houses found that
sixty-four percent (64%) favored specifying an international security role for the JSDF
in a revised constitution, and fifty-five percent (55%) favored collective self-defense.

JAPANS SOVEREIGNTY

123
Heginbotham, E. and Samuels, R. J. 1988. Mercantile Realism and Japanese Security
Policy, International Security 22: p.p. 171-203.
124
Kawasaki, T. 2001. Postclassical Realism and Japanese Security Policy, The Pacific Review
14: p.p. 221-240.
Although Japan's military budget is one of the highest in the world, China's military
power has surpassed Japan in many aspects. In modernizing its armed forces and
enhancing its power projection capabilities, China's defence spending has increased in
the last decade. Furthermore, Japans close geographical location to China and its
Senkaku/Diaoyu dispute has caused Japan to fear China. 125 In addition to this, Japans
sovereignty was at stake due to the overlapping disputes in the East China Sea. Their
sovereignty became one of the factors as to why they sought for military
normalization. It was noted that China became a factor for Japans reinterpretation of
the Article 9. Beijing overtaking Japan to be the second largest economy in the world
did not spur them to reinterpreted Article 9. It was due to China military expansion
and signs of aggressive behaviour in the East China Sea region that had driven Japan
to have taken such daring action. The situation had influenced Japan to act to defend
their territorial rights, especially in Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Chinese leaders were
taking advantage of Japans action to increase political and public support. The current
Chinese government are mostly from the fifth generation of leaders. They need to
have the support from the younger generation to ensure CPCs survivability.

JAPAN-UNITED STATES RELATIONSHIP

The Japan-United States relationship has been a contributing factor to Japan's
intention to reinterpret its constitution. Japan has indirectly been forced by the United
States to amend its constitution. 126 The United States defence policy, Pivot to Asia is
seen by Japan to not provide support to Washington. The redeployment of troops, slow
economic growth, reduction of the military budget, and the difficulty of the United
States to get out of the Middle East, are obstacles for the United States to assist Japan
should any conflict occurs in the Northeast East Asian region.127

IMPACT OF THE REINTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 9

As for the impact, the reinterpretation of Article 9 had allowed Japan to have more
freedom in their military practices, but not as assertive as they were prior to WW II.
Through the amendments of Article 9, Japan is now able to deploy their military
forces to participate in a more extensive role, especially in supporting an allied
partner, or protecting their own country. Abe had also mentioned their intent to be a
strong force internationally, and able to contribute to the peace keeping missions such
125
Wong Chin Wei. 12 October 2016. Desk Officer for East Asia, Analyst at DISD: Personal
Interview.
126
EmmanChanlett-Avery and Ian E. Rinehart, The US Military Presence in Okinawa and the
Futenma Base Controversy, 20 January 2016, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42645.pdf [7 June
2016].
127
Takahashi, S. 2013. Upgrading the Japan-U.S. Defense Guidelines: Toward a new phase of
operational coordination. Project 2049 Institute.
http://project2049.net/documents/japan_us_defense_guidelines_takahashi.pdf [5 June 2016].
as the UN PKO. Japan faces stern challenges in wake of their intent to be a permanent
member of the UNSC, and their current affairs do not present a favourable future for
the candidacy. If Japan can do so, it would give them better control over the council,
which may not be in favour of every other nation. To note, their relations with her
allies would be affected if Japan decided to join UN-sanctioned efforts. Rewriting
Article 9 of the Japanese constitution would be welcomed by the United States.
Without constitutional limitations, Japan can operate within a certain limit to become
an effective military sidekick for the American superpower.128 Globally, a change
could lead to Japanese troops joining the Western coalitions in the Asia Pacific, and
other hot spots. In short, with the revision of the Article 9, Americans would perhaps
expect Japan to soon play the role that the UK does on the global stage. 129 With
reference to a 2012 report, the reinterpretation would call for a greater military
cooperation during peacetime, tension, crisis and war that would deepen the United
States-Japan alliance.

EFFECT TO THE ASIA PACIFIC REGION

JAPAN-UNITED STATES RELATIONS

The defence cooperation between United States and Japan had strengthened the
relationship between both nations. The signed treaty was an assurance that incidents
related to military involvement would not take place in the region. 130 To note, Japan
still perceives their relationship with United States to be important as a counterbalance
measure for them to deter any threats from China and North Korea. The United States-
Japan alliance allows Japan to not be easily targeted by China or North Korea. 131 The
relations between China and North Korea is a factor to be considered as well. United
States President Obama had mentioned that United States will help Japan especially
when it is concerning towards their territorial sovereignty. This complements United
States pivot in Asian region, as Japan is an important ally for United States to project
their power in the Asia-Pacific region.
JAPAN AND CHINA RELATIONS

128
Panda, A. 2014. US, Japan overhaul mutual defense guidelines. The
Diplomat.http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/us-japan-overhaul-mutual-defense-guidelines/ [5 June 2016].
129
Takahashi, S. 2013. Upgrading the Japan-U.S. Defense Guidelines: Toward a new phase of
operational coordination. Project 2049 Institute.
http://project2049.net/documents/japan_us_defense_guidelines_takahashi.pdf [5 Jul 2016].
130
Dian, M. 2013. Japan & the US Pivot to the Asia Pacific. Strategic Updates. London: The
London School of Economics & Political Science.

131
Desker B. and Singh, B. Japans Rising Security Challenges. www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-
publication/idss/japans-rising-security-challenges/#.VtKAHH197IV accessed on 27 Feb 16.
Abes military ambitions have already provoked China, who accuses him of sabre-
rattling. Relations between the two countries have soured since 2010, with arguments
over disputed islands between the Chinese and Japanese, issues over maritime region,
and Japaneses air force intercepting Chinese jets amid escalating military
activities.132 How badly China would react to a remilitarized Japan is not clear, but
Beijing would not ignore such clear challenge to its dominance. Japans resurgence
would also urge North Koreas nuclear programme. The security situation in the
Korean peninsula would be tense and there is no indication of denuclearization in the
region anytime soon.

