Airpower at 18,000' - The Indian Air Force in The Kargil War - Carnegie Endowment For International Peace PDF

2/10/2017 Airpowerat18,000:TheIndianAirForceintheKargilWarCarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace
Airpowerat18,000:TheIndianAirForceinthe
KargilWar
BenjaminLambeth
TheKargilconflictwasamilestoneeventinIndianmilitaryhistoryandonethatrepresentsatellingprototypeofIndiasmostlikelytypeoffuturecombat
challenge.
PublishedSeptember20,2012
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SouthAsia India Pakistan DefenseandSecurity
Foreword
Inthespringof1999,theworldslowlybecameawareofPakistansforayintotheKargilDrassectorofthedisputedstateofJammuandKashmir,a
provocationthatwouldincitethelimitedwarnowknownastheKargilconflict.ThisclashrepresentedawatershedinIndoPakistanisecurityrelations
becauseitdemonstratedthateventhepresenceofnuclearweaponsmightnotdampenthecompetitionthathaspersistedhistoricallybetweentheregions
largeststates.Buttheconflictdistinguisheditselfinotherwaysaswell,especiallyinthescaleandtypeofmilitaryoperations.
Althoughpaststrugglesforadvantagealongthedisputedbordersoutsideofdeclaredwarsinvariablyinvolvedsmallinfantryelementsonbothsides,the
KargilconflictwasuniquebothinthenumberofmajorIndianlandformationscommittedtothestruggleandNewDelhisdecisiontoemployairpower.The
roleofairpower,however,wastingedwithcontroversyfromtheverybeginning.Bothduringandimmediatelyaftertheconflict,itwasnotclearwhetherthe
IndianAirForce(IAF)leadershipofthetimeadvocatedthecommitmentofIndianairpowerandunderwhatconditions,howtheIAFactuallyperformedatthe
operationallevelandwithwhateffects,andwhethertheemploymentofairpowerwassatisfactorilycoordinatedwiththeIndianArmyateitherthestrategicor
thetacticallevelsofwar.Whetherairpowerprovedtobethedecisivelinchpinthathastenedthesuccessfulconclusionoftheconflictwasalsouncertainbut
allthesequestionsprovidedgristforconsiderabledisputationintheaftermathofthewar.
WhattheKargilconflictdemonstrated,however,wasthatairpowerwasrelevantandcouldbepotentiallyveryeffectiveevenintheutterlydemandingcontext
ofmountainwarfareathighaltitudes.AtatimewhenIndiaiscompelledtothinkseriouslyaboutthesecuritychallengesposedbyChinascontinuingmilitary
modernizationespeciallyasitaffectsIndiasabilitytoprotectitsequitiesalongtheformidableHimalayanborderlandsacriticalassessmentoftheIAFs
contributionstotheKargilconflictisessentialandinfactlongoverdue.Variouspartialanalyseshaveappearedalreadytheyareindispensablebecausethey
addressseveralspecificdimensionsofIAFoperationsrangingfromtheearlydebatesaboutstrategyandthepoliticalimpactofemployingairpowerto
overcomingthevariousdifficultiesthattheIAFhadtosurmountinquickorderifitsinstrumentsofcombatweretomakeausefulcontributiontothesuccessof
Indiasnationalaims.Thecombatcapabilitiesbroughttobearintheairspaceabovethemountainbattlefields,obviously,constitutedonlythevisibletipofthe
spearavastandofteninvisiblesystemoforganizationandsupportinvolvingeverythingfrommanagingintratheaterairlifttoredeployingcombatsquadronsto
planningandcoordinatingoperationstoimprovisingtechnicalfixesamidstthepressureofcombatwereallimplicatedinairpowerscontributiontotheKargil
War.
Thisstoryhasneverbeentoldbeforeindepthorwithcomprehensivenessandbalanceyetitdeservestellingbothbecauseitshedslightonanimportant
episodeinIndianmilitaryhistoryandbecauseitslessonshaveimplicationsformanagingthemoredemandingthreatsthatIndiaisconfrontedwithinthe
Himalayas.ThismonographbyBenjaminLambethadvancesbothaimsadmirably.ItrepresentsaseriousscholarlyefforttounderstandhowtheIAFactually
performedatKargilandisexemplaryforthemeticulousnessofitsresearch,thepoliticaldetachmentofitsanalysis,anditsinsightswhichcouldcomeonly
fromoneofAmericaspremieranalystsofairpower,whoalsohappenstohaveaccumulatedextensiveflightexperienceinmorethanthreedozendifferent
typesofcombataircraftworldwidesince1976.Lambeths manifestedduringadistinguishedcareerofoverfortyyears(mostofitatRAND)has
alwaysbeenwideranging:inadditiontohismanywritingsonairpowerandairwarfare,ithasincludedseminalstudiesonSovietmilitarythoughtnuclear
deterrence,strategyandoperationsgeopoliticsinthesuperpowercompetitionandtheevolutionofmilitarytechnologyanditsimpactonwarfighting.
GivenhisdiverseinterestsandhisformalacademictrainingatGeorgetownandHarvard,itisnotsurprisingthatLambethsstudyrangesacrossmultiple
levelsofanalysis,fromthegeopoliticaltothetactical.Thisbroadapproachpermitshimtocoverairpowerscontributiontotheconflictinextraordinarydetail.It
reliesnotsimplyonthepublishedrecordbutalsoondetailedinterviewswiththeIAFsleadershipanditscombatcadresaswellasonextensive
communicationswithahostofparticipantsfromtheotherservicesinvolvedinthewar,allbroughttogetherinaseamlessandcoherentanalyticalnarrative.
http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/09/20/airpowerat18000indianairforceinkargilwarpub49421 1/22
Astheresult,thereportissimultaneouslyachronicleofwhattheIAFactuallydidandafairevaluationofbothitsachievementsanditsshortcomings.National
securityanalystsintheUnitedStatesandinIndia,aswellaspolicymakersinbothcountries,woulddowelltoreadthemonographcarefullybecauseofits
judgmentsaboutIAFcapabilitiesandthepathsimplicitlysuggestedforfutureU.S.Indiandefense(andinparticularairpower)cooperation.
TheSouthAsiaprogramoftheCarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeaceisprivilegedtopublishLambethsreport.IamespeciallygratefultotheIndian
CouncilforCulturalRelationsforsupportingtheEndowmentsongoingresearchonIndiansecurity.
ASHLEYJ.TELLIS
SeniorAssociate
CarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace
Summary
HighinthemountainsofIndiancontrolledKashmirin1999,IndiaandPakistanfoughtinanintenseborderclashforlimitedbutimportantstakes.
OvershadowedbyNATOshigherprofileairwarforKosovo,theKargilWarensuedforseventyfourdaysatacostofmorethanathousandcasualtieson
eachside.YetitremainsonlydimlyappreciatedbymostWesterndefenseexpertsandbarelyatallbystudentsandpractitionersofairpower.
Nevertheless,itwasamilestoneeventinIndianmilitaryhistoryandonethatrepresentsatellingprototypeofIndiasmostlikelytypeoffuturecombat
challenge.TheKargilconflictwasemblematicofthekindoflowerintensityborderskirmishbetweenIndiaandPakistan,andperhapsalsobetweenIndiaand
China,thatcouldrecurinthenextdecadeinlightoftheinhibitingeffectofnuclearweaponsonmoreprotractedandhigherstakestestsofstrength.
TheexperienceoffersanexemplarycasestudyintheusesofairpowerinjointwarfareinhighmountainconditionsandiskeytoafullunderstandingofIndias
emergingairposture.ItistheoneinstanceofrecentIndianexposuretohighintensitywarfarethatprovidesinsightsintotheIndianAirForces(IAFs)
capabilities,limitations,relationswithitssisterservices,andinteractionswithIndiascivilianleadership.
The Kargil conflict offers an exemplary case study in the uses of airpower in joint warfare in high mountain
conditions and is key to a full understanding of Indias emerging air posture.
IntheKargilWar,theIAFrapidlyadaptedtotheaircampaignsuniqueoperationalchallenges,whichincludedenemypositionsatelevationsof14,000to
18,000feet,astarkbackdropofrocksandsnowthatmadeforuncommonlydifficultvisualtargetacquisition,andarestrictionagainstcrossingtheLineof
ControlthatformstheborderwithPakistan.Withoutquestion,theeffectiveasymmetricuseofIAFairpowerwaspivotalinshapingthewarssuccessful
courseandoutcomeforIndia.YettheconflictalsohighlightedsomeofIndiasmilitaryshortcomings.ThecovertPakistaniintrusionintoIndiancontrolled
Kashmirthatwasthe laidbareagapingholeinIndiasnationwiderealtimeintelligence,surveillance,andreconnaissancecapabilitythathad
allowedtheincursiontogoundetectedformanydays.Itfurtherbroughttolighttheinitialneartotallackoftransparencyandopencommunicationbetween
theIndianArmystopleadersandtheIAFwithrespecttothegatheringcrisis.
Allthingsconsidered,theconflictwasapoortestofIndiasairwarfarecapability.DespitethehappyendingoftheKargilexperienceforIndia,theIAFsfighter
pilotswererestrictedintheiroperationsduetomyriadchallengesspecifictothiscampaign.Theywerethusconsignedtodowhattheycouldratherthanwhat
theymighthavedoneiftheyhadmoreroomformaneuver.
Onastrategiclevel,theKargilWarvividlydemonstratedthatastablebilateralnucleardeterrencerelationshipcanmarkedlyinhibitsuchregionalconflictsin
intensityandscaleifnotprecludethemaltogether.Intheabsenceofthenuclearstabilizingfactor,thoseflashpointscoulderuptintoopenended
conventionalshowdownsforthehigheststakes.ButtheKargilWaralsodemonstratedthatnucleardeterrenceisnotapanacea.Thepossibilityoffuture
conventionalwarsofmajorconsequencealongIndiasnorthernborderswithPakistanandChinapersists,andtheIndiandefenseestablishmentmustplan
andprepareaccordingly.
Introduction
TheIndianAirForce(IAF)istheworldsfourthlargestairservice,operatingmorethan1,300aircraftoutofsome60basesnationwide.Italsoisoneofthe
worldsoldestcontinuouslyfunctioningairforces,withrootsgoingbacktoOctober8,1932,whenitwasestablishedbyGreatBritainsRoyalAirForceasan
auxiliaryoftheIndianEmpireduringthetimeoftheBritishRaj.2Untiltheearly1990s,itwasprincipallyasupportentityfortheIndianArmy.3Today,ithas
acquiredindependentstrategicmissions,mostnotablyincludingthoseofnucleardeterrenceandretaliation,anditisadiversifiedfightingforcewithmanifest
ambitionstowardglobalreachandstatus.Italsoisafullspectrumcombatairarmwithaprecisionconventionalstrikecapability,fieldingnotonlyfourth
generationmultirolefighters,butalsoforceextendingtankers,arecentlyacquiredairbornewarningandcontrolsystemcapability,intertheaterairlifters,
unmannedaerialvehiclesequippedwithmultispectralsensorsforlongdwellstrategicandtacticalreconnaissance,andthebeginningsofamilitaryspace
surveillancecapability.
ThefieldofstrategicregardinwhichthismaturingforcemostcentrallyfiguresnowextendsfromtheeastcoastofAfricatoSumatraandtheentireIndian
Oceanoperatingarea.Likefewotherairarmsaroundtheworld,theIAFoperatesoverthemostdiverserangeofgeographicareas,fromtheSiachenglacier
inthenorthtothedeserts,jungles,andoceansthatsurroundIndiasperiphery.Aformerairofficercommandinginchief(AOCinC)oftheIAFsWesternAir
CommandwellcapturedtheIAFleadershipsnowoftexpressedcharacterizationofthesteadilymodernizingservicewhenhewrotein2009oftheIAFs
growingaspirationstotransformitselffromameresubcontinentaltacticalforcetoanintercontinentalstrategicaerospacepowerinconformitywithother
leadingairforcesintheworld.4
IndiasprincipalexternalchallengersandhencetheIAFsmainobjectsofstrategicandoperationalconcernareChinaandPakistan,inthatorder.Chinais
generallyregardedbytheIndiandefensecommunityasposingamoredownstreamsourceofpotentialtrouble,whereasPakistanisdeemedbothalonger
term ahereandnowthreattothecountryssecurity.5BecausebothIndiaanditstwoleadingrivalsallpossesswellstockedinventoriesofreadily
availablenuclearweapons,mostplannersinNewDelhiassessthelikelihoodofanalloutwaronthesubcontinentasbeingquitelow.Theuppermost
concernoftheIAFleadershipwithrespecttocombatreadinesstodayentailsoperatingdecisivelyataconventionallevelagainsteitherrivalwhenallsidesin
anyconflictwillbewithinimmediatereachofanuclearresponseoption.
Giventhisomnipresentriskofescalation,mostIndianthreatassessorsbelievethatanyfuturecombatengagementwitheitherChinaorPakistanwill,inall
likelihood,besharpandintensebutalsobriefandforlimitedstakes.Inthisregard,anofficialIAFpublicationreleasedin2007franklyacknowledgedthe
likelyshortdurationofanywarthatIndiamayhavetocontendwithintheneartermfuture.6Themostprobableprospect,accordingtoretiredIAFAir
CommodoreJasjitSingh,isforprolongedperiodsofpeacewithspurtsofarmedviolenceofgreatvariety.7
InathoughtfulenumerationofthediverseconflictpossibilitiesthatcouldconfrontIndiansecurityplannersinthenextdecade,aretiredIAFairmarshalin
2007listedasbeingamongthemostplausibleofthosepossibilitiesanextendedborderwarwithChina,withlittlelikelihoodofnuclearweaponsusea
shorterandmoreintensewarwithPakistanentailingaveryrealchanceofnuclearuseunlikeIndia,Pakistanhasneverproclaimedanuclearnofirstuse
policyasimultaneouswarwithChinaandPakistanoperatingincollusionandaprolongedlowerintensitywarinKashmiragainstbothPakistaniregular
forcesandindigenousKashmiriinsurgents.8
AninstructivepreviewofthislasttypeofconflictscenariocanbeseenintheKargilWarthatunfoldedinthehighmountainsofIndiancontrolledKashmirin
May,June,andJuly1999.Thatintenseborderclashforlimitedbutimportantstakes,whichensuedforseventyfourdaysatacostofmorethanathousand
casualtiesoneachside,wasovershadowedbyNATOshigherprofileairwarforKosovothatoccurredthousandsofmilesawayintheBalkansatroughlythe
sametime.Inlargepartbecauseofthatmoreattentiongettingdistraction,theKargilWarremainsonlydimlyappreciatedbymostWesterndefenseexperts
andbarelyatallbystudentsandpractitionersofairpower.
Western defense professionals have much to gain from a closer inquiry into this little-known chapter in the
history of air warfare.
Nevertheless,itwasamilestoneeventinIndianmilitaryhistoryandonethatrepresentsatellingprototypeofIndiasmostlikelytypeoffuturecombat
challengeintheimmediateyearsahead.9Nolessimportant,itoffersbothanexemplarycasestudyintheusesofairpowerinjointwarfareandaparticularly
revealingtestamenttothespecialdifficultiesofmodernairemploymentinhighmountainconditions.10TheKargilexperienceiskeytoaproperunderstanding
ofIndiasemergingairposturebecauseitconstitutestheoneinstanceofrecentIndianexposuretohighintensitywarfarethatprovidesinsightsintotheIAFs
capabilities,limitations,relationswithitssisterservices,andinteractionswithIndiascivilianleadership.Theconflictwasalsoemblematicofonetypeofborder
skirmishbetweenIndiaandPakistan,andperhapsalsobetweenIndiaandChina,thatcouldrecurinthenextdecadeinlightoftheinhibitingeffectofthe
nuclearoverhangonmoreprotractedandhigherstakestestsofstrength.AsretiredAirCommodoreSinghreflectedontheexperiencesixyearsafterits
successfulconclusionforIndia,theconflictwasatypicalexampleofalimitedwarinanuclearweaponsenvironment.11Forallthesereasons,Western
defenseprofessionalshavemuchtogainfromacloserinquiryintothislittleknownchapterinthehistoryofairwarfare.
Prelude to a Showdown
FlareupsalongtheborderbetweenPakistanandIndiahavealonghistory,goingbackasfaras1947whenBritishruleofthesubcontinentendedandthe
formerBritishIndianEmpirewassubdividedintothenewlyindependentUnionofIndiaandtheDominionofPakistan.ThatdevelopmentpromptedPakistan
tolaunchaguerillaincursionintoKashmirinanattempttoestablishcontroloverthecontestedregion.TheIndianArmyandtheIAFcounteredinforceby
enteringKashmiranddrivingthePakistanisponsoredirregularsoutofallbutasmallportionofthehighmountainstate.12
TheseedsoftheKargilconflictwerefirstplantedinMarchandApril1999.Then,determinedunitsofthePakistanArmycrossedtheLineofControl(LoC)
intotheIndianportionofcontestedKashmirintheremoteandruggedHimalayanheightsoverlookingKargilbetweentheKashmirValleyandtheLadakh
plateau.TheLoCrunningthroughJammuandKashmirthatseparatestheIndianheldandPakistanicontrolledportionsofthedisputedterritory(shownin
Figure1)isalongstandingproductofthethirdIndoPakistaniwarthatcreatedBangladesh.Itbisectssomeofthemostforbiddingterraintobefound
anywhereintheworld,withmostofthemainridgelinesbeingoffshootsofK2,theworldssecondhighestmountain.
WhilepreparationswereunderwayforanupcomingmeetingofIndiasandPakistansprimeministersinLahore,Pakistan,seniorleadersinthePakistan
Army,ledbythechiefoftheArmyStaff,GeneralPervezMusharraf,andthechiefoftheGeneralStaff,LieutenantGeneralMohammedAziz,wereconducting
initialreconnaissanceandlayingthelogisticalgroundworkfortheimpendingoperation.Themostlikelyaimoftheplannedgambit,apartfromseekingto
internationalizetheKashmirissueinIndoPakistanirelations,wastotakecontrolofIndiassolelineofcommunicationtotroopsontheSiachenglacierby
obstructingtheuseofthekeytwolanenationalhighwayNH1AinLadakhrunningfromSrinagarthroughKargiltoLeh.ItprovidedaccesstotheIAFsairfield
atThoiseontheaxistoSiachen.13
Theincursionsplannerstookfulladvantageoftherelaxedatmospherethathad
cometoprevailinNewDelhiafterthevisitofPrimeMinisterAtalVajpayeetoPakistantohelppromulgatetheLahoreDeclaration,whichwassignedby
VajpayeeandhisPakistanicounterpart,NawazSharif,onFebruary21.Withit,thegovernmentsofbothcountriessworetheircommitmenttothevisionof
peaceandstabilityembodiedintheUnitedNationscharter.14ThePakistanArmyleaderschosetoexploitthenascent,andultimatelyshortlived,feelingof
goodwillthathademanatedfromthatdeclarationinawaythatmightirreversiblychangethestatusquoalongtheLoCtoPakistansadvantage.
Becauseofthecapriciousweatherthatpredominatesinthearea,theIndianArmyduringtheharshestwintermonthsthatimmediatelyprecededtheKargil
crisisvacateditsmostinhospitableforwardoutpoststypicallyatelevationsof14,000to18,000feetthatwerenormallymannedonIndiassideoftheLoC
throughouttheremainderoftheyear.SincesubstantialgapsexistedinIndiasdefensesinthesegmentofKashmirthatlayonbothsidesoftheLoC,a
segmentfeaturingveryfewtrailsleadingofffromthemainroadways,thePakistaniplannersthoughtthevacatedoutpostsmadeprimetargetsforseizure.
Addingfurthertotheattractivenessoftheplannedgambit,theoutpostsweresituatedoneasilydefendedhighgroundthatIndiantroopswouldhavetoattack
frombelowinordertotrytorecapturethem.AclevermixofregularcombattroopsandlocalcivilianporterswouldinfiltratetheareaandpresenttheIndian
governmentwithafaitaccompliinKashmir.
Pakistansmilitaryleaderswereallbutsurelyemboldenedbytheircountrysacquisitionofanuclearweaponsdeliverycapabilitywithintheprecedingyear.
TheymayalsohavebeenencouragedbyaderivativebeliefthattheawarenessofthatcapabilityinkeyleadershipcirclesinNewDelhiwouldmorethan
offsetanyconventionalmilitaryadvantageIndiaenjoyedintheregion.15AndeveniftheoperationweretobedetectedbyIndiawhileitwasstillinprogress,
theincursionsplannerslikelyjudgedthattheIndianArmysreactiontoitwouldbeslowandlimitedatbest.Mostimportant,theyprobablytookitasa
foregoneconclusionthatwereIndiatoseektoconventionalizetheensuingconflict,pressurefromtheinternationalcommunitywouldquicklyinterveneand
forcetheVajpayeegovernmenttoceasecombatoperationswithinaweek,thusleavingPakistancomfortablyinpossessionofgainsitwouldmakeby
infiltration,inthewordsofretiredIndianArmyMajorGeneralG.D.Bakshi.16
Ultimately,inwhatturnedouttobeaphasedinfiltrationinuniquelychallengingmountainterrain,Pakistanitroopsmovingbyfootandhelicopteroccupied
roughly130outpostsonIndiassideoftheLoCbeforetheintruderswerefirstdetectedbylocalshepherdsonMay3.17Atleasteighteenartillerybatteries,
mostofthemfromacrosstheLoCinPakistanicontrolledterritory,weresaidtohavesupportedtheoperation.Indiansourceslaterreportedthatthe
occupyingforcenumberedfrom1,500to2,000combatants,withperhapsfourtofivetimesthatmanytroopsmobilizedtohelpsupplythemostforward
elementsontheIndiansideoftheLoC.TheoccupyingtroopcontingentconsistedmainlyofelementsofthelocalPakistanArmyNorthernLightInfantry(NLI)
andmembersofPakistanseliteSpecialServicesGroup,withmanyoutfittedinciviliangarbsoastoappearasindigenousKashmirimujahideen.The
intruderswerewellarmed,welltrainedinmountainwarfare,andaccustomedtooperatingathighelevations.18
IndiassecurityprincipalsandotherinformedexpertshavefreelyadmittedthatthePakistanArmyachievedcompletestrategicandtacticalsurpriseinits
executionoftheincursion,owingtoitshavingreliedoninplaceNLIformationsratherthanmovinginaheaviertroopcontingentthatwouldhavegenerateda
largerdeploymentsignature.19Theincursionsorganizersfurthersoughtplausibledeniabilityofanyculpabilityfortheiraggressiveactionthroughtheuseofa
shrewddeceptionmeasure.TheygeneratedindigenousmilitantIslamistradiotrafficwithinPakistanioccupiedKashmirtoconvinceIndiansignalsintelligence
monitorsthattheincursionwasinsurgentactivityoverwhichPakistanhadnocontrol.20Finally,theintruderstookspecialcaretomoveonlyattimesthat
wouldallowthemtoavoiddetectionbyperiodicIndianwinterairsurveillanceoperations.21
AstheIndianArmyunitsthathadmannedthetemporarilyvacatedoutpostsbeganreturningtotheirstationsduringthefirstweekofMay,theyslowly
discoveredthefullextentoftheoccupationofthosepositionsbyPakistanitroops.TheIndianArmys121stInfantryBrigadeassignedtomonitortheLoC
aboveKargillaunchedasuccessionofprobingpatrolsonMay5thatconfirmedtheinfiltration.ThefullscaleoftheintrusionswasvalidatedonMay8byIAF
pilotsinCheetahlighthelicoptersastheyflewsurveillancesortiesalongtheTololingridgeintheDrassubsectoroftheKargilregion.22
IttookmorethanaweekinallfortheIndianArmytotakestockofitschallengeathandandtodevelopthebeginningsofacourseofactiontodrivethe
invadersout.Eventhen,thearmyslocalcommandersgrosslyunderestimatedand,accordingly,misreportedthefullmagnitudeofthesituationtheywere
facing.AslateasMay19,LieutenantGeneralKrishanPal,thecommanderof15CorpsthatrepresentedtheIndianArmysmainfightingpresencein
Kashmir,wassaidtohavebeenblissfullyoblivious[of]thedeathlysituation.AtakeyUnifiedHeadquartersmeetinginSrinagartodiscussnextstepsfor
addressingthesituation,hepredictedthatinthecomingshowdown,theincursionwouldbedefeatedlocally.23OtherreportingupthelinebytheIndian
Armyofferedsoothingassurancesthattheinfiltrationwillbevacatedin48hours.24Clearly,localgroundcommandersinKargilandSrinagardidnot
appreciatethefullgravityofthePakistanichallengeatthestartofthegatheringcrisis.
OncetheyunderstoodmorefullywhathadtranspiredalongtheLoC,thearmysleadersfinallyrespondedbymovingfiveinfantrydivisions,fiveindependent
brigades,and44battalionsfromtheKashmirValleytotheKargilsector,ultimatelymobilizingsome200,000Indiantroopsinall.Mostofthisbuildupoccurred
duringthethreeweeksbetweentheinitialdetectionoftheincursionandtheeventualstartonMay26ofamajorjointcounteroffensivecodenamedOperation
Vijay(meaningvictoryinHindi).TheavowedobjectivesweretodriveouttheintrudingforcesandtorestoretheLoCtoitspreviousstatus.Theresponse
wasalmostcertainlymoredeterminedthananythingthePakistanArmyleadershadanticipated.25
Enlisting the IAFs Involvement

