Bridge Risk Assessment

RISK ASSESSMENT OF EXISTING BRIDGE
STRUCTURES
A dissertation submitted to the University of Cambridge in partial fulfilment of the requirements

for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
by
Daniel Imhof
Kings College December 2004

To my grandfather Jodok Burgener,
Chief Engineer of the Grande Dixence dam in Switzerland

Risk assessment of existing bridge structures I
DECLARATION
The work described in this dissertation was carried out in the Department of Engineering at the
University of Cambridge between October 2001 and December 2004. The author declares that, except
for commonly understood and accepted ideas, or where specific reference is made to the work of others,
the content of this dissertation is his own work and includes nothing that is the outcome of work done in
collaboration. The dissertation has not been submitted previously, in part or in whole, to any university
or institution for any degree, diploma, or other qualification. The length of this dissertation is 209 pages
and it contains 73 figures and approximately 75,000 words including appendices and references.
D Imhof
December 2004
II Risk assessment of existing bridge structures
Risk assessment of existing bridge structures III
SUMMARY
Bridges provide critical links in the transport network, but are vulnerable to damage by human actions,
natural hazards and aggressive environmental conditions. To avoid disruption of the network, the
adequate performance of the bridges has to be guaranteed by undertaking strengthening, repair or
replacement when necessary. To ensure the most efficient use of limited economic resources, it is
important that such actions are only undertaken on those bridges which actually need intervention. A
bridge-specific analysis has to be undertaken to judge the performance of a bridge with regard to the risk
of collapse. Current practice is based on safety considerations only and relies upon deterministic
evaluation of a single estimate of the factor of safety, defined as the ratio of the structural resistance of
the bridge and the load effects induced. Although some existing assessment codes make allowance for
other important parameters such as ductility, redundancy, or consequences of failure, to the authors
knowledge there exists no method that combines all these parameters.
In this dissertation a new comprehensive methodology has been developed to evaluate the risk of
structural collapse of existing concrete bridges, where risk is defined as the product of the consequences
and probability of failure. In the method proposed here, the key parameters influencing the risk of bridge
collapse are identified and quantified. The five key risk indicators chosen are: (1) current safety,
(2) future safety, (3) warning level (redundancy), (4) condition evaluation and (5) importance
(consequences of failure). Standardising curves have been developed to transform the original indicator
values of each parameter to a common scale, so that these different indicators can directly be compared
quantitatively. A novel graphic representation of the results, referred to as a risk spiderweb, is used to
visually highlight the relative significance of each parameter and allows detection of the critical
indicators. Finally a single performance measure combining the risk indicators is defined as well as a
minimum acceptance criterion. By considering all risk indicators at the same time, the failure to meet
acceptance thresholds by one or more of the risk indicators can in some circumstances be compensated
for by higher values of the other indicators. This criterion helps to decide whether the performance of
the bridge is adequate or whether intervention is necessary.
IV Risk assessment of existing bridge structures
Risk assessment of existing bridge structures V
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Over the past few years I have received support and encouragement, both professionally and personally,
from many different people. I am sure to forget to mention some people by name in the list that follows,
so I begin by thanking them first.
The persons responsible for my presence in the United Kingdom are Professor Manfred A. Hirt, director
of ICOM at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Lausanne and Dr Simon F. Bailey, now partner
at Andrews Associate in Croydon (UK). During my time as a research assistant in Lausanne they
convinced me that undertaking a thesis would be a challenge and enrichment of my professional career. I
would like to thank them for opening the door to this British adventure and the continued contact.
I would like to thank Dr Campbell R Middleton, my supervisor, for providing me the opportunity to
work in an excellent research environment, for the freedom and liberty to pursue my own doctoral
research and the support given to me throughout. I would also like to thank Professor Andrew C Palmer,
the advisor of this thesis, for his guidance and the many broad ranging and interesting discussions,
especially those concerning the risk acceptance aspects.
I am pleased to acknowledge the Swiss Academy of Engineering, Kings College Cambridge, Mott
MacDonald and the Werner Steiger Stiftung for providing financial support; without their help this
research would never have been possible.
Many thanks to the people who helped in the preparation of the thesis document: Ann Frost, Ainslie
White, Graeme Walker and Paul Fidler. My time at Cambridge has been very memorable. I have been
fortunate to make acquaintance and work with many different people. In particular, I would like to thank
John Ochsendorf (now assistant professor at MIT), Frank Jensen, Jeffrey Yee, Dr Andrew Lennon and
Francesca Lea of the structures group and Marcelo Silva, Michelle Schaffer and Georg Klein of Kings
College for their friendship. Whether during formal halls, tea breaks or Friday nights down the pub,
there has never been a shortage of interesting conversation and good laughs.
I have also had fruitful discussions with many people during their visits to Cambridge, my attendance at
conferences and visits to other centres of research. In particular, I would like to thank Professor Rdiger
Rackwitz, who I visited at TU Munich in order to discuss his work on the life quality index, Professor
Robin Spence from the Cambridge University Centre for Risk in the Built Environment, who helped me
to model the number of fatalities involved in a bridge collapse, Patrick Steiner of Swiss Re, who
introduced me to the risk management approach of reinsurance companies, Dr John Menzies, who
shared his extensive knowledge of bridge failures with me, and Professor F. Michael Bartlett of the
University of Western Ontario for numerous discussion on the updating of material strengths.
Finally, my sincerest thanks to my family (Klaus, Madeleine, Roland, Laurence, Josiane and Chantal)
for the unconditional support and encouragement. And to Milena, thank you for everything we have
done, seen, experienced and celebrated together over the past few years, as well as for your support and
understanding.
VI Risk assessment of existing bridge structures
TABLE OF CONTENTS
DECLARATION ...................................................................................................................................... I
SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................................... III
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .......................................................................................................................V
TABLE OF CONTENTS ........................................................................................................................ VI
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................. 1
1.1 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION ........................................................................................................ 1
1.2 AIM AND SCOPE ...................................................................................................................................... 3
1.3 RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY ..................................................................................................... 4
1.4 ORGANISATION ....................................................................................................................................... 6
CHAPTER 2. BRIDGE ASSESSMENT...................................................................................................... 9

2.1 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................................... 9
2.2 WHY BRIDGES FALL DOWN ................................................................................................................. 10
2.2.1 General considerations.................................................................................................................. 10
2.2.2 Bridge collapse database............................................................................................................... 13
2.3 STRUCTURAL CODES USED FOR ASSESSMENT .................................................................................. 20
2.3.1 Design codes .................................................................................................................................. 20
2.3.2 Assessment codes ........................................................................................................................... 24
2.3.3 Discussion...................................................................................................................................... 26
2.4 CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................................................................... 27
CHAPTER 3. BASIC VARIABLES .......................................................................................................... 29

3.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................ 29
3.2 UNCERTAINTY AND VARIATIONS ............................................................................................................. 30
3.2.1 Sources of uncertainty.................................................................................................................... 30
3.3 RESISTANCE PROPERTIES ......................................................................................................................... 32
3.3.1 Generic data................................................................................................................................... 32
3.3.2 In-situ testing: Estimation of lower bounds for strength values using statistics ............................ 34
3.3.3 In-situ testing: Code methods for the estimation of in-situ material strengths for assessment ...... 39
3.3.4 Updating existing strength information: Bayesian Characteristic Value (BCV) ........................... 40
3.3.5 Comparison of methods for estimating in-situ strength ................................................................. 43
3.3.6 Updating partial factors................................................................................................................. 45
3.3.7 Deterioration of the resistance....................................................................................................... 46
3.4 HAZARDS AND LOADING ......................................................................................................................... 50
3.4.1 Hazard inventory ........................................................................................................................... 51
3.4.2 Bridge-specific live loading ........................................................................................................... 51
3.4.3 Flooding hazard............................................................................................................................. 52
3.5 CONCLUSIONS ......................................................................................................................................... 52
Risk assessment of existing bridge structures VII
CHAPTER 4. SAFETY ............................................................................................................................... 55

4.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................ 55
4.2 MEASURES TO QUANTIFY SAFETY ............................................................................................................ 56
4.2.1 Factor of safety .............................................................................................................................. 56
4.2.2 Reliability index ............................................................................................................................. 57
4.3 STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS .......................................................................................................................... 62
4.3.1 Failure criterion............................................................................................................................. 63
4.3.2 Analysis methods............................................................................................................................ 64
4.3.3 Application example: Validation of structural analysis methods with beam-and-slab bridges ..... 69
4.4 SENSITIVITY OF ASSESSED SAFETY TO STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS, LOADING AND MATERIAL DATA ............ 74
4.5 RISK INDICATOR: FACTOR OF SAFETY...................................................................................................... 74
4.6 CONCLUSIONS ......................................................................................................................................... 75
CHAPTER 5. WARNING LEVEL ............................................................................................................ 77

5.1 INTRODUCTION ........................................................................................................................................ 77
5.2 DUCTILITY............................................................................................................................................... 78
5.2.1 Ductility check for load redistribution of beams ................................................................................ 78
5.2.2 Ductility check for plastic analysis of slabs ....................................................................................... 90
5.3 REDUNDANCY ......................................................................................................................................... 94
5.3.1 Introduction........................................................................................................................................ 94
5.3.2 Redundancy quantification................................................................................................................. 94
5.4 RISK INDICATOR: WARNING MARGIN ...................................................................................................... 98
5.5 CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................................................................... 100
CHAPTER 6. CONDITION EVALUATION ......................................................................................... 103

6.1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................................... 103
6.2 INSPECTIONS.......................................................................................................................................... 104
6.2.1 Types of inspection....................................................................................................................... 106
6.2.2 Quality of inspection .................................................................................................................... 106
6.2.3 Inspection techniques................................................................................................................... 107
6.3 CONDITION RATING ............................................................................................................................... 109
6.3.1 Review of existing condition rating systems................................................................................. 109
6.4 RISK INDICATOR: CONDITION RATING ................................................................................................... 113
6.4.1 Element condition rating.............................................................................................................. 113
6.4.2 Overall condition rating............................................................................................................... 114
6.5 CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................................................................... 115
CHAPTER 7. CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE .................................................................................. 117

7.1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................................... 117
7.2 (RE)CONSTRUCTION COSTS .................................................................................................................... 118
7.3 USER COSTS ........................................................................................................................................... 120
7.4 LIFE SAVING COSTS ............................................................................................................................... 122
7.4.1 Number of potential fatalities ...................................................................................................... 122
7.4.2 Life-saving cost per person (value of human life)........................................................................ 124
7.4.3 Cost of injuries............................................................................................................................. 127
7.4.4 Total life-saving costs .................................................................................................................. 128
7.5 RISK INDICATOR: IMPORTANCE OF THE BRIDGE ..................................................................................... 129
VIII Risk assessment of existing bridge structures
7.5.1 Examples...................................................................................................................................... 130

7.6 CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................................................................... 132
CHAPTER 8. RISK................................................................................................................................... 135

8.1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................................... 135
8.2 RISK PERCEPTION .................................................................................................................................. 136
8.2.1 Risk aversion................................................................................................................................ 138
8.3 ACCEPTABLE RISK ................................................................................................................................. 139
8.3.1 Risk comparison........................................................................................................................... 140
8.3.2 Calibration of target failure probabilities to existing codes ........................................................ 142
8.3.3 Cost-benefit analysis (Economic optimisation)............................................................................ 144
8.3.4 Life quality method (Socio-economic optimisation)..................................................................... 148
8.3.5 Extending and comparing CBA and LQM: Application examples............................................... 150
8.4 CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................................................................... 158
CHAPTER 9. PRACTICAL RISK ASSESSMENT OF EXISTING BRIDGE STRUCTURES........ 161

9.1 INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................................................... 161
9.2 OVERALL RISK PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT ......................................................................................... 162
9.2.1 Existing approaches for evaluating performance ........................................................................ 162
9.2.2 Proposed evaluation system......................................................................................................... 164
9.3 MULTI-CRITERIA ANALYSIS ................................................................................................................... 166
9.3.1 Risk spiderweb ............................................................................................................................. 166
9.3.2 Standardising curves.................................................................................................................... 167
9.3.3 Acceptable performance criteria.................................................................................................. 178
9.3.4 Modular structure of proposed methodology............................................................................... 180
9.3.5 Validity check of the proposed methodology................................................................................ 181
9.3.6 Sensitivity analysis ....................................................................................................................... 188
9.4 APPLICATION EXAMPLES OF REAL BRIDGE RISK ASSESSMENT ............................................................... 190
9.5 ALTERNATIVE ACCEPTANCE CRITERION ................................................................................................ 193
9.6 CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................................................................... 194
CHAPTER 10. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS................................................................................ 197

10.1 AIM OF THESIS ....................................................................................................................................... 197
10.2 RISK INDICATOR APPROACH .................................................................................................................. 198
10.2.1 Current safety and future safety................................................................................................... 198
10.2.2 Warning level before collapse...................................................................................................... 198
10.2.3 Condition ..................................................................................................................................... 199
10.2.4 Importance of the bridge.............................................................................................................. 200
10.3 PRACTICAL RISK ASSESSMENT METHOD FOR EXISTING BRIDGE-STRUCTURES ........................................ 200
10.4 CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................................................ 201
10.4.1 Bridge collapse database ............................................................................................................. 201
10.4.2 Determination of material properties .......................................................................................... 202
10.4.3 Structural analysis methods ......................................................................................................... 202
10.4.4 Consequences of failure ............................................................................................................... 203
10.4.5 Target failure probabilities .......................................................................................................... 203
10.4.6 Practical risk assessment methodology........................................................................................ 203
10.4.7 Implications of the proposed risk assessment methodology......................................................... 204
10.5 FURTHER WORK ..................................................................................................................................... 205
Risk assessment of existing bridge structures IX
REFERENCES..................................................................................................................................................... 207
APPENDIX A. BRIDGE COLLAPSE DATABASE ................................................................................. A1
APPENDIX B. EXAMPLE BRIDGES ........................................................................................................ B1
B.1 LARLING BRIDGE .....................................................................................................................................B1

B.2 SANDHOLE BRIDGE ..................................................................................................................................B2
B.3 ALLT CHONOGHLAIS BRIDGE...................................................................................................................B2
B.4 WINTERBOURNE BRIDGE .........................................................................................................................B3
CURRICULUM VITAE .....................................................................................................................................CV1

X Risk assessment of existing bridge structures
DEFINITIONS
Assessment: The set of activities performed in order to verify the adequacy of an existing
structure for future use.
Bridge: A structure including supports erected over a depression or an obstruction, such as

water, road- or railway, and having a track or carriageway for carrying traffic or
other moving loads.
Corrosion: Electrochemical mechanism of degradation of steel in concrete.
Ductility: Ability to deform significantly beyond the elastic limit while maintaining an
ultimate resistance at or above the design value.
Failure: Collapse of a significant part of the structure or the complete structure, both of
which render the structure incapable of remaining in service.
Maintenance: The upkeep of property of equipment. In bridge engineering maintenance includes

periodic renewal of the structure (pavement, bearings, joints, waterproofing,..), but
also repair/strengthening needed to ensure the good performance of the bridge.
Plastic hinge: A section in a structural member at which the inelastic rotations are assumed to be
concentrated. A plastic hinge is assumed to occur at a critical section under the
plastic moment where inelastic behaviour occurs at the section and adjacent to it, so
that locally a change of curvature occurs due to inelastic behaviour in the concrete
and/or the steel. Its influence on the deformation of the structure is equivalent to the
rotation of a hinge.
Redundancy: The capability of a bridge superstructure to continue to carry loads after the damage
or the failure of one of its members.
Risk: The likelihood of sustaining a loss from a hazard event over a specified future time
period combined with its severity. It is defined in terms of expected probability and
frequency, exposure, and consequences, such as death and injury, financial cost of
repair and rebuilding, and loss of use.
Safety: From the structural engineering point of view, safety means that the resistance of
the bridge is greater than the induced load effects.
Scour: The undermining of a foundation through the action of moving water.
Strength: Structural resistance of the bridge.
Structural Analysis: Determination of the action effects over the whole or part of a structure, with the
purpose of carrying out a verification at the ultimate and/or serviceability limit
state.
Risk assessment of existing bridge structures XI
NOTATION
Latin upper case
A(t) : Steel bar cross-sectional area at time t

A : Area
AC : Accident costs
AADT : Annual average daily traffic
BCV : Bayesian characteristic value
C : Consequences of failure, costs
Ccr : Critical chloride concentration (corrosion threshold)
COV : Coefficient of variation of the population
COVx : Coefficient of variation of the sample
CR : Overall condition rating
CRi : Condition rating of element i
D : Failure costs
E : Youngs modulus
EDYL : Energy dissipated in the yield-lines
FX(x) : Cumulative density function (CDF) for the variate x
FOS : Factor of safety
FOS0 : Factor of safety at present time
FOSna : Factor of safety at the time of the next assessment
Gk : Dead load effect
GCAF : Gross cost of averting a fatality
I : Second moment of area, importance ratio
ICAF : Implied costs of averting a fatality
J : Torsional constant
L : Life quality index
L() : Likelihood function
Ld : Additional length of the detour route
M : Moment, maintenance cost
N : Number of people exposed
NF : Number of potential fatalities
~N(,): Normally distributed with mean and standard deviation
P(A) : Probability of A occurring
P(B|A) : Probability of B occurring, assuming that A has occurred
PF : Performance factor
PM : Performance measure
Qi : Load effect
Qk : Live load effect
R : Resistance
Rn : Nominal resistance
RSF : Residual strength factor
S : Load effects
SLS : Service limit state
TTC : Travel time costs
ULS : Ultimate limit state
V : Average velocity of vehicles
XII Risk assessment of existing bridge structures
VOC : Vehicle operating costs

W : Section modulus
WCS : Worst credible strength
WDQ : Work done by the loads
WM : Warning margin
X : Random variable
Latin lower case
anom : Nominal geometric values

c : Cover
d : Depth of reinforcement
e : Life expectancy
fctm : Mean concrete tensile strength
fcu : Concrete (cube) compressive strength
fi : Strength value obtained from test i
fy : Yield-strength of the steel reinforcement
ft : Tensile strength of the steel reinforcement
fX(x) : Probability density function (PDF) for the variate X
fX,Y(x,y) : Joint probability density function of X and Y
fX(x|xn) : Probability density function conditional on xn
f '() : Prior distribution of
f "() : Posterior distribution of
g : Gross domestic product per person
h : Slab thickness
k : A persons probability of being killed in case of failure, reduction factor of total failure
cost, element live load factor
l : Span length
mx : Mean of the sample
n : Number of test results
np : Average vehicle occupancy
p : Probability
p : Safety relevant parameter vector
r : Corrosion rate
1/r : Curvature
t : Time
ti : Time to corrosion initiation
tn-1, : Coefficient of the Student-distribution for n tests and a confidence level (1-)
trsl : Remaining service lifetime
w : Uniformly distributed load, proportion of the time spent by an individual in economic
activities
wi : Weight of element i
x : Neutral axis depth
xn : Sample of size n
yp : Depth of bridge foundation
ys : Scouring depth
z : Value of the normal variate for a confidence level (1-)
Risk assessment of existing bridge structures XIII
Greek upper case
( ) : Standard normal distribution function
Greek lower case
1 : Confidence level
i : Sensitivity factor
: Reliability index
: Partial safety factor, interest rate
: Yearly discount rate
M : Partial safety factor for material properties
: Degree of redistribution
: Strain
i : Load modifier
: Distribution parameter, rotation
: System live load factor
: Mean value of the population
low : Lower bound of the mean value
: Bias, Poissons ratio
: Standard deviation of the population
: Resistance factor
s : System factor
Latin upper case subscripts
G : Dead load
LS : Life-saving
Q : Live load
Latin lower case subscripts
avail : Available
c : Concrete, cost
const : (Re)construction
d : Design
d : Daily
equ : Equivalent
f : Failure
ft : Failure time
h : Hogging
k : Characteristic
m : Mean
nom : Nominal
opt : Optimal
pl : Plastic
XIV Risk assessment of existing bridge structures
r : Cracking
red : Reduced
ref : Reference
req : Required
s : Steel, sagging, safety
t : Target
tot : Total
ts : Tension-stiffening
u : Ultimate
user : User costs
wf : Without partial safety factors
y : Yield, elastic
Other superscripts
: Standardised risk indicator value

1. Introduction 1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION
Bridges form an essential part of the infrastructure of a nation, facilitating its social and economic
development by allowing the free movement of people and goods between remote locations. As such,
they are exposed to natural hazards, such as earthquakes and flooding, which may damage or destroy
them. Bridges are endangered not only by the forces of nature, but also by modern methods of
transportation (e.g. train/ship/truck impact or overloading). To prevent bridge collapses such as those
shown in Figure 1.1, a rational and comprehensive method for assessing the risk of structural collapse is
required.
(a) Railbridge (b) Showa Bridge Bridge at Webber Falls (Arkansas River)
Austria Japan Oklahoma, USA
(2002 flooding) (1964 earthquake) (2002 ship impact)
Figure 1.1 Examples of bridge collapses
In an environment of ever-growing traffic demands and an ageing bridge stock, it is important to have a
tool to decide which bridges need strengthening and which ones can be left without intervention. As
indication, in the United States more than 27% of all highway bridges were deemed structurally
deficient or functionally obsolete in 2000 [FHWA, 2002]. The cost of repair and replacement of these
bridges over the next 20 years is estimated to be US$94 billion per year at 2002 prices. As repair and
maintenance resources are always limited, they have to be allocated in a rational way.
2 Risk assessment of existing bridge structures
A new practical risk assessment method, which would help to rank the necessity for repair,
strengthening and replacement more efficiently than the methods currently employed, would thus be of
significant benefit to society. Current bridge assessment is typically based on safety alone and involves
checking that the strength of each member is greater than the effect of the applied forces. Traditional
bridge safety is quantified in terms of a deterministic factor of safety, which is defined as the ratio of the
available resistance and the calculated load effects, and is used to decide whether a structure is safe. This
approach is lacking from several important aspects:
First element failure may not mean collapse. Bridge failure is assumed to take place when the
load effects, calculated with linear elastic analysis methods, reach the resistance capacity at one
single point within the structure. Linear elastic analyses are lower bound methods and for
redundant structures, which most bridges are, the theoretical first element failure load and
location of the critical stress may well bear little relation to the actual stress state. After the
resistance has been reached in one element the bridge may be able to redistribute the loads in the
structure because of the nonlinear behaviour of most materials. Collapse of the whole or part of
the bridge might therefore occur at loads considerably higher than the loads that initiate first-
element failure.
No allowance is made for warning level. For many bridges, the load magnitude provoking first
element failure is different from the load leading to complete collapse, and so the bridge will
show warning signs before the ultimate failure occurs. Because of this inherent warning level,
the consequences of failure may be avoided or at least reduced.
Provision for condition is vague. In the UK, the occurrence of deterioration has been
increasing even among bridges under 20 years old [Vassie, 1984]. Most structural codes give no
accurate guidelines on how to include the overall condition of the bridge in the safety
assessment, but bridges in very poor condition are often the first to be strengthened, even if their
safety has been shown to be sufficient. Such interventions are often based on serviceability and
external appearance criteria in order to maintain public confidence. It is therefore important to
include this criterion in the assessment.
No provision is made for future deterioration. Analysis is made for present day scenarios,
with no allowance for future degradation, but in the time between assessments, there may be
critically important deterioration of the bridge resulting in a weaker resistance, which may
potentially result in an unacceptable risk of collapse and therefore should be anticipated in
advance by being predicted at each assessment.
No provision is made for the importance of the bridge. The magnitude of the consequences
of failure (number of people at risk, economic consequences) is ignored. Although engineers are
1. Introduction 3
aware of this, only few of the structural codes include the consequences of failure or make direct
distinction between important bridges and rarely used bridges in remote areas.
In assessment, a bridge that does not pass the safety requirements may still be considered to be
performing satisfactorily, if other parameters such as the inherent warning level or the consequences of
failure are considered. In this way, costly intervention might be avoided. This emphasises that safety is a
critical parameter in the assessment of existing structures, however it is also important to consider other
criteria when judging the performance of a bridge with regard to the collapse risk. As these criteria are
rarely considered in todays assessments, a novel comprehensive evaluation method is developed in this
study.
1.2 AIM AND SCOPE
The aim of this thesis is to propose a novel, rational and practical bridge assessment methodology that
includes provisions not only for safety, but also for other factors not considered in traditional bridge
assessment such as condition, warning level and consequences of failure. In this approach, bridge failure
is defined as system failure of the bridge or a substantial part of it, and not element failure at a single
location. Although this new methodology concentrates on the ultimate limit state, it implicitly takes into
account serviceability problems when the structural condition is evaluated.
Using this new method, the assessor will be able to decide whether the performance of the bridge is
adequate with regard to the risk of collapse. In addition, he could employ it to show the effectiveness of
a risk-reducing action. For example, this method could be used to demonstrate that an initially
inadequate performance of a bridge might be made adequate by closing one traffic lane.
In some countries, computer-based bridge management systems (BMS) allow the systematic assessment
of a large number of bridges. These systems are mainly based on condition evaluation and cost
optimisation, with the aim of ranking priorities for maintenance of bridges. In contrast to bridge
management systems, the method presented in this thesis is intended for use in individual bridge
assessment, taking into account as many site-specific characteristics as possible. Furthermore it is not
based on condition alone and also considers hazards that might not have manifested themselves so far:
for example, the new methodology considers the possibility of an exceptional flooding situation,
whereas it would be ignored in a BMS because such a problem would not be detected during a condition
evaluation.
The general risk assessment methodology developed in this thesis is applicable to all types of bridges.
However, this PhD focuses on short to medium span (< 50 m) reinforced concrete bridges which make
up the highest percentage of motorway and trunk road bridges in the UK and most other developed
countries. Bridges made of other materials and long-span bridges could equally be assessed with the
same methodology. In these cases, some of the safety-related aspects, such as ductility and redundancy,
and cost-related aspects would have to be modified accordingly.
1.3 RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY
Rather than concentrating on safety only, the assessment method proposed here uses risk as its
benchmark. Risk is defined as the product of the probability of failure, pf, and the consequences of
failure, C. The actual failure probability of a bridge is difficult to determine as most structures are
unique and statistically significant historical failure data is not available. Whereas in other industries
design development involves cycles of extensive product testing and feedback, in structural engineering
computation supplants testing because most projects are one-off large-scale structures that could not
realistically be tested first. The uncertainties involved in the calculation process can subsequently be
large and the real failure probability will probably never be known.
Instead of calculating the product pf C, which can be complicated and uncertain, this method involves
the calculation of five indicators that have a significant influence on pf and/or C, and hence on the risk.
The five risk indicators proposed are illustrated in Figure 1.2 and are briefly explained below.
Figure 1.2 Risk indicators for risk assessment
1. Current safety is quantified as the factor of safety for first element failure calculated with the
structural resistance at present time.
2. Future safety is also quantified as the factor of safety for first element failure, but takes into
account the possible degradation of the resistance during the time period up to when the next
assessment is undertaken. This risk indicator is included in the risk assessment methodology to
warrant that the risk assessment remains valid until the next one is carried out.
1. Introduction 5
3. Warning level reflects the capacity of a bridge to continue carrying loads after one element of the
structure has failed; it is quantified using the difference in the applied loads that provoke first
element and system failure respectively.
4. Condition evaluation uses the inspection results to give more detailed information about the overall
state of the structure; it is quantified using predefined condition ratings.
5. Importance of the bridge within the road network is measured in terms of the consequences of
failure.
These five indicators have been chosen with the aim to detect the criteria for which one specific bridge
is deficient, isolated from the other criteria. By separating the current safety and the future safety, the
influence of the assumed degradation model is demonstrated. In this way, the predicted degradation can
be revised through special in-situ inspection of the structure, if necessary. Similarly, element and system
failure are considered in separate risk indicators (safety and warning level) to make the assessment
simpler. The evaluation of the factor of safety corresponding to first element failure is straightforward,
but more advanced structural analysis is needed for the calculation of the warning level implying system
failure. Because the proposed method is intended to be practical, the more complicated analysis,
required to determine the warning level, should only be undertaken if necessary. The modular format of
the new method makes it possible to omit this advanced calculation, if the performance of the bridge can
be shown to be acceptable through calculating the safety level alone.
Measures to quantify the magnitude of the individual risk indicators have been studied and the most
practical have been chosen, e.g. factor of safety as the benchmark to quantify safety. As each risk
indicator influences either the probability of failure or the consequences or both, they can be combined,
but since the different risk indicators are measured in different units and different scales, it is difficult to
compare them. To make a comparison possible, it is proposed to use a standard scale on which all the
risk indicators have the same importance. To transform the original risk indicator values to standardised
values, so-called standardising curves are used. The standardising curves are chosen so that they respect
conditions on the worst, what is just acceptable and the best values of each risk indicator.
Finally, all standardised risk indicators are summarised in a graphical representation in the form of a
radial risk spiderweb; this facilitates detection of the indicators that govern the risk of collapse. The
degree of uncertainty in each of these may then be improved by further more refined investigations
which might allow updating of the resistance or refining of the load modelling. Additionally, a
performance measure combining all standardised risk indicators is compared with the defined acceptable
value, to decide whether the collapse risk of the bridge is acceptable.
It is intended that the risk assessment method proposed here is undertaken after each principal
inspection, because it recognises that the deterioration of the structure cannot be predicted for longer
periods. This is in contrast with traditional bridge assessments, which are carried out for an assumed
remaining service lifetime.
1.4 ORGANISATION
Figure 1.3 shows the relationships between the different topics and their groupings into chapters of this
thesis. The organisation of this thesis is slightly different from many Civil Engineering doctoral works
as it does not include a literature review at the beginning, but contains references to previous works in
most of the chapters. This format has been chosen because the chapters treat separate issues, which are
only combined in chapter 9. Each chapter could itself be a topic for a PhD dissertation, but this thesis
work focuses on the confluence of all these risk-influencing properties. The separate components for the
overall risk-assessment are first presented individually, followed by a description of a means for
combining them, and finally by a method for decision-taking.
Chapter 2 explains why assessments have to be undertaken. It begins with a study of the causes of
bridge collapse and then introduces traditional present-day methods of assessment of existing bridges.
Chapter 3 describes the basic variables that influence safety. To assess the structural safety as
accurately as possible, it is important to include resistance properties which reflect the actual situation of
the bridge. Unfortunately, the strength and loading characteristics will vary within any one bridge and
also between bridges. The chapter explains how the two parameters, strength and loading, can be
determined and updated to include site-specific information.
Chapters 4 to 7 describe the five risk indicators adopted for the practical risk assessment methodology.
Chapter 4 compares different measures of safety to decide on a measure of the safety level of a bridge.
Two separate risk indicators are calculated: one for the present-day safety and one for the future safety,
which takes into account the possible degradation of the materials until the next assessment. The chapter
also compares different levels of structural analysis and evaluates the sensitivity of the assessed safety
level to material data, load model and structural analysis.
Chapter 5 suggests methods to calculate the loads that lead to system failure. The ability of a bridge to
redistribute applied loads means that it is capable of continuing to carry load after one of its members
has failed. A redundant bridge has additional reserves of strength, and the failure of one element does
not necessarily result in the failure of the complete system. The structural analysis methods used to
calculate system failure loads rely on sufficient ductility, for which acceptance criteria have been
developed. The end of chapter 5 proposes a novel approach to include redundancy in the risk
assessment.
1. Introduction 7
Chapter 6 suggests criteria for classifying the bridge condition observed during inspection. The
structural safety is influenced by the construction and use of a structure. A natural mechanism for
confirming the adequate safety of structures is the feedback of information from inspection and
monitoring of performance in service.
Chapter 7 evaluates the consequences of a bridge collapse. Different types of consequence, such as
fatalities or costs, can occur and they all need to be measured using a common unit, namely costs. The
total costs of failure are expressed as the sum of the (re)construction costs, the user costs and the life-
saving costs.
Chapter 8 explains the general definition of risk. Two new methods are presented which allow
calculation of the acceptable (target) probabilities of failure. They are based on an optimisation of (a) the
cost-benefit during the lifetime of a bridge and (b) the quality of human life. These methods are very
useful for research purposes, but they are too complicated to be used in practice and do not implicitly
include provision for factors such as the warning level.
Chapter 9 proposes a more practical assessment methodology, which involves the five risk indicators
presented in earlier chapters. The risk indicators are related to each other because they all influence the
risk of bridge collapse; this fact is used to transform them to the same standard scale. On the standard
scale, each risk indicator has the same weight and can be directly compared to the others. Presented on a
radial spiderweb graph, the critical indicators can immediately be detected and a performance measure,
based on the combined risk indicators, helps to judge the collapse risk of a bridge as acceptable or not.
The modular structure of the proposed methodology allows for progressive levels of sophistication: an
engineer could, for example, start the assessment without undertaking any in-situ testing; if safety is
seen to be a critical risk indicator on the spiderweb, he can then undertake site-specific testing to
improve his risk assessment.
Chapter 10 concludes by evaluating the overall achievements, drawing conclusions and investigating
the scope for further work.
Appendix A contains a database of 347 recorded bridge collapses; this is believed to be the most
comprehensive bridge collapse database in the world, and has been used in chapter 2 to derive trends of
the causes, types and stages of bridge collapse.
Appendix B contains a description of the bridges that have been used in this thesis as examples for the
evaluation of the different risk indicators and the overall risk performance. These are typical bridges
from the UK road network which have been selected to include short and medium span bridges, different
levels of traffic and different disruption consequences.
Figure 1.3 Organisation of the thesis

2. Bridge Assessment 9
CHAPTER 2. BRIDGE ASSESSMENT
Beautiful Railway Bridge of the Silvry Tay!

Alas, I am very sorry to say
That ninety lives have been taken away
On the last Sabbath day of 1879,
Which will be remembered for a very long time.
William McGonagall (c.1825-1902), The Tay Bridge Disaster
2.1 INTRODUCTION
Structural assessments are usually undertaken whenever the use of a bridge has changed (e.g. heavier
vehicles, new lane added) or the bridge has been damaged (e.g. scouring, earthquake, bridge bashing).
Apart from these irregular assessments, some countries assess their bridges on a more regular basis to
efficiently allocate monetary resources for maintenance.
One of the most important requirements in any bridge assessment is the evaluation of the hazards to
which a bridge might be exposed. In this chapter, the major causes of bridge collapse are studied. For
this purpose a database has been developed, listing over 347 incidences of bridge collapse.
Once the possible causes for bridge collapse are known, the engineer has to evaluate the risk of bridge
collapse due to these causes. The assessment process is different from the design process. In design the
engineer is planning a new bridge and the properties of the materials that will finally be in place are not
precisely known. Increasing strength by utilising more materials can significantly increase the safety
without necessarily resulting in a substantially higher capital cost. By contrast, in assessment the
engineer is evaluating an existing bridge. He can obtain quite accurate material data by extracting
samples from the bridge, but adding materials cannot cheaply increase the assessed safety.
Although structural codes for bridge assessment exist that do, to a certain extent at least, take into
account factors not considered in design, such as redundancy, ductility and importance of the bridge,
this chapter will show that there is a clear need for a more comprehensive risk assessment methodology
that rationally includes provision for all the key factors which influence the risk of structural collapse.
2.2 WHY BRIDGES FALL DOWN
2.2.1 General considerations
In order to understand why bridges are falling down, they have to be investigated on an individual basis.
Unfortunately, most bridge failures are not reported in the literature because of the perceived need to
protect professionals from legal liability and perhaps a reluctance to broadcast failings and/or mistakes.
When a failure is finally admitted, its importance is often played down so as not to erode confidence in
the profession as a whole. Some failure analyses have nevertheless been undertaken by different
researchers: Hadipriono analysed 57 and Bailey et al. 138 individual bridge failures
[Hadipriono, 1985][Bailey, 2002]. Matousek & Schneider reported 800 civil engineering failures
including buildings, bridges and tunnels [Matousek, 1976].
The references cited above have been studied in detail and are used in the following sections to examine
three fundamental questions relating to the nature of bridge failure: (a) what types of failure occur
(serviceability or ultimate failure of elements/systems), (b) when do most failures occur and, most
importantly, (c) what are the main causes of bridge failure.
In addition to the failure analyses by other researchers mentioned above, 347 bridge collapses have been
analysed as a part of this PhD thesis. The outcome of this study is presented in section 2.2.2.
2.2.1.1 What types of failure occur?
Bridge failure can be defined in different ways:
Failure of an individual element of the structure

Failure of temporary elements during construction (e.g. scaffolding, falsework)
Partial or complete collapse of the structure
Poor serviceability and poor in-service behaviour of the bridge manifested through cracks and
excessive deformation
Caution should be taken when comparing the bridge failures in the work by the researchers cited
above, as they do not always deal with the same type of failure. For example, of the 800 reported failure
cases considered by Matousek et al., 384 were due to failure of the structure itself; the remaining failures
involved the scaffolding, excavation and other construction equipment. If the type of structural failure is
analysed, the following figure is obtained from Matouseks data, with reference to the total number of
fatalities, the total insured loss (cost) and the total number of failures:
Failure type
Loss of equilibrium
ULS Complete collapse
Partial collapse
Other failures
Excessive cracks Number of failures
Settlement, deformation Insured loss

SLS
Wrong dimensions
Fatalities
Other unsafisfactory states
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Percentage of failure type [%]
Figure 2.1 Type of failure for the 384 structural failures analysed by Matousek & Schneider
(adapted from [Matousek, 1976])
The first four types of failure of Figure 2.1 relate to the ultimate limit state (ULS), whereas the other
four are related to the serviceability limit state (SLS). The figure shows that the ultimate limit state
failures, especially failures resulting in the complete collapse of the structure, are far more common than
the serviceability failures. However, the conclusion that the ULS is the primary limit state might be
wrong, as small failures are often neglected and not included in the insurance statistics, which were the
main sources of Matouseks study.
This thesis is primarily concerned with analysing the risk of collapse of bridges, i.e. the ultimate limit
state. However, serviceability issues such as excessive cracking also influence the risk of collapse, as
serviceability failures can be the first sign of an imminent collapse. If such warning signs are detected,
severe consequences of failure can be prevented and therefore the risk of collapse reduced. In this thesis
serviceability issues are thus considered in the condition evaluation risk indicator, which is introduced in
section 6.4.
2.2.1.2 When do failures occur?
Structural failures may occur during construction, during service life or when they are refurbished or
demolished.
Figure 2.2 shows at what time the failures analysed by Matousek et al. occurred.
Time of failure
During construction
0 - 2 years of service
3 -5 years of service
> 5 years of service
During service, time unknown
During refurbishment
0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Percentage of structures failing [%]
Figure 2.2 Time of failure (adapted from [Matousek, 1976])
It is interesting to note that around half of Matouseks failures occurred during the construction stage as
compared to the in-service period. One could infer from Matouseks data that most designers consider
the in-service performance of a structure as the most important period and do not pay enough attention
to the construction stage: design of scaffolding, accurate propping and bracing, construction sequence
and monitoring. The percentage of construction failures might vary when specific types of structures,
such as bridges, are considered. Hadipriono found that 10% of the errors responsible for bridge failure
were made during design, 21% during construction and 69% during utilisation [Hadipriono, 1985]. From
the above, it can be concluded that many bridge failures could be prevented if more attention was paid to
the construction stage. Once the construction period is over, the probability of failure is thus
significantly reduced.
2.2.1.3 What are the main causes of failure?
In technical terms, structural collapse occurs when the loads exceed the resistance of the structural
element or system. Bailey et al. [Bailey, 2002] found that the three most common causes for bridge
collapse in order of prevalence were impact of vehicles and ships 22%, errors made during design 19%
and scour 14%. However, despite what might have been suspected, overloading was not a primary cause
of bridge failure (Figure 2.3). In another study, a selection of major bridge failures in the United States
and Europe was studied, and the results show that two thirds of the failures were caused by vehicle, ship
or train impact (unreferenced report cited in [Menzies, 1996]) supporting the conclusions of Bailey et al.
Earthquake (1%)
Instability (1%)
Corrosion (2%)
Wind (2%)
No information (6%) Impact (22%)
Fatigue (9%)
Overloading (11%)
Design errors (19%)
Dynamic effects (12%)

Scour (14%)
Figure 2.3 Causes of bridge collapse (adapted from [Bailey, 2002])
2.2.2 Bridge collapse database
Since this thesis focuses on partial or complete structural collapse, failure is defined as collapse of a
significant part of the structure or the complete structure, both of which render the structure incapable of
remaining in service. Although some researchers have undertaken surveys of samples of bridge failures
in the past, to the knowledge of the author there is no comprehensive database currently available in the
literature covering most of the important recorded bridge collapses in history from around the world.
Such a database could provide knowledge about the major causes of bridge collapse, their geographical
location and their time of occurrence. Once the common traits of the collapses have been detected, a risk
assessment strategy can be developed for preventing, or at least reducing the likelihood of, such failures.
As part of the present research project a database reporting bridge collapses has been developed; the
Imhof database lists 347 bridge collapses and is included in Appendix A. It is based on an extensive
search of the literature and the Internet. It does not pretend to be complete, but is believed to be the most
comprehensive in the world, and because of its size, helps to derive general trends. It starts with the
collapse of the Rialto Bridge in Venice in 1444 when (too many) people celebrated the wedding of the
Duke of Ferrara on the bridge, and ends with some bridge collapses in 2004. Road, rail and foot bridges
have been considered, though the majority of the cases are road bridges (Figure 2.4a).
Since the risk assessment methodology of this thesis is concerned with the bridge assessment of
traditional types of bridges, special types of bridges such as pontoon, floating, bascule, draw and rope
bridge failures have been discarded, as there are substantial differences in the causes of failure of these
bridges. Most of the causes of bridge collapse of these special bridges are not relevant for traditional
types of bridges. Temporary bridges have also not been included, nor were bridges that collapsed during
demolition, as the methodology is developed for the assessment of existing in-service bridges.
Subsequently all the bridges recorded in the Imhof database either collapsed during construction or in
service (Figure 2.4b). On reviewing the data in this large database, it is found that a high proportion
(32%) of collapses occur during construction, reinforcing the conclusions of others presented earlier
[Matousek, 1976][Hadipriono, 1985][Bailey, 2002].
Foot (6%)
In service (68%)
Rail (28%) Construction (32%)
Road (66%)
(a) Type of failed bridges (b) Stage at failure
Figure 2.4 Imhof Database
The bridge failures have been collected from all over the world. However, the majority of the failures
come from Europe and North America (Figure 2.5). This might be explained in part by the higher
number of bridges and higher vehicle volumes than on the other continents, but it is certainly also
because of the lack of information and limited reporting that emanates from less developed nations and
dictatorial or communist regimes. As a result, it was difficult to find out more about the prevalence of
bridge collapses in Africa, Asia and South America.
Africa (2%) Australia (2%)

Australia (2%) Japan (2%)
Italy (3%)
South America (4%) Europe (47%) India (3%)
France (3%) United States (30%)
Asia (12%) Canada (3%)
Switzerland (3%)
Austria (4%)
United Kingdom (8%)
North America (34%)