JAPAN AND NORTH/SOUTH KOREA RELATIONS

North Korea is seen to be increasingly aggressive in weapon testing, and presents
itself as a threat to Japan. As of July 2016, a total of five missiles and nuclear weapon
test had been conducted by North Korea. Japan sees North Korea's action as
provocative. Apart from Pyongyangs refusal to obey the rules of international
decisions, failure of China as a close ally to control the Pyongyang regime became a
strong factor too.133 North Koreas nuclear programs could spark other development of
nuclear weapons in the Northeast Asian region. Security became one of the prime
factors as to why Japan sought for military normalization. North Korea's aggressive
actions provided an opportunity for Japan to strengthen its relations with South Korea.
However, South Korea was very cautious in its relations with Japan. The disputes of
Dokdo/Takeshima issue will continue to be the straining issue in Japan's relations with
South Korea. South Koreas action in giving priority to China rather than Japan in its
foreign relations was expected and come as no surprise to Japan.134 Apart from seeing
China as a huge market economy, China has been an alternative to South Korea's
relations with Japan.

JAPAN AND ASEAN RELATIONS

ASEAN presents itself as an extensive market which suited Japans intent to grow
their economy through the principles of Abenomics. The likes of Philippines,
Vietnam, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and Myanmar, have shown their support
towards Japans military normalization. The ASEAN nations are even looking to work
together with Japan to boost their economic status. Most importantly, ASEAN nations
are tied to conflicts with China, such as the territorial disputes over the South China
Sea issue. The lack of unity within the ASEAN countries has placed Japan to be
132
Withitwinyuchon, N. Japans New Defence Policy: Identity Change or Strategic Shift,
International Journal of Social Science and Humanity, Vol. 6, No. 3, March 2016.
133
Desker B. and Singh, B. Japans Rising Security Challenges. www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-
publication/idss/japans-rising-security-challenges/#.VtKAHH197IV accessed on 27 Feb 16.
134
Hughes, C. 1996. The North Korean Nuclear Crisis and Japanese Security, Survival. Vol. 38
(2): p. 83.
among the main powers in Asia Pacific. Hence the reason Abe had made the effort to
visit ten members of ASEAN was to create a security impact in curbing Chinas rising
power.135 This allows the South East Asian region to not be overpowered by the likes
of China.

CONCLUSION
The senior demographic of Japan who was involved in wars is slowly decreasing, and
the younger generations who did not go through the challenging period of WWII are
now replacing them. History has shown them that war can incur losses to the nation in
a sense of wealth, and lives. Japan received a valuable lesson by understanding what
United States had experienced in the Iraq and Afghanistan war. Due to that, Japan
embraced self-defence in a collective manner with the intent to gain national trust, and
presenting JSDF with the foundation to gain more experience. Similarly, the growth of
Japanese nationalism regarding how Japan is sorting their territorial sovereignty in the
region of East China Sea, was one of the influencing factor as well.
The future of reinterpreting Article 9 is quite bright as recently Abe won the
Upper House election in July 2016. This would mean that; Abe will have at least 2
years to realize the reinterpretation. The result of this election shows that Abe and his
party, LDP enjoys the most solid political backing of any leader in his countrys post
war history. His party dominates the parliament, and no other politicians enjoy a
higher personnel approval rating than him. In quick order, Tokyo issued a new
Defence White Paper, which identifies the growing assertiveness of China as
Japans most serious challenge. Abe had appointed a hard-line lawmaker, Tomomi
Inada, who is famous for her revisionist views of Japans wartime actions, as his new
Defence Minister on 3 August 2016. The intensity among the Japanese public were
raised in due to the insecurity that exist in Japans security position. Abe, given the
political situation in Japan took the chance to implement his plans pertaining to the
Article 9.
Understanding that Japans sovereignty was at risk by the external factors, the
reinterpretation would allow them to position themselves better defensively. Japans
decision to pursue on the nuclear-agreements, and not turning into a nuclearized state
had showcased their intent of not turning into the offensive for the sake of their
interests. With the embracement to gain international support, the JSDF had opted for
the collective self-defence practices, which will in turn give them more experiences
abroad. They intend to focus on building their security up internally first. This can in
turn assist Japan in confronting threats from North Korea, and China.
135
Kawai, M. 2013. New Challenges for ASEAN-Japan Relation: Celebrating the 40th year of
ASEANJapan friendship and cooperation. 13 December. Asian Pathway. http://www.asiapathways-
adbi.org/2013/12/new-challenges-for-asean-japan-relations-celebrating-the-40th-year-of-asean-japan-
friendship-and-cooperation/#sthash.tRuC8Nxc.dpuf [22 June 2016].
 The final research question was on how the reinterpretation of Article 9 had
affected the Japan-United States security pact, and the regional security policy in Asia
Pacific region. Japans response to allay the fears of their neigbouring nations depicted
how it had affected the other nations. This had the United States responding on
Japans reinterpretation of Article 9 to be a positive move in the direction of bettering
the United States-Japan alliance. Japans reinterpretation of the Article 9 can be
concluded to be a pivotal step for Japan to contribute progressively to the regional,
and international security. Based on the findings through this research, it was derived
that the United States-Japan security alliance was a core external factor on how the
security situation in the region was shaped. It was supported through the findings in
the research that this was one of the influencing factors that urge Japan to reinterpret
the Article 9. The treaty between United States and Japan became one of the
researched factors in this study. The reinterpretation of Article 9 was not due to an
exclusive pressure from the United States, however, the United States did urged Japan
to evaluate their commitment based on collective self-defence. The United States
facing budget cuts did not altered the relevance of their military presence in Japan.
Through the request for more commitment from Japan in sense of collective self-
defence, the importance of the alliance became apparent to Abe and LDP. By
accommodating to the demand by the United States, Japan helped them to ensure that
the United States commitment to support Japan would still be there. There were
apparent external security matters, which influenced Japan to further consider the
reinterpretation of Article 9. With their main intent being to protect the national
interests and sovereignty, the act of reinterpreting was to defend itself from external
geopolitical threats, and not to return to its imperial ways.
Based on how the ASEAN nations had responded to the benefits upon the
reinterpretation of Article 9, and Japans foreign direct investments was influenced by
it as well. With the principle of Abenomics, countries such as Myanmar, Thailand,
Malaysia, and Singapore supported Japans military normalization ideology. Whereas
with Asian Pacific region lacking unity, Japans reinterpretation of Article 9 could be
the best way for the ASEAN region to rebalance Chinas influential rise. The support
shown by the nations are suggesting that Japans remilitarization was more than
welcome. The third hypothesis was proven further after the value of investment of
Japan in 2014 in the ASEAN region was triple the amount, compared to what they had
invested in China. With an investment worth over USD 23.6 billion, potential growth,
and preferred political conditions. Japan had chosen to implement the process of
military normalization, even though the international community was comfortable
with its pacifist stance. Based on the findings in the research, Japan had opted for the
shift due to domestic politics, geo-strategic environment, and economic interests. The
findings from the literature reviews, and interviews had answered this research
question. It was supported that Abes administration responded to reinterpret the
Article 9, even though the polls from the Japanese public had voted to maintain the
current practices. Abes decision was also influenced by United States in sense of their
military contribution. This would have affected their security, and economical status.
The research had findings which showcased Japans commitment to allay the
fears of its neighbours and allies on its military normalization. This was due to the
stigma of a potential militaristic Japan in the future, based on the precedents of WWII
Japan. Vietnam, Philippines, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and Myanmar, were all in
support of Japans reinterpretation for their Article 9. Japan acted to restructure their
Emperors power position, emphasizing human rights value, and stepping away from
the image of inclination to wage war, to assure the other nations that the
reinterpretation of Article 9 is focused on peaceful agendas. Japans national identity,
especially with the United States was inclined towards the preservation of peace.

