[ORAL ARGUMENT SCHEDULED FOR APRIL 10, 2017]

No. 16-5248

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

SAIFULLAH PARACHA,

Petitioner-Appellant,

v.

DONALD J. TRUMP, et al.,

Respondents-Appellees.

On Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

BRIEF FOR APPELLEES

CHAD A. READLER
Acting Assistant Attorney General
CHANNING D. PHILLIPS
United States Attorney
MATTHEW M. COLLETTE
MICHAEL SHIH
Attorneys, Appellate Staff
Civil Division, Room 7268
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, DC 20530
(202) 353-6880
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, RULINGS, AND

RELATED CASES

GLOSSARY

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ...................................................................................1

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES..........................................................................................1

PERTINENT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION .........................................................2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .............................................................................................2

A. Parachas Confinement and Habeas Petition ................................................ 2

B. Parachas Bill of Attainder Claims ................................................................... 3

C. The District Courts Decision .......................................................................... 7

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ..............................................................................................9

STANDARD OF REVIEW ................................................................................................ 11

ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................................... 11

I. Paracha Lacks Standing To Pursue His Bill-of-Attainder Claim. ....................... 11

A. The district court properly rejected both of Parachas

theories of standing. ........................................................................................12

B. Parachas contrary arguments are unpersuasive. .........................................15

II. Parachas Claims Are Not Cognizable in Habeas and Are

Therefore Barred by 28 U.S.C. 2241(e)(2). .......................................................... 19

III. The Challenged Statutory Provisions at Issue Are Not Bills

of Attainder.................................................................................................................. 23

CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 27
ii
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

ADDENDUM

iii
 TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases: Page(s)

* Aamer v. Obama,
742 F.3d 1023 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ...........................................................................10, 21, 22
Al-Madhwani v. Obama,
642 F.3d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 2011) ....................................................................................... 23
* Al-Zahrani v. Rodriguez,
669 F.3d 315 (D.C. Cir. 2012) ................................................................................... 20, 21
Ali v. Obama,
736 F.3d 542 (D.C. Cir. 2013) ......................................................................................... 26
Ameur v. Gates,
759 F.3d 317 (4th Cir. 2014) ........................................................................................... 23
Arjay Assocs., Inc. v. Bush,
891 F.2d 894 (Fed. Cir. 1989).......................................................................................... 16
Bond v. United States,
564 U.S. 211 (2011) .......................................................................................................... 17
Boumediene v. Bush,
553 U.S. 723 (2008) .................................................................................................... 20, 21
Burke v. Barnes,
479 U.S. 361 (1987) .......................................................................................................... 11
Clapper v. Amnesty Intl USA,
133 S. Ct. 1138 .................................................................................................................. 12
Communist Party of United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd.,
367 U.S. 1 (1961) .............................................................................................................. 23
Foretich v. United States,
351 F.3d 1198 (D.C. Cir. 2003) ...........................................................................16, 25, 26
Hamad v. Gates,
732 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2013) ........................................................................................... 23
__________________________
* Authorities upon which we chiefly rely are marked with asterisks.
iv
INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919 (1983) .......................................................................................................... 16
Janko v. Gates,
741 F.3d 136 (D.C. Cir. 2014) ................................................................................... 11, 22
* Kiyemba v. Obama,
555 F.3d 1022 (D.C. Cir. 2009), vacated, 559 U.S. 131,
reinstated, 605 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2010) ...................................................... 22-23, 24
561 F.3d 509 (D.C. Cir. 2009) ......................................................................................... 20
605 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2010) .................................................................... 11, 23, 24, 25
Lexmark Intl, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014) ...................................................................................................... 17
* Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555 (1992) .................................................................................................... 11, 12
Navegar, Inc. v. United States,
103 F.3d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1997) ......................................................................................... 16
* Preiser v. Rodriguez,
411 U.S. 475 (1973) .......................................................................................................... 21
Raines v. Byrd,
521 U.S. 811 (1997) .......................................................................................................... 12
Scenic Am. Inc. v. U.S. Dept of Transp.,
836 F.3d 42 (D.C. Cir. 2016) ........................................................................................... 11
Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Grp.,
468 U.S. 841 (1984) .......................................................................................................... 23
Simmonds v. Abbott,
169 F. Appx 840 (5th Cir. 2006) .................................................................................... 16
Spencer v. Kemna,
523 U.S. 1 (1998) .............................................................................................................. 17
United States v. Brown,
381 U.S. 437 (1965) .......................................................................................................... 16
United States v. Lovett,
328 U.S. 303 (1946) .......................................................................................................... 16
v
Warger v. Shauers,
135 S. Ct. 521 (2014) ........................................................................................................ 22
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,
343 U.S. 579 (1952) .......................................................................................................... 26
Zivotofsky ex rel. Ari Z. v. Secretary of State,
444 F.3d 614 (D.C. Cir. 2006), affd. 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015)........................................ 18
Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry,
135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015) ...................................................................................................... 18

U.S. Constitution:

Art. I, 9, cl. 3 (Bill of Attainder Clause)............................................................................ 2

Statutes:

2017 Continuing Appropriations and Military Construction,

Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act,
Pub. L. No. 114-223, 130 Stat. 857 (2016) ...................................................................... 5
Authorization for Use of Military Force,
Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) ............................ 2, 8, 10, 12, 13, 15, 19, 24
Carl Levin and Howard P. Buck McKeon National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, Pub. L. 113-291,
128 Stat. 2392 (2014) ...................................................................................................... 5-6
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 2015,
Pub. L. No. 113-235, 128 Stat. 2130 (2014) ................................................................... 7
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113,
129 Stat. 2242 (2015):
Div. B, tit. V ................................................................................................................. 4, 5
Div. M, tit. VI .................................................................................................................. 6
Div. K, tit. VII ................................................................................................................. 7

vi
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016,
Pub. L. No. 114-92, 129 Stat. 726 (2015) ............................................................ 7, 14, 15
28 U.S.C. 1291 ..................................................................................................................... 1
28 U.S.C. 2241(a) ................................................................................................................. 1
28 U.S.C. 2241(e) ............................................................................................................... 19
28 U.S.C. 2241(e)(1) .......................................................................................................... 19
* 28 U.S.C. 2241(e)(2) ........................................................... 1, 8, 9, 10, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23