AfterseveralearlyfirefightswiththeentrenchedPakistanisthatoccasionednumerousIndianfatalitiesinanunsuccessfulbidtorecapturetheclosestofthe
occupiedpositions,theIndianArmyapproachedtheIAFonMay11andaskedittohelpturnthetidethroughacommitmentofarmedhelicopterstosupport
theembattledgroundtroops.26Conflictingviewspersisttothisdayregardingwhathappenedovertheensuingtwoweeksafterthatinitialarmyentreatywith
respecttowhenandhowtheIAFshouldbecomeinvolvedintheconductofIndiasloomingcounteroffensive.
OneviewmaintainsthattheIAFinitiatedcombatoperationsoverKargilonlyreluctantlyandsoughttoavoidinvolvementintheconflictaltogether,claiming
inexperienceinmountainwarfareandunfamiliaritywiththeterrain,aswellastheriskassociatedwiththeheightenedSAM[surfacetoairmissile]threatin
themountains.ThatviewholdsthattheIAFcommitteditselftothefightonlyafteraninsistentdemandforsuchinvolvementfromtheIndianArmy
leadership.27ThisinterpretationdrewmuchofitsclaimtoveracityfromanassessmentbyanIndianciviliandefensewriterthatappearedshortlyafterthewar
ended.ThewriterallegedthatoncetheextentofthePakistaniintrusionswasdiscovered,theIAFatfirstsidesteppedrequestsbythearmytoattackthe
infiltratorsandagreedtolenditssupporttotheongoingfightingonlyafteritsleadershipwaspresentedwitha andpressed[presumablyby
highergovernmentauthority]intomakingattacksonMay26.28
Intruth,theIAFbeganconductinginitialreconnaissancesortiesovertheKargilheightsasearlyasMay10,lessthanaweekafterthepresenceoftheenemy
incursionwasfirstconfirmedbyIndianArmypatrols.ItalsobegandeployingadditionalaircraftintotheKashmirValleyinenoughnumberstosupportany
likelycombattasking,establishedarudimentaryairdefensecontrolarrangementtherebecausetherewerenogroundbasedradarsinthearea,andbegan
extensivepracticeofairtogroundweaponsdeliveriesbybothfightersandattackhelicoptersatHimalayantargetelevations.29OnMay12,anIAFhelicopter
wasfireduponnearthemostforwardbasedPakistanipositionsoverlookingKargilandlandeduneventfullywithadamagedrotor.Thathostileactprompted
AirHeadquarterstoplaceWesternAirCommand,theIAFunitresponsiblefortheJammuandKashmirsectors,onheightenedalertandtoestablishquick
reactionaircraftlaunchfacilitiesattheIAFsnorthernmostoperatinglocationsatAirForceStationsSrinagarandAvantipur.30
Thenextday,IAFJaguarfightersconductedtacticalreconnaissancesortiesintheKargilareatogatherprospectivetargetinformationusingtheironboard
longrangeobliquephotographysystems,andaforwarddirectioncenterforthetacticalcontrolofcombataircraftwasestablishedattheIAFshighest
elevationairfieldatAirForceStationLeh.
Concurrently,CanberraPR57andMiG25RreconnaissanceaircraftwerepressedintoserviceoverKargil,andelectronicintelligencemissionsbegantobe
flownregularlybytheIAFinthevicinityofthedetectedintrusionandbeyond.31Finally,onMay14,AirHeadquartersactivatedtheIAFsairoperationscenter
forJammuandKashmirandmobilizeditsfieldedforcesinthatsectorforapossiblealloutaircounteroffensive.32Atthesametime,incloseconjunctionwith
their15Corpscounterparts,WesternAirCommandplannersdevelopedatailoredconceptofoperationsforkineticairemploymentintheKargilheightsthat
includedtargetselectionprocedures,forcedeconflictionandothersafetycriteria,andanarrangementforconductingandcommunicatingpromptbattle
damageassessment.Fromtheverystart,theIAFexpectedthatitwouldbeengagedinearnestagainsttheintrudersjustassoonasitandthearmy
leadershipcouldagreeonafinalcourseofaction.AstheAOCinCoftheIAFsWesternAirCommandatthetime,AirMarshalVinodPatney,lateraffirmed,
wewerereadyforafullfledgedwarandhadbeenforsomedaysbeforeMay25,1999,whengovernmentclearance[tocommittheIAFtocombat]was
received.33
Inanefforttosettherecordstraightonceandforall,sinceretiredAirChiefMarshalAnilTipnis,whowaschiefoftheAirStaffatthetimeoftheincursionand
wholateroversawtheIAFsresponse,offeredadetailedreconstructioninOctober2006ofhisownrecollectionsregardingthesequenceofeventsduringthe
highcommandsinitialdeliberationsabouttheKargilcrisis.AsTipnisrecalled,onMay10,afullweekaftertheincursionwasfirstdetectedandtheIndian
Armyhadattemptedaninitialarmedresponseonitsown,hisvicechief,AirMarshalPrithviSinghBrar,informedhimofareportpassedupthelinethat
morningbytheIAFsassistantchiefofstaffforintelligencethatthearmymaybeinsomesortofdifficultiesintheKargilarea.QueriedbyTipnisastothe
natureoftherumoreddifficulties,thevicechiefrepliedthathewasnotsurebutthattherereportedlywasunusualartilleryfiring.34
TipnislearnedlaterthatdaythatthegroundforceorganizationresponsiblefortheKargilsector,NorthernArmyCommand,hadcommunicatednothingofits
ongoingoperationstoitsassignedproviderofairsupportincaseofhostilitiesalongtheLoC,theIAFsWesternAirCommand.Thenextday,Tipnissvice
chieftoldhimthathisarmycounterparthadindicatedthatthearmycouldhandlethesituation.TipnisfurtherlearnedthatNorthernArmyCommandhad
askedthelocalairofficercommanding(AOC)forJammuandKashmirtoprovideimmediatefiresupportbyMi25andMi35helicoptergunshipsandarmed
Mi17helicopterstoevictafewintruderswhohadsteppedacrosstheLoCintheKargilsector.TheAOCrepliedthatthehighterrainoverwhichthe
requestedsupportwastobeprovidedlayabovetheeffectiveoperatingenvelopeofthehelicopters.35Headdedthatifthearmygenuinelyneededsignificant
airsupportforitsoperations,itwouldneedtoconveythatrequirementtohigherheadquartersfordetailedconsiderationandapproval.
Inthemeantime,TipnissvicechiefagainpulsedhisarmycounterpartastowhetherNorthernArmyCommandreallyneededhelpfromtheIAF.AsTipnis
recalled,thearmyvicehadexpressedthearmysabilitytomanage,butwasupsetthatAOCJammuandKashmirhadnotaccededtoHeadquarters
NorthernCommandsfiresupportdemand.Atthat,Tipnisrecalled,therewasnodoubtinmymindthatthesituationwasdesperate.Becausecommitting
airpowerincloseproximitytotheLoCcoulddangerouslyescalatetheconflict,TipnisinsistedthatthearmyneededpoliticalclearancebeforetheIAFcould
providetherequestedfiresupport.HealsoruledoutanyemploymentofIAFarmedhelicoptersbecausetheywouldbesittingducksforenemyinfrared
surfacetoairmissilefire.Fixedwingfighters,hesaid,wouldbeessentialformissioneffectiveness,andtheIAFreservedtheprerogativetogivefiresupport
inthemanneritconsideredmostsuitable.Tothis,thearmyvicechiefrespondedthatthearmywascapableofthrowingbacktheintrudersonitsownbut,
asTipnisrecalled,thatdoingsowouldtaketimeandthatairsupportfromtheIAFwouldhastentheprocess.Thearmyvicecontinuedtoinsistthatsuch
supportbeprovidedsolelyintheformofarmedhelicopters.36
Facingthiscontinuedimpasseinhisdealingwiththearmy,TipniscalledameetingofhismostseniorsubordinatesatAirHeadquartersonMay15toreview
theknowneventsastheyhadplayedoutthusfar.Afterbeingbriefedonthesituation,theairchiefissuedthisassessmentanddirection:
37
Tipnisthenreiteratedhisdeterminationthatdespitethearmyscontinuedinsistenceontheuseofhelicoptersinafiresupportrole,suchusewouldcontinue
tobedeniedbytheIAFbecausethehelicopterswouldbevulnerableintheextreme.38
Thefollowingday,Tipnismetwiththearmyvicechiefatthelattersrequest(thearmychief,GeneralVedMalik,wasoutofthecountryonofficialtravel).The
armyvicechiefonceagainpressedhisrequestforimmediatesupportbyarmedhelicopters.AirMarshalPatneyproposedthatTipniscallaChiefsofStaff
CommitteemeetingtoseekhighlevelclosureonceandforallontheIAFsinvolvementinthecomingcounteroffensive.Inthemeeting,Tipnisreiteratedthe
needforpriorgovernmentapprovalforanyintroductionofIndianairpowerintotheloomingfight,sincethechancethatsuchacommitmentcouldtriggera
majorescalationofthefightingwas,inhisview,veryhigh.39
Asforthemannerinwhichthearmyhadrespondedtothecrisisinitsassessmentandconductuptothatpoint,Tipnisrecalledthattherehadbeena
40
OnMay23,GeneralMalik,havingsincereturnedtoNewDelhi,summonedTipnisandthechiefoftheNavalStaff,AdmiralSushilKumar,tohisoffice.As
Tipnisrecalled,
AftergoingbackandforthwithTipnisonthehelicopterissue,GeneralMalikretorted,Ifthatsthewayyouwantit,Iwillgoitalone.Tipniseventuallygavein
against[his]betterjudgmentoutofadesiretosavearmyairforcerelations.41
Thenextday,theChiefsofStaffCommitteemetandadoptedaunanimousstanceregardingwhatshouldbedonewithrespecttotheintrusion.Intheend,it
tooktheincontrovertibleevidenceofthereconnaissanceimageryprovidedbytheIAFandbyothersourcesforthearmychieftorealizethefullextentofthe
problemandtoagreetotaketheissuetotheprimeminister.42
DuringapivotalMay25meetingoftheCabinetCommitteeonSecurity(whosemembersweretheprimeminister,defenseminister,homeminister,finance
minister,andexternalaffairsminister)chairedbyPrimeMinisterVajpayee,GeneralMalikexplainedtheseriousnessofthesituationintheKargilsectorand
theneedfortheIAFtostepinwithoutdelay.Atthat,Vajpayeereportedlysaid:OK,getstartedtomorrowatdawn.Tipnisthenaskedtheprimeministerfor
permissiontocrosstheLoCwhileattackingenemytargetsonIndiassideoftheLoC.Tothat,Vajpayeerespondedadamantly:No.NocrossingtheLoC.43
Withthatbindingruleofengagementfirmlystipulatedbythecivilianleadership,thediewasfinallycastforfullscaleIAFinvolvementinthecounteroffensive.
Laterthesameday,TipnispaidanincognitovisittotheIAFsmainoperatingbaseinKashmiratSrinagarforanonsceneassessmentofthesituation.While
there,hepersonallyassuredthecommanderof15Corpsthathistroopstakingfirewouldreceiveallneededairsupport.44
Tobesure,TipnissseeminglyconclusivefirsthandrecollectioninnowayclosedthebooksontheinterservicecontretempsoverthedelayingettingtheIAF
engagedinthecampaign.Onthecontrary,whilenotcontestingthebasicfactsasoutlinedbytheairchief,aformerIndianArmyvicechieflambastedTipnis
for,amongotherthings,havingrefusedtohonorNorthernArmyCommandsrequestforimmediateoncallattackhelicoptersupport,havingvoicedallegedly
baselessconcernoverthechancethattheintroductionofairpowercouldresultinescalation,andhavingdelayedIAFinvolvementinthefightinguntilpolitical
approvalbytheCabinetCommitteeonSecuritywasfirstsoughtandgranted.45Theformerarmyvicechiefwentontoauthoranevenmoreoutspokenlitany
ofsimilarcomplaintsin2009,whichprompted,inclosesuccession,apointbypointrebuttalbyaretiredIAFairmarshalariposteagainstthatrebuttalfrom
theformerarmyvicechiefandamoreauthoritativerebuttalfromanotherretiredairmarshalwhohadbeentheAOCforJammuandKashmirduringthe
leaduptoandconductoftheKargiloperation.46Despitethetestyinterservicebackandforthbothattheoutsetofplanningforthecampaignandlater,the
IAFwasfullypreparedfortheloomingconflict.Ithadbeenbusyalmostfromthefirstdayoftheincursionsdiscoverymarshalingitsassetsandpositioning
themtoshowhowIndiasairarmmightmakeaneffectivedifferenceinthegatheringconfrontation.
Initial Air Operations

