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| 2017 Bukidnon State University College of Law | Page 1
Rules on Guardianship of Minors
DIGESTED BY: Mara Genina C. Unabia
G.R. No. 132223
June 19, 2001
BONIFACIA P. VANCIL, petitioner, vs. HELEN G.
BELMES, respondent.
FACTS: Bonifacia Vancil is the mother of Reeder
Vancil, a Navy serviceman of the USA who died in the
said country on Dec. 22, 1986. Reeder had 2 children
named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife,
Helen Belmes. In May of 1987, Vancil commenced
before the RTC of Cebu a guardianship proceeding.
On July 15, 1987, Vancil was appointed legal and
judicial guardian over the persons and estate of
Valerie and Vincent. On August 13, 1987, the natural
mother of the minors, Helen, submitted an
opposition, asseverating that she had already filed a
similar petition for guardianship before the RTC of
Pagadian City.
On June 27, 1988, Helen filed a motion for Removal of
Guardian and Appointment of a New One, asserting
that she is the natural mother in actual custody of
and exercising parental authority over the subject
minors at Maralag, Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur
where they are permanently residing. On October 12,
1988, the trial court rejected and denied Belmes
motion to remove and/.or disqualify Bonifacia as
guardian and instead ordered petitioner Vancil to
enter the office and perform her duties as such
guardian upon the posting of a bond of P50,000.
ISSUE: Whether or not Vancil could be the legal
guardian of Valerie and Vincent despite the presence
of their natural mother.
HELD: Sec. 7 of Rule 93 of the Revised Rules of Court
confirms the designation of the parents as ipso facto
guardian of their minor children without need of a
court appointment and only for good reason may
another person be named.
Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted
by the courts that the right of parents to the custody
of their minor children is one of the natural rights
incident to parenthood, a right supported by law and
sound public policy. The right is an inherent one,
which is not created by the state or decisions of the
courts, but derives from the nature of the parental
relationship.
Art. 214 of the Family Code: In case of death,
absence or unsuitability of the parents, substitute
parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving
grandparentxxx
The law vests on the father and mother join parental
authority over the persons of their common children.
In case of absence or death of either parent, the
parent present shall continue exercising parental
authority. Only in case of the parents death, absence
or unsuitability may substitute parental authority be
exercised by the surviving grandparent.
Courts should not appoint persons as guardians who
are not within the jurisdiction of our courts for they
will find it difficult to protect the wards. There is
nothing in the law which requires the courts to
appoint residents only as administrators or
guardians. However, the courts, charged with the
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responsibilities of protecting the estates of deceased
persons, wards of the estate, etc., will find much
difficulty in complying with this duty by appointing
administrators and guardians who are not personally
subject to their jurisdiction. The courts should not
consent to the appointment of persons as
administrators and guardians who are not personally
subject to the jurisdiction of our courts here.
G.R. No. L-57438
January 3, 1984
FELICIANO FRANCISCO, petitioner, vs. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS and PELAGIO FRANCISCO,
respondents.
FACTS: On August 30, 1974 respondent Pelagio
Francisco, claiming to be a first cousin of Estefania
San Pedro, petitioned the court for the removal of
petitioner and for the appointment in his stead of
respondent Pelagio Francisco. Among the grounds is
the failure of the guardian to submit an inventory of
the estate of his ward and to render an accounting.
Petitioner thereafter submitted an inventory to which
respondent Pelagio Francisco filed an objection on the
ground that petitioner actually received P14,000 for
the sale of a residential land and not P12,000 only as
stated in the deed of sale and reported by him in his
inventory. The respondent judge found the claim to
be true and in his order of April 17, 1980 relieved the
petitioner as guardian.
In the order dated September 12, 1980, respondent
judge acknowledged that his finding was rather harsh
and somewhat unfair to the said guardian.
Nevertheless, respondent judge ordered the
retirement of petitioner on the ground of old age.
On March 11, 1981, the court a qui appointed
respondent Pelagio Francisco as the new guardian of
the person and property of the incompetent Estefania
San Pedro.
Petitioner Feliciano questioned the assailed decision
on the ground that Pelagio was 5 years older than
him.
HELD: A guardianship is a trust relation of the most
sacred character, in which one person, called a
guardian acts for another called the ward, whom
the law regards as incapable of managing his own
affairs. A guardianship is designed to further the
wards well-being, not that of the guardian. It is
intended to preserve the wards property, as well as
to render any assistance that the ward may
personally require. While custody involves immediate
care and control, guardianship indicates not only
those responsibilities, but those of one in loco
parentis as well.
Having in mind that guardianship proceeding is
instituted for the benefit and welfare of the ward, the
selection of a guardian must, therefore, suit this very
purpose. Thus, in determining the selection of a
guardian, the court may consider the:
1. Financial situation;
2. Physical condition;
3. Sound judgment;
4. Prudence;
5. Trustworthiness;
6. Morals, character, conduct;
 Digested cases on Special Proceedings | Digested by Unabia, Cape et al. | 2017 Bukidnon State University College of Law | Page 2
7. Present and past history of a prospective
appointee; or
8. Probability of his being able to exercise the
powers and duties of guardian for the full period
during which guardianship will be necessary.
A guardian is or become incompetent to serve the
trust if he is so disqualified by:
1. Mental incapacity;
2. Conviction of crime;
3. Moral delinquency; or
4. Physical disability.
A guardian, once appointed may be removed in case
he becomes:
1. Insane;
2. Incapable of discharging his trust;
3. Unsuitable;
4. Has wasted or mismanaged the estate; or
5. Failed for 30 days after it is due to render an
account or make a return.
As correctly pointed out by the appellate court, the
rather advanced age of petitioner at 72 years old,
finds direct support in the delay of the accounting
and inventory made by petitioner.
While age alone is not a controlling criterion in
determining a persons fitness or qualification to be
appointed or be retained as guardian, it may be a
factor for consideration.
G.R. No. 151243
April 30, 2008
LOLITA R. ALAMAYRI, petitioner, vs. ROMMEL,
ELMER, ERWIN, ROILER and AMANDA, all
surnamed PABALE, respondents.
FACTS: Almayri petitions the court for the setting
aside of the CA decision. Cesnando Fernando,
representing S.M. Fernando Realty Corp filed an
action for Specific Performance with Damages (Civil
Case) against Nelly Nave who owns a parcel of land
which the former alleged was the subject of a
'Kasunduan ng Pagbibilihan'. However, Nave
allegedly reneged on their agreement when she
refused to accept the partial payment of Fernando.
The said lot was instead sold to the Pabale siblings.
Subsequently, the civil proceedings were suspended
by virtue of a guardianship proceedings. In June
1988, Nave was declared therein to be incompetent.
The lower court declared the nullity of the two sale
agreements on the ground that Nave was found
incompetent since 1980. The Pabale siblings
intervened. The Court of Appeals granted the appeals
of both Fernando and the Pabale siblings and upheld
the validity of the Deed of Sale executed by Nelly
Nave dated February 20, 1984. Hence this petition.
Petitioner alleged that since Nave was judicially
determined to be an incompetent, all contracts that
she subsequently entered into should be declared
null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the declaration
incompetency constitutes res judicata.
HELD: No. There was no identity of parties and
issues between the special proceeding on the
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guardianship of Nave and the civil case. The decision
on the former on her incompetency should not
therefore bar by conclusiveness of judgment the
finding in the latter case (civil case) that Nave was
competent and had capacity when she entered into
the contract of sale over the subject lot in favor of
the Pabale siblings.
Res judicata literally means a matter adjudged: a
thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or
matter settled by judgment. Res judicata lays the
rule that an existing final judgment or decree
rendered on the merits, and without fraud or
collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon
any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the
rights of the parties or their privies, in all other
actions or suits in the same or any other judicial
tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and
matters in issue in the first suit.
The doctrine of res judicata thus lays down two main
rules which may be stated as follows:
The judgment or decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction on the merits concludes the parties
and their privies to the litigation and constitutes
a bar to a new action or suit involving the same
cause of action either before the same or any
other tribunal
Any right, fact or matter in issue directly
adjudicated or necessarily involved in the
determination of an action before a competent
court in which a judgment or decree is rendered
on the merits is conclusively settled by the
judgment therein and cannot again be litigated
between the parties and their privies whether or
not the claims or demands, purposes or subject
matters of the two suits are the same.
These two main rules mark the distinction between
the principles governing the two typical cases in
which a judgment may operate as evidence. In
speaking of these cases, the first general rule above
stated, and which corresponds to the afore quoted
paragraph (b) of Sec. 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court, is referred to as bar by former judgment;
while the second general rule, which is embodied in
paragraph (c) of the same section and rule, is known
as conclusiveness of judgment.
There is bar by prior judgment when, as between
the first case where the judgment was rendered and
the second case that is sought to be barred, there is
identity of parties, subject matter and causes of
action
But when there is identity of parties in the first and
second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the
first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters
actually and directly controverted and determined
and not as to matters merely involved therein. This is
the concept of res judicata as conclusiveness of
judgment.
Incompetent a person suffering the penalty of civil
interdiction or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals,
deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write,
those who are of unsound mind, even though they
have lucid intervals, and persons not being of
unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak
of mind, and other similar causes, cannot, without
outside aid, take care of themselves and manage
their property, becoming thereby an easy prey for
deceit and exploitation.
 Digested cases on Special Proceedings | Digested by Unabia, Cape et al. | 2017 Bukidnon State University College of Law | Page 3
For proceedings for the appointment of a guardian,
read Rule 93, Secs. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 8 of the Rules of
Court.
The objectives of an RTC hearing a petition
appointment of a guardian is to determine:
1. Whether a person is indeed a minor or
incompetent who has no capacity to care
himself and/or his properties; and
2. Who is most qualified to be appointed as
guardian.
The rules reasonably assume that the people who
best could help the trial court settle such issues
would be those who are closest to and most familiar
with the supposed minor or incompetent, namely, his
relatives living within the same province and/or
persons caring for him.
G.R. No. 110427
February 24, 1997
The Incompetent, CARMEN CAIZA,
represented by her legal guardian, AMPARO
EVANGELISTA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
(SPECIAL FIRST DIVISION), PEDRO ESTRADA
and his wife, LEONORA ESTRADA, respondents.
FACTS: Carmen Caniza (94), a spinster, a retired
pharmacist, and former professor of the College of
Chemistry and Pharmacy of the University of the
Philippines, was declared incompetent by judgment
of the QC RTC in a guardianship proceeding instituted
by her niece, Amparo A. Evangelista. She was so
adjudged because of her advanced age and physical
infirmities which included cataracts in both eyes and
senile dementia. Amparo A. Evangelista was
appointed legal guardian of her person and estate.
Caiza was the owner of a house and lot. Her
guardian Amparo commenced a suit to eject the
spouses Estrada from the said premises in the MTC of
Quezon City. Complaint pertinently alleged that
plaintiff Caiza was the absolute owner of the
property in question, covered by TCT No. 27147; that
out of kindness, she had allowed the Estrada
Spouses, their children, grandchildren and sons-in-
law to temporarily reside in her house, rent-free; that
Caiza already had urgent need of the house on
account of her advanced age and failing health, "so
funds could be raised to meet her expenses for
support, maintenance and medical treatment;" that
through her guardian, Caiza had asked the Estradas
verbally and in writing to vacate the house but they
had refused to do so; and that "by the defendants'
act of unlawfully depriving plaintiff of the possession
of the house in question, they ** (were) enriching
themselves at the expense of the incompetent,
because, while they ** (were) saving money by not
paying any rent for the house, the incompetent **
(was) losing much money as her house could not be
rented by others." Also alleged was that the
complaint was "filed within one (1) year from the
date of first letter of demand dated February 3,
1990."
In their Answer, the defendants declared that they
had been living in Caiza's house since the 1960's;
that in consideration of their faithful service they had
been considered by Caiza as her own family, and
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the latter had in fact executed a holographic will by
which she "bequeathed".
Judgement was rendered by the MetroTC in favor of
for Caiza but it was reversed on appeal by the Quezon
City RTC.
an
for Caiza sought to have the Court of Appeals reverse
the decision but failed in that attempt.
his
It ruled that (a) the proper remedy for Caiza was
indeed an accion publiciana in the RTC, not an accion
interdictal in the MetroTC, since the "defendants have
not been in the subject premises as mere tenants or
occupants by tolerance, they have been there as a
sort of adopted family of Carmen Caiza," as
evidenced by what purports to be the holographic will
of the plaintiff; and (b) while "said will, unless and
until it has passed probate by the proper court, could
not be the basis of defendants' claim to the property,
** it is indicative of intent and desire on the part of
Carmen Caiza that defendants are to remain and
are to continue in their occupancy and possession, so
much so that Caiza's supervening incompetency
cannot be said to have vested in her guardian the
right or authority to drive the defendants out. They
conclude, on those postulates, that it is beyond the
power of Caiza's legal guardian to oust them from
the disputed premises.
Carmen Caiza died, and her heirs -- the
aforementioned guardian, Amparo Evangelista, and
Ramon C. Nevado, her niece and nephew,
respectively -- were by this Court's leave, substituted
for her.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Evangelista, as Caiza's legal
guardian had authority to bring said action; and
2. Whether or not Evangelista may continue to
represent Caiza after the latter's death.
HELD:
1. The Estradas insist that the devise of the house
to them by Caiza clearly denotes her intention
that they remain in possession thereof, and
legally incapacitated her judicial guardian,
Amparo Evangelista, from evicting them
therefrom, since their ouster would be
inconsistent with the ward's will.
A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior
to the testator's death, it may be changed or
revoked; and until admitted to probate, it has no
effect whatever and no right can be claimed
thereunder, the law being quite explicit: "No will
shall pass either real or personal property unless
it is proved and allowed in accordance with the
Rules of Court" (ART. 838,id.).
An owner's intention to confer title in the future
to persons possessing property by his tolerance,
is not inconsistent with the former's taking back
possession in the meantime for any reason
deemed sufficient. And that in this case there
was sufficient cause for the owner's resumption
of possession is apparent: she needed to
generate income from the house on account of
the physical infirmities afflicting her, arising from
her extreme age.
Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a
competent court the general guardian of both the
person and the estate of her aunt, Carmen
Caiza. Her Letters of Guardianship clearly
 Digested cases on Special Proceedings | Digested by Unabia, Cape et al. | 2017 Bukidnon State University College of Law | Page 4

installed her as the "guardian over the person Application for the Writ of Habeas
and properties of the incompetent CARMEN Corpus
CANIZA with full authority to take possession of
the property of said incompetent in any province
or provinces in which it may be situated and to DIGESTED BY: Alfredo G. Cape, Jr.
perform all other acts necessary for the
management of her properties.
G.R. No. 111876
By that appointment, it became Evangelista's
duty to care for her aunt's person, to attend to
her physical and spiritual needs, to assure her January 31, 1996
well-being, with right to custody of her person in
preference to relatives and friends. It also
became her right and duty to get possession of,
and exercise control over, Caiza's property, both
real and personal, it being recognized principle JOHANNA SOMBONG, petitioner, vs. COURT OF
that the ward has no right to possession or APPEALS and MARIETTA NERI ALVIAR, LILIBETH
control of his property during her incompetency. NERI and all persons holding the subject child
That right to manage the ward's estate carries ARABELA SOMBONG in their
with it the right to take possession thereof and custody, respondents.
recover it from anyone who retains it, and bring
and defend such actions as may be needful for
this purpose.