Rule:

Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B) ...................................................................................................... 1

Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) ........................................................................................................... 1, 9

Other Authorities:

Blacks Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) ................................................................................. 25

Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 22, 2009) ............................................. 3

Exec. Order No. 13,567, 76 Fed. Reg. 13,277 (Mar. 7, 2011)........................................... 3

U.S. Dept of Def., Periodic Review Board:

Memorandum for the Record (Oct. 12, 2016), http://go.usa.gov/x9JKZ ......................... 3

Unclassified Summary of Final Determination

(Apr. 7, 2016), http://go.usa.gov/x9JKg ............................................................... 3

William Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents (rev. 2d ed. 1920) .................................... 26

vii
 CERTIFICATE AS TO PARTIES, RULINGS, AND RELATED CASES

Pursuant to D.C. Circuit Rule 28(a)(1), the undersigned counsel certifies as

follows:

A. Parties and Amici

Saifullah Paracha is the petitioner-appellant. The respondents-appellees are

Donald J. Trump, in his official capacity as President of the United States; James

Mattis, in his official capacity as Secretary of Defense; and Rear Admiral Peter J.

Clarke, in his official capacity as Commander of the Joint Task Force Guantanamo.

There are no amici.

B. Rulings Under Review

The ruling under review is the district courts decision denying Parachas

motion for summary judgment, which the court certified as a partial final judgment

pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b). Paracha v. Obama, 194 F. Supp. 3d

7 (D.D.C. 2016).

C. Related Cases
This case has not previously been before this Court. Appellants petition for a

writ of habeas corpus remains pending in the United States District Court for the

District of Columbia. See Paracha v. Trump, No. 1:04-cv-2022 (D.D.C.).

/s/ Michael Shih

MICHAEL SHIH
 GLOSSARY

AUMF Authorization for Use of Military Force

 STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Petitioner-appellant Saifullah Paracha invoked the district courts jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. 2241(a). On April 30, 2015, Paracha moved for summary judgment

on his bill-of-attainder claim. On June 16, 2016, the district court denied Parachas

motion for want of subject-matter jurisdiction on two grounds: that Parachas claim

was barred by 28 U.S.C. 2241(e)(2), and that Paracha lacked standing. On July 29,

2016, the court entered a partial final judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil

Procedure 54(b). Paracha filed a timely notice of appeal on August 11, 2016. See Fed.

R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B). This Court has appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

Paracha is a Pakistani national detained at the United States Naval Station in

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. In the course of litigating his pending petition for a writ of

habeas corpus, Paracha sought a declaration that thirty-two statutory provisions

some restricting the Executive Branchs authority to transfer or release individuals

detained at Guantanamo; others imposing reporting requirements on the Executive

Branchare unconstitutional bills of attainder. The issues presented are:

(1) Whether the district court correctly ruled that Paracha lacked Article III

standing to bring his bill-of-attainder claim;

(2) Whether the district court correctly ruled that it lacked subject-matter

jurisdiction over Parachas bill-of-attainder claim under 28 U.S.C. 2241(e)(2); and

 (3) Whether, if the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction, the challenged

provisions are unconstitutional bills of attainder.

PERTINENT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION

Article I, Section 9, Clause 3 of the U.S. Constitution provides that No Bill of

Attainder . . . shall be passed.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Parachas Confinement and Habeas Petition

Petitioner-appellant Saifullah Paracha is a Pakistani national. Since 2004, he has

been detained at Guantanamo pursuant to the Authorization for Use of Military

Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001) (2001 AUMF), as

informed by the law of war. Paracha filed a habeas petition in 2004. The case was

stayed at his request in 2011.

In 2009, President Barack Obama convened a Guantanamo Review Task Force

to review . . . the status of each individual currently detained at Guantanamo and to

determine whether it is possible to transfer or release the individual[] consistent with

the national security and foreign policy interests of the United States. Exec. Order

No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897, 4898-99 (Jan. 22, 2009). Individuals not approved

for release or transfer would be further evaluated to determine whether the Federal

Government should seek to prosecute the detained individuals for any offenses they

may have committed. Id. The order made clear that neither the order nor any Task

2
Force determination would create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural,

enforceable at law or in equity by any party. Id. at 4900.

The Guantanamo Review Task Force examined Parachas case, determined not

to approve him for transfer or release, and referred him for potential prosecution.

Dkt. 389-1, Ex. 1, at 4.

In 2011, President Obama established a Periodic Review Board tasked with

conducting reviews to determine whether continued custody of individual

Guantanamo detainees remains necessary to protect against a continuing significant

threat to the security of the United States. See Exec. Order No. 13,567, 76 Fed. Reg.

13,277 (Mar. 7, 2011). In Parachas initial review, the Board determined that Paracha

should remain in custody at Guantanamo. See Periodic Review Board, Unclassified

Summary of Final Determination (Apr. 7, 2016), http://go.usa.gov/x9JKg. Several

months later, after conducting a file review, the Board ordered a second full review of

Parachas detention. Periodic Review Board, Memorandum for the Record (Oct. 12,

2016), http://go.usa.gov/x9JKZ.

B. Parachas Bill of Attainder Claims

In April 2015, while his habeas petition was stayed, Paracha filed a motion for

summary judgment, claiming that fourteen statutory provisions were unconstitutional

bills of attainder and seeking a declaration to that effect. Dkt. 401 at 6. The

government opposed Parachas motion, and the district court indicated that it would

defer its ruling until the stay was lifted. Paracha then moved to supplement his
3
motion with a bill-of-attainder challenge to eighteen more statutory provisions, see

Dkt. 413; Dkt. 418, and asked the court to lift the stay with respect to the

bill-of-attainder claim only.1

The thirty-two challenged provisions fall into four categories, and are listed for

the Courts convenience in the addendum to this brief. See Add. A1-A4.