LessthanaweekbeforethestartofOperationVijay,onMay21,theIAFhadlaunchedaCanberraPR57from106Squadrontoconductareconnaissanceof
thebesiegedareathatoverlookedhighwayNH1AandtheadjacenttownofKargil.Whiledescendingto22,000feetjusttwomilesfromtheLoC,whichput
theaircraftaslowas4,000feetabovethehighestridgelines,theCanberrasustainedadirecthitinitsrightenginebywhatwaslaterdeterminedtohave
beenaChinesemadeAnzainfraredsurfacetoairmissile.47Fromthatmomentonward,theIAFleadershipknewwithoutdoubtthatitwasnearingthebrink
ofamajorcombatinvolvement.
The initial attacks marked the first time that the IAF had expended ordnance in combat in Kashmir since its
early-generation Vampire jet fighters destroyed Pakistani bunkers in the Kargil sector in December 1971.
Kineticairoperationsbeganinearnestat0630onMay26withsixattacksinsuccessionbytwoshipelementsofMiG21,MiG23,andMiG27fighters
againstintrudercamps,materieldumps,andsupplyroutesinthegeneralareasoverlookingDras,Kargil,andBatalik.Theseinitialattacksmarkedthefirst
timethattheIAFhadexpendedordnanceincombatinKashmirsinceitsearlygenerationVampirejetfightersdestroyedPakistanibunkersintheKargilsector
inDecember1971.TheIAFfightersthatwerepressedintothesefirstdayattacksconducted57mmrocketattacksandstrafingpassesagainstenemy
targets.Asecondwaveofairattacksbeganthatafternoon,followedbyhighaltitudereconnaissanceoverflightsbyCanberraPR57sandsubsequentlow
passesbyMiG21Mstoconductnearrealtimebattledamageassessment.48
Nearlyallofthetargetsselectedforattackinthoseinitialstrikeswereonornearjaggedridgelinesatelevationsrangingfrom14,000to18,000feet.(See
Figure2foragraphicportrayalofthehighmountainterrain.)Thestarkbackdropofrocksandsnowmadeforuncommonlydifficultvisualtargetacquisition,
complicatedfurtherbythesmallsizeoftheenemytrooppositionsdispersedagainstavastandundifferentiatedsnowbackground.Inspiredbytheunique
viewfromthecockpitofafighterflyinghighovertheruggedterrain,theIAFcodenameditscontributiontothecampaignOperationSafedSagarHindifor
whitesea.49
Duringtheseconddayofsurfaceattackoperations,theIAFlosttwofightersinclosesuccession.Thefirst,aMiG27from9Squadron,experiencedan
enginefailurewhilecomingoffatargetafteritspilothadjustconductedasuccessfultwopassattackwith80mmrocketsand30mmcannonfireononeofthe
enemysmainsupplydumps.Theensuinginflightemergencyresultedinthepilotejectingsafelyafterseveralunsuccessfulairstartattempts,onlytobe
capturedbythePakistaniintrudersalmostassoonashehittheground.50AirChiefMarshalTipnislaterreportedthatthepilothadfiredhisrocketswell
outsidetheoperatingenvelopestipulatedfortheweapon,causingtheenginetoflameout.ThesuddenlossofpowerinthethinHimalayanaircouldhave
resultedfromrocketexhaustgashavingbeeningestedthroughtheenginesairinletsoneithersideoftheaircraft.(TheMiG27wasflyingatanaltitudewell
abovethatatwhichtherocketshadbeenclearedtobefired.)51
Thesecondfighterloss,aMiG21from17Squadronflyingtopcoverforthestrikers,sustainedaninfraredsurfacetoairmissilehitwhileitspilotwasflying
overtheterrainatlowleveltoassistinthesearchforthedownedMiG27pilot.Thepilot,SquadronLeaderAjayAhuja,alsosucceededinejectingsafelybut
wasexecutedshortlyafterhewascapturedfollowinghislanding.Hisbodywassubsequentlyreturnedbearingfatalbulletwoundsandclearsignsof
brutalization.52
Onthethirddayofairoperations,anIAFMi17helicopterwasdowned,again
byanenemyshoulderfiredStingersurfacetoairmissilewhileconductingalowlevelattack.Theillfatedhelicopterhadbeenthelastinafourshipflightof
armedMi17sflyingintrailformationandwastheonlyaircraftintheflightthathadnotbeenconfiguredwithaselfprotectionflaredispensertodrawaway
anyincomingheatseekingmissiles.53
The stark backdrop of rocks and snow made for uncommonly difficult visual target acquisition, complicated
further by the small size of the enemy troop positions dispersed against a vast and undifferentiated snow
background.
TheIAFspilotsquicklyunderstoodwhattheIsraelishadlearnedatgreatcostduringtheYomKippurWarof1973,whenEgyptianandSyriansurfacetoair
missilesandantiaircraftartillerydownednearlyathirdoftheIsraeliAirForcesfighterinventory(102aircraft)beforethethreeweekwarfinallyendedin
victoryforIsrael.54Demonstratingitsadaptability,theIAFmovedwithdispatchtoequipallofitsparticipatingfighterswithflaresinordertoprovideanactive
countermeasureagainstanyenemyinfraredguidedmissiles.55ItalsocalledahaltonceandforalltoanyfurtheruseofslowmovingandvulnerableMi17
helicoptersinanarmedfiresupportroleanddirectedthatalltargetattacksbyIAFfightersbeconductedfromoutsidethelethalthreatenvelopesofenemy
shoulderfiredsurfacetoairmissiles.Inall,enemyforcesfiredmorethan100surfacetoairmissilesatIAFaircraftthroughouttheconflict.Aftertheservices
firstthreedaysofcombatoperations,however,notasingleoneofitsaircraftwasdownedorsustainedbattledamage.56
Throughoutthecampaign,wheneverIAFreconnaissanceorgroundattackoperationswereunderwayintheimmediatecombatzone,WesternAir
CommandensuredthatMiG29sorotherairtoairfighterswerealsoairborneoncombatairpatrolstationsoverthegroundfightingonIndiassideoftheLoC
toprovidetopcoveragainstanyattemptbythePakistanAirForce(PAF)toenterthefrayinagroundattackrole.PAFF16stothewesttypicallymaintained
asafedistanceof10to20milesonthePakistanisideoftheLoC,althoughtheyoccasionallyapproachedascloseas8milesawayfromtheongoingground
engagements.ThePAFsdirectorofoperationsduringtheKargilWarlaterreportedthattherehadbeenisolatedinstancesofIAFandPAFfighterslockingon
toeachotherwiththeironboardfirecontrolradars,butthatcautionhadprevailedonbothsidesandthatnoclose[airtoair]encounterstookplace.57IAF
fightersneverjoinedinaerialcombatwiththePAFF16sduetotheVajpayeegovernmentsstrictinjunctionthatIndianforcesnotcrosstheLoC.58Seven
yearslater,however,AirChiefMarshalTipnisrecalledthathehadpersonallyauthorizedhisescortingfighterpilotstochaseanyPakistaniaircraftbackacross
theLoCinhotpursuitwerethosepilotstobeengagedbyenemyfightersinaerialcombat.59
Inall,theIAFflewsome460fightersortiesthroughoutthecampaigndedicatedexclusivelytomaintainingbattlespaceairdefense.60Thesemediumand
highaltitudedefensivecombatairpatrolsandoffensivefightersweeps,typicallyentailingfourshipflightsofMiG29s,tookplacenotonlyintheimmediate
areaofgroundfightingintheKargilsectorbutthroughoutWesternAirCommandsareaofresponsibility.AsOperationVijaysaircomponentcommander
laterrecalled,hewasnotjustconcernedaboutKargilortheKashmirregionbuthadapotentiallylargerscalewarinmind:Iwasworkingonamuchbigger
canvas.Iwasfullyconsciousthataswehitandkilledenemysoldiers,therewaseverypossibilityforescalation,possiblyoutsidetheimmediatecombat
area,anditwasmyjobtobereadywithadequateremainingresourcesforthateventuality.61
IAFstrikeaircraftoperatedprimarilyfromthreenorthernbases,AirForceStationsSrinagar,Avantipur,andUdhampur.Theclosestofthosetothefighting,
Srinagar,wasmorethan70milesawayfromthewarzone.WithinjustdaysafterthefullextentofthePakistaniincursionwasconfirmedandwellbeforethe
formalstartofOperationSafedSagar,theMiG21bissquadronpermanentlystationedatSrinagarwasjoinedbyadditionalMiG21M,MiG23BN,andMiG
27MLsquadrons,whileadditionalsquadronsofMiG21MsandMiG29sdeployednorthwardtoAvantipur.
BythetimeOperationSafedSagarhadreacheditsfullstride,theIAFhaddeployedsome60ofitsfrontlineaircrafttosupportthewareffort,makingforabout
aquarterofWesternAirCommandscombinedfighterinventory.62Astheyawaitedmissiontasking,thosesquadronscommittedtothecampaigninitiated
specialtrainingaimedatbetteracclimatingtheirpilotstoconductingnightattacksundermoonlitconditions.Suchcombatoperationsbyfightersoverhigh
mountainousterrainatnighthadneverbeforebeenattemptedintheIAFshistory.63
Because of their rudimentary bomb sights, the inaccuracy of their unguided weapons, and the ruling
against crossing the Line of Control, MiG-21, MiG-23, and MiG-27 pilots typically achieved only limited
effectiveness when attempting to provide close air support against enemy point targets.
Increasinglyasthejointcampaignunfolded,mostIndianArmyoperationswereprecededbypreparatoryairstrikes,eachofwhichwascloselycoordinated
beforehandbetween15CorpsplannersandtheAOCforJammuandKashmir.64Becauseoftheirrudimentarybombsights,theinaccuracyoftheirunguided
weapons,andtherulingagainstcrossingtheLoC,MiG21,MiG23,andMiG27pilotstypicallyachievedonlylimitedeffectivenesswhenattemptingtoprovide
closeairsupportagainstenemypointtargets.
Rapidlyadaptingtotheseconstraints,onMay30,justfourdaysafterthestartofOperationSafedSagar,AirChiefMarshalTipnisdecidedtotakeactionto
helpcorrecttheproblemofinaccuracy.HechosetocommitIAFMirage2000Hfighterscapableofdeliveringlaserguidedbombstogroundattackoperations
intheKargilsector.Thefightersfirsthadtobeconfiguredtodeliverthebombs,soAirHeadquarterslaunchedanacceleratedefforttodosoatAirForce
StationGwalior,wheretheMirage2000Hswereprincipallybased.
IndiasAircraftSystemTestingEstablishment(ASTE)inBangalorewaswellalonginadevelopmentalprogramtointegrateIsraelimadeLiteningelectro
opticaltargetingpodsontotheMirage2000HandJaguarfighters.TosupporttheacceleratedeffortatGwalior,ASTEbeganafullcourtpresstoprepare
selectedMirage2000Hsfrom7SquadrontobefittedwithLiteningpodsforuseoverKargil.Atthesametime,ASTEhelpedmodifytheMirage2000Hs
centerlineweaponsstationtocarry1,000poundU.S.madePavewayIIlaserguidedbombsinsteadoftheIAFsFrenchproducedMatraprecisionmunitions,
whichwereprohibitivelyexpensive.Concurrently,theIAFseliteTacticsandAirCombatDevelopmentEstablishmentlocatedatAirForceStationJamnagar
tooktheleadindevelopingandvalidatingbesttactics,techniques,andproceduresfordeliveringthePavewayII.65ByJune12,theupgradedMirage2000Hs
werereadytocommenceprecisionstrikeoperationsinangerforthefirsttimeinIAFhistory.
Inthemeantime,airoperationsagainstidentifiedintruderpositionsandsupportfacilitiescontinuedintheJubarandMashkohValleysectorsbetweenMay28
andJune1.ThroughoutthefirstweekofJune,inclementweatherhinderedsuchoperationsandpersistedtoapointwhereaclouddeckbelowtheridgelines
precludedairattacksentirelyonJune10and11.Fortunately,15CorpshadnourgenttargetservicingrequirementsfortheIAFduringthosetwodays.66
A Successful Endgame for India

BythetimeOperationVijayhadreachedfullmomentuminearlyJune,theIndianArmyhadmarshalednearlyacorpsworthofdedicatedtroopstrengthinthe
Kargilarea,includingtheThirdandEighthMountainDivisionsandasubstantialnumberofsupportingartilleryunits.Theoverridingobjectiveofthoseforces
wastorecapturethehighgroundfromwhichtheintrudershadadirectlineofsighttohighwayNH1A,allowingthemtolaydownsustainedartilleryfireonit
andonadjacenttargets.Towardthatend,aftermorethanaweekofhardfighting,unitsofEighthMountainDivisionrecapturedthestrategicallyimportant
TololingridgecomplexandtheadjacentPoint5203intheBataliksectoronJune13,inwhatoneinformedaccountlaterdescribedasprobablytheturning
pointinIndiaslandcounteroffensive.67
Fourdayslater,onJune17,anotherimportantbreakthroughinthejointcampaignwasachievedwhenaformationof7SquadronMirage2000Hsstruckand
destroyedtheenemysmainadministrativeandlogisticsencampmentatMunthoDhalointheBataliksectorbymeansofaccuratelyplaced1,000pound
generalpurposebombsdeliveredinhighanglediveattacksusingtheaircraftscomputerassistedweaponsaimingcapability.Forthispivotalattack,theIAF
waiteduntiltheencampmenthadgrowntoasizethatrendereditstrategicallyripeforsuchtargeting.TheAOCinCofWesternAirCommandatthetime,Air
MarshalPatney,affirmedlaterthattheessentiallytotaldestructionbytheIAFoftheNLIsrudimentarybutabsolutelylifesustaininginfrastructureatMuntho
Dhaloparalyzedtheenemywareffort,asitwastheirmajorsupplydepot.68Incharacterizingtheattackasperhapsthemostspectacularofallthe
[campaignsair]strikes,aservingIAFaircommodorereportedattheendof1999thatitresultedinasmanyas300enemycasualtieswithinjustminutes.69
Figure3showspreandpoststrikeaerialimageryoftheenemycampatMunthoDhalo.Inthefirstimage,adensearrayoftentsandstructures,aswellas
tracksleadingupthehillsidefromtheencampment,areclearlyvisible.Inthesecond,aftercompletionoftheIAFsattacks,allthatremainarebombcraters
andrubble.
Aweeklater,onJune24,atwoshipelementofMirage2000Hs,inthefirstever
combatuseoflaserguidedbombsbytheIAF,struckanddestroyedtheNLIscommandandcontrolbunkersonTigerHill,thedirectioncenterforthe
forwardbasedartillerythathadbeenfiredagainsttheIndianArmysbrigadeheadquartersatDras.Theyusedtwo1,000poundPavewayIIlaserguided
munitions,withotherfightersstrikingadditionaltargetswithunguidedbombs.70Intheseattacks,thetargetwasacquiredthroughtheLiteningpodselectro
opticalimagingsensoratabout12milesout,withweaponreleaseoccurringataslantrangeofabout5milesandtheaircraftthenturningawaywhile
continuingtomarkthetargetwithalaserspotfortheweapontoguideon.71
Thefollowingday,Mirage2000HsandJaguarsinitiatedaroundtheclockbombingofenemypositionsthroughouttheBatalikandDrassubsectors.Mirage
2000Hsstruckasmanyas25separatedesignatedaimpointstowardthecampaignsend,includingatMunthoDhaloandtheequallyimportantPoint4388
overlookingDras.72
The air support provided by the IAF almost instantly boosted the morale of Indias beleaguered ground
troops and facilitated an early recapture of their outposts at Muntho Dhalo and Tiger Hill.
TheairsupportprovidedbytheIAFalmostinstantlyboostedthemoraleofIndiasbeleagueredgroundtroopsandfacilitatedanearlyrecaptureoftheir
outpostsatMunthoDhaloandTigerHill.Afteranexhaustingstruggle,TigerHillwasretakenonJuly4,andbyJuly8,15Corpsreportedthatitsunitshad
recaptured99percentoftheBatalikYaldorsubsectorand90percentoftheDrasarea,leadingPrimeMinisterVajpayeetodeclarethatthereisgoingtobea
greatvictory.73Thenextday,theIAFreceivedthiscongratulatorymessagefromtheIndianArmysfieldheadquarters:
74
Otherthanforaninconsequentialbriefdelayduetoweather,IAFcombatoperationscontinuedwithoutinterruptionforsevenweeks.Attheheightof
OperationSafedSagar,theIAFwasgeneratingmorethan40fixedwingcombatsortiesadayinbothdirectandindirectsupportto15Corps.WesternAir
CommandwasnotthesoleproviderofIAFassetstoconductthesedailymissions.BecauseofitsdepthwithrespecttoIndiaswesternborder,theservices
CentralAirCommandheadquarteredatAllahabadinUttarPradeshhastraditionallybeentherepositoryofsuchmajorIAFstrategicassetsasthesince
retiredMach3capableMiG25RhighaltitudereconnaissanceaircraftandtheMirage2000Hs.ItwasunderCentralAirCommandsaegisthattheMiG25R
waspressedintoauniquemediumaltitudetacticalreconnaissanceroletomeettheneedsofOperationSafedSagar.TheMirage2000HsoftheIAFs7
SquadronwerealsoCentralAirCommandsassetsandweresecondedtotheoperationalcontrolofWesternAirCommandfortheiruseintheKargil
fighting.TherewasreluctanceatfirsttoemploytheMirage2000Hs,assomeintheIAFsleadershipwantedtosavethefightersincasetheconflict
escalated.Forthatreason,theaircraftwereneverfullycommittedtothefight.Iftheyhadbeen,accordingtotheparentcommandsAOCinCatthetime,
theymighthaveyieldedevenbetterresultsthanthoseachievedinOperationSafedSagar.75
AerialstrikeoperationsendedonJuly12.Inall,IAFfightersflewmorethan1,700strike,combatairpatrolandescort,andreconnaissancesortiesthroughout
thecampaignscourse,includingaround40atnightduringthefinalweeksoffighting.
Table1presentsabreakdownofthetotalnumbersofIAFsortiesflown
throughoutthecampaignbyaircrafttype.AlthoughtheIAFsMi17helicopterswerenotusedinanarmedroleafteronewaslosttoanenemysurfacetoair
missileduringtheairoffensivesthirdday,theycontinuedtoplayavitalpartthroughouttheremainderofthecampaigninconductingairlift,casualty
evacuation,andreconnaissancemissions.76
Atlonglast,yardbybloodyyard,asaretiredIndianArmygenerallaterdescribedtheeffort,theKargilridgelineswererecapturedfromtheintrudersthrough
aheroicIndianinfantrycounteroffensivefacilitatedfromitsfirstdaysonwardbysupportingIAFairpower.77ByJuly26,Indianforceshadreclaimedamajority
oftheirseizedoutpostsaboveKargilanddriventheenemytroopsthathadoccupiedthembacktotheirownsideoftheLoC,withallremainingPakistani
forcessubsequentlyvacatingthestilloccupiedpositionsundertheweightofdiplomaticpressurefromtheUnitedStates.Intheend,byitsofficialafteraction
count,theIndianArmysuffered471troopskilledinactionand1,060soldierswoundedduringtheKargilfighting.Fortheirpart,theoccupyingPakistaniforces
weresaidbyIndiansourcestohavelostmorethan700troopskilledinactionwitharoundathousandmorewounded,althoughmuchdisagreementand
uncertaintystillsurroundthelatterfigures.78
Diculties Aecting the Provision of Close air support