Germany (16%)
Others (24%)
(a) by continent (b) by country
Figure 2.5 Imhof Database: Geographical origin of recorded bridge failures

To compare the quality of the structural codes in place in different countries, it would be interesting to
compare the bridge failure rates, i.e. the ratio of the number of collapsed bridges and the total number of
bridges, of each country. However, it would be difficult to determine these failure rates as the total
number of bridges in a country varies over the years and not all bridge failures are recorded in the
database.
Table 2.1 summarises the general classification of the causes of collapse adopted in the Imhof database.
After the table, some examples from the database are given to illustrate each failure cause category.
Table 2.1 Classification of failure causes
Failure cause Nature Example
Limited knowledge Possible failure mode unrecognised Unknown problems of fatigue, brittle
failure
Unknown phenomena
Unknown buckling problems
Natural hazard Extreme conditions Wind
More extreme and frequent hazard Storm
occurrence than assumed
Flooding
Design error Omission of load or load combination Calculation errors
(human error during Wrong assumption in ground condition Error in software
design stage)
Inadequate design of scaffolding Unfavourable geotechnical properties not
detected
Overloading Accidental overloading Illegal overweight
Loading increased with time Changes to legal limit
Change of use without structural Special heavy-weight transports
assessment
Impact Impact of ships Loss of ship control
Impact of vehicles Loss of vehicle control
Impact of trains Bridge bashing overheight vehicles
Human error Workman use wrong material Change of original construction sequence
(non-design) Workman change original design Stiffeners welded to wrong section
Poor workmanship Scaffolding dismantled too early
Inadequate maintenance action
Vandalism Fire Deliberately set fire
Explosion Terrorist acts
Deterioration Corrosion of steel reinforcing bars Loss of resistance of steel bars or hangers
Corrosion of prestressing cables Loss of bond in RC structures
Concrete deterioration Alkali-silica reaction, Freeze-thaw action
Fatigue
Limited knowledge leads to collapse because some structural phenomena are not fully understood and
problems are not recognised as such by the engineers. One of the major unknown problems arose with
the introduction of new construction steels with higher yield stresses. Some of them had a brittle
behaviour (Hardenbergerstrasse Bridge, 1936) and some of the steel became brittle under very cold
temperatures (Sully-sur-Loire suspension bridge, 1985). Other such collapses occurred when engineers
made no allowance for the interaction between bridge deck superstructure and the loading from humans
(marching army on Angers suspension bridge, 1850, 200 deaths), trains (Kiaochow bridge, 1923) or
wind (Tacoma Narrows suspension bridge, 1940). Other more recently identified limits in structural
behaviour were demonstrated by failures due to local buckling of steel plates (Cledau Bridge, Milford
Haven, 1970), fatigue (Glenn Loch Bridge, 1912) and creep or shrinkage (Lichtendorf Bridge, 1968).
Another interesting case of failure due to limited knowledge was the partial collapse of Buckman Bridge
in Florida in 1970. Here, voided piers were deliberately filled with seawater during construction.
Anaerobic bacteria present in the seawater produced methane gas, which led to an expansion of the piers
and subsequent collapse.
Natural hazards can result in more extreme loading than was initially assumed when the bridge was
designed. At design, an estimate of a reasonable probability of occurrence of a certain extreme hazard
magnitude is made; for example, a flood with a return period of 100 years might be considered.
Unfortunately, this magnitude may be exceeded as the 1000-year flood can occur tomorrow. There have
been many failures due to flooding (bridges in Germany and Austria, 2002), hurricanes (Menai Strait
suspension bridge, 1839), storm (Schoharie Bridge, 1987), winds and gales (Tay Bridge, 1879,
90 deaths), and erosion (Braz Bridge, 1995). The waters of the river can also cause scouring of the piers
(Traun Bridge, 1982) and, as a consequence, settlement of the foundations (Wassen, 1987).
Furthermore, water carrying debris (British Columbia Bridge, 1981) and ice (Niagara Falls Bridge,
1938) can destroy piers and abutments. The earthquakes in Japan (Nishihomiya, 1995), Chile (Valdivia
River Bridge, 1960), California (San Francisco Oakland Bay Bridge, 1989), Peru (Piura Bridge, 1998)
and Turkey (Trans European Motorway Bridge, 1999) have shown engineers the power of nature. Less
common are bridge collapses caused by fire (Turkey Creek Bridge, 2002) and high temperatures acting
on the structure (Vorland Bridge, 1972).
Design errors include errors of omission such as insufficient stiffeners (Bedford Bridge, 1896). Often
some important actions such as uplifting wind (Kaslaski Bridge, 1970), earth pressure (Leer
Bridge, 1960) and shear (Aschaffenburg, 1988) have not been considered by the designer; these are
errors due to omission or inadequate experience. Design assumptions sometimes do not correspond to
reality and result in an unsafe structure. When the groundwater level is higher than expected, piles can
be designed too optimistically (Stargard bridge, 1894). When bridges are constructed using the
incremental launch method downhill, the friction angle can be determined too imprudently, resulting in
the uncontrolled sliding away of the bridge (Valengin Bridge, 1973). Often the scaffolding for the
construction is inadequately designed. Probably due to time and cost pressures for temporary works, a
number of bridges have collapsed under the weight of fresh concrete because of weak scaffolding
(Cologne Wahn Airport Bridge, 1995) or failure of lifting equipment (Frankenthal Bridge, 1940).
Insufficient bracing (Ohio Falls, 1927) and cable anchorage failure (Cheju Island suspension
bridge, 1981) have also resulted in collapses. Finally, calculation mistakes may also be responsible for a
collapse as in the case of the prestressed bridge between Rio de Janeiro and Niteroi (1970).
Overloading occurs when too many people (Naga City Bridge, 1972, 145 deaths), too many vehicles
(Pagosa Springs Bridge, 1937) or excessively overloaded vehicles (Brajamanbari Bridge, 1982) use the
bridge. It can also be the case when the legal load limit is increased from the one considered at the time
of design (Uschgorod Bridge, 1877), without any assessment and/or strengthening to accommodate
increased loading.
Impact occurs when vehicles or ships collide with the structure. Ship impact may destroy the underside
of the deck (Second Narrows Bridge, 1927), the piers (Webber Falls Bridge, 2002) or the abutments
(Alm Sound Bridge, 1980). Derailed trains crashing into the bridge substructure can potentially result
in a very high number of fatalities (Eschede disaster, 1998, 100 deaths). The height of a truck on the
road below the bridge might be bigger than the available headroom (Whiteson Bridge, 1937).
Human error manifests itself through human actions caused by negligence or ignorance. A distinction
is made between design and human error. Design errors are the responsibility of the design team during
the design stage before construction starts, whereas human errors are made by other people at a later
stage. Distinguishing between design and human error enables an estimate to be made of the number of
collapses which could have been prevented with better design. During construction, workers sometimes
deviate from the original design by using poor quality materials (Mozyrow Bridge, 1927) or incorrect
material quality grades (Czerny Bridge, 1985). Often they replace the original design concept by in-situ
solutions such as changes in the welding details (Sungsu Bridge, 1994) or changes in the construction
sequence (Clifton Bridge, 1995). Incorrectly fixed anchorages (Dawson Creek suspension bridge, 1957)
or the removal of load-bearing elements during construction (Gtikhausen Bridge, 1913) may also result
in catastrophic consequences. Inexcusable actions, such as leaving maintenance equipment on railway
tracks, can have disastrous consequences (Wuppertal Schwebebahn Bridge, 1999). To minimise the
likelihood of human errors, monitoring or quality control procedures should be instigated. Such
monitoring can, however, only be effective if the necessary response is implemented when warning
signs appear; failure to respond to warnings may be considered another form of human error (Daman
Bridge, 2003). During construction, the planned work should be explained in detail to all persons
involved and closely supervised to prevent collapses caused by communication failures (Grogol
Bridge, 1996).
Vandalism is the action of people deliberately damaging a bridge. In 1881, people deliberately burned
down the Morelos Bridge in Mexico causing 214 fatalities. Nowadays, damaging bridges might be used
as a means of war (Mostar Bridge, 1993) or terrorism (IRA bombing of Hammersmith Bridge, London,
1996).
Deterioration of the bridge can reduce the load-bearing capacity of a bridge. Rotten timber piers (Zell
am See Bridge, 1974), rotten timber structure (Vorarlberg Bridge, 1976) and corrosion (Ynys-y-Gwas
Bridge, 1985) are some examples of failures caused by deterioration. Collapses induced by
deterioration could in theory be prevented with adequate inspection and maintenance programmes.
In the bridge collapse database, all the bridge failures have been deemed to result from a single primary
cause, even if there were multiple contributing factors. The author is well aware that several factors may
have led to the collapse of some of the bridges listed however, to derive trends, it has been necessary to
focus on one primary failure cause. Figure 2.6 summarises the entire bridge collapse database in terms of
collapse mode and primary cause of collapse. It can be seen that almost two thirds of all failures result in
total collapse of the structures. Partial failures often occur in multiple span bridges or redundant bridges.
Natural hazard is the most important failure cause if all recorded failures are considered. Of all the
natural hazards, the most frequent was flooding/scour (61%) followed by earthquake (14%), fire or
explosion (6%) and storm (5%).
Complete (61%) Vandalism (0.6%)

Deterioration (2.3%) Natural hazard (29.3%)
Partial (39%) Limited knowledge (9.6%)
Human error (9.9%)
Overloading (9.9%)
Impact (17.7%)
Design error (20.9%)
(a) Collapse mode (b) Causes of collapse
Figure 2.6 Extent and cause of bridge failure for all bridges considered
Although it is important to argue the case for greater care during construction, this research project
focuses on the causes of collapse of bridges that have been in service for some time. In Table 2.2,
construction failures have been omitted and only in-service failures have been analysed. Comparing
Figure 2.6b and Table 2.2, it is observed that design error as a cause of collapse is much less common
once the bridge is in service. This reduction is contrasted by an increase of the percentage of natural
hazard and impact induced failures. Human error is also a much less common failure cause for existing
bridges. It is thus concluded that for existing bridges, design and human error play a secondary role to
natural hazard and impact.
Table 2.2 Causes of bridge collapse for in-service bridges by date of failure [%]
Collapse cause All bridges Before 1900 1900-1940 1941-1990 1991-2004

(237 bridges) (35 bridges) (27 bridges) (117 bridges) (58 bridges)
Limited 9 14 30 7 1
knowledge
Natural hazard 40 31 37 37 50
Design error 5 9 0 4 5
Overloading 14 26 4 14 14
Impact 25 17 29 30 19
Human error 3 0 0 2 7
Vandalism 1 3 0 0 2
Deterioration 3 0 0 6 2
TOTAL 100 100 100 100 100
By comparing the in-service failure causes for different time periods, one notices that natural hazard has
always been the most significant cause of bridge collapse. Before 1900, overloading was responsible for
the collapse of 26% of recorded failures, although nowadays it plays a less important role (14% 1991
2004). Limited knowledge led to 30% of the recorded collapses between 1900 and 1940, when new
materials such as high-strength but brittle steel, with imprecisely known behaviour, were first
introduced. In recent times, this cause has become less important, but it should be kept in mind that there
may be new construction techniques, such as prestressed, cable-stayed and CFRP bridges, which have
not been in service long enough for potentially dangerous, and as yet unknown, phenomena to be
exhibited. Deterioration is deemed to be of greater importance with the ageing of concrete structures
and corroding steel. In the last ten years, there have also been some bridge failures due to human error.
The data shows that over the last 64 years, in order of importance, natural hazard, impact and
overloading are the primary causes of in-service bridge collapse together accounting for 82% of
recorded failures. Flooding/scour is the most frequent natural hazard (66% of all natural hazards
between 1940 and 2004) and should therefore be at least considered in bridge assessment. Some of the
hazards can be extreme, but it is not economically feasible to design bridges to withstand all hazard
levels. In assessing the risk of collapse of existing bridges it is therefore very important to state the
hazards taken into account (see hazard inventory in section 3.4.1).
2.3 STRUCTURAL CODES USED FOR ASSESSMENT
In many nations around the world, extensive bridge assessment programmes have been undertaken, or
are in progress. Generally, bridges are first assessed using the current design codes and no further
analysis is required if the structure is shown to be adequate to these criteria. If this first assessment
identifies some inadequacies, codes specifically developed for assessment can be used; these take into
account the characteristics of one particular bridge and remove therefore some of the conservativeness of
the more generic design codes. In the following, the major structural codes used for assessment are
critically reviewed.
2.3.1 Design codes
2.3.1.1 Traditional design codes
The ultimate goal of structural design codes is to provide a simple, safe and economically efficient basis
for the design of ordinary structures under normal loading and environmental conditions. In current
European practice, design values for resistances R are calculated using characteristic values of the
material properties Xk divided by a partial safety factor M, typically greater than 1, and design values for
load effects are introduced as characteristic values multiplied by a partial safety factor, typically greater
than 1. As an example, Eurocode 0 uses the following limit state equation to determine structural
adequacy [EC 0, 2001]:
Equation 2.1
Where G: Partial safety factor for the dead load

Q: Partial safety factor for the live load
Gk: Dead load effect
Qk: Live load effect
anom: Nominal geometric values
The traditional design codes must include general rules applicable to all types and various configurations
and geometries of bridges. Because these codes can be used for the design of many types of new
bridges, the load and resistance calculations are simplified and the extra cost due to the generalisation is
marginal when compared with the total cost of a new bridge. In the case of the assessment of an existing
bridge, however, an acceptable safety level can often not be achieved using this general design approach
because of the inbuilt level of conservativeness in design methods needed to make provision for the
greater uncertainties involved.
To remove some of this conservativeness the design codes of some countries make allowance for
individual bridge characteristics such as redundancy or consequences of failure. The most advanced of
these design codes are briefly reviewed in the following sections.
2.3.1.2 AASHTO (United States)
The American Load-Resistance Factor Design (LRFD) Bridge Design Specifications are less
conservative than a traditional design code because they make some allowance for ductility, redundancy
and the operational importance [AASHTO, 1998].
Required LRFD design condition for each limit state:
Equation 2.2
Where i : Load modifier

i : Load factor
Qi : Load effect
: Resistance factor
Rn : Nominal resistance
The load modifier i, which is a new addition not included in most other design codes, is obtained by
combining the three factors relating to ductility, D, redundancy, R, and operational importance, I
(Table 2.3):
Equation 2.3
The AASHTO code states that the ductility capacity may either be established by testing or with
analytical models, but the classification as ductile or non-ductile is left up to the designer. The same is
also true for the classification of the elements as redundant or non-redundant. The code only states that
main elements whose failure is expected to cause the collapse of the bridge are designated as failure-
critical and the associated structural system as non-redundant. Also, the interpretation of the i values
given is vague, and little information is given on how they were derived.
Table 2.3 Terms for the load modifier i [AASHTO, 1998]
Ductility D Redundancy R Operational importance I
Nonductile components 1.05 Nonredundant 1.05 Important bridges 1.05

and connections members
Conventional design 1.00 Conventional 1.00 Typical bridges 1.00
redundancy level
Components and 0.95 Exceptional 0.95 Relatively less 0.95
connections with ductility- redundancy level important bridges
enhancing measures
2.3.1.3 JCSS Model Code
In 1971 the Liaison Committee which co-ordinates the activities of six international associations in civil
engineering, composed of CEB, CIB, fib, IABSE and RILEM, created a Joint Committee on Structural
Safety, JCSS, with the aim of improving the general knowledge in structural safety. JCSS has recently
developed a full probabilistic model code [JCSS, 2001]. This code is intended as the operational part of
national codes that allow for probabilistic modelling of actions and materials. Unlike deterministic
design codes, which take into account the uncertainties of the material strength and the loading by
applying conservative partial safety factors, the JCSS code uses probabilistic distributions to quantify
the uncertainties of each variable. Instead of a deterministic assessment of the resistance and the load
effects, the so-called reliability index is used to quantify safety (see section 4.2.2). The calculated is
then compared to a given minimum acceptable value of the reliability index, the so-called target
reliability index t.
The proposed target reliability values are in part the result of a calibration process that should lead to the
same structural dimensions as the present Eurocodes [Vrouwenvelder, 2002]. The targets are claimed to
be compatible with observed failure rates and with outcomes of cost-benefit analyses, but because the
target derivation [Rackwitz, 2000] seems to be just a mathematical formulation, the author doubts
whether the actual causes of observed failures (see section 2.2) are also included in the reliability
analysis. The JCSS target values depend on the relative consequences of failure and on the relative cost
of safety measures, i.e. cost of possible intervention to increase safety (Table 2.4).
In Table 2.4, as the relative cost of providing additional safety increases, the target reliability level
decreases. The consequence classes are quantified by the ratio of the failure costs and the costs of
construction.
Table 2.4 Target reliability indices t for a one-year reference period and ultimate limit state related
to the structural system [JCSS, 2001]
Relative cost of Consequence classes

safety measure Minor Moderate Large
Large 3.1 3.3 3.7

Normal 3.7 4.2 4.4
Small 4.2 4.4 4.7
Using codified target reliability levels may be inappropriate, as the calculated reliability of the structure
under consideration is sensitive to the assumed failure criterion and to the number and selection of basic
variables. Having a single target reliability level that could cover all failure criteria seems to be over-
ambitious; the JCSS code should state more clearly what failure criterion has been used to determine the
target reliability indices.
The second part of the JCSS Model Code presents standardised load models. Probabilistic models for all
live loads are described to guarantee consistency in the distributions used by assessing engineers to
calculate the reliability index. In the past, researchers have often compared reliability indices calculated
with different probabilistic distributions, which is meaningless; in this regard the JCSS Code is a big
improvement.
2.3.1.4 NKB Report No 55E (Nordic countries)
Similar to the JCSS code, this model code serves as a guidance document for the development of
structural codes in the Scandinavian countries. In this document, structures are assigned to 3 different
safety classes dependent on the consequences of failure. A distinction is also made between different
types of failure (ductile with/without reserve of capacity, brittle).
Table 2.5 Stipulated values of the reliability index for the ultimate limit state and a one-year reference
period [NKB 55E, 1987]
Safety class Type of failure

Ductile with reserves Ductile Brittle
Low 3.09 3.71 4.26

Normal 3.71 4.26 4.75
High 4.26 4.75 5.20
The target reliability indices stated in Table 2.5 are given for the ultimate limit state, which the NKB
Code defines as equivalent to failure of an element or the entire structure. However this seems
inappropriate as there may be a huge difference between element and system failure probabilities.
Another difficulty is how to decide whether a structure is ductile or brittle; the code does not provide
enough guidance for this.
2.3.2 Assessment codes
2.3.2.1 OHBDC (Ontario, Canada)
The Ontario Highway Bridge Design Code [OHBDC, 1992] contains a chapter for the evaluation of
existing bridges. In this chapter the same limit states as used for design are also adopted for assessment,
however, the load factors for permanent and live loads are modified (e.g. Table 2.6). For the system
behaviour, single load path systems, i.e. systems in which the failure of any single component or
connection thereof would cause collapse of the system, are differentiated from multiple load path
systems. For the element behaviour, differentiation is made between primary and secondary
components.
Although the OHBDC code has a deterministic code format and does not explicitly use the reliability
index, its load factors have been derived by calibration of calculated reliability indices to acceptable
target values [Nowak, 1992].
Table 2.6 Evaluation load factors for live load [OHBDC, 1992]
Traffic type Primary Component Secondary Component

Single load path system Multiple load path system
Normal traffic 1.55 1.40 1.30

Controlled vehicle 1.25 1.15 1.15
If the bridge is re-evaluated within 5 years of the current assessment, the live load factors can be reduced
to 90% of the specified values, because the traffic will not increase drastically during this short period.
The resistance factors are the same as for design.
Although the OHBDC takes into account system and element behaviour, using the codes definitions
alone, it is difficult to decide whether an element should be considered a primary or a secondary
component, and whether there is just one single load path or multiple load paths. Furthermore, the
influence of the type of structural analysis on the outcome of the safety evaluation and the required
ductility levels for multiple load paths are not directly stated.
2.3.2.2 BD 21 and BD 79 (United Kingdom)
In the UK, the design live load model [BS 5400, 1990] is also used for assessment. However, for
assessment purposes, this is factored to give the Assessment Live Loading [BD 21, 2001], i.e. the
design live loading is reduced to remove a 10% contingency included in the design loading and to make
allowance for the traffic flow and the road surface condition. The code for assessment BD 21 uses the
same limit state criterion as the design codes, but allows changes to the resistance parameter values to
reflect updated estimates of the magnitudes of material strengths/properties (see section 3.3.3.1). At the
same time, it allows a reduction in the material partial safety factors due to the reduced uncertainty when
assessing existing structures.
Bridges that do not meet the requirements of BD 21 are deemed substandard. For such bridges, the
unpublished draft document BD 79 [BD 79, 2000] explains how more advanced levels of assessment
can be undertaken. For example, it describes how the consequences of failure and the loading history
(when a bridge is known to have withstood unrestricted traffic over a sufficiently long period) can be
taken into account in the safety assessment. This document also gives guidance on the use of reliability
analysis: it specifies the limit states to be considered, the probability distributions of the resistance and
load variables, and the model uncertainties. BD 79 proposes that the target reliability index be
established by calibrating against a notionally similar bridge that satisfies the assessment requirements
exactly.
Although the BD 79 approach includes several factors not included in traditional design codes - such as
the consequences of failure, the loading history, bridge-specific loading and updated material properties
- the practical application is difficult, as there is missing information about the derivation of some of the
given curves which are used for the safety assessment. The calibration to a similar bridge assumes that
the current assessment requirements are adequate, a concept which has not gained general acceptance in
the bridge profession. Also, no information is given on how more advanced structural analysis such as
plastic analysis can be used for the assessment.
2.3.2.3 CAN/CSA-S6-88 (Canada)
Clause 12 Existing Bridge Evaluation of the Canadian design code CSA-S6-88 was the first code to
specify values for the required target reliability level for bridges [CSA, 1990]. This clause only applies
to bridges which are secure against causes of failure other than traffic loading and thus only deals with
vehicle overload scenarios. The target reliability index t is given as a function of four factors: the
element behaviour (brittle with/without post-failure capacity, ductile failure), the system behaviour
(elements not/probably/definitely leading to total collapse), the traffic category (non-permit, permit
single/multiple trip and controlled traffic) and the inspection level (not inspectable, routine or special
inspection). The limit state equation is the same as for design, but with modified partial factors. The
partial factor for dead load depends on the target reliability index and the type of dead load, i.e.
surfacing or other dead load. The partial factor for live load depends on the target reliability index, the
type of analysis and the span.
This Canadian Code is precise and allows the four important factors mentioned above to be taken into
account in assessment. The derivation of the target reliability index is based on an empirical life safety
criterion (see section 8.3.2), and the derivation of the partial factor values is essentially based on
calibration to past criteria, including reliability indices, combined with these criteria and whether or not
they make sense [Allen, 1992][Allen, 2003]. Unfortunately, no detailed information on the assumptions
made regarding the level of warning, the people at risk and other factors could be found. Moreover,
precise criteria are lacking for the different ductility levels in the element behaviour categories, and also
for the system behaviour categories.
2.3.3 Discussion
This review of the existing structural codes used for assessment has shown that they use the same
concepts as the traditional design codes, but with modifications to take into account better knowledge of
the bridge under assessment. Regarding ductility and redundancy, none of the codes precisely states the
meaning of degree of warning or how to decide if a failure has to be considered as ductile or as brittle.
The lack of information might lead to a wrong interpretation or to an overly optimistic estimate of safety
due to beneficial redundancy. Most of the cited references produce subjective assessments of system
effects. This is not sufficient for the purpose of evaluation of existing structures, which requires a
objective assessment of the redundancy of the structural system.
Although some of the structural codes used for assessment include additional provisions not included in
the traditional design codes such as ductility, redundancy, consequences of failure, costs of safety
measures, site-specific loading and deterioration - there is not a single code which combines all these
parameters and gives sufficient information on how to quantify each of them. Because these parameters
all have an influence on the collapse risk, there is clearly a need to develop such an all-embracing
methodology.
Some codes propose to base the assessment on reliability concepts. The major difficulty with this
approach is finding a consistent method for determining the target reliability index. Although the
probabilistic codes state target values, it is often unclear how they have been derived. For instance, the
failure criterion, which can have an enormous influence on the calculated reliability index, is never
mentioned in the codes.
2.4 CONCLUSIONS
For existing bridges, there will always be a risk of collapse as bridges are not only under the influence of
nature, but also man. Furthermore, their structural resistance will decrease with time as the materials
used in their construction deteriorate. To minimise the likelihood of collapse, risk assessments have to
be undertaken on a regular basis as well as when the function of a bridge has changed.
An important part of a risk assessment is to set up the hazard inventory, i.e. a list of all hazards that
might conceivably endanger the existence of the bridge. In this chapter, nearly 350 bridge failures have
been studied to identify the main causes of bridge collapse. The Imhof bridge collapse database is
believed to be the most comprehensive record of bridge failures published to date. Bridges collapse due
to various causes including natural hazards, design errors, impact, human errors, limited knowledge
and overloading. Analysis of this database confirms that a large proportion of bridge collapses occur
during construction. Better supervision of the construction process, training of the workforce and the
improved design and checking of temporary works could significantly reduce the incidences of failure at
this stage. This thesis focuses on bridges that have already been commissioned and are in service; the
major causes of collapse for bridges during their service lifetime in order of frequency are: (1) natural
hazard (especially flooding/scour), (2) impact and, to a less degree, (3) overloading. The findings in this
chapter help an assessing engineer identify which hazards should be included in his assessment. He
should then try to envisage all conceivable hazards and specify the magnitude of each he is allowing for
in the assessment.
The bridge codes of some countries recognise that there is a significant difference between the design of
a new structure and the assessment of an existing structure by issuing distinct requirements for
assessment. A review of a number of existing structural codes used for assessment has shown that some
codes contain provisions that have not been considered in the traditional design codes. These provisions
include ductility, redundancy, consequences of failure, site-specific loading and deterioration. All the
codes deal only with some of them, however an approach taking all into account does not exist at
present. The goal of this PhD is to develop such a holistic approach to assess the risk of collapse of
existing bridges.
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3. Basic variables 29
CHAPTER 3. BASIC VARIABLES
When you can measure what you are speaking about and express it in numbers, you know something
about it; but when you can not measure it, when you can not express it in numbers, your knowledge of it
is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind: it may be the beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely, in
your thoughts, advanced to the stage of science.
William Thomson, Lord Kelvin of Largs (1824-1907)
3.1 INTRODUCTION
Before the assessing engineer can execute the structural analysis to evaluate structural safety, he has to
quantify the variables used in the resistance and load models. Knowing them as precisely as possible is
paramount when assessing the safety of bridges. Most parameters are likely to exhibit significant varia-
tions in magnitude. For example, the strength and performance of any given sample of concrete are de-
pendent on the casting process: how much water was present, what aggregates were used and the degree
of vibration. This chapter explains how the properties of the structural materials and the loading are de-
termined and how generic properties, valid for a population of bridges, can be made more bridge-
specific.
When determining the material properties for assessment, the procedure usually starts by calculating
the strength of a structure using the characteristic material properties specified in the design. In more
refined assessment, the material strength values can be based on properties derived from inspection and
in-situ testing data. The problem is how to include this additional information in the calculation of the
material strength used in assessment. This chapter describes the basis of the characteristic strength used
in design, how in-situ strength values are calculated in the British codes and the Eurocodes, and pro-
poses a novel method for combining the design strength values with in-situ data from sampling to derive
an updated strength value.
Furthermore, deterioration of the material properties can lead to a decrease in the structural resistance.
This has to be taken into account when making predictions about the future structural safety. This chap-
ter reviews existing deterioration models and suggests that a simple degradation model be used in the
risk assessment methodology of this thesis.
The load models contained in the structural codes are kept simple to be applicable to all types of
bridges. As a result they may be very conservative for some structures; bridge-specific loading could
potentially increase the assessed safety of a bridge. However, the last section of this chapter shows that
more bridge-specific load models need a lot of input data, which might not be available, and their use is
therefore only recommended for bridges for which the local loading situation is substantially different
from the situation used for the derivation of the code load models.
3.2 UNCERTAINTY AND VARIATIONS
3.2.1 Sources of uncertainty
Provision for a range of uncertainties must be allowed for on both the loading and resistance sides of the
bridge assessment. Most calculations are subject to the following sources of uncertainties:
Physical/Mechanical uncertainty: This arises from natural variation and cannot be decreased by using
a large test sample. Examples include the variation in steel yield strength, the variability of traffic load-
ing or the physical dimensions of a structural component.
Statistical uncertainty: Estimation error arises from the use of a limited number of tests and inexact
data subject to measurement errors. Generally, the observations of a variable do not represent it perfectly
and different sample data sets can produce different statistical estimators. It is possible to reduce this
type of uncertainty through more testing or sampling of the structure.
Modelling uncertainty: Model imperfections arise from the mathematical model used to represent the
real-life behaviour; they are associated with the use of simplified relationships between the basic vari-
ables to represent the actual relationships, e.g. calculation of bending moments in a slab. Modelling un-
certainty can potentially be reduced by further research or the increased availability of data, such as ul-
timate load tests of similar bridges.
Human Error: Human error arises during the design, construction and operation of a structure. Uncer-
tainty due to human error may be reduced by quality assurance procedures such as inspection, which can
reduce the rate of occurrence and the magnitude of errors, but it is difficult to measure human error sta-
tistically.
To quantify these uncertainties, the basic variables are considered here as random variables described by
probabilistic density functions (PDF) to show their variation. These PDFs are defined by the type of dis-
tribution (e.g. normal, lognormal,), the mean and the standard deviation .
Instead of and often the following two statistical parameters are specified:
1. The coefficient of variation COV, which is a measure of the relative variation.
2. The bias , which is the ratio of the mean value and the characteristic value.
The characteristic value xk corresponds to the value specified at the design stage. Rather than using arbi-
trarily chosen values for material and loading properties, characteristic values are based on a probabil-
ity p of not being exceeded (Figure 3.1).
Figure 3.1 Probabilistic description of a basic variable
The characteristic value xk of a random basic variable X is defined as the p-th fractile of X:
Equation 3.1
Where FX-1: Inverse distribution function of X

p: Probability of being exceeded
The probability p is selected arbitrarily so that the characteristic values are rarely exceeded. Most struc-
tural codes use p-values between 1% and 5%, e.g. Eurocode 2 and CEBFIP Model Code 1990 define
the characteristic mechanical properties of material strengths as 5%-fractiles [EC 2, 2001]
[MC 90, 1991].
For a given xk-value, COV and are related, but often both values are given to facilitate the determina-
tion of the mean and standard deviation of the distribution.
3.3 RESISTANCE PROPERTIES
The assessment engineer is often able to demonstrate that the actual in-situ material strength of the
bridge is higher than the one specified in the design calculations. When samples are taken on the bridge,
the strength information can be made more site-specific by updating the original population strength dis-
tribution and by deriving more accurate characteristic values from the updated bridge-specific distribu-
tion.
This section firstly presents generic data for the resistance properties and secondly explains how in-situ
tests can be used to derive site-specific data. Site-specific strength values can be determined as lower
bounds based on the test results alone (confidence and prediction intervals), or by combining the generic
strength distributions with the test results (Bayesian updating). Finally, at the end of the section it is fur-
ther explained how deterioration can be taken into account in the calculation of the structural resistance.
3.3.1 Generic data
The uncertainties associated with the material properties have their origin in potentially unknown manu-
facturers, production batches, variations within a given batch and variations in erection quality. There
have been several studies on the probabilistic distribution of the basic variables of the population of
bridges. It is beyond the scope of this section to present all these considerations in detail. In para-
graph 3.3.1.3 the generic population distributions used in this thesis are summarised, but beforehand
some additional information is given for the individual variables. This information can help to improve
the quality of the generic distributions by decreasing the variation of the strength values.
3.3.1.1 Concrete compressive strength
The in-situ strength of a particular structure varies with the quality of the material supplied, the age of
the structure and the systematic variation of strength due to normal construction practice. Compared
with the COV for the concrete strength for the population of all concrete bridge structures, the COV for
one particular bridge structure can be much smaller when the concrete comes from only one batch
and/or only one element is considered (Table 3.1). This is important because a smaller COV implies a
narrower PDF, and hence the characteristic concrete strength derived from the PDF will be higher and
the calculated resistance of the structure greater.
Table 3.1 Coefficient of variation due to in-situ strength variation within the structure [FHWA, 1999]
Structure composed of: One member Many members
One batch of concrete 7% 8%

Many batches of concrete Cast-in-place 12% 13%
Precast 9% 10%
3.3.1.2 Steel Yield strength
Due to the conventional design philosophy of attempting to achieve ductility by imposing that the steel
should yield before the concrete crushes, for flexure the concrete compressive strength often has a much
smaller influence on the structural strength and behaviour than do reinforcement properties. It is thus
important to know the steel properties as accurately as possible.
The JCSS Model Code proposes to divide the variance of the steel yield strength into three contribu-
tions:
Variance of different mills, 12
Variance in a mill from melt to melt, 22
Variance within a melt, 32
For high standard steel production the JCSS code gives the following values: 1 = 19 MPa,
2 = 22 MPa, 3 = 8 MPa [JCSS, 2001].
The overall standard deviation tot may be calculated as:
Equation 3.2
Tests of the batch of reinforcing steel used on an existing bridge can considerably diminish the assumed
steel variations, if the batch is known to belong to the production of a specific mill and originates from
the same melt (as 1 = 2 = 0). Unfortunately, this can only be achieved in rare cases where the steel
certificates state the melt number. Although the identification system of the reinforcing bars, e,g. in the
UK [CARES, 2004], states the country and steel production mill, it does not give information on the
melt.
3.3.1.3 Generic probabilistic density functions of the basic variables
Knowing the specified design characteristic value, which is a fractile value of the PDF, and based on
generic population probabilistic density functions, the assessing engineer can make an initial estimate of
the strength distributions. Several researchers have determined generic distributions for several material
properties [Bez, 1989] [Bailey, 1996] [Middleton, 1998a] [Melchers, 1999] [JCSS, 2001] [Neo-
cleous, 2004] and such generic information can be used when no site-specific data is available. If
bridge-specific information becomes available, then the generic distribution can be used as the initial
distribution which can be updated using the bridge-specific data (see section 3.3.4). Table 3.1 lists the
generic PDFs for the relevant material properties that will be adopted for concrete structures in this the-
sis. The values listed in this table were either taken directly or interpreted conservatively from the refer-
ences cited above.
Table 3.2 Generic probability density functions for material properties
Basic variable Distribution COV

type
Concrete compressive Lognormal 1.28* - 6 MPa*

strength [MPa]
Overall depth [mm] Normal 1.0** 0.05 -
Depth of section, lever Normal 1-10/xnom** - 10 mm
arm [mm]
Yield strength of modern Lognormal 1.15 0.08 -
reinforcement steel [MPa]
Area of reinforcing steel Normal 1.0 0.04 -
[mm2]
* excluding high strength concrete
** For depths xk is replaced by xnom = nominal depth (from design drawings or measured on bridge)
3.3.2 In-situ testing: Estimation of lower bounds for strength values using sta-
tistics
Assessment often involves in-situ testing of an existing bridge to obtain improved information about its
basic variables. By using this new data, statistical properties of the basic variables can be updated. The
number of samples should be as high as possible, but usually it is not feasible to take too many samples
because of the cost and the potential damage to the bridge. The following sections describe methods to
derive lower bounds of the population mean strength (confidence interval) and of the individual strength
values (prediction interval) from in-situ test results. In section 3.3.3 it will be shown that these concepts
are in fact used by some of the existing assessment codes.
3.3.2.1 Confidence interval
When the mean strength of the population of bridges, , is not known, a lower bound estimate of the
population mean can be derived from a sample of size n, for a certain level of confidence (1 - ), e.g. a
95% confidence level. The lower bound of the mean low is the left hand side limit of a one-sided confi-
dence interval; such a confidence interval is an interval that includes the mean value with a pre-
assigned probability (1-):
Equation 3.3
The meaning of a confidence interval is now illustrated with an example. Using Monte-Carlo simulation,
10 samples have been randomly drawn from a fictitious given population distribution N(35, 6). The
10 samples could correspond to 10 tests undertaken on a bridge to establish values for the concrete com-
pressive strength. Every sample consists of 3 concrete cores for which the compressive strength has been
determined.
Table 3.3 10 samples drawn randomly from a N(35,6)-population distribution (concrete compressive
strength) [MPa]
Sample Value 1 Value 2 Value 3
1 35.9 37.1 38.3

2 31.5 31.9 30.2
3 41.3 42.9 42.8
4 41.8 25.1 40.2
5 31.0 38.6 41.0
6 21.3 39.2 32.1
7 30.2 34.8 25.7
8 39.3 26.8 42.3
9 43.2 31.7 40.0
10 30.3 46.9 33.4
Assuming that the mean of the population is not known, an interval containing the mean with a certain
probability can be derived. In the case where the population standard deviation, , is known, the lower
bound of the population mean can be calculated with [Tamhane, 2001]:
Equation 3.4
Where mx: Mean of the sample strength test results

z: Value of the standard normal variate N(0,1) for a confidence level (1-)
n: Number of test results
Figure 3.2 shows the confidence intervals of the 10 samples for (1) = 0.95. It can be seen that 9 of the
10 confidence intervals contain the population mean value = 35 MPa. With these intervals we have
thus an empirical confidence level of 90%, which would be closer to 95% if more samples were taken.
The figure also shows that when only 3 cores are tested, the derived lower bound value for the mean can
either be conservative (sample 7: low = 24.6 MPa) or optimistic (sample 3: 36.7 MPa). This indicates
that basing an estimate of the mean value on the lower bound of the confidence interval, can be far too
optimistic when just 3 test results are available. This shows the importance of testing as many cores as
possible; as the number of test results will always be relatively small, the estimated lower bound may be
too high.
In the confidence interval-approach, a lower bound on the population mean is found. The mean is differ-
ent from the characteristic value, which is a fractile of the population distribution. Generally, the engi-
neer is more interested in a safe lower limit on strength, rather than estimating the mean, i.e. he is more
concerned about where the individual observations may fall. The point is that the estimated lower bound
for the mean of the whole structure could be far higher than the strength value at one particular location.
When elastic analysis methods are used, the engineer calculates the material strength only in one loca-
tion. Using the mean value could thus result in an unconservative estimation of the resistance. An excep-
tion, in which using a mean value of the strength makes sense, is yield-line analysis, where the resis-
tance along a number of yield lines over a region of the deck is considered.
Population PDF
Sample results
Figure 3.2 95% (one sided) confidence intervals from 10 samples drawn from a N(35,6)-distribution
( known = 6 MPa)
3.3.2.2 Prediction interval
Another interval can be calculated to give information about the lower bound of all individual observa-
tions. Such a prediction interval is the interval that includes all individual observations of a parameter
with a certain probability, e.g. contains 95% of all strength values that could be measured on a bridge.
For a normally distributed random variable X with an unknown coefficient of variation of the population
COV, the lower bound of the prediction interval is [Tamhane, 2001]:
Equation 3.5
Where tn-1,: Coefficient of the Student-distribution

: Probability of being exceeded
COVx: Coefficient of variation of the sample
In the case where the coefficient of variation of the population is known, the characteristic value is based
on the normal distribution instead of the Student distribution. To illustrate the meaning of the prediction
interval let us consider the same 10 samples drawn by Monte Carlo simulation from a known population
distribution N(35, 6) (Table 3.3). Figure 3.3 shows the prediction intervals of each sample. The predic-
tion intervals are generally much wider than the confidence intervals for the mean (Figure 3.2); this is
because a prediction interval is meant to include a random variable such as the concrete compressive
strength, while a confidence interval is meant to include a fixed unknown parameter, such as the mean of
the compressive strength distribution. As for the confidence interval, for small sample sizes the lower
bound of the prediction interval can vary greatly with different samples (here varying from 18.9 to
31.0 MPa) and it is therefore important to have as many test results as possible.
Population PDF
Sample results
Figure 3.3 95% (one sided) prediction intervals from 10 samples drawn from a N(35,6)-distribution
( known = 6 MPa)
3.3.3 In-situ testing: Code methods for the estimation of in-situ material
strengths for assessment
Some of the structural codes have recognised the benefit of deriving strength values from test results;
they contain equations for including site-specific information in the assessment. In the following two of
them are presented and critically reviewed.
3.3.3.1 BD 44 - Worst credible strength
The British assessment standard BD 44 contains the concept of Worst credible strength (WCS)
[BD 44, 1995]. This concept aims to more accurately model the actual material strengths of the struc-
ture. The WCS-value may be greater or less than the specified characteristic value.
The advice note BA 44 calculates the WCS from n tests, n 3, with obtained strengths fi [BA 44, 1996]:
Equation 3.6
This formula is an empirical one and is said to have no statistical meaning, but Equation 3.6 is quite
similar to the lower bound of the confidence interval low (Equation 3.4). It is therefore assumed that the
WCS is an estimate of the mean of the strength distribution. For (1-) = 95% and thus z = 1.64, the
WCS-formula leads to lower strength estimates than the lower bound of the mean as long as /mx is less
than 0.12. In practice, however, based on typical -values (see section 3.3.1) and applied to real bridge
examples, it can be shown that /mx can be at least twice as large. As an example, let us look at a con-
crete test sample with mean mx = 25 MPa. Knowing that a typical value for for concrete might be
around 6 MPa, we have /mx = 0.2 which is clearly bigger than 0.12. Hence, the WCS-equation can give
less conservative results than the low-equation.
3.3.3.2 Eurocode EN 1990 Characteristic strength
The Eurocode EN 1990 [EC 0, 2001] calculates a characteristic strength value xk, and not an estimate for
the mean of the population as in the WCS-formula. To determine this characteristic strength it uses the
lower bound of the prediction interval (Equation 3.5).
3.3.4 Updating existing strength information: Bayesian Characteristic Value