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phase of operational coordination. Project 2049 Institute.
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2016].

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Security 18: p.p. 44-79.

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Personal Interview.

Withitwinyuchon, N. Japans New Defence Policy: Identity Change or Strategic Shift,

International Journal of Social Science and Humanity, Vol. 6, No. 3, March 2016.

SUPERVISOR
Dr. Mohd Ikbal bin Mohd Huda is Senior Lecturer at the Strategic Studies and
International Relations Program at the National University of Malaysia (UKM). He
obtained his Bachelors Degree and PhD degree in Japan Studies from the University
of Malaya and Japanese Language degree in Asia University (
), Tokyo, Japan. His thesis entitled Japanese Official Development Assistance
(ODA) to Malaysia 1966-2010: Impact on Socioeconomic Development. In his
research he analyse significant of Malaysia-Japan bilateral relations in the contact of
economic cooperation. His current research focuses on International Political
Economy, Japans Political Economy (ODA), Japans Foreign Policy, Japan ASEAN
Relations and Malaysia Japan Relations (economic cooperation). In addition, he is
also Director for Asian Peace Network (APN), International programs with The
Nagasaki Foundation Promotion of Peace from 2008-present, Committee for
Malaysian Association on Japanese Studies (MAJAS), Committee for Department of
East Asian Studies (JATUM) and Visiting Scholar at Yokohama National University
from June 2016 April 2017.
FACTORS ATTRIBUTING TO THE INABILITY OF THE ASSAD REGIME
TO END THE ARMED REBELLION IN THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR

Lt Col (U) Alirupendi Perudin joined the Royal Brunei Armed Forces on 11
September 1992. He has served in the Air Regiment, Royal Brunei Air Force and held
several posts at the Ministry of Defence Brunei Darussalam. He holds a Master of
Science in Defence and Strategic Studies (University of Madras, India).

ABSTRACT

This study analyses the factors contributing to the inability of the Assad Regime to
end the protracted armed rebellion, despite tremendous support from Iran and Russia
against the fragmented opposition comprised of a weaker, limited, and divided
regional backing from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Turkey as well as a jaded, half-
hearted Western assistance. This paper finds that there were clearly strong arguments
for domestic politics contributing to Assads incapability to end the conflict. In
addition, textual evidence also showed that regional geopolitics has a role in
preventing Assad from ending the armed rebellion. Global geopolitics, on the other
hand, favoured Assads capability in ending it. Overall, Assads regime own dire
manpower shortage, severe lack of economic and social wherewithal, and his hard,
inflexible stand on negotiation towards corruption, brutal minority regimes to fight to
the bitter end, are deemed as key reasons for the said inability. Deepening regional
Sunni-Shiite sectarianism, and resurging international East-West rivalry were the
conflicts main driving forces. The findings of this study imply the need to examine
Assads regime to better understand the conflict and by extension, surmises the
necessity for firstly greater academic scrutiny on the dictators psyche and strategy,
towards a deeper understanding of the quagmire in Syria. Secondly, it appeared that
attention should be directed towards a diplomatic scrutiny of the despotic regime
capacity and mindset, for a more effective, and peaceful negotiations.
INTRODUCTION
The conflict in Syria has been going on for half a decade. What started in the spring of
2011 as a demonstration asking for reform had descended rapidly into a violent civil
war, drawing in regional forces and extra-regional involvement. Unlike other Arab
Spring uprisings, Syrias turned into a prolonged quagmire of a civil war. Like a
whirlpool, this conflict pulled in everyone in the area deep into the abyss of tragic and
lengthy entanglement. The conflict was so catastrophic that more than 200,000 people
were killed, with over four million seeking refuge abroad, approximately eight million
were displaced internally, while about 12 million inside Syria were in need of
humanitarian assistance.136
Irans help in the issue includes assisting Syria in circumventing sanctions,
extending training regime militias, supplying weapons, and even being directly
involved with their soldiers.137 Russias support in the United Nations (UN) came in
the form of blocking proposals amounting to pressure towards political transition, and
UN-supported sanctions. Russia also continued supplying arms amid sanctions and
blockades. Later, the Russian military had intervened directly by attacking ISIS, and
the rebels. Thus, Assad Regime received strong external support from Iran and Russia,
and indirect support from China. Their support enabled the Syrian forces to maintain
control over key populated areas, regained their lost territories lost, and resume a
position of strength to negotiate for peace, should it opt to do so. Saudi Arabia and
Qatar supported the opposition by supplying arms along with channeling organised
funding, providing media power, religious influence, and political support. Turkeys
involvement was limited to the facilitation of arms flow and fighters, and
humanitarian aid, but later turned into forms of interventions and confrontations.
Western states have intervened in the form of sanctions, condemnations of the
regimes brutality, and expression of the desire for a regime change. The USA went a
step further by shipping arms, and training the rebels. 138 The Western supported the
lack of consensus, with feeble and inconsequential policies being adopted. 139 The
136
S.N. Abboud, Syria, Polity Press, Massachusetts USA, 2016, p. 188.
As at Feb 2016, Syrian Center for Policy Research (SCPR) estimated death toll at 470,000.
[http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/a-staggering-new-death-toll-for-syrias-war-470000/].
UN special envoy Steffan de Mistura estimated death toll of 400,000 since according to him UN official
estimated stopped in 2014 at 250,000. [http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/04/staffan-de-mistura-
400000-killed-syria-civil-war-160423055735629.html].
Syrian Observatory for Human Rights documented 301781 human losses up to August 2016.
[http://www.syriahr.com/en/?p=50612].
137
E. Hokayem, Iran, the Gulf States and the Syrian Civil War, in T. Dodge and E. Hokayem
(eds), Middle Eastern Security, The US Pivot and the Rise of ISIS, Routledge, International Institute for
Strategic Studies, ADELPHI Series 447- 448, London UK, 2014. p. 56.
138
R. Erlich, Inside Syria, Prometheus Books, New York USA, 2014, p. 214.