JustthreeweeksbeforethecommencementofOperationSafedSagar,WesternAirCommandhadconcludedathreeweeklongannualexerciseduring
whichithadflownsome5,000trainingsortiesinvolvingupwardof300aircraftthatincludedsimulatedattacksagainsttargetsintheHimalayas.79
Nevertheless,theIAFexperiencedaslowstartintheKargilcampaignandrodeasteeplearningcurveatfirstasitspilotsandplannersgraduallyadaptedto
unfamiliaroperatingconditionsandsteadilyimprovedtheirperformanceovertime.AsaformerIAFairmarshalfranklyconcededonthisscore,theservice
tooksometimebeforehoningthe[needed]skillsandbecomingeffectiveinahighmountaincombatsettingthatnoairforcehadeverexperiencedbefore.80
Untilthathappened,thePAFsdirectorofoperationsduringtheKargilcrisiswasonfirmgroundinremarkingretrospectivelythattheresultsachievedbythe
IAFinthefirsttwodaysweredismal.81Inasimilarvein,someIndianArmyfieldcommanderslatercomplainedthatforthecampaignsfirstthreeweeks,the
effectivenessoftheIAFsefforttoprovidecloseairsupportfortheirtroopswasnearnegligible.82
The IAF experienced a slow start in the Kargil campaign and rode a steep learning curve at first as its pilots
and planners gradually adapted to unfamiliar operating conditions and steadily improved their
performance over time.
TherearetwocompellingreasonswhytheattempteddeliveryofeffectivecloseairsupportwassoproblematicfortheIAFthroughoutmostoftheKargil
fighting.First,theenemytargetsthatpresentedthemselvesintheKargilheightswerenothinglikethemoreconventionaltargetarraythatfighteraircraft
typicallyengagewhenprovidingsupporttogroundcombatoperations.AsoneIAFairmanlaterpointedout,thetargetcomplexdidnotconsistoftroop
concentrations,commandposts,andlogisticalsupplylines,butrathernearinvisiblehumanswelldugintohideoutsonvarioushilltopsandslopes,where
onlytheirtentsandearthworkstructureswereidentifiablefromtheairwhennotmaskedbythenaturalcamouflagethatwasprovidedbytheubiquitous
blackandwhitecolorcombinationoftheterrain.Bythisaccount,thelargesttargetstruckbytheIAFduringOperationSafedSagar,theenemyssupply
campatMunthoDhalo,wouldnormallyhavebeenthesmallesttargetconsideredfortheuseofairpowerduringanormalalloutwar.83
Tomakemattersworse,theIAF,whichwaswellfamiliarwiththeuseofforwardaircontrollersinsupportoffriendlytroopsinclosecontactwithenemyforces,
wasunabletoemploygroundbasedterminalattackcontrollersforitscloseairsupportmissionsduringtheKargilcounteroffensive.Suchusewasprecluded
becausetheenemysshooterpositionsweregenerallyremote,mostcloseairsupportrelatedtargetsweresmallandeithernaturallyorartificially
camouflaged,andtherequiredminimumsafedistancefromthetargetruledoutaclearviewofthetargetfromthegroundandanypracticalwayof
designatingitaccurately.84Figure4,whichdepictstwotypicalenemytargetarrayssituatedalonghighHimalayanridgelines,wellcapturestheIAFsvisual
targetacquisitionproblemthroughouttheKargilWar.
Second,IAFoperationswerehamperedfromtheverystartbymultipleconstraintsontheirfreedomofaction.Tobeginwith,becauseoftheirhighgross
weightwhenfullyfueledandarmed,theIAFsheavyMi25andMi35Hindattackhelicopterswereunabletooperateatthehighmountainelevationswhere
mostofthefightingtookplace.Accordingly,theywerenotusedatanytimeduringtheKargilcampaign.Inaddition,prohibitedfromcrossingtheLoC,fast
movingfightersweredriventoemploytargetattacktacticsusingingressandegressheadingsthatwerenotoptimalor,inmanyinstances,evensafe.
Bywayofexample,inthecaseofafighteraircraftflyinginsideamountainvalleywithhighridgelinesoneitherside,aturnintoawrongvalleythatendsup
beingaboxcanyoncanresultindisasterforthepilotifhehasinsufficientlateralmaneuveringroomoravailablepowertoclearverticalobstructions.Likewise,
successfullyservicingtargetssituatedonsteepmountainslopesrequirescrossvalleyattacksinwhichtheestablishmentofadirectlineofsightbetweenthe
attackingaircraftandthetargetoccurslateinthepilotssetupforweaponreleasebecauseofinterveningridgelines.Whenoneaddstosuchcomplicating
factorsanunusuallysmalltargetsize,theresultalltoooftenisadelayedorfailedvisualtargetacquisitionor,dependingontheterrainlayout,anabnormally
steepdiveangleforweapondelivery.Sincealtitudelossduringdiverecoveriesissubstantiallygreaterathighmountainelevationsthanduringstrike
operationsconductedclosertosealevel,suchabnormaldiveanglesallowlittletargettrackingtimebeforearecoveryfromthedivemustbeinitiated.Allof
thesecomplicatingfactorsinvariablymakeerrorsmorelikelyinweaponreleaseandplacement.
WithrespecttotheharmfulimpactofthepoliticallyimposedLoCconstrainton
theIAFstacticalflexibility,IndiasministerforexternalaffairsduringtheKargilWarlaterrecalledinhismemoirs:Therewerebuttworoutesfortheairforce
tooperateon,andbothwereextremelynarrowfunnels.Ourmissionscouldflyinthisnarrowcorridoreitherwestoreastorreverse.Hefurtherrecalled:
85
ThefactoftheLoCnotbeingavisiblymarkedlineonthegroundcompoundeddifficulties.85Relatedly,becausethedecreepreventedtheIAFfrom
operatingonthePakistanisideoftheLoC,theconductofOperationVijayremainedlimitedtotheimmediateterrainfromwhichtheIndianArmysoughtto
evicttheintruders,whilethemostlucrativetargetsassociatedwithprovidinglogisticalsustenancetotheintrudersenjoyedaninviolatesanctuaryinPakistani
occupiedKashmir.Inparticular,thetownofSkarduonthePakistanisideoftheLoCwasonly108milesfromKargilandhadalltheneededfacilitiesfor
providinglogisticalandartillerysupporttothePakistaniintruders.HadtheIAFbeenpermittedtocrosstheLoC,itcouldhavesparedtheIndianArmythe
needforitscostlyfrontalassaultagainstthePakistanisbyleveragingitsasymmetricadvantagetoattacktheirsourceofresupplyinPakistanioccupied
Kashmir,ineffectimposinganaerialblockade.That,however,wouldhaveriskedescalationtoawiderwar,perhapsoneinvolvingthePAF,whichthe
Vajpayeegovernmentwasdeterminedtopreventateverycost.
Moreover,themanportablesurfacetoairmissilesthattheintruderswieldedhadaneffectiveslantrangethatwassufficienttorequiretheIAFsfighterpilots
toremain6,000to8,000feetabovethehighridgelinesatalltimesinordertostaysafelyoutsidetheirthreatenvelopes,whichincreasedtheaircraftsturn
radius,renderingsometargetsunserviceablefromtheairbecauseoftheprohibitionagainstanycrossingoftheLoC.Ontopofthat,whenbombswere
dropped,theirdeliveryaccuracywasdegradedathigherreleasealtitudes.Becauseoftheextremeelevationatwhichmostofthefightingtookplace,the
IAFsmunitionsdidnotperformaerodynamicallytotheirfamiliarspecificationsforlowerreleasealtitudes.Thereducedairtemperatureanddensityabovethe
Kargilheightsaltereddragindicesandotherperformanceparametersthathadneverbeforebeencalculatedforthoseconditions,causingweaponsnotto
guideaspredictedandrequiringadaptationofdeliverytechniquesthroughrealtimeimprovisation.86Moretothepoint,asaresultofthereduced
aerodynamicdragcausedbythesurroundingthinairathigheraltitudes,unguidedmunitionstendedtoovershoottheirintendedaimpoints.Precision
munitionstendedtohavegreatertrajectoryinertia,whichtranslatedintoanincreaseintheweaponsnormalcircularerrorprobable.
The man-portable surface-to-air missiles that the intruders wielded had an effective slant range that was
sufficient to require the IAFs fighter pilots to remain 6,000 to 8,000 feet above the high ridgelines at all
times in order to stay safely outside their threat envelopes, rendering some targets unserviceable from the
air.
Inaddition,asnotedabove,thethinnerairrequiredpilotstoreleasetheirweaponsandinitiateapulloutsoonerthantheynormallywouldinairspacecloserto
sealevel,furtherdegradingdeliveryaccuracy.Onanumberofoccasions,Indiangroundunitswereallegedbysometohaveabortedcloseairsupportattacks
inprogressatthelastminuteoutofconcernthatafratricideincidentmightoccurasaresultoftheinaccuracyoftheIAFsunguidedbombs.87Infact,theonly
reasonthatanycloseairsupportmissionsinprogresswereaborted(allwerepreplannedandcoordinatedinadvancewith15Corps)hadtodoeitherwith
interveningweatheratthelastminuteorwithfriendlygroundunitsthathadnotyetremovedthemselvesfromdangerouslycloseproximitytoenemyforces.88
TheIAFsappreciationofthislegitimateconcernovertheeverpresentdangeroffratricideanditsunerringairdisciplineweresuchthat,inthewordsofthe
AOCinCofWesternAirCommandatthetime,therewasnocase[throughoutthecampaign]ofablueonbluekillinspiteofpossiblyhighinaccuraciesin
thehills.89
Stark terrain folds in the Himalayas tended to obscure the enemy from aerial observation and to mask the
effects of bomb detonations, rendering even near misses ineffective.
Complicatingmattersfurther,thePakistanisindividualtrooppositionsweresmallandgenerallywellconcealed,makingthemoftensoresistanttovisual
acquisitionandtargetingthattheIAFspilots,accordingtooneanalysisofthecampaign,didnotprovidereliableandconsistentclosesupportto15Corpss
engagedunits.StarkterrainfoldsintheHimalayastendedtoobscuretheenemyfromaerialobservationandtomasktheeffectsofbombdetonations,
renderingevennearmissesineffective.Theyalsoservedtocanalizeaerialapproachestotargets,dictatingaircraftingressandegressheadingsand,inthe
process,makingIAFfighterspredictableandhencemoresusceptibletogroundfire.90
Assessing the IAFs Performance