(BCV)
3.3.4.1 Introduction to Bayesian theory
The main problem with methods based only on in-situ tests, is that the strength prediction derived from a
small sample can be inaccurate, possibly resulting in an overly optimistic estimation. In this thesis it is
proposed that an alternative method, using prior information based on the knowledge and experience of
the engineer, is more appropriate for estimating the in-situ strength of materials. This method, labelled
the BCV-approach, relies on Bayesian theory.
In the BCV-approach, the test results are assessed using concepts based on conditional probabilities. The
following equation shows how the prior probability P(A), the probability of A occurring, is modified to
give the posterior probability P(A|B), the probability of A occurring given that B has occurred. The like-
lihood function P(B|A) is the probability of B occurring, assuming that A has occurred.
Equation 3.7
Starting from Equation 3.7, which is the basis of the so-called Bayesian theory, it can be shown that by
treating such parameters of a probability distribution as the mean value or standard deviation, as a ran-
dom variable, the following relationship holds [Tang, 1971]:
Equation 3.8
Where f " (): Posterior distribution of distribution parameter to be estimated after additional data
is collected
L (): Likelihood function of the additional data obtained for a given value of ,
i.e. P(data|)
f ' (): Prior distribution of before the additional test data is incorporated
k: A normalisation constant to make f " () a proper density function
The equation above can be considerably simplified if the distribution of the parameter is appropriately
chosen with respect to that of the underlying random variable: in the case of a normal random variable X
with known , if the prior distribution of the mean is normal too, then the posterior distribution of
remains normal [Tang, 1971]. Such pairs of prior/posterior parameter distributions are known in the
Bayesian terminology as conjugate distributions. The book by Ang & Tang contains many of the most
common conjugate distributions [Ang, 1975].
As explained before, and with the exception of plastic analysis methods, the assessing engineer is usu-
ally more interested in where the individual observations fall rather than in the value of the mean. In the
BCV-approach it is suggested that the same principle as used in design is adopted for selecting strengths,
namely the 5%-fractile as the characteristic value, but the PDF of the strength variable is updated to in-
clude the results of in-situ tests. Using Bayesian updating, a posterior distribution can be found, and
from this updated distribution we can select the 5%-fractile for assessment, which is named here as the
Bayesian Characteristic Value (BCV). The BCV-approach proposed here is thus a conventional Bayes-
ian updating, applied to the mean of the population using sample data from in-situ tests.
3.3.4.2 Derivation of the Bayesian Characteristic Value
Based on typical population distribution parameters for the strength variables (see section 3.3.1), we can
find the prior distribution parameters, i.e. mean 0 and standard deviation 0, which correspond to the
design characteristic value: Table 3.2, for example, suggests a value of 6 MPa for the concrete strength
standard deviation 0. In the following a strength variable X, such as the concrete strength, is considered
as normally distributed. Using the law of total probability, the prior density of X, fX(x) may be written as
[Ang, 1975]:
Equation 3.9
The first term of the integral is the conditional density fX(x|1). This probability density depends on the
mean 1, but has a constant standard deviation 1 for all mean values. The standard deviation for design
is clearly bigger than for assessment because in design, allowances for variations between concrete
plants, between batches and within the batch have to be made. However, for the Sandhole bridge (see
Appendix B.2), which is used to demonstrate various procedures in this thesis, the concrete volume is so
small, that it is likely, that only one batch of concrete would have been used in construction. So a lower
1 of 2.4, consistent with FHWA recommendations [FHWA, 1999], can be assumed.
The probability density of the mean M, fM(1), is also assumed to be normally distributed with constant
mean value 2 =0 and constant variance 22. Knowing the prior standard deviation, 0, and the standard
deviation for assessment, 1, we can calculate 2 using 0 = (12 + 22) [Tang, 1971].
Given a sample of strength tests xn = (x1, x2,.., xn), the posterior conditional density fM(1|xn) is nor-
mally distributed [Ang, 1975]:
Equation 3.10
The posterior density of the strength variable X becomes:
Equation 3.11
Where 2'': Mean of fM(1|xn)

2'': Standard deviation of fM(1|xn)
0'': Standard deviation of fM(x|xn), 0'' = (12 + 2'' 2)
BCV corresponds to the 5%-fractile of the posterior distribution (Figure 3.4).
Figure 3.4 Prior and posterior distribution of the Sandhole Bridge concrete strength using a normal
distribution, 5%-fractiles defining the design and Bayesian characteristic value
Table 3.4 shows an example of an application of the Bayesian Characteristic Value-approach. The
strength distributions were assumed normally distributed. Three concrete cores were tested on Sandhole
bridge, resulting in the following values: 27.5, 22.5 and 34.5 MPa. The originally specified characteris-
tic value for design was 20 MPa.
Table 3.4 - Example of distribution updating with test results [MPa]
Distribution Mean value Standard deviation Background
Prior of variable X, fX(x) 29.8 6.0 5%-fractile of this distribution corre-

sponds to specified (design) character-
istic value
Conditional density 1 2.4 1 estimated using 1/ = 0.08
fX(x|1) [FHWA, 1999] as all concrete comes
from same batch
Prior of mean 1, fM(1) 29.8 5.5 Mean corresponds to prior distribution
and 2 from 0 = (12 + 22)
Posterior of mean 1, 28.3 1.3 Test results xn and Equation 3.10
fM(1|xn)
Posterior of variable X, 28.3 2.7 Equation 3.11 and 0'' = (12 + 2''2)
fX(x|xn)*
* The Bayesian characteristic value BCV corresponds to the 5%-fractile of the posterior distribution of the vari-
able X
In summary, with this method the prior density function describing the design strength distribution is
represented as the integral of the product of a density conditional on the mean and the density of the
mean itself. By assuming a site-specific standard deviation 1 for the conditional probability, the prior
distribution of the mean can be found. Using Bayesian statistics the distribution of this mean is updated
as soon as test results become available. Finally, the updated distribution of the strength parameter is
derived and the Bayesian characteristic value selected.
3.3.5 Comparison of methods for estimating in-situ strength
In the following, different estimates of concrete strength obtained with the methods described above are
compared, with the aim to obtain the best estimate on actual strength. Table 3.5 shows the comparison
for the Sandhole Bridge concrete strength tests mentioned in paragraph 3.3.4.2.
The Sandhole tests results are a good example for the WCS-value being higher than the lower bound of
the confidence interval since /mx = 0.21 > 0.12. This is important because the WCS-value is currently
used for assessment in the UK.
The Eurocode-value is slightly different from the lower bound of the prediction interval because if the
standard deviation of the population is known, the Eurocode is not strictly correct as it replaces COVx
(sample COV) in Equation 3.5 by the coefficient of variation of the population, which is COV = / and
not /mx. Comparing the Eurocode predictions with and without prior information underlines that more
realistic predictions can often be obtained by assuming conservative prior information instead of omit-
ting prior information.
Table 3.5 Sandhole Bridge concrete strength tests: Derived concrete strength used for assess-
ment [MPa]
Without prior With prior information
Specified strength 20 -
Minimum test result 22.5 22.5
Lower bound of confidence interval 18.0 22.5*
Lower bound of prediction interval 7.8 16.8*
Worst Credible Strength (WCS) 24.9 24.9
Eurocode 7.9 16.9*
Bayesian characteristic value (BCV) - 23.8**
* Prior information = 6 MPa
** Prior distribution fX(x) ~ N(29.8, 6)
These results show a significant difference between the characteristic strength determined with the
Eurocode and the BCV-approach; using a BCV-value can often be more beneficial than using the Euro-
code-value. As mentioned before, the WCS cannot directly be compared to these two values, as it is not a
characteristic value, but is thought to be an estimation of the mean.
One of the advantages of using the Bayesian formulation is that one can combine various sources of in-
formation such as direct/indirect measurements or inspections at different time periods. The posterior
distribution from one source of information may subsequently be used as the prior distribution when
new information becomes available; the process can be repeated whenever new inspections are under-
taken. Probabilities based on Bayesian concepts are not to be taken as frequencies, they only state the
degree of belief of one particular assessor: the prior information included in the calculations corresponds
to the subjective assessment of the evaluator. A common criticism of conditional probability methods is
that the final answer may be sensitive to the initial prior probabilities assumed. This is a valid criticism
that users should keep in mind. There is however, a method by which the sensitivity of the prior assump-
tions can be checked: by choosing diffuse prior distributions, i.e. with large coefficients of variation, all
bias in the initial probabilities is eliminated and the sensitivity of the final outcome can be evaluated.
For elastic analysis methods this thesis recommends the use of the BCV for in-situ strength estimation.
This is because it uses the same fractile-philosophy used in the design code for assessment and gives a
lower bound for the individual strength values, rather than for the mean value. For plastic analysis meth-
ods such as yield-line analysis, the author suggests the use of the mean of the updated (posterior) distri-
bution as YLA is an averaging technique.
3.3.6 Updating partial factors
Material partial safety factors make some allowance for the differences between the strength of test
specimens and their strength in situ [EC 2, 1992]. By taking into account bridge specific information,
the resulting more accurate strength value eliminates some of the uncertainties associated with the use of
specified characteristic strengths. For this reason most assessment codes permit partial safety factors for
material, m, to be reduced when compared to the values used in design. Table 3.6 shows the example of
the UK.
Table 3.6 Material partial safety factors, m, in the UK
Design: Char. Value Assessment: WCS

[BS 5400, 1990] [BD 44, 1995]
Concrete 1.5 1.2

Shear in concrete 1.25 1.15
Reinforcement 1.15 1.10*
* May be reduced to 1.05, if measured steel depths are used in addition to WCS
Although these partial safety factors may be useful in allowing for uncertainty, they are not directly
linked to the probability of system failure, which, as a result, may vary across systems. For example a
safety factor of two in one system may not imply the same level of safety as in another system. To over-
come this problem, partial factors may be calculated using reliability theory (see section 4.2.2.1),
whereby the partial factors depend on the relative importance, reflected in the sensitivity factor i, of the
considered load or resistance, the target reliability index and the coefficient of variation of the load or
resistance [Bassetti, 1998][ISO 2394, 1998]. For example, for larger spans, where the role of the dead
load is more significant, the partial safety factor for the dead load should also be larger in order to
achieve the same level of reliability. This is not the case in the design codes where the partial factor for
the dead load is constant. Alternatively, partial safety factors may be obtained by maximising the total
expected benefit-costs [Faber, 2003a].
Because none of these alternatives for calculating partial factors is yet accepted in the UK, but also to
keep the risk assessment methodology more practical, in this thesis the reduced partial safety factors are
used as stated in the assessment codes. These values are already lower than the design values and thus
result in a less conservative estimate of safety. The assessment safety factors of Table 3.6 are only up to
20% higher than when partial factors are excluded. Therefore, little improvement of the safety evalua-
tion can be obtained by further reducing the partial factors. Rather than relying on reliability calculations
to calculate partial factors, thereby introducing further assumptions, it is preferred to determine the char-
acteristic strength values as accurately as possible and then use this together with the assessment code
partial factors.
3.3.7 Deterioration of the resistance
Assessing the risk of collapse of an existing bridge should not only take into account the safety at pre-
sent time, but also how the safety level will change in the following time until the next assessment. En-
vironmental effects will degrade the construction materials and hence reduce the structural resistance.
Reinforced concrete deterioration mechanisms include corrosion, alkali-silica reaction, carbonation,
freeze-thaw action and leaching. More detailed information about these mechanisms can be found in
[Vassie, 1984], [BA 52, 1994] and [Brhwiler, 1998]. In this section we will concentrate on corrosion,
which is one of the most important phenomena affecting the durability of steel reinforced concrete struc-
tures. The immediate cause of corrosion is normally penetration by chloride or carbonation of the con-
crete, but there will often be underlying physical factors that increase the probability of reinforcement
corrosion such as concrete porosity, low cover depth, leaking joints, faulty drainage, absence of water-
proofing membranes, and number and intensity of freeze-thaw cycles.
A short description of the corrosion process follows and finally a general degradation model for corro-
sion is presented. In the practical risk assessment methodology this degradation model will be used for
the safety evaluation at the time of the next assessment. Deterioration due to other deterioration mecha-
nisms is implicitly taken into account through the condition rating (see chapter 6), which is used to make
allowance for the present-day condition of the bridge.
3.3.7.1 Corrosion process
Modelling the chloride-induced deterioration is an important basis for assessing existing concrete struc-
tures at different times, but it is difficult because of the numerous factors involved and the imperfect
knowledge of the reaction processes. During cement hydration, a highly alkaline pore solution (pH 12.5
13.6) is formed in the concrete [Roelfstra, 2004]. In this high-pH environment, the reinforcing steel
forms a thin oxide film that protects the steel from corrosion. This passivating film remains intact as
long as the composition of the pore water solution remains stable. The degradation of reinforced con-
crete structures due to reinforcement corrosion can be divided into two phases (Figure 3.5).
Figure 3.5 Deterioration process of reinforced concrete members (adapted from [Stewart, 2003b])
The first phase of corrosion is called corrosion initiation, where the chloride ions penetrate the concrete
cover by diffusion and capillary action, the outer layer of the reinforcement is depassivated and corro-
sion commences. This phase starts with the construction of the structure and ends with the depassivation
of the reinforcing steel.
It is well established that chloride penetration and depassivation of the reinforcement are governed by
concrete cover, porosity, chloride concentration and environmental conditions [Roelfstra, 2004]. Most
researchers assume that reinforcement corrosion starts when the chloride concentration at the level of
reinforcement reaches a threshold Ccr, but analysis of the data produced in a UK bridge study on the per-
centage of cases of corrosion in relation to the total chloride concentration at the level of the reinforce-
ment showed significant scatter [Vassie, 1984]. Table 3.7 shows that corrosion was often absent at chlo-
ride levels above the 0.35% threshold, commonly seen as the threshold value above which corrosion is
possible. Furthermore, corrosion was also found at concentrations below 0.35%.
Table 3.7 Analysis of UK chloride concentration data (Units % Cl- by weight of cement)
[Vassie, 1984]
Chloride range 0.2% 0.2-0.35% 0.35-0.5% 0.5-1.0% 1.0-1.5% 1.5%
Number of cases 99 86 43 105 59 54

investigated
Number showing 2 19 10 34 38 41
corrosion
Percentage show- 2.0 22.1 23.3 32.4 64.4 75.9
ing corrosion
In a review paper Stewart & Faber summarised the critical chloride concentrations proposed by different
researchers [Stewart, 2003b]; they found little consensus on the chloride concentration necessary to
cause depassivation of the surface of the reinforcing steel.
Since there is no generally agreed critical chloride content level and there are persistent doubts about
modelling chloride penetration, the author prefers the use of a more practical deterioration model (see
section 3.3.7.2). In practical applications, chloride concentrations may not be available and cannot al-
ways be accurately assessed [Lea, 2004].
Once corrosion is initiated, the propagation-phase follows and includes various processes (Figure 3.5):
Loss of cross-sectional area of reinforcing steel
Reduction of bond
Crack initiation and propagation by spalling and delamination, caused by expansive rust prod-
ucts
For concrete deck slabs in corrosive environments the estimated time from initiation of corrosion to first
cracking of concrete cover ranges between 2 and 5 years [Liu, 1998]. The corrosion rate is governed by
the electrical resistivity of the concrete, the permeability of the concrete cover, humidity, exposure and
temperature. There is little information available for predicting corrosion rates, except that corrosion
rates for low, medium and high corrosion intensities have been suggested (see [Middleton, 1998b]).
Some empirical models have been developed (see [Stewart, 2003b]), but it would be difficult to apply
these to structures other than those for which they were derived.
Besides the general corrosion, which occurs continuously over substantial areas of reinforcement with
metal loss uniformly distributed over the circumference of the bar and the corroding area, there is also a
more localised type of corrosion. This corrosion in bridge decks and in substructure concrete near leak-
ing expansion joints is called pitting corrosion; it is characterised by the mixed occurrence of uncor-
roded and pitted reinforcement. Stewart has published a model for pitting corrosion deterioration [Stew-
art, 2003a], but its applicability for practical assessments is questionable, as it is based on two studies
with very small steel bar diameters and has not been verified for other cases.
Similar to the lack of agreement of models for corrosion initiation/propagation and pitting corrosion,
there are no widely accepted predictive models for corrosion-induced reduction of bond and cracking.
Because of the large uncertainties in the models and parameters, long-term predictions of the deteriora-
tion process are inherently inaccurate. It is thus believed that in risk assessment, deterioration should
only be predicted for short reference periods. That is why in this thesis, deterioration is only considered
for the time interval between inspections. A new risk assessment would ideally be undertaken after each
inspection.
3.3.7.2 General degradation model
Many different degradation models have been proposed for all kinds of deterioration mechanisms. A
recent review of the models used to predict corrosion of reinforcement is included in [Middle-
ton, 1998b]. For the practical risk assessment approach developed in this thesis, a simple deterioration
model has to be available as the inclusion of degradation is only a small part of the overall assessment
procedure. It is suggested that the corrosion model contained in the draft of Advice Note BA 81 be
adopted [BA 81, 2000]. This empirical model is based upon corrosion losses measured from the Midland
Links (UK) structures [Roberts, 2000]. The time taken for chlorides to reach the steel surface depends
on the mechanism, such as vehicle spray, by which the chlorides get access to the steel. The BA 81
model contains values for the most common access mechanisms. The time to initiation of corrosion from
first exposure to chlorides is obtained from the cover dimension (Figure 3.6). The total time to corrosion
initiation ti is finally calculated as the sum of the time to first exposure and the time following first expo-
sure.
Time after
exposure [yrs]
12
10
0
0 20 40 60 80 100
Cover depth [mm]
Figure 3.6 Time to corrosion initiation following first exposure [BA 81, 2000]
The corrosion environment is either based on measured data such as half-cell potentials or chloride con-
centrations (Table 3.8) or identified from a qualifier table given in the advice note if no data is available.
Table 3.8 Corrosion rate in BA 81 [BA 81, 2000]
Corrosion environment Half-cell potential Chloride content by Corrosion rate r

[mV] weight of cement [mm2/year]
High < -350 > 1.0% 3

Medium -350 << -200 0.3% < < 1.0% 2
Low > -200 < 0.3% 1
The resistance at time t is then calculated using the reduced bar cross-sectional area A(t):
Equation 3.12
Where A0 : Original bar cross-sectional area
3.4 HAZARDS AND LOADING
As for the resistance, it is important to determine the loading a bridge will experience as accurately as
possible. This section explains that a risk assessment should start by stating in a hazard inventory what
hazards are taken into account and to what extent.
Most countries have established codes prescribing the loadings to be considered in design or assessment.
Because these requirements have to be applicable for all bridges of a country, they might be rather con-
servative for some of them. Although some code traffic load models, such as the model in
[BD 21, 2001], differentiate on traffic volume and road type, most of them do not consider the trans-
verse load distribution. The real traffic load effect at one particular bridge location can be substantially
smaller than the one calculated with the code load model. Lower live load levels will result in lower load
effects and thus a higher safety level of the bridge. Including site-specific load levels may thus have a
beneficial effect on the assessed safety of a bridge. This section contains information on how to deter-
mine the magnitude of traffic and scour more accurately.
The use of site-specific load models is generally not practical, as a lot of load information has to be
gathered before one can derive load magnitudes. For the risk assessment methodology proposed in this
thesis it is therefore suggested that the existing assessment code load models be used and that site-
specific load models be relied on only when the assessor thinks that the code loadings might be signifi-
cantly different from the local situation.
3.4.1 Hazard inventory
Every risk assessment should start by identifying all conceivable hazards posing a threat to the structure,
but not all of them have to be considered in the analysis; there will always be residual risks. Because
such hazards as earthquake or flooding can have extreme magnitudes, zero risk will never exist. Safety
comes with an attached price and we have to accept there is an affordable limit. The risk assessment
method proposed in this thesis suggests that all hazards considered should clearly be indicated in the
hazard inventory in terms of hazard type and magnitude.
This inventory document would also contain a list of the hazards that are not considered in the risk as-
sessment because of their scale: some extreme natural hazards or man-made risks like terrorism acts
should be excluded from the risk assessment and explicitly be stated as accepted. These accepted haz-
ards are the hazards the engineer is aware of, but which he considers as admissible by justifying their
acceptability. Examples of such hazards might include a plane impact on the bridge or extreme ava-
lanches.
By documenting the hazards considered, the assessor might also be deemed to have acted responsibly
and with due process when unforeseeable hazards such as terrorist attacks take place. Nowadays such
possibilities must be considered, however the economics of protecting bridges from such events might
make it impossible to allow for such scenarios.
3.4.2 Bridge-specific live loading
Cooper has developed a bridge specific live loading which is included in the draft of BD 79 [Coo-
per, 1997][BD 79, 2000]. His load model takes into account the number of lanes loaded, the traffic flow
rate, weight restrictions and the roughness of the pavement surface [Cooper, 1997]. The author of this
thesis has previously proposed a simulation-based site-specific live load model [Im-
hof, 2001][Imhof, 2003a]. The Imhof model is used in section 4.4 to show how the assessed safety level
of a bridge can be increased by more accurately modelling the live loading. A requirement for the use of
site-specific loading is the availability of traffic statistics such as axle-loads, proportion of different ve-
hicle types and daily traffic for the bridge being assessed. As this information might not be available for
a particular bridge, site-specific bridge loading is only recommended for bridges for which the traffic
loading is considered to be very different from the traffic regime corresponding to the code loading. Fur-
thermore, it only makes sense to use bridge-specific live loading for bridges with a high live load to
dead load ratio. For other bridges, the assessed safety level might be increased more easily by updating
the resistance parameters based on in-situ tests.
3.4.3 Flooding hazard
The bridge failure survey in section 2.2 has shown that flooding is one of the most important reasons for
bridge failure, but the scour hazard is rarely found in loading codes and, as a result, flooding hazards are
typically neglected in assessment calculations. Because of the importance of considering scour, a simple
calculation model by Richardson & Davis is briefly summarised below [Richardson, 1995]. This method
compares the depth of the bridge foundation yp with the scouring depth ys. If the measured yp is bigger
than the estimated ys, the bridge has a satisfactory safety level.
The scouring effects resulting from the discharge during a flood event are functions of riverbed charac-
teristics and river geometry. According to Richardson & Davis, an existing bridge is adequate if its
foundations can withstand a superflood, i.e. a flood with a discharge corresponding to a 500year return
period. The total scour depth ys may be calculated as the sum of contraction scour and local scour.
Contraction scour occurs when the flow area of a stream is reduced by natural or artificial contraction
during flooding. The decrease in flow area causes an increase in the average velocity and hence the bed
shear stress. With higher erosive forces, more bed material is removed from the contracted zone than is
transported into it.
The formation of vortices at the base of the piers or abutments produces local scour. These vortices re-
sult from the pileup of water upstream of the obstruction and the subsequent flow acceleration around
the nose of the pier or abutment. The action of the vortex removes bed material from around the base of
the obstruction. The transport rate of sediment away from the base region is greater than the transport
rate into the region, and, consequently, a scour hole develops.
Based on laboratory results, Richardson & Davis have developed empirical equations to calculate con-
traction, pier and abutment scour [Richardson, 1995]. Johnson compared seven bridge pier scour equa-
tions using field data from bridges around the world and showed that the pier scour equation by
Richardson gives conservative results when applied to rivers [Johnson, 1995]. Although the equations
by Richardson & Davis can give excessive scour depths, for practical assessment purposes they are suf-
ficiently accurate and allow scour to be taken into account in a practical and straightforward way.
3.5 CONCLUSIONS
In a safety assessment the available structural resistance is compared to the load effects experienced by
the structure due to the action of external hazards. Before starting any calculations, the assessing engi-
neer should try to determine as accurately as possible all parameters influencing the resistance and the
load effects. Because of the many uncertainties involved, these basic variables cannot be allocated one
single value and their variation is best treated using probabilistic concepts.
The structural resistance depends mainly on the material properties. These properties have been speci-
fied in the original construction documents as characteristic values, i.e. corresponding to a fractile of the
population probability density function of the property, but they may be much higher in reality. By in-
cluding results from tests undertaken on the bridge, in-situ strengths may be predicted more precisely
and hence the quality of the safety assessment may be improved. Several methods, which allow the de-
termination of material strengths based on in-situ test results, have been compared. Confidence intervals
give a lower bound on the mean value of a strength parameter. In most cases, however, engineers are not
interested in the mean of the population, but rather in where the individual values fall. Prediction inter-
vals are thus more appropriate as they give a lower bound on all the values to be found on one bridge. It
has also been shown that one has to be careful when deriving strength values from small number of test
results, as these predictions may be very high or very low.
The author has proposed the adoption of the Bayesian Characteristic Value (BCV) as a measure of mate-
rial strength for use in assessment. This concept takes into account not only the test results from one
sample, whose size is often small, but also prior information. The prior strength distributions may be
determined by using generic population probabilistic distribution functions, together with the specified
design strengths. The posterior strength distribution is obtained by using Bayesian updating techniques.
The posterior characteristic strength BCV is then calculated as the 5%-fractile of the posterior distribu-
tion function, similar to the design characteristic strength value.
Deterioration of the safety-relevant material properties may be calculated with a general deterioration
model, although most deterioration processes are complex phenomena and are difficult to model. The
chosen degradation model for steel corrosion is simple to use and is considered sufficiently accurate for
short time intervals, as suggested in the proposed risk assessment methodology.
When it comes to loading, it is important to build a hazard inventory before starting any analysis and to
specify the type and intensity of the hazards that are considered in the analysis. This inventory should
also state the risks that are accepted because of their scale. The load models from the assessment codes
are generally sufficiently accurate, but can be updated when the local situation appears to be very differ-
ent from the extreme situation on which the code load models are based.

4. Safety 55
CHAPTER 4. SAFETY
Better be safe than sorry
Proverb, mid 19th century
4.1 INTRODUCTION
A lot of people think that safety is the most important, if not the only, parameter to be considered in a
risk assessment. In structural terms a structure is safe if the load-bearing capacity of the bridge is greater
than the loads likely to be applied by man or by nature. Because of the random nature of the loads and
the resistance, it is difficult to predict how safe a bridge is. In order to quantify safety, researchers have
proposed several measures. The simplest is a direct comparison of resistance and load effects, the so-
called factor of safety. It is based on a deterministic evaluation of the resistance and the load effects and
as such is usually conservative when taking into account possible variations in these parameters.
Another safety measure is the reliability index, which is in theory directly related to the probability of
failure. Although structural reliability theory is not able to calculate actual failure probabilities, it allows
notional probabilities to be calculated. These probabilities may not be interpreted in a frequentist way,
but have a useful meaning when comparing similar bridges and using the same probabilistic
assumptions. It takes into account the variability of the variables used in the analysis and may also be
used to calculate the sensitivity of the end result to each variable.
Whichever safety measure is chosen, the assessed level of safety will depend on three key parameters:
(1) the type of structural analysis, (2) the material properties and (3) the loading. The latter two have
already been considered in chapter 3. In the current chapter, the most common structural analysis
methods used for the determination of the safety level are reviewed. The assessment of concrete bridges
using elastic analysis can often lead to an apparent failure. However, because the linear elastic failure
corresponds to failure of one single element in the structure, the bridge may be able to continue carrying
loads. Due to the ability of concrete structures to significantly redistribute load effects prior to the
formation of a complete collapse mechanism, the ultimate load predictions calculated with elastic
analysis may be very conservative. In contrast, nonlinear and plastic methods recognise that collapse
occurs when a mechanism forms. More of the bridge deck is used to resist the applied loads and the
corresponding level of safety is thus higher than the value calculated with elastic methods. Different
methods of structural analysis are applied to two example beam-and-slab bridges and it is shown that by
considering nonlinear behaviour the ultimate load capacity of a bridge can be shown to be up to 50%
higher than when it is calculated with linear elastic analysis.
Having recognised that there is a difference in terms of safety level when system rather than element
failure is considered, three risk indicators to be used in the new risk assessment methodology are
presented at the end of the chapter.
4.2 MEASURES TO QUANTIFY SAFETY
4.2.1 Factor of safety
Various methods of defining safety have been proposed in the literature [Freudenthal, 1956]
[Basler, 1960][Hasofer, 1974]. The factor of safety FOS is often used when the safety of different
structures or structural elements are compared.
For elastic analysis methods FOSelastic is defined as the ratio of the resistance R and the load effects S,
both including the partial safety factors. The partial safety factors, which take into account the
uncertainties, are generally taken from the design/assessment codes. These generic factors are valid for
most bridges and as such they do not reflect site-specific uncertainties.
Equation 4.1
For the yield-line method FOSYLA is the ratio between the factored energy dissipated in the yield-lines,
EDYL, and the factored work done by the loads, WDQ:
Equation 4.2
Conventional design often considers only the elastic factor of safety. For assessment, where it can be
beneficial to evaluate safety as accurately as possible, FOSYLA is sometimes used. If not mentioned
otherwise, in the following the elastic factor of safety is meant when discussing FOS.
4. Safety 57
4.2.2 Reliability index
4.2.2.1 Structural reliability theory
The reliability index is in theory at least an improved safety indicator as it takes into account the
specific uncertainty of all the parameters involved. It is directly related to the theoretical probability of
failure of a structure, pf:
Equation 4.3
Where ( ): Standard normal distribution function
While for some risks the probability of an event happening is easily calculated from past history, e.g. car
accidents, there are many events that either occur infrequently or have never yet occurred. For these,
there is no experience on which to base an assessment of the probability of occurrence. To assess the
probability of failure of structures, which in most cases belong in this category, the theory of structural
reliability has been developed.
In the following a brief and basic description of structural reliability theory is given. In its simplest form,
the probability of failure pf is equal to the probability that S is greater than R:
Equation 4.4
Equation 4.4 states that the probability of failure is equal to the integral, over the range of all possible
values of S, of the probabilities that S is equal to x and R is less than or equal to x. Figure 4.1 illustrates
the integrand of Equation 4.4 as a function of the PDFs of R and S.
fR(r), fS(s)
FR(x) = P(R x)
R
fS(x) = P(x<Sx+dx)
x
R, S
dx
Figure 4.1 Probability of failure as a function of resistance and load effects
A three dimensional representation of the failure zone with respect to the joint probability distribution of
R and S is shown in Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2 Failure zone (R-S < 0) with respect to the joint probability distribution of R and S (joint
PDF generated from PDFs of Figure 4.1 assuming no correlation between R and S)
4. Safety 59
With this figure the failure probability becomes:
Equation 4.5
Where fR,S(r,s): Joint probability density function of R and S
As the failure probability estimates from this equation depend on subjective probability density
functions, they are subjective rather than frequentist in nature. Equation 4.5 is very sensitive to the
probability laws chosen for R and S. Equally plausible laws can give rise to differences in pf of two or
more orders of magnitude [Schneider, 1999][Ellingwood, 2000].
As exact solutions of the joint probability integral can only be calculated in rare cases, the probabilistic
analysis of structural safety is usually carried out by either simplifying the probability density function
in Equation 4.5 or by using numerical integration methods such as the Monte Carlo technique [Thoft-
Christensen, 1982][Melchers, 1999].
In the first case, the First or Second Order reliability methods (FORM/SORM) use a point estimator of
the limit state surface to estimate the reliability index [Rackwitz, 1978]. In this way the precise shape of
the limit state surface, and thus the volume of the failure zone, is not considered. A typical
FORM/SORM-based reliability analysis goes through the following steps:
1. Selection of appropriate limit-state function
2. Modelling of basic variables
3. Computation of reliability index
4. Perform sensitivity studies (sensitivity factors i)
5. Check safety (deemed safe if > target reliability index t)
A sensitivity factor i is a relative measure of how sensitive the reliability index is to changes in the
value of a basic variable Xi. i2 is a random variable Xis proportion of the total uncertainty; it is a
valuable measure to find the variables that most affect the safety of a structure and thus need to be
known more accurately than the others.
In the second case, numerical integration considers the volume of the failure zone that is bounded by the
limit state surface. Although they are still approximations, numerical methods are considered more
exact, because they do not rely on the point estimator used by analytical methods. Their accuracy,
however, depends on the shape of the failure function. Furthermore, by their numerical nature they can
only be used to estimate the probability of failure, and not for a sensitivity analysis.
The approximation and simulation methods are well developed today [Rackwitz, 2001] and several
commercial computer programs are available ranging from crude Monte Carlo to full SORM. A
description of the most commonly used programs is contained in [Schneider, 1996].
4.2.2.2 General comments on structural reliability
So far, there are few examples in the literature of reliability-based assessment used in practice. Casas
assessed arch bridges in Spain using site-specific information, such as traffic-data, geometry and
material strengths, and FORM [Casas, 2000], but the structural analysis was kept quite basic. For the
Dornaz Bridge in Switzerland, a detailed assessment including material testing, yield-line analysis and
system reliability was carried out [Bailey, 1999]. Ramboll has experience with probabilistic-based
assessment of post-tensioned bridges [Enevoldsen, 2000a] and also plasticity-based assessment of slab
bridges [Enevoldsen, 2000b]. Middleton used yield-line theory to assess slab bridges more accurately
and also incorporated it within a reliability framework, although he questioned the validity of the latter
for anything beyond sensitivity analysis [Middleton, 1994].
The evaluation of failure probabilities requires the use of considerable judgement. Structural reliability
theory certainly has a role to play in the assessment of existing structures. Its major advantages are:
The inclusion of the uncertainties inherent in the estimation of the loads and resistance.
The inclusion of a global sensitivity analysis. In the other methods the sensitivity of one
parameter after the other can be determined, but not altogether.
Sensitivity analysis can directly be used to plan inspection in an efficient way.
Its disadvantages are:
The difficulty of choosing an acceptable target probability of failure .
General lack of data to determine distributions, especially in the region of the extremes.
Statistical parameters of the models used in the analysis are often based on assumptions and are
thus approximate. However, the results are more or less valid, if they are relatively insensitive to
these assumptions. A sensitivity analysis at the end of the reliability analysis might help to show
the validity, e.g. by varying the COV of the distributions.
Sensitivity to the distributions used (tail-sensitivity, truncated distributions). Often the failures
occur in extreme tail regions.
4. Safety 61
Sensitivity to the number of basic variables included in analysis.
Difficulty to include model uncertainty. It is never possible to include all sources of uncertainty
in the probabilistic models used. Some sources of uncertainty are essentially non-quantifiable
and are often associated with factors such as the preferences of the analyst for particular
probabilistic models, the expertise of the study team, and human error.
Choice of limit-state functions is based on judgement. Furthermore, it is difficult to obtain

explicit limit state functions in the nonlinear range of the material behaviour while taking into
account system behaviour.
Correlation of multiple failure modes difficult to determine and include in the analysis.
Furthermore, the reliability of a structure estimated on the basis of a given set of probabilistic models for
load and resistances may have limited meaning (notional reliability). It may not, and probably does not,
reflect the actual reliability of the structure. Since the probabilistic modelling forming the basis of the
reliability analysis is highly influenced by subjectivity, the estimated reliability should be interpreted
only as a measure for comparison.
Although some researchers consider structural reliability analysis as the best way to assess existing
structures, the author believes that it should not be used on its own for that purpose. Taking into account
the limitations of the reliability index, it is suggested to use the factor of safety as the major indicator for
safety in the risk assessment strategy developed in this thesis. Not least, practising engineers are familiar
with FOS, and the uncertainties are also taken into account through partial safety factors. In the authors
opinion, instead of using a more precise safety measure, it is important to include in the assessment other
risk-influencing parameters, such as consequences of failure or degree of warning.
Despite its limitations, structural reliability theory can be a useful instrument to detect the critical
parameters through a sensitivity analysis: in section 9.3.6 it is used to find the critical risk indicators
among the five considered.
4.3 STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS
A recent study on why 294 bridges of the UK motorway and trunk road network have failed their
assessment, and therefore been considered as substandard, has recently been carried out by Parsons
Brinckerhoff Ltd. [Parsons Brinckerhoff, 2003]. The conclusions were that most of the bridges were
declared substandard because the assessing engineers used conservative or inappropriate methods of
analysis (Figure 4.3). The use of more sophisticated structural analysis, such as plastic analysis instead
of elastic analysis, could therefore be beneficial and mean that some if not many of these bridges would
have passed the assessment.
Inappropriate use of standards (3%)

Conservative or inappropriate analysis (27%)
Design or construction errors (10%)
Conservative assumptions (12%)
Deterioration (13%)
Updates in standards (19%)
Increased loading (17%)
Figure 4.3 - Reasons for assessment failure of 294 UK bridges (adapted from
[Parsons Brinckerhoff, 2003])
This section looks at various methods of structural analysis to identify the ones most suitable for
modelling actual collapse. It starts with a short introduction on the failure criteria and analysis methods
used. Using these methods, the analytical predictions for two examples of model bridges are then
compared to the results obtained in the laboratory. As a result, the best methods for use in the proposed
assessment method can then be selected.
As flexure is the dominant failure mode of failure for the type of bridges considered in this thesis
[Parsons Brinckerhoff, 2003], most of the following considerations will be for bending failure, however
similar reasoning could be applied for other modes of failure such as shear failure.
4. Safety 63
4.3.1 Failure criterion
Generally, three different criteria are used to define when failure at the ultimate limit state has been
reached:
A. First element failure, corresponding to the load level at which the first element reaches its
resistance. For flexure, a bilinear representation of the moment-curvature relationship for
reinforced concrete may be used (state 1: linear elastic, uncracked, state 2: cracked), but in
practice often a linear relationship is assumed, ignoring the uncracked state.
B. First element failure with redistribution. The structural analysis is defined as linear with
redistribution, if the action effects derived from linear analysis are redistributed within the
structure. For the verification of the ultimate limit state, the moments in the sections with the
highest action effects resulting from linear elastic analysis may be reduced, provided that in the
other sections the moments are increased to maintain equilibrium. To be able to redistribute the
moments, the structure needs to be ductile.
C. Formation of a mechanism, which can take place whenever critical sections are ductile enough
to permit the necessary deformation. Nonlinear structural analysis assumes a nonlinear material
behaviour. For bending, a trilinear moment-curvature diagram includes also state 3 (plastic state,
Figure 4.4). Some codes (e.g. Model Code 1990) allow work hardening (Mu > My), others
include state 3 with Mu = My.
Generally failure criterion A is used in practice, sometimes criterion B when dealing with continuous
beams. Criterion C is only rarely used.
Figure 4.4 Idealised trilinear moment-curvature relationship