139
S.N. Abboud, Syria, Polity Press, Massachusetts USA, 2016, p. 135.
support was gradually perceived as inactive, and ambivalent, and the European
Unions policy on Syria appeared to be inconsistent and ambiguous.140 Western states
had hardly mustered any adequate political resources to achieve regime change. 141
Western support was lackluster even after Assads usage of chemical weapons. Their
focus were also shifted towards fighting Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS).
Meanwhile, the Syrian rebels were fragmented, and regional backers
themselves were divided, lacking a coherent strategy, while fighting ISIS at the same
time. The rebels were fragmented into many groups which lacked the unity of
command partly because Saudi Arabia supported the Salafist elements, while Qatar
supported the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria.
Despite these notions, the Assad Regime could not end the armed rebellion.
The aim of this essay is to analyse the factors contributing to the Assad Regimes
inability to end the armed rebellion. This paper makes the assumption that at each
level, such as in the context of Syrias domestic politics, Middle East geopolitics, and
Global geopolitics, are contributing factors as to why Assad Regimes was unable to
end the armed rebellion. This essay addresses this by analysing Syrian domestic
politics, Middle East Geopolitics, and Global Geopolitics, by looking at the raised
arguments from each level of analysis, which had contributed more to the Assad
Regimes ability to end the rebellion or otherwise. From the analyses, the key factors
attributing to abovementioned inability were determined.

SYRIAS DOMESTIC POLITICS

Regimes Resiliency
Assads regime was corrupted, deep in cronyism, and biased towards the Alawites.
Thus, they had significantly lost the Sunnis majority which has made it more difficult
for Assad to recruit the youths. His economic reforms alienated the Sunni of poor
status, and increased the practices of cronyism among the Alawites 142. He removed the
Sunnis from organizations that had traditionally featured them, which had disrupted
their rapport.

140

ibid.
141
ibid.
142
C. Phillips, Syrias Bloody Arab Spring.
https://www.lse.ac.uk/IDEAS/publications/reports/pdf/SR011/FINAL_LSE_IDEAS__SyriasBloodyAra
bSpring_Phillips.pdf [11 June 2016].
 Dire manpower shortage had caused difficulties for them to launch decisive
offensive campaigns to defeat the rebels, while emboldening existing manpower with
outside fighters, instigating a shift in influence and decision-making away from the
regime to outsiders,143 notably Hezbollah, the Shabiha (pro-government militia) and
the National Defence Force (NDF).144 There were several different figures reported on
the number of manpower losses. One source estimated that 80,000 were killed, 70,000
men avoided military service, with many defected. 145 One source estimated the
depletion in the region of approximately 80,000 to 100,000 due to fatigue, desertions,
and losses.146 Another estimate reported that Assads army of 300,000 was
approximately halved, which forced Assad to have made some changes to draw in the
youths.147 This was done through the manners of waiving the normal draft, and
dodging penalties. Phillips stated that the regimes military strength had shrunk from
325,000 in 2011, to approximately 178,000 in 2013, and by mid-2015 they stood at
only 70,000-80,000 strong.148
The regime framed the conflict as am act of counter-terrorism, 149 which
allowed brutal measures, side-line reforms, and restricting the chances of negotiations.
The regime even targeted medical facilities and civilian population in rebel areas to
achieve its target of depriving support for the rebels. 150 Assads complete rejection of
any proposal of a power transition virtually shuts any room for negotiations. The
pattern of minority rule in the Middle East shows that the regimes would fight to the
bitter end, bringing everyone down with it, hence protracting the conflict. Other
examples were in Lebanon which led to the civil war which lasted from 1975 to 1990,
which saw the involvement of Saddam Husseins minority Sunni rule. Assad knew
143
Former Syrian Prime Minister Rijad Hijab exposed that Syria was occupied by Iranian
regime and that Irans General Suleimani, not Assad ran the country.
C. Phillips, The Battle for Syria: International Rivalry in the New Middle East, Yale University Press,
New Haven USA, 2016, p. 159.
144
S.N. Abboud, Syria, Polity Press, Massachusetts USA, 2016 pp. 108-111.
145
G. Mohney, Assad Admits Syrian Armys 'Shortage of Manpower' But Vows to Win
Bloody Conflict. https://news.vice.com/article/assad-admits-syrian-armys-shortage-of-manpower-but-
vows-to-win-bloody-conflict [11 June 2016].
146
I. Black, Wake-Up Call on Syrian Army Weakness Prompted Russian Intervention, The
Guardian.
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/01/syrian-military-weakness-russian-intervention [11
June 2016].
147
J. Hayward, Syrian President Assad Admits Military Manpower Running Low.
http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2015/07/28/syrian-president-assad-admits-military-
manpower-running-low/ [11 June 2016].

148
C. Phillips, The Battle for Syria: International Rivalry in the New Middle East, Yale
University Press, New Haven USA, 2016, p. 150.
149
Transcript of Exclusive AFP Interview with Syria's Assad on 11 February 2016,
https://www.yahoo.com/news/transcript-exclusive-afp-interview-syrias-assad-185240901.html?ref=gs
[15 March 2016].
150
C. Glass, Syria Burning: A Short History of a Catastrophe, Verso, London, UK, 2016, p.
33.
that if they were to lose power after a prolonged, brutal, and corrupted reign, they
would face dire consequences.