BoththeIndianArmyandtheIAFwereessentialplayersinagenuinelyjointcounteroffensive.Itwouldbehardtodeemeitherashavingbeenthemore
pivotalcontributortowarddeterminingtheultimatevictoryforIndiasforces.91Tobesure,fromasimpleweightofeffortperspective,15Corpsartillerywas
themainsourceofdirectfiresupportthroughoutthefighting,andmassivebarragesofitprovidedsustainedsuppressivecoverunderwhichIndianinfantry
teamseventuallymovedupthedauntingterraintorecapturetheirformerposts.Inall,15Corpscommitted15artilleryregimentsandmorethan300artillery
piecestowhatoneaccountcalledoneofthemostbitterlyfoughtmountainbattlesofalltimes.92Throughoutthecampaign,theyexpendedmorethan
250,000roundsofammunitioninasustainedlaydownoffireonascalenotseenanywhereintheworldsinceWorldWarII.
ButtosaythattheIAFturnedinapoorshowingduringtheKargilWar,asoneotherwiseinsightfulcampaignassessmentobservedtwoyearsafterthe
conflictended,overstatesthecumulativeimpactoftheIAFsoperationalshortcomingsbyaconsiderablemargin.9393Onthecontrary,asabetterinformed
reviewofOperationVijayconcludedsometimethereafter,theIAFsentryintoactiononMay26anditsgradualimprovementinperformanceovertimeinfact
representedaparadigmshiftinthenatureandprognosisoftheconflict.94
Granted,itwasonlynaturalthatIndiasleadingairmenwouldlendtheirvoicestosuchaselfcongratulatoryconclusion.Forexample,adecadeafterthewar
ended,thechiefoftheAirStaffatthetime,AirChiefMarshalFaliHomiMajor,suggestedthattheIAFsentryintotheKargilequationhadimmediately
alteredthenatureoftheconflict.95Bythesametoken,duringhistenureastheAOCinCofWesternAirCommand,AirMarshalPranabBarbora
volunteeredatroughlythesametimethattheconflictinKargilwouldhavegoneonandonifairpowerhadnotcomeintoplay.96Instrongsupporting
testimonytotheseobservations,theIndiangovernmentsformalafteractionassessmentofthecampaignreleasedonDecember15,1999,foundthe
interventionoftheIAFtohavebeenbothunnervingtotheenemyand
97
Itwasnot,however,justIndianAirForceleaderswhorenderedsuchlaudatoryjudgmentsregardingtheirservicesperformance.SeniorIndianArmyofficers
werelikewisegenerousinvoicingtheirappreciationoftheIAFscombatcontributions.Forexample,retiredMajorGeneralG.D.Bakshicharacterizedthe
IAFsinnovativeuseofairpowerasoneoftheexcellentfeaturesoftheKargiloperations,addingthatthecompletedominationoftheskybytheIAFover
theareaofintrusionservedtodemoralizethe[NLI]troopersand,incombinationwithartillery,servedtomasseffectsandgenerateanelementofshock
andawe.98
IftheIAFwasunabletoprovideconsistentlyeffectiveoncallcloseairsupportforalltheprevailingmultitudeofextenuatingfactors,itcertainlywaseffectivein
otherairapplicationsnolesspertinenttotheongoingfighting.TheIAFperformedmorethanadequatelyinservicingenemyheadquarterscomplexes,supply
dumps,andotherassetsthatweremorereadilyaccessibletoaerialattackfromstandoffranges.99AsaU.S.Armyofficerrightlyobservedinthisregard,the
IAFscontributiontothejointfightgrewasthecampaignworeon,andfighteraircraftarmedwithlaserguidedbombsandwellplacedunguidedmunitions
eventuallydestroyedvirtuallyallofthePakistanisupplylinesandplayedamajorroleinthebattleforTigerHill.100Furthermore,inmarkedcontrasttowhat
theaircomponentcommanderduringtheKargilfightinglatercharacterizedas15Corpssprofligacyintheuseofartilleryinacarpetbombingmode,the
IAFdroppedonlyaround500generalpurposebombsinallduringtheseventyfourdaycampaign,noneofwhichwerereleasedindiscriminatelyandthe
majorityofwhichweredeemedtohavebeeneffectiveagainsttheirassignedtargets.AsAirMarshalPatneyrecalledinthisregard,aftereverymission,the
armywouldgiveustheresultsoftheattack.Inabout70percentofthemissions,weweretoldbombsontarget.101
TheIAFalsorapidlyadaptedtothecampaignsuniqueoperationalchallenges.ThePAFsdirectorofoperationsduringthewarwasoneofmanywho
acknowledgedafterwardhowtheIAFimmediatelywentintoareappraisalmode[afteritsinitialcombatlosses]andcameoutwithGPS[GlobalPositioning
System]assistedhighaltitudebombingbytheMiG21,MiG23BN,andMiG27asamakeshiftsolution.Hefurtheracknowledgedtherapidreconfiguration
oftheMirage2000HwithLiteningpodstoallowtheoptionofdayandnightlaserguidedbombdelivery.OnceaccuratetargetattacksbyMirage2000Hsand
Jaguarsshowedtheirabilitytoachievesignificantcombateffects,headded,aroundtheclockoperationsbytheIAFhadmaderetentionofpostsuntenable
bythePakistaniinfiltrators.Inall,heconcluded,althoughtheIndianhighcommandwascompletelysurprisedbytheKargilintrusionattheoutset,theIAF
mobilizedandreactedrapidlyastheIndianArmytooktimetopositionitself.102
MuchoftheIAFsimprovedcombateffectivenessduringthecampaignovertimewasadirectresultofWesternAirCommandseventualreplacementof
classicmanualdivebombingbyMiG23sandMiG27swiththemoreaccuratemethodofGPSaidedlevelbombingfromsaferaltitudesabovetheeffective
reachoftheenemysmanportableinfraredsurfacetoairmissiles.AsthecommandsAOCinCatthetimelaterrecalled,whentheconflictstarted,there
wasonlyonesquadronfittedwithGPS.We[accordingly]acquiredhandheldGPSinstrumentsfromthemarketandfittedthemintheaircraft,whichallowed
forasomewhatadhocsystem.Withthetargetcoordinatesavailable,onapproachtothetarget,pilotsdroppedtheirbombsatthedetermineddistance
fromthetarget.Weknewthatifthecoordinateswereaccurate,theresultswouldbereasonable.AirMarshalPatneyadded:Wealsoknewthatthe
accuracywouldbemuchbetteratlowerheights.Thatiswhyweresortedtonightoperationsinthoseforbiddinghillsandatlowlevelsofaround500feet,
somethingneverdonebeforeanywhereintheworldandthatalsowithaircraftthathadnomodernaidsandinanareawherenoradarscouldoperate.103Air
ChiefMarshalTipnislaterapplaudedthisnovelinitiativeastheairwarsbiggestcontributiontoingeniousness.104
Bythesametoken,oncetheMirage2000Hwasintroducedintothedailyflowofoperations,theaccuracyofIAFweaponsdeliveriesagainstpointtargets
increasedsubstantiallyevenwiththeuseofunguidedlowdragbombs,thankstotheaircraftsmuchimprovedonboardavionicssuitethatfeaturesa
continuouslycomputedreleasepoint(CCRP)systemwhichcompensatesfortargetareawindandenablesnearpreciseweaponplacement.Thepilotsimply
designateshisintendedaimpointthroughhiscockpitheadupdisplay(HUD)andthendepressesaconsentbuttonontheaircraftscontrolstick.The
computerreleasesthebombautomaticallyatjusttherightmomentonceallrequireddeliveryaccuracyparametersareachieved.Withtheaidofthisproven
system,thepilotknowswithhighconfidencethathisbombwilllandonthepointdesignatedbythecursoronhisHUDoncetheweapondepartsitspylon.
FurtherinnovativerealtimeadaptationbytheIAFoccurred
whenMiG21pilotslackingsophisticatedonboardnavigationsuitesresortedtotheuseofstopwatchesandGPSreceiversintheircockpitsforconducting
105
nightinterdictionbombing. YetanothernoveltechniquedevelopedbytheIAFforuseinthecampaignentailedselectingweaponimpactpointssoasto
createlandslidesandavalanchesthatcoveredintrudersupplylines.106Finally,tonotejustoneofmanyadditionalexamplesthatcouldbecited,theIAF
pioneeredduringitsKargilcampaignwhathassincecometobecallednontraditionalintelligence,surveillance,andreconnaissancethroughitsuseofelectro
opticalandinfraredimagingtargetingpodsforconductinghighresolutionaerialreconnaissanceofthebattlespace.107
Itwasyetanotherexaggerationfortwocommentators,inassessingthecampaign,tosuggestthattheIAFsleaderswereshockedattheirtwoaircraft
lossestosurfacetoairmissilefireandthatthosesameleaderspanickedastheysearchedforalternativetactics,techniques,andproceduresforaddressing
thechallengethemissilespresented.108Infact,whatthoseleadersactuallydidinthecircumstanceswastoconsiderwithdeliberationasurfacetoairthreat
thattheyhadfullyanticipatedintheirpriorcontingencyplanningandthentoaddressitsystematicallyinasolutionsorientedway.AsAirChiefMarshalTipnis
toldPrimeMinisterVajpayeeandothersataCabinetCommitteeonSecuritymeetingafterthetwoaircraftweredowned,WhileIwassorrytolosetwo
fighters,Iwasnotoverlyworried.Theairforceknewwhathadgonewrongandknewwhatwasrequiredtobedonetoensurewedidnotrepeatthe
mistakes.109
Inthisconnection,astheineffectivenessoftheIAFsconventionalbombingpersistedforfourstraightdaysonend,Tipnisvisited15Corpsheadquartersin
Srinagartoconferwiththeonscenearmycommandersandtojointlyworkoutbestalternativeapproachestothesatisfactionofall.110Itwasinsubstantial
partoutofthatcrossservicemindmeldatthetacticallevelthatTipnisultimatelydecidedtoemployMirage2000Hsthatcoulddeliverlaserguidedbombswith
consistentaccuracyagainstthemostvitaltargets.
PartlybecausetheIAFhadnotamassedasizableinventoryoflaserguidedbombsatthetimethecrisiseruptedandpartlybecauseofthepaucityoftargets
ofsufficientmerittowarranttheuseofsuchcostlymunitions,WesternAirCommand,bytherecollectionofitscommanderatthetime,expendedonlytwo
laserguidedbombsinallthroughouttheKargilfighting,bothdeliveredagainsttheenemysmainforwardcommandpostonTigerHill.111Yeteventhislimited
useagainstakeyNLItargetdramaticallyalteredthedynamicsofthecampaign.Afterthosesuccessfullaserguidedbombattacks,subsequenttargetingpod
imageryobservedbyIAFpilotsinrealtimeshowedenemytroopsabandoningtheirpositionsattheverysoundofapproachingfighters.112Diarieskeptby
PakistanisoldiersthatwerelaterrecoveredbyIndianArmyunitsamplyattestedtothedemoralizationcausedbytheIAFsattacks,mostparticularlythose
conductedduringthecampaignsfinalcountdownonceprecisionmunitionswereintroduced.113
The IAF pioneered during its Kargil campaign what has since come to be called nontraditional intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance through its use of electro-optical and infrared imaging targeting pods for
conducting high-resolution aerial reconnaissance of the battlespace.
WithrespecttothealtitudefloorimposedonIAFfighteroperationsbyWesternAirCommandthroughoutmostofthecampaignoutoflegitimateconcernover
theubiquitousenemyinfraredsurfacetoairmissilethreat,thecommanderoftheIndianArmysFiftySixthMountainBrigade,BrigadierAmarAul,later
blamedtheineffectivenessofmanyIAFattemptsatcloseairsupportdeliveryontheunwillingnessofIAFpilotstotakereasonablerisksbydescendinginto
theenemyslethalantiaircraftthreatenvelope.114TothatallbutexpressintimationofIAFcowardiceinthefaceofenemyfire,anIAFgroupcaptain
respondedthatsuchunwillingnesswasdrivenbytheentirelyappropriateandsensibleneedfortheIAFtorespecttheeffectivenessoftheenemysinfrared
surfacetoairmissiles.Afarmoreseriouslapse,heobserved,wouldhavebeenadoggedtendencytopersistinsacrificingassetswhen,clearly,therewas
aneedforareassessment.115
Trueenough,theharddeckof6,000to8,000feetabovetheterrainthatwasimposedontheIAFspilotsafterthedowningoftwoaircraftbyenemysurface
toairmissilesduringthecampaignssecondandthirddaysreducedtheirabilitytodelivereffective[closeairsupport]to[ground]maneuverunits.116Butit
alsoeliminatedtheirsusceptibilitytoanallbutcertainhighlossratehadtheypersistedinattemptingsuchfoolhardyoperationsunderthecircumstances.On
thispoint,astheabovecitedgroupcaptainlatercorrectlynoted,gonearethedaysoffightersscreaminginatdecklevel,actingasapieceofextended
artillery.Theairdefenseenvironmentoftodaysbattlefieldjustdoesnotpermitsuchemploymentofairpoweranymore,asignificantfactthatneedstobe
understoodbysoldierandcivilianalike.117
By remaining safely outside the enemys lethal surface-to-air-missile threat envelope, the IAFs pilots during
the Kargil War were doing exactly what any professional airmen the world over would have done in similar
circumstances.
Inthisregard,itisworthnotinginpassingthatwhenthelegitimatedemandsofthreatavoidancerequirefighteraircrafttooperatesohighaboveabattlefield
thatengagedgroundtroopscannotseeorhearthem,itisonlynaturalforthelattertosuspectatsomelevelthattheirpromisedairsupportisnotthere.Yet
byremainingsafelyoutsidetheenemyslethalsurfacetoairmissilethreatenvelope,theIAFspilotsduringtheKargilWarweredoingexactlywhatany
professionalairmentheworldoverwouldhavedoneinsimilarcircumstances.Indeed,theydidwhatU.S.andalliedpilotshavedoneinallmajorinstancesof
aerialforceemploymentfromOperationDesertStormin1991onwardunless,ofcourse,atrulydireemergencysituationonthegroundshouldrequire
acceptinghigherrisk.118
ItalsoistruethattheIAFssuspensionofanyfurtherattemptstousearmedhelicoptersincombatanditsassociatedimpositionofanaltitudefloortokeep
fixedwingfightersoutoftheenemyssurfacetoairmissilethreatenveloperemovedalargecomponentofpotentialIndianfirepowerfromthefight,but
fromprovidingeffectivedirectfiresupporttofriendlytroopsinclosecontactwithenemyforces.119Thoselegitimateandproperoperatingrestrictionsinno
waykeptIAFpilotsfromprovidingindirectsupportandinterdictionthathadasteadilymountingeffectinfacilitatingIndiangroundadvancesagainstthe
enemyovertime.AstheIAFgroupcaptainlaterrecalledinthisregard,theseriesof[IAF]attacksagainstPoint4388intheDrassectorwasanexcellent
exampleofhowlethalairstrikes,combinedwithtimelyreconnaissance,detectedtheenemyplanstoshifttoalternatesupplyroutes,whichwereonceagain
effectivelyattacked.Inthis,theIAFsucceededinstranglingtheenemysupplyarteries.120
OneimportantbattlefieldeffectachievedbytheIAFscombatairpatroloperationsduringthecampaignwastheirpreventionofPakistanihelicoptersfrom
resupplyingtheNLIsoutpostsandconductingreconnaissanceandcasualtyevacuationmissions,anaccomplishmentthataretiredIndianArmymajor
generalportrayedastheIAFsmostsignificantcontributiontoOperationVijay.121AnothersignificantIAFcontributionwasthesuccessfulinterdictionof
neededresupplytotheincreasinglybeleagueredPakistaniintrudersbydestroyingtheNLIslogisticsbaseatMunthoDhalo.Byoneinformedassessment,
hundredsofenemytroopswerekilledbyIAFairactioninsuchattacks,andIndianmilitaryintelligenceinterceptednumerousenemyradiotransmissions
duringthecampaignthatattestedtotheeffectivenessofthoseattacks.122Especiallyduringthecampaignsfinaldays,thatinterceptedtrafficrevealedsevere
shortagesofrations,water,medicalsupplies,andammunition,aswellasaninabilityoftheoccupyingenemyunitstoevacuatetheirwounded.123Yetanother
tellingtestamenttotheeffectivenessoftheIAFsinterdictionattackscamewhenPakistansForeignMinisterSartajAziz,duringanofficialvisittoNewDelhi
onJune12asOperationVijaywasjustreachingpeakintensity,imploredtheIAFtostopitsairstrikesasoneofthreespecificrequeststhatheleviedonthe
Indiangovernment.124
The IAFs ability to adapt to an unnatural limitation imposed by top-down civilian direction and to work
effectively within the Vajpayee governments ban against any crossing of the Line of Control by Indian
forces may well have been the determining factor in keeping the PAF out of the fighting and hence in
maintaining escalation control throughout the seventy-four-day war.
TheIAFsabilitytoadapttoanunnaturallimitationimposedbytopdownciviliandirectionandtoworkeffectivelywithintheVajpayeegovernmentsban
againstanycrossingoftheLoCbyIndianforcesmaywellhavebeenthedeterminingfactorinkeepingthePAFoutofthefightingandhenceinmaintaining
escalationcontrolthroughouttheseventyfourdaywar.AfterthesurvivingintrudersweredrivenbackintoPakistanicontrolledterritoryandtheIndianArmy
reclaimedandsecureditspositionsintheKargilheights,AirMarshalPatneyreflectedinthisregard:
Patneyadded:
125
Intheend,however,neitherdevelopmenteveroccurred.126
TheasymmetricaluseofIndiasairpowerallowedtheVajpayeegovernmenttotelegraphanunmistakablesignalofitsseriousnesstokeyaudiencesbothin
Pakistanandworldwide.Further,asoneofthebestWesternaccountsoftheKargilfightingfromanoperationalperspectiveobserved,ithadtheadditional
domesticbenefitofgivingtheIAFadirectroleinamajornationalcrisis,notunimportantforfuturebureaucraticstruggles.127
National Security Lessons

TheKargilWarof1999wasarichteachingexperienceforIndiainthenationalsecurityarenainmanyrespects.Foronething,itrepresentedthecountrys
firstexposuretotheCNNfactor,inthattelevisedimagesofthefightingshowcasedinIndianlivingroomseacheveninghelpedthegovernmentandarmed
forcestomobilizedomesticsupportforOperationVijaywhile,atthesametime,demoralizingtheliteratePakistanirankandfile.Makingthemostofthattool,
theVajpayeegovernmentinteractedskillfullywiththenationsmediainbuildingdomesticandinternationalappreciationofthefactthatIndiahadbeen
attackedwithoutprovocationbyPakistanandaccordinglywasintherightinitschosenresponse.
The Vajpayee government interacted skillfully with the nations media in building domestic and
international appreciation of the fact that India had been attacked without provocation by Pakistan and
accordingly was in the right in its chosen response.
Asthecounteroffensiveunfolded,Indianmediacoverageofcombateventswasdetailedandextensive,withnumeroustelevisionchannelsshowinga
constantflowofscenesfromthewarzoneinamannerreminiscentofCNNscoverageofthe1991PersianGulfWar.SomeanalystsinNewDelhisuggested
afterwardthatthismediacoveragehelpedtoserveasaforcemultiplierforIndiancombatoperations,sinceitwasmorecrediblebyfarthanPakistans
versionofongoingevents.ItdefinitelyservedasamoraleboosterfortheIndianpopulace.Shortlyafterthecampaignended,theIndiangovernment
convenedaKargilReviewCommittee,chairedbytheeminentinternationalsecurityscholarandstrategistK.Subrahmanyam,whichwaschargedwith
determininghowPakistansforceshadsucceededincrossingintoIndiancontrolledterritoryandestablishingafootholdtherewithouthavingbeendetectedin
duetimebymilitaryintelligence.128ItconcludedontheimportantmediacoveragecountthattheshowdownagainstthePakistaniintruderswasIndiasfirst
televisionwarand,assuch,wasanexperiencethatknitthecountrytogetherasneverbefore.129
A major shortcoming highlighted by the war experience was a significant deficiency with respect to the
provision of timely indications and warning of impending crises.
AsforthecountrysvigilanceoveritsperenniallyvolatileborderwithPakistan,amajorshortcominghighlightedbythewarexperiencewasasignificant
deficiencywithrespecttotheprovisionoftimelyindicationsandwarningofimpendingcrises.AlthoughtheIndianArmyhadabrigadeoftroopsfieldedinthe
KargilsectortomonitoractivitiesthereandtheIAFpossessedCanberras,Jaguars,andMiG25Rscapableofoverseeingtheareabymeansofmediumand
highaltitudeaerialphotography,localciviliansnoticedtheintrudersbeforetheIndianAirForcedid.Inanearlycommentontheaircontributiontothe
campaign,aservingIAFaircommodorefranklyadmittedthatPakistansintrusionintothehighreachesoftheKargilsectormadeforasurpriseborderingon
shock.130Aclearlessonemanatingfromthisexperience,henoted,wastheurgentrequirementtoimproveoursurveillanceandreconnaissancecapability.
Wecannotaffordtobesurprisedagain.131Similarly,theIndianArmychiefatthetime,GeneralMalik,laterrecalledthatIndiassurpriseattheincursion
reflectedamajordeficiencyin[thecountrys]systemofcollecting,reporting,andassessingintelligence.132Clearly,theIAFneededabetternationwide,real
timeintelligence,surveillance,andreconnaissancecapability.
Asforthegoodnewspartofthestory,thisintelligence,surveillance,andreconnaissancedeficiencyhassincebeensubstantiallyimproveduponbyIndias
placementofindigenousreconnaissancesatellitesonorbit.InOctober2001,theIndiangovernmentlauncheditsfirstTechnologyExperimentSatellite,which
substantiallyimprovedthequalityofitsoverheadintelligenceproductasaresultofthesatellitesonemeterresolution.133Indiasspacebornesynthetic
apertureradarcapabilityprovidesallweather,aroundtheclockcoverage,andtheIndianArmyalsonowmaintainsaconstantvigilintheareawithits
inventoryofIsraelimadeSearcherandHeronunmannedaerialvehicles.Inaddition,todaytherearefivetimesthenumberoftroopspermanentlygarrisoned
intheKargilsectorthanatthetimeofthePakistaniincursionin1999,consistingoffourbrigadestotalingnearly20,000troops.134
Today there are five times the number of troops permanently garrisoned in the Kargil sector than at the
time of the Pakistani incursion in 1999.
Amajorinterserviceshortcominghighlightedbythefirsttwoweeksthatfollowedtheinitialdetectionoftheincursionwastheneartotallackoftransparency
andopencommunicationbetweentheIndianArmyandtheIAFwithrespecttothegatheringcrisis.Withoutquestion,theonsetoftheKargilconfrontation
revealedalackofeffectiveairgroundintegrationinIndiasjointarenaatthemostseniorleadershiplevel.Onthispoint,oneIAFairmanlaterlamentedthe
completelossofsynergybetweenairandlandforcesatthestartoftheoperationthathadbeenoccasionedbythelateinductionintothefrayofairpower
and,hence,thedenialoftheoptimumemploymentofitsattributesofoffensiveaction,notwithstandingthefactthatwewerefightingaclearlydefinedenemy
withinourownterritory.135AnotherIAFairman,notinghowthearmyattheoutsethadlookedtofightaclassicalhighaltitudebattleonitsown,asked
rhetoricallywhetheritwas,atleastduringthecampaignsfirsttwoweeks,acaseofmywar,canyouhelpratherthanourwar,letsdoittogether.136
Thisinclinationattheoutsettogoitalone,itmightbenoted,wasnotjustanidiosyncraticIndianArmytrait.ThesinceretireddirectorofoperationsofthePAF
duringtheKargilcrisis,AirCommodoreKaiserTufail,similarlynotedthePAFleadershipssurpriseathavingbeentoldofwhatthePakistanArmyleaders
hadauthorized,addingthatweallwerepiquedatbeingleftoutofthearmysplanning[and]weregiventobelievethatthiswasalimitedtacticalactionin
whichthePAFwouldnotberequired.TufailalsonotedthatfromtheverystartoftheKargilconfrontation,thePAFwastrappedbyacircumstantial
absurdityitwasfacedwiththeludicrouspredicamentofhavingtoprovideairsupporttoinfiltratorsalreadydisownedbythePakistaniArmyleadership.He
furthersuggestedthatintheend,thePAFsrestraintinwardingoffamajorconflagrationwasitsparamountcontributiontotheKargilconflict.137
IntheirclearinclinationatfirsttogoitaloneincounteringPakistansincursionintoIndiancontrolledKashmir,theIndianArmysleadersfailedtohonorthe
reasonablepropositionadvancedfouryearsearlierintheIAFsfirstpublishedairdoctrinethatwarsarerarelywonbyasinglecomponentofmilitary
force.TheIAFsdoctrinemanualissuedin1995hadnotedtheimmenseadvantagesairforcescanprovide asurfacebattlebeginsandthemajor
contributionairforcescanmakeinexploitingopportunitiesasaresultofsurfaceaction.138AsfortheopportunitycostsincurredbytheIndianArmyasa
resultofthatinitialfailure,onewasanunfortunatepersistenceofmisunderstandingsregardingtheIAFscapabilitiesandlimitationsthatcouldeasilyhave
beenclearedupinampletimebeforehandbymoreopenandtimelycrossservicecommunication.139
Forexample,ofthearmysinsistenceattheoutsetthattheIAFemploysolelyattackhelicoptersinthecloseairsupportrole,anIAFairmanlaterwrotethat
140
AsforthecomplaintsheardlaterfromsomearmycommentatorsthattheIAFspilotswouldnotdescendtoloweraltitudesfromwhichtheirfreefallmunitions
couldbedeliveredwithgreateraccuracy,anotherIAFairmanobservedthatoneofthevaluablelessonsthatemergedfromtheKargiloperationswasthe
needforcloserjointarmyairforceplanningandconsultationsfromtheverybeginning,wherebythetargetingadviceofIndianairmencould,atthevery
outset,beincorporatedintothearmysplanforgroundoperations.Thisairmanalsoexplainedwhyscarceairassetsshouldnotbefritteredawayon
insignificanttargetslikemachinegunpostsandtrenches,but[rathershouldbeused]onlargetargetsofconsequence,suchastheenemysupplycampat
MunthoDhaloandtheenemybattalionheadquartersatopTigerHill,againstwhichitcouldbemoreeffectiveinmeetingthearmyssupportneedsatthe
operationalandstrategiclevels.141
AftertheKargilReviewCommitteesreportwasreleased,theIndianArmycensuredtheresponsibledivisioncommanderandrelievedthebrigade
commanderthelatterofwhomsincewonalawsuitinwhichhesuccessfullyarguedthathisdismissalhadbeenwithoutvalidcause.142Noeffortwas
undertakenbeyondthat,however,toallocateresponsibilityforthebreakdowninjointnessattheserviceleadershiplevelandforthearmysslownesstoenlist
theIAFsfullinvolvementonceanimminentclashwasathand.
Adecadelater,theformerAOCforJammuandKashmirwhohadoverseenIAFoperationsatthetacticallevelduringthecampaignwrotethatoneofthe
mostimportantlessonsspotlightedbytheexperiencewasthecrucialneedforintegrationofhighermilitarymanagementandmissionbasedcapability
creation.Thathasnotyethappened.HeaddedthattheIAFandIndianArmytodayaredefinitelycreatingcommunicationnetworkswithcrossservice
interfacestoplugintooneanothersnetworkbutnotedfurtherthatwhetherthesewillworkinanetworkcentricenvironmentremainsunknown.143Healso
observedthattheKargilReviewCommitteesrecommendationshadstillnotyetbeenfullyimplementeddueto[persistent]differencesbetweenthearmy,
navyandairforceandtheunwillingnessofthepoliticalclasstoenactthebindinglegislation.144
Ontheplusside,oncethearmygotpastitsinitialdisagreementswiththeIAFoverpreciselywhatkindofairsupportitneededandjusthowthatsupport
mightbestbeprovided,anatmosphereofharmonylargelyprevailedbetweenthetwoserviceswhenitcametimetomoveaheadwiththeimplementationof
OperationVijay.Inthisrespect,GeneralMaliklaterrecalledthatoncethescaleandpotentialconsequencesoftheintrusionhadbecomefullyunderstoodand
assimilatedbytheservicechiefs,hewentoutofhiswaytopersuadetheCabinetCommitteeonSecuritythatIndiassubstantialairandnavalsupremacy
shouldbebroughttobearnotonlyintheimmediateKargilsectorbutalsoalongIndiasentirewesternborder.145Hefurtherrecalled:TheIndianAirForce
respondedveryquicklyaftertheCCSapprovedtheemploymentofairpoweronIndiassideoftheLoC.AfterMay23,therewerenoprofessional
differenceswhatsoeverthatcouldaffectourteamworkorplanning.146
Kargil and Todays Threats