Elastic methods are based on the assumption that failure takes place as soon as one point in a bridge
deck reaches its ultimate capacity. Simply supported beams, as statically determinate structures, may be
analysed using equilibrium considerations alone. They will form a simple collapse mechanism, when
one part of the structure reaches its structural capacity. Furthermore, when the ultimate capacity of a
section is reached, it is not possible to find a new equilibrium state in this cross section. This means that
one cannot increase the load in a statically determinate structure, if the ultimate capacity of any cross
section of the structure has been reached. For such structures there is thus nothing to gain in terms of
safety by considering nonlinear analysis.
For statically indeterminate structures, such as continuous structures and slabs, the elastic analysis is
affected by stiffness properties. For a ductile structure a collapse mechanism is not automatically formed
when one part of the structure reaches its ultimate capacity; for such structures further loading is
possible after the ultimate capacity of one or many cross-sections is reached. When some parts of the
structure begin to yield, their stiffness will be reduced and the rest of the structure attracts a larger
proportion of the load, until eventually a failure mechanism will form.
Few reinforced concrete structures under load behave in the elastic manner normally assumed; they
exhibit a nonlinear behaviour with increasing load. Up to the yield load, the nonlinear behaviour is
caused by cracking (reduction of stiffness). Further significant nonlinear behaviour arises when the
plastic part of the stress-strain relationship of the reinforcement steel is reached and a plastic hinge is
formed in the structure. Ductility may be defined as the ability to deform significantly beyond the elastic
limit, while maintaining an ultimate resistance at or above the yield value. In order to ensure adequate
load redistribution, the bridge members have to provide sufficient ductility (see section 5.2).
The advantage of the nonlinear analysis is that it gives a realistic description of the physical behaviour
of the structure (deflections and internal forces). One of the major disadvantages is that the superposition
of different load cases is not possible and the effort required to carry out the structural analysis will be
higher than for methods based on linear-elastic theory.
4.3.2 Analysis methods
To estimate the load effects in a bridge and compare them to the resistance, a bridge can be examined
with various analysis methods, which differ in simplicity and precision. In the following the most
commonly used are reviewed, but the list of the methods presented is non-exhaustive and a detailed
description of them would go beyond the scope of this chapter. More information on the methods cited
and others can be found in reference books such as [Favre, 1997], [Ghali, 1997] or [OBrien, 1999].
Today, the most widely used linear elastic methods for bridge deck analysis are linear finite element and
4. Safety 65
linear grillage analysis, while the most popular nonlinear analysis methods are nonlinear finite element,
nonlinear grillage and yield-line analysis.
4.3.2.1 Grillage analysis (GA)
Because of its simplicity, grillage analysis used to be the preferred analysis method for bridge decks; it
has been shown to be accurate [Hambly, 1991][OBrien, 1999]. In this technique the physical deck is
idealised by a grid structure of rigidly connected longitudinal and transverse beams (e.g. Figure 4.5),
each with a bending and torsional stiffness representative of the region of slab the member models. At
each junction of the grillage beams, deflection and slope compatibility equations can be set up.
Guidelines about the grillage layout and modelling procedure can be found in the book of OBrien &
Keogh [OBrien, 1999].
The dead load is applied as a distributed load over the longitudinal and transverse beam elements. So as
not to induce local bending due to the structural model used, the live load is always applied as point
loads at the nodes: if the vehicle wheels do not coincide with the grillage nodes, the forces are linearly
redistributed to act on the adjacent nodes. The load effects are calculated for each grillage beam, and the
highest local values are compared to the resistance of this beam.
Figure 4.5 Example: Grillage model of Allt Chonoghlais bridge and support conditions (grillage
members along direction of reinforcement)
4.3.2.2 Finite element analysis (FEA)
Traditionally grillage analysis was favoured over finite-element analysis, which was mainly used for the
most complex problems. With todays availability of inexpensive, high-speed computers and user-
friendly programs, the finite-element method has begun to replace grillage analysis as the method of
choice, even for relatively simple slab decks. Finite-element analysis is relatively easy to use and in
theory should give accurate results in the elastic load range, provided the structure is modelled
appropriately, although potential problems are always the issues of mesh size dependence and correct
modelling of boundary conditions.
In FEA the structure is modelled as a finite number of discrete segments of structure (e.g. Figure 4.6).
For slab bridges these elements are plate elements, for beams they are beam elements. The elements are
connected together at the nodes, at which the FEA solutions have to ensure compatibility and
equilibrium [Frey, 2001].
Line supports
Figure 4.6 Example: Finite element model of Allt Chonoghlais bridge
The stress resultants or load effects are calculated at the nodes of a finite element; using interpolation the
effects per unit width can be obtained for every point of the structure. The highest load effects are then
compared to the local resistance.
The examples in sections 4.3.3 and 4.4 show that for beam-and-slab and slab bridges there is generally
good agreement between the values from the linear finite element and grillage analyses, so that it may be
concluded that both methods are adequate for determining the linear elastic behaviour of these bridge
types.
4.3.2.3 Nonlinear finite element analysis (NLFE)
Nonlinear finite element analysis incorporates the behaviour of the finite element model beyond the
linear elastic range. Compared with linear-elastic calculations, NLFE is often able to assess better both
load effects and resistance by considering factors such as membrane action, cracking and actual material
behaviour.
The initiation and development of cracking dominates the modelling of nonlinear behaviour in most
commercial NLFE programs. There are different ways of modelling cracking. A detailed description of
the available crack models would go beyond the scope of this thesis, but is included in most NLFE-
software manuals such as [Diana, 2002].
After cracking, the concrete between two adjacent cracks can still resist tensile forces because of the
bond with the reinforcement; this tension stiffening effect results in the tensile stiffness of cracked
4. Safety 67
reinforced concrete sections being significantly greater than the stiffness of the steel reinforcement
alone. Most NLFE programs simulate the tension stiffening effect by using a stress-strain curve for
concrete in tension, allowing for a decrease in tension stiffening as cracking progresses.
Cracked reinforced concrete sections are also subject to a progressive decrease in shear capacity, known
as shear retention. This effect, defined by the post-cracking portion of the shear stress-strain curve, is
difficult to quantify. Commonly, full shear retention, if significant shear reinforcement is present, or no
shear retention, for sections with no reinforcement, is assumed.
The major problem with NLFE is that it relies on the input of many parameters, which will influence the
results. Whereas in research these parameters can be calibrated using laboratory test results, in a real
bridge assessment such data is not available. The assessing engineer will therefore have to make
conservative assumptions on the NLFE input parameters and this might reduce the advantage of using
NLFE.
4.3.2.4 Nonlinear grillage analysis (NLGA)
The calculation of the ultimate system failure load of a bridge using NLGA requires the investigation of
member performance and load redistribution in the longitudinal and transverse direction. The nonlinear
grillage analysis of structural systems is performed with stepwise modification of the stiffness
parameters to take into account material nonlinearity. A grillage model does not completely describe the
real behaviour as it ignores effects such as compressive membrane action. However, when studying the
(nonlinear) distribution of the load effects in the main members, it can be very useful. The grillage
layout and modelling procedure are the same as for the linear grillage analysis, but the moments of
inertia of the longitudinal as well as the transverse beams are taken from the moment-curvature relation
to take into account nonlinear behaviour. In this thesis, the torsional constant J is calculated following
the recommendations of OBrien [OBrien, 1999] and is assumed constant during the entire analysis.
To consider nonlinear structural behaviour, an incremental loading technique is proposed in this thesis;
this technique assumes a trilinear moment-curvature behaviour of all the elements, where each line
segment corresponds to different stiffness properties. Figure 4.4 shows a typical curve describing the
nonlinear behaviour of a reinforced concrete beam in bending. The points of transition between
segments will be referred to as critical points. It is further assumed that the member behaves in a linear
elastic manner in the stages between the critical points.
At the beginning of the incremental analysis, all the beam elements are in their linear elastic range
corresponding to the first segment of each elements curve (state 1 in Figure 4.4). The dead load and a
unit live load are applied to the structure in the assumed critical locations and the load effects in all the
elements are calculated. Each element is then checked to calculate the factor, by which the unit live load
should be multiplied in order to attain the level, at which the next critical load effect value Mr will be
reached (kink in moment-curvature curve). The finally chosen load factor is the minimum one of all the
elements. The load effects in all the elements are then calculated for the unit load multiplied by this final
load factor. These are the final results of the first iteration.
In the second iteration the stiffness of the element, where a critical load effect is reached, is modified to
reflect the reduced stiffness of the next segment (state 2). A second elastic analysis is then performed on
the new grillage with the updated stiffness and the unit load (at the same location) only. The resulting
load effects in all elements are added to the load effects of the previous iteration. Every element is
checked to find the lowest possible load factor by which the results of the second analysis should be
multiplied to produce a new critical point of the nonlinear moment-curvature diagram. The resulting
load factor is the incremental load factor and is added to the load factor of the previous iteration. These
are the results of the second iteration. The elements for which the ultimate load effect is reached are
removed on the subsequent grillage. This does not mean that they are removed in reality as the ultimate
load capacity is calculated as the sum of several different grillage layouts. The process is repeated until
the grillage becomes unstable, i.e. when no elements remain around the load application points.
4.3.2.5 Yield-line analysis (YLA)
This plastic method is usually less conservative than elastic methods and therefore significant savings
can potentially be made when assessing concrete structures. The use of yield-line analysis by practising
engineers is not widespread, possibly because it is difficult to apply to anything but the simplest slab
geometry, reinforcement layout and loading as well as for simple mechanisms.
Classical yield-line analysis is based on virtual work, where the rate of external work due to the applied
loads is equated to the rate of internal dissipation of energy [Favre, 1997][Ghali, 1997]. For a given
failure mechanism the minimum failure load can be found. In the commercially available computer
program COBRAS the user selects appropriate failure mechanisms from a pre-defined library of typical
slab failure mechanisms. The program then step-wise increments the mechanisms pattern and optimises
it to find the minimum value of the applied load [Cobras, 2001].
As an upper bound method, there is always a possibility that another, more critical, failure mechanism
may govern the actual collapse behaviour of the structure. The assessing engineer is thus dependent on
experience to determine the critical yield-line patterns. Also, it must be emphasised that in yield-line
analysis only flexural failure is considered.
As a plastic method, yield-line analysis relies upon ductility and at present there is little guidance in the
codes on how to ensure that sufficient ductility is available. In practice, the use of yield-line analysis
requires the engineer to check if the available rotation capacity is high enough for the entire mechanism
to form. For that purpose a practical ductility check method is developed in section 5.2.2.
4. Safety 69
4.3.3 Application example: Validation of structural analysis methods with

beam-and-slab bridges
Several of the above analysis methods have been verified by comparing the theoretical predictions to the
results of laboratory tests undertaken at Cambridge University [Lowe, 1999][Hazell, 1999]. Most
analysis methods are well-known in the structural engineering community, except the nonlinear grillage
analysis method, which will be explained in more detail below. Lowe & Hazell have tested several scale
models of reinforced concrete beam-and-slab bridges, two of which, called bridges A and C, will be
considered here. Both bridges were single span and simply supported at both ends. Load was applied by
a mechanical jack and was distributed to four/two patches via steel spreader beams to simulate twin axle
loading. The model bridges analysed had a span of 2 m; the dimensions and the reinforcement of a
typical T-beam of bridge A are shown in Figure 4.7. The material properties are given in Table 4.1.
(a) Typical beam cross-section (b) Plan
Figure 4.7 Bridge A (Lowe)
Table 4.1 (Measured) material properties of test bridges [Lowe, 1999][Hazell, 1999]
Structure Concrete 4mm steel 6mm steel 8mm steel

fc [MPa] fy [MPa] ft [MPa] fy [MPa] ft [MPa] fy [MPa] ft [MPa]
Bridge A 37 376 395* 423 444* - -

(tested by Lowe)
Bridge C 41 - - 400 420* 474 497*
(tested by Hazell)
Steel properties for both bridges: (Assumed) concrete properties for both bridges:
- Youngs modulus: Es = 200 GPa - Youngs modulus: Ec = 29 GPa
- Elongation: su = 0.05* - Poissons ratio: = 0.18
*
assumed by author of this thesis
Bridge A (tested by Lowe [Lowe, 1999])
Bridge A was loaded with 4 wheel loads (Figure 4.7b). For the linear and nonlinear grillage analyses, the
bridge has been modelled as shown in Figure 4.8a. The longitudinal grillage members are positioned at
the location of the longitudinal beams. The transverse grillage members represent the transverse stiffness
of the slab. Since in grillage analysis loads are only applied to nodes, the 4 patch loads were linearly
distributed to the adjacent node points, resulting in 8 point loads directly applied on the grillage nodes
(Figure 4.8b).
Figure 4.8 (a) Grillage model of bridge A, (b) failure sequence
Table 4.2 compares the major steps of the incremental nonlinear grillage analysis with what was
observed during the test; the NLGA seems to predict the failure sequence and real behaviour quite
accurately.
It has to be added that the nonlinear grillage results are sensitive to the assumptions made regarding
torsion. For bridge A the failure load has been calculated here for different torsion assumptions (Table
4.3). A constant torsional rigidity value corresponding to the one suggested by OBrien & Keogh gave
final results closely matching the observed maximum load.
4. Safety 71
Table 4.2 Major events in nonlinear grillage analysis of bridge A compared with test
Major step Load level Theoretical failure development Observed failure development in test
[kN] (see Figure 4.8b) [Lowe, 1999]
1 11.7 Cracking longitudinal beam 1 First cracks noticeable beneath load patches
in longitudinal beams 1 and 2 at total load of
~25 kN
2 17.1 Cracking longitudinal beam 2
2 23.6 Cracking transverse beams 3 and 4
4 29.2 Cracking transverse beam 2
5 32.3 Cracking longitudinal beam 3
6 42.4 Yielding longitudinal beam 2
7 45.3 Yielding longitudinal beam 1 Hogging cracks in top surface between
longitudinal beams 2 and 3 apparent at
48 kN
8 56.0 Ultimate moment capacity reached Initiation of fan mechanism on bottom
in longitudinal beam 1 surface of slab between longitudinal beams 2
and 3 at total load > 50kN
9 58.7 Ultimate moment capacity reached
in longitudinal beam 2
10 60.4 Yielding transverse beams 3 and 4 Flexural cracks beneath load patches very
large at load > 60 kN
11 60.9 Ultimate moment capacity reached Ultimate failure at 63.8 kN when one of load
in transverse beams 3 and 4 patches punched through beam 2. Deck has
well-developed yield-line mechanism
consisting of flexural hinges in longitudinal
beams 1 and 2, yield-lines in the slab
extending from the load patches of
longitudinal beam 2 to longitudinal beam 1.
Table 4.3 Predicted collapse load of bridge A for different torsion assumptions
Torsional rigidity GJ Ultimate collapse load [kN]

predicted by NLGA
Constant (as suggested by [OBrien, 1999]) 60.9

Zero (torsionless grillage) 41.3
Constant (twice as high as suggested by 65.1
[OBrien, 1999])
Varying proportionally to the flexural rigidity EI 53.7
In addition to nonlinear grillage (NLGA), several other types of structural analysis have been used to
assess the ultimate failure load of bridge A. If not stated otherwise, the analyses have been carried out by
the author. In summary the analysis methods considered were:
Linear elastic grillage analysis (GA). Using uncracked members the load is increased until the
load effect in one of the uncracked grillage members reaches its theoretical ultimate resistance.
Yield-line analysis (YLA). It has to be mentioned that in the yield-line software used here
[Cobras, 2001], no allowance is made for torsion of the beams.
Nonlinear finite element analysis (NLFE) undertaken by Lowe [Lowe, 1999]
Elastic one-way beam analysis using the ACI distribution factors [ACI 318, 1995]
Due to the variability in the material properties, the boundary conditions and the initial state of stress in
the structure, it is unlikely that the ultimate load capacity of a bridge will be predicted with 100%-
accuracy with any of the analysis methods discussed. Figure 4.9a shows the final crack pattern of
bridge A, with the predicted yield-line pattern superposed and Figure 4.9b compares the different
analysis method results.
Figure 4.9 Bridge A: (a) Cracking patterns on the bottom side observed in the test and superposed
critical yield-line pattern, (b) Comparison of ultimate load predictions (for NLFE: range of results due
to parameter sensitivity)
YLA and NLGA give an acceptable prediction of the ultimate load capacity (within 5%), while
nonlinear finite element analysis is very sensitive to the choice of several key program variables, such as
element type, mesh size, number of integration points, failure ratios, tension stiffening curves, shear
retention or material properties. The difficulty of determining the appropriate combination of parameters
4. Safety 73
makes it hard to have confidence in ultimate failure load predictions. Lowe considered the sensitivity of
the results to a feasible range of input parameters [Lowe, 1999]. He obtained a wide range of ultimate
load predictions (Figure 4.9b: 48.7 64.2 kN).
The load at which the first element reached the ultimate capacity in the linear elastic (uncracked) grillage
analysis was 40.1 kN; compared with first element failure, 50% more live load is required to fail the
structure, when failure of the structure as a whole is considered. This is a key issue; linear elastic
analysis is the main analysis method used in practice, yet it can give a 50% underestimate.
Bridge C (tested by Hazell [Hazell, 1999])
Bridge C was of equal width and span to bridge A, but contained heavier reinforcement and thinner slab
sections. The live load was applied as two wheel loads, simulating a single axle load, at one side of the
bridge at midspan. The critical failure mechanism obtained with yield-line analysis (Figure 4.10a) was
found to be similar to the one obtained with nonlinear grillage analysis and matched that observed in the
laboratory test.
For both, bridge A and bridge C, it was found that linear grillage analysis underestimated the collapse
load considerably. For bridge C the theoretical failure load for first element failure using linear elastic
(uncracked) grillage analysis was 50.4 kN. When the failure of the whole bridge structure is considered
29% more live load can be applied. Both the nonlinear grillage and yield-line analyses predict the actual
ultimate load capacity accurately (within 6%).
Figure 4.10 Bridge C: (a) Cracking patterns on the bottom side observed in the test and superposed
critical yield-line pattern, (b) Comparison of ultimate load predictions
4.4 SENSITIVITY OF ASSESSED SAFETY TO STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS,

LOADING AND MATERIAL DATA
As explained in the introduction of this chapter, the assessed level of safety depends on three key
parameters: (1) the method of structural analysis, (2) the material properties and (3) the loading. In the
following, a study by the author [Imhof, 2004b] on the sensitivity of the safety factor to these points is
summarised. This study examined two concrete slab bridges, namely Sandhole and Allt Chonoghlais
bridges (see Appendix B), and was aimed at showing which of the three parameters could lead to the
greatest improvement in the assessed safety level compared with the prediction of the safety level based
on GA with the material properties specified at design and the design code load models.
The study showed that the choice of the structural analysis method has the biggest influence (increase of
up to 64%) on the resulting factor of safety. Elastic grillage and linear finite element analysis give
similar results. If flexure is critical, and there is sufficient ductility to undergo the necessary
deformations, using yield-line analysis can be very beneficial. This first conclusion of the study is very
important as some researchers spend huge efforts on sophisticated reliability-based modelling yet use
linear elastic analysis.
Including site-specific material properties can also increase (up to 30% in the study) the assessed factor
of safety, but tests should only be carried out for properties which are likely to influence the assessed
capacity. If bending is critical, updating the steel yield-strength is worthwhile; in the absence of shear
links, and if shear is critical, it is better to collect some core samples to obtain concrete strength data.
The assessed factor of safety may also be increased (up to 19% in the study) by using a bridge-specific
load model. As such a model requires comprehensive traffic data and involves a greater amount of
calculations, its use is, however, only recommended for cases, where the traffic on site is believed to be
very different from the extreme traffic used for the derivation of the code load models.
4.5 RISK INDICATOR: FACTOR OF SAFETY
Because of the possibility of redistribution, the load-bearing capacity of an element cross-section is

often not the same as the load-bearing capacity of the system. Considering system rather than element
failure can lead to a higher level of assessed safety. In the risk assessment methodology of this thesis,
the element factor of safety is directly considered and the system factor of safety indirectly, as is
explained below.
4. Safety 75
More advanced analysis methods can improve the assessed factor of safety dramatically, but in some
cases this improvement will not be needed, as the bridge might be shown safe enough, even when
simpler analysis methods are used. In this thesis, it is therefore proposed that safety be included in the
risk assessment with three separate risk indicators:
Current safety is quantified in terms of the factor of safety at present time, FOS0, and is
calculated with linear elastic methods such as FEA or GA, which can be done by any practising
engineer. If this risk indicator is critical, it can be improved by including in-situ material and
loading properties.
Future safety is quantified in terms of the factor of safety at the time of the next assessment,
FOSna. This factor is calculated in exactly the same way as FOS0, but the resistance is reduced
(see section 3.3.7) in order to include the predicted deterioration of the structure with time. The
future safety risk indicator is included in the risk assessment methodology to make sure that the
risk assessment remains valid until the next one is due to be undertaken.
Warning level (see chapter 5), i.e. the additional safety available after first-element failure, can
be calculated by more advanced structural analysis such as NLFE, NLGA or YLA. By including
this risk indicator, some bridges with an insufficient element safety factor can be shown to be
performing adequately since they have a sufficient system safety factor.
By using three different risk indicators, the influence on the risk performance of the bridge, of
deterioration, but also of having a warning level after first element failure can be demonstrated
separately.
4.6 CONCLUSIONS
The evaluation of structural safety is an essential part of the risk assessment of existing bridges. Several
methods have been proposed to quantify the level of safety of a bridge; after reviewing the deterministic
factor of safety and the probabilistic reliability index, it was decided to use the former as the risk
indicator in this thesis. The reliability index has certain advantages, such as the inclusion of specific
variable uncertainties and the sensitivity analysis on the obtained results, but it depends strongly on the
assumptions made for the variables, and it is difficult to determine the tails of the probabilistic
distributions, as no information is usually available. Furthermore, there is still no generally agreed
criterion on how to determine the acceptable target reliability levels. The factor of safety approach, on
the other hand, is already known to practising engineers; it includes, although conservatively, variable
uncertainties in a deterministic way and has been proven to work satisfactorily.
The level of safety depends on the input information, i.e. load and resistance, but above all on the type
of structural analysis. Using laboratory results from Cambridge University, diverse analysis methods
have been compared. It has been demonstrated that by using more advanced analysis methods, the
ultimate failure load of the most common reinforced concrete bridge types can be assessed more
accurately, resulting in gains of up to 50% compared with elastic analysis. Yield-line analysis is easier to
implement than nonlinear grillage analysis, but it does not predict shear failures, and as an upper bound
method, the predicted failure mechanism might not be the critical one. Also, a ductility check is required
as this plastic method assumes sufficient ductility. The ultimate load might even be higher than the one
predicted by more advanced structural analysis, because of other hidden strengths such as compressive
membrane action [WS Atkins, 2000].
The chapter ends with the introduction of three risk indicators to be used in the new risk assessment
methodology of this thesis. As will be shown in chapter 9 this risk approach is modular and the
assessing engineer does not need to calculate all the proposed risk indicators, if he can show adequate
bridge performance with only some of the risk indicators. For this reason, it was decided to split safety
into two risk indicators: (1) safety in terms of first-element failure, which can easily be calculated using
elastic methods, and (2) reserve safety up to the collapse of the whole system, which requires more
difficult calculation using nonlinear or plastic methods. If within the risk assessment methodology of
chapter 9 the first risk indicator is sufficiently high, there is no need to evaluate the second. To warrant
the validity of the risk assessment until the next one is undertaken, a third risk indicator is introduced,
which takes into account the possible deterioration of the structure in between assessments.
5. Warning level 77
CHAPTER 5. WARNING LEVEL
Certis rebus certa signa praecurrerent (Certain signs precede certain events)
Cicero (106-43 BC), De Divinatione, Bk. I, ch. 52, sec. 118
5.1 INTRODUCTION
A failure in one element of a structure does not necessarily mean that the whole structure will
immediately fall down. As seen in chapter 4, most bridges can resist much higher loads than the load
causing first element failure. This can be of major benefit if taken into account for the risk assessment of
a bridge: a bridge which can still carry further load after first element failure will have a certain degree
of warning. Such warning signs as excessive deflection or cracking will show up once the first element
has failed, and announce that a collapse might be imminent. A part of the estimated failure consequences
can thus be avoided and the collapse risk reduced.
An increase of the loads beyond the elastic stage is often possible, because in most bridges the load can
be redistributed transversely and longitudinally, but this increase in load carrying capacity, defined here
as redundancy, is only possible, if sufficient deformation capacity is available. In statically
indeterminate reinforced concrete structures, the rotational capacity of the plastic hinges may be very
small and the theoretical systems load capacity may thus not be reached. For NLFE and NLGA
ductility, i.e. the ability to deform significantly beyond the elastic limit while maintaining an ultimate
resistance at or above the yield value, is implicitly included as the material behaviour is modelled by
means of force-deformation relationships. In contrast, linear analysis followed by redistribution and
plastic analysis methods, such as YLA, assume sufficient ductility. This chapter contains methods to
check whether sufficient deformation capacity is available for load redistribution.
Several studies have attempted to quantify the benefits of redundancy [Hendawi, 1994][Ghosn, 1998]
[Gharaibeh, 2000]. The main approaches are reviewed here, and, at the end of the chapter, a new method
taking into account the degree of warning in the risk assessment is proposed. It is based on the
difference in terms of factor of safety that occurs, when system rather than element failure is considered.
5.2 DUCTILITY
After having reached the elastic strength limit, a reinforced concrete element does not have unlimited
capacity to deform. At a certain point either the steel reinforcing bars will rupture, or the concrete itself
will crush, and the structural element will collapse. To ensure that the structure can undergo the
necessary deformations, a ductility check should accompany analysis methods which assume sufficient
ductility. In the following, two separate approaches are presented to address this issue: (i) a ductility
check for beam elements spanning in one direction and (ii) a ductility check for slabs, i.e. elements
spanning in multiple directions.
5.2.1 Ductility check for load redistribution of beams
To check that a structure is physically able to undergo the rotations necessary for load redistribution, the
available plastic rotation capacity (supply) is compared with the required plastic rotation capacity
(demand).
5.2.1.1 Supply: Available plastic rotation capacity
Definition
The available inelastic rotation of a plastic hinge pl,avail, before the resistance moment falls below the
ultimate value, is the integral of all the associated inelastic curvatures not considered in normal elastic
analysis. Inelastic curvature arises due to yielding of the steel and cracking or crushing of the concrete.
Inelastic regions may be modelled by using nonlinear moment-curvature relationships, e.g. Figure 4.4.
The rotation is the integral of the curvatures, 1/r, along the length of the beam (Figure 5.1a). In this
thesis, the rotation definitions of the Model Code 1990 have been adopted to measure ductility
[MC 90, 1991]:
1. The total rotation tot at failure is equal to the integral of the curvature along the member length.
2. The elastic rotation y is equal to the integral of the curvature along the member length at the
onset of yielding of reinforcement.
3. The plastic rotation pl, i.e. the rotation capacity, is calculated as the difference between the total
rotation tot and the elastic rotation y (Figure 5.1b).
The plastic rotation contains therefore the curvature that occurs after passing the yield moment up to
failure. Once the ultimate moment is reached, it is assumed that there is no more load-bearing capacity;
5. Warning level 79
the rotation capacity available after having reached tot is thus not taken into account, but is regarded as
an additional reserve.
Figure 5.1 (a) Rotation calculation and (b) Moment-rotation curve
Codified available plastic rotation capacity
The structural codes specify the available plastic rotation capacity in terms of the ratio of the depth of
concrete in compression at failure x and the depth to the tension reinforcement d (Figure 5.2). The
conventional way to calculate the x/d-ratio is to use design values (including partial safety factors) for
the material properties, a parabolic stress-strain diagram for the concrete with an ultimate strain of
cu = 0.35% and a bilinear stress-strain relationship for steel with an ultimate strain of su = 1%. In
addition, most codes contain a limit to the neutral axis depth in order to guarantee a failure by yielding
of the steel, because it is thought that steel failure means ductile failure.
In Eurocode 2 (EC 2) and the CEB-FIP Model Code 1990 (MC 90) reinforcing steel is categorised by
steel ductility (Table 5.1). The two parameters used to describe steel ductility are the strain hardening
ratio ft /fy and the ultimate steel strain su, i.e. the deformation corresponding to the tensile strength ft.
Table 5.1 Reinforcing steel ductility classes [MC 90, 1991][EC 2, 2002]
Model Code 1990 Eurocode 2 ft /fy [-] su [%]
A H (high ductility) 1.08 5

B N (normal ductility) 1.05 2.5
S - 1.15 6
Figure 5.2 Available plastic rotation specified in different codes for a beam with d = 300 mm and
diameter of smallest tensile reinforcing bar = 8 mm
The Model Code 1990 is the most advanced code with respect to plastic rotation capacity, as it is based
on more advanced theoretical models than the other codes and has been verified against real rotation
data. Whereas other codes are based on empirical equations multiplying the curvature at rupture by an
assumed plastic hinge length, MC 90 is based on integration of the plastic curvatures along the beam.
Compared with the other models it recognises that the available rotation capacity is decreasing when x/d
is approaching zero. For small x/d-values the beam is failing due to rupture of the reinforcement; the
available plastic rotation capacity decreases with decreasing x/d because the ultimate curvature at the
hinge is lower.
In the MC 90, the available plastic rotation capacity of hinges is given for a simply-supported beam
under a single point load. This static configuration could also represent the region between two points of
contraflexure over the support for a uniformly loaded continuous beam. In the latter case, the support
reaction is approximately transformed to a midspan load of a simply-supported beam. The MC 90
simply-supported beam has a slenderness ratio of span to structural depth, l/d, equal to 6, but the plastic
rotation capacities given in Figure 5.2 may be converted to any other slenderness value using the
assumption that the plastic rotation capacity varies proportionally to the square root of the slenderness
ratio [CEB 242, 1998].
The restrictions of some codes can be very conservative and exclude plastic analysis as tools for
assessment; for example, reinforcing bars with higher ductility than the ones used in the codes may lead
to higher ductility of a concrete element. Comparing the different codes in Figure 5.2 it seems that even
5. Warning level 81
if the requirements of some codes are respected, premature failures could also occur as only MC 90
drops off at low x/d; EC 2 and BS 5400 have plateaus.
Basic calculation model
In the last decade, very sophisticated calculation models, which take into account bond behaviour,
localised contraction of the bar at yield, crack spacing, shear and other parameters, have been developed
[CEB 242, 1998][Eligehausen, 1993][Sigrist, 1995][CEB 239, 1997]. After having reviewed different
models for the calculation of the available rotation capacity, a basic model has been developed in this
thesis. It works in a similar way to the more complicated models, but its assumptions are simpler, and
the calculations can be done in a more straightforward manner. In this basic model, as a first step, the
moment-curvature curve of the beam section is calculated. In a second step the inelastic curvatures along
the beam length are summed up to get the available plastic rotation capacity.
The moment-curvature relationship of the beam section (Figure 5.3) is calculated following the MC 90-
approach, assuming Bernoullis hypothesis of plane sections remaining plane.
Figure 5.3 Moment-curvature curve calculated with MC 90-approach

The theoretical first cracking moment Mr is:
Equation 5.1
Where W1: Section modulus in the uncracked state (state 1)

fctm: Mean concrete tensile strength
Because of the inevitable presence of pre-existing cracks due to environmental action or the construction
sequence, the curvature can be expected to leave state 1 for a moment smaller than the theoretical
cracking moment Mr. This reduced cracking moment is defined as Mr,red. For pure bending, Favre
proposed that Mr,red be given by [Favre, 1997]:
Equation 5.2
Figure 5.3 shows that beyond the reduced cracking moment Mr,red the contribution of the concrete in
tension between the cracks 1/rts (ts = tension stiffening), to the overall curvature of a beam in pure
bending decreases with increasing applied moment M.
The curvatures 1/ri, where i is the state of cracking (uncracked: state 1, cracked: state 2), are calculated
with the following general equation, in which Ii is the second moment of area of the beam section.
Equation 5.3
The curvature in state 1, 1/r1, is calculated with the complete uncracked concrete section and including
allowance for the reinforcing steel by using the transformed area method. The curvature in state 2, 1/r2,
is obtained by using the cracked concrete section including the steel.
Once M has reached Mr,red and for Mr,red M My, the mean curvature 1/rm is [MC 90, 1991]:
Equation 5.4
5. Warning level 83
Where 1/r1r: Curvature in state 1 for M = Mr

1/r2r: Curvature in state 2 for M = Mr
The yield moment My is calculated assuming the steel bars yield (s = fy/Es), whereas the ultimate
moment Mu corresponds either to steel rupture (s = su) or to concrete crushing (c = cu). Using section
equilibrium considerations we get the depth of the concrete in compression x, and hence the curvature
corresponding to steel rupture:
Equation 5.5
and for concrete failure :
Equation 5.6
For M > My, the mean curvature is [MC 90, 1991]:
Equation 5.7
Finally, the available plastic rotation capacity is obtained as the integral of the curvatures along the
beam corresponding to a moment diagram with a maximum applied moment of Mu, minus those with a
maximum applied moment of My (Figure 5.4). To simplify the calculations the nonlinear part between
Mr,red and My of Figure 5.3 is approximated by a linear segment, hence the plastic rotation becomes:
Equation 5.8
Where 1/rr,red: Curvature corresponding to Mr,red

Figure 5.4 Plastic rotation capacity calculated with basic model
With this basic model the plastic rotation capacity additionally available after having reached an applied
moment equal to Mu is neglected and, although shear influences are ignored and thus only flexural
hinges are considered, it leads to acceptable results, as shown by the comparison with experimental test
results (Table 5.2).
Table 5.2 Comparison of experimental test results and predictions of rotation capacities [mrad]
Test Tested by Test Authors basic model Model Code

specimen results 1990
tot pl tot diff. pl diff. pl diff.
RPL2 Eibl/Bhler 43 36 42 2% 31 14% 32 11%

[CEB 218, 1993]
1 Alvarez/Kppel/Marti - 17 40 - 18 6% 10 41%
[Alvarez, 2000]
T9B1 Bosco/Debernardi - 9 23 - 9 0% 6 33%
[CEB 218, 1993]
D12 Clarke 47 26 56 19% 24 8% 13 50%
[CEB 218, 1993]
S05 Calvi/Cantu/Macchi 47 37 55 17% 42 14% 34 8%
[CEB 218, 1993]
5. Warning level 85
In Table 5.2 the MC 90 pl -values are different from the test results because they are only stated for
standard values of the steel properties (Table 5.1) and do not take into account the actual steel
characteristics of the test beams. The basic model for beams proposed in this thesis and described above
is able to predict the available plastic rotation capacity sufficiently well (within < 14% compared with
experiments), but it requires a significant amount of input information, such as steel tensile strength and
elongation, which may not be known by the assessing engineer. To facilitate the calculations it is
therefore proposed that the Model Code 1990-values be used for pl,avail as they can be determined based
on the knowledge of the steel class, slenderness ratio and neutral axis depth alone. The MC 90-values
will always be conservative, but in cases where the steel properties are very different from the MC 90-
steel classes, e.g. specimens 1 and D12 in Table 5.2, it may be worth using the more detailed basic
model.
5.2.1.2 Demand: Required plastic rotation capacity
To avoid complicated nonlinear structural analyses, modern code provisions permit a reduction in the
maximum elastic bending moment in one section with redistribution to adjacent sections. The associated
required plastic rotation capacity depends on the amount of inelastic loading or, in other words, the
degree of moment redistribution.
As an example, Figure 5.5 shows the redistributed moments of a 2-span continuous beam, with equal
resistance for sagging and hogging moments, under uniform loading wtot. The original bending moment
diagram calculated with linear elastic analysis can be altered such that the bending moment over the
intermediate support is reduced: part of the hogging bending moment at the central support is transferred
to the adjacent regions of sagging moments, which are originally smaller than the central support
bending moment. The degree of redistribution is the ratio of the redistributed and the original hogging
moment at the central support.
The evaluation of the required rotations can be made on a theoretical basis with suitable modelling of
nonlinear behaviour [Eligehausen, 1993][Cosenza, 1991], but this procedure is complicated because of
its iterative nature, which takes into account the cracking of some regions and the nonlinearity
concentrated in the critically loaded sections. The author suggests a less accurate, but more
straightforward method; it uses a bilinear elastic-plastic moment-curvature curve instead of the trilinear
curve employed by other researchers. This has the advantage that the required plastic rotation can be
calculated in one step (Figure 5.6), rather than in an iterative process.
Before
redistribution
After
redistribution
Figure 5.5 Bending moment diagram for a 2-span continuous beam before and after redistribution
wtot __Muh
____Mus
wy __Muh
= =
wpl
+ +
o
pl,req
Total plastic rotation:
Figure 5.6 Total, elastic and inelastic loading and corresponding moment distributions and total
plastic rotation for 2-span beam with equal hogging and sagging resistance
When the uniformly distributed load of the 2-span continuous beam is increased, the moment
distribution remains elastic until the ultimate hogging moment capacity Muh is reached. Once this
capacity is attained, moment redistribution starts.
5. Warning level 87
Taking into account that some of the hogging moment will be redistributed with a fixed degree of
redistribution , the ultimate moment at the intermediate support is reached when:
Equation 5.9
Where wy: Load at which first yield occurs (elastic load)

l: Span
From Equation 5.9 the ultimate load wtot can be calculated. Once the ultimate moment is reached, the
moment at the central support cannot increase any more, since a plastic hinge is formed at the
intermediate support. For the subsequent analysis the static system of the continuous beam is replaced
by two simply-supported beams. The difference between the total load wtot and the elastic load wy is the
plastic load wpl. The required plastic rotation capacity pl,req corresponds to the total rotation, i.e. the sum
of left and right side rotations, at the intermediate support under wpl.
Equation 5.10
Where EI: Elastic bending stiffness of the cracked beam
In general terms, the required plastic rotation capacity at a notional hinge in a continuous beam is equal
to the proportion of the elastic moment which is redistributed multiplied by the simply-supported end
rotations, due to the applied loads.
Although not as precise as the full iterative nonlinear approach, the proposed approach leads to
acceptable results. In Figure 5.7 the simplified elastic-plastic approach is compared with the iterative
trilinear results by Cosenza et al. (cited in [Eligehausen, 1993]) of a continuous girder under uniformly
distributed load, with slenderness l/d = 20 and with a moment redistribution of 20% ( = 0.8).
pl, req [mrad]

20
15
10 Simplified bilinear
model
Iterative trilinear
5 model
0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
x/d
Figure 5.7 Required plastic rotation capacity of a continuous girder calculated with the simplified
approach and more accurate approach (fy = 440 MPa, = 0.8, compressive reinforcement ratio = 0.75
tension reinforcement ratio)
Figure 5.7 shows that, in the range of low x/d-values (x/d < 0.18), the simplified approach requires
higher plastic rotations than the more accurate approach. This is because in this range the second
moment of area I is small as the majority of the concrete section is cracked. Concrete bridge decks are
often designed for low values of x/d, and the simplified approach should thus be conservative. Although
in assessment one wants to be less conservative than in design, the simplified approach seems to be
appropriate as the difference between the bilinear and trilinear models is everywhere within 10% (for
x/d > 0.18).
5.2.1.3 Practical ductility evaluation for linear elastic analysis with redistribution
To check that there is sufficient ductility for moment redistribution or development of a failure
mechanism, the required plastic rotation capacity (demand) is compared to the available plastic rotation
capacity (supply). A ductility limit state criteria can be formulated to ensure that the available plastic
rotation pl,avail exceeds the required plastic rotation pl,req at each notional plastic hinge. The condition
for adequate ductility is therefore:
Equation 5.11
5. Warning level 89
If pl,req is greater than pl,avail, softening will occur at one hinge location before the redistributed moment
distribution can be obtained. In this case, the moment redistribution aimed for can never be achieved,
and failure will occur at a lower load.
As an alternative to the ductility limit state criterion, some codes contain limitations on the relative
neutral axis depth at failure x/d (Figure 5.8b): the intersection between the curves of the required and the
allowable plastic rotations provides the allowable value of for a given neutral axis depth x/d, ensuring
that pl,avail pl,req. Figure 5.8 shows how the limiting x/d-values are determined in order to guarantee
that the available plastic rotations are greater than the required plastic rotations.
pl [mrad] qpl, avail

pl,avail
30 d == 0.7
0.7 1.0
d == 0.8
0.8
0.8
d == 0.9
0.9
20 AASHTO
d == 1.0
1.0 0.6
ACI318
0.4 b/d =0.43 Points of

10 intersection
fck = 35 MPa MC90
0.2 fyk = 500 MPa
EC2
0 0.0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
x/d x/d
(a) Available plastic rotations for steel class A (b) -values for points of intersection pl,avail - pl,req
[MC 90, 1991] and required plastic rotations and code requirements
[Cosenza, 1991]
Figure 5.8 Derivation of ductility requirements for linear elastic analysis with redistribution
The allowable degree of moment redistribution derived from the points of intersection of the plastic
rotations differs slightly from the values proposed in the Eurocode 2. This is because the Eurocode-
curve is based on the available plastic rotation capacity values of the CEB Model Code 1978 and does
not take into account the recent studies on the required plastic rotations by Cosenza et al.
[Cosenza, 1991].
In Application Example 5.1 both the plastic rotation and neutral axis depth criteria are compared for a
continuous beam with a large number of equal spans and rectangular cross-section with tension
reinforcement only; both criteria show that the beam has enough ductility to undergo an elastic moment
redistribution of 20%.
h = 400 mm
Multiple spans of 6.04 m
d = 370 mm
From in-situ tests:
2
As = 700 mm fyk = 500 MPa Corresponds to High-
ftk = 540 MPa ductility steel, class A
b = 200 mm
su = 0.05 (Table 5.1)
fck = 35 MPa
x/d = 0.2
Redistribution degree = 0.8
Minimum distance between points of contraflexure either side of a support: 2.22 m, hence l/d = 6
Plastic rotations limit state criterion:

pl,req = 14.7 mrad (calculated with simplified approach, Figure 5.6)
pl,avail = 16 mrad (from MC 90-curve for high-ductility steel, class A, Figure 5.2)
pl,req < pl,avail OK.
Neutral axis depth criterion (Eurocode 2, Figure 5.8b):
= 0.8 > 0.7 OK.
Application Example 5.1 Plastic rotation limit state criterion and neutral axis depth criterion
The plastic rotation limit state criterion is time-consuming, as several intermediate steps have to be
evaluated. For the safety assessment of existing structures, the assessing engineer needs a more practical
method to check a structure for sufficient ductility; for his risk assessment, it is not necessary to know
the available and required plastic rotation capacities precisely. The author suggests therefore that the
neutral axis depth criterion (as in Figure 5.8b) be used for the ductility evaluation of beams.
5.2.2 Ductility check for plastic analysis of slabs
The x/d-criterion presented above is adequate for beam-type structures spanning in one direction, as well
as for ductility checks when linear elastic analysis is used together with redistribution of the moments.
Unlike beams, bridge slabs are often spanning in more than one direction and at the ultimate load stage
complicated failure mechanisms can form; a criterion based on integration of curvatures along the span
seems thus inappropriate due to the complexity involved. An approach focusing on the rotations of the
plastic hinges is preferable; the author proposes such an approach in the following.
5. Warning level 91
In YLA it is assumed that all rotations take place in the plastic hinge and no curvature is induced in the
rest of the structure (rigid elements). The curvature at the position of the plastic hinges corresponds
therefore to the rotation of these hinges. It is not necessary to know the absolute rotations of each hinge,
the rotation of one hinge relative to another is sufficient. Knowing the relative rotation and the moment-
curvature relationship of each hinge, it is possible to check that each hinge is able to undergo the
rotation necessary to form the complete failure mechanism. For simple failure mechanisms, the relative
rotations are easily determined by hand. For more complicated mechanisms, yield-line software allows
calculating the relative rotations between rigid blocks.
Since a hinge starts to form once the section is about to yield, for the complete mechanism to form it is
necessary that the curvature in each hinge is at least equal to the curvature at the onset of yielding.
Equation 5.12
Where i: Hinges necessary to form the critical failure mechanism

1/ryi: Curvature at the onset of reinforcement yielding in hinge i (Equation 5.4)
A hinge can only retain its moment capacity if the ultimate curvature is not reached; the curvature in
each hinge has therefore to be lower than its ultimate curvature.
Equation 5.13
Where 1/rui: Curvature of hinge i as it reaches its ultimate moment capacity (Equation 5.7)
1/ryi and 1/rui, including tension-stiffening, are calculated as explained in paragraph 5.2.1.1. For constant
cross-sectional properties, the curvatures do not depend on the width; hence they can be determined for
a unit width. If the cross-sectional characteristics vary along a yield-line, it has to be split into different
segments, all of which have to be checked individually. For yield-lines skew to the reinforcement
direction, the curvatures are calculated in the same way as the moment capacities, i.e. the longitudinal
and transverse curvatures are considered taking into account the angle between reinforcement direction
and yield-line:
Equation 5.14
Where 1/r: Curvature in direction parallel to main reinforcement

1/r: Curvature in direction perpendicular to main reinforcement
: Angle between yield-line and direction perpendicular to main reinforcement
With the above two requirements (Equation 5.12 and Equation 5.13) and the required relative rotations
in each hinge, the assessing engineer can verify whether the moment-curvature behaviour is adequate in
every hinge. As an example, the ductility of Winterbourne bridge (see Appendix B.4) is evaluated in
Application Example 5.2.
Bridges with low available ductility levels will not be able to undergo large rotations before failure and
plastic analysis will not be of any benefit. The above criteria could easily be implemented in a yield-line
program, such as COBRAS [Cobras, 2001], but the engineer would be required to provide detailed
information about the materials in place, e.g. tensile strength and elongation of steel bars, elastic moduli
of steel and concrete. It should be noted that the same approach could also be used for the plastic
analysis of beams, but the method described before, based on the x/d-ratio, is more practical, as it
requires fewer calculations.
5. Warning level 93
Critical failure mechanism: Moment-curvature behaviour at supports:

Moment M [kNm/m]
1600
1200
800
400
0
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Curvature 1/r [10 mm-1]
-5
Moment-curvature behaviour at midspan:

Moment M [kNm/m]
800
600
400
200
0
0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5
Curvature 1/r [10-5 mm-1]
Equation 5.12 (1/ryi values from diagrams above):
From the mechanism geometry (see unit rotations in failure mechanism above):
Equation 5.13 (1/rui values from diagrams above):
As solutions satisfying equations 5.12 and 5.13, and also the failure mechanism geometry exist, there
is sufficient ductility available to form the critical failure mechanism.
Application Example 5.2 Ductility check of Winterbourne bridge