2. As already stated, Carmen Caiza passed away
during the pendency of this appeal. The Estradas
thereupon moved to dismiss the petition, arguing
that Caiza's death automatically terminated the
guardianship, Amaparo Evangelista lost all
authority as her judicial guardian, and ceased to
have legal personality to represent her in the
present appeal. The motion is without merit.
While it is indeed well-established rule that the
relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily
terminated by the death of either the guardian or
the ward, the rule affords no advantage to the
Estradas. Amparo Evangelista, as niece of
Carmen Caiza, is one of the latter's only two (2)
surviving heirs, the other being Caiza's nephew,
Ramon C. Nevado. On their motion and by
Resolution of this Court, they were in fact
substituted as parties in the appeal at bar in
place of the deceased.
"SEC. 18. Death of a party. After a party
dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished,
the court shall order, upon proper notice, the
legal representative of the deceased to appear
and be substituted for the deceased within a
period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as
may be granted. If the legal representative fails
to appear within said time, the court may order
the opposing party to procure the appointment of
a legal representative of the deceased within a
time to be specified by the court, and the
representative shall immediately appear for and
on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The
court charges involved in procuring such
appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party,
may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the
deceased may be allowed to be substituted for
the deceased, without requiring the appointment
of an executor or administrator and the court
may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor
heirs.
FACTS: Johanna Sombong is the mother of Arabella
Sombong who was born on April 23, 1987 in Taguig,
Metro Manila. Sometime in November 1987, Arabella,
then only six months old, was brought to the Sir John
Clinic in Caloocan City, for relief of coughing fits and
for treatment of colds. Petitioner did not have enough
money to pay the hospital bill in the amount of
P300.00. With the failure of the petitioner to pay the
bill Arabella could not be discharged.
Petitioner surprisingly gave testimony that she
allegedly paid the private respondents by
installments in the amount of P1,700.00, knowing
that the payable sum was only P300.00. Despite such
alleged payments, the owners of the clinic, Dra.
Carmen Ty and her husband, Mr. Vicente Ty, allegedly
refused to turn over Arabella to her. Petitioner claims
that the reason for such a refusal was that she
refused to go out on a date with Mr. Ty, who had been
courting her. This allegedly gave Dra. Ty a reason to
be jealous of her.
In contrast to her foregoing allegations, petitioner
testified that she visited Arabella at the clinic only
after two years, i.e., in 1989. This time, she did not
go beyond berating the spouses Ty for their refusal to
give Arabella to her. Three years thereafter, i.e., in
1992, petitioner again resurfaced to lay claim to her
child. Her pleas allegedly fell on deaf ears.
Consequently, on May 21, 1992, petitioner filed a
petition with the RTC of Quezon City for the issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus against the spouses Ty. She
alleged that Arabella was being unlawfully detained
and imprisoned. The petition was denied due to lack
of jurisdiction, the alleged detention having been
perpetrated in Caloocan City.

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Petitioner, thereafter, filed a criminal complaint7 with On October 13, 1992, petitioner filed a petition for
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the RTC
against the spouses Ty. Dr. Ty, in her counter-affidavit, of Quezon City. On January 15, 1993, it rendered a
admitted that petitioners child, Arabella, had for decision granting the Petition for Habeas Corpus and
some time been in her custody. Arabella was ordering respondent Alviar to immediately deliver the
discharged from the clinic in April, 1989, and was, in person of Cristina Grace Neri to the petitioner.
the presence of her clinic staff, turned over to
someone who was properly identified to be the
childs guardian.
ISSUE: Whether or not a grant of the writ of habeas
corpus does not lie to afford the petitioner of the
relief she seeks.
In the face of the refusal of the spouses Ty to turn
over Arabella to her, she had sought the help of two
Barangay Captains and of the Mayor of
Caloocan City, and even the Congresswoman of
HELD: No. The grant of the writ of habeas corpus
Negros Occidental. Their efforts to help availed her
does not lie to afford the petitioner the relief she
nothing.
seeks.

On September 4, 1992, the Office of the City

In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus
Prosecutor of Caloocan City, filed an
is to determine whether or not a particular person is
information8 against the spouses Ty for Kidnapping
legally held. A prime specification of an application
and Illegal Detention of a Minor before the RTC of
for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and
Caloocan City. On September 16, 1992, an order for
effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal
the arrest of the spouses Ty was issued in the
restraint of liberty. The writ of habeas corpus was
criminal case. Facing arrest, Dra. Ty disclosed the
devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy
possibility that the child, Arabella, may be found at
to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the
Quezon City. The agents of the NBI went to said
best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom.
address and there found a female child who
A prime specification of an application for a writ of
answered to the name of Cristina Grace Neri. Quite
habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential
significantly, the evidence disclosed that the child,
object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to
Cristina, had been living with respondent Marietta
inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as
Neri Alviar since 1988. When she was just a baby,
distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person
Cristina was abandoned by her parents at the Sir John
therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint
Clinic. On April 18, 1988, Dr. Fe Mallonga, a dentist at
which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient.
the Sir John Clinic and niece of both Dra. Ty and
respondent Alviar, called the latter up to discuss the
possibility of turning over to her care one of the
several abandoned babies at the said clinic.
Respondent Alviar was told that this baby whose Although the writ of habeas corpus ought not to be
name was unknown had long been abandoned by her issued if the restraint is voluntary, we have held time
parents and appeared to be very small, very thin, and and again that the said writ is the proper legal
full of scabies. Taking pity on the baby, respondent remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a
Alviar and her mother, Maura Salacup Neri, decided minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a
to take care of her. third person of her own free will. It may even be said
that in custody cases involving minors, the question
of illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is not the
underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as
a remedy; rather, the writ of habeas corpus is
This baby was baptized on April 30, 1988. Her
prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right
Certificate of Baptism10 indicates her name to be
of custody over a child.
Cristina Grace S. Neri; her birthday to be April 30,
1987; her birthplace to be Quezon City; and her
foster father and foster mother to be Cicero Neri and
Maura Salacup, respectively. Respondent Alviar was
invited by the NBI for questioning on September 22, The issuance of a writ of habeas corpus does not lie
1992 in the presence of Dra. Ty and petitioner. in this case considering that petitioner is not entitled
Cristina was also brought along by said respondent. to the custody of Cristina Neri because she is not the
At that confrontation, Dra. Ty could not be sure that mother of the said child, and does not have the right
Cristina was indeed petitioners child, Arabella. to have custody over said child.
Neither could petitioner with all certainty say that
Cristina was her long lost daughter. xxx xxx xxx

We do not agree with the lower court that the

ground of abandonment of a child has been

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 Digested cases on Special Proceedings | Digested by Unabia, Cape et al. | 2017 Bukidnon State University College of Law | Page 6

repealed by Art. 231 of the Family Code for bound to deliver a child into the custody of any
abandonment can also be included under the claimant or of any person, but should, in the
phrase cases which have resulted from culpable consideration of the facts, leave it in such custody as
negligence of the parent (par. 2, Art. 231 of the its welfare at the time appears to require. In short,
Family Code). What can be the worst culpable the childs welfare is the supreme consideration.
negligence of a parent than abandoning her own
child. This court does not believe petitioner-
appellees explanation that she had been
negotiating for the discharge of her child for the
The foregoing principles considered, the grant of the
past five years. That was too long a time for
writ in the instant case will all depend on the
negotiation when she could have filed
concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the
immediately a complaint with the authorities or
petitioner has the right of custody over the minor; (2)
the courts x x x
that the rightful custody of the minor is being
withheld from the petitioner by the respondent; and
(3) that it is to the best interest of the minor
concerned to be in the custody of petitioner and not
Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ that of the respondent.
of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in
the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of
freedom of action. This is the basic requisite under
the first part of Section 1, Rule 102, of the Revised
Not all of these requisites exist in this case. The
Rules of Court, which provides that except as
dismissal of this petition is thus warranted.
otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ
of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty.
Wherefore, the appealed the decision is affirmed in
toto.

In the second part of the same provision,

however, habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases
where the rightful custody of any person is withheld
from the person entitled thereto. Thus, although the
writ of habeas corpus ought not to be issued if the
restraint is voluntary, we have held time and again
that the said writ is the proper legal remedy to
enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child
even if the latter be in the custody of a third person
of her own free will.
DIGESTED BY: Alfredo G. Cape, Jr.

G.R. No. 182497

It may even be said that in custody cases involving June 29, 2010
minors, the question of illegal and involuntary
restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for NURHIDA JUHURI AMPATUAN, petitioner, vs.
the availability of the writ as a remedy; rather, the JUDGE VIRGILIO V. MACARAIG, REGIONAL TRIAL
writ of habeas corpus is prosecuted for the purpose COURT, MANILA, BRANCH 37, DIRECTOR
of determining the right of custody over a child. GENERAL AVELINO RAZON, JR., DIRECTOR
GEARY BARIAS, PSSUPT. CO YEE M. CO, JR. and
POLICE CHIEF INSPECTOR AGAPITO QUIMSON,
respondents.

The controversy does not involve the question of
personal freedom, because an infant is presumed to
be in the custody of someone until he attains
majority age. In passing on the writ in a child custody
case, the court deals with a matter of an equitable
nature. Not bound by any mere legal right of parent
or guardian, the court gives his or her claim to the
custody of the child due weight as a claim founded
on human nature and considered generally equitable
and just. Therefore, these cases are decided, not on
the legal right of the petitioner to be relieved from
unlawful imprisonment or detention, as in the case of
adults, but on the courts view of the best interests of
those whose welfare requires that they be in custody
of one person or another. Hence, the court is not
FACTS: Petitioner alleged in her petition that her
husband PO1 Ampatuan was assigned at Sultan
Kudarat Municipal Police Station. On 14 April 2008, he
was asked by his Chief of Police to report to the
Provincial Director of Shariff Kabunsuan,
Superintendent Esmael Pua Ali (Supt. Ali). The latter
brought PO1 Ampatuan to Superintendent Piang
Adam, Provincial Director of the Philippine National
Police (PNP) Maguindanao. PO1 Ampatuan was
directed to stay at the Police Provincial Office of
Maguindanao without being informed of the cause of
his restraint. The next day, 15 April 2008, PO1
Ampatuan was brought to the General Santos City
Airport and was made to board a Philippine Airlines
plane bound for Manila. Upon landing at the Manila
Domestic Airport, PO1 Ampatuan was turned over to