1. Statutes Prohibiting Transfer or Release into the United States

Ten challenged provisions prohibit, in nearly identical terms, the Executive

Branch from using appropriated funds to transfer or release Guantanamo

detainees to or within the United States, its territories, or possessions. See, e.g.,

Consolidated Appropriations Act 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, div. B, tit. V,

527, 129 Stat. 2242, 2329 (2015). These provisions apply to Khalid Sheikh

Mohammed or any other detainee who (1) is not a United States citizen or a

member of the Armed Forces of the United States; and (2) is or was held on or after

June 24, 2009, at the United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, by the

Department of Defense. See, e.g., id. Several iterations of this restriction have

expired, but others remain in effect.

1
The stay has since been lifted in full. See Min. Order, Paracha v. Trump, No.
1:04-cv-2022 (D.D.C. Mar. 18, 2016). Parachas habeas petition is now being litigated
in district court.
4
 2. Provisions Restricting Preparation of Detention Facilities for Guantanamo Detainees

Eleven challenged provisions place restrictions on preparing facilities for

Guantanamo detainees. Ten of them prohibit, in nearly identical terms, the use of

appropriated funds to construct, acquire, or modify any [non-Guantanamo] facility in

the United States, its territories, or possessions to house any individual . . . who, as of

June 24, 2009, is located at Guantanamo and who:

(1) is not a citizen of the United States or a member of the Armed Forces of
the United States; and
(2) is
(A) in the custody or under the effective control of the Department of
defense; or
(B) otherwise under detention at United States Naval Station,
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.

Pub. L. No. 114-113, div. B, tit. V, 528, 129 Stat. at 2329. Again, several iterations

of this restriction have expired, but others remain in effect.2

The eleventh challenged provision in this category restricted funds made

available for fiscal year 2015 for the Department of Defense from being used to

construct new facilities at Guantanamo Bay absent a certification that the new

facilities would have an enduring military value independent of a high value

detention mission. Carl Levin and Howard P. Buck McKeon National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-291, 2808, 128 Stat. 2392,

2
Parachas opening brief notes (Br. 3) that Congress enacted another iteration
of this restriction in 2016. See 2017 Continuing Appropriations and Military
Construction, Veterans Affairs, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, Pub. L.
114-223, div. A, tit. V, 512 (2016).
5
2699 (2014). This provision has expired. Paracha has not challenged analogous

provisions that are currently in effect, so his claim is now moot with respect to this

provision.

3. Provisions Concerning Transfer or Release into Foreign Countries

Six challenged provisions concern the transfer or release of Guantanamo

detainees into foreign countries. Two of them bar the Executive Branch from using

appropriated funds to transfer or release Guantanamo detainees into four specific

countries: Libya, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. See National Defense Authorization Act

for Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92, 1033, 129 Stat. 726, 928 (2015); Pub. L.

No. 114-113, div. M, tit. VI, 603, 129 Stat. at 2929. Four others provide that, before

the Executive Branch can use appropriated funds to transfer or release Guantanamo

detainees into any other country, the Secretary of Defense must issue certain

notifications or certifications to Congress. See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 114-92, 1034, 129

Stat. at 969. Under the most recent such provision, the Secretary must certify that

the transfer concerned is in the national security interests of the United States, and

that the government of the foreign country . . . to which the [detainee] is to be

transferred is not a designated state sponsor of terrorism and has taken or agreed

to take appropriate steps to substantially mitigate any risk the [detainee] could attempt

to reengage in terrorist activity. Id. 1034(b), 129 Stat. at 969.

6
 4. Notice and Reporting Requirements

Five challenged provisions impose reporting requirements on the Executive

Branch to facilitate congressional oversight over operations at the Guantanamo

detention facility. Two identical provisions require the Secretary of State to notify

Congress [n]ot later than 5 days after the conclusion of an agreement with a country

. . . to receive by transfer or release individuals detained at United States Naval

Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. See Pub. L. No. 114-113, div. K, tit. VII, 7064,

129 Stat. at 2810 (2015); Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act

2015, Pub. L. No. 113-235, div. J, tit. VII, 7082, 128 Stat. 2130, 2683 (2014). The

three remaining provisions required the Executive Branch to issue one-time reports to

Congress containing: (1) a plan for the disposition of Guantanamo detainees, Pub.

L. No. 114-92, 1035(b)(4), 129 Stat. at 971; (2) information on detainees whom the

Executive Branch deemed high- or medium-risk threats to national security, id.

1037, 129 Stat. at 973; and (3) information about prior agreements between the

United States and foreign countries that enabled the transfer or release of detainees

into those countries, id. 1040, 129 Stat. at 975.

C. The District Courts Decision

The district court denied Parachas motion for want of subject-matter

jurisdiction. At the threshold, the court concluded that Paracha had failed to establish

standing to bring his bill-of-attainder challenge. App. 112. It rejected Parachas

argument that the challenged provisions injured him by preventing the government
7
from transferring him from the Guantanamo detention facility. The court explained

that the provisions did not cause Parachas detention because the government is

detaining him pursuant to a different statute: the 2001 AUMF. For the same reason,

invalidation of the provisions as bills of attainder would not afford Paracha any relief

from his detention.

The court also rejected Parachas alternative theory of standingthat the

challenged statutes injured his reputation. App. 112. The court acknowledged that

reputational injury deriving directly from government action can in some cases

support standing, but ruled that petitioners general allegations of reputational harm

did not meet this test. App. 113. The court emphasized that Paracha had failed to

show that the alleged harm to his reputation was caused by the challenged

provisionsas opposed to the conduct justifying his designation as an enemy

combatant. Id. That designation, the court further emphasized, would remain in

place even if Paracha prevailed on the merits of his claim. Id. Indeed, Paracha had

readily concede[d] that a resolution of this claim in his favor will have no impact

whatsoever upon his continued detention, nor will it actually affect his ability to be

transferred. Id.