5.3 REDUNDANCY
5.3.1 Introduction
Redundancy in structures can be defined in a number of different ways: a bridge might be considered
redundant when:
1. it is no longer required, e.g. due to change in functional requirements. This meaning of

redundancy is often used in common parlance.
2. there are multiple load paths for transferring load to the supports, as opposed to a single load
path.
3. before the whole structure collapses, additional load can be applied to the structure after the first
element has failed.
In this thesis the third definition is adopted; therefore redundancy embodies the capacity of a bridge to
redistribute load longitudinally (due to continuity) and transversely. Load redistribution is dependent on
topology, the relative stiffness and available ductility of the members. The structural elements of a
bridge do not behave completely independently, but interact with each other to form a structural system.
Compared with component failure, multi-component behaviour has in many cases a significant impact
on the true risk of structural failure. If there is sufficient redundancy, the initial failure is likely to be
noticed before total collapse takes place, allowing people to escape and avoiding serious consequences.
On the other hand, in statically determinate systems, a weakest-link or chain model governs, so the
failure of any single primary load-carrying component is catastrophic.
5.3.2 Redundancy quantification
Most assessing engineers agree on the benefit of considering redundancy in the evaluation of existing
structures, and some structural codes make allowance for redundancy (see section 2.3). However, the
codes are often imprecise about what makes a certain structure redundant or not. In the literature, there
are only a few studies on the issue of quantifying redundancy and defining its consequences on
structural safety. In the following the two main approaches used are presented: (1) The system-element
reliability approach and (2) the global failure approach.
5.3.2.1 System-element reliability approach
In this approach, the system reliability index is compared with the element reliability indices. The
problem of predicting system reliability is formulated as determining the system reliability from the
5. Warning level 95
component reliabilities. For that purpose, a structural system is modelled as a system of parallel and
series elements [Thoft-Christensen, 1992][Schneider, 1996][Melchers, 1999].
Modelling of the systems reliability has to take into account what happens after one element has failed.
The post-failure resistance of a member can be represented by the residual strength factor RSF. For
perfectly brittle material behaviour, a member i carries no load after it has failed, and RSFi takes the
value of 0. For perfectly ductile behaviour, the failed member keeps supporting a load equal to its
resistance (RSFi = 1). Intermediate material behaviour can be modelled with a residual strength factor
0 < RSFi < 1. After one element has failed, the remaining load is applied to the non-affected elements,
according to their stiffness. The probability of failure of a particular load path can be calculated by
combining the failure probabilities of all the elements that have to fail to provoke system failure, i.e.
form the collapse mechanism. Finally, all possible load paths have to be evaluated and then be
combined.
Using this approach, Hendawi & Frangopol have studied the effects of material behaviour, correlations
of element resistances, uncertainties in load and resistances, resistance sharing and number of elements
on the system reliability of parallel systems [Hendawi, 1994]. For example, they showed that for
systems with not fully correlated resistances, a two member ductile system is more reliable than a single
ductile member having the cross-sectional area of the two members. They also found examples where an
assemblage of two brittle members had a lower reliability than a single brittle member with equivalent
cross-sectional area.
Gharaibeh et al. use system redundancy and reliability range to classify structural systems
[Gharaibeh, 2000]. System redundancy system is defined as the difference between the reliability index
of the system and the reliability index of its weakest member. The reliability range system is defined as
the difference between the reliability indices of the strongest and the weakest member of the system.
Structural systems are then classified in three categories: (i) very redundant systems (system > system 0),
(ii) redundant systems (system system > 0) and (iii) non-redundant systems (system 0).
The idealisation of the system-element reliability approach might not be a realistic model of the
behaviour of the structure under load. The existence of multiple load paths is not by itself sufficient to
define redundancy. With this approach, the load transfer is based on approximate stiffness calculations
only, and no check is undertaken to verify if the predicted load path is really possible. Often insufficient
ductility will make some load paths impossible, as the elements transferring the loads to other elements
might not be able to undergo the necessary deformation.
In most of the studies cited above, the element failure type, such as ductile with/without reserves, or
brittle failure, is not based on calculated deformation behaviour of these elements, but is chosen
arbitrarily by the analyst. Also, the correlation between the failure probabilities of different elements is
very difficult to determine and for practical applications only bounds on the system failure probability
can be determined, resulting in a big range of possible values. This influence of correlation raises serious
issues regarding the description of redundancy using this idealised series/parallel modelling.
Finally, being a reliability-based approach adds even more complexity (see section 4.2.2). The author
thinks this method is not appropriate to quantify the gain in structural safety due to redundancy.
5.3.2.2 Global failure approach
To avoid the problem of just combining failure probabilities of individual members and thus neglecting
the real load-path, here it is suggested that the ultimate failure (collapse) be calculated directly. With the
so-called global failure approach, a system resistance is defined as a global criterion, not as a sequence
of element failures. Redundancy is quantified by comparing the system failure load with the load
corresponding to first element failure. In section 4.3.2 structural analysis methods which allow
calculation of both element (using FEA, GA) and system failure (using NLFE, NLGA, YLA) have
already been reviewed. The system factors developed by Ghosn & Moses are one example of the global
failure approach.
System factors (Ghosn & Moses)
Ghosn & Moses proposed the system factor approach to account for the level of redundancy in the
design and evaluation of beam-and-slab bridges [Ghosn, 1998]. This method penalises designs with
insufficient redundancy by requiring that their elements be more conservatively designed than is allowed
by current standards. Redundant designs, on the other hand, are rewarded by permitting less
conservative element design. The system factors are provided for typical bridge configurations with
parallel elements of equal capacity. Ghosn & Moses modified the US design equation for the strength
limit state to reflect the level of redundancy of typical bridge configurations:
Equation 5.15
Where s: System factor, statistically based multiplier relating to system redundancy

: Resistance factor
R: Nominal resistance
Qi: Load effect
i: Partial load factor
5. Warning level 97
The system factor in Equation 5.15 replaces the load modifier i of the AASHTO design code
(Equation 2.2). The system factors are given for typical configurations of single span and continuous
steel and prestressed concrete I-beam bridges (e.g. Table 5.3). To ensure that a minimum safety level is
maintained, an upper limit for s of 1.20 has been introduced. In addition a lower limit of 0.8 is specified
to match current AASHTO-practice.
Table 5.3 System factors s for redundancy of single span, prestressed concrete I-beam bridges with
two or more traffic lanes, ultimate limit state [Ghosn, 1998]
Beam spacing 4 beams 6 beams 8 beams 10 beams
1.2 m 0.87 1.04 1.08 1.08

1.8 m 0.98 1.06 1.06 1.06
2.4 m 1.04 1.07 1.07 1.07
3.0 m 1.06 1.06 1.06
3.7 m 1.01 1.02
Ghosns report also requires a check be carried out to see if there is sufficient ductility to produce the
required levels of redundancy. To determine the system factors s, Ghosn & Moses performed numerous
nonlinear analyses of different beam-and-slab bridge configurations and different material properties.
The system factors were calibrated to match the difference in system and element reliability indices from
bridges known to have redundant configurations. For their study, all bridges with four or more beams
were classified as redundant, and the average difference in element and system reliability index of all
4-beam bridge analyses was chosen as the target value for this difference. Although reliability theory has
been used for the calibration, the user of the proposed method will not need to undertake reliability
calculations, but use deterministic system factors accounting for redundancy (Table 5.3).
The approach suggested by Ghosn & Moses is indeed practical, but it is limited to certain beam-and-slab
bridges with a given number of beams and beam spacings. To include other types of bridges a more
general approach should be developed. Furthermore, calibrating the redundancy levels to bridges
known as redundant might be considered questionable.
In the following a general approach to quantify redundancy is presented. It is applicable to any type of
bridge with any design load. However, it can only be used if detailed information on the bridge
elements, including nonlinear material properties, is available, in order to carry out a nonlinear or plastic
analysis.
5.4 RISK INDICATOR: WARNING MARGIN
The warning margin approach developed here by the author quantifies redundancy by comparing the
factor of safety corresponding to first element failure with the one corresponding to system failure. As
explained in chapter 4, the factor of safety for first element failure FOSelement is calculated, using linear
elastic analysis methods, as follows:
Equation 5.16
Where R: Structural resistance (including partial safety factors)

SG: Load effect calculated with linear elastic analysis due to dead load (including partial
safety factor)
SQ: Load effect calculated with linear elastic analysis due to live load (including partial
safety factor)
k: Element live load factor
The resistance R can be considered to be required for two things: One part for carrying dead load and
this must always be carried in full, and the remaining strength which is available to carry live load. The
portion of the live load to be carried is k.
The ultimate (system) failure load can be determined using nonlinear or plastic analysis. This load is
equal to Q where is the system live load factor.
When failure of the system is considered, the factor of safety becomes:
Equation 5.17
Comparing Equation 5.16 and Equation 5.17, FOSsystem can be rearranged as:
Equation 5.18
Where WM: Warning margin

5. Warning level 99
The warning margin quantifies the additional margin of the factor of safety, when system rather than
first element failure is considered. As such, it is a direct measurement of the redundancy of the bridge.
WM can be expressed as follows:
Equation 5.19
Where the multiplier is
Equation 5.20
WM contains the percentage increase of the live load to cause collapse after first element failure, referred
to as , and with the ratio of SQ and SG, i.e. ratio of dead and live load effect, it also takes into account
the dependency on the span length. This is important because with span length increasing, the dead load
becomes more important than the live load. For longer spans, even when the live load can be increased
considerably after first element failure (large ), the additional factor of safety due to redundancy, WM,
is small. In this case a great increase in the applied live load will not considerably contribute to the
assessed safety level.
In the application example below the warning margin of Larling bridge, one of the example bridges used
throughout this thesis, is calculated; it is demonstrated that the calculation of this measure of redundancy
is relatively easy, as it requires only a linear elastic calculation to calculate the first element failure load,
and a nonlinear or plastic analysis to calculate the total collapse load.
The warning margin is a measure of the safety factor margin, and bridges with WM-values greater than 0
will give warning signs, through element failure, before the whole bridge system fails; measures can
then be undertaken before it is too late. The author has carried out several bridge assessments and found
-values of up to 0.6. With SG/SQ-values ranging from 0.5 (short span bridges) to 4 (medium span
bridges) the warning margins ranged therefore between 0 and 0.4, but very few bridges had WM > 0.3.
SG = 101 kNm (calculated with FEA)
SQ = 222 kNm (calculated with FEA)
R = 325 kNm (using material data and [BD 44, 1995])
FOSelement = 1.01 (Equation 5.16)
k = 1.009 (from Equation 5.16)
Multiplier = 1.58 (system live load factor calculated with YLA)
= 0.57 (Equation 5.20)
WM = 0.39 (Equation 5.19)
Application Example 5.3 Warning margin of Larling bridge
5.5 CONCLUSIONS
The true ultimate load capacity of a bridge can be much higher than the one predicted with linear elastic
analysis and first element failure as the failure criterion; more advanced structural analysis can
potentially give an improved prediction over linear elastic analysis, but in order to be able to support
loads beyond the elastic level, a structure has to be able to undergo considerable plastic deformation. In
the assessment of existing structures ductility, amongst other considerations, has an important role to
play. In nonlinear analysis ductility is implicitly taken into account by using force-deformation
relationships of the elements, but when linear elastic analysis followed by redistribution or plastic
analysis are used to check a bridges safety, sufficient ductility is a prerequisite and should be verified.
For beam-structures, ductility can be checked by comparing the available plastic rotation capacity
(supply) and the plastic rotation capacity required (demand) for a given load redistribution. A basic
calculation model for beams, which takes into account tension stiffening and calculates the plastic
rotation capacity by using moment-curvature relationships, has been presented. The calculation of the
required plastic rotation capacity corresponding to a certain degree of redistribution can be
approximated by assuming an elastic-plastic bending behaviour and using two static systems to analyse
the structure: the initial static system and a second system with a hinge at the location where the first
element yielded. However, the calculation of the available and required plastic rotation capacities is
5. Warning level 101
time-consuming and requires a lot of input information, which might not be available. For practical
ductility checks of beam structures it is therefore suggested that the ductility requirements given in the
present codes (e.g. Model Code 1990) be applied; these state the allowable x/d-ratio depending on the
degree of redistribution.
These code requirements have been derived for beam-structures spanning in one direction and are not
appropriate for slabs, which span in more than one direction. Another simple ductility check for the
plastic analysis of slabs has therefore been developed in this thesis. It is based on the general assumption
of yield-line analysis: all rotations take place in the plastic hinges and the rest of the structure deforms as
rigid elements. Hence the rotations in these hinges are equal to the curvature of their cross-section.
Three conditions are stipulated for sufficient ductility: (i) the curvature at each plastic hinge location has
to be greater than the curvature at the onset of steel yielding, (ii) the curvature at each plastic hinge
location has to be lower than the curvature corresponding to the ultimate moment capacity, and (iii) the
relative rotations of the failure mechanisms have to be respected.
If sufficient ductility is available, the ultimate collapse load can be predicted using advanced structural
analysis. Redundancy, i.e. the difference between the first element and system failure situation, is a good
indicator for the warning level of a structure, since once an element of the bridge has failed, the bridge
will announce the imminent collapse with excessive cracking and deformation. This can decrease the
consequences of failure as precautions may be taken. At the end of this chapter the warning margin is
presented as the measure of the warning level risk indicator; it quantifies the reserve in terms of factor of
safety when collapse rather than first element failure is considered.

6. Condition evaluation 103
CHAPTER 6. CONDITION EVALUATION
I cannot imagine any condition which would cause this ship to founder. Modern shipbuilding has gone
beyond that.
Edward John Smith, Captain of the Titanic (1850-1912)
6.1 INTRODUCTION
Bridges in poor condition are often the first to be repaired, even when their safety has been shown to be
sufficient. This is because the public is concerned when bridges show considerable signs of deteriora-
tion. Deterioration is often a first sign of an imminent decrease of a bridges safety: a defect may be con-
sidered minor, but could be the first indication of a serious problem.
In most traditional safety assessments the overall condition of the bridge is taken into account by modi-
fying the overall structural resistance by a condition factor, but there are problems associated with how
to select the value of this factor and how to apply it to the structure as a whole.
In theory, the deterioration of all construction materials could directly be taken into account in the calcu-
lations by reducing the available section of the materials, e.g. reduction of steel bar section. This is
sometimes done in practice, but it is difficult to accurately determine the damage and the variation of the
deterioration at different locations. For steel bar corrosion theoretical models exist and are used to pre-
dict the deterioration in time (see section 3.3.7), but other deterioration mechanisms such as leaching or
freeze-thaw action are commonly neglected in the structural assessment. A new approach is proposed
here to take most types of deterioration into account, when assessing the risk of bridge collapse.
In this thesis, the condition of the bridge is considered as one of the five main parameters influencing the
risk of collapse. The risk indicator for condition is deliberately separated from the safety risk indicator
so that the state of the bridge, and its possible effect on safety, can be explicitly considered. For exam-
ple, a bridge could have an acceptable safety level, but because of freeze-thaw action, a reduction of that
level might have to be considered.
This chapter develops a rational way to quantify the condition of a bridge for use in the risk assessment
methodology of this thesis. The overall condition of the bridge is evaluated as a condition rating, which
is an indicator of the bridges performance with respect to durability. Different deterioration mecha-
nisms are considered at the same time and their damage is evaluated. The classification relies on the out-
come of inspections carried out on the bridge. The main purpose of assessment inspections, tests and
sampling is to obtain further knowledge of the specific structure, thereby reducing the uncertainties in
calculations. In addition, by monitoring a bridge over time, early warnings of progressive degradation
may potentially be identified, so that corrective action can be taken at an early stage, and fatalities be
prevented.
Section 6.2 explains what should be inspected and when, which inspection techniques are used and what
their limitations are. Section 6.3 describes how the inspection information is transformed into a condi-
tion rating in different countries and section 6.4 presents the risk indicator, which integrates the condi-
tion evaluation into the risk assessment framework of this thesis.
6.2 INSPECTIONS
Since the inspection procedure and reporting might differ from one country to another, the aim of this
section is not to describe the inspection system of one particular country, but to give a general overview
of what is done in an inspection and for what purpose. Often a standard checklist or inspection form,
completed during the inspection, is used to promote completeness and consistency between inspections.
The inspectors determine what type of damage an inspected element is subject to and the extent of the
damage; in most countries they state:
The type of damage/deterioration process (e.g. corrosion, freeze-thaw action,).
The severity with respect to the considered type of damage.
The extent of the damage within an element.
To judge the severity of a damage, in some countries damage manuals with examples of severity states
are made available to the inspectors. These catalogues contain a full description of the severity state (see
section 6.3) and include photos of typical examples to make the condition evaluation more consistent.
As an example, the severity states for reinforcement corrosion used in Switzerland are given in Figure
6.1. The extent of the damage may be expressed as a percentage (e.g. defect present in 10% of element
area) or as a number (e.g. number of bearings).
The major elements of a reinforced concrete bridge that are inspected, and are safety relevant, include:
foundations
substructure (piers, abutments, wingwalls)
superstructure (parapets, slabs {top, bottom, cantilevers}, beams, webs)
(a) Severity state 2 (b) Severity state 3
(c) Severity state 4 (d) Severity state 5
Figure 6.1 Visual description of the Swiss corrosion severity states for reinforced concrete
[KUBA-MS-Ticino, 1998]
6.2.1 Types of inspection
In a typical inspection all physical features of the bridge that affect its structural integrity are examined.
The structure is compared with the drawings, and damaged or deteriorated sections are identified. How
detailed the inspection is, and how frequently it is carried out, depends on the type of inspection. For
example, in the UK there are principal, general and special inspections [BIM, 2001].
A principal inspection is regularly scheduled (e.g. every 6 years in the UK) to determine the physical
and functional condition of a bridge and to identify any changes since previous inspections. Access
equipment is needed to enable all parts of the structure to be examined. This type of inspection is mainly
a visual inspection, but limited testing may be required on concrete elements.
In addition to the principal inspections, general inspections can take place more regularly (e.g. every
2 years in the UK) between principal inspections, and aim to detect obvious damage or defects. These
are typically basic visual inspections conducted from deck level, ground or water levels, or from perma-
nent access structures.
A special inspection is a detailed examination of a critical part of the structure, and its purpose is to de-
tect deficiencies not normally detected during other inspections. It is only undertaken when triggered by
prior inspection, when the service conditions of the bridge have changed (e.g. more traffic lanes) or
when the structures were subject to exceptional load conditions (e.g. record water level or earthquake).
More sophisticated methods such as non-destructive testing can be used to investigate defects.
One of the characteristics of the risk assessment procedure of this thesis is that the assessments should
be undertaken at short intervals of time and not for remaining service lives of 30 or more years as used
in traditional bridge assessments. Since degradation of the materials may only be predicted vaguely, it is
suggested that risk assessments be carried out frequently, rather than over longer periods. By carrying
out assessments after each important inspection, the time period for which degradation has to be pre-
dicted will be reduced. General inspections do not provide enough information to take into account in
the risk assessment, since in this type of inspection damage is only detected and only vaguely quantified.
It is therefore proposed that risk assessments be carried out after each principal inspection. In addition,
risk assessments would also have to be undertaken after special inspections, as more information about
the damage is available at this time.
6.2.2 Quality of inspection
The quality of inspection is not always the best, and hence assessing the safety level of a bridge based on
inspection results may not give an adequate picture. Ideally, specially trained people would carry out the
inspections. Experience shows that it is helpful to have a structural engineer on site, as the structure can
often only be inspected for a very short time (high traffic disruption costs) and the danger potential is
best evaluated directly on site [Schmid 2001]. Possible signs of damage, such as settlements, cracking
patterns and changes in the soil condition, have to be correctly recognised and identified.
It is not realistic to expect that every inspection be undertaken with a structural engineer. In the UK,
people without any formal inspection qualifications have been carrying out inspections since there is no
national qualification required for bridge inspectors. Most countries do not specify the required qualifi-
cations for the inspectors. One exception is the United States, where the National Bridge Inspection
Standards (NBIS) specify the required qualification of the personnel and the requirements for the inspec-
tion [NBIS, 2003]. However, the stated qualifications consider only the people in charge of the inspec-
tion team, no qualification requirements are included for the people actually carrying out the inspections.
Beginning in 1998, the US Federal Highway Administrations (FHWA) Nondestructive Evaluation
Validation Center undertook a comprehensive study to examine the reliability of inspections of highway
bridges [FHWA, 2001][Phares, 2004]. The study showed that principal inspections are completed with
significant variability, particularly with respect to the assignment of condition ratings. The frequency
with which field notes were taken also varied considerably, and inadequacies of the detailed special in-
spections were noted. Specifically, most of the inspectors did not make a note of the types of defects,
such as weld cracks, that this type of inspection is designed to identify.
This vagueness in the condition evaluation justifies looking separately into the safety assessment, in-
cluding deteriorated resistance, and the condition rating (general condition of the bridge). In the meth-
odology presented here, a risk indicator for safety and a separate one for condition rating are therefore
employed. Since in this risk methodology all the indicators are considered at the same time, the risk per-
formance of a bridge for which the safety level is adequate, but which is in poor condition, may be con-
sidered as not acceptable. If the condition rating indicator makes the overall risk performance unsatisfac-
tory, the assessor may improve the quality of the condition rating risk indicator by undertaking a more
detailed (special) inspection.
6.2.3 Inspection techniques
6.2.3.1 Visual inspection
For all the sophisticated technology employed in bridge design and construction today, the maintenance
and preservation of bridges still depends largely on regular visual inspection of the structures. The visual
inspection method is the predominant nondestructive evaluation technique used for checking the safety
and condition performance in most countries, but it depends on the interpretation of the inspectors,
whose subjective assessments may have a significant impact on the safety assessment and subsequent
maintenance strategy of a bridge.
Based on the results of the FHWA-study cited above [Phares, 2004] and other inspection reports
[Schmid, 2001], the following recommendations can be made to improve the accuracy of visual inspec-
tions:
A clear and precise condition rating system should be developed such that the accuracy and reli-
ability of the condition rating is increased. The rating criteria should be defined in a non-
ambiguous way: high, medium and low ratings should be avoided, as inspectors are hesitant to
assign low or high condition ratings, and as a result tend to prefer medium ratings. Less am-
biguous criteria use photographic examples and give numerical values for the extent of damage
ratings.
The training of the inspectors should be improved and standardised. A qualification for the in-
spectors should be a prerequisite.
Minimum vision standards for inspectors should be set, as in the FHWA-study some of the in-
spectors clearly had inadequate vision.
6.2.3.2 Non-destructive testing of reinforced concrete structures
Although visual inspection can give a fairly good indication of a bridges condition, it sometimes cannot
detect early indications of corrosion. A limited amount of non-destructive testing (NDT) might be car-
ried out to obtain a better assessment of the condition of reinforced concrete structures. Non-destructive
testing encompasses all the myriad of test procedures that do not significantly damage the fabric of the
structure. This testing should be confined to where visual inspection indicates a problem or to critical
structural elements. Currently four tests for in-situ corrosion investigations are used as standard in prin-
cipal inspections in the UK: these are based on measurements of half-cell potentials, chloride content,
covermeter and depth of carbonation [BIM, 2001]. Each test provides limited information, so data from
all tests has to be interpreted together, in order to make more reliable judgements [Vassie, 1984]. A good
description of the major NDT techniques, their characteristics, application domain, reliability, testing
device manufacturers and literature can be found in the ZfPBau-Kompendium [Schickert, 1999].
Based on an extensive investigation of the performance of the main NDT-techniques used for reinforced
concrete structures, Lea concluded that these methods cannot measure the loss of reinforcement area or
the corrosion rate, but can only provide an indication of the likelihood of corrosion within the test area
examined [Lea, 2004]. Furthermore, factors such as environmental condition, concrete quality and con-
dition, and an assessors experience heavily affect the reliability of these techniques. As a consequence,
the result of one single investigation can be completely misleading. A structure should therefore be
monitored by different operators at different times using several NDT techniques.
6.3 CONDITION RATING
Condition ratings are used to describe the current in-situ status of a component, not its original state. In
most countries they are assigned by evaluating the severity of deterioration and the extent to which dam-
age is present throughout the component being rated. In most countries the severity states are verbally
described and sometimes illustrated by photos showing easily recognisable damage/condition (e.g.
Figure 6.1). An element condition rating does not translate directly into an overall rating of a bridges
condition, but it is a good indicator of the quality of specific elements. Overall condition ratings may be
obtained by combining the element ratings, taking into account their importance within the bridge-
system. In the following the condition rating systems used in different countries are compared, and in
section 6.4, a practical rating system for including the overall condition evaluation in risk assessment is
derived.
In this thesis we are interested in how critical the condition problems are to the risk of collapse, but the
inspections are not only intended for the safety assessment of a bridge, but also for the planning of main-
tenance actions and non-structural repairs (e.g. replacement of bearings). In order to quantify the influ-
ence of the condition on the risk of collapse, in section 9.3.2.5 the condition rating of a bridge is related
to the level of safety, and hence to the risk.
6.3.1 Review of existing condition rating systems
6.3.1.1 United Kingdom
In the UK, the Highways Agency uses a system of inspection reporting, whereby bridge managers enter
observed defects for all the relevant elements of the structure directly onto a computerised bridge man-
agement database called the Structures Management Information System (SMIS). Defect type (e.g.
cracks, loss of concrete, leaching/staining,), extent and severity are entered into SMIS in accordance
with defect ratings and codes set out in the Bridge Inspection Manual [BIM, 2001]. The severity rating
is related to the nature of the defect: (i) damage-causing, (ii) appearance related, (iii) paint coatings and
protective systems, or (iv) affecting adjacent elements. Table 6.1 shows the severity and extent rating for
the damage-causing defects, as these are the most relevant in the collapse risk assessment of existing
bridges.
Table 6.1 Severity and extent scales for damage causing defects in the UK Bridge Inspection Manual
[BIM, 2001]
Severity rating D1 Defect is definitely not causing damage to element or structure.

D2 Minor. Defect is unlikely to be causing damage to the element or
structure now or unlikely to result in damage in near future.
D3 Moderate. Defect is probably causing damage to element or struc-
ture, or is likely to do so in near future.
D3S Moderate. Defect may present a danger to the public in the near
future.
D4 Severe. Defect is clearly causing damage to element or structure.
D4S Severe. Defect is presenting a danger to the public.
D5 Defect is causing element to be non-functional, i.e. no longer ful-
fils its intended function due to defect or deterioration.
Extent rating SA No significant defect.

SB Defect present in less than 5% of area or length of element.
SC Defect present in 5 20% of area or length of element.
SD Defect present in 20 50% of area or length of element.
Although the Bridge Inspection Manual gives much detail on how to determine the severity of cracks,
e.g. isolated cracks versus group of possibly related cracks, and the inspection findings are precisely
written down (crack widths and spacing, corroded steel section, concrete workmanship, graffiti, vegeta-
tion,), it is difficult to obtain a general condition rating from the UK inspection reporting. The UK
definitions of severity using vague terms, such as unlikely, probably and clearly, might also be inter-
preted differently by different inspectors. The UK inspection reporting system is thus not considered the
most practical when selecting a method for the condition evaluation within a general risk assessment
framework as proposed in this thesis.
6.3.1.2 Germany
The German advice note RI-EBW-PRF (see [Kunz, 2001]) contains rules for a simple and standard
reporting of the observed inspection results in accordance with the inspection norm DIN 1076
[DIN 1076, 1999]. The inspectors evaluate each incidence of damage according to three categories:
(i) structural safety, (ii) highway traffic safety and (iii) durability. Each of the three categories is given a
rating. The three-part rating is then converted into one number using given conversion tables. The extent
of damage is taken into account by adding/subtracting a number from the one-number condition rating
depending on the extent of the damage (large, medium, small). The condition rating of a bridge within
one element (e.g. superstructure, substructure,) is derived as the highest rating of a damage of this
element plus/minus a factor taking into account the damage amount within this element [Kunz, 2001].
The global bridge condition rating is then calculated as the maximum value of all the bridge elements
plus/minus a factor taking into account the percentage of damaged elements.
The German system gives an overall rating based on the amount of damage of the most severely dam-
aged element. This approach ignores the safety-related importance of the damaged elements. Further-
more, the descriptions of the severity states are very vague, e.g. damage with no/long-term, short-term or
immediate effect on safety.
6.3.1.3 United States
In the United States, condition ratings describing the general condition of a bridge are generated during
routine inspections. The US National Bridge Inventory contains ratings on the conditions of three major
bridge components: deck, superstructure (deck supporting elements), and substructure. The condition
ratings, which range from 0 to 9, describe both the degree of bridge deterioration and the extent to which
it is distributed throughout the structures components (Table 6.2).
Table 6.2 US Bridge Condition Ratings [FHWA, 2002]
Rating Category Description
9 Excellent condition
8 Very Good Condition
7 Good Condition No problems noted.
6 Satisfactory Condition Some minor problems.
5 Fair Condition All primary structural elements are sound but may have minor section loss,
cracking, spalling, or scour.
4 Poor Condition Advanced section loss, deterioration, spalling or scour.
3 Serious Condition Loss of section, deterioration, spalling or scour have seriously affected
primary structural components. Local failures are possible. Fatigue cracks
in steel or shear cracks in concrete may be present.
2 Critical Condition Advanced deterioration of primary structural elements. Fatigue cracks in
steel or shear cracks in concrete may be present or scour may have re-
moved substructure support. Unless closely monitored, it may be neces-
sary to close the bridge until corrective action is taken.
1 Imminent Failure Major deterioration or section loss present in critical structural compo-
Condition nents, or obvious loss present in critical structural components, or obvious
vertical or horizontal movement affecting structure stability. Bridge is
closed to traffic but corrective action may put bridge back in light service.
0 Failed Condition Out of service; beyond corrective action.
The US system does not look at the element level, but generates only an overall condition rating for the
major components. With nine different categories and vague descriptions of the condition states, in
terms of extent and also severity, the inspectors have difficulty choosing a consistent rating
[Phares, 2004].
6.3.1.4 Switzerland
The Swiss inspection database KUBA-DB also uses a standard format to classify the severity of the
damage of the inspected elements [KUBA-MS-Ticino, 1998]. During the inspection, the prevailing dete-
rioration processes are identified and their effects are rated on a scale of five severity states (e.g. for cor-
rosion Table 6.3); such criteria as the condition of the concrete surface, crack widths and chloride con-
tents at the reinforcement level allow each bridge element to be classified. Corresponding to each sever-
ity state, the database manual also proposes suitable intervention measures.
Table 6.3 Corrosion severity states and possible interventions for reinforced concrete bridges in the
Swiss inspection database KUBA-DB [KUBA-MS-Ticino, 1998]
Severity state Description Possible interventions
1: Good (no/minor No visible damage, only thin surface No intervention

damage) cracks, no corrosion signs.
2: Acceptable (unim- Corrosion traces visible and/or local No intervention
portant damage) spalling, thin cracks due to steel bar corro- Surface protection
sion and/or humid zones, non-significant Local anti-corrosion coating
mechanical damage.
3: Damaged (impor- Spalling with exposed reinforcement bars, No intervention
tant damage) non-significant section losses (on average Surface protection
less than 10% of the visible reinforcement Local anti-corrosion coating and sur-
bars), cracks and/or humid zones. face protection
Complete refurbishment
4: Bad condition (ex- Spalling with exposed reinforcement bars, No intervention
tensive damage) significant section losses (on average more Local anti-corrosion coating
than 10% of the visible reinforcement Local anti-corrosion coating and sur-
and/or pitting corrosion), cracks and/or face protection
humid zones. Complete refurbishment including the
replacement of the reinforcing bars
5: Alarming condition The safety is jeopardised, urgent safety- Emergency intervention
(urgent intervention enhancing measures necessary.
required)
Similar descriptions are given for other deterioration processes, creating consistency in condition
evaluation. Because of its simplicity, the inclusion of several deterioration processes, and also the facili-
tated classification (detailed examples including photographs contained in manuals), there is less scope
for inconsistency in inspection reporting by different inspectors. The element condition rating is ob-
tained by multiplying the severity state by the percentage extent of the damage within the element. At
the end, the global condition rating of a bridge-structure is calculated by summing up the weighted
contributions of the element condition ratings. The weight of each element is calculated by dividing the
tributions of the element condition ratings. The weight of each element is calculated by dividing the
element cost by the total cost of the structure. This weighting might be appropriate for cost-effective
maintenance planning to avoid costly elements being too much deteriorated, but with regard to the risk
of collapse, the importance of an element would better be reflected in its contribution to bridge safety.
For example, an element with a low factor of safety may put the bridge in danger, and further deteriora-
tion should be prevented.
6.4 RISK INDICATOR: CONDITION RATING
The condition evaluation is included in the risk assessment methodology of chapter 9 by using condition
rating as one of the five risk indicators. For this purpose, a practical bridge condition rating system is
needed which can be related to safety, and subsequently to risk. In the following, it is proposed that
firstly, an element condition rating be calculated for each inspected element, and secondly, all element
ratings be combined to an overall condition rating for the whole structure.
6.4.1 Element condition rating
Because of its simplicity, its inclusion of different deterioration processes and the lower degree of ambi-
guity, the Swiss element condition rating system (see section 6.3.1.4) has been adopted in this thesis.
The severity state definitions of this system may have to be adapted for use in other countries. Because
of lower maintenance budgets, some countries will accept much more deterioration than others. For ex-
ample the condition of the bridge of Figure 6.2 may be judged as acceptable in New York, but in Swit-
zerland this would almost certainly be judged as unacceptable.
Figure 6.2 Heavily deteriorated in-service bridge deck of the F.D.R. Drive southbound in Manhattan
(reproduced with kind permission of Dr Bojidar Yanev, New York City Department of Transportation)
6.4.2 Overall condition rating
To calculate the overall condition rating of the bridge it is proposed here that the inspected elements be
weighted by their safety-related importance; the weight wi of the element i is inversely proportional to
its safety level, i.e. the weight of elements with a high factor of safety will be less important than wi of
elements with a low factor of safety:
Equation 6.1
Where FOS0i: Factor of safety at present time of element i

n: Number of elements
If there is more than one condition rating for one element because different types of deterioration have
been found on this element, the maximum of these condition ratings will be retained for this element.
For bridge elements for which factors of safety are not available, e.g. bearings and expansion joints, the
user assigns weighting factors based on judgement. The overall condition rating CR is the weighted sum
of the condition ratings of the inspected elements, CRi:
Equation 6.2
This weighting is illustrated for a made up bridge in Application Example 6.1.
Application Example 6.1 Overall condition rating CR
Inspected element i Condition rating CRi Factor of safety FOS0i Weight wi wiCRi
Girder 1 0.8 0.65 0.65

Deck slab 3 1.5 0.35 1.05
Overall condition rating CR: 1.7
As the condition rating of a bridge influences the safety of a bridge and thus the risk of collapse, it is
important that those elements that are most likely to reduce the safety are given the highest attention.
The proposed overall condition rating penalises elements that are safety-critical by giving them a higher
weighting. For the purpose of this thesis, where the risk of collapse is evaluated, this approach is more
appropriate than weighting the inspected elements in terms of economic costs, which is adequate for op-
timal maintenance planning. It has to be mentioned that the proposed weighting could be the subject of
discussion as it might lead to inconsistent results between two bridges which are broadly in a similar
condition, but have a very different number of elements.
6.5 CONCLUSIONS
In todays safety evaluations, the calculated structural resistance is often modified to take into account
the deterioration of the bridge, but it is difficult to decide by what amount the resistance should be re-
duced to consider different deterioration mechanisms such as corrosion or freeze-thaw action. In practice
intervention measures are often applied when the bridge is in poor condition, even if the engineer has
demonstrated adequate safety. Condition evaluation is an essential ingredient in the safety (and hence
risk) assessment, since damage appearing to be minor can lead to serious structural problems.
Bridge inspections can provide the engineer with important information regarding the state of the bridge.
There are different types of inspection, varying in frequency and level of detail; as the risk assessment
methodology proposed here relies on regular assessments, it is suggested that they be undertaken just
after the outcome of the principal inspections, which take place in the UK every six years. This type of
inspection is more detailed than general inspections, which are carried out more frequently, but examine
the structure in less detail and thus provide less information for assessment of condition.
The main bridge inspection techniques and their limitations have been reviewed in this chapter. It has
been demonstrated that most techniques currently in use are not very reliable; their output is often influ-
enced by material and environmental properties, reliability of test apparatus and assessors experience.
When recording and comparing the condition of different bridges, it is difficult to be precise and consis-
tent, therefore, a condition rating system as unambiguous as possible should be employed. A review of
the rating systems used in different countries has revealed that most of them are either too vague in their
condition descriptions, or too complex to use in an assessment framework. To include all the inspection
results, it is proposed that a practical approach based on severity, extent and importance of the elements
be used. To determine the relative importance of one element to another, their factors of safety are com-
pared.
Because of this imprecision in condition rating, it is suggested that two different risk indicators be used
for safety and condition evaluation. In this way, the safety risk indicator will not be influenced by the
vague condition rating, but at the same time the overall risk assessment includes the condition rating.
The safety indicator is based on the current resistance and its predicted future (based on steel corrosion
only), whereas the condition rating may also take into account a not yet detected potential decrease of
resistance (due to several deterioration mechanisms). To establish the effect of a bridges condition on
the collapse risk, the condition rating classes are related to the structural resistance in chapter 9.
7. Consequences of failure 117
CHAPTER 7. CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE
Nothing is worth doing unless the consequences may be serious.
George Bernard Shaw (1856 - 1950)
7.1 INTRODUCTION
The risk assessment methodology of this thesis uses five risk indicators, one of them being the
importance risk indicator. Here it is suggested that the importance of a bridge be quantified in terms of
the consequences of failure: a bridge is important if the consequences after a bridge collapse are high.
The purpose of a road network is to facilitate delivery of community benefits such as accessibility,
mobility, economic development, emergency service access and social justice. Bridges are generally part
of a bigger network and the consequences of bridge failure can extend well beyond the bridge location
itself: a bridge in a critical location can seriously affect the performance of the entire network and may
therefore be associated with high user costs in the event of failure. These costs can be much higher than
those associated with the structure rebuilding costs.
The estimation of the consequences of failure of a structural system or of its elements requires a good
understanding of the system and its relationship with its surroundings. Consequences include:
bridge replacement costs
loss of life
loss of equipment
loss of architectural achievement
cost of temporary measures
road user costs (delayed traffic costs due to slowing down of traffic, costs due to detours of
traffic) composed of additional costs for vehicle operating, travel time and accidents.
costs of non-travelling, if no detours possible

social impact costs. These costs are incurred by businesses and the community in addition to
those costs related to the traffic use. Inconvenience to the community includes, for example,
buses being diverted from their usual stops, HGVs routed through residential roads, longer
routes for emergency vehicles and economic impact on local industry and businesses. This
effect is difficult to quantify, but it is heavily related to the type of road. Furthermore, it can lead
to adverse public opinion and a bad reputation for the responsible bridge authority.
A major difficulty encountered when quantifying these consequences is determining how to include
different contributions such as direct economic losses (bridge damage, repair costs), indirect losses (user
delay, impact on economic growth), non-monetary losses from loss of life or injury, damage to the
environment and social disruption. For practical reasons and because the majority of the consequences
considered may be expressed directly in monetary units, in this thesis all consequences are expressed in
these units, but it is difficult to assign a monetary value to some consequences.
To simplify the calculation of the consequences of failure, which are used in this thesis to measure the
importance of a bridge, it is suggested that costs be split into: (1) (re)construction costs Cconst, (2) user
costs during reconstruction Cuser and (3) life-saving costs CLS. In the following section methods to
calculate these costs are presented, and in paragraph 7.5.1 practical examples are used to illustrate their
application.
7.2 (RE)CONSTRUCTION COSTS
Once a bridge has collapsed, it might be rebuilt to continue fulfilling its function as a part of the road
network. When determining the importance of a bridge, it is implicitly assumed that the bridge will be
rebuilt, as otherwise it would not make sense to evaluate its importance. In the special case, where the
perceived benefit of the bridge is lower than the reconstruction costs, the bridge would normally not be
rebuilt. This aspect will be taken into account through the user costs (paragraph 7.3), which will be very
small for a bridge with negligible benefit.
When calculating the costs of reconstruction of a bridge, it is assumed that a bridge will be reconstructed
exactly as it was before the collapse; this assumption is made to facilitate the calculations of the
assessing engineer who calculates the reconstruction costs only as a measure of the bridge importance,
and not as a tender for a new bridge. The (re)construction costs Cconst are mainly associated with civil
engineering works and can be estimated, based on current material and labour costs, the structural type
and geometry, and the geographic location.
Material cost
Unit Material costs (per ton, m3 or m2 of deck) are tabulated in most countries depending on their quality
(e.g. concrete grade), section type (column, deck, walls,), construction type (e.g. precast or in-situ
concrete) and the sectional geometries. In the UK, Spons Civil Engineering and Highway Works Price
Book is published yearly and gives very detailed cost information [Davis, 2003]. These material prices
can be useful in cost-benefit analysis, when the cost-optimal quantity of a material is sought for a bridge
design (see section 8.3.3).
Cost of labour
The cost of labour can be estimated as a percentage of the material costs. For example, for reinforced
concrete members, Val suggests a labour cost of 60% of the material costs [Val, 2003]. This approach
seems to be too simplified as some materials will be cheaper than others (e.g. steel versus fabric
reinforcement), but the associated labour costs might be approximately the same. Rather than examining
labour and material costs separately, in this thesis construction costs are considered as a whole, i.e.
including material and labour costs. In the UK, Spons price book contains bridgework costs based on
recovered data from recently completed structures (e.g. Table 7.1).
Table 7.1 Bridgework prices for the UK [Davis, 2003]
Item Span* [m] Unit Total net rate []
Demolish to ground level and disposal off site - m3 6.66

(reinforced concrete bridge deck or
superstructure)
Demolish to ground level and disposal off site - m3 26.19
(reinforced concrete bridge abutment or bank
seat)
Reinforced in-situ concrete road viaduct 15 m2 of deck 950 to 1070
20 900 to 950
25 880 to 900
Reinforced concrete road bridge with precast 12 m2 of deck 1010 to 1070
beams 17 950 to 1010
22 900 to 970
27 870 to 930
Reinforced in-situ concrete footbridge with 5 m2 of deck 870 to 900
precast beams (widths up to 6 m) 10 810 to 840
20 840 to 870
* maximum span between piers or abutments
These prices give a fair estimation of the total construction costs, as they include excavation,
reinforcement, formwork, concrete, bearings, expansion joints, deck, waterproofing, deck finishings and
parapets.
7.3 USER COSTS
Computer software has been developed to automatically calculate the road user costs. Highway network
models such as CONTRAM (CONtinuous TRaffic Assignment Model) or SATURN are computer
programs for modelling traffic in road networks over time [Contram, 2002][Van Vliet, 1997]. They
predict traffic routes, link flows, and model queues and delays at junctions as they evolve over time.
They can assign traffic to minimum cost routes, reflect the way drivers may behave when familiar with a
network and produce a full description of flows, delays and journey times in the network. Although they
are still only models, they are capable of accurately representing time varying network conditions.
However, rather than being programs to calculate user costs, they are tools for the network owner to
minimise disruption and use the network optimally.
Another program, called QUADRO (QUeues And Delays at ROadworks), provides a method for
assessing the total cost of major road maintenance works [Quadro, 2002]. An obvious element is the
direct works costs of resurfacing or reconstruction. Another cost element, namely the delay costs, which
are the costs imposed on road users while the roadworks are being carried out, can be just as important
as the works costs. When assessing maintenance works, both works and road user costs are taken into
account by QUADRO. This program is a powerful tool, which can compare the full costs of alternative
maintenance options and also assess the maintenance implications of different options for road
improvements. For simple evaluations of the user costs due to bridge collapse, however, this model is
too complicated.
For individual bridge assessments, the computer programs cited above seem to be inappropriate. They
need a vast amount of input information as the whole area around the bridge has to be modelled in terms
of traffic flow and road geometry. In the future, this information might become readily available for all
bridges, but as the importance of a bridge, quantified through the consequences of collapse, can only be
calculated approximately, for practical purposes a simpler approach giving the order of magnitude of the
consequences of failure is sufficient.
For the risk assessment of one particular bridge, it is therefore proposed that the user costs Cuser be
considered simplified as the summation of the additional vehicle operating cost VOC, travel time cost
TTC and accident cost AC that would result from closure of the bridge, if it collapsed.
Equation 7.1
In the following, the first two terms are defined in terms of equations that have been adapted from the
World Banks Highway design and maintenance standard model [Watanatada, 1987] to suit the needs of
this thesis. The last term is defined by a new equation proposed here for the evaluation of accident costs,
based on similar formulas used in the above mentioned programs.
Equation 7.2
Equation 7.3
Equation 7.4
Where AADT: Annual average daily traffic on original route