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 Digested cases on Special Proceedings | Digested by Unabia, Cape et al. | 2017 Bukidnon State University College of Law | Page 7
policemen of Manila and brought to Manila Mayor
Alfredo Lim by Police Director Geary Barias and
General Roberto Rosales. A press briefing was then
conducted where it was announced that PO1
Ampatuan was arrested for the killing of two
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Officials. He was
then detained at the Police Jail in United Nations
Avenue, Manila. Thereafter, PO1 Ampatuan was
brought to inquest Prosecutor Renato Gonzaga of the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila due to the
alleged murder of Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, head of the
Law Department of the COMELEC. On 20 April 2008,
PO1 Ampatuan was turned-over to the Regional
Headquarters Support Group in Camp Bagong Diwa,
Taguig City.
Petitioner continues that on 21 April 2008, Chief
Inquest Prosecutor Nelson Salva ordered the release
for further investigation of PO1 Ampatuan. The Order
was approved by the City Prosecutor of Manila. But
Police Senior Superintendent Co Yee Co, Jr., and Police
Chief Inspector Agapito Quimson refused to release
PO1 Ampatuan.
This prompted Petitioner to file the petition for writ
of habeas corpus in the RTC of Manila. Meanwhile,
on 21 April 2008, the City Prosecutor of Manila
recommended that the case against PO1 Ampatuan
be set for further investigation and that the latter be
released from custody unless he is being held for
other charges/legal grounds.
Armed with the 21 April 2008 recommendation of
the Manila Citys Prosecution Office, petitioner, who is
the wife of PO1 Ampatuan, filed a Petition for the
Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus before the RTC of
Manila on 22 April 2008. On 24 April 2008, finding
the petition to be sufficient in form and substance,
respondent Judge Virgilio V. Macaraig ordered the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus commanding
therein respondents to produce the body of PO1
Ampatuan and directing said respondents to show
cause why they are withholding or restraining the
liberty of PO1 Ampatuan. On 25 April 2008, the RTC
dismissed the petition for habeas corpus.
Hence, the petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court to question the validity of the RTC
Order.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC was correct in
dismissing the petition.
HELD: Essentially, a writ of habeas corpus applies to
all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which
any person is deprived of his liberty.
Rule 102 of the 1997 Rules of Court sets forth the
procedure to be followed in the issuance of the
writ. The Rule provides:
RULE 102
HABEAS CORPUS
SECTION 1. To what habeas corpus extends.
Except as otherwise expressly provided by law,
the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all
cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by
which the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto.
SECTION 2. Who may grant the writ. The writ
of habeas corpus may be granted by the
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Supreme Court, or any member thereof, on any
day and at any time, or by the Court of Appeals
or any member thereof in the instances
authorized by law, and if so granted it shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines, and may
be made returnable before the court or any
member thereof, or before a Court of First
Instance, or any judge thereof for hearing and
decision on the merits. It may also be granted by
a Court of First Instance, or a judge thereof, on
any day and at any time, and returnable before
himself, enforceable only within his judicial
district.
xxxx
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge
authorized. If it appears that the person alleged
to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of
an officer under process issued by a court or
judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a
court of record, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process, render the
judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not
be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the
writ is allowed, the person shall not be
discharged by reason of any informality or defect
in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall
anything in this rule be held to authorize the
discharge of a person charged with or convicted
of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person
suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
The objective of the writ is to determine whether the
confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the
writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is
the legality of a person's detention as of, at the
earliest, the filing of the application for the writ
of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its
inception illegal, it may, by reason of some
supervening events, such as the instances mentioned
in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the
time of the filing of the application.
Plainly stated, the writ obtains immediate relief for
those who have been illegally confined or imprisoned
without sufficient cause. The writ, however, should
not be issued when the custody over the person is by
virtue of a judicial process or a valid judgment.
The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ,
therefore, is that the individual seeking such relief is
illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or
placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an
individuals liberty is restrained via some legal
process, the writ of habeas corpus is
unavailing. Fundamentally, in order to justify the
grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of
liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and
involuntary deprivation of freedom of action.
In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus is to determine whether or not a particular
person is legally held. A prime specification of an
application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an
actual and effective, and not merely nominal or
moral, illegal restraint of liberty. The writ of habeas
corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and
effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful
restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense
of personal freedom. A prime specification of an
application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of
liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ
of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of
involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary,
 Digested cases on Special Proceedings | Digested by Unabia, Cape et al. | 2017 Bukidnon State University College of Law | Page 8
and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is
illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of
action is sufficient.
In passing upon a petition for habeas corpus, a court
or judge must first inquire into whether the petitioner
is being restrained of his liberty. If he is not, the writ
will be refused. Inquiry into the cause of detention
will proceed only where such restraint exists. If the
alleged cause is thereafter found to be unlawful, then
the writ should be granted and the petitioner
discharged. Needless to state, if otherwise, again the
writ will be refused.
While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue
as a matter of course or as a mere perfunctory
operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial
discretion is called for in its issuance and it must be
clear to the judge to whom the petition is presented
that, prima facie, the petitioner is entitled to the
writ. It is only if the court is satisfied that a person is
being unlawfully restrained of his liberty will the
petition for habeas corpus be granted. If the
respondents are not detaining or restraining the
applicant or the person in whose behalf the petition is
filed, the petition should be dismissed.
In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under
Restrictive Custody. Republic Act No. 6975 (also
known as the Department of Interior and Local
Government Act of 1990), as amended by Republic
Act No. 8551 (also known as the Philippine National
Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998),
clearly provides that members of the police force are
subject to the administrative disciplinary machinery
of the PNP. Section 41(b) of the said law enumerates
the disciplinary actions, including restrictive
custody that may be imposed by duly designated
supervisors and equivalent officers of the PNP as a
matter of internal discipline. The pertinent provision
of Republic Act No. 8551 reads:
Sec. 52 x x x.
xxxx
4. The Chief of the PNP shall have the power to
impose the disciplinary punishment of dismissal
from the service; suspension or forfeiture of
salary; or any combination thereof for a period
not exceeding one hundred eighty (180)
days. Provided, further, That the Chief of
the PNP shall have the authority to place
police personnel under restrictive custody
during the pendency of a grave
administrative case filed against him or
even after the filing of a criminal
complaint, grave in nature, against such
police personnel. [Emphasis ours].
xxxxx
Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under
restrictive custody, such constitutes a valid argument
for his continued detention. This Court has held that
a restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or
whereabouts of police officers under investigation by
their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or
restraint of liberty.
Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint
which is beyond the ambit of habeas corpus. It is
neither actual nor effective restraint that would call
for the grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a
permissible precautionary measure to assure the PNP
authorities that the police officers concerned are
always accounted for.
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Since the basis of PO1 Ampatuans restrictive custody
is the administrative case filed against him, his
remedy is within such administrative process.
In sum, petitioner is unable to discharge the burden
of showing that she is entitled to the issuance of the
writ prayed for in behalf of her husband, PO1
Ampatuan. The petition fails to show on its face that
the latter is unlawfully deprived of his liberty
guaranteed and enshrined in the Constitution.
Wherefore, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
DIGESTED BY: Alfredo G. Cape, Jr.
G.R. No. 182855
June 5, 2013
MR. ALEXANDER "LEX" ADONIS, represented by
the CENTER FOR MEDIA FREEDOM AND
RESPONSIBILITY (CMFR), through its Executive
Director, MRS. MELINDA QUINTOS-DE JESUS;
and the NATIONAL UNION OF JOURNALISTS OF
THE PHILIPPINES (NUJP), through its
Chairperson, MR. JOSE TORRES, JR., petitioners,
vs. SUPERENTENDENT VENANCIO TESORO,
DIRECTOR, DAVAO PRISONS AND PENAL FARM,
PANABO CITY, DIGOS DAVAO DEL
NORTE, respondent.
FACTS: Adonis was convicted by the RTC of Davao
City for Libel, filed against him by then
Representative Prospero Nograles. He was sentenced
to an indeterminate sentence of five (5) months and
one (1) day of arresto mayor maximum, as minimum
penalty, to four (4) years, six (6) months and one (1)
day of prision correccional medium, as maximum
penalty. He began serving his sentence at the Davao
Prisons and Penal Farm on February 20, 2007.
A second libel case was likewise filed against Adonis
by Jeanette L. Leuterio, pending before the RTC of
Davao City.
On December 11, 2007, the Board of Pardons and
Parole (BPP) issued an order for the Discharge on
Parole of seven (7) inmates in various jails in the
country, which included Adonis. The said document
was received by the City Parole and Probation Office
of Davao on May 2, 2008.
Meanwhile, on January 25, 2008, the Supreme Court
issued Administrative Circular No. 08-2008, the
subject of which is the "Guidelines in the Observance
of a Rule of Preference in the Imposition of Penalties
in Libel Cases."
In view of these developments, Adonis, on April 18,
2008 filed with the RTC of Davao City a Motion to
Reopen Case (With Leave of Court), praying for his
immediate release from detention and for the
modification of his sentence to payment of fine
pursuant to the said Circular.
On May 26, 2008, before the RTC, Adonis moved for
his provisional release from detention. The motion
was granted in open court and he was allowed to
post bail in the amount of P5,000. Subsequently on
even date and after Adonis filed a cash bond and an
undertaking, the trial court issued an Order directing
the Chief of Davao Penal Colony "to release the
accused Alexis Adonis unless he is being held for
 Digested cases on Special Proceedings | Digested by Unabia, Cape et al. | 2017 Bukidnon State University College of Law | Page 9

some other crimes or offenses." On the same date, basis for the respondent to deny his immediate
the said order was served to the respondent, but the release at that time.
release of Adonis was not effected.

On May 30, 2008, Adonis filed the instant petition for Wherefore the petition is dismissed.
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus alleging that
his liberty was restrained by the respondent for no
valid reason. DIGESTED BY: Rianne L. Fernandez

The respondent consequently filed his G.R. No. 163108

Comment. Adonis then filed on October 27, 2008 an
Urgent Motion to Resolve and on November 7, 2008 a
Manifestation and Motion, reiterating all his previous
prayers.
On February 11, 2009, the Court received the letter
from the respondent, informing the Court that Adonis
had been released from confinement on December
23, 2008 after accepting the conditions set forth in
his parole and with the advise to report to the City
Parole and Probation Officer of Davao.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to
the writ of habeas corpus.
HELD: The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint.
The writ exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to
relieve persons from unlawful restraint and as an
effective defense of personal freedom. It is issued
only for the lone purpose of obtaining relief for those
illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient
legal basis. It is not issued when the person is in
custody because of a judicial process or a valid
judgment.
February 23, 2005
GLENN CABALLES y CHUA, petitioner, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS, HON. EMMANUEL D. LAUREA,
HON. BENJAMIN T. ANTONIO, and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS: Petitioner Glenn Chua Caballes was charged
with rape of a minor in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Malabon City. During the pendency of the case,
Caballes averred that he was deprived of his right to
a speedy trial and his constitutional right to a speedy
disposition of the case caused by several delays; thus
led him to file a petition for Habeas
Corpus and/or Certiorari and Prohibition for with the
Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition. The CA issued a
Resolution requiring the petitioner to inform the court
of his choice of remedy within five (5) days from
notice. In compliance, the petitioner filed a
manifestation with the appellate court that he had
chosen his petition to be treated as a petition
for habeas corpus without prejudice to the
concomitant application of certiorari if the court
considered the same necessary or appropriate to
give effect to the writ of habeas corpus.

ISSUE: Whether or not the proper remedy from the

Section 4, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court
appellate courts denial of a petitioner for a writ
provides when a writ must not be allowed or
of habeas corpus is a petition for certiorari under
discharge authorized, to wit:
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge
authorized. If it appears that the person
HELD: As correctly held by the CA, a writ of habeas
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
corpus is not the proper remedy to assail the trial
custody of an officer under process issued by a
courts denial of the petitioners motion to dismiss
court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order
the case, the denial of the petition for bail.
of a court of record, and that the court or judge
had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the
A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not
corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule 102
be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the
of the Rules of Court, as amended. In Ex Parte
writ is allowed, the person shall not be
Billings, it was held that habeas corpus is that of a
discharged by reason of any informality or defect
civil proceeding in character. It seeks the
in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall
enforcement of civil rights. Resorting to the writ is not
anything in this rule be held to authorize the
to inquire into the criminal act of which the complaint
discharge of a person charged with or convicted
is made, but into the right of liberty, notwithstanding
of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person
the act and the immediate purpose to be served is
suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.
relief from illegal restraint. The rule applies even
when instituted to arrest a criminal prosecution and
In the instant case, Adonis was convicted for libel by
secure freedom. When a prisoner petitions for a writ
the RTC, in a criminal case. Since his detention was
of habeas corpus, he thereby commences a suit and
by virtue of a final judgment, he is not entitled to the
prosecutes a case in that court. Habeas corpus is not
Writ of Habeas Corpus. He was serving his sentence
in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as
when the BPP granted him parole, along with six (6)
substitute for the trial courts function. It cannot take
others, on December 11, 2007. While it is true that a
the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ
convict may be released from prison on parole when
cannot be used to investigate and consider questions
he had served the minimum period of his sentence;
of error that might be raised relating to procedure or
the pendency of another criminal case, however, is a
on the merits. The inquiry in a habeas
ground for the disqualification of such convict from
corpus proceeding is addressed to the question of
being released on parole. Notably, at the time he was
whether the proceedings and the assailed order are,
granted the parole, the second libel case was
for any reason, null and void. The writ is not
pending before the RTC. In fact, even when the
ordinarily granted where the law provides for other
instant petition was filed, a second criminal case was
remedies in the regular course, and in the absence of
still pending. The issuance of the writ under such
exceptional circumstances.
circumstance was, therefore, proscribed. There was