In the alternative, the court ruled that Paracha could not prevail even if he had

standing because the court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

2241(e)(2). That provision divests courts of jurisdiction over any action relating to

any aspect of the detention, transfer, treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement

8
of a Guantanamo detainee that does not sound in habeas. Id. The court concluded

that Parachas claim does not sound in habeas because it does not implicate any aspect

of his confinementand is therefore barred by 2241(e)(2). App. 114-15.

The court entered partial final judgment for the government on Parachas

bill-of-attainder claim. App. 117-19; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Paracha challenges thirty-two statutory provisions as unconstitutional bills of

attainder. These provisions fall into four categories: (1) those that prohibit the

Executive Branch from expending appropriated funds to transfer Guantanamo

detainees to detention facilities in the United States; (2) those that prohibit the

Executive Branch from expending appropriated funds to acquire or modify detention

facilities to hold transferred Guantanamo detainees; (3) those that set conditions upon

the transfer or release of Guantanamo detainees into foreign countries, and that bar

transfer or release into four specified countries; and (4) those that require the

Executive Branch to issue certain notifications and reports to Congress.

The district court correctly rejected Parachas claim for want of subject-matter

jurisdiction on two independent grounds.

First, Paracha lacks Article III standing to bring this claim because neither of

his two theories of injury passes constitutional muster. Paracha asserts that the

challenged provisions limit the Executive Branchs authority to transfer him out of

Guantanamo. But the provisions in question did not cause his continued detention.
9
Paracha is detained at Guantanamo pursuant to the 2001 AUMF as informed by the

law of war. And Paracha remains detained at Guantanamo because the Executive

Branch has determined that he cannot be transferred or released. For the same

reason, Parachas asserted injury cannot be redressed by court order: Invalidation of

the challenged provisions would have no effect on his continued detention.

Paracha also asserts that the challenged provisions impugn his reputation by

labeling him a terrorist. As a factual matter, the provisions do no such thing. And

even if they did, the district court properly concluded that any reputational damage to

Paracha flows from his designation as an enemy combatant pursuant to the 2001

AUMFa designation that will not change even if this Court declares the challenged

provisions to be unconstitutional.

Second, 28 U.S.C. 2241(e)(2) limits the jurisdiction of the federal courts over

Guantanamo-related claims by detainees such as Paracha to those that may be raised

in a federal habeas petition. Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023, 1030 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

Parachas bill-of-attainder claim does not sound in habeas because, as Paracha

conceded below, it does not challenge the fact, place, duration, or conditions of his

confinement.

The district courts judgment should be affirmed even assuming that Paracha

can overcome these jurisdictional hurdles. This Court has already held that

prohibit[ions] on the expenditure of any funds to bring any Guantanamo detainee

to the United States are not bills of attainder because such prohibitions are not
10
legislative punishments; they deprive petitioners of no right they already possessed.

Kiyemba v. Obama, 605 F.3d 1046, 1048 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kiyemba III). That holding

controls this case.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

This Court reviews de novo the district courts dismissal of an action for lack

of subject-matter jurisdiction. Janko v. Gates, 741 F.3d 136, 139 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

ARGUMENT

I. Paracha Lacks Standing To Pursue His Bill-of-Attainder Claim.

The district court correctly concluded that Paracha lacks standing to pursue his

bill-of-attainder claim.3 As the party invoking jurisdiction, Paracha bears the burden

of proving all three elements of standing. Scenic Am. Inc. v. U.S. Dept of Transp., 836

F.3d 42, 48 (D.C. Cir. 2016). First, Paracha must demonstrate that the challenged

statutes have inflicted an injury in fact upon him: that is, an invasion of a legally

protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent,

not conjectural or hypothetical. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)

(quotation marks, citations, and footnote omitted). Second, Paracha must

demonstrate that the injury was fairly trace[able] to the challenged provisions. Id.

(alteration in original). Finally, Paracha must demonstrate that it is likely, as opposed

3
Many of the statutory provisions challenged by Paracha have expired or been
repealed. See Add. A1-A4. Parachas claim is therefore moot as to those provisions.
See Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361, 362 (1987).
11
to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a judgment in his favor. Id.

at 561 (quotation marks omitted). This inquiry is especially rigorous when

reaching the merits of the dispute would force [the Court] to decide whether an

action taken by [another branch] of the Federal Government was unconstitutional.

Clapper v. Amnesty Intl USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013) (quoting Raines v. Byrd, 521

U.S. 811, 819-20 (1997)).

A. The district court properly rejected both of Parachas

theories of standing.

Neither of Parachas two theories of standing meets these standards. His first

theory, which he refers to as a confinement injury (Br. 8), is that the thirty-two

challenged provisions harm him by making it harder for the Executive Branch to

transfer or release him from his current conditions of confinement in Guantanamo.

See App. 112. But not one provision is responsible for Parachas detention in

Guantanamo. Paracha is being detained at Guantanamo pursuant to a completely

different statutethe 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No.

107-40, 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001) (2001 AUMF), as informed by the law of

war.

Nor is any challenged provision responsible for Parachas continued detention in

Guantanamo. As Paracha acknowledges, military detainees are confined, released,

and exchanged by the executive branch at the discretion of the executive branch. Br.

8. The Executive Branch, of its own volition, has deemed Paracha unsuitable for

12
either transfer or release. Dkt. 389-1, Ex. 1, at 4. And because Parachas habeas claim

remains pending in district court, he cannot assert a legal right to release that would

supersede that Executive Branch determination.