ThisleavesuswiththestillunansweredquestionastowhethertheKargilexperienceoffersaninstructiveprototypeforthemostprobableneartermthreats
thatmayfacetheIAFalongIndiasborderswithPakistanandChinainthedecadeahead.Withoutquestion,theunusuallydemandingchallengespresented
byOperationSafedSagarmadeforasoberingwakeupcallfortheIAF,whichevidentlyhadnotgivenmuchthoughttosuchascenarioandhadnottrained
routinelyatsuchelevationsuntilitwasforcedtodosobyoperationalnecessity.Notlongafterthefightingended,Indiandefenseexpertsbegan
contemplatingsuchlimitedengagementsintimeandscaleasthemostlikelywaveofthefuturewithrespecttoanyprovocationsofthatsortthatmightarise
anewalongthevolatileLoCrunningthroughKashmir.Inthatregard,AirCommodoreSinghvoicedtheopinionofmanywhenhecalledKargilatemplatefor
limitedwarandfutureoptionsifwarbecomesinevitable.147
The unusually demanding challenges presented by Operation Safed Sagar made for a sobering wake-up
call for the IAF, which evidently had not given much thought to such a scenario and had not trained
routinely at such elevations until it was forced to do so by operational necessity.
Viewedinhindsight,theKargilWarisrepletewithinsightsintothedynamicsofdeterrenceintheIndoPakistanirelationship.Especiallyimportantinthis
regard,Pakistansmilitaryleadersmiscalculatedbadlyintheirapparentbeliefthattheinternationalcommunitywouldpressimmediatelyforaceasefirein
Kashmiroutofconcernoverapossibleescalationofthefightingtothenuclearlevel,withthenetresultthatPakistanwouldbeleftwithaneasilyacquired
newsliceofterrainontheIndiansideoftheLoC.Inaddition,GeneralMaliklatersuggestedthatthosewhoconcoctedtheincursiongambithaderroneously
convincedthemselvesthatastabledeterrentrelationshipbetweenIndiaandPakistanatthenuclearlevelwouldenableaPakistaniconventionaloffensive
intoKashmirwithvirtualimpunity.ThatanalysiswasbasedontheputativepremisethatIndiawouldnotcountertheprovocationwithanalloutconventional
responsethatwouldriskeitherescalationorendinginacostlystalemate.148
Since the Vajpayee government scrupulously kept its combat operations confined to Indiancontrolled
Kashmir, the international community had no compelling reason to intervene.
Intheend,bothofthoselikelyPakistaniassumptionsprovedunfounded.Thenuclearbalancebetweenthetwocountriesdid deteradeterminedIndian
conventionalresponse,andthesuccessfulreactionthatIndiaultimatelymountedontheKargilheightsfellwellshortofbeingalloutinscale.Furthermore,
sincetheVajpayeegovernmentscrupulouslykeptitscombatoperationsconfinedtoIndiancontrolledKashmir,theinternationalcommunityhadnocompelling
reasontointervene.
Asaresult,aremotebuthighintensityandhighstakesshowdownwasallowedtorunonformorethantwomonths,somethingthePakistanArmysleaders
allbutcertainlydidnotanticipatewhentheyfirstconjureduptheirincursionplan.Indeed,intheviewofaretiredIndianArmymajorgeneral,Pakistans
militaryleadershadnotthoughtbeyondthefirstweekor10daysintheirapproachtoplanningtheconfrontation.Theyalso,thegeneralsuggested,allbut
surelydidnotbargainonthecombatinvolvementofIndianairpower.149AninformedandinsightfulformerPakistanArmybrigadierlaterwellcharacterized
theintroductionofIAFfightersintotheconflictonMay26asaneffectiveasymmetricverticalescalationthatPakistancouldnotmatchwithoutrunning
unbearablerisksofalargerandmoreconsequentialconfrontation.150
TheKargilexperiencealsosuggestedthatifChinaandPakistancametoappreciatethatIndiapossessedanoverwhelmingconventionalforce
preponderanceintheregion,thatpresencecouldactasadeterrentagainstsuchprovocationsinthefuture.SucharealizationultimatelyledtoanewIndian
declaratorypolicytowardthatendthatwasenunciatedinJanuary2000byIndiasthenministerofdefense,GeorgeFernandes.151AtaseminarinNewDelhi
thatmonth,FernandesobservedthatinprecipitatingtheKargilWar,Pakistanhadnotabsorbedtherealmeaningofnuclearizationthatitcandeter the
useofnuclearweapons,butnotallandanywar.Theoverarchingteachingofthewarexperience,headded,wasthatnuclearweaponshadnotrendered
warintheregionobsoleteormadecovertwarbyproxytheonlyoption.Anolessimportantteaching,Fernandessaid,wasthatconventionalwar
remainedfeasible,butwithdefinitelimitations[now]ifescalationacrossthenuclearthresholdwastobeavoided.152
The Kargil experience suggested that if China and Pakistan came to appreciate that India possessed an
overwhelming conventional force preponderance in the region, that presence could act as a deterrent
against such provocations in the future.
ArelatedquestionofnotehereconcernstheextenttowhichtheIAFsroleinhelpingtoenableIndiassuccessfuloutcomeinOperationVijaymayoffera
centralingredientof deterrenceagainstfuturesuchprovocations.Inthisregard,areflectiveIAFwarrior/scholarsuggestedthattheIAFsnever
donebeforehighelevationinterdictionoperationsduringtheKargilfightingcontributedsignificantlytotheachievementofthegovernmentsultimatestrategic
goalofevictingPakistansforcesfromthepositionsthattheyhadoccupied.Hefurtherobservedthatitstellingstrikesagainstenemytroopemplacementsand
supplydumpscreatedastrategiceffectbyforcingPakistansleadershiptoreassessitsstrategyofconductinganopenendedproxywaragainstIndia.This
airmanaddedthatthoseoperationsalsosilencedcriticswithinIndiawho[previouslyhad]feltthatairpowerwasessentiallyescalatoryinnature.153
Withoutadoubt,theairbalancethroughouttheKargilWarstoodmarkedlyinIndiasfavor,withanoverallfighterforceratioof750to350.Withrespecttothe
mostcuttingedgefightersthenfieldedbythetwosides,Pakistansinventoryofjust26U.S.providedF16Aswasgreatlyoutmatchednumerically,and
perhapsqualitativelyaswell,bytheIAFs145highestperformanceaircraft(70MiG29s,45Mirage2000Hs,and30Su30s).154AirCommodoreSingh
suggestedthatthisadvantageinIndiasfavorclearlydeterredPakistanfromusingitsairforcetocometotherescueofitssoldiers,whoselargenumbers
werebeingkilledbytheIndianArmyandAirForce[andwere]beingdeniedcriticallyneededsupplieslikeammunition,rations,andreinforcements.155
Yetatthesametime,prudentIndiandefenseplannerswilllikelyfindthemselvesshortchangedintheirpreparationsforthefullspectrumofpossible
challengestotheircountryssecurityinyearstocomeiftheydrawunduecomfortfromthehappyendingoftheKargilexperienceandacceptthatconflictas
their planningbaselineforhedgingagainstfuturecontingenciesalongtheLoC.MuchlikeNATOsairwarforKosovothatunfoldedintheBalkansat
roughlythesametime,theKargilWarwasapoortestofIndiasairwarfarecapability.TheIAFsfighterpilotswereconsignedtodowhattheycouldrather
thanwhattheymighthavedoneinalessrestrictedengagementinwhichtheywouldnothavebeenboundbysuchoperatingconstraints.Moreover,like
NATOsroughlyconcurrentOperationAlliedForceagainstSerbia,theenemyhadtheinitiativethroughoutmostoftheKargilWar,andboththenatureofthe
operationalchallengetheIAFfacedintheKargilheightsandthetargetingrequirementsthatensuedfromthatchallengenecessarilydictatedan
unconventionalandsuboptimaluseofIndiasincreasinglycapableairweapon.156
Prudent Indian defense planners will likely find themselves shortchanged in their preparations for the full
spectrum of possible challenges to their countrys security in years to come if they draw undue comfort from
the happy ending of the Kargil experience and accept that conflict as their only planning baseline for
hedging against future contingencies along the Line of Control.
AdecadeafterOperationSafedSagarssuccessfulconclusion,AirMarshalPatneyobservedthatPakistanhadareasonablygoodairforcebutelectednot
touseitorwaswaryoftheconsequencesofitsuse.[It]handedoverairdominancetoIndiawithoutafight.HadPakistanoffered[aerial]combatthe
patternofairactivitywouldhavebeenverydifferent.Wewouldhavehadtofightforairdominance,evenifitwasatthecostofotherairoperationsofthe
war.157ThatsuggeststhatabolderPakistaniriskcalculus,orevenaninadvertentescalationdynamicemanatingfrommisjudgmentoneitherside,could
haveresultedinahigherintensityshowdownoverthesameinitialstakes.Thatescalatedconflict,inturn,wouldhavedemandedafarmorerobustand
sustainableIndianconventionalforceposturethanthatwhichprevailedwellenoughoverPakistanin1999.
Ultimately,onecanonlyspeculateastowhatkeptamajoraerialclashbetweentheIAFandPAFfromoccurringatanytimeduringtheKargilfighting.
However,itisclearthatarecurringborderchallengealongtheLoCinyearsyettocomecouldenduppresentingamoredemandingtestoftheIAFsstrength
thantheKargilconflictthatwouldrequireamoreexactingapproachtoairpoweremployment.InsofarasIndiasclearpreeminenceinthebilateralairbalance
contributedmateriallytoitssuccessin1999,theIAFshouldhaveeveryincentivehenceforthtosustainanolesspronouncedcombatedgeoverPakistanin
itsfutureforcedevelopment.ItshouldalsohavestrongmotivationstomaintainatleastalocalpreponderanceofaircapabilityalongIndiasborderwithChina.
Forstudentsofairwarfare,theIAFscombatexperienceduringthe1999KargilWarreaffirmedanumberofabidingcharacteristicsofmodernairarms
aroundtheworldtoday.Itshowed,forexample,thatinnovationandadaptabilityunderthestressofconfiningrulesofengagementinthiscasetheVajpayee
governmentsstrictinjunctionthattheIAFnotcrosstheLoCunderanycircumstancesisagenerichallmarkofmodernairmanship.Itfurthershowedthat
professionalisminsuchoperationallycrucialmattersascampaignplanning,presentationofforces,accommodationofnewanduniquetacticalchallenges(in
thisinstancetheneedtoengagehardtoseetargetsinunprecedentedlyhighelevationHimalayanbattlespace),andeffectivelyunderwritingtheneedsofa
jointforcecommanderisscarcelyamonopolyofmorefamiliarWesternairarms.Itdemonstratedyetagainhowtheeffectiveapplicationofairdelivered
firepower,particularlyifunmatchedbytheopposingside,canshortenandfacilitatetheoutcomeofanengagementthatmightotherwisehavepersisted
indefinitely.
Andwhenitcomestostillneededimprovementsinthejointarena,itshowedthatanabsenceoftransparencyincrossservicecommunication,tosaynothing
ofinterdependenceincampaignplanning,isbynomeansamalaiseuniquetotheUnitedStatesanditsallies.Onthisimportantcount,aninformedIndian
assessmentofusefulteachingstobedrawnfromtheKargilexperienceunderscoredthepostcampaignrevelationsaboutthequarrelingbetweentheair
forceandarmychiefsovertheuseofairpowerinKargilandconcludedthattheproblemisclearlynotaminorone.AtleastonelessonofKargilappears
nottohavebeensufficientlywelllearnedthehighcostofbureaucraticpolitics.158Theissueisstillcontroversial,andmanyobserversofIndiasmilitary
organizationanddefensedecisionmakingarrangements,bothinIndiaandworldwide,havearguedforsometimethatamajorsteptowardamelioratingthat
highcost,atleastatthemargins,wouldbetocreatethepositionofchiefoftheDefenseStaff.Thejobofthenewchiefwouldbetooverseeandadjudicate
interservicedifferenceswhenitcomestotheapportionmentofmilitaryrolesandresources,ashaslongbeenthepracticeintheUnitedStates(withits
chairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff)andinmostotherdevelopedWesterncountries.
The Broader Strategic Outlook