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 Digested cases on Special Proceedings | Digested by Unabia, Cape et al. | 2017 Bukidnon State University College of Law | Page 10
DIGESTED BY: Rianne L. Fernandez
DISCLAIMER: Technically, dili ni siya about habeas
corpus na case but rather related to ethics ni Judge
Perello.
A.M. No. RTJ-05-1952
December 24, 2008
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR,
complainant, vs. JUDGE NORMA C. PERELLO,
former Clerk of Court LUIS C. BUCAYON II, Court
Stenographers THELMA A. MANGILIT, CECILIO
B. ARGAME, MARICAR N. EUGENIO, and
RADIGUNDA R. LAMAN and Interpreter PAUL M.
RESURRECCION, all of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 276, Muntinlupa City, respondents.
FACTS: The instant case stemmed from the judicial
audit conducted by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) in all seven (7) branches of the
Regional Trial Court in Muntinlupa City, including
Branch 276 then presided by respondent Judge
Norma C. Perello (Judge Perello). The audit was
prompted by reports of perceived irregular
disposition of petitions for habeas corpus by the said
court. In its Memorandum, the audit team reported
that for the period 1998-2004, a total of 219 petitions
for habeas corpus were assigned to Branch 276, the
subject matters of which are classified into (a)
hospitalization; (b) custody of minors; (c) illegal
possession of firearms; and (d) violation of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 6425, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The records for 22
of these cases were not presented to the audit team,
while the case folders of about a hundred cases did
not contain copies of the decisions of conviction. The
audit team also noted a huge disparity in the number
of petitions for habeas corpus raffled in Branch 276
as against those raffled in the other branches, which
led the team to doubt if the raffle had been
conducted with strict regularity considering the fact
that Judge Perello was the Executive Judge that time.
They likewise reported several substantive and
procedural lapses relative to the disposition
of habeas corpus cases in Branch 276, the audit team
observed that in some of the petitions for habeas
corpus, respondent Judge Perello erred in ordering
the release of the prisoners before they have served
the full term of their sentence.
Thus, they recommended to the OCA to consider the
judicial audit report as an administrative complaint
against (a) Judge Perello and Clerk of Court Atty. Luis
Bucayon II for gross ignorance of the law, grave
abuse of discretion and grave misconduct; and (b)
Court Stenographers Thelma Mangilit, Cecilio
Argame, Maricar Eugenio and Radigunda Laman, and
Court Interpreter Paul Resurreccion for gross
inefficiency.
In her Comment, Judge Perello opined that the Audit
Team that evaluated these Habeas Corpus cases filed
with this Court are probably not lawyers, hence, are
not conversant with the Constitution, with
jurisprudence, and the Rules on the grant of the Writ
of Habeas Corpus and the retroactivity of laws. She
insisted that her decisions ordering the release of the
prisoners who were serving their sentence for illegal
possession of firearms and violation of the Dangerous
Drugs Act were in accordance with law and
jurisprudence. For those convicted of illegal
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possession of firearms under the old law (Presidential
Decree No. 1866), she applied retroactively the
provisions of the amendatory law or R.A. No.
8294, pursuant to Article 22 of the Revised Penal
Code which provides for the retroactive application of
laws that are favorable to the accused even to those
already convicted and serving sentence. Inasmuch as
R.A. No. 8294 imposed the penalty of six (6) years
only, it was incumbent upon her to grant the writs to
those prisoners who have been imprisoned for eight
(8) years already. For those convicted for violation of
R.A. No. 6425, she applied the said law and not the
amendatory law or R.A. No. 9165, otherwise known
as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002, mainly because it aggravated the penalty and
is therefore not favorable to them.
For his part, Atty. Luis Bucayon II, Branch Clerk of
Court, explained in his Comment that while he failed
to present the case folders and records of 22
petitions to the audit team at the time the audit was
conducted at their branch, there was an agreement
between him and the audit team that the latter could
pick up these folders and records before the end of
their audit. However, the audit team failed to return
to get these case records. He claimed to be baffled as
to how his alleged failure to make the records
available to the audit team could constitute gross
ignorance of the law, grave abuse of discretion and
grave misconduct.
On the other hand, Court Interpreter Paul
Resurreccion averred in his Comment that all
petitions for habeas corpus have their corresponding
Minutes but these were not attached to the records
because the Branch Clerk of Court refused to put his
remarks and findings thereon. He further claims that
he always made it a point to prepare the Minutes and
his co-employees could attest to this fact.
Finally, Thelma Mangilit, Cecilio Argame, Maricar
Eugenio and Radigunda Laman, all Stenographers of
Branch 276, submitted their Joint
Comment. According to them, Branch 276 had the
heaviest case load among all the branches
in Muntinlupa City. Despite this, they allegedly
religiously attended the hearings and transcribed
their notes thereafter. With respect to the petitions
for habeas corpus, they saw no need to transcribe
their stenographic notes as the proceedings therein
were non-adversarial in nature. They prioritized those
cases which were adversarial and on appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court erred in their
decision against Judge Perello.
HELD: Be that as it may, however, we agree with the
Court Administrator that there is no merit in the
charge of grave misconduct leveled against Judge
Perello. For grave misconduct to exist, the judicial act
complained of should be corrupt or inspired by an
intention to violate the law or a persistent disregard
of well-known legal rules. Here, it appears that she
was not motivated by any corrupt or vicious motive.
At this juncture, it is worth mentioning that Judge
Perello had been previously charged with and found
guilty of committing several administrative
infractions, namely: (1) gross ignorance of the law for
which she was suspended for six (6) months; (2)
undue delay in transmitting to the Court of Appeals
the records of a case for which she was
fined P20,000.00; (3) dereliction of duty for which she
was fined P5,000.00; (4) conduct unbecoming a
 Digested cases on Special Proceedings | Digested by Unabia, Cape et al. | 2017 Bukidnon State University College of Law | Page 11
judge for which she was admonished; and most
recently (5) grave abuse of discretion, grave abuse of
authority, knowingly rendering an unjust judgment,
gross ignorance of the law and/or procedure for
which she was fined in the amount of P10,000.00. It
is therefore evident that Judge Perello had a
penchant for committing infractions during her
tenure.
The OCA imposed the penalty of suspension for
three (3) months on Judge Perello. In view, however,
of Judge Perellos compulsory retirement which makes
suspension impossible to impose, the proper action is
to impose a fine on her in the maximum amount
of P40,000.00, deductible from her retirement pay.
With regard to Atty. Bucayons liability, the charges
against him all pertained to his duties as Branch
Clerk of Court. It must be noted that during the
pendency of this administrative case against him,
Atty. Bucayon had transferred to the Public Attorneys
Office of the Department of Justice on July 26,
2004 and was accordingly issued a clearance by the
OCA. Thus, we accept the OCAs recommendation to
dismiss the charges against him for being moot.
On the liability of Court Stenographers Mangilit,
Argame, Eugenio and Laman, Administrative Circular
24-90 imposes upon all court stenographers the duty
to transcribe all stenographic notes and to attach the
transcripts of such notes to the records of each case
not later than twenty (20) days from the time the
notes were taken. The records reveal that respondent
stenographers failed to transcribe the stenographic
notes and attach them to the records of each
case. By their own admission, they did not bother to
transcribe the notes as the proceedings were non-
adversarial in nature. We find this explanation
unacceptable considering that the requirement under
the Circular applies to all proceedings whether
adversarial or not.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds
Judge Norma C. Perello GUILTY of gross ignorance of
the law and abuse of discretion, for which she is
meted a fine of P40,000.00 to be deducted from her
retirement benefits. Court Stenographers Thelma
Mangilit, Cecilio Argame, Maricar Eugenio and
Radigunda Laman, and Court Interpreter Paul
Resurreccion are found GUILTY of simple neglect of
duty, for which they are each meted
a fine of P5,000.00, and sternly warned that a
repetition of the same shall be dealt with more
severely.
For being moot, the charges against Atty. Luis
Bucayon II are hereby DISMISSED.
DIGESTED BY: Zennia Marie V. Deleonio
G.R. No. 92163
June 5, 1990
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS
CORPUS. JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner, vs.
JUDGE JAIME SALAZAR (Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City [Br. 103],
SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR AURELIO TRAMPE,
PROSECUTOR FERDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND
CITY ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR EULOGIO
MANANQUIL, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION DIRECTOR ALFREDO LIM, BRIG.
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GEN. EDGAR DULA TORRES (Superintendent of
the Northern Police District) AND/ OR ANY AND
ALL PERSONS WHO MAY HAVE ACTUAL
CUSTODY OVER THE PERSON OF JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, respondents.
G.R. No. 92164
June 5, 1990
SPS. REBECCO E. PANLILIO AND ERLINDA E.
PANLILIO, petitioners, vs. PROSECUTORS
FERNANDO DE LEON, AURELIO C. TRAMPE,
FFRDINAND R. ABESAMIS, AND EULOGIO C.
MANANQUIL, and HON. JAIME W. SALAZAR, JR.,
in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch
103, respondents.
FACTS: In the afternoon of February 27, 1990,
Senate Minority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was
arrested by law enforcement officers by the NBI on
the strength of a warrant of arrest issued by Hon.
Jaime Salazar of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City Branch 103.
The warrant had issued on an information signed and
earlier that day filed by a panel of prosecutors,
charging Senator Enrile, the spouses Rebecco and
Erlinda Panlillio, and Gregorio Honasan with the crime
of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder allegedly committed during the period of the
failed coup attempt from November 29 to December
10, 1990. Senator Enrile was taken to and held
overnight at the NBI headquarters on Taft Avenue,
Manila, without bail, none having been recommended
in the information and none fixed in the arrest
warrant.
The following morning, February 28, 1990, he was
brought to Camp Tomas Karingal in Quezon City
where he was given over to the custody of the
Superintendent of the Northern Police District, Brig.
Gen. Edgardo Dula Torres.
On the same date of February 28, 1990, Senator
Enrile, through counsel, filed the petition for habeas
corpus herein (which was followed by a supplemental
petition filed on March 2, 1990), alleging that he was
deprived of his constitutional rights in being, or
having been:
(a) Held to answer for criminal offense which
does not exist in the statute books;
(b) Charged with a criminal offense in an
information for which no complaint was
initially filed or preliminary investigation was
conducted, hence was denied due process;
(c) Denied his right to bail; and
(d) Arrested and detained on the strength of a
warrant issued without the judge who issued
it first having personally determined the
existence of probable cause.
The Court issued the writ prayed for, returnable
March 5, 1990 and set the plea for hearing on March
6, 1990. On March 5, 1990, the Solicitor General filed
a consolidated return for the respondents in this case
and in G.R. No. 92164. Said return urged that the
petitioners case does not fall within the Hernandez
ruling because the information in Hernandez charged
murders and other common crimes committed as
necessary means for the commission of rebellion.
Whereas the information against Sen. Enrile et al.
charged murder and frustrated murder committed on
the occasion, but not in furtherance, of rebellion.
 Digested cases on Special Proceedings | Digested by Unabia, Cape et al. | 2017 Bukidnon State University College of Law | Page 12
The court granted Senator Enrile and Spouses Panlilio
provisional liberty conditioned upon their filing, within
24 hours from notice, cash or surety bonds of
P100,000.00 and P200,000.00, respectively.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Supreme Court should
abandon the Hernandez ruling and adapt the
minority view expressed in the main dissent of
Justice Montemayor in said case that rebellion
cannot absorb more serious crimes, and in said
case that rebellion cannot absorb more serious
crimes, and that under Article 48 of the Revised
Penal Code rebellion may properly be complexed
with common offenses, so called; this option was
suggested by the Solicitor General in oral
argument although it is not offered in his written
pleadings;
2. Whether or not the Supreme Court should
hold Hernandez applicable only to offenses
committed in furtherance, or as a necessary
means for the commission, of rebellion, but not to
acts committed in the course of a rebellion which
also constitute "common" crimes of grave or less
grave character;
3. Whether or not the Supreme Court should
maintain Hernandez as applying to make
rebellion absorb all other offenses committed in
its course, whether or not necessary to its
commission or in furtherance thereof.
HELD:
1. No. In the view of the majority, the ruling remains
good law, its substantive and logical bases have
withstood all subsequent challenges and no new
ones are presented here persuasive enough to
warrant a complete reversal. This view is
reinforced by the fact that not too long ago, the
incumbent President, exercising her powers
under the 1986 Freedom Constitution, saw fit to
repeal, among others, Presidential Decree No.
942 of the former regime which precisely sought
to nullify or neutralize Hernandez by enacting a
new provision (Art. 142-A) into the Revised Penal
Code to the effect that "(w)hen by reason, or on
the occasion, of any of the crimes penalized in
this Chapter (Chapter I of Title 3, which includes
rebellion), acts which constitute offenses upon
which graver penalties are imposed by law are
committed, the penalty for the most serious
offense in its maximum period shall be imposed
upon the offender."' In thus acting, the President
in effect by legislative flat
reinstated Hernandez as binding doctrine with
the effect of law. The Court can do no less than
accord it the same recognition, absent any
sufficiently powerful reason against so doing.
2. No. The Court unanimously voted to reject the
theory that Hernandez is, or should be, limited in
its application to offenses committed as a
necessary means for the commission of rebellion
and that the ruling should not be interpreted as
prohibiting the complexing of rebellion with other
common crimes committed on the occasion, but
not in furtherance, thereof. While four Members
of the Court felt that the proponents' arguments
were not entirely devoid of merit, the consensus
was that they were not sufficient to overcome
what appears to be the real thrust
of Hernandez to rule out the complexing of
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rebellion with any other offense committed in its
course under either of the aforecited clauses of
Article 48, as is made clear by the following
excerpt from the majority opinion in that case:
There is one other reason-and a fundamental
one at that-why Article 48 of our Penal Code
cannot be applied in the case at bar. If
murder were not complexed with rebellion,
and the two crimes were punished separately
(assuming that this could be done), the
following penalties would be imposable upon
the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of
rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000
and prision mayor, in the corresponding
period, depending upon the modifying
circumstances present, but never exceeding
12 years of prision mayor, and (2) for the
crime of murder, reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to death, depending upon
the modifying circumstances present. in
other words, in the absence of aggravating
circumstances, the extreme penalty could
not be imposed upon him. However, under
Article 48 said penalty would have to be
meted out to him, even in the absence of a
single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said
provision, if construed in conformity with the
theory of the prosecution, would
be unfavorable to the movant.
Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was
enacted for the purpose of favoring the
culprit, not of sentencing him to a
penalty more severe than that which would
be proper if the several acts performed by
him were punished separately.
3. No. the information filed against the petitioner
does in fact charge an offense. Disregarding the
objectionable phrasing that would complex
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder, that indictment is to be read as
charging simple rebellion. Thus, in Hernandez,
the Court said:
In conclusion, we hold that, under the
allegations of the amended
information against defendant-appellant
Amado V. Hernandez, the murders, arsons
and robberies described therein are mere
ingredients of the crime of rebellion allegedly
committed by said defendants, as means
"necessary" (4) for the perpetration of said
offense of rebellion; that the crime charged in
the aforementioned amended information is,
therefore, simple rebellion, not the complex
crime of rebellion with multiple murder,
arsons and robberies; that the maximum
penalty imposable under such charge cannot
exceed twelve (12) years of prision
mayor and a fine of P2H,HHH; and that, in
conformity with the policy of this court in
dealing with accused persons amenable to a
similar punishment, said defendant may be
allowed bail.
The plaint of petitioner's counsel that he is
charged with a crime that does not exist in
the statute books, while technically correct so
far as the Court has ruled that rebellion may
not be complexed with other offenses
 Digested cases on Special Proceedings | Digested by Unabia, Cape et al. | 2017 Bukidnon State University College of Law | Page 13
committed on the occasion thereof, must
therefore be dismissed as a mere flight of
rhetoric. Read in the context of Hernandez,
the information does indeed charge the
petitioner with a crime defined and punished
by the Revised Penal Code: simple rebellion.
DIGESTED BY: Zennia Marie V. Deleonio
G.R. No. 139789
July 19, 2001
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS
CORPUS OF POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, ERLINDA K.
ILUSORIO, petitioner, vs. ERLINDA K. ILUSORIO-
BILDNER, SYLVIA K. ILUSORIO-YAP, JOHN DOES
and JANE DOES, respondents.
G.R. No. 139808
July 19, 2001
POTENCIANO ILUSORIO, MA. ERLINDA I.
BILDNER and SYLVIA K.
ILUSORIO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and ERLINDA K.
ILUSORIO, respondents.
FACTS: Potenciano Ilusorio, a lawyer, 86 year old of
age, possessed extensive property valued at millions
of pesos. For many year, he was the Chairman of the
Board and President of Baguio Country Club. He was
married with Erlinda Ilusorio, herein petitioner, for 30
years and begotten 6 children namely Ramon, Lin
Illusorio-Bildner (defendant), Maximo, Sylvia, Marietta
and Shereen. They separated from bed and board in
1972. Potenciano lived at Makati every time he was
in Manila and at Illusorio Penthouse, Baguio Country
Club when he was in Baguio City. On the other hand,
the petitioner lived in Antipolo City.
In 1997, upon Potencianos arrival from US, he stayed
with her wife for about 5 months in Antipolo city. The
children, Sylvia and Lin, alleged that during this time
their mother overdose Potenciano which caused the
latters health to deteriorate. In February 1998,
Erlinda filed with RTC petition for guardianship over
the person and property of Potenciano due to the
latters advanced age, frail health, poor eyesight and
impaired judgment. In May 1998, after attending a
corporate meeting in Baguio, Potenciano did not
return to Antipolo instead lived at Cleveland
Condominium in Makati. In March 1999, petitioner
filed with CA petition for habeas corpus to have the
custody of his husband alleging that the respondents
refused her demands to see and visit her husband
and prohibited Potenciano from returning to Antipolo.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas
corpus should be issued.
HELD: A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention, or by which the
rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one
entitled thereto. To justify the grant for such petition,
the restraint of liberty must an illegal and involuntary
deprivation of freedom of action. The illegal restraint
of liberty must be actual and effective not merely
nominal or moral.
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Evidence showed that there was no actual and
effective detention or deprivation of Potencianos
liberty that would justify issuance of the writ. The
fact that the latter was 86 years of age and under
medication does not necessarily render him mentally
incapacitated. He still has the capacity to discern his
actions. With his full mental capacity having the
right of choice, he may not be the subject of
visitation rights against his free choice. Otherwise,
he will be deprived of his right to privacy.
The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent
to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a
husband. In any event, that the husband refuses to
see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do
so without threat or any penalty attached to the
exercise of his right. Coverture, is a matter beyond
judicial authority and cannot be enforced by
compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by
the sheriffs or by any other process.
DIGESTED BY: Zennia Marie V. Deleonio
G.R. No. 167193
April 19, 2006
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS
CORPUS ENGR. ASHRAF KUNTING, petitioner.
FACTS: On October 19, 2001, petitioner Kunting was
arrested in Malaysia for violation of the Malaysian
Internal Security Act. On June 12, 2003, the Royal
Malaysian Police in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, turned
over Kunting to the PNP-IG and Task Force Salinglahi
pursuant to warrants for his arrest issued by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Isabela City, Basilan.
Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping
for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention with the RTC
under separate Amended Informations, docketed as
Criminal Case Nos. 3674-1187, 3537-1129, 3608-
1164, and 3611-1165.
Petitioner was immediately flown to the Philippines
and brought to the PNP-IG at Camp Crame for
booking and custodial investigation.
In a letter dated July 3, 2003, Atty. Guillermo G.
Danipog, Jr., Police Superintendent and Chief of the
Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, informed the Branch
Clerk of Court of the RTC that Kunting was already in
the custody of the PNP-IG. Atty. Danipog requested
for Kuntings temporary detention at the PNP-IG,
Camp Crame, Quezon City due to the high security
risks involved and prayed for the issuance of a
corresponding commitment order.
In a letter dated July 9, 2003, Emilio F. Enriquez,
Acting Clerk of Court of the RTC, replied to the
request of Atty. Danipog, thus:
xxx
The undersigned referred the matter to Hon.
Danilo M. Bucoy, Presiding Judge of this Court,
who issued the Alias Warrant of Arrest in the
herein mentioned case (Criminal Case No. 3674-
1187) and per his instruction, accused As[h]raf
Kunting y Barreto [may be] temporarily detained
thereat by virtue of the Alias Warrant of Arrest
issued in this case, however considering that the
accused is a high security risk, he should be
brought to Isabela, Basilan as soon as the
necessary security escort can be provided for his
transfer, where the proper commitment order can