In light of the Executive Branchs independent decision to continue detaining

Paracha under the 2001 AUMF, Parachas alleged injury is not fairly traceable to the

challenged provisions. Restrictions on transferwhether tied to specific countries or

to certification requirementsdo not affect Paracha because there are no plans to

move him for these restrictions to thwart. Restrictions on the construction of

facilities to house detainees in the United States likewise have no effect on him. And

Paracha has made no attempt to show how the general notice and reporting

requirements related to Guantanamo detainees stand in the way of his release. Thus,

to the extent Paracha bases his claim of injury on his continued confinement, he lacks

standing because none of the challenged provisions cause his injury.

Parachas confinement theory does not establish his standing for the separate

reason that a declaration that the provisions are bills of attainder would not afford

him any relief. To reiterate, Parachas detention is independent from the provisions

whose constitutionality he contests. As Paracha admitted below, a judgment in his

favor would have no impact on his detention, treatment, conditions of

confinement, and prospects of . . . getting [a] transfer or a trial. App. 113

(alteration in original).

13
 Parachas second theory of standing, which he labels a reputational injury

(Br. 8), is that the challenged statutes injure him by dubbing him a war criminal and

an enemy of humankind. This theory fares no better than the first. Although

reputational harm is a cognizable harm for purposes of Article III, the district court

properly concluded that none of the challenged provisions caused the asserted injury

to [Parachas] reputation. App. 113.

The text of the challenged provisions underscores this point. All of them refer

to Guantanamo detainees using some variant on the phrase [an] individual[] detained

at United States Naval Station, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. See supra p. 6. This language

merely defines the class of persons to which each provision applies, and Paracha is

included within that class solely because of his detainee status. The provisions cannot

fairly be read as instantiating a congressional judgment that Paracha and his fellow

Guantanamo detainees are guilty of any specific crimes.

Only two challenged provisions even arguably relate to the reputational harm

Paracha claims to have suffered. One is a certification requirement under which the

Secretary of Defense must assess[] the risk that an individual will engage in

terrorist activity . . . if released as a condition of transfer or release. Pub. L. No.

114-92, 1034(d), 129 Stat. at 970. The other is a one-time reporting requirement

that instructed the Secretary of Defense to inform Congress which Guantanamo

detainees had been deemed a high-risk or medium-risk threat to the United States.

Id. 1037, 129 Stat. at 973. As part of that report, Congress asked the Secretary to
14
explain whether the listed detainees had undertaken any prior actions in support of

terrorism, hostile actions against the United States . . . , gross violations of human

rights, and other violations of international law, and whether that detainee was

affiliated with Al-Qaeda or other terrorist groups. Id. 1037(b)(5)(A), (B), 129 Stat. at

973. These provisions fall far short of denigrating Paracha in the manner he asserts

they do.

Paracha would still not satisfy Article IIIs causation requirement under his

reading of these provisions. As the district court observed, any reputational harm

Paracha has suffered is far less likely to have resulted from the application of these

thirty-two provisions to him than from his designation as an enemy combatant under

the 2001 AUMF. This intervening cause makes the connection between the

challenged provisions and the damage to Parachas reputation too attenuated to

support standing. See App. 113.

For the same reason, Parachas reputational theory cannot satisfy Article IIIs

independent redressability requirement. Even if Paracha obtains all of the relief he

seeks, he will remain designated as an enemy combatant and will continue to be

detained as such. App. 113. The courts thus cannot provide a significant measure

of redress for the harm to [Parachas] reputation. App. 114 (quotation marks

omitted).

B. Parachas contrary arguments are unpersuasive.

Parachas three responses to the district courts ruling lack merit.

15
 1. Paracha argues (Br. 7) that [s]tanding is self-evident for persons and entities

against whom a bill of attainder is directed. But a litigant cannot circumvent the

limits on Article III jurisdiction with the talismanic invocation of the Bill of Attainder

Clause. This Court has not permitted a bill-of-attainder claim to proceed without first

examining whether the claimant had standing to bring it. E.g., Foretich v. United States,

351 F.3d 1198, 1210 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Navegar, Inc. v. United States, 103 F.3d 994, 999

(D.C. Cir. 1997). And other courts of appeals have dismissed bill-of-attainder claims

for want of jurisdiction on this basis. See, e.g., Arjay Assocs., Inc. v. Bush, 891 F.2d 894,

897-98 (Fed. Cir. 1989); Simmonds v. Abbott, 169 F. Appx 840, 840-41 (5th Cir. 2006).

The fact that a statute applies to a person does not automatically mean that it causes

imminent injury that will be redressed by invalidation of that statute.

Parachas argument (Br. 9) that cases striking down bills of attainder have

never required that the complainant be deprived of an enforceable right or a protected

liberty interest misses the point. None of the cases Paracha cites dispenses with the

requirement that a party show imminent injury caused by the challenged statute that

would be redressed if the statute were struck down. In United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S.

303 (1946), the Supreme Court invalidated a statute cutting off the salaries of specific

federal employees. In United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965), the Court overturned

the conviction of an individual under a criminal statute prohibiting members of the

Communist Party from leading labor organizations. And in INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.

919, 959 (1983) (Powell, J., concurring), Justice Powell argued that a statute
16
overturning an Executive Branch determination to suspend the deportation of

specific immigrants should be invalidated on bill-of-attainder grounds.

2. Paracha next argues (Br. 10) that he has standing because his bill of attainder

argument is a separation of powers argument . . . that always may be raised by an

affected individual. Again, Paracha is wrong. He does not cite, and the government

is not aware of, any authority suggesting that a plaintiff raising a separation-of-powers

argument may ignore Article IIIs requirements of injury, causation, and redressability.