Fragmented Opposition
Rebels strength of 100,000 - a third of the regime forces initial strength - was large
enough to prolong attrition, while the many different rebel groupings (1,000 groups)
had attracted a wider base of the population (Islamist, secular, urban, rural, middle
class etc.), not just a few sectors and made it difficult for the Assad Regime, and
peace negotiators to satisfy all their needs. 151 Occasional unity among rebels had
resulted in greater achievement making it harder for the regime forces to defeat the
rebels.
However, lack of rebel leadership gave rise to Sunnis appeal, increasing the
sectarian effect, which in turn prolonged the conflict. Abboud pointed out that the
rebels had failed to unite in order to bring any political changes, thus, making them
unable to formulate a plan to account for post-Assad Syria and providing material
support to the demonstrators on ground.152 The Local Coordination Committee (LCC)
prefers non-violence and was initially against Western intervention. The Syrian
National Coalition (SNC) initially chose the non-violent route, but later shifted
otherwise. SNC had also strongly advocated for a Western intervention. 153 Lund
pointed out that the lack of organized opposition leadership has driven the protest
movement towards Sunni identity politics which had rose to give guidance to the
rebellion.154

Syrian Economy
Pre-civil war economic decline and poor economic policy which had neglected the
rural populace, had contributed to the lack of support for the regime. Economic
liberalisation had benefitted mainly the urban classes, economic elites, and regime
officials, thus marginalising the middle and lower class citizens.155

151
BBC,What's happening in Syria? http://www.bbc.co.uk/newsround/16979186 [18 June
2016].
152
S.N. Abboud, Syria, Polity Press, Massachusetts USA, 2016 pp. 73-77.
153
ibid.
154
A. Lund, Syria: The First Five Years. http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/63076 [11 Oct
2016].
155
Abboud S.N., 2016. Syria, Polity Press, Massachusetts USA, pp.34-40.
 Economic collapse and damaged basic health services and education due to
sanctions and war reduced support for the regime. It was difficult to sustain the war
without outside support, either to recruit, enforcing a good security standard, or
attracting the youths. These would have been able to enhance the chances of the
regime forces, to gain leverage and confidence of the population by effective
governance. The Syrian Center for Policy Research (SCPR) estimated an economic
loss of approximately US$254.7 billion by the end of 2015. 85 per cent of the
country were living in below the poverty line, with almost 7 in 10 Syrians in extreme
poverty and unemployment reaching 52.9 per cent, a surge from 14.9 per cent in
2011.156 House Research Paper estimated 157 economy contracted by more than 50 per
cent, inflation averaging 51 per cent, Syrian pound depreciated by about 80 per cent,
dwindling of oil production from 387,000 barrels per day (b/d) to less than 10,000 b/d.
There were other indications as well, such as effective electricity generation falling by
more than 70 per cent, fiscal deficit (excluding subsidies) maintaining at 20 per cent
of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and natural gas production declining by 2014.

MIDDLE EASTS GEOPOLITICS AND INTERVENTIONS

Arab Spring
The Arab Spring was a contributing factor in the rise of Saudi Arabias prominence as
the leading anti-Shiite power, and a popular Western ally. Arab Spring successes in
other states made Assad Regime irreversibly unpopular. Egypt, a traditional key player
at that point of time was also facing its own power transition. Libya was in the midst
of its own civil war. There was a lack of consensus among the Arab states on how to
deal with Syria. Algeria and Iraq were suspicious of Arab Leagues increasing
involvement. Due to this, Iraq and Lebanon refused to accept the sanctions. The Arab
states were also divided in recognising Syrias political opposition, whose officials
had encouraged for a military intervention.158
The force of the Arab Spring had made it difficult for the general Arab public
to back brutal dictators. Even benevolent monarchies in the region were concerned of
their popularity. Assads own brutal crackdown made any hope for support from the
Syrian populace impossible. This was one of the key reasons why it was difficult for

156
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/a-staggering-new-death-toll-for-syrias-war-
470000/ [11 Oct 2016].
157
D. Butter, Syrias Economy: Picking Up the Pieces, The Royal Institute of International
Affairs Chatham House, London, UK, 2015.
https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/20150623SyriaEconomy
Butter.pdf [18 June 2016].
158
Abboud S.N., 2016. Syria, Polity Press, Massachusetts USA, p.123.
the Assad Regime to recruit youths to join, thus the regime continued to face
manpower depletion.

Sectarianism
The shift from a nationalist nature of uprisings to sectarian fighting made the supply
of recruits for either side virtually limitless, making the conflict more protracted and
difficult to be solved decisively. The Middle East being a Sunni majority region
ensured that the supply of recruits on the Sunni side (rebels) is consistent, thus making
it harder for the Assad Regime to gain the advantage. The sectarian nature had evolved
during the militarisation process. Polarisation of regional support was also sectarian in
nature, for example, how Iran and Hezbollah were on the Alawi regimes side, while
Saudi and Qatar being the Sunnis regional power were on the rebels side. Each sides
respective regional backers would ensure that the balance of power, this in turn made
it ripe for protraction of the conflict.

Support for the Assad Regime: Shiite Backers

Support from Iran was indeed strong: giving arms, training, military personnel,
financing, and political support. There were significant support that came from
Hezbollah. However, Irans exhaustion could be seen by its offer of asylum protection
to Assad, and its commitment elsewhere, notably Yemen.
It was estimated that there were around 10,000 Iranian operatives in Syria as of
December 2013.159 According to the UN, Iran spent at least US$6 billion every year to
support Assad.160 Iran was also experiencing fatigue as it had commitments in Iraq
and Yemen, and on-going concerns over the Golan region.161 Iran offered Assad and
his family asylum in the Islamic Republic. From Iran, Assad could continue
orchestrating his military campaign in Syria, however, Assad rejected the offer.162
Taken from a different perspective, Iran itself was under sanctions, and the nuclear
programme deal with the US was seen as a way of lifting those sanctions. Continuous
159
Email Interview Answers by Miss Zuwara Razali, Senior Civilian Analyst (Middle East
and International Organisation), Defence Intelligence Staff Division, Ministry of Defence Malaysia [17
August 2016].

160
ibid.
161
R. Flores, Flash Points: Is Syria's Assad losing power?, CBS News.
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/flash-points-syria-assad-losing-power/ [11 June 2016].
162
i24news, Iran offered Syrian president Assad and his family asylum: report.
http://www.i24news.tv/en/news/international/middle-east/110770-160423-iran-offered-syrian-
president-bashar-Al-Assad-and-his-family-asylum-report [11 June 2016].
support for Assad would only distant Irans relation with the US, which will be
damaging for Iran in the long term. This element, coupled with the drop in oil prices
had caused prolonged support for Assad Regime unsustainable.163

Syria was pivotal to the Hezbollah-Iran alliance. Iran provided as much as

US$200 million annually to Hezbollah.164 In mid-2016, Hezbollah promised to send
more fighters to defend Aleppo, a city critical to the defence of Damascus.165 It could
be seen that the support from Hezbollah was an integral part to ensure the regimes
survival. It showed that Hezbollah had remained relentless in their support, even after
years of fighting in Syria. Hezbollah was not a part of the Syrian forces, so there was
only so much Assad could do to control them.