 Digested cases on Special Proceedings | Digested by Unabia, Cape et al. | 2017 Bukidnon State University College of Law | Page 14
be issued as the herein mentioned case is about
to be submitted by the prosecution.
xxx
On September 15, 2003, the RTC issued an Order
directing the Police Superintendent and Chief, Legal
Affairs Division, PNP-IG, to immediately turn over
Kunting to the trial court since Kunting filed an Urgent
Motion for Reinvestigation.
On November 5, 2003, PNP-IG Director Arturo C.
Lomibao wrote a letter to Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencito R. Zuo, Department of Justice (DOJ),
requesting for representation and a motion to be filed
for the transfer of the venue of the trial from Isabela
City, Basilan to Pasig City, for the following reasons:
(1) Several intelligence reports have been received
by the PNP-IG stating that utmost effort will be
exerted by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) to recover
the custody of Kunting from the PNP considering his
importance to the ASG; and (2) there is a big
possibility that Kunting may be recovered by the ASG
if he will be detained in Basilan due to inadequate
security facility in the municipal jail and its proximity
to the area of operation of the ASG.
On August 13, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision
against petitioners co-accused in the consolidated
Criminal Case Nos. 3608-1164, 3537-1129, 3674-
1187, and 3611-1165, finding 17 of the accused, who
were tried, guilty of the crime/s charged.
On February 11, 2005, the RTC issued an Order
denying Kuntings Motion to Set Case for Preliminary
Investigation since the PNP-IG has not turned over
Kunting. The trial court reiterated its Order dated
September 15, 2003, directing the Police
Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-
IG, to turn over Kunting to the court.
In a letter dated February 22, 2005, Police Chief
Superintendent Ismael R. Rafanan reiterated the
request to Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo to
facilitate the transfer of the venue of the trial of
Kuntings case, citing the same grounds in the
previous letter. He added that if Kunting had been
transferred to Isabela City, Basilan, he could have
been one of the escapees in a jail break that occurred
on April 10, 2004 as suspected ASG members were
able to go scot-free.
On March 15, 2005, Police Inspector Amado L.
Barbasa, Jr., OIC, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, filed
with the RTC a Motion to Defer Implementation of the
Order dated February 11, 2005, citing, among other
grounds, the existence of a pending motion for the
transfer of the venue of the trial of Criminal Case No.
3537-1129 against Kunting, which was allegedly filed
by the DOJ before this Court. Police Inspector Barbasa
prayed that the Order of the RTC dated February 11,
2005, directing the turnover of Kunting to the court,
be suspended until the motion for the transfer of
venue is resolved.
On March 14, 2005, Kunting, by counsel, filed this
petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
Kunting stated that he has been restrained of his
liberty since June 12, 2003 by the PNP-IG led by
Police Chief Superintendent Ismael Rafanan and
assisted by PNP Intelligence Chief, General Robert
Delfin. He alleged that he was never informed of the
charges filed against him until he requested his
family to research in Zamboanga City. It was
discovered in the RTC of Isabela City, Basilan that his
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name appeared in the list of accused who allegedly
participated in the kidnapping incident which
occurred on June 2, 2001 in Lamitan, Basilan.
Kunting asserted that he never participated in the
kidnapping incident, so he promptly filed an Urgent
Motion for Reinvestigation on September 8, 2003. He
was aware that the PNP-IG requested Chief State
Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuo for representation to file
a motion with this Court for the transfer of venue of
his case from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City.
Having no further information on the status of his
case, he filed a Motion to Set Case for Preliminary
Investigation on January 26, 2005. He stated that
since no action was taken by the trial court or the
DOJ, he filed this petition to put an end to his illegal
detention classified in the records as "for safekeeping
purposes only."
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioned writ of habeas
corpus should be issued.
HELD: A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention, or by which the
rightful custody of a person is withheld from the one
entitled thereto. To justify the grant for such petition,
the restraint of liberty must be an illegal and
involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. The
illegal restraint of liberty must be actual and effective
not merely nominal or moral.
Evidence showed that there was no actual and
effective detention or deprivation of Potencianos
liberty that would justify issuance of the writ. The fact
that the latter was 88 years of age and under
medication does not necessarily render him mentally
incapacitated. He still has the capacity to discern his
actions. With his full mental capacity having the
rights against his free choice. Otherwise, he will be
deprived of his right to privacy.
The case at bar does not involve the right of a parent
to visit a minor child but the right of a wife to visit a
husband. In any event, that the husband refuses to
see his wife for private reasons, he is at liberty to do
so without threat or any penalty beyond judicial
authority and cannot be enforced by compulsion of a
writ of habeas corpus carried out by the sheriffs or by
another process.
DIGESTED BY: Deborah M. Carlos
G.R. No. 169482
January 29, 2008
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION OF HABEAS
CORPUS OF EUFEMIA E. RODRIGUEZ, filed by
EDGARDO E. VELUZ, petitioner, vs. LUISA R.
VILLANUEVA and TERESITA R.
PABELLO, respondents.
FACTS: This is a petition for review of the resolutions
dated February 2, 2005 and September 2, 2005 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88180 denying
the petition for habeas corpus of Eufemia E.
Rodriguez, filed by petitioner Edgardo Veluz, as well
as his motion for reconsideration, respectively.
Eufemia E. Rodriguez was a 94-year old widow,
allegedly suffering from a poor state of mental health
and deteriorating cognitive abilities. She was living
 Digested cases on Special Proceedings | Digested by Unabia, Cape et al. | 2017 Bukidnon State University College of Law | Page 15
with petitioner, her nephew, since 2000. He acted as
her guardian.
In the morning of January 11, 2005, respondents
Luisa R. Villanueva and Teresita R. Pabello took
Eufemia from petitioner Veluz house. He made
repeated demands for the return of Eufemia but
these proved futile. Claiming that respondents were
restraining Eufemia of her liberty, he filed a petition
for habeas corpus in the Court of Appeals on January
13, 2005.
The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner failed to
present any convincing proof that respondents (the
legally adopted children of Eufemia) were unlawfully
restraining their mother of her liberty. He also failed
to establish his legal right to the custody of Eufemia
as he was not her legal guardian. CA denied.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was also
denied.7 Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that, in determining whether or not
a writ of habeas corpus should issue, a court should
limit itself to determining whether or not a person is
unlawfully being deprived of liberty. There is no need
to consider legal custody or custodial rights. The writ
of habeas corpus is available not only if the rightful
custody of a person is being withheld from the person
entitled thereto but also if the person who disappears
or is illegally being detained is of legal age and is not
under guardianship. Thus, a writ of habeas
corpus can cover persons who are not under the legal
custody of another. According to petitioner, as long
as it is alleged that a person is being illegally
deprived of liberty, the writ of habeas corpus may
issue so that his physical body may be brought
before the court that will determine whether or not
there is in fact an unlawful deprivation of liberty.
Respondents state that they are the legally adopted
daughters of Eufemia and her deceased spouse,
Maximo Rodriguez. Prior to their adoption,
respondent Luisa was Eufemias half-sister while
respondent Teresita was Eufemias niece and
petitioners sister.
Respondents point out that it was petitioner and his
family who were staying with Eufemia, not the other
way around as petitioner claimed. Eufemia paid for
the rent of the house, the utilities and other
household needs.
Sometime in the 1980s, petitioner was appointed as
the "encargado" or administrator of the properties of
Eufemia as well as those left by the deceased
Maximo. As such, he took charge of collecting
payments from tenants and transacted business with
third persons for and in behalf of Eufemia and the
respondents who were the only compulsory heirs of
the late Maximo.
In the latter part of 2002, Eufemia and the
respondents demanded an inventory and return of
the properties entrusted to petitioner. These
demands were unheeded. Hence, Eufemia and the
respondents were compelled to file a complaint for
estafa against petitioner in the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. Consequently, and by reason of their
mothers deteriorating health, respondents decided
to take custody of Eufemia on January 11, 2005. The
latter willingly went with them. In view of all this,
petitioner failed to prove either his right to the
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custody of Eufemia or the illegality of respondents
action.
ISSUE: Whether or not habeas corpus should be
granted.
HELD: Petition denied.
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of
illegal confinement or detention by which any person
is deprived of his liberty or by which the rightful
custody of a person is being withheld from the one
entitled thereto. It is issued when one is either
deprived of liberty or is wrongfully being prevented
from exercising legal custody over another person.
Thus, it contemplates two instances: (1) deprivation
of a persons liberty either through illegal
confinement or through detention and (2) withholding
of the custody of any person from someone entitled
to such custody.
In this case, the issue is not whether the custody of
Eufemia is being rightfully withheld from petitioner
but whether Eufemia is being restrained of her
liberty. Significantly, although petitioner admits that
he did not have legal custody of Eufemia, he
nonetheless insists that respondents themselves
have no right to her custody. Thus, for him, the issue
of legal custody is irrelevant. What is important is
Eufemias personal freedom.
Fundamentally, in order to justify the grant of the writ
of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in
the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of
freedom of action.
In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas
corpus is to determine whether or not a
particular person is legally held.
In this case, the Court of Appeals made an inquiry
into whether Eufemia was being restrained of her
liberty. It found that she was not:
There is no proof that Eufemia is being
detained and restrained of her liberty by
respondents. Nothing on record reveals that
she was forcibly taken by respondents. On the
contrary, respondents, being Eufemias adopted
children, are taking care of her. (emphasis supplied)
The Court finds no cogent or compelling reason to
disturb this finding.
DIGESTED BY: Deborah M. Carlos
G.R. No. 168728
August 2, 2007
SAMUEL BARREDO y GOLANI, petitioner, vs.
HON. VICENTE VINARAO, Director, Bureau of
Corrections, respondent.
FACTS: This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus. Petitioner Samuel Barredo y Golani
prays for his release from the maximum security
compound of the New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa
City on the ground that he has already served the
sentence imposed on him for illegal possession of
firearms and for carnapping filed in RTC Quezon City.
The cases were tried jointly. After trial, the court
rendered a joint decision finding petitioner guilty of
both charges.
 Digested cases on Special Proceedings | Digested by Unabia, Cape et al. | 2017 Bukidnon State University College of Law | Page 16
No appeal was made, hence, the decision became
final and executory.
Petitioner was committed to the custody of the
Quezon City Jail (as detention prisoner) on March 15,
1993.[7] After conviction, he was transferred to and
confined at the maximum security compound of the
New Bilibid Prison in Muntinlupa City on July 23,
1994[8] where he is now still detained.
According to petitioner, as of August 2, 2004, he
already served a total of 18 years. He claims that, on
October 9, 2001, the Board of Pardons and Parole
passed a resolution recommending the commutation
of his sentence to a period of from 15 to 20 years. He
further points out that, based on the Bureau of
Corrections revised computation table for
determining the time to be credited prisoners for
good conduct while serving sentence, he should only
serve 14 years, 9 months and 18 days. Thus, this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not habeas corpus is applicable.
HELD: No.
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS WILL NOT ISSUE IF
DETENTION IS BY VIRTUE OF VALID JUDGMENT
The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases
of illegal confinement, detention or deprivation of
liberty. It was devised as a speedy and effective
remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint.
More specifically, it is a remedy to obtain immediate
relief for those who may have been illegally confined
or imprisoned without sufficient cause and thus
deliver them from unlawful custody. It is therefore a
writ of inquiry intended to test the circumstances
under which a person is detained.
The writ may not be availed of when the person in
custody is under a judicial process or by virtue of a
valid judgment. However, the writ may be allowed as
a post-conviction remedy when the proceedings
leading to the conviction were attended by any of the
following exceptional circumstances:
(1) there was a deprivation of a constitutional right
resulting in the restraint of a person;
(2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the
sentence or
(3) the imposed penalty was excessive, thus voiding
the sentence as to such excess.
The rule is that if a person alleged to be restrained of
his liberty is in custody of an officer under process
issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment
or order of a court of record the writ of habeas corpus
will not be allowed. Thus, Section 4, Rule 102 of the
Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge
authorized. If it appears that the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in
the custody of an officer under process issued
by a court or judge or by virtue of a
judgment or order of a court of record, and
that the court or judge had jurisdiction
to issue the process, render the judgment, or
make the order, the writ shall not be allowed;
or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is
allowed, the person shall not be discharged by
reason of any informality or defect in the process,
judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this
rule be held to authorize the discharge of a
person charged with or convicted of an
offense in the Philippines, or of a person
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suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment.
SENTENCE IS VOID INSOFAR AS IT FAILED TO
IMPOSE AN INDETERMINATE SENTENCE
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General,
however, the trial court erred in imposing a straight
penalty of imprisonment for 30 years in the
carnapping case. The sentence imposed by the trial
court deprived petitioner of the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. Hence, it was void
insofar as it failed to impose an indeterminate
sentence.
Since the crime was committed by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons, the imposable
penalty under the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 was
imprisonment for not less than 17 years and 4
months and not more than 30 years. Furthermore,
pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
court should have imposed an indeterminate
sentence with a maximum term not exceeding the
maximum fixed by the special penal law and a
minimum term not less than the minimum term
prescribed by the same law.
REDUCTION OF PENALTY UNDER AMENDATORY
LAW SHOULD BE APPLIED RETROACTIVELY
Petitioner is likewise entitled to a reduction of the
penalty imposed upon him in the illegal possession of
firearms case in view of the passage of RA 8294. The
law reduced the penalty for simple illegal possession
of firearms to prision correccional in its maximum
period and a fine of not less than P15,000. Being
favorable to petitioner, RA 8294 should be applied
retroactively to benefit him. Further applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the proper imposable
penalty is imprisonment for 4 years, 2 months and 1
day as minimum to 6 years as maximum.
PETITIONER HAS NOT YET SERVED THE
PENALTIES IMPOSED ON HIM
Petitioner has to serve the penalties imposed on him
successively in the order of their severity. Hence, he
has to first serve the more severe penalty, i.e., that
imposed in the carnapping case: imprisonment for 17
years and 4 months as minimum to 30 years as
maximum. Only after he has served this will he
commence serving the less severe penalty imposed
in the illegal possession of firearms case:
imprisonment for 4 years, 2 months and 1 day as
minimum to 6 years as maximum. Thus, while he has
already served the minimum penalty in the
carnapping case, he has not yet served the minimum
penalty in the illegal possession of firearms case.
Consequently, petitioner is not entitled to the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. Neither is he
eligible for parole because only prisoners who have
served the minimum penalty imposed on them may
be released on parole on such terms and conditions
as may be prescribed by the Board of Pardons and
Parole.
DIGESTED BY: Deborah M. Carlos
G.R. No. 160792
August 25, 2005
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS
CORPUS OF CAPT. GARY ALEJANO, PN
(MARINES) CAPT. NICANOR FAELDON, PN
 Digested cases on Special Proceedings | Digested by Unabia, Cape et al. | 2017 Bukidnon State University College of Law | Page 17
(MARINES) CAPT. GERARDO GAMBALA, PA LT. SG
JAMES LAYUG, PN
CAPT. MILO MAESTRECAMPO, PA LT. SG
ANTONIO TRILLANES IV, PN
HOMOBONO ADAZA, and ROBERTO RAFAEL
(ROEL) PULIDO, petitioners, vs. GEN. PEDRO
CABUAY, GEN. NARCISO ABAYA, SEC. ANGELO
REYES, and SEC. ROILO GOLEZ, respondents.
FACTS: Early morning of 27 July 2003, some 321
armed soldiers, led by the now detained junior
officers, entered and took control of the Oakwood
Premier Luxury Apartments (Oakwood), an upscale
apartment complex, located in the business district of
Makati City. The soldiers disarmed the security
officers of Oakwood and planted explosive devices in
its immediate surroundings. The junior officers
publicly renounced their support for the
administration and called for the resignation of
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and several
cabinet members.
Around 7:00 p.m. of the same date, the soldiers
voluntarily surrendered to the authorities after
several negotiations with government emissaries.
The soldiers later defused the explosive devices they
had earlier planted. The soldiers then returned to
their barracks. On 31 July 2003, Gen. Abaya, as the
Chief of Staff of the AFP, issued a directive to all the
Major Service Commanders to turn over custody of
ten junior officers to the ISAFP Detention Center.
On 1 August 2003, government prosecutors filed an
Information for coup detat with the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 61, against the soldiers
involved in the 27 July 2003 Oakwood incident for
coup detat. The trial court later issued the
Commitment Orders giving custody of junior officers
Lt. SG Antonio Trillanes IV (Trillanes) and Capt.
Gerardo Gambala to the Commanding Officers of
ISAFP.
On 2 August 2003, Gen. Abaya issued a directive to
all Major Service Commanders to take into custody
the military personnel under their command who
took part in the Oakwood incident except the
detained junior officers who were to remain under the
custody of ISAFP.
On 11 August 2003, petitioners filed a petition
for habeas corpus with the Supreme Court. On 12
August 2003, the Court issued a Resolution, which
resolved to:
(a) ISSUE the WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS; (b)
require respondents to make a RETURN of the
writ on Monday, 18 August 2003, at 10:00 a.m.
before the Court of Appeals; (c) refer the case
to the Court of Appeals for RAFFLE among the
Justices thereof for hearing, further proceedings
and decision thereon, after which
a REPORT shall be made to this Court within
ten (10) days from promulgation of the
decision.[3]
Thus, the Court issued a Writ of Habeas Corpus dated
12 August 2003 directing respondents to make a
return of the writ and to appear and produce the
persons of the detainees before the Court of Appeals
on the scheduled date for hearing and further
proceedings.
On the same date, the detainees and their other co-
accused filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati
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City a Motion for Preliminary Investigation, which the
trial court granted.
On 18 August 2003, pursuant to the directives of the
Court, respondents submitted their Return of the Writ
and Answer to the petition and produced the
detainees before the Court of Appeals during the
scheduled hearing. After the parties filed their
memoranda on 28 August 2003, the appellate court
considered the petition submitted for decision.
On 17 September 2003, the Court of Appeals
rendered its decision dismissing the petition.
Nonetheless, the appellate court ordered Gen.
Cabuay, who was in charge of implementing the
regulations in the ISAFP Detention Center, to uphold
faithfully the rights of the detainees in accordance
with Standing Operations Procedure No. 0263-04. The
appellate court directed Gen. Cabuay to adhere to his
commitment made in court regarding visiting hours
and the detainees right to exercise for two hours a
day.
ISSUE: Whether or not the denial of the petition for
habeas corpus was valid.
HELD: Yes. In a habeas corpus petition, the order to
present an individual before the court is a preliminary
step in the hearing of the petition.[6] The respondent
must produce the person and explain the cause of his
detention.[7] However, this order is not a ruling on
the propriety of the remedy or on the substantive
matters covered by the remedy. Thus, the Courts
order to the Court of Appeals to conduct a factual
hearing was not an affirmation of the propriety of the
remedy of habeas corpus.
For obvious reasons, the duty to hear the petition for
habeas corpus necessarily include the determination
of the propriety if the remedy. If a court finds the
alleged cause of the detention unlawful, then it
should issue the writ and release the detainees. In
the present case, after hearing the case, the CA
found that habeas corpus is inapplicable. After
actively participating in the hearing before the CA,
petitioners are estopped from claiming that the
appellate court had no jurisdiction to inquire into the
merits of their petition.
The CA correctly ruled that the remedy of habeas
corpus is not the proper remedy to address the
detainees complaint against the regulations and
conditions in the ISAFP Detention Center. The remedy
of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into
the cause of detention of a person. The purpose of
the writ is to determine whether a person is being
illegally deprived of his liberty. If, however, the
detention is proven lawful, then habeas corpus
proceedings terminate.
The use of habeas corpus is thus very limited. It is
not a writ of errot. Neither can it substitute for an
appeal.
A mere allegation of a violation of ones
constitutional right is not sufficient. The courts will
extend the scope of the writ only if any of the
circumstances is present: (a) there is deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting in the unlawful restraint
of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to
impose the sentence, (c) an excessive penalty is
imposed and such sentence is void as to the excess.
 Digested cases on Special Proceedings | Digested by Unabia, Cape et al. | 2017 Bukidnon State University College of Law | Page 18