In relying on Bond v. United States, 564 U.S. 211, 217 (2011), Paracha confuses

Article III standing with the distinct doctrine of prudential standingwhich, unlike

Article III standing, derives not from the Constitution but from judicial reluctance to

decide a case over which the court would otherwise have jurisdiction. See Lexmark

Intl, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (2014). The Bond Court

ultimately rejected the argument that prudential standing prevents a court from

hearing a federal prisoners claim that she had been convicted of a crime in violation

of the Tenth Amendment. But the Court reached that conclusion only after holding

that the prisonerwho had been imprisoned as a result of her conviction

clear[ly] satisfied the requirements of Article III because incarceration . . .

constitutes a concrete injury, caused by the conviction and redressable by invalidation

of the conviction. Bond, 564 U.S. at 217 (alteration in original) (quoting Spencer v.

Kemna, 523 U.S. 1, 7 (1998)). The Court did not hold, or even imply, that a party in

Parachas position has standing under Article III.

17
 Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015), is even further afield.

There, the Supreme Court affirmed a decision of this Court rejectingon separation-

of-powers groundsa plaintiffs claim that the State Department had violated his

right to have Israel recorded as his birthplace in his passport. Id. at 2083. Again,

however, plaintiff had Article III standing to bring that claim. As this Court

explained, Congress had conferred on [plaintiff] an individual right to have Israel

listed as his place of birth on his passport. See Zivotofsky ex rel. Ari Z. v. Secretary of

State, 444 F.3d 614, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2006), affd, 135 S. Ct. 2076. The State Department

allegedly violated that right by refusing to do soand courts could remedy that

violation by ordering the agency into compliance. Id.

3. Finally, Paracha argues (Br. 8) that the challenged provisions injure him by

preventing him from receiving privileges, such as paid labor, packages from home,

etc., to which he believes he is entitled. Elsewhere in his brief, he asserts that the

challenged provisions caused his confinement in a maximum security setting with

shackling, heavy surveillance, limited correspondence, etc. See Br. 22. Paracha

hypothesizes that, were it not for the challenged provisions, he would have been held

in traditional military captivity in a barracks-like setting. Id.

This refinement of Parachas confinement theory suffers from the same flaws.

It fails to meet the causation prong of the standing inquiry because not one provision

is responsible for his detention at Guantanamo; his placement there is attributable

entirely to the Executive Branchs decision to continue detaining him pursuant to the
18
authority granted by the 2001 AUMF as informed by the law of war. And not one

provision instructs the Executive Branch to hold Guantanamo detainees under

particular conditions; control over the conditions of confinement at the Guantanamo

facility remains vested in the Executive Branch. Separately, this argument fails to

meet the redressability prong of the standing inquiry because a declaration invalidating

the challenged provisions will not in any way modify the conditions of Parachas

confinement.

II. Parachas Claims Are Not Cognizable in Habeas and Are

Therefore Barred by 28 U.S.C. 2241(e)(2).

Even if Paracha had standing, his claim would be barred by 28 U.S.C.

2241(e)(2). As this Court has recognized, Congress has expressly limited the

subject-matter jurisdiction of Article III courts over Guantanamo-related claims to

claims that sound in habeas. Parachas bill-of-attainder claim does not sound in

habeas because it does not implicate any aspect of his detention, so it is barred by 28

U.S.C. 2241(e)(2).

In 28 U.S.C. 2241(e), Congress exercised its constitutional prerogative to

withdraw from federal courts jurisdiction over all claims brought against the United

States by detainees at Guantanamo Bay. One subsection of that provision bars

federal courts from hearing any application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on

behalf of a detainee. 28 U.S.C. 2241(e)(1). The other subsection bars federal

19
courts from hearing all actions relating to any aspect of the detention, transfer,

treatment, trial, or conditions of confinement of a detainee. Id. 2241(e)(2).

In Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008), the Supreme Court invalidated

2241(e)(1) with respect to detainees such as Paracha, holding that the withdrawal of

jurisdiction over detainee habeas petitions violated the Suspension Clause. But that

narrow holding did not invalidate 2241(e)(2), which this Court has subsequently

upheld as a valid exercise of congressional power. See, e.g., Al-Zahrani v. Rodriguez, 669

F.3d 315, 319 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Because 2241(e)(2) remains in force, a detainee who

brings a claim that relat[es] to any aspect of [his] detention [or] transfer and that

does not sound in habeas may not invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts.

Kiyemba v. Obama, 561 F.3d 509, 513 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Kiyemba II).

Section 2241(e)(2) bars Parachas claim. He alleges that thirty-two statutory

provisionswhich limit the Executive Branchs power to transfer or release

Guantanamo detainees, and which impose notice and reporting requirements on the

Executive Branchare unconstitutional because they harm his reputation and create

barriers to his release. This claim relat[es] to any aspect of the detention, transfer,

treatment, trial or conditions of confinement of Paracha. 28 U.S.C. 2241(e)(2).

Indeed, Paracha makes no attempt to show that his claims do not relate to his

detention or transfer.

Accordingly, the only possible avenue for jurisdiction over Parachas claim is if

it sounds in habeas. Kiyemba II, 561 F.3d at 513. It does not. The writ of habeas
20
corpus encompasses challenges to the fact, place, or duration of confinement, Preiser v.

Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 486 (1973), andin this Circuitto certain conditions of

confinement, Aamer v. Obama, 742 F.3d 1023, 1038 (D.C. Cir. 2014). 4 As Paracha

admitted in district court, no aspect of his confinement will change even if he prevails

on his bill-of-attainder claim. App. 113. His claim is therefore barred by 2241(e)(2).

Parachas rejoinders are unpersuasive. He first contends (Br. 20 n.5) that

2241(e)(2) does not apply to him because the Supreme Court invalidated it in

Boumediene, supra. As noted, this Court has rejected that argument. See Al-Zahrani, 669

F.3d at 319. Relatedly, Paracha urges (Br. 9 n.4) this Court to ignore 2241(e)(2) in

service of judicial economy. But this Court cannot disregard limitations on its

subject-matter jurisdiction to conserve judicial resources.

Paracha next suggests (Br. 8-9) that his claims sound in habeas because the

challenged provisions label him as a war criminal and an enemy of humankind.

But as explained above, the provisions do not instantiate any such judgment; they

refer to Guantanamo detainees only to set forth the individuals to whom they apply.