Support for Syrian Opposition: Sunni Challengers

Strong support (arms and finance) from Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Turkey, and Jordan, has
made Assad virtually surrounded by states opposing him. Nonetheless, Saudi and
Qatars divergence in their support for the rebels caused fragmentation among the
rebels. Western restriction of the supply of arms to the rebels, limited leeway for
regional backers, while the regime faced no such restriction. This had made the rebels
to be less effective something Assad could have taken advantage of. The Saudi
Qatar divergence had given more challenges to the mediators, or Assad to satisfy
these key regional backers of the opposition in any negotiation. Turkeys stand on
Assads oust and accusations of an ISIS-Syrian regime tactical alliance, further
hindered the prospects of effective negotiation.
Recently there was an improved cohesion among the rebels and increased
regional support to rebels in the face of Russian intervention. In fact, the rebels made
some gains with the intensified Saudi support. It was cited that the supply of anti-tank
weapons was a significant factor.166 In February 2016, the Saudi Foreign Minister had
even proposed supplying the rebels with surface-to-air missiles (SAM). 167 Qatar also

163
Abboud S.N., 2016. Syria, Polity Press, Massachusetts USA, p.132.
164
Institute for the Study of War, Hezbollah in Syria,
http://www.understandingwar.org/report/hezbollah-syria. [30 July 2016].

165
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2016/06/hezbollah-send-fighters-syria-aleppo-
160624180847854.html [30 July 2016].
166
L. Bassam and T. Perry, Saudi Arabia's 'Intensified' Support to Syrian Rebels is Reportedly
Slowing Regime Advances, Business Insider. http://www.businessinsider.com/saudi-arabias-intensified-
support-to-syrian-rebels-is-reportedly-slowing-regime-advances-2015-11?IR=T&r=US&IR=T [19 June
2016].

167
L. Dearden, Saudi Arabia Recommends Giving Surface-To-Air Missiles to Syrian Rebels to
'Change Balance of Power', Independent. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-
east/saudi-arabia-recommends-giving-surface-to-air-missiles-to-syrian-rebels-to-change-balance-of-
power-a6886206.html [19 June 2016].
used its powerful media tool the Al-Jazeera Network - for propaganda. Qatars
support for groups linked to the Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Qaedas affiliates were
against Saudis interests. The rift between Qatar and Saudi had also put the US in an
awkward position. Saudi has been a long-time ally and a main oil supplier to the US.
Qatar, on the other hand, is host to the US Pentagons main forward operation centre.
Turkey remains the main route for the supply of arms and fighters into Syria.
If there was one country that could initially reduce tensions and mediate the process, it
would have been Turkey. Yet Turkey opted to side with Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The
rebels recent progress and improved cohesion were due to changes in the regional
posture brought about by the Saudis new King Salman who sees Iran as a more
pressing threat. This recent development could have contributed to greater resistance
by the rebels, making it harder for the Assad Regime to win.168

The March of ISIS

ISIS intervention shifted the Western and regional focus to ISIS, especially following
the ISIS terror attacks on Western cities. ISIS also fights against the Syrian rebels.
ISIS entry justifies Russias intervention, which the Russians use to attack the rebels
too. ISIS adds another front for the regime to fight in addition to fighting against the
rebels and Kurds. ISIS, unlike the rebel groups would never feature in any negotiation
table and is likely to have no interest in negotiations. This presents Assad with limited
opportunity to regain the grounds lost to ISIS through negotiations. This leaves him
with the military option. In May 2016, ISIS detonated car bombs and suicide bombs in
the coastal cities of Jableh and Tartous, killing 150 people and wounding more than
255. This shows that despite sustaining some loss after Russias intervention, ISIS was
still capable of attacks at the core of the Assad Regime. 169 ISIS considerable income
has helped it to sustain the conflict. As of September 2014, ISIS earned US$2 million
per day from the sale of oil in Syria and Iraq, not including income from taxation,
extortion, and the black market.170
The Assad Regime would need significant ground forces to drive ISIS out,
something Assad simply did not have while fighting the rebels. Even General Martin
Dempsey, the US Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff, had hinted on the need for

168
N. Walsh, Analysis: Syrias Al-Assad Regime in Trouble, Losing Ground.
http://www.govtslaves.info/analysis-syrias-Al-Assad-regime-in-trouble-losing-ground/ [11 June 2016].
169
http://theconversation.com/islamic-state-strikes-in-assad-territory-expose-his-and-russias-
weaknesses-59854 [11 June 2016]

170
C. Lister, Assessing Syrias Jihad, in T. Dodge and E. Hokayem (eds), Middle Eastern
Security, The US Pivot and the Rise of ISIS, Routledge, International Institute for Strategic Studies,
ADELPHI Series 447- 448, London UK, 2014. pp. 75-77.
ground forces in order to degrade and ultimately destroy ISIS. 171 Assad took
advantage of ISIS involvement in fighting the Syrian rebels, in which he branded all
opposition fighters as terrorists.

GLOBAL GEOPOLITICS AND INTERVENTIONS

The Wilted Wrath of the West
Westerns supply of arms, non-lethal aid, and training helped to sustain the rebellion.
However, Westerns limit of supply of advanced weapons (especially anti-air) to
rebels due to concerns on Jihadist receiving them reduced rebels effectiveness. The
Pentagon in October 2015 ended its program of equipping and training the rebels, a
program which had amounted to an expense of USD500 million.172

Western policies towards Syria was inconsistent, lackluster, and lack of will to
intervene. Westerns action after the Assad Regime had opted for chemical weapons
was also limited. Assad realised that if the West would not intervene even after the
application of chemical weapons, there would hardly likely be any Western direct
attack on them in the future. This was partly due the US fatigue on their War on
Terror campaign. Without any direct Western attacks, there was no prospect of a
rebels decisive victory. Dr Maszlee viewed this as an indication that the West were
not serious in stopping the conflict for fear of escalation of tensions with Russia. 173
Assad should have been able to capitalise on this to end the rebellion, especially
before the incursion of ISIS.