As to denial of right to counsel: the scheduled visiting
hours provide reasonable access to the detainees,
giving petitioners sufficient time to confer with the
detainees. The detainees right to counsel is not
determined by the scheduled visits, even at the
hearings before the Senate and the Feliciano
Commission, petitioners were given time to confer
with the detainees, a fact that petitioners themselves
admit. Thus, at no point were the detainees denied
the right to counsel.
liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person
is withheld from the person entitled thereto.
He may also avail himself of the writ where as a
consequence of a judicial proceeding (a) there has
been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting
in the restraint of a person; (b) the court had no
jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an
excessive penalty has been imposed, as such
sentence is void as to such excess.

As to inhumane punishment: the boarding of the iron However, in this case, we find that there was no
grills is for the furtherance of security within the violation of the constitutional rights of the accused
ISAFP Detention Center. This measure intends to and a resultant deprivation of liberty or due process
fortify the individual cells and to prevent the of law. In fact, the petition may be viewed as an
detainees from passing on contraband and weapons attempt at a second motion for reconsideration of a
from one cell to another. The boarded grills ensures final decision of the Court, disguised as one
security and prevent disorder and crime within the for habeas corpus. The accused were sentenced to
facility. The dimished illumination and ventilation are the supreme penalty of death as a result of a valid
but discomforts inherent on the fact of detention and accusation, trial, and judgment by a court of
do not constitute punishments on the detainees. competent jurisdiction, after a fair and equitable trial.
The factual milieu does not show a mistrial or a
violation of the constitutional rights of the
DIGESTED BY: Yvonne Maryknoll A. Bioyo accused. As ruled by this Court, in its decision of
September 25, 1997, the constitutional infirmity
G.R. Nos. 138268-69
cannot affect the conclusion since accused-
May 26, 1999 appellants did not make any confessions or
admissions in regard to the crime charged. Further
JURRY ANDAL, RICARDO ANDAL and EDWIN the earring recovered from Jury Andal was not
MENDOZA, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE OF THE obtained in the course of the investigation itself, but
PHILIPPINES, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, obtained through a search incident to a lawful arrest.
BATANGAS BR. 05, LEMERY, THE DIRECTOR,
BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, and THE
DIGESTED BY: Yvonne Maryknoll A. Bioyo
HONORABLE, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, in
their official capacities, respondents.
G.R. No. 143881
FACTS: The case before us is a petition for a writ
August 9, 2001
of habeas corpus filed by Jury Andal, Ricardo Andal
and Edwin Mendoza, all convicted of rape with
DANILO EVANGELISTA y SOLOMON, petitioner,
homicide affirmed by this Court in a decision en
vs. HON. PEDRO SISTOZA, DIRECTOR, BUREAU
banc promulgated on September 25, 1997, and a
OF CORRECTIONS, MUNTINLUPA CITY, METRO
resolution promulgated on February 17, 1998. They
MANILA, respondent.
are scheduled for execution on June 16, 17, and 18,
FACTS:
1999. Petitioners seek a writ of habeas corpus on the
Petitioner Danilo Evangelista comes to us via the
basis of a claim of mistrial and/or that the decision of
instant Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas
the RTC was void. They pray for a temporary
Corpus to seek his release from imprisonment on the
restraining order to stay their execution and/or a
ground that after giving retroactive application to the
preliminary injunction enjoining their execution.
provisions of Republic Act No. 8294.
The petitioners rely on the argument that the trial
court was ousted of jurisdiction to try their case since
Petitioner was indicted for robbery and illegal
the pre-trial identification of the accused was made
possession of the firearm used in the commission of
without the assistance of counsel and without a valid
the robbery and thereafter convicted of the said
waiver from the accused.
crimes. For illegal possession of firearms, petitioner
was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
ISSUE: Whether or not a writ of habeas corpus
imprisonment of eighteen (18) years of reclusion
should be granted.
temporal as minimum to reclusion perpetua as
maximum. On the other hand, the indeterminate
HELD: No. [Though] we agree with petitioners that
penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years of prision
the extra-ordinary writ of habeas corpus is the
correccional as minimum to ten (10) years of prision
appropriate remedy to inquire into questions of
mayor as maximum was imposed by the trial court
violation of the petitioners constitutional rights and
upon the petitioner for robbery.
that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this
review. Indeed, under the Constitution, the
On appeal, the CA sentenced the accused-appellant
jurisdiction of this Court has been expanded to
to suffer: (1) an indeterminate penalty of
determine whether or not there has been a grave
imprisonment of Four (4) Years, Two (2) Months and
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
One (1) Day of Prision Correccional as minimum to
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
Six (6) Years and Eight (8) Months of Prision Mayor as
instrumentality of the Government.
maximum for robbery, and (2) an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of Twelve (12) Years, Five (5)
And under Rule 102, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of
Months and Eleven (11) days of Prision Mayor as
Court, it is provided that Except as otherwise
minimum to Seventeen (17) Years, Four (4) Months
expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas
and One (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum
corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement
in for illegal possession of firearm.
or detention by which any person is deprived of his