See supra p. 14-15. And even if the provisions did attach such labels to Paracha, he has

failed to explain how such labeling would at all implicate the fact, duration,

4
The Aamer majority held that certain conditions-of-confinement challenges
may be adjudicated in habeas cases, rejecting the governments argument that 28
U.S.C. 2241(e)(2) withdraws federal-court jurisdiction to consider them. That
holding controls here. The government respectfully disagrees with the jurisdictional
holding in Aamer, and preserves that issue for potential further review.
21
place, or conditions of his detention. See Aamer, 742 F.3d at 1036. Indeed,

Paracha conceded below that his bill-of-attainder claim has nothing to do with any

aspect of his confinement. See App. 115 n.3.

Finally, invoking the doctrine of constitutional avoidance (Br. 18-20), Paracha

urges this Court to interpret 2241(e)(2) in a manner that permits his claim to

proceed. That doctrine, however, does not apply to an unambiguous statute. See

Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 521, 529 (2014). And Paracha has failed to identify any

ambiguity in this statute, whose text plainly prohibits Article III courts from hearing

all non-habeas claims relating to any aspect of the detention [or] transfer of a

Guantanamo detainee. 28 U.S.C. 2241(e)(2).

Because Parachas constitutional arguments lack merit, avoidance would not be

warranted even assuming that the doctrine applies. He contends principally (Br.

13-18) that 2241(e)(2) deprives him of the ability to obtain relief from these

thirty-two alleged bills of attainder. But this Court has held that [t]he class of claims

to which 2241(e)(2) constitutionally applies includes any [non-habeas]

detention-related claims brought by a Guantanamo detainee, whether statutory or

constitutional. Janko v. Gates, 741 F.3d 136, 146 (D.C. Cir. 2014).

Paracha also contends, without elaboration (Br. 15), that 2241(e)(2) violates

[e]qual protection and due process. However, this Court has held that the due

process clause does not apply to Guantanamo detainees with no property or

presence in the sovereign territory of the United States. Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d
22
1022, 1026 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Kiyemba I), vacated, 559 U.S. 131 (per curiam), reinstated,

605 F.3d 1046 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (Kiyemba III); see also Al-Madhwani v. Obama, 642 F.3d

1071, 1077 (D.C. Cir. 2011). And even if the clause applied, every court to consider

such a challenge to 2241(e)(2) has rejected it. See Ameur v. Gates, 759 F.3d 317, 327-

29 (4th Cir. 2014); Hamad v. Gates, 732 F.3d 990, 1004-05 (9th Cir. 2013).

III. The Challenged Statutory Provisions at Issue Are Not Bills of

Attainder.

This Court should affirm the district courts judgment even if it concludes that

Paracha can surmount the jurisdictional hurdles identified above. In Kiyemba III, supra,

this Court held that statutory restrictions on the transfer of Guantanamo detainees to

the United States are not bills of attainder. That holding controls this case.

A bill of attainder is a law that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts

punishment upon an identifiable individual without provision of the protections of a

judicial trial. Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minnesota Pub. Interest Research Grp., 468 U.S. 841

(1984). Only the clearest proof suffices to establish the unconstitutionality of a

statute on such a ground. Communist Party of United States v. Subversive Activities Control

Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 83 (1961). In Kiyemba III, this Court applied that standard to hold that

statutory provisions prohibit[ing] the expenditure of any funds to bring any

Guantanamo detainee to the United States were not bills of attainder. 605 F.3d at

1048. Such prohibitions are not legislative punishments, the Court explained,

23
because they deprive [Guantanamo detainees] of no right they already possessed.

Id.

The provisions at issue in this case do not meaningfully differ from those in

Kiyemba III. The first three categories of provisions Paracha has challenged restrict the

Executive Branchs authority to transfer or release Guantanamo detainees into the

United States and other countries. But Paracha has no legal entitlement to transfer or

release: He is being detained under the 2001 AUMF as informed by the law of war,

and no court has concluded that his detention is unlawful. See App. 112. As for the

fourth category of provisions Paracha has challenged, which require the Executive

Branch to issue general notifications or reports to Congress for the purpose of

facilitating oversight, those provisions do not affect Paracha in the slightest, let alone

deprive him of a right. Thus, Parachas bill-of-attainder claim is foreclosed by Kiyemba

III.

Paracha asks this Court (Br. 20-21) to ignore Kiyemba III because he believes its

bill-of-attainder holding was dicta. That is incorrect. Plaintiffs in that case, all of

whom were Guantanamo detainees, sought a court order compelling their release into

the United States. See Kiyemba I, 555 F.3d at 1024. All of them had receivedand

rejectedoffers of resettlement in at least one other country. This Court declined to

grant those plaintiffs relief because the political branches held exclusive power . . . to

decide which aliens may, and which aliens may not, enter the United States, and on

what terms. Kiyemba III, 605 F.3d at 1048. To reach that conclusion, the Court
24
relied on statutory provisions restricting the Executive Branchs ability to transfer

Guantanamo detainees into the United States. Id. That reliance would have been

improper if the provisions were unconstitutional bills of attainder. Thus, the Courts

bill-of-attainder analysis was pivotal to its decision. See Blacks Law Dictionary (10th

ed. 2014) (defining holding). The fact that the concurring judge in Kiyemba III

would have denied plaintiffs relief without deciding the bill-of-attainder issue does not

change this conclusion. See 605 F.3d at 1052 n.6 (Rogers, J., concurring).

Nor can Paracha derive support from Foretich v. United States, 351 F.3d 1198

(D.C. Cir. 2003). In Foretich, this Court invalidated a congressional statute that

imposed a uniquely demanding child-custody standard on a single private individual

because of unproven allegations that he had sexually abused his child. Id. at 1204.