Western sanctions were ineffective in changing Assads behaviour or inducing

massive defections. Western sanctions made it difficult for the Assad Regime to be
militarily effective or to rule provinces it controls. In turn, this prolonged the
situation, and made it difficult for the Assad Regime to end the conflict.

Direct Western military intervention against the Assad forces would bring
many difficulties. Firstly, even if direct attacks would force Assad to seek negotiation,
there were no clear and reliable negotiation partner among the rebels. In fact, as the
171
J. Stern and J.M. Berger, ISIS: The State of Terror, William Collins, London, UK, 2015, p.
234.
172

Email Interview Answers by Miss Zuwara Razali, Senior Civilian Analyst (Middle East and
International Organisation), Defence Intelligence Staff Division, Ministry of Defence Malaysia. [17
August 2016]. In some way it can be seen as the US acknowledging it had not achieved its objective.
173
Email Interview Answers by Dr Maszlee Malik, Assistant Professor, Department of Fiqh
and Usul al-Fiqh, International Islamic University Malaysia [29 September 2016].
jihadist groups were the dominant ones. Western intervention would in some way
hand over the power to the extremists. Additionally, there is no clear credible
competitor to Assads leadership whom the West could promote to come into power
should the opposition side wins. Experts were also of the view that the Western
governments had sabotaged UN peace proposals by vetoing Assads inclusion in
negotiations.174 Westerns resistance to include Assad as part of peace negotiations
hindered effective negotiations.

Enter Russian Hordes

Russia had provided strong support in the form of supply of arms, training, and direct
military intervention to help the regime regain some grounds. It was reported that in
December 2012, Russian troops disguised as military advisers had manned Russian-
supplied anti-air weapons. It was alleged that Syrias credible air defences was an
important factor of the US non-interference against Assad or the imposing of a no-fly
zone.175 In late 2013, Russia supplied various equipment and weapons, including new
armoured vehicles, radar and guided bombs.176 Politically, Russias Veto vote at the
UN (strongly backed by Chinas Veto) was vital for Assad Regimes survival.
However, it might have given Assad a false sense of guarantee to do as they please
and stall one peace proposal after another in hope to regain control of the whole state.
In turn, this contributed to the prolonging of the conflict.

The stated aim of Russias intervention is to fight the ISIS and other terrorists.
Russias intervention against ISIS indirectly improved Assads image as a force to
fight ISIS directly. While undeniably that its intervention did cause damage to ISIS,
Russia had also ended up attacking moderate Syrian rebels. Framing the intervention
as counter-terrorism was convenient for Russia since the rebels were comprised of
several groups, many of which were either actual extremists or are linked to the
movement. The more the international community branded these groups as terrorists,
the greater the latitude for Russia and the Assad Regime has, to attack while
restricting the Westerns support for the rebels. Russia had even attempted to persuade
the UNSC to include the Islam Army and Ahrar al-Sham in the UNs terror group
list.177

174
I. Sinclair, Has Wester Intervention Prolonged the Syrian Civil War? And Has Our Press Covered It
Up? http://www.juancole.com/2016/03/has-western-intervention-prolonged-the-syrian-civil-war-has-
our-press-covered-it-up.html [11 June 2016]. The UN viewed that since Assad was part of the problem
he should also be part of the solution.
175
Email Interview Answers by Miss Zuwara Razali, Senior Civilian Analyst (Middle East and
International Organisation), Defence Intelligence Staff Division, Ministry of Defence Malaysia.
176
ibid.

177
A. Lund, A Ceasefire in Syria? http://carnegie-mec.org/diwan/62765 [11 Oct 2016].
 However, Russias intervention was also largely for Russias geopolitical and
domestic benefits, not entirely for Assads victory. Firstly, it was to reassert itself
politically and militarily beyond its neighbourhood. In doing so, they can still be
recognised as a major world power. Linked to this reason, is their chance to gain
leverage and advantage over the West with regards to the Ukraine issue and the lifting
of sanctions related to it. Russia had hoped to assert its influences in the Middle East,
and this was reflected by their actions of securing its naval base at Tartus, and playing
a key role in peace negotiations. Russias early withdrawal indicated the unwillingness
to be engaged for a long period, and as criticism of Assads intention to recapture
whole country, bringing in the possibility of easing out Assad eventually. Russias
agreement on the eradication of chemical weapons indicated that Russia did not just
gave a blank cheque to Assad, and its support is not unconditional. Even after its
partial withdrawal, Russias military support remained considerable. Kozhanov
pointed out that Russia had continued keeping military bases at Tartus, and
Khmeimim. This was alongside maintaining advanced jets, strike helicopters, and
modern air defence systems in the region. Yet again, Assad had failed to achieve any
major military victory.178