AsforthebroaderimplicationsoftheKargilbenchmarkfordeterrenceandinternationalsecurity,thatwarwasthefirstseriousborderconflictofsustained
durationbetweentwonucleararmedantagoniststhatendedwithaclearwinnerandloserattheconventionallevel.159Althoughitisalwaysriskytotryto
generalizefromasingularand,inmanyways,uniquecaseofthatsort,theKargilWarnonethelessoffersmuchfoodforcreativethoughtregardinganumber
ofgenericissueareas,suchastheescalationdynamicsthatgovernabilateralnuclearrelationshipofmajortension.Itunderlinestheimportanceofavoiding
suchescalationpronethresholdsasIndiascrossingoftheLoCtocarrythefightingintoPakistan,andPakistansengagementofIAFfightersservicingNLI
targetsonIndiassideoftheLoC.Anditremindsmilitaryplannersoftheeverpresentpossibilitythatinadvertentleadershipmisjudgmentoneitherside
regardingtheotherslimitsoftolerancecouldleadtoabreachofthenucleartaboothatneitherplayerwantsorcouldpossiblyprofitfrom.
The Kargil War was the first serious border conflict of sustained duration between two nucleararmed
antagonists that ended with a clear winner and loser at the conventional level.
TheconfrontationalsoshowedIndiathedownsidestrategicconsequencesofanavowednuclearnofirstusepolicythatnecessarilyputthecountrys
governmentinareactivemodewhenitcametotheprospectofinadvertentnuclearescalation.Bythesametoken,forPakistansleaders,theunexpected
andunexpectedlysharpandintenseresponsethattheirprovocationpromptedfromtheIndianArmyandIAFshouldmakethemthinktwiceaboutthelimits
oftheirnucleardeterrent.Moretothepoint,itshouldhavehadatemperinginfluenceontheirinitialpresumptionsabouttheextenttowhichmerelyhavinga
crediblenuclearattackcapabilityinandofitselfempoweredthemtotryconventionalactsofterritorialacquisitionwithimpunity.Tothatextent,itshouldhave
instilledaswellahealthyonceburned,twiceshymindsetamongthoseleadersandtheirsuccessorswhomightbetemptedtoundertakearepriseofthat
gambitsomedayinthefutureparticularlyinlightofthepersistentregionalimbalanceofconventionalairpowerinIndiaspronouncedfavor.
Forbothprotagonists,thewarrepresentedarealworldbattlelaboratoryforreconfirmingsomethingtheleadersofNATOandtheWarsawPactcameto
learnduringtheheightoftheColdWarinCentralEuropeagenerationbefore.Astablebilateralnucleardeterrencerelationshipatthestrategiclevelcan
markedlyconstraininintensityandscale,ifnotinhibitentirely,recurrentflashpointsthat,intheabsenceofsucharelationship,mighthaveeverychanceof
eruptingintoanopenendedconventionalshowdownforthehigheststakes.ButtheKargilWardemonstratedthatnucleardeterrenceisclearlynota
panacea.ThepossibilityoffutureconventionalwarsofmajorconsequencealongIndiasnorthernborderswithPakistanandChinapersists,andtheIndian
defenseestablishmentmustplanandprepareaccordingly.
NOTES
1
FlightLevel200(pronouncedtwozerozeroinaviatorparlance)is20,000feetabovesealevel.
2
AcomprehensiveassessmentoftheIAFanditsneartermforcedevelopmentplanswillappearinBenjaminS.Lambeth,
(SantaMonica,Calif.:RANDCorporation,forthcoming).Withoutquestionthemostauthoritativetreatmentofthe
IAFsevolutionandcapabilitiestodatefromaninformedIndianairmansperspectiveisthemagisterialvaledictoryvolumeencapsulatingacareersworthof
involvementwiththesubjectbyAirCommodoreJasjitSingh,IAF(ret.), (NewDelhi:Knowledge
World,2007).
3
Inaclearearlytestamenttothisfact,theIAFsinauguralNo.1SquadronestablishedonApril1,1933,wasexpresslydesignatedtheArmyCooperation
Squadron,andallsubsequentsquadronsforyearsthereafterwereformallyassignedthearmycooperationroleastheywerestoodup.SeeGroupCaptain
A.S.Bahal,IAF,StrategicRolesofAirPower:Think,Plan,EquipandTrainforIt, (NewDelhi)(Spring2007):9.
4
AirMarshalV.K.Bhatia,IAF(ret.),Forecastfor2030,SPs (NewDelhi),September2009,40.
5
Inacredibleindicatorofrankandfileviewsinthisregard,themostsophisticatedeffortyetundertakentomeasureIndianpopularattitudestowardforeign
andstrategicpolicymattersconductedbytheChicagoCouncilonGlobalAffairsin2007foundthatterrorism,Islamicfundamentalism,andtensionsbetween
IndiaandPakistanallrankedhigherontherosterofassessedthreatsthanChinasongoingdevelopmentasamilitarypower.(CitedinStephenP.Cohen
andSunilDasgupta, [Washington,D.C.:BrookingsInstitutionPress,2010],14.)
6
(NewDelhi:IndianAirForce,AirHeadquarters,October8,2007),22.
7
Singh, ,251.
8
AirMarshalP.K.Pandey,IAF(ret.),MeetingtheChallenges:IAF2020, ,(December2007):61.InkeepingwithIndias
fundamentallydefensivestrategicorientationandmindset,themostbasicprincipleofthecountrysnucleardoctrineattheexecutionlevelisitsinsistenceon
nofirstuseofnuclearweapons.NofirstusewasinitiallyproposedbyIndiatoPakistanin1994(unsuccessfully)asaformalarmscontrolmeasureandhas
beenreaffirmedbyasuccessionofIndiaspoliticalleaderseversince.ForaninformeddiscussionoftherootsofthispolicyanditspracticalbearingonIndias
securitysituationandbreadthofstrategicoptions,seeAshleyJ.Tellis,
(SantaMonica,Calif.:RANDCorporation,MR1127AF,2001),30212.
9
Forinformativeoverviewassessmentsofthisregionalwar,seeAirCommodoreJasjitSingh,IAF(ret.),ed.,
(NewDelhi:KnowledgeWorld,1999)AshleyJ.Tellis,C.ChristineFair,andJamisonJoMedby,
(SantaMonica,Calif.:RANDCorporation,MR1450,2001)andPeterR.Lavoy,ed.,
(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2009).
10
Thetermjoint,instandardmilitaryusage,referstothecooperativeinvolvementoftwoormorearmedservicesinacombat,peacekeeping,or
humanitarianoperation.
11
AirCommodoreJasjitSingh,IAF(ret.),Kashmir,CovertWars,andAirPower, (NewDelhi)(Summer2005):79.
12
12BurtonStein, (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2010),358.
13PreetiKumar,SustainingAirBridges, (NewDelhi),(October2008):8.Thesetwotopmilitaryleadersweresaidtohaveobtainedthein
principlegoaheadfromPakistansPrimeMinisterNawazSharifwithouthavingofferedhimanyspecificsregardingtheplannedincursion.Foraninformed
accountofthemotivationsthatmostlikelyunderlaythisPakistaniinitiativebyasinceretiredPakistaniArmybrigadier,seeShaukatQadir,AnAnalysisofthe
KargilConflict1999, (April2002):2427.
14SeeTheLahoreDeclaration,Washington,D.C.:U.S.InstituteofPeace,PeaceAgreementsDigitalCollection,postedFebruary23,1999.
15SuchapresumptioncouldhaveanimatedthePakistaniincursionsplannersevenif,asseemsmostlikely,thepossibilityofactualnuclearweaponsusein
theworstcaseneverfiguredseriouslyintheircalculations.
16MajorGeneralG.D.Bakshi,IndianArmy(ret.),Kargil:DynamicsofaLimitedWarAgainstaNuclearBackdrop, (Summer2009):43.
ThejournalisapublicationoftheCentreforLandWarfareStudiesinNewDelhi.
17Ibid.,44.
181999KargilConflict,GlobalSecurity.org.www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/kargil99.htm.
19AirCommodoreJasjitSingh,IAF(ret.),SomeReflectionsontheIAF, ,(NewDelhi)(Monsoon2004):179.
20Bakshi,Kargil:DynamicsofaLimitedWarAgainstaNuclearBackdrop,44.
21GovernmentofIndia,NationalSecurityCouncilSecretariat,KargilReviewCommittee,
(NewDelhi:Sage,2000),227.
22PushpindarSingh, ,VolumeIII:WorldAirPower(NewDelhi:TheSocietyforAerospaceStudies,
2007),108.
23RahulBedi,PayingtoKeeptheHighGround, (October1999):31.
24AirMarshalVinodPatney,IAF(ret.),1999WarinKargilandItsAftermath,NewDelhi:CentreforAirPowerStudies,briefingtoagroupofsuccessor
generationIAFofficers,September8,2011.
25ForawellresearchedassessmentofthegroundfightingconductedbytheIndianArmyduringthe74daycounteroffensive,seeJohnH.Gill,Military
OperationsintheKargilConflict,inLavoy,ed., ,92129.SeealsoCaptainMarcusP.Acosta,HighAltitudeWarfare:
TheKargilConflictandtheFuture,thesissubmittedinpartialfulfillmentoftherequirementsforthedegreeofMasterofArtsinNationalSecurityAffairs,
Monterey,Calif.:NavalPostgraduateSchool,June2003.AmorecondensedversionofthelatteraccountispresentedinMajorMarcusP.Acosta,TheKargil
Conflict:WagingWarintheHimalayas, (September2007):397415.
26AirCommodoreArjunSubramaniam,IAF,KargilRevisited:AirOperationsinaHighAltitudeConflict, (NewDelhi),(Summer2008):
186.AtthetimeoftheKargilWar,theIAFoperatedmostoftheIndianmilitarysrotarywingaircraft,includingseveralvariantsofattackhelicopters.
27Acosta,HighAltitudeWarfare:TheKargilConflictandtheFuture,58.
28Bedi,PayingtoKeeptheHighGround,31.
29CommentsonanearlierdraftbyAirMarshalVinodPatney,IAF(ret.),August16,2011,andPatney,1999WarinKargilandItsAftermath.
30WesternAirCommand,comprisingsixteenbasesandheadquarteredinNewDelhi,isthelargestandmostimportantoffiveIAFregionalcommands
throughoutIndia.Liketheotherfour,itisbothaforceproviderorganizationforjointcombatandtrainingoperationsandatheaterlevelwarfightingcommand
withinitsassignedareaofresponsibility.
31Patney,1999WarinKargilandItsAftermath.
32KargilDailyProgressofOpSafedSagar,http://vayusena.tripod.com/kargilsummary1.html.
33Patney,1999WarinKargilandItsAftermath.
34AirChiefMarshalA.Y.Tipnis,IAF(ret.),OperationSafedSagar, (NewDelhi),(October2006):6.
35Ibid.,8.
36Ibid.,810.
37Ibid.Onthispoint,accordingtoastillservingseniorIAFleaderwhowascloselyinvolvedinpreparationsfortheIAFsentryintothecampaignatthe
operationalandtacticallevel,thearmywascaughtunawaresandwantedtoretrievethesituationbyaskingtheIAFforhelpwithouttakingtheissuetothe
primeminister.Thatultimatelyunsuccessfulbidreflectedapoorappreciationofthesituationbythearmyatthatstage,aswellasitslackofknowledge
aboutthelimitedoperationalcapabilityoftheIAFshelicopters.(Commentsonanearlierdraft,December4,2011.)
38Tipnis,OperationSafedSagar,810.
39Ibid.IntheretrospectiveviewofastillservingseniorIAFleader,theescalationaspectwasoverstressedbytheIAFchief,andthearmyleadership
interpretedthatlegitimateavowedconcernastherationalizationforanIAFreluctancetolenditssupporttothearmy,whichwasabsolutelywrong.
(Commentsonanearlierdraft,December4,2011.)
40Tipnis,OperationSafedSagar,12.InatacitaffirmationofthisrecollectionbyTipnisofthearmysstanceduringitsinitialdaysofjockeyingfor
bureaucraticposition,thearmychief,GeneralMalik,laterrecalledthatonMay17,IaskedtheDGMO[DirectorGeneralofMilitaryOperations]andVCOAS
[ViceChiefofArmyStaff]ifIshouldreturntoNewDelhiimmediately.Bothadvisedmethatasthesituationwaswellwithinthecapabilityof15Corpsand
Northern[Army]Command,therewasnoneedformetodoso.(VedPrakashMalik, [NewDelhi:HarperCollins,2006],
109.)
42CommentsonanearlierdraftbyastillservingseniorIAFleaderwhowascloselyinvolvedinpreparationsfortheIAFsentryintothecampaignatthe
operationalandtacticallevel,December4,2011.
44KargilDailyProgressofOpSafedSagar,http://vayusena.tripod.com/kargilsummary1.html.TheairchiefalsometwiththeIAFfightersquadron
commandersandsomeofthelinepilots(myboys)atSrinagarwhowouldtakepartintheloomingcounteroffensive.Helaterreportedthattheywere
strainingattheleashtogetgoing.(Tipnis,OperationSafedSagar,14.)
45Ontheplusside,asoneinformedseniorIAFleaderlaterremarkedwithregardtothesecharges,thoseinthe[Indian]Armywhohadsomefirsthand
knowledge[ofthecrossservicedeliberationsduringtheleaduptoOperationVijay]havenotbeensoexasperatinglyvituperative.(Commentsonanearlier
draftbyretiredAirMarshalVinodPatney,IAF,August16,2011.)
46Forthefullrecordofthispointedand,attimes,intemperatecontretemps,seeLieutenantGeneralHarwantSingh,IndianArmy(ret.),KargilOnceMore:
HigherDefenceManagementNeedsReorganisation, (NewDelhi),November2006LieutenantGeneralHarwantSingh,IndianArmy(ret.),Kargil
Controversy:MismanagementofHigherDefence, (NewDelhi),OctoberDecember2009AirMarshalR.S.Bedi,Kargil
Controversy:AnIAFResponse, (NewDelhi),JanuaryMarch2010LieutenantGeneralHarwantSingh,IndianArmy(ret.),Kargil
Controversy:ArmyPinpointsIAFFailures, (NewDelhi),AprilJune2010andAirMarshalNarayanMenon,IAF(ret.),Kargil
Controversy:IAFontheGhostsofKargil, (NewDelhi),JulySeptember2010.
47Singh, ,VolumeIII:WorldAirPower,111,andKargilDailyProgressofOpSafedSagar,at
http://vayusena.tripod.com/kargilsummary1.html.
48Singh, ,VolumeIII:WorldAirPower,111.
49AirCommodoreRameshV.Phadke,IAF,AirOffensiveintheHighHimalayas, (NewDelhi),(December1999):1606.Notably,theIAF
assignedthatdesignatortoitsimpendingcounteroffensiveoverKargilwellbeforethecodenameforthejointserviceOperationVijaywascoined.
(CommentsonanearlierdraftbyretiredAirMarshalVinodPatney,IAF,August16,2011).
50Thepilot,FlightLieutenantKambampatiNachiketa,wasrepatriatedonJune3afterhavingbeenheldprisonerofwarforaboutaweek.
52CommentsonanearlierdraftbyAirMarshalVinodPatney,IAF(ret.),August16,2011.AirMarshalPatneylatercharacterizedSquadronLeaderAhujas
decisiontodivertfromhisassignedmissionandtojointhesearchforthedownedMiG27pilotasanactofbraverybeyondthecallofduty.(Patney,1999
WarinKargilandItsAftermath.)AhujawasposthumouslyawardedtheVirChakra,Indiasthirdhighestdecorationforgallantryunderfire.Hewasthesole
IAFmemberamongeightIndiancombatantsinallwhoearnedmedalsforgallantryduringtheKargilWar.
54AsreportedbytheIsraeliAirForcecommander,MajorGeneralBinyaminPeled,toSecretaryofStateHenryKissingerduringanafteractionbriefingonthe
warsresults.DeclassifiedWhiteHousememorandum,October22,1973.
55UntiltheKargilWarerupted,onlytheIAFsMiG23BNsandafewJaguarsandMiG27shadbeenprovisionedwithinfraredcountermeasuresagainstsuch
surfacetoairmissiles.Sincethen,theentireIAFfighterinventoryhasbeenfittedwithsuchimprovements.SeeRupakChattopadyay,TheIndianAirForce:
Flyingintothe21stCentury, (NewDelhi),(May2002):44.Incontrast,anyIAFhelicopterslikelytoventureintoharmswayhadlong
beenconfiguredwithflaredispensers.(EmailcommunicationtotheauthorbyretiredAirMarshalVinodPatney,IAF,August27,2011.)
56Subramaniam,KargilRevisited:AirOperationsinaHighAltitudeConflict,187.
57AirCommodoreKaiserTufail,PAF(ret.),Kargil1999:ThePAFsStory, (NewDelhi),Issue3(2009):98.
58Onthispoint,astheAOCinCofWesternAirCommandatthetimelaterrecalled,IthinkmyinsistencetomountCAPsacrossthe[commandsentire
areaofresponsibility]atdifferentheightsandtimestogivethemessagethatIwasreadyandanglingforanenlargedconflicthelped.Itwasakintothrowinga
glove,butitwasnotpickedup.(CommentsonanearlierdraftbyretiredAirMarshalVinodPatney,IAF,August16,2011.)
59Tipnis,OperationSafedSagar,13.Tipnisadmittedthathehadnotformallysoughtsuchapprovalauthorityfromtheprimeministerduringthepivotal
CabinetCommitteeonSecuritymeetingthedaybeforethecampaignstarted.However,hesaid,Iconsideredthelibertyanessentialelementforthe
successoftheaerialairdefensemeasures.Inviewofthe[primeministers]earliernodtothegroundforceshotpursuit,myconsciencewasnotunduly
burdened.
60GroupCaptainD.N.Ganesh,IAF,IndianAirForceinAction,inSingh,ed., ,183.
61EmailcommunicationtotheauthorbyAirMarshalVinodPatney,IAF(ret.),August27,2011.
621999KargilConflict,www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/kargil99.htm.
63In1971,IAFfightershadflownnightstrikemissionsagainstPAFairfieldssituatedinflatlowlands,butthoseattackspresentedafarlessdaunting
challengetomissionplannersandpilotsthanconductingnightcombatoperationsoverthehighlyvariegatedmountainterrainoftheHimalayas.(Comments
onanearlierdraftbyretiredAirMarshalVinodPatney,IAF,August16,2011.)
64ColonelM.Sabharwal,IndianArmy,JointOperationsinModernWarfare, (NewDelhi),(Spring2006):19.
66KargilDailyProgressofOpSafedSagar,athttp://vayusena.tripod.com/kargilsummary1.html.
67Gill,MilitaryOperationsintheKargilConflict,114.
68EmailcommunicationstotheauthorbyretiredAirMarshalVinodPatney,IAF,August27and29,2011.Seealsothehighlightsofabriefinggivenby
PatneyonJuly12,1999,asreportedinOp.SafedSagar:WesternAirCommandOperationsinKargil, (NewDelhi),Issue5
(1999).
69Phadke,AirOffensiveintheHighHimalayas,1608.
70AirChiefMarshalTipnispersonallyobservedthisprecedentsettingeventwhileflyingonthewingoftheleadaircraftintheaftcockpitofatwoseatMirage
2000TH.(Tipnis,OperationSafedSagar,16.)
72PrasunK.Sengupta,MountainWarfareandTriServiceOperations, (October1999):25.
73Ibid.,121.
74Ganesh,IndianAirForceinAction,184.
75CommentsonanearlierdraftbyretiredAirMarshalV.K.JimmyBhatia,IAF,August18,2011.Onthispoint,intheretrospectiveviewofastillservingIAF