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 Digested cases on Special Proceedings | Digested by Unabia, Cape et al. | 2017 Bukidnon State University College of Law | Page 19
ISSUE: Whether or not the Writ of Habeas Corpus
should be granted.
HELD: Yes. On July 6, 1997, Republic Act No. 8294
took effect. The said law effectively reduced the
imposable penalty for the offense of illegal
possession of firearms. Hence, for the illegal
possession of a low powered firearm such as that of
the petitioner's, the penalty is now prision
correccional in its maximum period which has a
duration of four (4) years, two (2) months, and one
day to six (6) years, and a fine of not less than Fifteen
Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00). It is the retroactive
application of this provision of law which petitioner
seeks to forward his cause.
Petitioner is of the mistaken belief that the two terms
of imprisonment are to be served simultaneously.
Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on the
matter of service of two or more penalties. When the
culprit has to serve two or more penalties, he should
serve them simultaneously if the nature of the
penalties will so permit; otherwise said penalties shall
be executed successively, following the order of their
respective severity. Terms of imprisonment must
therefore be served successively. Thus, we have held
that in the service of two prison terms, the second
sentence did not commence to run until the
expiration of the first.
Fortunately, however, petitioner can and shall be
restored to his liberty in light of recent
jurisprudence, which shed light on the correct
interpretation of the following provisions of Republic
Act No. 8294. The Office of the Solicitor General
which did not interpose any objection to this petition
is correct in pointing out that should petitioner's case
be reviewed in light of recent jurisprudence, he may
be found guilty only of the crime of robbery. In other
words, he would be exonerated of the offense of
illegal possession of firearm. The reason for this is our
pronouncement in People vs. Walpan Ladjaalam that
the accused can be convicted of simple illegal
possession of firearms, provided that no other crime
was committed by the person arrested. Conversely
stated, if another crime was committed by the
accused, he cannot be convicted of simple illegal
possession of firearms. Thus, we ratiocinated:
We cannot accept either of these interpretations
because they ignore the plain language of the
statute. A simple reading thereof shows that if an
unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any
crime, there can be no separate offense of simple
illegal possession of firearms.
XXX
Moreover, penal laws are construed liberally in favor
of the accused. In this case, the plain meaning of RA
8294's simple language is most favorable to herein
appellant. Verily, no other interpretation is justified,
for the language of the new law demonstrates the
legislative intent to favor the accused. Accordingly,
appellant cannot be convicted of two separate
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offenses of illegal possession of firearms and direct
assault with attempted homicide. Moreover, since the
crime committed was direct assault and not homicide
or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be
deemed an aggravating circumstance. X X X
The law is clear: the accused can be convicted of
simple illegal possession of firearms, provided that
"no other crime was committed by the person
arrested." If the intention of the law in the second
paragraph were to refer only to homicide and
murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in
the third paragraph. Verily, where the law does not
distinguish, neither should we.
In view of the well-entrenched rule that
criminal laws shall be given retroactive effect if
favorable to the accused, petitioner Danilo
Evangelista is deemed to have committed only
the crime of robbery for which he has already
served more than the maximum period of the
penalty imposed upon him.
DIGESTED BY: Eileen Shiella A. Dialimas
G.R. No. 170497
January 22, 2007
ROGELIO ORMILLA, et al, petitioners, vs., THE
DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, AND THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS: This is a petition for the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus filed for and in behalf of Rogelio
Ormilla, Rogelio Rivera and Alfredo Navarro, praying
for their release from confinement on the ground that
an excessive penalty was imposed on them.
Petitioner, together with Rivera and Navarro, was
convicted of two counts of rape and sentenced
to reclusion perpetua for each count. He is presently
confined at the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa
and has served approximately 17 years of his
sentence. In the instant petition, Ormilla alleged that
he should be released from confinement by virtue of
Republic Act No. 8353, otherwise known as The Anti-
Rape Law of 1997. He claimed that under the new
rape law, the penalty for rape committed by two or
more persons was downgraded to prision
mayor to reclusion temporal. Thus, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua imposed on him is excessive
and should be modified in accordance with R.A. No.
8353. He prayed that he be released so he could
apply for pardon or parole.
ISSUE: Whether or not the writ may be granted in
favor of petitioner.
RULING: The petition lacks merit. Section 1, Rule
102 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for
the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus may be
availed of in cases of illegal confinement by which
any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the
rightful custody of any person is withheld from the
 Digested cases on Special Proceedings | Digested by Unabia, Cape et al. | 2017 Bukidnon State University College of Law | Page 20
person entitled thereto. In Feria v. Court of Appeals,
the Court held that the writ may also be issued
where, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a)
there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right
resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) the court
had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an
excessive penalty has been imposed, as such
sentence is void as to such excess. None of the above
circumstances is present in the instant case.
Recall that petitioner was charged and convicted
under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code which
states that, When and how rape is committed. Rape
is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:
1. By using force or intimidation;
2. When the woman is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; and
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or
is demented.
The crime of rape shall be punished by
reclusion perpetua. Whenever the crime of
rape is committed with the use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to
death. (Emphasis added)
With the enactment of R.A. No. 8353, petitioner
claims that the penalty of reclusion perpetua has
become excessive, as the new law now punishes rape
with prision mayor, citing Article 266-B as follows:
Rape under paragraph 2 of the next preceding
article shall be punished by prision
mayor. Whenever the rape is committed with the use
of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
penalty shall be prision mayor to reclusion temporal.
Petitioners reliance on the above-mentioned
portion of Article 266-B is misplaced. Note that
the penalty of prision mayor is imposed for
rape committed under paragraph 2 of Article
266-A which is committed by any person who
inserts his penis into another persons mouth
or anal orifice; or any instrument or object, into
the genital or anal orifice of another person. It
bears stressing that petitioner, together with Rivera
and Navarro, was charged with and convicted of rape
by having carnal knowledge of a woman using force
and intimidation under Article 335, which is now
embodied in paragraph 1 of Article 266-A. When
and How Committed. Rape is committed: 1) By a
man who shall have carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following
circumstances: a) Through force, threat or
intimidation; x x x x 2) By any person who,
under any of the circumstances mentioned in
paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of
sexual assault by inserting his penis into
another persons mouth or anal orifice, or any
instrument or object, into the genital or anal
orifice of another person.
Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. No. 8353, the penalty for rape
committed by two or more persons, using force,
threat or intimidation is reclusion perpetua to death,
to wit:
Art. 266-B. Penalties. Rape under
paragraph 1 of the next preceding article
shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
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Whenever the rape is committed with the
use of a deadly weapon or by two or more
persons, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.
xxxx
It must be emphasized that the same penalties were
imposed under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code
prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8353. It is clear
therefore that R.A. No. 8353 did not downgrade the
applicable penalties to petitioners case.
Considering that the penalty of reclusion
perpetua was properly imposed and that
petitioner is confined under authority of law,
the petition for the issuance of a writ
of habeas corpus is hereby DENIED.
Additional Readings
DIGESTED BY: Eileen Shiella A. Dialimas
G.R. No. 162734
August 29, 2006
MARIE ANTONETTE ABIGAIL C. SALIENTES,
ORLANDO B. SALIENTES, and ROSARIO C.
SALIENTES, petitioners, vs. LORAN S.D.
ABANILLA, HONORABLE JUDGE PEDRO
SABUNDAYO, JR., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 203, MUNTINLUPA CITY, respondents.
SHORT FACTS AND DOCTRINE/S: Loran and
Marie are the parents of minor Lorenzo. They lived
together with the parents of Marie. Due to in-laws
problems Loran suggested they move to their own
house. Marie refused but Loran left anyway. Marie
and her parents prevented Loran from seeing his son.
Loran filed this case for habeas corpus. Marie
contends that the petition for Habeas Corpus is not
the appropriate remedy and that she is entitled,
under Art. 213 of the Family Code, to the custody of
the minor. Habeas Corpus may be resorted to in
cases where rightful custody is withheld from a
person entitled thereto. Under Article 211 of the
Family Code, respondent Loran and petitioner Marie
have joint parental authority over their son and
consequently joint custody. In the present case,
private respondents cause of action is the deprivation
of his right to see his child as alleged in his petition.
Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available to
him. Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the
judicial adjudication of the custody and serves as a
guideline for the proper award of custody by the
court. It is not a basis for preventing the father to see
his own child.
FACTS: Loran Abanilla (Loran) and Marie Antonette
Abigail Salientes (Marie) are the parents of the minor
Lorenzo Emmanuel Abanilla, who was at the time two
years old. The couple lived together with Maries
parents, petitioners Orlando and Rosario Salientes.
 Digested cases on Special Proceedings | Digested by Unabia, Cape et al. | 2017 Bukidnon State University College of Law | Page 21
Due to in-laws problems, Loran suggested that they
transfer to their own house. Marie refused. Loran left
anyway and was thereafter prevented from seeing
his son. Loran filed a petition for Habeas Corpus and
Custody in the RTC of Muntinlupa City. The court
ordered Marie and her parents to produce and bring
before the court the body of the minor Lorenzo in
order to show cause why the said child should not be
discharged from restraint. Marie moved for a
reconsideration of the above order which was denied
She then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA
which was also dismissed.
The CA held that the order of the RTC did not award
to anyone the custody of the Lorenzo, the order
merely directs petitioners to produce the Lorenzo in
order for the trial court to conduct a full inquiry in the
matter of his custody. This is a mere interlocutory
order which is not appealable. Hence this appeal by
certiorari. Marie and her parents contend that the
order is contrary to Article 213 of the Family Code
which provides that no child under seven years of
age shall be separated from the mother unless the
court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.
They maintain that Loran has failed to present any
evidence of any compelling reason. They also argue,
that assuming that there were compelling reasons,
the proper remedy of Loran was not habeas corpus
but a simple action for custody. They assert that
habeas corpus is unavailable against the mother
who, under the law, has the right of custody of the
minor. Loran, on the other hand argues that Art. 213
applies only to the second part of his petition
regarding the custody of his son. It does not address
the first part, which pertains to his right as the father
to see his son. He asserts that a writ of habeas
corpus is available against any person who restrains
the minors right to see his father and vice versa. He
also asserts that the complaints filed by Marie were
merely for delay. Loran also maintains that, under
the law, both him and Marie share custody of Lorenzo
and when Marie is out of the country, as required by
her job as an international flight stewardess, he
should have the custody of Lorenzo and not the
maternal grandparents.
ISSUE: Whether or not Habeas Corpus was
the appropriate remedy.
HELD: Yes. Habeas Corpus may be resorted to in
cases where rightful custody is withheld from a
person entitled thereto. Under Article 211 of the
Family Code, respondent Loran and petitioner Marie
Antonette have joint parental authority over their son
and consequently joint custody. Although the couple
is separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to
be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a
juridical grant of custody to one parent, both parents
are still entitled to the custody of their child. In the
present case, private respondents cause of action is
the deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged
in his petition. Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is
available to him. In a petition for habeas corpus, the
childs welfare is the supreme consideration. The
Child and Youth Welfare Code unequivocally provides
that in all questions regarding the care and custody,
among others, of the child, his welfare shall be the
paramount consideration. The order of the court to
produce the body of the minor before the court was
merely in line with the directive contained in Section
9 of A.M. 03-04-04-SC. Moreover, Article 213 of the
Family Code deals with the judicial adjudication of the
custody and serves as a guideline for the proper
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award of custody by the court. It is not a basis for
preventing the father to see his own child.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated November 10, 2003 and the Resolution dated
March 19, 2004 of the Court of Appeals re AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners. SO ORDERED
DIGESTED BY: Amer Hussain S. Pangcoga
UDK No. 14817
January 13, 2014
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS
CORPUS OF MINOR SHANG KO VINGSON YU
SHIRLY VINGSON @ SHIRLY VINGSON DEMAISIP,
petitioner, vs. JOVY CABCABAN, respondent.
FACTS: Shang Ko, 14 year old, is the daughter of
Shirly Vingson Demaisip. Shirly Alleged that Shang Ko
ran away from home. Shirly went to the police station
in Bacolod City upon receipt of information that
Shang Ko was in the custody of respondent Jovy
Cabcaban, a police officer in that station. Since
Cabcaban refused to release Shang Ko to her, Shirly
sought the help of the National Bureau of
Investigation to rescue her child. Shirly, however,
failed to get the custody of Shang Ko because the
latter chose to stay with a private organization that
adopted her called Calvary kids. This prompted
petitioner Shirly to file a petition for habeas corpus
against respondent Cabcaban and the unnamed
officers of Calvary Kids before the Court of Appeals
(CA) rather than the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod
City citing as reason several threats against her life in
that city. Cabcaban claimed that Shang Ko left her
mother because she was maltreated and was driven
out. Cabcaban claimed that Shang Kos father was a
Taiwanese and that Shirly wanted the child back to
use her as leverage for getting financial support from
him. Hence, the CA ruled in favor of Cabcaban.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA was correct.
HELD: Yes. Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of
Court, the writ of habeas corpus is available, not only
in cases of illegal confinement or detention by which