Olive Branch: International Peace Proposals

In 2012, Kofi Annan, the then UN Special Representative for Syria had
proposed a peace initiative which would serve as a transitional plan. It proposed for an
end to violence, access to humanitarian assistance, President Assads resignation, and
a transition leading to a multi-party democratic system. Interestingly, the negotiation
did not include representatives from the Syrian government nor the opposition, but
rather only included countries supporting both sides to discuss the proposed agenda.
The regime rejected the proposal due to the participation of terrorists, while the
opposition insisted on Assads resignation. An UN Observers mission was deployed
beginning April 2012, but was suspended in August due to violence and lack of
cooperation from the regime.179 The proposal (Geneva I) had also failed because the
countries supporting either side were not fully committed. Iran and Saudi Arabia
seemed stuck in their tunnel vision situation of a geopolitical contest. Western states
were reluctant to back their support with political pressure on the opposition. Russia
and China were skeptical and had opposed the proposal for Assads resignation.
Failure of the proposal had led to Annans resignation.
Lakhdar Brahimi who replaced Annan had brought in regime and opposition
representatives in the subsequent talks. By then, the opposition was so fragmented,
178
N. Kozhanov, Russias Withdrawal from Syria is Nothing of the Kind.
http://carnegie.ru/2016/03/21/russia-s-withdrawal-from-syria-is-nothing-of-kind-pub-63137 [11 Oct
2016].
179
Abboud S.N., 2016. Syria, Polity Press, Massachusetts USA, pp. 150-151.
they could not come to an agreement and was left unsatisfied with the representation.
Both warring sides did not attend the meeting in good faith. The Syrian National
Council had withdrawn its participation from the talks, and the armed rebel groups
rejected the dialogue. The Islamist elements of the armed rebels gained more
influence, and by then, ISIS had already entered the battle scene. This enabled the
regime to frame the conflict as a counter-terrorism effort, considering that the
opposition was allegedly composed of terrorists, and that they should not be
negotiated with. Meanwhile, regional backers continued to be flippant on the issue. 180
There were lack of political incentives from international players to bring the parties
together to the negotiation table.181 Thus, Brahimis Geneva II had failed, and had to
resign, only to be replaced by Stefan de Mistura.
Stefan de Mistura adopted a radically approach through a bottoms-up strategy
of freezing local areas. This approach had focused on local ceasefires starting with
Aleppo, rather than proposing a larger picture peace plan like a transition government.
This was done with the hope of allowing access to humanitarian aid, and building the
momentum and confidence towards a larger peace settlement. While the plan ensured
engagement with actors on the ground, unlike the previous two which were more
disconnected with reality, it did not provide clearly the incentives for the fighters to
lay down arms. Additionally, there was nothing that encourages the fighters to stop
from simply moving from the frozen area to another area to fight. 182 The plan did not
bear any significant achievement as of mid-2016. Moscow had also made a peace
proposal in 2014, led by its Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov. The proposal
was problematic as it only includes carefully selected opposition who were essentially
loyal to the regime, and does not pose any serious threats to the regime. Another
reason why it was an issue was that, it did not address the oppositions key demands,
in particular Assads resignation which was not an agenda the opposition was
prepared to discuss at all. Not surprisingly, all key opposition groups rejected it.183
CONCLUSION
Domestically, while the oppositions fragmentation was a significant weakness that
Assad should have capitalised on, there were overwhelmingly greater arguments
happening in Syrias domestic politics that prevented Assad from being able to end the
rebellion. Several factors were deemed to be the significant reasons behind this

180
Abboud S.N., 2016. Syria, Polity Press, Massachusetts USA, pp. 152-156.
International actors like the US were ambivalent, apparently more concerned with the entry and spread
of ISIS control in Syria and their global threat, added by the refugee crisis and on-going nuclear
weapons program deal with Iran. This resulted in the West themselves began framing their on
involvement as counter-terrorism effort.
181
ibid.
182
Abboud S.N., 2016. Syria, Polity Press, Massachusetts USA, pp. 156-158.
183
Abboud S.N., 2016. Syria, Polity Press, Massachusetts USA, pp. 158-160.
situation. These are the dire manpower shortage, and the lack of economic and social
facilities, which made it extremely hard for the Assad Regime to seize the opportunity
to win militarily. Likewise, Assads complete rejection of any proposal of a power
transition and the pattern of minority rule tend to fight to the bitter end also hinder
likelihood of ending rebellion through peace negotiations. Hence the above finding
agrees that Syrian domestic politics contribute more to the Assad Regimes inability to
end the armed rebellion.
Looking at Middle East geopolitics, the weightage of both sides of argument is
more balanced or less distinctive, in comparison to the situation with their domestic
politics. The growing sectarian (Sunni-Shiite) divide had not only become the catalyst
of the conflict at the beginning, but had sustained it.184 Nonetheless since regional
geopolitics were geared towards protracting the conflict, the overall regional
geopolitics, albeit by a narrow margin, did not favour Assad to end the rebellion.
Middle East geopolitics therefore had contributed more to the Assad Regimes
inability to end the armed rebellion.
At global level, the arguments on both sides were also quite balanced
compared to domestic politics. However, due to clearly strong Russias support and
weaker Western support, global geopolitics was deemed to slightly favour Assad in
ending the rebellion. Hence this rejects with the third assumption. Global geopolitics
on the whole does not contribute more to the inability of the Assad Regime to end the
armed rebellion.
This study therefore broadly deduces that it is the regimes own lack of
manpower, effective command, and inadequate economic and social means as well as
the tendency of its brutal dictators who came from the ethnic minority to fight to the
bitter end, that acted as the principal reason to Assads inability to end the civil war. It
is arguably because of this, that Assad could not ride on Russias direct military
intervention, and Irans virtually limitless support to win militarily or negotiate
peacefully. It is because of these reasons that the regime could not capitalise on the
fragmentation of the rebels, the divergence of regional backers, and the lack of
political will from the Western region. Thus, without adequate means for Assad to
decisively win, the war can only be prolonged.
The main implication of the findings is the need to scrutinize deeper or focus
academic studies on the Assad Regime to help end the quagmire. This study had
identified the regime as the main component in finding the preferred solution. In order
to studying the regime, it is not sufficient to study Assads biography alone. The
regime structure, evolution, and comparison with other regional regimes would
provide better context and understanding. The study had extended its breadth, as it
infers for diplomats closer examination on the regimes mind-set, which drives not

184
The fiercely competing regional sectarian powers tremendously shaped the course of the
conflict which otherwise were just domestic political unrests.
only the domestic behaviour but also foreign policies. Only with deeper understanding
of Assad and his regime, both through academic study and diplomatic engagement,
one can unlock the stubbornness of the regime to consider negotiating power
transition and to make it abandoning the fight to the severe and catastrophic end.

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SUPERVISOR

Tan, Kim Hua (Ph.D) is Assoc Professor at the Sustainability of Language Sciences
Research Centre (SOLS), Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, UKM. A little
on some of her projects. She co-led a consultative project in collaboration with
MIMOS in the development of an automatic Eng Malay translation software, a
corollary of two smaller projects of which she was also a project member, Provision
of Grammatical analysis evaluation services for the enhancement and expansion of a
Bilingual Knowledge Bank and The Evaluation of Grammatical Analysis in the
Development of E-Translation Software. Late 2013, UiTM Sarawak has invited her
as a guest speaker to share her project experiences on electronic lexicography with the
academic staff members. 2016 onwards saw her collaboration with NIOSH (National
Occupational Safety and Health) on a project The Development of Enhanced
bilingual glossary for Hygiene using corpus-based techniques. Her more recent
appointments include the guest editor of Pertanika JSSH Vol. 24(S) Feb, 2016 and
chief editor of FASeH, FSSK 2016/ 2017 research bulletin. Much of her research
interests centred around digital humanities, including corpus-driven research, corpus
lexicography and studies on the interrelationship between language, power and
ideology.