VOCu: Unit vehicle operating costs [ per kilometre per vehicle]
Ld : Additional length of the detour route
gday: Per capita daily GDP for country
np: Average number of people per vehicle
V: Average velocity of vehicles
AR: Accident rate on original route [fatalities per kilometre per day]
ICAF: Implied costs of averting a fatality (see section 7.4.2)
The costs calculated with the above equations are daily costs and have to be multiplied by the estimated
duration of traffic interruption. UK traffic data is published yearly in the Transport Statistics Bulletin
[TSB, 2003]. UK unit vehicle operating costs VOCu may be taken from the QUADRO manual, where
they are derived from fuel and non-fuel costs [Quadro, 2002]. AR-values for typical road types are also
given in this manual, while road-specific values of AR can be obtained from the UK Department for
Transport (Transport Statistics Roads).
There are some limitations to the equations above as congestion on the detour route due to additional
traffic is only approximated; no traffic capacity checks are undertaken on the detour routes and accident
characteristics on the detour route are assumed to be the same as on the original route. Nevertheless, this
practical approach allows a distinction to be made between bridges with high user costs and bridges with
low user costs.
Partial collapse user costs
In the case of partial collapse, e.g. only part of the deck or only one of two bridges collapse, the normal
traffic flow must be reduced. The costs of detouring traffic and the associated delays must also be taken
into account. Based on his experience the assessor may estimate the percentage of the potential traffic
volume delayed at the bridge which chooses another road. Equations 7.2 to 7.4 can then be used to
estimate the additional costs to the users on the detour route.
7.4 LIFE SAVING COSTS
The life saving costs CLS are determined by estimating the probable fatalities resulting from the bridge
collapse, and multiplying them by the life-saving cost per person, i.e. the cost to implement an
intervention which saves one human life.
7.4.1 Number of potential fatalities
The likely number of fatalities on the bridge in the case of bridge collapse is dependent on the number of
lanes, the span, the traffic speed and flow and the proportion of different vehicle types in the flow, i.e.
vehicles with different occupancies. The likely fatalities below the bridge may be evaluated as a function
of the failed span lengths and the traffic flow on any infrastructure underneath (roads, waterways,
railways). The number of fatalities of people who drive into the gap after the bridge has collapsed will
depend on the traffic volume and visual circumstances such as the weather, time of day, lighting and
geometry of approach.
Here it is suggested that the number of potential fatalities, NF, be evaluated by using the same equation
Coburn & Spence developed for buildings subject to earthquakes [Coburn, 1992]:
Equation 7.5
Where M1: Population per building

M2: Occupancy at the time of the earthquake
M3: Injury distribution at collapse
M4: Mortality post-collapse
For bridge collapse risk assessment, the parameters Mi have been adapted to the case of bridge failure, as
the major fatalities are caused differently when buildings collapse (direct fatalities in case of bridge
collapse compared with death due to collapsing upper floors in buildings). For bridge collapse, M1 has
been defined as the maximum number of people on/under the bridge, which depends on location, span,
traffic, and persons per car. M2 has been defined as the occupancy at time of failure. M3 is the
probability of death at collapse and M4 is the probability of death post-collapse (in hospital).
The assessor can estimate the product M1M2, based on maximum traffic and location information (roads
or railway under the bridge, or buildings and other facilities under the bridge). The maximum traffic is
evaluated taking into account the AADT, the traffic distribution per month, day, and time of day, the
vehicle occupancy, the span and average traffic speed. This is done to evaluate the heaviest traffic that
could potentially be on the bridge: in one month on a particular day and at a particular time of that day
the traffic can be significantly higher than the AADT. This information can be found in official statistics
bulletins (e.g. [TSB, 2003]). Knowing the span, the traffic speed and the vehicle occupancy, an upper
bound of the number of people on the bridge can then be estimated. Additionally the assessor evaluates
the possible number of people under the bridge.
Based on experience in similar catastrophe situations (e.g. collapsing bridges or one floor buildings), M3
and M4 are determined by the assessor taking into account the bridge configuration: for bridges with a
great height above ground or those crossing a river, most fatalities will occur on the bridge site (M3 1)
and almost none in hospital (M4 0).
Although much of the required information has to be estimated by the assessor, the proposed method is
sufficient to model the potential fatalities, as the life-saving costs usually play a less important role in
the overall cost analysis (see examples in section 7.5.1).
7.4.2 Life-saving cost per person (value of human life)
Expressing the consequences of failure in monetary units requires a valuation of human life. The value
of human life is a concept that is best avoided as it is repugnant to many people; there may be a conflict
between economic efficiency and an ethical system. Many researchers circumvent the problem of giving
a value to human life by using the number of lives saved and only quantifying the amount of money that
is needed to save human lives. This value varies with time, because of economic growth and inflation,
and location, because of relative costs and wealth in different societies, but conceptually should not vary
from one discipline to another, e.g. health sector and preventing motor accidents. Various attempts have
been made by researchers to put an economic value on human life (Table 7.4); the principal approaches
are briefly summarised in the following.
Analysis of historic data
An obvious approach to determining its value is to look at historic data and risk-preventing preferences.
Rowe defines the value of human life as the amount of money society is willing to pay to prevent a
premature death [Rowe, 1977]. This can be observed by actually measuring what society pays for safety
and anti-pollution measures, but with this definition of the value of human life, the risk-reducing
efficiency of those measures is not taken into account. In fact, Rowe did only look at how much was
spent on a safety measure to prevent a death, but he did not analyse how many deaths were actually
saved with the introduction of a safety measure.
An improvement came with the Gross Cost of Averting a Fatality (GCAF) [Skjong, 2003]:
Equation 7.6
Where Cost: Marginal cost of the risk control option

Risk: Reduced risk in terms of averted fatalities
To take into account the age structure of a population, the cost-effectiveness of a life-saving intervention
can be determined in more detail by using the number of life years saved, rather than the number of
prevented fatalities. The most well-known and largest study, which compares the cost-effectiveness of
different life year-saving actions, has been undertaken in the US by Tengs et al. [Tengs, 1995]. Table
7.2 shows a summary of the 587 life-saving interventions studied. Tengs defined cost effectiveness as
the net resource cost of an intervention per year of life saved. The analysed life-saving interventions
ranged from those that save more resources than they consume, to those costing more than 10 billion
dollars per year of life saved. In theory, by reallocating resources and implementing only the most
effective measures, some tens of thousands of additional lives could be saved annually in the US with
the same budget.
Table 7.2 Major results from the US life-saving intervention study by Tengs et al. [Tengs, 1995]
Life-saving intervention Cost/life year saved
- Ban residential growth in tsunami-prone areas 0

- 1988 vs 1971 safety standard for concrete 0
construction
- Widen existing bridges on highways $82,000
Medical Intervention (median value of different $19,000
medical life-saving interventions)
Injury prevention (median value) $48,000
Toxic control (median value) $2.8 million
Median value for all 587 cases $42,000
Tengs study may be criticised because of its assumptions: for example cost/life saved estimates are
transformed to cost/life-year by considering the average number of years of life saved when a
premature death is averted. This average number cannot be determined precisely and is chosen by the
analyst. Furthermore, future costs and life-years have been discounted to their present value at a rate of
5%. This is a rather high discount rate (see section 8.3.3.1) and means that future costs will be
considerably downrated. Although this study of available cost-effectiveness data may not represent a
random sample of all life-saving interventions, it nevertheless shows that there is an enormous variation
in the cost of saving one year of life, depending upon the type of life-saving intervention. For example,
much more money is spent to control toxic gas emission than is spent to prevent deaths due to medical
interventions (Table 7.2).
Life quality method
In the life quality method (see section 8.3.4) Rackwitz derived the implied cost of averting a fatality,
ICAF, from what is referred to as the life quality equation [Rackwitz, 2002]. The ICAF represents the
amount that the society of one country should and can afford to spend on preventing a fatality, which
depends on the health and wealth of this society. It is obtained by maximising the quality of life and is
calculated as:
Equation 7.7
Where g: Gross domestic product per person

e: Life expectancy
w: Proportion of the time spent by an individual in economic (wealth creating) activities
The ICAF is related to one anonymous person and is different for each country (Table 7.3).
Table 7.3 Implied cost of averting a fatality (ICAF) [Rackwitz, 2002]
Country ICAF [x105 US$]
Haiti 0.5
China 1.5
UK 8.0
USA 11.0
In Table 7.4 various attempts at quantifying the value of human life are summarised. It should be
mentioned that all values in this table cannot be directly compared as they might have been derived with
different underlying assumptions such as discount rates or remaining life years. Also, they were not all
collected for the same year and in the same currency; in addition to discounting-induced differences,
there might also be inflation- and exchange rate-induced differences. Nevertheless, this table confirms
that a huge range of values is in use today.
When comparing the estimates of the value of a life from one context, e.g. labour market, to another, e.g.
prevention of nuclear accidents, one should recognise that different populations have different
preferences over risks (see section 8.2) and are prepared to spend different amounts of money on life-
saving.
However, for the risk assessment of existing bridges, it is proposed that the same value of life-saving
cost be used for the whole population of a single country, in accordance with the principle of equality of
all citizens. Looking after the general life quality of the whole population of a country, the ICAF is the
most objective measure and is not biased towards one group of society. The ICAF has been adopted in
this thesis to quantify what it costs to prevent a fatality, since it takes into account health, wealth and
productivity of a society.
Table 7.4 Different approaches quantifying the economic value of human life
Reasoning Value of human life [x106 US$]
Lost earnings due to premature death [Faber, 2003b] 0.45

Money spent on government programmes per life saved 0.1 (steering column protection)
[Lind, 1991] 90 (asbestos removal)
Life-saving cost of new Swiss earthquake code [Schneider, 2000] ~5.9*
Life-saving cost of wearing motor cycle helmet [Schneider, 2000] ~0.003*
Value of human life based on US labour market studies, converted 3.8 9
into year 2000 dollars [Viscusi, 2003]
Value of human life based on US tradeoffs outside the labour 0.77 (fire prevention) 5.4 (automobile
market studies, converted into year 2000 dollars [Viscusi, 2003] safety)
Median GCAF based on Tengs-study assuming that a fatality 1.47
corresponds to 35 remaining life-years [Tengs, 1995]
GCAF US Federal Highway Administration, road transport 2.5
[Skjong, 2003]
GCAF UK Department of Transport, road transport 1.6**
[Skjong, 2003]
GCAF Railtrack, Overground railways [Skjong, 2003] 1.6 - 4.2**
GCAF London Underground, underground railways 3.2**
[Skjong, 2003]
GCAF EU Road transport [Skjong, 2003] 1
Implied cost of averting a fatality, ICAF [Rackwitz, 2002] 0.014 (Nigeria) 1.1 (USA)
* Exchange rate used: 1 Swiss Franc = US$ 0.60
** Exchange rate used: 1 = US$ 1.60
7.4.3 Cost of injuries
Apart from the costs for averting fatalities, one should also take into account the injury-related costs.
These costs are very hard to quantify as they depend on the exact local situation at the time of the
collapse.
In 1992 the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) reported that for the United States, the
cost of injury can be taken as ranging from $1,000 (minor) to $10,000 (serious injuries)
[FEMA 228, 1992]. Viscusi has reviewed the value of human injury in different sectors and different
countries [Viscusi, 2003] and found a large range of values (Table 7.5).
Table 7.5 Value of a human injury in 2000 [Viscusi, 2003]
Sample Implicit value of a statistical injury [US$]
US Chemical worker survey 17,700 - 22,700

US National Medical expenditure survey 47,400 - 59,100
Canada Labour market activity survey 10,800 - 14,400 (injury)
161,200 191,000 (severe injury)
Taiwan survey of petrochemical workers 49,700
These numbers are orders of magnitude smaller than those for fatalities (Table 7.4). In the bridge
collapse database of Appendix A, the number of fatalities for in-service bridge collapses was in all but
one case higher than one tenth of the number of injuries. Taking these two observations into account
implies that the total cost of injuries will make a minor contribution to the total failure costs. Therefore,
and also because the number of injured and dead is difficult to predict, it is proposed here that only life-
saving costs be included in the consequences of failure and injury-saving costs be ignored.
7.4.4 Total life-saving costs
Once the potential number of fatalities and the cost of saving a human life have been determined, the
total life saving cost CLS of a bridge with NF potential fatalities can be calculated using the following
equation by Rackwitz [Rackwitz, 2002]:
Equation 7.8
Where k: A persons probability of being killed in the event of failure
For technical systems, k can be estimated taking into account the average number of persons
endangered by the event, the severity and suddenness of failure, availability and functionality of rescue
systems, etc [Rackwitz, 2002], but in the case of bridge failures k is difficult to determine because of
the lack of historical failure data.
7.5 RISK INDICATOR: IMPORTANCE OF THE BRIDGE
In the risk assessment methodology developed in this thesis, the importance of a bridge is evaluated in
terms of the consequences of failure, which are defined in terms of the total costs of failure. These total
costs of failure Ctot are calculated as:
Equation 7.9
Where Cconst: (Re)construction costs

Cuser: User costs
CLS: Life-saving costs
In contrast to conventional cost-benefit analysis (see section 8.3.3), the risk assessment method proposed
in this thesis does not discount costs to net present values; discounting is not necessary as the assessment
does not consider the whole life cycle costs of the structure, but considers the costs of failure if it
occurred at the time at which an assessment is taking place. These costs are used as a measure of the
importance of a specific bridge within a network at this time.
Because the total failure costs can be very high, the ratio Cconst/Ctot rather than the total costs, is used
here to quantify the importance risk indicator:
Equation 7.10
Where I: Importance ratio
Although counterintuitive because high I-values will correspond to low importance bridges, by doing so
there will be a lower (worst value I = 0) and an upper bound (best value I = 1) of the importance risk
indicator, which will be useful when all the risk indicators are combined together (see chapter 9).
7.5.1 Examples
In the following, the predicted failure cost calculations of three real bridges (Larling, Sandhole and
Winterbourne bridges, see Appendix B) are given as examples of the proposed methodology for
evaluation of the importance of a bridge. The three bridges vary in geometry, road network layout and
volume of traffic (Table 7.6). The cost evaluations for these bridges have all been published elsewhere
[Imhof, 2003b].
Table 7.6 Characteristics of the three example bridges analysed
Bridge Larling Sandhole Winterbourne

Parameter (central span of a
3 span bridge)
Span 9.2 4.0 12.1

[m]
Annual average daily traffic AADT 33,000 4,400 97,000
[veh/day]
Accident rate AR 1.4 0.6 2.1
[x104 fatalities/(kmyear)]
Additional detour length Ld 2.5 70 35
[km]
7.5.1.1 (Re)construction costs Cconst
The geometry of the bridge is directly reflected in the costs of (re)construction. The wider, longer and
thicker the bridge is, the higher the (re)construction costs (Table 7.7).
Table 7.7 Review of the (re)construction costs of the three example bridges analysed based on the
Spons price book tables 2001 []
Larling Sandhole Winterbourne

(central span only)
Cost of removal of failed bridge 3,000 2,000 10,000

Reconstruction cost 118,000 36,000 207,200
Total Cconst 121,000 38,000 217,200
7.5.1.2 User costs Cuser
The user costs can vary significantly with the location of the bridge; bridges close to or linking dense
habitation zones, such as Winterbourne bridge, will have much higher user costs in the event of collapse
(Table 7.8). The user costs also increase for longer detour routes such as the detour route of Sandhole
bridge.
Table 7.8 Review of the user costs of the three bridges analysed []
Vehicle operating costs VOC 272,300 676,000 11,203,500

(Equation 7.2)
Travel time costs TTC 96,300 239,600 3,002,400
(Equation 7.3)
Accident costs AC 5,900 46,800 122,800
(Equation 7.4)
Total Cuser 374,500 962,400 14,328,700
(Equation 7.1)
7.5.1.3 Life-saving costs CLS
For all three bridges, it is assumed that all fatalities will happen on the bridge site (M3 = 1) and none in
hospital (M4 = 0). In the evaluation of the life-saving costs the location of the bridge plays again a major
role; Winterbourne bridge has a high AADT and thus also a much higher number of potential fatalities
(Table 7.9).
Table 7.9 Review of the life-saving costs calculations of the three bridges analysed
M1M2 3.26 0.04 10.15

[persons]
NF 3.26 0.04 10.15
(Equation 7.5) [persons]
N 296 52 175
[persons]
k 0.011 0.0008 0.058
Total CLS 19,990 18 327,767
[]
7.5.1.4 Total costs Ctot
Table 7.10 summarises the costs determined above. Comparing the total costs caused by the bridge
collapse of Larling, Sandhole and Winterbourne bridge, one can see that they are a clear indicator of the
importance of the bridge. Winterbourne bridge is a very important bridge as it is used daily by a high
number of passengers and collapse could result in enormous user costs.
In all three examples, the user costs are the most significant component of the total costs and have
therefore a significant influence on the importance rating of a bridge. It is interesting to note that based
on this model, Sandhole bridge, which initially might be considered unimportant because of its remote
location and low traffic, is found to be more important than Larling bridge. This is primarily due to the
high costs incurred in taking the long detour route around Sandhole bridge, if it were to collapse.
Table 7.10 Review of the consequences of failure of the three bridges analysed []
(Re)construction costs Cconst 121,000 38,000 217,200

User costs Cuser 374,500 962,400 14,328,700
Life-saving costs CLS 19,990 18 327,767
Total costs Ctot 515,490 1,000,400 14,873,667
(Equation 7.9), rounded
Importance ratio I 0.24 0.04 0.01
(Equation 7.10)
7.6 CONCLUSIONS
Most people do not realise how important a bridge is, until it has collapsed. The consequences of
collapse will go far beyond the costs of demolishing and rebuilding the bridge. The bridge being out of
service means that traffic has to take alternative routes resulting in longer journeys, communities will
suffer economic impact and the public might loose confidence in similar bridges. There are many other
consequences of failure, but the point here is that the importance of a bridge may be assessed in terms of
consequences of failure.
To compare the consequences of failure of different bridges, it is necessary to evaluate every type of
consequence, e.g. fatalities or user delay costs, in the same units of measurement. In this thesis, the three
main consequences are calculated in monetary units: the total costs are the sum of (1) the
(re)construction costs, (2) the user costs during reconstruction and (3) the costs of saving human lives.
After reviewing different methods for evaluating these costs, practical methods for use in this thesis risk
assessment framework have been proposed in this chapter.
The (re)construction costs are calculated based on unit bridgeworks costs, including labour and all
material, published in construction price books. The user costs are calculated as the sum of additional
vehicle operating, travel time and accident costs, when the traffic has to take a detour route different
from the original one over the collapsed bridge. Rather than calculating the costs of fatalities, which is
deemed unethical, it is suggested that the costs of preventing these fatalities be evaluated; the so-called
life-saving costs may be determined by multiplying the probable number of fatalities by the cost of
averting a fatality. The former may be estimated as the product of the number of probable fatalities and
the probability of being killed in the case of bridge collapse. The cost of averting a fatality is taken as
the value that a society should and can afford to pay for prevention of a human fatality. This value is the
same for all parts of a country in accordance with the principle of equality of all citizens.
The calculation of the consequences of failure of three example bridges has shown that the user costs
dominate the cost calculation. Interestingly, bridges with very low traffic, situated in remote areas, can
have large consequences of failure when the traffic detour route is very long. The total costs of failure,
taking into account several importance-related aspects at the same time, are a good measure of the
importance of a bridge within the road network.

8. Risk 135
CHAPTER 8. RISK
Risk is the potential for realisation of unwanted, negative consequences of an event
W. D. Rowe (1930- )
8.1 INTRODUCTION
By including the consequences of failure the assessment of existing bridge structures as proposed in this
thesis uses risk rather than safety alone to decide whether a bridges performance is adequate. This chap-
ter explains how risk is defined, and how risk acceptance criteria can be established.
To be deemed useful, a structure should provide clear benefits to society over the course of its in-service
life: it should improve the quality of life of the community by providing easy access between divided
locations without incurring disproportionate costs to the benefits derived. The engineer responsible for a
structure has to minimise the risk of failure to an acceptable level. One of the most difficult problems
is defining how to set acceptance thresholds; a compromise between benefits, cost, environmental and
safety issues has to be made. Whether an existing bridge should be strengthened depends thus on the
consequences of failure, C, and the probability of failure, pf. The product of these two factors is denoted
the risk R:
Equation 8.1
The risk may be expressed in various ways, e.g. in monetary terms or the likely number of human fatali-
ties if failure was to occur. Risk assessment, as a basis for decision-making, is not a new undertaking.
We all take risks into account when we make decisions in our daily lives, e.g. when buying a car, the
trade-off between safety and cost is important to most people. We assess the risk associated with a cer-
tain option, and when the benefits outweigh the risk, we are willing to proceed with the option.
Using risk assessment to assess the performance of an existing bridge is a concept that is quite different
from what todays practising engineers are familiar with. Engineers today assure safety rather than ana-
lyse risk. Usually they guarantee safety by building in a safety margin (design) or by showing that the
available safety margin is sufficiently large (assessment). In contrast, a traditional risk assessment uses
risk as the primary parameter aiding the engineer in the decision process. This risk assessment procedure
consists of the following three steps:
1. Calculation of risk (risk analysis)
The first step consists of estimating the probability that an adverse consequence will result from some
action. For structural components, information on the rate of failure of particular bridge types or compo-
nents, i.e. historical data, is rare. It is possible, however, to calculate notional failure probabilities by
using structural reliability analysis (see section 4.2.2.1). The consequences of the failure of a structural
system can be estimated with the methods described in chapter 7.
2. Quantifying preferences (risk acceptance criteria)
The second step in the procedure quantifies preferences, i.e. it defines the acceptable risk, in order to
respect social and ethical principles. To limit the risk that people are exposed to, regulatory agencies
define limit values of acceptable risk. In order to do so, they face the important question of how safe is
safe enough. Inevitably they must reach a balance between benefit and risk. Furthermore it is generally
agreed that zero risk is never achievable; to require zero risk would mean to forbid that particular under-
taking.
3. Making decisions
The last step requires the engineer making decisions to propose interventions that will ensure that the
calculated risk is less than the level deemed to be acceptable. This step is not considered in this thesis.
As the calculation of the two risk components of the first step, failure probability and consequences, has
already been presented in chapter 4 and chapter 7, this chapter focuses on the second step in this risk
assessment procedure: risk acceptance criteria. It begins with an introduction to how different risks are
perceived and then addresses the questions of what should be permitted to happen, and what are accept-
able risks.
8.2 RISK PERCEPTION
The general public has an intuitive understanding of risk and would like to see the number of deaths re-
duced, but the public view is sometimes very narrow and tends to focus on risks covered by the media,
such as terrorist attacks, whilst voluntary risks, such as smoking, are often ignored. Even if the product
pfC is the same for two events, the significance of the risks, as far as the public is concerned, may be
8. Risk 137
different. The risk of death due to smoking or a car accident is much greater than the risk of death in the
event of a train crash, yet the former receive almost no public notice while recent rail accidents in the
UK have resulted in weeks of press coverage and public enquiries [Cullen, 2001]. The subjective risk
perceptions of the public will generally be quite different from the qualitative and quantitative assess-
ments made according to traditional engineering methodologies.
For most people, risk perception involves peoples beliefs, attitudes, judgments and feelings, as well as
the wider social or cultural values and dispositions towards hazards and their benefits [Royal Soci-
ety, 1992]. Acceptability of risks varies with age, gender, socio-economic conditions, level of education,
cultural background and available information. Several authors have studied the influence of parameters
such as exposure, familiarity (personal experience), controllability and the horror of the hazard
[Starr, 1969][Litai, 1980][Coburn, 1992][RAE, 2003].
Litai analysed twenty-six parameters that influence human attitudes towards risk, each of them with a
2-state (dichotomous) representation (e.g. voluntary and involuntary risk) [Litai, 1980]. This representa-
tion assumes that the human mind is not sensitive to small increments in parameters such as severity or
controllability, and reacts only to extreme changes. Table 8.1 gives, in descending order of importance,
the six most important of these parameters according to Litai. This table also summarises the risk con-
version factors proposed by different researchers; these factors, mainly based on databases of life insur-
ance companies, allow the transformation of fatality rates that are deemed acceptable in one context to
another. The accuracy of these factors is quite approximate as they are usually crudely assessed and their
values rounded.
Table 8.1 Recommended values of the risk conversion factors
Risk conversion factor [-]

Parameter Example [Starr, 1969] [Rowe, 1977] [Litai, 1980]
Volition
(Voluntary/Involuntary) Smoking/Nuclear Energy ~1000 100 100
Severity -
(Ordinary/Catastrophic) Sports/Aviation 50 30
Manifestations -
(Delayed/Immediate) Smoking/Aviation 0.2/year 30
Familiarity - -
(Familiar/New mode of Floods/Nuclear Energy 10
death)
Controllability -
(Controllable/Uncontrollable) Floods/Aviation 100 5
Origin -
(Natural/Man-made) Floods/Aviation 10 20
8.2.1 Risk aversion
Although all individuals should be equally protected regardless of the number of people involved in an
accident, society becomes risk averse as losses per accident increase, particularly when risks are man-
made and involuntary. Perception of risk seems closely related to the dread factor, and much less to ex-
posure level and risk familiarity. People accept the death of a single person and recognise that we all die
eventually, but the simultaneous death of many people can be mentally devastating. Risk aversion, espe-
cially for immediate risk manifestation, creates fear which is out of proportion to the risk computable
from mortality statistics.
Unfortunately, the media, which both influence and reflect public concern, take little notice of frequent
single fatality accidents such as road accidents, but report frequently on much rarer hazards, such as rail-
way crashes, when ten or a hundred people are killed. This can result in funds being diverted from where
they are most effective in saving lives to other risk areas.
Risk aversion can be taken into account by converting the risk acceptance threshold of ordinary risk to
one corresponding to a catastrophic risk. This might be done using risk conversion factors (Table 8.1).
Alternatively, some industries use frequency-consequence (FN) curves, such as in Figure 8.1, with the
ordinate representing the frequency distribution F of N or more fatalities and the abscissa representing
the consequences (N fatalities). These curves define a delineator between acceptable and unacceptable
risk.
An FN curve criterion with a slope steeper than 1 represents a desire to reduce the relative frequency of
high fatality events [Ellingwood, 2001]. Traditionally FN curves have the following format
[Reid, 1992]:
Equation 8.2
Where n and m are constants, generally greater then unity, chosen by the regulator to reflect the degree
of risk aversion, e.g. the ISO 2394-Code recommends n = 1 or 2 and m = 2 when calculating the yearly
societal probability of failure for structures [ISO 2394, 1998]. This approach might appear logical as the
acceptable failure probability is modified depending on the number of expected fatalities, but it is diffi-
cult to justify the choice of the parameters m and n, and in addition the FN curves do not provide a con-
sistent means for comparing the risks associated with different activities as they would have to be de-
rived for each activity individually to take into account the different perception parameters (Table 8.1).
8. Risk 139
Figure 8.1 FN curves for different types of UK offshore platforms [CMPT, 1999]
The methods mentioned in this section seem vague and depend on the subjective assumptions made by
the assessor. In this thesis it is believed that all lives in a country are of equal value and hence the ac-
ceptable risk, to which they can be exposed, should be the same. The methodology adopted here looks at
the risk-influencing parameters safety and consequences of failure. Allowance is made for risk aversion
when the consequences of failure are analysed in monetary terms. The more people at risk, the higher
the user costs and hence the poorer the overall bridge performance with regard to the risk of collapse.
8.3 ACCEPTABLE RISK
It is evident that the probability of failure of a strategically, economically or socially critical structure, or
one whose collapse would endanger human life should ideally be zero. However in reality pf can never
be zero as there is always a finite possibility of the design load being exceeded or material strengths be-
ing inadequate.
An important aspect of reliability-based assessment is the selection of appropriate values for the target
reliability of the structures under assessment. Different methods have been proposed for estimating the
(acceptable) target reliability index t or its corollary the target probability of failure pt. In the following
subsections, four methods will be examined in detail. These are:
i. Risk comparison (8.3.1)
ii. Calibration to existing code criteria (8.3.2)
iii. Cost-benefit analysis (8.3.3 and 8.3.5.1)
iv. Life quality method (8.3.4 and 8.3.5.2)
The last two methods are generally used to determine optimal design parameters such as the thickness of
the slab. In this thesis they have been modified to derive acceptable failure probabilities. Both methods
are first presented as used for their original purpose, and then are further developed to derive pt of three
example bridges.
8.3.1 Risk comparison
One method for selecting acceptable risk-of-death values may be to compare the risk of the chosen event
with other hazards. In daily conversation risk is a rather commonly used notion: we talk about the risk of
getting lung cancer or being killed on the road. Risks can be due to natural causes or can be conse-
quences of human activity. Estimates of selected risks in society, collected by several researchers, are
reproduced in Table 8.2.
The current rate of fatalities from motor accidents varies little from one reference to another, all re-
searchers reporting risk levels between 2x10-4 and 3x10-4 per year. This could be used as an upper bound
for the acceptable probability of death per year, but because different persons perceive risks in different
ways (see section 8.2), setting acceptable fatality rates is not so simple.
For example, an inspection of Table 8.2 confirms that the societal activities fall into two general catego-
ries: those in which the individual participates on a voluntary basis and those in which the participation
is involuntary, imposed by the society in which the individual lives. In the case of voluntary activities,
the individual uses his own value system to evaluate his experiences. For involuntary activities, the cri-
teria and options are determined not by the individuals affected, but by a controlling body such as the
government. Generally, engineered structures are used by people in the expectation that they will not
fail. In contrast, people may reasonably fear an aircraft accident since the incidence of accidents and
deaths are widely publicised, even if the actual relative risk of this activity may not be fully appreciated.
The probability of structural failure may therefore be considered to fall within the involuntary risk cate-
gory [Melchers, 1999].
8. Risk 141
Table 8.2 Risk of death of different societal activities based on historical failure record [/year]
[Litai, 1980] [Haldi [Melchers, 1999] [Reid, Bounds all re-

, 1998] 2000] searchers
Lower Char. Lower Char. Lower Char. Upper Char. Lower Upper
Activity bound value bound value bound value bound value bound bound
Coal miners 2.5x10-3 3x10-4 2.5x10-2 2.1x10-4 2.1x10-4 2.5x10-2

Smoking 4x10-3 1.0x10-3 7x10-3 - 1x10-3 7x10-3
Alpine 1.5x10-3 2x10-3 3x10-5 - 3x10-5 2x10-3
climbing
Construction 1.5x10-4 4.4x10-4 - 1.5x10-4 1.5x10-4 4.4x10-4
work
Car travel 3x10-4 2.0x10-4 2x10-4 3x10-4 2x10-4 3x10-4
Train travel 4x10-6 1.5x10-5 - 1.8x10-4 4x10-6 1.8x10-4
Swimming 3x10-5 3x10-5 1.7x10-4 7x10-5 - 3x10-5 1.7x10-4
Building 4x10-5 8x10-6 2.4x10-5 - 4x10-6 4x10-6 4x10-5
fires
Air travel 9x10-6 2.4x10-5 - - 9x10-6 2.4x10-5
Structural 1x10-7 - 1.4x10-7 1x10-7 1.4x10-7
failures
Bridge failure risk in the UK
Menzies estimated that the failure rate of bridges in the UK is in the region of one collapse every
1-2 years [Menzies, 1996]. The historical data in the bridge collapse database in Appendix A, which
covers more bridge collapses and a longer period of time than Menzies data, indicates a lower collapse
rate in the UK of one bridge every 57 years. Loss of life associated with bridge collapse in the UK is
rare. From the limited data available it is reasonable to infer that loss of life associated with UK highway
bridge collapse is in the region of one life lost every ten years. With a total population of 59.2 million,
the individual fatality rate is thus 2x10-9 /year. Compared with the fatality rates of Table 8.2, this value
is very low; it may be suggested that bridges in the UK be considered safe enough. This might change in
the future as economic pressures lead to less inspection and monitoring, and encourage engineers to get
the maximum use out of structures, whilst traffic loads increase. Without sufficient inspection, early
warnings of potential losses may be missed.
Critical comments
Although acceptable failure probabilities could be derived by looking at historical failure rate data, there
are some limitations of this method:
Risk statistics include data of different quality [Okrent, 1980].
The observed failure rates, averaged over all bridges, may be meaningless for a specific bridge,
since every bridge has different characteristics (geometry, resistance parameters, loading, static
system) and the bridge population is highly heterogeneous.
It is misleading to think that estimates computed using reliability analysis can be related directly
to criteria concerned with human fatality rates, or with observed structural failure rates. The cal-
culated probabilities are notional and may be different from the actual ones (see section 4.2.2.2).
Todays preferences and perceptions may be different from past ones, e.g. acceptance of death
from events such as diseases or childbirth was much greater in the past than it is today.
8.3.2 Calibration of target failure probabilities to existing codes
This approach calibrates the risk acceptance threshold to the same level of risk that has been tolerated in
the recent past. Todays structural codes are based mainly on practical experience; they represent a con-
sensus of what different practising engineers consider as safe enough. Proponents of this approach ar-
gue that society achieves an acceptable trade-off between risks and benefits only through an extensive
period of experience that allows for learning through trial and error. The target failure probabilities pt
should therefore match the probabilities of failure obtained if the design specifications are exactly re-
spected.
Allen uses this approach for his empirical life safety criterion, which is a mixture of past experience and
simplified reliability theory [Allen, 1991]. He calculates an acceptable limit P of the failure probability
pf by calibrating to the design codes:
Equation 8.3
Where P: (Notional) target annual probability of failure determined by reliability theory

T: Reference period
8. Risk 143
A: Activity factor, a measure of the risk associated with the activity (depending on traffic
type)
K: Calibration factor based on experience with existing codes
W: Warning factor reflecting the likelihood of death or injury
n: Number of people at risk
This life safety criterion recognises that the probability of death due to structural failure is equal to the
probability of structural failure times the probability of death given that the failure occurs. For design
purposes the latter probability is conservatively assumed to equal 1.0, but experience shows that some
failures are much less likely to result in death or injury: bridge failure due to scour may occur in the ab-
sence of any person.
By calibrating target reliabilities to past and current practice, it is assumed that these practices are ac-
ceptable. Doing such calibration exercises reveals that there is significant variation between structures in
terms of failure probabilities depending on the form of members, used materials and design practices
[Bassetti, 1998]. The value of the target failure probability may be dependent on how it is calculated;
one should therefore not directly compare reliability indices obtained from different probabilistic models
and methods of structural analysis. Some researchers have proposed that such calibrated target reliabil-
ities be based on bridge population statistics [Nowak, 2000], but when these population target reliabil-
ities are then compared with individual bridge reliability indices, the underlying assumptions might be
inconsistent.
This problem may, however, be avoided by performing analysis on a relative basis: using the same limit-
states and probabilistic models for the calculation of pf and pt. For example Tanner used calibration for
the safety assessment of a 70-year old concrete arch bridge that was to be strengthened and widened af-
ter a scour-induced settlement of the pillars [Tanner, 2001]. He designed the same bridge to fulfil the
minimum structural code requirements. The reliability index of this calibrator bridge is then used as the
target reliability t with which the actual bridge reliability has to be compared. The more advanced
assessment methods proposed in the UK (see section 2.3.2.2) are also based on this approach
[BD 79, 2000].
Although calibration of the target reliability levels to existing codes provides continuity and can there-
fore easily win the confidence of practising engineers, it also allows inconsistencies and inefficiencies in
current design practice to propagate into safety assessment of existing structures. Todays codes should
lead to a safe design, but compliance with the codes does not imply a uniform risk level because during
design simple structural analysis is often used, and also because of the generic nature of the traditional
design codes (see section 2.3.1.1).
8.3.3 Cost-benefit analysis (Economic optimisation)
In its normal use cost-benefit analysis (CBA) determines optimal design parameters assuming that all
risks are quantifiable in common units and should be managed to maximise the total expected net benefit
to society [Nathwani, 1997]. In section 8.3.5 this method will be extended to calculate pt.
For CBA, a structure is deemed to be optimal when the utility of its existence is maximised. The objec-
tive function Z(p) is defined as:
Equation 8.4
Where p: Parameters having an influence on safety (e.g. steel area As, slab thickness h)
B(p): Benefit derived from the existence of the structure
C(p): Cost of construction
M(p): Maintenance cost
D(p): Failure cost
Benefits and costs are evaluated for the whole life cycle of the structure. The optimisation is carried out
for a given remaining service life, trsl, chosen by the assessing engineer with the consent of the bridge
owner. For bridges, the benefit B(p) is independent of p if the use of the bridge is the same for differ-
ent p. As illustrated in Figure 8.2 the objective function can therefore be reformulated such that the goal
is to minimise the cost components C(p), M(p) and D(p):
Equation 8.5
Where Z(p): Reformulated objective function
Section 7.2 contains information on how to calculate the construction costs C(p). The maintenance costs
are defined as the costs associated with keeping the bridge functional with respect to load and volume
capacity and preventing the need for any major structural replacement or strengthening work over the
remaining service life trsl. To simplify the calculations the yearly maintenance costs may be predicted as
a percentage of the construction costs. Typical average annual values of these costs vary between 1-2%
of the bridges construction costs [Munich Re, 1992][Branco, 1995].
8. Risk 145
Cost
Z(p)
C(p)+M(p)
D(p)
p
opt Safety relevant
parameter p
Figure 8.2 Objective function in terms of cost
The expected costs of failure in one particular year correspond to the total cost of bridge collapse (see
chapter 7) times the probability that collapse occurs in the same year. The total cost of failure D(p) is the
cumulative expected failure cost over trsl.
The initial construction cost C(p) will increase if the underlying safety-relevant parameters p are made
stronger and thus the reliability of the bridge is increased (Figure 8.2). On the other hand, the expected
failure loss D(p) will decrease with increasing p: with increasing reliability the probability of failure de-
creases and hence the expected failure loss decreases. The optimal parameter vector popt can be deter-
mined by minimising Z(p).
8.3.3.1 Discounting of future costs
It is assumed that all quantities in Equation 8.5 can be measured in monetary units. The structure is op-
timised at the decision point, i.e. at time t = 0. Discounting is used to find the equivalent value today of
costs occurring in the future. The net present value NPV of a cost C occurring t years after the decision
point is:
Equation 8.6
Where : Yearly discount rate

: nterest rate, related to in the following way: = ln(1+ )
The 2003 edition of the Green Book of the UK government, which describes how the economic, finan-
cial, social and environmental assessments of a policy, programme or project in the public sector should
be combined, recommends a yearly discount rate of 3.5% [Green Book, 2003]. Whereas discounting is
standard procedure in the financial sector, it is less well understood and accepted when applied to prob-
lems involving human health and safety. People fear that future generations may be treated unfairly.
Some people even argue that no discounting at all should be included. The philosophical argument
against omitting discounting is that when discounting is ignored, societal decisions will place more em-
phasis on well-being of future generations, rather than improving welfare of those now alive.
It is a question of inter-generational morality that can only be answered in one way: All lives, present or
future, have the same value. Discounting future loss of life does not imply that we value future lives
less than our own (Keeney cited in [Nathwani, 1997]). Pat-Cornell argues that current generations
have the right to use resources and create risks for the future, but only to the extent that they would do
the same if they were to live with the consequences [Pat-Cornell, 1983]. Therefore future human safety
must be discounted at a rate that reflects future opportunities. It follows that, according to Pat-Cornell,
risks, mortalities and gains in life expectancies must be discounted at the same rates as cash flows.
Recent discount rate proposals by Rackwitz take into account the observation that individuals tend to
undervalue a prospect of future consumption in comparison to that of present consumption
[Rackwitz, 2004]. In utility theory this discounting rate can be referred to as the rate of time preference
of consumption. Many people perceive actions that are long deferred as being less important than present
actions. As a consequence, the willingness to pay now to reduce risks in the future is smaller than the
willingness to reduce present-day risks. Considering this, Rackwitz has suggested bounds on the dis-
count rate depending on the time preference of consumption and economical growth. Since the discount
rate has a significant influence on the outcome of cost-benefit analysis, and only upper and lower
bounds of it can be determined in his approach, the optimal CBA-solution might, however, be uncertain.
8.3.3.2 Total life-cycle costs
In CBA the costs in Equation 8.5 are the sum of the costs that the bridge will encounter during its re-
maining service lifetime trsl. For the maintenance cost, the cumulative M(p) of the yearly costs Ci can be
calculated with the following equation taking into account discounting.
Equation 8.7
8. Risk 147
For the failure cost the cumulative D(p) of the yearly expected failure cost pftCf is:
Equation 8.8
Where Cf(t,p): Cost of failure at time t (i.e. reconstruction costs, user costs and life-saving costs,
see chapter 7)
pft(t,p): Failure-time probability, i.e. probability that the bridge fails at time t (and survived
before t)
By using a structural degradation model (e.g. section 3.3.7) and structural reliability analysis, the prob-
ability of failure as a function of time, pf(t,p), can be calculated. To determine pft(t,p) it is assumed that
the failure events for different time periods are totally independent, and act in series. pft(t,p) can there-
fore be calculated from the yearly failure probabilities pf(i,p) as follows:
Equation 8.9
Figure 8.3 illustrates pf(t) and pft(t) for the Larling bridge.
Figure 8.3 Probability of failure and failure-time probability from Larling bridge example with the
original slab thickness reduced to 52% and corrosion rate: 3 mm2/year
8.3.3.3 Limitations of the CBA method for determining optimal design parameters
In Equation 8.8 the cost in the event of failure depends on the probability of failure and the con-
sequences of failure. A problem arises with the multiplication of a very small number (probabil-
ity of failure) and a large number (consequences). As each of them may only be known to an or-
der of magnitude, the expected cost is very uncertain.
Material deterioration is a complex process and its modelling is uncertain (especially for large
trsl -values). The prediction of the failure probabilities in the future, based on such models, is
therefore also uncertain.
The aim of CBA is to minimise the life-cycle costs; as a purely economic criterion it does not
reflect societal concerns such as improving the quality of human life.
The use of cost-benefit analysis raises many philosophical and ethical issues. Fundamentally,
one must ask if human life can be reduced to a monetary value.
8.3.4 Life quality method (Socio-economic optimisation)
The Life quality method (LQM) is one of the first risk acceptance criteria to explicitly take into account
the wealth and health of society. At the heart of this method is a social indicator, the life quality index L,
developed by Nathwani et al. [Nathwani, 1997]. This index can be derived from consideration of the life
expectancy at birth, e, and the gross domestic product per person per year, g, in a given country. The life
expectancy at birth is a reflection of the general well-being of a society, whilst g is a persons average
contribution to the wealth produced by that society. As a general indicator, L can be used as an objective
function for risk management of all kinds of risks in a society. It is also helpful for deciding whether an
undertaking is of net benefit to society. The life quality index assumes equality of all the people living
within the borders of a nation, although different countries have different Ls reflecting the different lev-
els of development, wealth and health.
Nathwani et al. propose the following expression for L:
Equation 8.10
Where f(g): Intensity of the enjoyment of life (related to g)

h(t): Function of the time one can spend outside the activities that produce g (related to e)
8. Risk 149
When comparing different risk reduction strategies, the best option is that which leads to the highest life
quality index. The goal is therefore to maximise the net benefit to society in terms of the length of life in
good health for all members at all ages. Acceptability for the life quality index can be derived by the
requirement that its increment dL, expressed as a function of the variables affected, should be positive.
Rearranging this requirement Nathwani et al. derived the following inequality [Nathwani, 1997]:
Equation 8.11
Where w: Percentage of the total lifetime spent working

de: Change in life expectancy of the population due to a change in the level of risk to the
population associated with a project; an increased risk would be expressed in terms of a
negative de
dg: Associated gain or compensation (e.g. people living close to chemical plant are paid for
exposure to risk)
From Equation 8.11 it is also possible to calculate the amount of money that should be invested into
structural safety to save the life of one person, the so-called implied cost of averting a fatality (ICAF, see
section 7.4.2) [Rackwitz, 2002]. After further developments, not reproduced in this thesis, Rackwitz has
derived the following inequality applicable to the design of technical facilities [Rackwitz, 2002]:
Equation 8.12
Where p: Vector of all safety-relevant parameters