any person is deprived of his liberty, but also in cases
involving the rightful custody over a minor. The
general rule is that parents should have custody over
their minor children. But the State has the right to
intervene where the parents, rather than care for
such children, treat them cruelly and abusively,
impairing their growth and well-being and leaving
them emotional scars that they carry throughout
their lives unless they are liberated from such
parents and properly counseled. Since this case
presents factual issues and since the parties are all
residents of Bacolod City, it would be best that such
issues be resolved by a Family Court in that city.
Meantime, considering the presumption that the
police authorities acted regularly in placing Shang Ko
in the custody of Calvary Kids the Court believes that
she should remain there pending hearing and
adjudication of this custody case. Besides, she herself
has expressed preference to stay in that place.
 Digested cases on Special Proceedings | Digested by Unabia, Cape et al. | 2017 Bukidnon State University College of Law | Page 22
DIGESTED BY: Amer Hussain S. Pangcoga
G.R. No. 166470
August 7, 2009
CECILIO C. HERNANDEZ, MA. VICTORIA C.
HERNANDEZ- SAGUN, TERESA C. HERNANDEZ-
VILLA ABRILLE and NATIVIDAD CRUZ-
HERNANDEZ, petitioners, vs. JOVITA SAN JUAN-
SANTOS, respondent.
FACTS: Maria Lourdes San Juan Hernandez (or Lulu)
was born on February 14, 1947 to the spouses Felix
Hernandez and Maria San Juan Hernandez.
Unfortunately, the latter died due to complications
during childbirth. After Maria's death, Felix left Lulu in
the care of her maternal uncle, Sotero C. San Juan.
On December 16, 1951, Felix married Natividad Cruz.
The union produced three children, petitioners Cecilio
C. Hernandez, Ma. Victoria C. Hernandez-Sagun and
Teresa C. Hernandez-Villa Abrille. Meanwhile, as the
only child of Maria and the sole testate heir of Sotero,
Lulu inherited valuable real properties from the San
Juan family (conservatively estimated at P50 million
in 1997). Sometime in 1957, Lulu went to live with
her father and his new family. She was then 10 years
old and studying at La Consolacion College. However,
due to her violent personality, Lulu stopped schooling
when she reached Grade 5. In 1968, upon reaching
the age of majority, Lulu was given full control of her
estate. Nevertheless, because Lulu did not even
finish her elementary education, Felix continued to
exercise actual administration of Lulus properties.
Upon Felix's death in 1993, petitioners took over the
task of administering Lulu's properties. During the
period of their informal administration (from 1968
until 1993), Felix and petitioners undertook various
projects involving Lulus real properties. Lulu was also
deceived by the petitioners in selling the formers
properties to another. In September 1998, Lulu
sought the assistance of her maternal first cousin,
respondent Jovita San Juan-Santos, after learning that
petitioners had been dissipating her estate. On
October 2, 1998, respondent filed a petition for
guardianship in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San
Mateo, Rizal, Branch 76. She alleged that Lulu was
incapable of taking care of herself and managing her
estate because she was of weak mind.
In a decision dated September 25, 2001, the RTC
concluded that, due to her weak physical and mental
condition, there was a need to appoint a legal
guardian over the person and property of Lulu. Thus,
it declared Lulu an incompetent and appointed
respondent as guardian over the person and property
of Lulu on a P1 million bond.
Meanwhile, Lulu was provided with two housemaids
tasked to care for her. Sometime in November 2003,
Lulu was abducted from her Marikina apartment.
Jovita immediately sought the assistance of the Police
Anti-Crime Emergency Response (PACER) division of
the Philippine National Police. On December 15,
2003, respondent filed a petition for habeas corpus in
the CA alleging that petitioners abducted Lulu and
were holding her captive in an undisclosed location in
Rodriguez, Rizal. On April 26, 2005, the CA granted,
affirming the RTCs decision in toto, the petition
for habeas corpus, ruling that Jovita, as her legal
guardian, was entitled to her custody.
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ISSUE: Whether or not the person is an incompetent
who requires the appointment of a judicial guardian
over her person and property.
HELD: Yes. Under Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of
Court, persons who, though of sound mind but by
reason of age, disease, weak mind or other similar
causes are incapable of taking care of themselves
and their property without outside aid, are
considered as incompetents who may properly be
placed under guardianship. The RTC and the CA both
found that Lulu was incapable of taking care of
herself and her properties without outside aid due to
her ailments and weak mind.
Similarly, we see no compelling reason to reverse the
trial and appellate courts finding as to the propriety
of respondent's appointment as the judicial guardian
of Lulu. We therefore affirm her appointment as such.
Consequently, respondent is tasked to care for and
take full custody of Lulu, and manage her estate as
well.
Inasmuch as respondents appointment as the
judicial guardian of Lulu was proper, the issuance of a
writ of habeas corpus in her favor was also in order.
A writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal
confinement or detention or by which the rightful
custody of person is withheld from the one entitled
thereto. Respondent, as the judicial guardian of Lulu,
was duty-bound to care for and protect her ward. For
her to perform her obligation, respondent must have
custody of Lulu. Thus, she was entitled to a writ
of habeas corpus after she was unduly deprived of
the custody of her ward.
DIGESTED BY: Terence L. Valdehueza
G.R. No. 154994
June 28, 2005
JOYCELYN PABLO-GUALBERTO, petitioner, vs.
CRISANTO RAFAELITO GUALBERTO V, respondent.
G.R. No. 156254
June 28, 2005
CRISANTO RAFAELITO G. GUALBERTO
V, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS; Hon.
HELEN B. RICAFORT, Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court Paraaque City, Branch 260;
and JOYCELYN D. PABLO-
GUALBERTO, respondents.
FACTS: On March 12, 2002, Crisanto Rafaelito
Gualberto V filed a petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage to Joycelyn Pablo-Gualberto, with an
ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite of Rafaello,
their 4 year-old son, whom Joycelyn allegedly took
away from the conjugal home and his school when he
decided to abandon her husband in February 2002.
On April 2, 2002 The RTC heard the ancillary prayer
of Crisanto for custody pindente lite due to failure of
Joycelyn to appear despite notice. A certain Col.
Renato Santos testified that he was commissioned by
Crisanto to conduct surveillance on Joycelyn and
came up with the conclusion that she was having a
lesbian relation with a certain Noreen Gay Cuidadano
in Cebu City; and a certain Ms. Cherry Batistel, a
house helper of the spouses, testified that the
 Digested cases on Special Proceedings | Digested by Unabia, Cape et al. | 2017 Bukidnon State University College of Law | Page 23
mother does not care for the child and the she saw
Joycelyn, in one occasion, slapping her child. On April
3, 2002, The RTC awarded the custody of Rafaello to
Crisanto.
On April 16, 2002, Joycelyn filed a motion to lift the
award of custody pindente lite of the child to Crisanto
despite that she did not present any evidence to
support her motion. On May 17, 2002, the RTC issued
the assailed order, reversing the April 3 award, at the
same time awarding the custody to Joycelyn
reasoning, citing Article 213 of the Family Code, that
the child shall not be separated from his mother
unless the Court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise. The Court finds the reason stated by
Crisanto not to be a compelling reason to award the
custody; however, he will not be deprived of his
entitlement to spend time with the child.
Crisanto filed a petition for certiorari before the CA
and charging the RTC Judge with grave abuse of
discretion for issuing the May 17, 2002 Order; and
questioning the same order which had superseded
the still valid and subsisting April 3 Order that
awarded him of the childs custody. The CA partly
favored Crisanto, ruling that the RTC Judge acted with
grave abuse of discretion in reversing its April 3
Order. The CA explained that the only incident to
resolve was Joycelyns Motion to Dismiss and not the
issuance of the earlier Order. According to the CA, the
prior Order awarding provisional custody to the father
should prevail, not only because it was issued after
hearing, but also because the trial court did not
resolve the correct incident in the later Order.
Nonetheless, the CA stressed that the RTC Judge was
not precluded from resolving Joycelyns petition to lift
the award, as that the motion had yet to be properly
considered and ruled upon. However, the CA directed
that child be turned over to Crisanto until the issue
be resolved.
Hence, the petition for review (first petition) filed by
Joycelyn under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court;
and the petition for certiorari (second petition) by
Crisanto under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ancillary remedies of
habeas corpus and preliminary mandatory injunction
with urgent for immediate issuance of preliminary
injunction be granted by the Supreme Court?
HELD: No, the ancillary remedies of habeas corpus
and preliminary injunction could not be granted by
the Supreme Court. The Court held that Joycelyn has
the right to keep her minor son in her custody. A writ
of habeas corpus may be only issued when the issue
only pertains to the rightful custody of any person is
withheld from the person entitled thereto, a situation
which does not apply to the case at hand.
On the other hand, the ancillary remedy of
preliminary injunction cannot be granted because
Crisantos right to custody has not been proven to be
clear and unmistakable. Unlike an ordinary
preliminary injunction, the writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction is more cautiously regarded,
since the latter requires the performance of a
particular act that tends to go beyond the
maintenance of the status quo. Besides, such
injunction would serve no purpose, now that the case
has been decided on its merits.
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Wherefore, the petition of Joycelyn be granted. The
assailed decision of the CA is hereby reversed and
the RTC Order of May 17, 2002 be reinstated. The
petition of Crisanto be dismissed.
DIGESTED BY: Terence L. Valdehueza
G.R. No. 154598
August 16, 2004
RICHARD BRIAN THORNTON for and in behalf of
the minor child SEQUEIRA JENNIFER DELLE
FRANCISCO THORNTON, petitioner, vs. ADELFA
FRANCISCO THORNTON, respondent.
FACTS: On August 28, 1998, Richard Brian Thornton,
an American, married Adelfa Francisco Thornton, a
Filipina. A year later, Adelfa gave birth to their
daughter, Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco Thornton
(Too long for a name, right? Lets call her
Langga Jenny). After three years of marriage,
Adelfa grew tired of being a plain housewife and
wanted to return to her old job as a guest relations
officer in a nightclub with the freedom to go out with
her friends. Several times, when her husband was out
of the country, she had left the care of Langga Jenny
to her househelp in order for her to come out with
her friends. On December 7, 2001, Adelfa left the
family home and took Langga Jenny with her without
notifying her husband; she went to Sta. Clara,
Lamitan, Basilan. Brian filed a petition for habeas
corpus in the designated Family Court in Makati, but
was dismissed, presumably because of the allegation
that the child was in Basilan. Brian went to Basilan to
ascertain the whereabouts of his wife and daughter,
but he did not find them; the Barangay Office of Sta.
Clara issued a certification that Adelfa no longer
resides there.
Brian gave up of his search when he got hold of
Adelfas cellular bills showing calls from different
places. He then filed for another petition for habeas
corpus to the CA which could issue a writ enforceable
in the entire country. CA dismissed the petition
contending that it does not have the jurisdiction over
the case. It ruled that R.A. 8369 (The Family Courts
Act of 1997) gave exclusive original jurisdiction over
petitions of habeas corpus, and that it impliedly
repealed R.A. 7902 (An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction
of the CA) and B.P. 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980).
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA was correct in ruling
that it has no jurisdiction over the petition with the
contention that R.A. 8369 had impliedly repealed R.A.
7902 and B.P. 129, and that the former law had
granted family courts the exclusive and the original
jurisdictions over such petitions.
HELD: No. The Court of Appeals should take
cognizance of the case since there is nothing in R.A.
8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of
habeas corpus involving the custody of minors. The
Supreme Court disagreed with the CAs reasoning
because it will result in an iniquitous situation,
leaving individuals like petitioner without legal
recourse in obtaining custody of their children.
Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of
 Digested cases on Special Proceedings | Digested by Unabia, Cape et al. | 2017 Bukidnon State University College of Law | Page 24
minors they are looking for would be helpless since
they cannot seek redress from family courts whose
writs are enforceable only in their respective
territorial jurisdictions. Thus, if a minor is being
transferred from one place to another, which seems
to be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus
case will be left without legal remedy. This lack of
recourse could not have been the intention of the
lawmakers when they passed the Family Courts Act of
1997.
As observed by the Solicitor General:
Under the Family Courts Act of 1997, the
avowed policy of the State is to protect the rights
and promote the welfare of children. The creation
of the Family Court is geared towards addressing
three major issues regarding childrens welfare
cases, as expressed by the legislators during the
deliberations for the law. The legislative intent
behind giving Family Courts exclusive and
original jurisdiction over such cases was to avoid
further clogging of regular court dockets, ensure
greater sensitivity and specialization in view of
the nature of the case and the parties, as well as
to guarantee that the privacy of the children
party to the case remains protected.
The primordial consideration is the welfare and best
interests of the child. The Supreme Court rule,
therefore, that R.A. 8369 did not divest the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court of their jurisdiction
over habeas corpus cases involving the custody of
minors.
The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent
to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and
Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas corpus
relating to the custody of minors. Further, it cannot
be said that the provisions of R.A. 8369, R.A. 7092
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and B.P. 129 are absolutely incompatible since R.A.
8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the
Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in
cases involving the custody of minors. Thus, the
provisions of R.A. 8369 must be read in harmony with
R.A. 7029 and B.P. 129 that family courts have
concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus
where the custody of minors is at issue.
In any case, whatever uncertainty there was has
been settled with the adoption of A.M. No. 03-03-04-
SC Re: Rule on Custody of Minors and Writ of Habeas
Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors. Section 20 of
the rule provides that:
Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas
corpus. A verified petition for a writ of habeas
corpus involving custody of minors shall be filed
with the Family Court. The writ shall be
enforceable within its judicial region to which the
Family Court belongs.
xxx xxx xxx
The petition may likewise be filed with the
Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of
its members and, if so granted, the writ shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ
may be made returnable to a Family Court or to
any regular court within the region where the
petitioner resides or where the minor may be
found for hearing and decision on the merits.
From the foregoing, there is no doubt that the Court
of Appeals and Supreme Court have concurrent
jurisdiction with family courts in habeas corpus cases
where the custody of minors is involved.
Wherefore, the petition is granted and that the
petition for habeas corpus is reinstated and
remanded to the Court of Appeals.