leaderwhoheadedtheinitialintegrationoftheLiteningpodwiththeMirage2000HandJaguarandwhoflewmostoftheassociatedfighttestsorties,the
MirageswiththeLGBsshouldhavebeenusedfromDayOne,sincetheintegrationhadbeenessentiallycompletedanddeclaredfitforoperationalusethree
monthsbefore,inJanuary1999.Adulyconservativefinalcertificationofthepodsforactualcombatemployment,headded,mighthaverequiredasmuchas
aweektocompleteoncethestartofOperationSafedSagarwasclearlyimminent,butegohasslesandothersourcesofbureaucraticpushbackoccasioned
aneedlessandcostlydelayinthefirstuseoflaserguidedbombsuntilJune24.(Commentsonanearlierdraft,December4,2011.)
76Singh, ,VolumeIII:WorldAirPower,122,andBedi,Kargil:AnIAFPerspective,152.
77Bakshi,Kargil:DynamicsofaLimitedWarAgainstaNuclearBackdrop,45.
78Forawelldocumentedaccountofthevariousconflictingcasualtynumbersonbothsides,seeGill,MilitaryOperationsintheKargilConflict,122.
80Bedi,Kargil:AnIAFPerspective,151.
81Tufail,Kargil1999:ThePAFsStory,9798.
83
85JaswantSingh, (Bloomington,Ind.:UniversityofIndianaPress,2007),203.
86AsastillservingIAFfighterpilotlaterexplainedinthisregard,suchfactorshadneverbeencalculatedbyanymanufacturerforthistypeofaltitude,with
theresultthattheverydifferentattributesoftheatmosphereatthataltitudecauseweaponstogoofftheirmark.SeeGanesh,IndianAirForcein
Action,180.
87Acosta,HighAltitudeWarfare:TheKargilConflictandtheFuture,62.
89CommentsonanearlierdraftbyAirMarshalVinodPatney,IAF(ret.),August16,2011.
90Theeffectivenessofartillerywasalsohamperedattimesbystarkterrainfeaturesonthehighmountainbattlefieldthatdictatedinefficienttrajectoryangles
andoftenpreventedtheobservationofhits.
91OnthisstillcontentiousdebatingpointinsomeIndianArmyandIAFcircles,however,AirChiefMarshalTipnishimselfwasmagnanimoustoafaultin
concedingfreelysixyearslaterthatitwasthearmysleadershipinthisoperation,wewereonlyinsupport.(Tipnis,OperationSafedSagar,16.)
92SayanMajumdar,TheIAFsMMRCARequirement:TheMirageFactor, (NewDelhi),Issue5(2005):30.
93Tellis,Fair,andMedby, ,71.
95AirChiefMarshalFaliHomiMajor,IAF,NationalDefenceandAerospacePower, (NewDelhi),(Spring2009):3.
96IDoNotSeeChinatoBeaMajorConcerninMyAreaofResponsibility,interviewwithAirMarshalP.K.Barbora,IAF,AirOfficerCommandinginChief,
WesternAirCommand, (NewDelhi),(October2008):28.
97KargilReviewCommittee, ,22,105.
98Bakshi,Kargil:DynamicsofaLimitedWarAgainstaNuclearBackdrop,48,50.
99Acosta,HighAltitudeWarfare:TheKargilConflictandtheFuture,2.Closeairsupportiscommonlyunderstoodworldwidetoentailairactionbyfixed
androtarywingaircraftagainsthostiletargetsthatareincloseproximitytofriendlyforcesandthatrequiredetailedintegrationofeachairmissionwiththefire
andmovementofthoseforces.JointPublication102, (Washington,D.C.:U.S.
GovernmentPrintingOffice,April12,2001),90.
100Acosta,HighAltitudeWarfare:TheKargilConflictandtheFuture,58.101CommentsonanearlierdraftbyAirMarshalVinodPatney,IAF(ret.),August16,2011.
102Tufail,Kargil1999:ThePAFsStory,98.GPSisanabbreviationfortheAmericansatellitebasedGlobalPositioningSystem.
103EmailcommunicationtotheauthorbyAirMarshalVinodPatney,IAF(ret.),August22,2011.Thelowoperatingaltitudeof500feetabovetheterrainwas
permissibleatnightbecausethePakistaniintruderscouldnotvisuallyacquiretheIAFsaircraftfortargetingusingtheopticalsightsontheirshoulderfired
surfacetoairmissiles.Ofcourse,thisGPSaidedlevelbombingtechniquewaslimitedsignificantlybytheaccuracyofthetargetcoordinatesprovidedtothe
IAFspilots.AsAirMarshalPatneyrecalled,thearmywasonlyabletogiveusroughcoordinates,astheyhadnomeanstobeaccurategiventhesizeand
natureofthetargetsthatweredifficulttodiscernfromthegroundaswellasfromtheair.Henceairtogroundattackswereatbestagainstapproximations
oftargetpositions.Asanillustrationofthewisdomofthetechnique,onamissionatnight,welaunchedsixaircraftwithtwobombseachatintervalsofone
minuteagainstthesametarget.Thenextmorning,areconnaissancerunshowedthattherewere10cratersinthesnowinreallycloseproximity.
Unfortunately,thetargetcoordinateswerefaulty.Ibid.
106Sengupta,MountainWarfareandTriServiceOperations,26.
107TheaircomponentcommanderinsupportofOperationVijaylaterexpoundedfurtherontheseinstancesofIAFimprovisationunderduress:Difficultiesin
establishingtargetcoordinatesaccuratelyandthesmall,wellcamouflagednatureofthetargetspromptedoneofouryoungerpilotstocarryasmallvideo
camerawithhiminafighterandtofilmtheareaofinterestsothatanimmediatereconnaissancereportwasavailableandatanexpandedscale.Thisisonly
oneofmanyinstanceswhereinitiativewasusedandoutoftheboxthinkingwasresortedto.Otherexampleswerethesystemofarearadarcoverage[in
supportoftheIAFsCAPoperations]andtheuseoftheMiG25Rataloweraltitudetoimprovetheresolutionofitspictures.(Emailcommunicationtothe
authorbyAirMarshalVinodPatney,IAF[ret.],August22,2011.)Suchimproviseddevelopmentofsolutionstomajorproblemsunderthepressureof
immediateoperationalneed,moreoftenthannotbyexceptionallycleverandcreativejuniorofficers,isadistinctiveculturaltraitofprofessionalairmenthe
worldoverknowninIndianparlanceas ,sometimestranslatedlooselyasfrugalengineering.(CommentsonanearlierdraftbyretiredAirMarshalV.
K.JimmyBhatia,IAF,August18,2011.)
108Acosta,HighAltitudeWarfare:TheKargilConflictandtheFuture,60andBedi,PayingtoKeeptheHighGround,31.
111Singh, ,VolumeIII:WorldAirPower,125,reportedthattheIAFdeliveredatotalofninelaserguided
bombsagainstenemytargetsduringtheKargilwar,eightbyMirage2000HsandonebyaJaguar.Theaircommanderforthecampaign,however,distinctly
recallsthatonlytwowereexpendedintoto,bothagainstthetargetcomplexonTigerHill.Inhiswords,wecouldnotfindasuitabletargetformoresuch
attacks.Forthemorespreadoutinterdictiontargets,welldirected1,000pound[unguided]bombsweretheweaponofchoice.(Emailcommunicationtothe
authorbyAirMarshalVinodPatney,IAF[ret.],August2,2012.)Eitherway,whatmattersmosthereisnotthetotalcount,butthefactthattheuseoflaser
guidedbombsduringtheKargilcampaignwasasignificantandmilitarilyeffectivecombatfirstfortheIAF.
114HarinderBaweja, (NewDelhi:BooksToday,2000),68.
115Ganesh,IndianAirForceinAction,18081.Byblindlyadheringtojustsuchadoggedtendency,theSovietAirForcelostmorethanahundredofits
groundattackfightersand300attackhelicopterstomujahideeninfraredsurfacetoairmissilesandantiaircraftgunsduringitstenyearcombatinvolvement
oversimilarhostileterraininAfghanistan.(GeneralMohammadYahyaNawroz,AfganistanArmy[ret.]andLieutenantColonelLesterW.Grau,USA[ret.],
TheSovietWarinAfghanistan:HistoryandHarbingerofFutureWar?FortLeavenworth,Kans.:ForeignMilitaryStudiesOffice,1995.
116Acosta,HighAltitudeWarfare:TheKargilConflictandtheFuture,43.Onthispoint,inallfairnesstotheIAF,theaircomponentcommanderfor
OperationVijaylaterremarkedthatthereisnowaythatanyonecangiveanaccurateaccountoftheresultsofCASmissions,sincethetargetsweresmall
andthearmygenerallyreferredtoageneralareaandnottoexactandaccuratecoordinates.Thetargetsweresosmallthatapostattackreconnaissance
passwouldnothelp.(EmailcommunicationtotheauthorbyretiredAirMarshalVinodPatney,IAF,August29,2011.)
117
118Italsomightbenotedthatinthecaseoflaserguidedbombemployment,ahigherreleasealtitudeisactuallypreferabletacticallybecauseitgivesthe
weaponmoretimetoacquireitstargetandtogainenergywhileguidingtoitslaserspot.
119Acosta,HighAltitudeWarfare:TheKargilConflictandtheFuture,34.Onthisstilldisputatiouspointamongmanylandcombatantswhohavestudiedthe
KargilWar,itmaywellbethatgiventhenearprohibitiveenvironmentalandoperationalcircumstancesthatprevailedinthehighmountainwarzone,closeair
support,strictlydefined,wasabustatKargil,asaU.S.MarineCorpsofficerlateralleged.(LieutenantColonelScottW.Pierce,USMC,MountainandCold
WeatherWarfighting:CriticalCapabilityforthe21stCentury,FortLeavenworth,Kans.:SchoolofAdvancedMilitaryStudies,UnitedStatesArmyCommand
andGeneralStaffCollege,2008,35.)Bynomeans,however,couldthesamebesaidofthebroaderindirectfiresupportandinterdictionthattheIAF
providedto15CorpsduringOperationVijay.MostIndianArmycommentatorshavereadilyacknowledgedthelattertohavebeenbotheffectiveanddeeply
appreciated,especiallyduringthecampaignslasttwoweeks.
121CommentsonanearlierdraftbyMajorGeneralG.D.Bakshi,IndianArmy(ret.),August24,2011.
126ItshouldbeaddedinpassingherethatseniorofficersfromallthreeIndianserviceshavesinceopinedthattheVajpayeegovernmentsinsistencethat
IndianforcesnotcrosstheLoCunderanycircumstancesduringtheKargilWarconstitutedamajorlostopportunityinthecountryssystemicallyconflicted
relationshipwithPakistan.(CommentsonanearlierdraftbyretiredAirMarshalVinodPatney,IAF[ret.],August16,2011.)ForexampleaformerIndianArmy
vicechiefwrotein2009:TherewasnogreatcaptainintheIndianmilitarywhocouldurgethepoliticalexecutivetolethimseizetheopportunityofferedby
Pakistantotakethebullbythehorns.Instead,thearmychiefacquiescedtotroopsbeingcondemnedtofrontalattacks.OurtimidresponseatKargillaid
thefoundationforfutureterroristattacks.(Harwant,KargilControversy:MismanagementofHigherDefence.)Morerecently,aformerIndianNavychief
alsocharacterizedKargilasthelastbattleofWorldWarIIfoughtwithmassivefrontalattacksandartillerybarrages,addingthathadtherebeensomecool
headed,joint,andstrategicthinkingwhentheKargilintrusionsweredetected,wecouldhavewidenedtheconflict,keptthePaksengagedonland,and
blockadedthembysea.Alreadyindireeconomicstraits,theywouldhavecometotheirkneessoon.Ofcourse,thiswouldhaverequiredpoliticalwill.(Email
communicationtotheauthorbyformerchiefofNavalStaffAdmiralArunPrakash,IndianNavy[ret.],August18,2011.)
127Gill,MilitaryOperationsintheKargilConflict,107108.
128SeeKargilReviewCommittee, .
129Ibid.,20.
130Phadke,AirOffensiveintheHighHimalayas,1605.
131Ibid.,1609.
132Malik,TheKargilWar,3,12.
133RajeshM.Basrur,TheLessonsofKargilasLearnedbyIndia,inLavoy,ed., ,315.
134ManuPubby,KargilRevisited:VigilWithoutEnd, (NewDelhi),(JulyAugust2009):29.
135GroupCaptainR.G.Burli,IAF,OffensiveAirPowerintheHighMountains, (NewDelhi),(Spring2007):9192.
137Tufail,Kargil1999:ThePAFsStory,9799.
138DoctrineoftheIndianAirForce(NewDelhi:IndianAirForce,AirHeadquarters,AirWarStrategyCell,IAP2000,October6,1995),67.
139Thisexperience,itmightbenoted,wasaremarkableprecursortoU.S.CentralCommandssimilarlyflawedOperationAnacondainAfghanistaninMarch
2002,inwhichCENTCOMslandcomponentalsosoughtinitiallytogoitaloneandtheaircomponentlikewiseintervenedinbarelysufficienttimetohelp
underwriteasatisfactoryoutcomeintheend.ForacomparisonofOperationsVijayandAnacondathatdrawsoutthemanysimilaritiesbetweenthetwo,see
Subramaniam,KargilRevisited:AirOperationsinaHighAltitudeConflict,19194.AfullaccountofthelatterexperiencemaybefoundinBenjaminS.
Lambeth, (SantaMonica,Calif.:RANDCorporation,MG1661CENTAF,
2005),163231.
140Subramaniam,KargilRevisited:AirOperationsinaHighAltitudeEnvironment,187.
142Seewww.ndtv.com/news/india/wrongedkargilherogetshisdue28060.php.
143AirMarshalN.Menon,IAF(ret.),RememberKargil,SPs (NewDelhi),(June2009):40.Tocitejustoneillustrationinpointhere,anotable
interoperabilityproblemhighlightedbytheKargilexperiencewasthattheIndianArmyandtheIAFuseddifferentcommunicationssystems,withonlyarmy
unitsatthetimeequippedwithdigitalradios.AnilR.Pustam,MountainAirSupportDemandsSpecialEquipmentandTraining, ,U.S.Naval
Institute,September2000,7071.
144Menon,RememberKargil,40.
145WithregardtothemaritimedimensionofIndiasresponse,inadeterminedanticipatorymovetohelpdeterPakistanfromescalatingthefightingintoa
largerwaronceIndiawasfullyengagedagainsttheNLIintruders,theIndianNavywentonfullalertasearlyasMay20andreadieditselftoblockade
Pakistansports,principallyKarachi,shouldanassessedneedforsuchactionarise.Towardthatend,surfacecombatantsconfiguredforconductingmissile
firingandantisubmarineandelectronicwarfareweredeployedintheNorthArabianSea.IntheensuingOperationTalwar(Hindiforsword),Indiaseastern
andwesternfleetsjoinedassetsandblockedtheArabianSearoutestoPakistan.Later,PakistansformerprimeministerNawazSharifdisclosedthat
Pakistanhadbeenleftwithjustsixdaysoffueltosustaincombatoperationshadafullscalewarbrokenout.Forafullertreatmentofthiseffectiveexercisein
lateralescalation,seeViceAdmiralG.M.Hiranandi,IndianNavy(ret.), (NewDelhi:LancerPublishers,
2009),6371.
146Ibid.,11.
147Singh,Kashmir,CovertWars,andAirPower,83.
148GeneralV.P.Malik,IndianArmy(ret.),TheKargilWar:SomeReflections, (NewDelhi),(Summer2009):2.
149Bakshi,Kargil:DynamicsofaLimitedWaragainstaNuclearBackdrop,45.OfthisshortsightedmilitaryleadershipcomportmentgoingintoPakistans
Kargilimbroglio,thePAFsdirectorofoperationsduringtheconflictrecalledlaterthatinanefforttokeepitsplansecret,thearmytrio[ofplanners]ledby
ArmyChiefofStaffGeneralPervezMusharraftooknooneintoconfidenceandpresidedoveraclosedloopthoughtprocessthatengenderedastringof
oversightsandfailures,includingafailuretograspthewidermilitaryanddiplomaticramificationsofalimitedtacticaloperationthathadthepotentialof
creatingstrategiceffects,failuretocorrectlyvisualizetheresponseofapowerfulenemytowhatwas,ineffect,amajorblowinadisputedsector,andfailure
toappreciatetheinabilityofthe[Pakistani]armyofficerstoevaluatethecapabilitiesandlimitationsofanairforce.(Tufail,Kargil1999:ThePAFsStory,
99.)
150Qadir,AnAnalysisoftheKargilConflict1999,27.
151GroupCaptainT.D.Joseph,IAF, (NewDelhi:KWPublishers,2008),155.
152QuotedinSingh,Kashmir,CovertWars,andAirPower,8687,emphasisadded.
153AirCommodoreArjunSubramaniam,IAF,TheStrategicRoleofAirPower:AnIndianPerspectiveonHowWeNeedtoThink,Train,andFightinthe
ComingYears, (Fall2008):64.
154Singh,Kashmir,CovertWars,andAirPower,80.
155Ibid.,81.
156ThesepointsaredevelopedinPatney,1999WarinKargilandItsAftermath.
157AirMarshalVinodPatney,IAF(ret.),AirDominance:ConceptandPractice, (NewDelhi),(Summer2009):133,144.
158Basrur,TheLessonsofKargilasLearnedbyIndia,319.
159ForthemostincisivereflectionstodateonthemanyaspectsoftheKargilexperienceasviewedfromthisperspective,seethechaptersbyTimothyHoyt,
PeterLavoy,andRobertJervisinLavoy,ed., ,14470,171206,and37797,respectively.
ABOUTTHEAUTHOR
BenjaminS.LambethisaseniorfellowattheCenterforStrategicandBudgetaryAssessments,apositionheassumedin2011afterathirtysevenyear
careerattheRANDCorporation.Alongtimespecialistininternationalsecurityaffairsandairwarfare,heholdsadoctorateinpoliticalsciencefromHarvard
UniversityandservedpreviouslyintheOfficeofNationalEstimatesattheCentralIntelligenceAgency.Alsoacivilratedpilot,hehasflownorflowninmore
than40differentcombataircrafttypeswiththeU.S.AirForce,Navy,MarineCorps,andeightforeignairforces.In1989,hebecamethefirstAmericancitizen
toflytheSovietMiG29fighterandthefirstWesternerinvitedtoflyacombataircraftofanytypeinsideSovietairspacesincetheendofWorldWarII.In2002,
hewaselectedanHonoraryMemberoftheOrderofDaedalians,thenationalfraternityofU.S.militarypilots.Heistheauthorof
(SmithsonianInstitutionPress,1999), (CornellUniversityPress,2000), (RAND,
2001), (RAND,2003)
(RAND,2005), (RAND,2011),and
(NavalInstitutePress,forthcoming).
Endofdocument
About the South Asia Program

TheCarnegieSouthAsiaPrograminformspolicydebatesrelatingtotheregionssecurity,economy,andpoliticaldevelopment.Fromthewarin
AfghanistantoPakistansinternaldynamicstoU.S.engagementwithIndia,theProgramsrenownedteamofexpertsofferindepthanalysisderived
fromtheiruniqueaccesstothepeopleandplacesdefiningSouthAsiasmostcriticalchallenges.
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2/10/2017 Airpowerat18,000:TheIndianAirForceintheKargilWarCarnegieEndowmentforInternationalPeace

Enlisting the IAFs Involvement

Initial Air Operations

A Successful Endgame for India

Diculties Aecting the Provision of Close air support

Assessing the IAFs Performance

National Security Lessons

Kargil and Todays Threats

The Broader Strategic Outlook

About the South Asia Program

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