That statute made it more difficult for that individual, and only that individual, to

exercise his preexisting parental rights. Paracha, by contrast, lacks any right to

transfer or release. Because congressional restrictions on the circumstances under

which Paracha can be transferred or released impose no burdens upon him, this case

bears no resemblance to Foretich.

The framework applied in Foretich underscores that the challenged provisions

are not bills of attainder. A statute imposes punishment in violation of the Bill of

Attainder Clause if it meets three independent but not necessarily decisive

criteria. Foretich, 351 F.3d at 1218. The inquiry turns on whether (1) the burden

imposed by the statute falls within the historical meaning of legislative punishment,
25
(2) whether the statute reasonably can be said to further nonpunitive legislative

purposes, and (3) whether the legislative record evinces a congressional attempt to

punish. Id.

Parachas argument fails at each turn. As to the first factor, military detention

is a traditional, lawful, and essential aspect of successfully waging war and is

devoid of all penal character. Ali v. Obama, 736 F.3d 542, 545 (D.C. Cir. 2013)

(quoting William Winthrop, Military Law and Precedents 788 (rev. 2d ed. 1920)). As to

the second factor, the challenged provisions reflect Congresss considered judgment

that the Nations security is best served by restricting the circumstances under which

individuals detained at Guantanamo may be released. That judgment warrants

deference. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38 (1952)

(Jackson, J., concurring). As to the third factor, isolated statements in the

Congressional Record cannot render a statute a bill of attainder without any other

indicia of punishment. Foretich, 351 F.3d at 1225. Because Paracha satisfies neither

the first nor the second factor, he cannot satisfy the third.

26
 CONCLUSION

For these reasons, the judgment of the district court should be affirmed.

Respectfully submitted,

CHAD A. READLER
Acting Assistant Attorney General
CHANNING D. PHILLIPS
United States Attorney
MATTHEW M. COLLETTE

/s/ Michael Shih

MICHAEL SHIH
Attorneys, Appellate Staff
Civil Division, Room 7268
U.S. Department of Justice
950 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
Washington, D.C. 20530
(202) 353-6880
michael.shih@usdoj.gov

February 2017

27
 CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that this brief complies with the requirements of Federal Rule

of Appellate Procedure 32(a). This brief contains 6,349 words.

/s/ Michael Shih

MICHAEL SHIH
 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on February 22, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing

brief with the Clerk of the Court for the United States Court of Appeals for the

District of Columbia Circuit by using the appellate CM/ECF system. Participants in

the case are registered CM/ECF users, and service will be accomplished by the

appellate CM/ECF system.

/s/ Michael Shih

MICHAEL SHIH
ADDENDUM
 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page(s)

Table 1: Restrictions on transfer/release of Guantanamo

detainees into the United States ......................................................... A1

Table 2: Restrictions on preparing facilities for

Guantanamo detainees........................................................................ A2

Table 3: Restrictions on transfer/release of Guantanamo

detainees into foreign countries.......................................................... A3

Table 4: Guantanamo-related notice and reporting requirements .................... A4

 Table 1
Restrictions on transfer/release of Guantanamo detainees
into the United States
Statute Provision Status
National Defense Authorization Act for 1034 Expired
Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-66 (2013)

Consolidated and Further Continuing Div. B, Tit. V, 528 In effect

Appropriations Act 2015, Pub. L. No.
113-235 (2014)
Div. C, Tit. VIII, 8112 In effect

Carl Levin and Howard P. Buck McKeon 1033 Expired

National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-291 (2014)

Department of Homeland Security 533 In effect

Appropriations Act 2015, Pub. L. No.
114-4 (2015)

National Defense Authorization Act for 1031 Expired

Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92 (2015)

Consolidated Appropriations Act 2016, Pub. Div. B, Tit. V, 527 In effect

L. No. 114-113 (2015)
Div. C, Tit. VIII, 8103 In effect
Div. F, Tit. V, 532 In effect
Div. M, Tit. VI, 601 Expired

A1
 Table 2
Restrictions on preparing facilities for Guantanamo detainees
Statute Provision Status
National Defense Authorization Act for 1033 Expired
Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-66 (2013)

Consolidated and Further Continuing Div. B, Tit. V, 529 In effect

Appropriations Act 2015, Pub. L. No.
113-235 (2014)
Div. C, Tit. VIII, 8113 In effect
Div. I, Tit. V, 512 Expired

Carl Levin and Howard P. Buck McKeon 1032 Expired

National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2015, Pub. L. No. 113-291 (2014)
2808 Expired

National Defense Authorization Act for 1032 Expired

Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92 (2015)

Consolidated Appropriations Act 2016, Pub. Div. B, Tit. V, 528 In effect

L. No. 114-113 (2015)
Div. C, Tit. VIII, 8104 In effect
Div. J, Tit. IV, 412 Expired
Div. M, Tit. VI, 602 Expired

A2
 Table 3
Restrictions on transfer/release of Guantanamo detainees
into foreign countries
Statute Provision Status
National Defense Authorization Act for 1035 Repealed by Pub.
Fiscal Year 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-66 (2013) L. No. 114-92,
1034

Consolidated and Further Continuing Div. C, Tit. VIII, 8114 Expired

Appropriations Act 2015, Pub. L. No.
113-235 (2014)

National Defense Authorization Act for 1033 Expired

Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92 (2015)
1034 In effect

Consolidated Appropriations Act 2016, Pub. Div. C, Tit. VIII, 8105 In effect
L. No. 114-113 (2015)
Div. M, Tit. VI, 603 Expired

A3
 Table 4
Guantanamo-related notice and reporting requirements
Statute Provision Status
Consolidated and Further Continuing Div. J, Tit. VII, 7082 In effect
Appropriations Act 2015, Pub. L. No.
113-235 (2014)

National Defense Authorization Act for 1035(b)(4) Complied with

Fiscal Year 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-92 (2015)
1037 Complied with
1040 Complied with

Consolidated Appropriations Act 2016, Pub. Div. K, Tit. VII, 7064 In effect
L. No. 114-113 (2015)

A4