C(p): Construction costs
h(p): Failure rate per year
: Interest rate (see section 8.3.3.1)
NF: Number of potential fatalities from failure
k: A persons probability of being killed in case of failure
GF: Constant derived from considerations of changes in mortality resulting from changes
of safety-related measures implanted in a regulation or code
Table 8.3 shows the major social parameters included in the life quality method for a selection of differ-
ent countries.
Table 8.3 Social indicators for some countries (adapted from [Rackwitz 2002])
Country Gross domestic prod- Life Life quality GF

uct per person, g expectancy, e index, L
[x103 /year] [years] [-] [x105 ]
Haiti 1 54 89 1.3
China 2.7 70 133 4.1
UK 16.4 78 189 12
USA 23.8 77 211 24
To determine the optimal design parameters p the original Equation 8.12 has been modified in this thesis
to the following equation in which h(p) has been replaced with the probability of failure pf(p). Equation
8.12 has been changed to replace the derivative of C with respect to h by the more easily calculable deri-
vates of C and pf with respect to p.
Equation 8.13
Equation 8.13 can be interpreted as a societal condition on the additional costs (or additional g) when
the probability of failure is altered through a change in the parameter vector p. Using this equation the
acceptable parameter vector p and hence the acceptable reliability level can be determined as will be
shown with an application example in paragraph 8.3.5.2.
8.3.5 Extending and comparing CBA and LQM: Application examples
CBA and LQM are normally used to determine optimal design values for the parameter vector p. In this
section the original methods have been further developed to derive target failure probabilities. As exam-
ples the target failure probabilities of Larling, Sandhole and Winterbourne bridges are calculated by
cost-benefit analysis and by the life quality method, and are critically compared. In both methods the
safety-influencing parameters p (slab thickness, concrete strength and reinforcement area) are varied to
find the minimum acceptable value. The acceptable probability of failure, corresponding to these opti-
mal values of strength parameters, can then be deduced.
The probabilities of failure are calculated using FORM (see section 4.2.2.1) and yield-line analysis [Im-
hof, 2003b]. The probability of failure of each bridge at time zero has been calculated for different val-
ues of the parameters in vector p (Figure 8.4).
8. Risk 151
Figure 8.4 Probability of failure at time zero depending on the steel area
In CBA, in addition to the variation of the failure probability with p, pf also varies with time because the
resistance decreases with time due to structural deterioration. For the three example bridges this deterio-
ration has been modelled by reducing the steel with time according to the deterioration model of para-
graph 3.3.7.2. As all the bridges have already been in service for a long time, it has been concluded that
the corrosion initiation period is already over. Corrosion propagation calculations have been made for
medium (r = 2 mm2/year) and high (r = 3 mm2/year) corrosion environments.
By taking into account the deteriorated steel, the probability of failure for a given parameter vector p can
be calculated at different time periods (e.g. Figure 8.5).
pf(t) [x10-4]
4
0
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Time [years]
Figure 8.5 Time dependent probability of failure for the Sandhole bridge with 88% of the original
steel (corrosion rate r = 2 mm2/year)
8.3.5.1 Cost-benefit analysis: Extension to derive target failure probabilities
By extending the original CBA method, intended for the optimisation of the design parameters, the tar-
get probability of failure pt is calculated in two steps: (1) The optimal parameter vector p is determined
using Equation 8.5 and (2) the probability of failure corresponding to this optimal p is determined. This
probability corresponds to pt.
A true multidimensional optimisation could be undertaken to perform these two steps. Here a less com-
plicated unidimensional optimisation is employed, and this will be shown to be accurate enough. In the
parameter vector p the area of reinforcement steel As, the slab thickness h, and the concrete strength fcu
have each been varied in turn. For each of the parameters considered pt is determined and the lowest
value obtained is taken as the CBA-target failure probability. This approach might not lead to the opti-
mal parameter vector p, but should result in conservative estimates of pt as the failure probability corre-
sponding to the CBA-optimal design parameter vector p obtained by multidimensional optimisation
might be higher than the one obtained with unidimensional optimisation.
In the first step described above, the cumulative failure costs D(p) in Equation 8.5 are calculated for dif-
ferent p-values using Equation 8.8. The individual points of the calculated D(p)-curve are then fitted by
an exponential function. Assuming that maintenance costs do not vary significantly with the safety pa-
rameter vector p, they are neglected here. In accordance with Equation 8.5 the optimal value of each pa-
rameter considered is that for which the total cost is the lowest (e.g. Figure 8.6). As the construction
costs vary much less with the design parameter than the costs of failure, the minimum total cost is in
most cases situated close to the point where the failure costs start to increase considerably.
Costs [x10 5]
2.5
Construction
Construction cost
cost C(p) trsl = 40 years
C(p)
2 Cost of failure D(p) = 0.06
Cost of failure D(p)
Total cost
Total Z(p)
cost Z'(p) r = 2 mm2/year
1.5
1
Z(p) = C(p) + D(p)
0.5
Optimum
0
0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
h/horiginal
Figure 8.6 CBA-optimisation of the slab thickness h of Larling bridge

8. Risk 153
In the second step, knowing the relationship between the probability of failure and the design parameter
value (e.g. Figure 8.4), the target probability of failure can be derived from the optimal values of the
parameters considered. As an example, Table 8.4 shows the CBA target failure probabilities for Larling
bridge. In this table, the effect of varying the concrete strength fcu is not included because the target
probabilities of failure are quasi independent of fcu. This is because only bending failure is considered by
yield-line analysis and fcu has only a minor influence in bending failure. The table demonstrates that pt-
values calculated with CBA are very sensitive to trsl; when trsl is increased from 10 to 40 years pt-values
can get 105 times lower.
Table 8.4 CBA Target probabilities of failure pt for the Larling bridge obtained by varying design pa-
rameter values (corrosion rate r = 2 mm2/yr)
pt trsl = 10 yrs trsl = 40 years

= 0.06 = 0.02 = 0.06 = 0.1
Varying As 4x10-6 10-12 10-11 10-10

Varying h 7x10-6 10-12 10-11 10-8
8.3.5.2 Life quality method: Extension to derive target failure probabilities
In this extended version of the original LQM method the optimal parameter vector p is determined using
Equation 8.13 and then, the target probability of failure can be derived from the relationship between
probability of failure pf and p. To solve Equation 8.13 the construction costs are determined from the
amounts of material in place (see section 7.2); C(p) and its derivative dC(p)/dp can therefore be deter-
mined. pf(p) has already been calculated for the CBA (e.g. pf(As) in Figure 8.4), and so dpf(p)/dp is also
known. The other parameters of this equation are either fixed (GF from Table 8.3) or have been deter-
mined earlier in this thesis (for k and NF see section 7.5.1). Table 8.5 summarises the obtained target
failure probabilities, obtained by unidimensional optimisation, for different discount rates .
Table 8.5 Target probabilities of failure pt based on LQM-optimal values of the considered strength
variables of the three bridges, corresponding to different discount rates
Yearly discount Larling Sandhole Winterbourne

rate, Varying As Varying h Varying As Varying h Varying As Varying h
0.02 4.0x10-4 4.0x10-4 5.0x10-3 5.0x10-3 1x10-4 1x10-4

0.04 8.0x10-4 8.0x10-4 1.0x10-2 1.0x10-2 3x10-4 2x10-4
0.06 1.1x10-3 1.3x10-3 1.4x10-2 1.5x10-2 4x10-4 3x10-4
0.10 1.9x10-3 2.0x10-3 2.4x10-2 5.0x10-2 6x10-4 4x10-4
8.3.5.3 Results, sensitivity study and discussion
This section compares the results obtained and examines the influence of the risk of being killed, the
yearly discount rate, the rate of corrosion, the remaining service life, and the user costs on the target fail-
ure probabilities.
With both methods, the target failure probabilities are specifically calculated for the bridges being exam-
ined and for bridge collapse as the failure criterion. They are not intended to be used for other bridges or
other failure criteria. For instance, all failure probabilities calculated here correspond to system failure
and cannot be compared to failure probabilities calculated with linear-elastic analysis methods. This will
explain why the derived failure probabilities are rather low compared with first element failure prob-
abilities, often found in the literature.
In most cases the optimal probability of failure corresponded to strength parameters lower than the ones
actually adopted in the design. This means that in most cases all three bridges can safely carry the loads
applied (as pf < pt), if quantifying target failure probabilities using LQM and/or CBA. In some cases -
such as Sandhole bridge with = 0.06, r = 3 mm2/year, trsl = 40 years and pf = 10-14 - however, the
bridge would not pass the assessment as pf > pt (Table 8.6). This underlines the importance of knowing
the parameters , r and trsl in CBA. Unfortunately these parameters cannot be determined unequivo-
cally and have to be chosen by the assessing engineer.
The target probabilities pt obtained by varying the area of steel As are similar to those obtained by vary-
ing the slab thickness h, affirming that a unidimensional optimisation is sufficient here. Table 8.6 com-
pares the LQM-target failure probabilities to those obtained by CBA. The CBA-values are vastly differ-
ent from the LQM-values as the goals of the two methods are dissimilar (minimising the life-cycle costs
and maximising health and wealth of society, respectively). It can be seen that for the three bridges
considered here, the LQM-values are always higher than the CBA-probabilities. Conversely there might
be cases where the CBA-values are higher than the LQM ones, and in these cases the LQM-values
should be considered as an upper bound on the target probability because they are based on societal
considerations, rather than pure economic optimisation.
Table 8.6 Comparison of target probabilities of failure pt computed using LQM and CBA for
= 0.06 and trsl = 40 years
Bridge LQM Cost-benefit analysis (CBA)

r = 2 mm2/year r = 3 mm2/year
Larling 1.1x10-3 10-11 10-16

Sandhole 1.4x10-2 10-11 10-15
Winterbourne 3x10-4 7x10-8 10-9
8. Risk 155
The differences in pt between Larling and Winterbourne bridge in the LQM-criterion can be explained
by the higher number of people at risk, and hence higher probability of being killed in the event of fail-
ure of Winterbourne bridge. Interestingly the CBA results in lower pt -values for Sandhole bridge in
comparison with Winterbourne bridge. This may be due to the different ratio of the construction costs
and the failure costs: C(poriginal)/Cf(poriginal) is 24% for Larling, 4% for Sandhole and 1% for Winter-
bourne. However, the main difference in the target probabilities of failure is in the different increase of
pf when the original strength variables are reduced (e.g. As in Figure 8.4). At time zero the probability of
failure for all bridges (with original strength) is very low. But when the design parameters are reduced,
this probability increases much faster for Winterbourne bridge (Figure 8.4).
Risk of being killed
In the LQM-equation (Equation 8.13) pf(p) is approximated by an exponential function since a Chi-
square test [Ang, 1975] showed that this type of distribution was the best suited for each of the three ex-
ample bridges analysed. Thus we have dpf/dp = pfs, where s is a constant. As dC(p)/dp is also constant,
pf varies inversely proportional with NFk. The LQM target failure probabilities are therefore sensitive to
NF and k, which cannot be determined precisely. In CBA this sensitivity is far less pronounced as the
life-saving costs are less important than the user costs (see section 7.5.1).
Discounting
Discounting is one of the key-elements in CBA. Table 8.7 suggests that for both LQM and CBA, the
discount rate has an influence on the target safety level. Increasing the yearly discount rate means ne-
glecting failure costs in the future and results in increased target probabilities of failure. The longer the
period over which costs and benefits extend, the greater the impact of discounting.
Table 8.7 Influence of discount rate on target probabilities of failure

(trsl = 40 years, r = 2 mm2/year)
Bridge LQM CBA

= 0.02 = 0.1 = 0.02 = 0.1
Larling 4x10-4 2x10-3 10-12 10-10

Sandhole 5x10-3 2x10-2 10-12 10-11
Winterbourne 9x10-5 4x10-4 10-9 10-7
Rate of corrosion
As can be seen in Table 8.8 the rate of corrosion clearly has more influence on the target failure prob-
ability of Larling and Sandhole bridges than for Winterbourne bridge. This result indicates that for the
deterioration model used here, where the corrosion is considered per steel bar, knowledge of the corro-
sion rate becomes more important for small diameter bars, as on Larling and Sandhole bridges.
Table 8.8 Influence of remaining service lifetime and corrosion rate on target probabilities of failure
in CBA ( = 0.06)
Bridge r = 2 mm2/yr r = 3 mm2/yr

trsl = 10 yrs trsl = 40 yrs trsl = 10 yrs trsl = 40 yrs
Larling 10-6 10-11 10-6 10-16

Sandhole 10-11 10-11 10-11 10-15
Winterbourne 10-6 10-7 10-7 10-9
Remaining service lifetime
The LQM criterion does not depend on the remaining service lifetime trsl; in contrast, in CBA this pa-
rameter is important. For Larling bridge trsl has a bigger influence than for Sandhole bridge (Figure 8.7).
(a) Larling bridge (b) Sandhole bridge
Figure 8.7 CBA-optimum for As ( = 0.06 and r = 2 mm2/year)

8. Risk 157
To explain this difference a new concept called equivalent probability of failure is introduced here. As-
suming the cost of failure Cf is independent of t and p, the equivalent probability of failure, pequ, is de-
rived directly from Equation 8.8:
Equation 8.14
The equivalent failure probability takes into account time variation of pft and discounting. The objective
function (Equation 8.5) changes into
Equation 8.15
and the optimal p can be found by solving
Equation 8.16
(a) trsl = 10 years (b) trsl = 40 years
Figure 8.8 Comparison of the equivalent probability of failure for different remaining service lifetimes
with = 0.06 and r = 2 mm2/year (the circles indicate the optimal steel area)
From Figure 8.8 it can be seen that for a bridge with a high ratio C(p)/Cf (i.e. Larling), the pequ-value that
corresponds to the optimal p can be much higher than for bridges with a low cost ratio. For longer re-
maining service periods the optimal value of the integral (Equation 8.14) remains the same, but because
of the different shape of the pequ(p)-curves, the optimal p, and with it the target probability of failure pt,
changes. Figure 8.8(b) also explains the high target failure probabilities in Table 8.8 of Winterbourne
bridge: because of the localised steeper shape of the pequ-curve, a much greater reduction of the design
parameter p is possible before the pequ-curve starts to increase, and dpequ/dp reaches the limit of Equation
8.16.
User costs
The influence of the user costs becomes important when the ratio C(p)/Cf changes significantly. Table
8.9 shows that for Larling bridge, where the original ratio was 24%, the target probability changes from
10-8 to 10-10 when the user costs are multiplied by four, resulting in C(p)/Cf = 7%. For the other bridges
the original ratio was already very low and thus there is not a big change in pt, when user costs are var-
ied.
Table 8.9 CBA Target probability of failure pt depending on the assumed user costs
User costs/original user costs

Bridge 0.5 1 2 4
Larling 10-7 10-8 10-9 10-10

Sandhole 10-11 10-11 10-12 10-12
Winterbourne 10-7 10-8 10-8 10-8
8.4 CONCLUSIONS
In previous chapters, methods for calculating the two key elements of risk, the failure probability and the
consequences, have been presented. Although an estimate of the risk of collapse for any individual
bridge can be determined, there is still no generally recognised method for determining the risk accep-
tance threshold or target risk level. Several methods proposed by other researchers for calculating target
probabilities of failure have been reviewed, and finally two new methods for deriving an acceptable fail-
ure probability have been developed and critically compared. These two methods are complimentary as
one optimises the health and wealth of society, whereas the other uses a purely economic optimisation.
A comparison with other risks, such as car travel or smoking, cannot easily be employed for deriving
target values since risks in different fields are perceived differently. Risk acceptance depends on factors
such as volition, severity, manifestation, familiarity, controllability and origin. Additionally, the failure
8. Risk 159
probabilities obtained using structural reliability analysis are notional and cannot directly be compared
with actual failure probabilities.
Calibration to existing structural codes uses the safety level provided by todays structural codes as a
reference. This level is deemed acceptable because the codes have gone through an extensive period of
trial and error. Although this approach provides continuity, it also allows inconsistencies and inefficien-
cies in current practice to propagate into the assessment of existing structures. As for risk comparisons,
calibration to existing codes completely ignores the benefits and costs of implementing risk-reduction
measures.
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is used to maximise the benefit and minimise the costs of the existence of a
structure over its remaining service lifetime. Because it considers the whole life cycle, its results are sen-
sitive to the assumed deterioration model and the remaining service lifetime. CBA is a purely economic
evaluation tool and does not consider the human life condition.
The life quality method (LQM) aims to optimise the health and wealth of a society, which is measured
by a social indicator; this life quality index is computed using the life expectancy at birth and the gross
domestic product per person in a given country. With this criterion, risk acceptance requires an im-
provement of the net benefit to society in terms of length of life in good health.
None of the approaches considered is without limitations. Each gives special attention to some aspects
of risk acceptance, such as guaranteeing the same safety level as existing codes, minimising costs or im-
proving the quality of life, but ignores others. As a result, none of the approaches gives a definitive an-
swer.
Comparing the risk acceptance methods described in this chapter, it is found that cost-benefit-analysis
and the life quality method are much better able to cope with the broad range of acceptable-risk prob-
lems than calibration to either existing codes or fatality statistics. Based on the general principles of
CBA and LQM, which are normally intended to derive optimised designs, two versions of these methods
have been developed in this chapter to determine target failure probabilities. Their implementation and
sensitivity to different input parameters have been detailed using three practical application examples.
The LQM target failure probabilities have been found to always be higher than those derived using CBA
for the examples considered, but there might be cases where the LQM-values are lower than the CBA-
values, e.g. when the failure costs are very low. Because they have different goals (economic efficiency,
improving health and wealth) LQM and CBA should be used together. The lower of the target failure
probabilities obtained is suggested to serve as the target failure probability needed for decision-making,
however, for ethical reasons the LQM-value should be regarded as a definite upper limit.
Both the CBA and LQM methods for determining target probabilities avoid the problem of comparing
incompatible notional and actual probabilities of failure. The target probability of failure for a specific
bridge is calculated using the same limit-states and probabilistic distributions as is used to calculate the
probability of failure of the actual bridge. In this way, both failure probabilities are notional and are thus
comparable.
The assessment methodology developed in this thesis needs to be practical. Although the above men-
tioned methods to determine the acceptable probability of failure could be applied to real bridges, they
are far too complicated and time-consuming to use in practical applications: the costs and failure prob-
abilities, depending on time and on the safety-relevant parameters, have to be determined. Furthermore
the methods presented depend on such parameters as the discount rate, for which there is no single
commonly agreed value.
To overcome these problems, in the next chapter the calculation of risk is avoided. Instead, the risk-
influencing parameters are quantified and used in combination to evaluate the performance of a bridge
with regard to the risk of collapse.
9. Practical risk assessment of existing bridge structures 161
CHAPTER 9. PRACTICAL RISK ASSESSMENT

OF EXISTING BRIDGE
STRUCTURES
9.1 INTRODUCTION
The aim of this thesis is to develop a rational and practical method for assessing the risk of collapse of
existing bridges; this method should enable the engineer to decide whether the actual risk state of a
bridge is satisfactory or whether intervention is necessary.
Risk is defined as the product of the probability of failure and the failure consequences. In previous
chapters, five different risk indicators, which have a direct influence on either the probability of failure
or the consequences of failure, have been described and measures to quantify the indicators have been
proposed. The risk indicators are well-suited to practical applications, since the calculations associated
with them are relatively quick and simple.
This chapter proposes a new method for combining these risk indicators to obtain an overall picture of
the risk performance of an existing bridge. The five risk indicators are usually measured in different
units; to make a comparison between them possible, they have first to be transformed to a common unit
of measurement scale, the so-called standard scale. This transformation is facilitated by the use of
standardising curves, which map the relationship between the original risk indicator values and the
standard scale. These curves are derived so that multiplying the standardised values of any indicator by a
factor results in the collapse risk being divided by the same factor. The curves are based on practical
observations and respect constraints on worst, just acceptable and best values of each indicator.
Once all the risk indicators are standardised, they can be illustrated on the risk spiderweb. This is a
radial graph which provides a visual representation of the relative significance of each risk indicator
presented on a common scale; it allows rapid identification of those indicators that are most likely to
warrant more extensive in-depth investigation if they collectively indicate that the overall performance
of the bridge with regard to the risk of collapse is unacceptable.
Risk acceptance can be based on acceptable performance criteria, in which a combined measure of all
the five risk indicators is compared to an acceptable threshold value. This comparison helps the engineer
to decide whether the performance of the bridge is adequate or whether remedial action has to be taken.
For example, a bridge might have a low factor of safety, yet the consequences of failure in case of bridge
collapse would only be minor. By looking at other parameters, and not only at safety, the proposed
methodology can demonstrate the performance of such a bridge to be acceptable and no intervention
required.
The proposed risk assessment methodology is practical because it uses readily quantifiable inputs and
has a modular structure. Not all risk indicators need always be calculated. The safety indicator should
always be calculated, however if, based on his experience, the assessing engineer considers that some of
the other risk indicators are acceptable, he does not have to determine these in detail, but can assign
them the just acceptable value. For example, the engineer could consider the bridge to be in good
condition without having to undertake inspections. In this case he would assign the just acceptable value
to the condition rating risk indicator without undertaking any explicit calculation.
9.2 OVERALL RISK PERFORMANCE ASSESSMENT
9.2.1 Existing approaches for evaluating performance
There are a number of different approaches for evaluating performance in the literature. They include
several definitions of key measures of performance. Two examples of such approaches are briefly
explained in the following.
9.2.1.1 Munich Re approach
The reinsurance company Munich Re has developed a combined risk indicator applied to megacities,
which is intended to be a measure of the material loss potential that might result from natural hazards.
The combined risk indicator is based on the following three subsidiary basic indicators
[Munich Re, 2003]:
i. the hazard estimated from the material loss the reinsurance company will have to pay for in
case of building collapse. This loss is calculated as the average annual loss AAL and the
probable maximum loss PML.
ii. the vulnerability, determined from structure-specific information such as material/structure-

type, safety standard, quality of the construction and building density.
iii. the exposed values, i.e. average monetary value of household, gross domestic product, world
economic importance.
Hazards include earthquakes, floods, storms and other natural phenomena. The total hazard value is
calculated as the sum of 80% of the AAL-value and 20% of the PML-value. All indicators are finally
rated on a scale of 0 to 10. The combined risk indicator is obtained by multiplying the three individual
basic indicators.
The Munich Re-approach is appropriate when the risk of failure of a population of structures is assessed,
and insurance premiums have to be set based on expected loss over large population and using historical
data. To assess the risk to one particular bridge, however, it is necessary to consider bridge-specific
properties, such as the structural behaviour at failure, or the consequences of failure, as there is a
significant variation in these properties within the bridge population.
9.2.1.2 Atkins approach (Sterritt et al.)
Atkins propose a global performance index to demonstrate the performance of the structures stock, as
well as the effects of structures maintenance funding over time [Sterritt, 2003]. The global performance
index comprises four performance indicators (PI):
i. Visual condition; PI based on the condition data currently available in the British structures
database.
ii. Structural Reliability; PI depending on the probability of failure, obtained using conventional
reliability analysis, and the consequences of failure.
iii. Availability; PI depending on traffic delay costs or restrictions on traffic.
iv. Outstanding maintenance.
The performance indicators are linked to a generic performance scale that allows comparisons to be
made between them. The generic scale goes from 0 (worst possible performance) to 100 (best). As the
performance decreases, the level of intervention required increases disproportionally; to take this into
account, a nonlinear grading is used to qualify the PIs (Table 9.1).
The generic performance descriptions of Table 9.1 are then linked to specific descriptions for each of the
four performance indicators. The global performance index is the weighted combination of the four
performance indices. Sterritts proposed method is still under development; in the draft report describing
the method no details are given on the derivation of the weighting of the four PIs. Sterritts approach has
some points in common with the new risk assessment methodology proposed in this thesis, but there are
also some important differences. Unlike the method used by Sterritt, availability and maintenance are
not explicitly taken into account in the methodology proposed here as the aim of the authors approach
is to evaluate the risk of collapse. It is not concerned with maintenance funding.
Table 9.1 Generic Performance categories [Sterritt, 2003]
PI Generic performance description
95-100 Very Good Performance well above minimum requirements. Standard level of maintenance
sufficient.
85-94 Good Performance above minimum requirements. Some intervention may be required to
maintain performance at this level.
65-84 Fair Performance marginally above minimum requirements. Intervention required to
prevent substandard classification.
40-64 Substandard Performance below minimum requirements. Special attention required to allow
structures to remain in unrestricted service.
0-39 Very substandard Performance well below minimum requirements. Significant remedial
action required.
The draft report of the Atkins approach is not very transparent and does not give enough guidance on the
calculation of the parameters required to determine the PIs: no information is given, for example, on the
probabilistic distributions used for the reliability analysis. To determine the structural reliability PI, a
predefined table is used to transform the probability of failure and failure consequences into a PI score,
but no information is given on the derivation of this table and the failure criterion considered.
Sterritts procedure also does not make provision for deterioration of the structure until the next
assessment is undertaken. At present his method is restricted to the risk of failure due to traffic
overloading and makes no allowance for the most common causes of bridge collapse, namely natural
hazards and impact as shown in section 2.2 of this thesis.
9.2.2 Proposed evaluation system
This section proposes a new methodology to evaluate the risk state of a bridge, taking the principal risk-
influencing parameters into account; it uses five risk indicators which a practising engineer can easily
quantify using the methods described in previous chapters (Table 9.2).
Table 9.2 Risk indicators of new risk assessment methodology
Risk indicator Quantified as Details
1. Current safety, corresponding to first element failure Factor of safety at present time Chapter 4
(FOS0)
2. Future safety, corresponding to first element failure at Factor of safety at time of next Chapter 4
time of next assessment, taking into account assessment (FOSna)
deterioration until next assessment
3. Warning level, reflecting bridge redundancy Warning margin (WM) Chapter 5
4. Condition, evaluation of the health of the bridge Condition rating (CR) Chapter 6
5. Importance, within the road network Ratio of construction costs to Chapter 7
total failure costs (I = Cconst/Ctot)
Figure 9.1 summarises the risk assessment procedure proposed in this thesis; the first four steps of this
figure, and the risk indicators obtained with them, have been described in earlier chapters. The aim of
this chapter is to explain the last step, i.e. how the different indicators are considered together, and how
the so-called performance measure PM, which combines the risk indicators, can be interpreted to judge
the performance of a bridge with regard to the risk of collapse.
Figure 9.1 Proposed assessment procedure for existing structures
9.3 MULTI-CRITERIA ANALYSIS
9.3.1 Risk spiderweb
A radial graphical representation, called a risk spiderweb, has been chosen to show the relative
importance of each of the five risk indicators (Figure 9.2). This representation allows the state of the
bridge to be visualised with respect to each of the risk indicators. A bridge that performs badly for one
indicator, can perform well for the other indicators. By expressing all five at the same time, the critical
indicators can be detected and more accurate information can then be gathered for them. On the
spiderweb the critical points are those within the acceptance line (see Figure 9.2); this line joins the
values on the risk indicator axes that correspond to the acceptance threshold of each risk indicator. The
line joining the actual values of the risk indicators, i.e. the graph showing the actual risk, is called the
bridge-specific risk-plot.
Current safety
5
Importance 2
5 2
5 Future safety
2
Bridge-specific
2 risk plot
2
Acceptance
line
5 5
Condition Warning level
Figure 9.2 Spiderweb for risk assessment
Since the indicators are not normally measured in the same units, the scale on the spiderweb
representation would be different for each indicator if they were plotted in their original units. To allow
a quantitative comparison of the five indicators possible, standardising curves are used to transform the
original risk indicator values to a common non-dimensional standard scale with the range of each
indicator going from 0 (worst) to 5 (best). Values higher than 2 are deemed acceptable, and values lower
than 2 signal a problem. The value of 2 on the standard scale corresponds to a value of the original, non-
standardised indicator value that is just acceptable, i.e. the threshold value for acceptability. The next
section offers proposals for these values and the derivation of the standardising curves.
9.3.2 Standardising curves
To transform the original indicator values to standard scale values, the standardising curves are chosen,
so that if the standard scale value is multiplied by a factor q, the risk of collapse is divided by the same
factor, i.e. improved performance of the risk indicator reduces the risk of collapse. As the risk is defined
as the product of the failure probability and the consequences of failure, the risk can be decreased by
reducing the consequences and/or the failure probability.
The following paragraphs propose standardising curves, which have been derived imposing constraints
on the best values, what is just acceptable and the worst, of the non-standardised risk indicators. The
suggested curves are based on general considerations, however a bridge-owning organisation may
modify them if they differ too much from its policy, especially with regard to the acceptance condition
of the risk indicators, e.g. the consequences of failure that are stated as acceptable in this section may not
necessarily be acceptable for all bridge-owning organisations.
To indicate the difference between standardised and non-standardised risk indicators, the standardised
risk indicators will be denoted by a prime, e.g. the non-standardised factor of safety at present time is
denoted FOS0, whilst the same indicator transformed to the standard scale is denoted FOS0.
9.3.2.1 Current safety (FOS0 > FOS0)
The factor of safety at present time FOS0 is the ratio of the factored strength of the critical element and
the sum of the factored load effects, which are caused by the dead load of the structure and the applied
live load (see section 4.2.1). It is calculated by using elastic structural analysis, such as grillage analysis
or linear finite element analysis, and is a quantity familiar to assessing engineers.
To link FOS0 to the standard scale, the relationships between probability of failure pf and the area of
steel reinforcement As, and that between factor of safety FOS0 and area of steel As are considered. By
using reliability analysis the probability of failure has been calculated for different bridge layouts, and
different steel areas; the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm has been used to fit the obtained points to
different types of functions [Profit, 2003]. By using a Chi-square goodness of fit test [Ang, 1975], the
exponential function was found to be the function best suited for each bridge layout that was analysed.
This procedure has been undertaken for both flexure and shear failure.
Furthermore, it was found that the variation of the factor of safety in terms of the area of steel can be
approximated by a linear function for both bending and shear modes of failure; this has been verified for
all bridges analysed, using the Chi-square test at a significance level of 5%. With the approximated
linear FOS0 As relationship, and the exponential pf As relationship, pf is then expressed as an
exponential function of FOS0 (Figure 9.3).
FOS0 p
f
linear exponential
FOS = aAs (bAs+c)
0 p =e
f
Steel amount As Steel amount As
pf
exponential
(bFOS0 /a+c)
p =e
f
Factor of safety at
present time FOS
0
Figure 9.3 Derivation of relationship pf -FOS0 (a, b and c are fitting constants)
By definition, an increase by a factor q in the standard scale results in a decrease by a factor q in the risk
of bridge collapse. As the risk of bridge collapse is directly related to pf, and since the pf FOS0
relationship is exponential, the non-standardised factor of safety can be transformed into a standardised
value as follows:
Equation 9.1
Where FOS0: Non-standardised factor of safety at present time

FOS0: Standardised factor of safety at present time
A: Constant
B: Constant
Equation 9.1 fulfils the condition that the value of 5 is the best value on the standard scale. The
constants A and B can be found by defining the boundary constraints. If we stipulate that FOS0 = 1
corresponds to the just acceptable value on the standard scale, by definition this is FOS0 = 2, and
FOS0 = 0 corresponds to the worst value on the standard scale, i.e. FOS0 = 0, we obtain A = 3.15 and
B = 1.96.
FOS0 (non-standardised)
8
6 FOS0 = 3.15 - 1.96ln(5-FOS 0)
2
1
0
0 1 2 3 4 5
FOS0 (standardised)
Figure 9.4 Standardising curve for the factor of safety at present time
With this standardising curve the relationship between the factor of safety at present time and the
standard scale is approximately linear for values of FOS0 < 1, but for higher FOS0-values, i.e. acceptable
safety values, the slope of the curve is steadily increasing; very high non-standardised values are then
required to improve the values on the standard scale significantly.
9.3.2.2 Future safety (FOSna > FOSna)
The factor of safety in the future FOSna takes into account the possible degradation of the bridge until
the next assessment; this ensures that the risk assessment remains valid until the next is undertaken. As
with the factor of safety at present time, it is calculated by using elastic analysis and corresponds to first
element failure. The only difference is in the resistance, which is calculated by using material
deterioration functions (see section 3.3.7.2). The standardising curve to transform FOSna into FOSna is
therefore the same as for FOS0 (Figure 9.4).
9.3.2.3 Importance (I > I)
The importance of a bridge is measured in terms of the total failure costs in the case of bridge collapse.
Chapter 7 explained how the ratio of the construction costs and the total failure costs I can be
determined. When I is increased by a factor q, the risk, according to Equation 8.1, is decreased by the
same factor q. This means that I is related to the standard scale value I so that:
Equation 9.2
Where F: Constant
G: Constant
To determine G it is assumed that motorway bridges, which correspond to the worst cases in terms of
consequences of failure, represent the acceptable value for the I-ratio. This assumption has been made to
guarantee that all new bridges would have an acceptable performance with regard to risk collapse when
assessed with the method proposed in this thesis.
If all other risk indicators were at their acceptable level, a bridge with an importance ratio corresponding
to a busy motorway bridge would be acceptable. In this thesis the acceptable I-ratio has therefore be set
to 0.01, corresponding to Winterbourne bridge, a motorway bridge with an important daily traffic. For
I = 0.01, I equals 2 and therefore G = 200. This condition, and Equation 9.2, imply that the best value
on the standard scale, i.e. I = 5, is set to equal I = 0.025. All bridges with I 0.025 have therefore a
standard scale value of 5 (Figure 9.5).
I = Cconst/Ctot (non-standardised)
0.2
0.15
0.1
0.05
0
0 1 2 3 4 5
I (standardised)
Figure 9.5 Standardising curve for the importance ratio
As most bridges have I-ratios greater than 0.01, the standardised risk indicator values will often be in the
acceptable region, i.e. I > 2. Including the importance risk indicator in the assessment can therefore be
of benefit when other indicators are in their unacceptable range.
9.3.2.4 Warning level (WM > WM)
Bridges with the same factor of safety, based on linear-elastic considerations, can have quite a different
probability of total collapse; a bridge that fails in one member can in some cases withstand much higher
loads, whereas in other cases first element failure can lead directly to total collapse. Section 5.4
describes how the additional safety contribution due to redundancy, the so-called warning margin WM,
can be quantified.
A high warning margin decreases the collapse risk in two ways:
(1) The factor of safety of the system is higher than the factor of safety corresponding to first
element failure because of the load redistribution. This additional safety is quantified as an
increase WMs of the standardised warning margin value that corresponds to a bridge with no
warning margin.
(2) The consequences of failure, measured as total costs, are reduced because prior to collapse,
warning signs in the form of element failure are likely to predict imminent failure and measures,
such as reducing traffic flows, can be undertaken to prevent total failure. This cost-reduction is
quantified as an increase WMc of the standardised warning margin value that corresponds to a
bridge with no warning margin.
The contribution of the first term, WMs, can be quantified using the FOS0-FOS0-curve (Figure 9.4)
and equation 5.18, where WM is the difference between the system factor of safety and the element
factor of safety (Figure 9.6):
Equation 9.3
Where fFOS0( ): Standardising function for the factor of safety (Figure 9.1)
FOS0 I = Cconst/Ctot
8 0.05
0.025
WM Cconst/kCtot
Cconst/Ctot
0 0
0 5 0 5
WMs FOS0 WM I
c
(a) Increase of safety level (b) Decrease of failure costs
Figure 9.6 Two components of increase of the warning margin WM

(k: multiplier depending on warning margin, see below)
The contribution of the second item, WMc, comes from the reduction of the failure consequences. If
we have no warning margin, i.e. brittle structure with no redundancy, the bridge will fall down when the
first element fails. In this case the costs of failure will correspond to the total costs Ctot as calculated in
chapter 7.
For high warning margins, there will be no system collapse after element failure has occurred; since
there is sufficient warning, all measures will be taken to avoid the possibility of system failure. In this
case, there will only be repair costs; these are difficult to estimate at the time of the assessment, as the
scale of the repairs is only known once the warning signs have been detected. They can be low if early
warning signs are recognised as such, otherwise they can become high. In the following derivation of
WMc the repair costs are ignored; however, as explained below, allowance is made for them indirectly.
There are two limiting bounds for the warning-induced total cost reduction: (1) no cost reduction for
WM = 0 and (2) all consequences of failure prevented for WM WMopt, where WMopt is the optimal
warning margin. A bridge with a WM-value greater than WMopt will not collapse and therefore there will
be no costs of failure. The author has carried out several bridge calculations [Imhof, 2004a] and
reworked the results of a study on bridge redundancy by Ghosn & Moses [Ghosn, 1998] to find typical
WM-values. The range was found to be between 0 and 0.4, although very few bridges had WM-values
above 0.3. WM > 0.3 corresponds to highly redundant bridges and WMopt has therefore been set to 0.3.
All warning margins above this threshold are assumed to result in no failure costs. To simplify the
calculation of WMc it is further assumed that between these two bounds, the total failure costs
decrease linearly (Figure 9.7). Compared with a brittle bridge (WM = 0), for which a bridge collapse will
result in the full consequences of failure Ctot, the consequences of failure of a redundant bridge will be
reduced to kCtot. The parameter k is introduced to model this linear cost reduction in terms of the
warning margin.
Figure 9.7 Reduction of the total failure costs depending on WM

For bridges with I < 0.025, the reduction in the consequences of failure results in an increase of the
I = Cconst/Ctot-ratio, which in turn leads to an increase WMc of I (Figure 9.6b). This increase will be
limited to a k-value that corresponds to Cconst/(kCtot) = 0.025, for which the maximum value on the
standard scale is reached. Hence, with the approach presented above, it is not possible to reduce the
consequences of failure to zero, so provision is indirectly made for eventual repair costs.
For bridges with I > 0.025, WMc = 0. For all other bridges, it can be calculated as:
Equation 9.4
The total increase of the standard scale value, WM, is defined as the sum of the two contributions due
to additional safety and failure cost reduction mentioned above:
Equation 9.5
Finally, by stipulating that a warning margin of 0 corresponds to the just acceptable value of the
standard scale for WM, the standardising curve for the warning margin is derived. As in the proposed
assessment methodology several risk indicators are considered at the same time, setting the just
acceptable value of WM to zero does not necessarily mean that the performance of a bridge with no
warning margin will be accepted; it may, however, be acceptable if the other standardised risk indicators
are at higher standard scale levels.
Unlike the standardising curve for FOS0, the curve for WM is not the same for each bridge. It depends on
the factor of safety and on the I-ratio of the bridge under assessment. The standard scale values WM are
calculated with Equation 9.5 and take into account the constraint WM = 2 when WM = 0. Furthermore,
WM-values greater than 3 are set equal to 3 when determining WM. Figure 9.8 shows examples of
such standardising curves. It is noticeable that in the region of the low WM-values, there is a
contribution due to WMs and WMc, but as WM increases, k decreases, and when k has reached I,
WMc cannot increase further (Equation 9.4). After this, the standard scale is dependent only upon
WMs.
Warning margin WM (non-standardised) Warning margin WM (non-standardised)

0.5 0.5
Increase in WM due
0.4 0.4 to WMs only
0.3 0.3
Increase in WM due to
0.2 0.2 WMs and WMc
0.1 0.1
0 0
0 1 2 3 4 5 0 1 2 3 4 5
WM (standardised) WM (standardised)
(a) I = 0.003 (b) I = 0.013
Figure 9.8 Examples of standardising curves for the warning margin (FOS0 = 1.8)
Figure 9.9 shows that WM increases with increasing WM, but I has a big influence on this. For a
constant warning margin, bridges with high I-values (low importance bridges) see a decrease of the
WMvalue with increasing I. This is because of the limited possibility of reducing the total failure costs.
By contrast, for bridges with low I (important bridges), the WM-value decreases with decreasing I. For
very low I-values, even when a warning margin is available, the reduced consequences of failure will
still be high; in this case, only very high warning margins lead to high values of WM, as the increase
WMc depends linearly on the I-ratio (Equation 9.4).
Standardised warning
margin WM
5
WM = 0.1
4 WM = 0.2
WM = 0.3
3
0
0.001 0.003 0.005 0.01 0.02 0.03
Importance ratio I = C /C
const tot
Figure 9.9 Comparison of the standard scale values for FOS0 = 1.8 and varying I- and WM-values
One of the major hypotheses for the warning margin standardising curve proposed here is the
assumption that the total failure costs are reduced proportionally to the warning margin in a linear
manner (Figure 9.7). Another possibility for the standardising curve would be to use an empirical curve
based on the need of warning as a function of the importance of the bridge, instead of using a reduction
of costs, but the curves proposed here appear to respect this option too, i.e. more important bridges
require higher WM for the same WM-value.
With the proposed standardising curve for the warning margin all WM-values are greater than 2, i.e.
they are acceptable values. It can therefore only be beneficial to include the warning level in the overall
risk assessment. A brittle bridge (WM = 0) will not collapse if FOS0 > 1. For a redundant bridge,
however, collapse does not occur even when FOS0 < 1, provided that FOS0 + WM > 1 (Equation 5.17).
9.3.2.5 Condition (CR > CR)
To determine the condition rating CR of the bridge, the inspected elements of a structure are categorised
into a damage severity state, and the extent and importance of the damage is taken into account. For the
derivation of the standardising curve, the condition ratings have to be related to the risk of collapse.
Condition influences the safety of a bridge, but since the condition ratings are based on visual
appearance only, they are not necessarily directly related to safety. In the definition of the severity states
(Table 6.3), safety is only mentioned in state 5, where a safety problem might be suspected, and
immediate intervention required.
In most countries condition ratings are used to assist in prioritising maintenance actions. In order to
relate these condition ratings to risk considerations, Roelfstra et al. have mapped the Swiss visual
appearance condition ratings, which are also used in the risk assessment methodology of this thesis, to a
set of quantitative criteria that directly affect bridge safety [Roelfstra, 2004]. Table 9.3 shows their
criteria, which have been simplified by the author to derive the standardising curve for the condition
rating CR.
The condition rating categories 2 to 5 are all defined in terms of proportion of reinforcement area loss.
Condition rating 2 is defined as the section loss that leads to first cracking [Roelfstra, 2004]. Condition
rating 3 is limited to reinforcement section losses of less than 10%; within this limit the change in
structural behaviour is negligible. A section loss of 25% or more is assumed to produce major changes
in the structural resistance and in this way significantly reduces the factor of safety; Roelfstra chose this
limit as the triggering value for condition rating 5.
Table 9.3 Condition ratings mapped to structural safety (for reinforced concrete bridges)
Condition Safety-related definition For standardising purposes

rating [Roelfstra, 2004] in this thesis
1 < 0.2% free Cl-/mass of cement at level of -

primary reinforcement
2 < 0.05 mm of reinforcement bar radius loss Original reinforcement area
3 < 10% of reinforcement bar area loss 10% reinforcement area loss
4 < 25% of reinforcement bar area loss 20% reinforcement area loss
5 > 25% of reinforcement bar area loss -
Roelfstras justifications for his safety-related definitions are vague, but the visual appearance
descriptions used by inspectors are equally imprecise. For the purpose of relating the condition ratings,
which are determined by visual inspection, to the structural safety of the bridge, Roelfstras definitions
are sufficient; his criteria are not intended for use by inspectors.
For the inspections, different descriptions of the condition rating categories are used for different
deterioration mechanisms such as corrosion or freeze-thaw action (see section 6.3.1.4). The condition of
an element in one condition rating category is assumed to be equally related to safety for each
deterioration mechanism. For the mapping of the condition ratings to safety-related ratings, steel area
loss as a result of corrosion is considered here, but a similar mapping could be derived by considering
another deterioration mechanism.
As Table 9.3 relates the condition ratings to the area of steel and thereby to the factor of safety, the
standardising curve for CR can be derived. According to the definition of the condition rating categories
(Table 6.3), a condition rating CR = 2 is acceptable, i.e. this will be equal to CR = 2 on the standard
scale. For the condition states 2, 3 and 4 the steel area is taken from Table 9.3. As stated in
section 9.3.2.1, the relationship between the area of steel reinforcement and the factor of safety can be
approximated by a linear function. By taking this into account and by using the relationship between
factor of safety and standard scale (Equation 9.1), the standard scale values of the condition states 3
and 4 are calculated. With the boundary condition that the worst condition rating, CR = 5, should
correspond to the worst standard scale value, CR = 0, a logarithmic curve can be fitted through the
points that have been calculated. The fitted curve corresponding to these points is shown in Figure 9.10
(validated by Chi-square test at a significance level of 5%).
Condition rating CR (non-standardised)

5
4 CR = 1.78 ln(-2.1(CR - 2.438))+2.12
0
0 1 2 3 4 5
CR (standardised)
Figure 9.10 Standardising curve for the condition rating
The standardising curve shows that for the condition risk indicator, the maximum achievable standard
scale value is 2.2. This means that by including the condition of the bridge, the overall risk performance
can only be improved marginally; the CR-value will often decrease the overall assessed performance,
because the bridge deteriorates with time, and its condition becomes unacceptable (CR < 2).
9.3.3 Acceptable performance criteria
All five standardised risk indicators are directly linked to the risk of collapse. It is therefore natural to try
to combine them into a single performance value, which can then be compared to a reference acceptable
value. This comparison will show whether the overall performance of a bridge is adequate with regard to
the collapse risk. The performance can be acceptable even if one of the risk indicators is clearly below
the acceptable limit, as some indicators may compensate for others.
Two possible criteria for defining overall acceptable risk are suggested in the following paragraphs: (1)
the performance factor criterion and (2) the performance measure criterion. In section 9.3.5.1 they will
be critically compared and the most appropriate selected for the risk assessment methodology of this
dissertation.
The performance factor and performance measure may also be used to rank bridges with regard to their
risk of collapse.
9.3.3.1 Performance factor criterion
A risk spiderweb graph which shows a small enclosed area of the net is a concern: the first attempt to
derive a single performance value from the five indicator values involves the use of the enclosed area A,
contained within the bridge-specific risk plot of the spiderweb graph. This area can then be compared to
a reference area Aref of the graph, for which all the indicators are equal to the just acceptable value on the
standard scale (Figure 9.11).
Current safety Current safety

5 5
Area A Area Aref
Future 2 Future
Importance 5 5 safety Importance 5 2 5 safety
2
Origin of risk 2
2
spiderweb
5 5 5 5
Condition Warning Condition Warning
level level
(a) Enclosed area of bridge-specific risk plot (b) Reference area
Figure 9.11 Areas used in performance factor criterion
The enclosed area of the bridge-specific risk plot can be calculated by summing up the areas of the five
segments whose vertices are given by the origin of the risk spiderweb, the values of two adjacent risk
indicators and the angle between two axes of the risk spiderweb, i.e. 2/5:
Equation 9.6
With the performance factor PF, defined as the ratio of the enclosed spiderweb area A and the
acceptable area Aref, the criterion for acceptability of a bridges performance with regard to the risk of
collapse becomes:
Equation 9.7
If PF < 1 the bridge performance is unacceptable and action has to be taken to reduce the risk.
9.3.3.2 Performance measure
The performance measure PM is the average risk indicator and uses the fact that an increase in any of
the standardised risk indicator values will result in the same reduction of the risk, and so a positive
increment of one indicator can counterbalance a negative one of another. The criterion for acceptance of
a bridges performance with regard to the collapse risk (Equation 9.8) uses the same acceptance
threshold as the individual risk indicators, i.e. the overall risk performance is acceptable when PM is
greater or equal to 2. If PM < 2 the performance is unacceptable and intervention will be required to
reduce the risk to an acceptable level.
Equation 9.8
It has to be mentioned that FOS0 is not included in this criterion in order not to count safety twice. By
considering FOSna the acceptance criterion remains valid until the next assessment is carried out. In the
spiderweb however, FOS0 and FOSna are separately shown to demonstrate how safety evolves, based on
the chosen deterioration rate, in the time period considered.
9.3.4 Modular structure of proposed methodology
The risk assessment methodology, using the risk spiderweb to visually evaluate performance together
with one of the proposed acceptable performance criteria, is not dependent on calculation of all five risk
indicators. If the engineer knows that some of the risk indicators are acceptable, he does not need to
calculate them and can allocate them a default value of 2 on the standard scale to indicate that they are
already deemed acceptable. As a consequence, these indicators will stay neutral on the spiderweb and in
the performance criterion, i.e. they will not trigger any action.
As a first step, the engineer could set all risk indicator values to a value of 2, and calculate only FOS0
and FOSna. This case corresponds to the traditional assessment approach, where only element safety is
considered although even then it is better since traditional assessment does not calculate FOSna. If, by
using the spiderweb graph and a performance limit-state criterion, the performance with respect to the
collapse risk of the bridge is deemed adequate, no further action is required. If it is not, the engineer can
then calculate some of the other risk indicators to improve his risk performance assessment, i.e. those he
thinks would be the most likely to reduce the risk of collapse. Inadequate safety (FOS0 < 2) could, for
example, be counterbalanced by low consequences of failure (I > 2).
Application Example 9.1
In the following application example only FOS0 and FOSna have been calculated. Because the
performance measure PM is less than 2, the risk of collapse of the bridge is judged as unacceptably high
(Equation 9.8). Using the risk spiderweb future safety is identified as the critical risk indicator
(FOSna =1.84) since it is the lowest of the five indicators; as FOS0 > 2 the engineer might question his
deterioration model and perhaps request NDT testing to possibly modify his deterioration predictions to
reflect measured levels of deterioration. Alternatively, he could calculate one of the other risk indicators
which were previously assumed to be just acceptable. For example, if by using yield-line analysis the
warning margin could be shown to be WM = 3.14, the performance measure would become PM = 2.24,
and the overall performance adequate.
FOS0 = 1.1 > FOS0 = 2.15

Current safety
FOSna = 0.9 > FOS = 1.84
5 na
all other standardised risk indicators = 2

2.15 Future (assumed acceptable by assessor)
Importance 5 2 5 safety
1.84
2
2
5 5
Condition Warning
level Performance measure: 1.96 < 2, not OK
Application Example 9.1 Example of a traditional safety assessment
9.3.5 Validity check of the proposed methodology
Before concluding that the proposed methodology, which involves the spiderweb graph and a
performance limit-state criterion, is a rational, consistent and safe tool for risk assessment, potential
flaws in the logic on which it is based need to be identified and the methodology tested for validity,
consistency and applicability. To achieve this goal a number of different application examples are
studied, which have been designed to extend the methodology to the limits.
9.3.5.1 Selection of acceptable performance criterion
First, considerations are made to decide which of the two proposed acceptable performance criteria (see
section 9.3.3) should be selected for the practical risk assessment methodology.
Application Example 9.2 shows the risk assessment of a bridge with a safety level deemed to be just
acceptable (FOS0 = FOSna = 1), which has acceptable consequences of failure (I = 0.01), but shows signs
of significant deterioration (CR = 3.5). From observation of the spiderweb graph, this last characteristic
is immediately detected as critical. The following figure shows the graphical results that would be
obtained with 4 different scenarios of warning margin ranging from WM = 0 to WM = 0.15.

5 5
2 Future 2 Future
Importance 5 2 5 safety Importance 5 2 5 safety
2 2
1.41 1.41
2 2.48
5 5 5 5
level level
Performance factor: 0.88 < 1, not OK Performance factor: 0.96 < 1, not OK
Performance measure: 1.85 < 2, not OK Performance measure: 1.97 < 2, not OK
(a) No redundancy, WM = 0 (b) Small redundancy, WM = 0.05

5 5
2 Future 2 Future
Importance 5 2 5 safety Importance 5 2 5 safety
2 2
1.41 1.41
3.15 4.22
5 5 5 5
level level
Performance factor: 1.08 > 1, OK Performance factor: 1.26 > 1, OK

Performance measure: 2.14 > 2, OK Performance measure: 2.41 > 2, OK
(c) Medium redundancy, WM = 0.1 (d) High redundancy, WM = 0.15
Application Example 9.2 Sensitivity of risk performance limit-state criteria to change in warning
margin (FOS0 = 1, FOSna = 1, CR = 3.5, I = 0.01)
Comparing the acceptable performance criteria proposed in paragraph 9.3.3, it is observed that in each
of the four cases of Application Example 9.2, both the performance factor and the performance measure
lead to the same conclusions, i.e. for warning margins of WM 0.1, the bridge performance is deemed to
be adequate. However, the two acceptable performance criteria may sometimes lead to different
conclusions.
Application Example 9.3 compares two bridges, which differ in their risk indicator values. Bridge A has
very high factors of safety and two risk indicators (importance and condition) close to zero. Bridge B
has a rating of 2.1 for each of the 5 risk indicators.

5 5
3.46
Future 2.1 Future
Importance 5 1 5 safety Importance 5 2.1 5 safety
3.46 2.1
1.07 2.1
2 2.1
5 5 5 5
level level
Performance factor: 1.28 > 1, OK Performance factor: 1.10 > 1, OK

Performance measure: 1.88 < 2,not OK Performance measure: 2.10 > 0, OK
(a) Bridge A (b) Bridge B
Application Example 9.3 Comparison of acceptable performance criteria
The performance factor of bridge A is higher than that of bridge B, whereas the inverse is true for the
performance measure. Furthermore, the performance measure would judge the risk performance of
Bridge A as unacceptable since PM < 2, whereas the performance factor would imply it is acceptable
since PF > 1.
Since all risk indicators are equally related to risk and as the performance measure directly takes into
account that a positive increment in one risk indicator can counterbalance a negative increment in
another, it is the appropriate measure to be used for risk performance acceptance. Although, the
performance factor would be a good graphical means to help visualise the risk performance, i.e. the
larger the enclosed area of the bridge-specific risk plot the better the risk performance, it is not
appropriate for decision-taking, as it may lead to controversial outcomes, such as for bridge A above.
Furthermore PF is dependent on the order in which the risk indicators are considered. The performance
measure acceptance criterion (Equation 9.8) is subsequently selected as the risk acceptance criterion.
9.3.5.2 Test of new methodology
Different configurations of risk indicators have been analysed to test the proposed methodology and
detect any inconsistencies.
Application Example 9.4 shows that the risk state of a bridge with an acceptable factor of safety could
be declared inadequate in situations where the condition is poor; in these cases, an increase of the
condition rating might be achieved by undertaking a more detailed inspection which may reveal that CR
was better than predicted. Another remedy to potentially improve the performance measure of this
example is the calculation of the warning level, and the importance of the bridge, since these risk
indicators were assumed to be at the just acceptable level and may in practice be higher than the default
threshold value initially adopted.
FOS0 = 1.1 > FOS = 2.15

0
Current safety FOSna = 1.05 > FOSna = 2.08
5 CR = 3 > CR = 1.66
2.15 Future The importance and warning level risk

Importance 5 2 5 safety indicators are assumed acceptable:
2.08 WM = 2
I = 2
1.66
2 Performance measure: 1.93 < 2, not OK
5 5 Warning Although FOS0 > 1, this bridge's

Condition performance is not adequate because of
level
its condition
Application Example 9.4 Effect of including the condition rating
The standardising curve for the condition rating (see paragraph 9.3.2.5) has a maximum standard scale
value of 2.2, i.e. only slightly above the just acceptable value of 2.0. With this upper limit of 2.2, even
the highest condition rating cannot significantly improve the overall risk rating of a bridge with a low
safety level (Application Example 9.5).
FOS0 = 0.85 > FOS = 1.76

Current safety 0
FOSna = 0.85 > FOS = 1.76
5 na
CR = 1 > CR = 2.18
1.76 Future The warning level and importance risk

Importance 5 2 5 safety indicators are assumed to be acceptable:
1.76 WM = 2
2.18 I = 2
2 Performance measure: 1.99 < 2, not OK
5 5 Warning Insufficient safety cannot be counter-
Condition
level balanced by excellent condition rating only
Application Example 9.5 High condition rating, but low safety levels
In Application Example 9.6, the importance ratio is found to be 0.2. Although this is high compared
with the I-values calculated for real bridges by the author (see section 7.5.1), it shows that there is a
danger that this high risk indicator could result in bridges with very low safety factors falling into the
acceptable category.
FOS0 = 0.6 > FOS0 = 1.32

Current safety
FOSna = 0.6 > FOS = 1.32
5 na
WM = 0 > WM = 2
CR = 3 > CR = 1.66
1.32 Future I = 0.2 > I = 5
Importance 5 5 safety
1.32
Performance measure: 2.49 > 2, OK
1.66
2
I high (e.g. low traffic and short
5 5 Warning detour route and nearby population
Condition
level ~0)
Application Example 9.6 Low safety risk indicators with high importance risk indicator
Additional safety constraint
The factors of safety in Application Example 9.6 are very low and could mean that first element failure,
and maybe even system failure, is acceptable (since PM could be greater than 2), but the public would
not tolerate system failure; neither is such a failure in the interest of the owner. To overcome this
limitation of the risk assessment methodology, a further requirement for risk acceptance is introduced;
this requirement is a constraint on the safety risk indicator FOS0 and has to be considered in addition to
the performance measure limit-state criterion (Equation 9.8). If FOS0 < 1, the factor of safety
corresponding to first element failure, and calculated without any partial safety factors, has to be greater
than 1:
Equation 9.9
Where (FOS0)wf: Factor of safety corresponding to first element failure, calculated without partial
safety factors on loads or material resistance
With this constraint every element failure is in theory avoided. This requirement also demonstrates to
the assessor the margin to actual element failure of the bridge.
The next example complies with the constraint that (FOS0)wf > 1. It demonstrates the benefit of using the
new risk assessment methodology. The risk indicators of this example could correspond to a bridge
which was designed for lower loads than those used for the assessment and which is very redundant.
This bridge, which would fail a traditional safety assessment, is now deemed to be acceptable, since
other risk-influencing indicators, which counterbalance the low safety level, are included in the overall
risk evaluation.
FOS0 = 0.7 > FOS = 1.5

Current safety 0
FOSna = 0.7 > FOSna = 1.5
5
WM = 0.3 > WM = 3.5
CR = 2 > CR = 2
1.5 Future I = 0.02 > I = 4
1.5 Performance measure: 2.75 > 2, OK
2 (FOS0)wf = 1.09 > 1, OK
3.5
Acceptable because high warning
5 5 Warning level will increase safety and
Condition
level decrease consequences of failure
Application Example 9.7 High warning level and deficient safety risk indicators
In the following example, a high warning level increases the system safety and decreases the possible
consequences of failure, because action may be taken after warning signs are observed and before the
ultimate failure occurs.
FOS0 = 1.03 > FOS0 = 2.05

Current safety
FOSna = 1.03 > FOSna = 2.05
5
WM = 0.34 > WM = 5
CR = 2 > CR = 2
2.05 Future I = 0.005 > I = 1
2.05 Performance measure: 2.51 > 2, OK
2
Very important bridge with safety
just sufficient. Overall performance
5 5 Warning acceptable because high warning
Condition
level level available.
Application Example 9.8 High warning level and a very low importance risk indicator
If, instead of WM = 0.34 obtained by nonlinear analysis, there were no warning margin available (brittle
bridge), the performance measure would be PM = 1.76, and hence the overall bridge performance
deemed unsatisfactory since PM < 2. In this case, even a sufficient factor of safety (FOS0 > 2) cannot
counterbalance the very high consequences of bridge collapse. FOS0 and FOSna would have to be greater
than 1.8 to make sure that PM > 2. Only a high level of system safety, i.e. high FOS- and/or WM-values,
can therefore compensate for very high consequences of failure.
The last case shows that if one risk indicator value is very low, the others have to be high to
counterbalance it. For the warning level and for safety, however, the risk indicator values will never be
very low, as the standardising curves for WM proposed in section 9.3.2.4, and indirectly the additional
safety constraint (Equation 9.9) impose a lower bound for these risk indicators.
The application examples above have shown that the proposed methodology allows:
i. performance rating of a bridge based not only on safety, but also on other important risk-
influencing parameters.
ii. evaluation of the benefit gained from one risk indicator when others are below the just
acceptable value.
iii. performance rating of a bridge as inadequate, when only one risk indicator is low and the
others are acceptable.
iv. detection of critical risk parameters on the risk spiderweb graph, which may then be
investigated in more detail.
9.3.6 Sensitivity analysis
The risk assessment methodology proposed in this thesis is based on the evaluation of five risk
indicators. In the initial analysis the assessor will determine these conservatively; he will only
investigate in more detail when adequate bridge performance cannot be demonstrated otherwise. Before
doing this, he must determine from which risk indicator he can get the greatest potential benefit, i.e. the
largest improvement in terms of the performance measure.
A sensitivity study helps to take into account the range of possible values of the risk indicators. Such a
sensitivity study could be carried out deterministically by varying in turn each of the risk indicators and
examining the resulting PM-value, but because of the nonlinear standardising curves used and the
dependence of some of the standardised risk indicator values on several non-standardised risk indicators
it is proposed that structural reliability analysis be used (see section 4.2.2). In reliability analysis all risk
indicators may be considered at the same time; it is effective at identifying those that govern PM.
In this analysis the risk indicator values are introduced as probabilistic density functions rather than
deterministic values, and Equation 9.8 serves as the limit-state function. The probabilistic distributions
have to reflect the belief of the assessor as to what range of values the risk indicators may attain.
Because of the uncertainties involved in the calculation of the risk indicators, conservative risk indicator
values are preferred. This preference is modelled here by using a triangular probabilistic distribution for
all the non-standardised risk indicators (e.g. Figure 9.12), but other distributions may equally well be
used to reflect the assessors beliefs.
Probability
0
Initial feasible FOS0
(conservative) value upper bound
Figure 9.12 Probability density function of FOS0 used for the sensitivity analysis
The triangular distribution assumed is weighted towards the conservative value. For risk indicator values
away from the conservative value the probability of occurrence decreases. Triangular distributions are
used to model all five risk indicators. For all risk indicators but CR, the lower bound of this distribution
is suggested to correspond to the initial conservative estimate of the non-standardised risk indicator
value. The upper bound corresponds to the maximum feasible value that the non-standardised risk
indicator may reach, i.e. a subjective estimate of a practical upper limit. For CR, however, the initial
(conservative) value is taken as the upper bound whereas an optimistic value of CR corresponds to the
lower bound. This is because low CR-values correspond to a lower risk, whilst for the other non-
standardised risk indicators lower values correspond to a higher risk of collapse. Table 9.4 shows how
the optimistic risk indicator values may be justified.
As shown in Table 9.4 the determination of the optimistic values does not have to be precise; it is based
on the experience of the assessor. The aim of the sensitivity analysis is not to calculate an upper bound
value of the performance measure, but to identify the risk indicators for which a further investigation
would be most likely to demonstrate adequate overall bridge performance. In the reliability analysis, the
critical risk indicators are those with the highest sensitivity values (i-values see section 4.2.2).
Table 9.4 Derivation of optimistic values for use in the triangular probabilistic distribution functions
of the five risk indicators
Risk indicator Optimistic value of non-standardised risk indicator
Current safety The material properties may be higher or the live loading lower than those assumed to
derive the initial (conservative) estimate of the factor of safety. The assessor can therefore
predict an optimistic FOS0-value, higher than the conservative one, which is based on his
experience, e.g. if he knows that the material strength of similar bridges was 30% higher
than the specified material strength, he can estimate the upper FOS0-value to be 30% higher
than the initial value.
Future safety The deterioration rate assumed to calculate the conservative estimate of FOSna may in fact
be lower. An upper limit of FOSna can be predicted with an optimistic lower deterioration
corrosion rate.
Warning level The original risk assessment may have ignored the warning margin (WM = 0), i.e. no
advanced structural analysis was undertaken, but in reality the bridge may be redundant and
have a high WM-value. From his knowledge of similar bridges, the assessor could estimate
an optimistic upper bound of the warning margin.
Condition The condition rating, which is initially based on a principal inspection, may actually be
better than thought. Before undertaking a special inspection to prove this, the assessor needs
to recognise its potential benefit in terms of performance measure; he therefore includes an
optimistic value of CR in the sensitivity analysis.
Importance For the initial estimation of the failure costs, the engineer may have assumed that there is
only one long detour route available after the bridge has collapsed, but in reality several
shorter detour routes are possible. The engineer can therefore estimate a more optimistic
higher Iratio.
The following table shows the results from an example application of this method. By comparing the
sensitivity factors, it is confirmed that, the warning margin, which has not been calculated previously,
could considerably increase PM, and should be determined by carrying out a nonlinear or plastic
structural analysis. The table also confirms that no benefit would derive from determining the condition
rating in more detail; it would be better to study more thoroughly the consequences of failure, which for
this example have the greatest effect on PM.
Table 9.5 Example of detection of critical risk indicators
Non-standardised Initial Feasible Sensitivity

risk indicator (conservative) value (optimistic) value factor i
FOS0 0.70 0.97 0.18

FOSna 0.68 0.94 0.18
WM 0.00* 0.20 0.59
CR 2.00 1.00 0.13
I = Cconst/Ctot 0.01 0.02 0.75
* not calculated in initial assessment
9.4 APPLICATION EXAMPLES OF REAL BRIDGE RISK ASSESSMENT
The bridges at Larling, Sandhole and Winterbourne (see Appendix B) have been assessed using the new
risk-based approach presented in this chapter. The results of the risk indicator calculations prior to
transformation into standardised form are given in Table 9.6.
Table 9.6 Non-standardised risk indicators
Bridge FOS0 FOSna WM CR I = Cconst/Ctot
Larling 1.01 0.98 0.39 2 0.24

Sandhole 0.65 0.61 0.19 3 0.04
Winterbourne 1.08 1.07 0.20 2 0.01
It can be seen that without using the same scale for all indicators, it is difficult to interpret the relative
significance of each indicator or to identify which indicator is the most critical. When using the standard
scale, however, this becomes apparent (see standardised values in Figures 9.13 to 9.15).
1. Larling bridge
Larling bridge has almost all the standardised risk indicator values above the just acceptable value of 2
(Figure 9.13); its importance indicator value I is very high. The only dangerous indication comes from
the future safety indicator: FOSna is lower than the acceptable value of 1. The performance measure
indicates that the performance of this bridge is adequate with regard to the risk of collapse.
Current safety
5
Importance 2.02 Future

5 5 safety
1.97
2
2.54
Condition 5 5 Warning
level
Figure 9.13 Risk spiderweb and performance measure of Larling bridge
2. Sandhole bridge
Sandhole bridge has 3 standardised risk indicators within the acceptance line, but has a high importance
indicator level (Figure 9.14). Because of its low factor of safety, FOS0 = 0.65, Sandhole bridge would
fail a traditional assessment, which is based on safety only.
Current safety
5

5 5 safety
1.34
1.66
2.33
level
Figure 9.14 Risk spiderweb and performance measure of Sandhole bridge

Although FOS0 < 1, its unfactored safety factor is (FOS0)wf = 1.07 and does respect Equation 9.9, i.e.
element failure should not occur. The performance measure confirms that the performance of Sandhole
bridge is adequate and it would be deemed to have an acceptable risk of collapse.
3. Winterbourne bridge
Figure 9.15 shows that Winterbourne bridge is acceptable for all of the standardised risk indicators. Its
importance rating is I = 2. Winterbourne bridge is part of an important motorway, and the consequences
in case of failure would be severe. However, as a worst case bridge in terms of consequences of failure,
Winterbournes I-ratio has been adopted as the acceptance threshold for the importance standardising
curve. This warrants that new bridges will pass the assessment when the proposed risk methodology is
used. The performance measure of Winterbourne bridge indicates that the performance of this bridge is
adequate.
Current safety
5

5 2 5 safety
2.11
2
level
Figure 9.15 Risk spiderweb and performance measure of Winterbourne bridge
It is worth noting that when the risk assessment is made only with regard to the factor of safety
corresponding to first element failure, Winterbourne bridge performs best. However when all the risk
indicators are considered, the performance of Larling bridge, with a lower FOS0 than Winterbourne
bridge, is the best of the three. This result underlines the importance of considering other parameters
apart from FOS0 in the assessment of the collapse risk of existing bridges.
Sandhole bridge performs the worst as its bridge-specific risk plot is partly located within the acceptance
line, however it has an acceptable PM-value. For this bridge, strengthening, which increases the two
safety factor indicators FOS0 and FOSna, appears to be the only option to increase the risk performance.
A higher condition rating cannot significantly increase PM.
Using the proposed standardising curves and the performance measure, all three bridges would be
considered to have an acceptable risk of collapse. With the proposed risk assessment methodology,
which considers other parameters besides safety, costly intervention can therefore be avoided.
9.5 ALTERNATIVE ACCEPTANCE CRITERION
The proposed assessment methodology may appear complicated because of the standardising process
and the choice of the standardising functions. A more straightforward assessment methodology would
combine all the five risk indicators without transforming them to a standard scale. The acceptance
criterion could be formulated as:
Equation 9.10
With Equation 9.11
Equation 9.12
Equation 9.13
Equation 9.14
Where k3: Factor reducing FOS0 for a given condition rating CR (based on Table 9.3)
Iacceptable: Acceptance threshold of the I-ratio (in this thesis Iacceptable = 0.01)
This approach seems to be more practical, but it lacks in the following respects:
It is not possible to detect the critical risk indicators as they are not measured in the same units.
For bridges with inadequate performance detection of the critical risk indicators is very
important for optimal intervention planning.
The contribution of the warning level to the reduction of the consequences of failure is ignored.
The warning margin is only used as an increase of the safety level.
The notion of collapse risk, which is defined as the product of the probability of failure and the
consequences, is not used to derive the ki-factors whereas, the aim of this thesis is to assess the
collapse risk. pf and FOS0 have a different influence on risk (Figure 9.3).
Equation 9.10 is a criterion based on safety; the influence of the five risk indicators on the
collapse risk is not directly taken into account.
The evaluation system proposed in section 9.2.2 is very easy to use once the standardising curves have
been fixed. The user has to provide FOS0, FOSna, WM, CR and I and the assessment method will then
tell him whether the bridge performance with regard to the collapse risk is acceptable. If it is not
adequate, the risk spiderweb will tell him which indicators are critical and should be investigated in
more detail. For these reasons the author believes that the assessment methodology originally proposed
is more practical, appropriate and useful than the alternative acceptance criterion.
9.6 CONCLUSIONS
Traditionally, assessment of existing bridges has been based solely on the factor of safety FOS0.
However, a bridge with a sufficient factor of safety, but high consequences of failure, may represent a
far higher risk than a bridge with a lower factor of safety and almost no consequences of failure. Here a
novel, more rational assessment methodology has been presented based on risk, rather than the factor of
safety.
The method is based on five risk indicators, which can be calculated by practising engineers. Since all
these indicators influence the risk of bridge collapse, they are related to each other, and can be
transformed to a common standard scale which allows a quantitative comparison of the relative
importance of each. This transformation is carried out using standardising curves, which respect
imposed acceptability constraints, and are derived in such a way that for each risk indicator the same
increase in the standard scale value has the same influence on the collapse risk.
After standardising, the different contributors to the evaluation process are included as dimensionless
indicators with equal weight. To allow comparison, the individual risk indicators are represented on a
spiderweb graph. The risk indicator values situated within the acceptance line, which joins all just
acceptable values, indicate inadequacies and are therefore the indicators that ought to be investigated
further.
To judge the overall performance of a bridge, the average of the risk indicator values is evaluated. This
so-called performance measure takes into account the relative differences to the just acceptable value of
each risk indicator. For adequate bridges it should be greater than the just acceptable risk indicator
value. This acceptable performance criterion was shown to be more consistent than the performance
factor criterion, based on the enclosed area of the spiderweb graph, which led to some inconsistent
conclusions.
Several examples have been tested to check the validity of the method proposed. The results obtained
were consistent and valid, except for the case where very low safety factors have been counterbalanced
by a very low bridge importance. To ensure that no bridge will pass the assessment based solely on the
performance measure but suffer element failure, a further acceptance constraint has been imposed on the
factor of safety calculated without any partial factors.
For bridges with a risk deemed to be unacceptable, it would be worth refining the values of the critical
risk indicators before undertaking any strengthening. For example, the resistance parameters could be
increased after an inspection/NDT testing and result in a higher factor of safety. A sensitivity study
using reliability analysis and based on the feasible range of the risk indicators has been proposed for the
detection of the risk indicators with the greatest potential benefit.
The method is practical as it is based on simple risk indicators and because of its modular nature. If the
bridge collapse risk can be shown to be acceptable with only some of the risk indicators, and the others
set equal to the just acceptable value, the latter do not have to be calculated in detail. Furthermore, by
modifying the standardising curves, the method can easily be adjusted to the acceptance preferences of a
particular bridge-owning organisation.

10. Summary and conclusions 197
CHAPTER 10. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
10.1 AIM OF THESIS
The thesis presented here aims to develop a rational and practical method for the assessment of the
collapse risk of existing bridge structures. This methodology should enable decision makers to
determine which bridges represent the highest risk of failure and where intervention should be
undertaken. Apart from safety, measured here by comparing the element resistance and the induced load
effects, this comprehensive approach also includes factors that are relevant and important in evaluating
risk but are not considered in traditional assessment, such as redundancy and the consequences of
failure. Some of these parameters are already included in more advanced structural codes, but to the
authors knowledge no code or published methodology considers all the factors allowed for here, and
most do not give sufficient guidance on how to quantify the additional parameters that they do take into
account.
The following five key tasks were identified and successfully completed in developing this risk
assessment methodology:
1. Propose a practical and rational evaluation concept that integrates several important parameters,
some of which have not yet been considered in todays assessment strategies.
2. Develop methods to quantify each of these parameters.
3. Find a common scale for these parameters in order to compare and combine them in a multi-
parameter assessment.
4. Develop a procedure for identification of the critical parameters; these could then be re-
evaluated in more detail.
5. Determine overall acceptability criteria for performance with regard to the risk of collapse of an
individual bridge.
The thesis focuses on short to medium span (< 50 m) reinforced concrete bridges, but the same
principles would also be applicable to other types of bridges.
10.2 RISK INDICATOR APPROACH
In order to achieve the five goals listed above, the work began with a study of the major parameters
which influence the risk of collapse. Five risk indicators have been selected to incorporate the main
parameters: (1) current safety, (2) future safety, (3) warning level, (4) condition and (5) importance of
the bridge.
10.2.1 Current safety and future safety
Safety can be measured in different ways; in this thesis the factor of safety, i.e. the ratio of structural
resistance and load effects, has been compared with the reliability index. Rather than using conservative
partial safety factors, the latter takes the specific uncertainties of each basic variable into account, but it
is sensitive to the probability distributions assumed to describe the uncertain variables. These
distributions have often been determined from data clustered around the mean which are then
extrapolated to the extremes. The extremes cannot be predicted accurately, but have a great influence on
the calculated reliability index; this index will also depend substantially on the selected failure criterion.
It was therefore decided to use the traditional deterministic factor of safety including partial safety
factors for load and resistance, and not the reliability index, as the measure of safety.
For the first two risk indicators of the proposed assessment methodology, i.e. current safety and future
safety, the failure criterion adopted corresponds to first element failure and the factors of safety are
calculated with linear-elastic analysis methods. To warrant the validity of the risk assessment until the
next assessment is due to be carried out, allowance is made for the possible deterioration of the
structural resistance in the second risk indicator: the factor of safety at the time of the next assessment is
calculated using material degradation functions. Because the prediction of the future safety is uncertain,
it is suggested that risk assessments be undertaken at short intervals, i.e. after each principal inspection,
which are carried out every 6 years in the UK.
10.2.2 Warning level before collapse
Most current design and assessment codes consider failure in terms of an individual member reaching its
resistance and ignore the effect of the complete structural system. Todays practice checks that the
resistance of each member is greater than the applied forces. The member forces are conventionally
calculated using elastic analysis, while the member resistance may be calculated using inelastic member
behaviour. Though in design this approach has been successful for many years, it ignores the beneficial
effect of taking into account the safety of the system as a whole, as opposed to the safety of individual
members.
By definition, redundant bridges are capable of carrying loads after one element has failed. Because
these bridges will show warning signs before the ultimate collapse occurs, their consequences of failure
will be reduced, since action may be taken to avoid serious consequences. It has been proposed to
quantify the third risk indicator as the warning margin, i.e. the difference in the factors of safety
corresponding to first element failure and system failure, to allow provision for redundancy to be
included in the risk assessment.
Whereas nonlinear analysis, such as nonlinear finite element or nonlinear grillage analysis, takes
ductility implicitly into account, plastic analysis and linear elastic analysis followed by redistribution
assume sufficient ductility of the structure. For these methods of analysis it is necessary to check that
this assumption is valid. Two different approaches evaluating ductility have been derived, one for beams
and one for slabs.
10.2.3 Condition
The physical condition of the material components of a bridge has a clear influence on safety and hence
on the risk of collapse. Deterioration processes such as corrosion, leaching or freeze-thaw action, can
degrade the resistance of a structure, and some damage, which appears minor at the time, could have
serious consequences in the future. Although bridge inspections can give some information on the
condition state of a bridge, it is difficult to include such information directly in the safety assessment.
For corrosion, deteriorated sections could be incorporated in the safety assessment by using reduced
steel bar sections, but using reduced material geometries is impractical for other deterioration types, for
which the damage might not be as apparent as for corrosion. Because of the vague nature of the
condition rating of a bridge, it is proposed here to consider the condition evaluation isolated from the
safety risk indicators. To rate the overall condition of a specific bridge, the damage is first allocated a
severity rating using tables defining different severity states; secondly, these element severity ratings are
multiplied by the extent of the damage as a percentage to give an element condition rating, and thirdly,
the overall condition rating, which quantifies the fourth risk indicator, is obtained as the sum of the
weighted element condition ratings. The suggested weighting reflects the safety-related importance of
the elements.
10.2.4 Importance of the bridge
The importance of a bridge is measured in terms of the consequences of failure. The consequences of a
bridge collapse can be varied and might be quantified in different units, such as number of fatalities or
costs. In this thesis, the consequences of failure are all translated into monetary units. It is not necessary
to calculate them very precisely, because they are only used as a measure of the relative importance of
the bridge within a road network.
It is suggested that the total costs be evaluated as the sum of the (re)construction costs, the user costs and
the life-saving costs. The (re)construction costs are based on unit rates for construction costs, which are
published annually and cover both material and labour costs. Models exist for calculating the user costs
and the computer programs implementing these models take into account the traffic flows and capacity
of the road network. For practical evaluations it is proposed that simplified equations be used to
calculate additional travel time costs, vehicle operating costs and accident costs. The life-saving costs
take into account the number of potential fatalities, the probability that someone is killed if the bridge
collapses and the costs that are implied to avert such a fatality.
The analysis of the consequences of failure of three existing bridges has shown that bridges, which
initially were considered unimportant because of their remote location, can have high consequences of
failure because they provide the only transport route in the region.
10.3 PRACTICAL RISK ASSESSMENT METHOD FOR EXISTING BRIDGE-

STRUCTURES
The risk assessment methodology consists of the following five steps:
1. System definition. The static, material and deterioration properties are determined. Based on
the inspection results the risk indicator for the condition is evaluated.
2. Hazard inventory. The hazards which endanger the bridge and which are taken into
consideration in the assessment are clearly stated. The hazard inventory also indicates those
risks that are accepted, such as a plane falling on the bridge. This document is important to
release the assessor from liability in the case of a bridge collapse caused by an extreme hazard
not included in the assessment.
3. Structural analysis. The load effects due to the considered hazards are calculated and the risk
indicators current safety, future safety and warning margin are determined.
4. Consequences of failure. The costs of a bridge collapse are quantified and the importance risk
indicator is calculated.
5. Risk assessment. The five risk indicators are considered at the same time and a decision is
taken as to whether the performance of the bridge is adequate. If not, remedial action is
proposed.
Risk is defined as the product of the probability of failure and the consequences of failure. Because the
five risk indicators all have a direct influence on one or both of these parameters, they can be considered
together in a multi-criteria analysis. Unfortunately, they are calculated in different units and have first to
be transformed to a common standard scale. To facilitate this transformation, standardising curves have
been suggested, which are derived so that if a standardised risk indicator value is multiplied by a
factor q, the risk of collapse is divided by the same factor. Furthermore, they respect constraints on what
is just acceptable, what is the best and the worst value for each risk indicator.
The standardised risk indicators are presented in a radial graph; this spiderweb graph provides a visual
representation of the significance of the individual indicators and allows the assessor to identify which
indicators are critical.
The judgement on the adequate performance of a bridge with regard to the risk of collapse is made by
using the performance measure limit-state criterion. The performance measure, which is the average risk
indicator value, is compared to the acceptable value on the standard scale. If an initial risk assessment
has shown inadequate bridge performance, a sensitivity study can be undertaken to demonstrate which
risk indicator would be most beneficial to investigate in more detail.
10.4 CONCLUSIONS
10.4.1 Bridge collapse database
More resources should be targeted on the design, monitoring and supervision of the construction stage of
a bridge life since the collected data indicates that a high percentage of collapses (32%) occur during this
period.
The principal causes of in-service bridge collapse are, in order of importance: natural hazard (40%),
impact (25%) and overloading (14%).
Of all the natural hazards, scour/flooding was observed to be the most frequent cause of in-service
bridge collapse (64%), followed by earthquakes (15%) and fire/explosion (6%).
10.4.2 Determination of material properties
When assessing an individual bridge, it is important to obtain the best possible information on the site-
specific properties. The material strengths can be based on tests carried out on site. The number of tests
should be as high as possible, as the quality of the estimated material strength will increase with the test
sample size.
For linear elastic analysis methods, where failure at one location of the bridge is considered, the material
strength is most appropriately calculated as the Bayesian characteristic value (BCV); this approach
considers prior information as well as the test results.
For yield-line analysis, which is an averaging technique, the mean of the updated probabilistic
distribution can be used.
10.4.3 Structural analysis methods
Linear finite element and grillage analysis methods, which give approximately the same results, are
adequate when first element failure of a structure is calculated. By using one of these methods, the
assessing engineer can easily calculate the two risk indicators for safety.
System failure can be calculated directly with nonlinear or plastic analysis, rather than by deriving
system failure probabilities from the element failure probabilities. In the calculation of system failure
loads, plastic and nonlinear analyses give adequate results. Nonlinear grillage analysis is preferred to
nonlinear finite element analysis, as it is less sensitive to the choice of key program variables, such as
mesh size, element types or cracking models, and cannot only determine the ultimate load, but also the
failure sequence.
As plastic analysis assumes sufficient ductility, this has to be checked. The evaluation of ductility based
on the comparison of available and required plastic rotation capacity is too complicated to be used in
practice; instead, an evaluation based on the code requirements is suggested for beams, and one based on
the moment-curvature curve and the relative rotations of the failure mechanism is recommended for
slabs.
10.4.4 Consequences of failure
The importance of a bridge can be quantified by analysing the consequences of failure. The user costs
are the principal costs of failure. Bridges with a high level of traffic, or long detour routes in case of
failure may therefore be equally important.
For short and medium span bridges, the life-saving costs represent only a small percentage of the total
costs; a rough estimation of the cost of preventing a fatality is therefore sufficient.
10.4.5 Target failure probabilities
Methods are available for calculating the consequences of failure and the probability of failure, and the
collapse risk can therefore be quantified, but there is still the question of what risk is acceptable.
Different methods to determine target failure probabilities have been compared in this thesis.
The target failure probability is best based on the outcome of both cost-benefit analysis and the life
quality method. The former method minimises the life-cycle costs of the bridge and the latter optimises
the life quality of a nation. These methods were originally intended for the optimisation of design
parameters. In this thesis they have been developed further in order to derive target failure probabilities
for use in determining acceptance criteria in assessment.
The calculation of target failure probabilities with these methods is complicated and should be restricted
to academic purposes. They rely on data which may not be available, such as cost data depending on
safety-relevant parameters. A substantial amount of intermediate calculations, such as calculation of
failure probabilities depending on safety-relevant parameters, has to be carried out.
For practical applications, an approach based on the determination of several parameters that influence
the risk of collapse is preferred to a method that calculates the risk itself. The former approach avoids
the need to determine the value of acceptable risk which takes into account all risk-influencing
parameters at the same time. It also removes the problem of very small numbers (failure probabilities)
being multiplied by very high numbers (consequences of failure).
10.4.6 Practical risk assessment methodology
There were other interesting intermediate results from the work which was carried out in order to
achieve the five key tasks listed in section 10.1. The following paragraph presents the five main
conclusions with reference to these tasks:
1. The proposed methodology is practical because it uses five risk indicators that are relatively
easy to calculate. Furthermore, because of its modular structure, the assessment can be carried
out in steps. The warning level, for example, which requires nonlinear or plastic calculation, can
be left out if adequate bridge performance can be demonstrated with the other indicators. The
method is rational because a low risk indicator, which indicates a high risk of failure, can only
be counterbalanced by other high risk indicators, which decrease the overall risk.
2. Measures have been developed to quantify the five risk indicators in a practical way.
3. The five proposed risk indicators all have a direct influence on the risk of collapse and can
therefore be linked in a multi-criteria analysis. A standard scale has been suggested, onto which
all the risk indicators can be projected.
4. The risk spiderweb graph is a convenient means for representation of the combined influence of
the five risk indicators. The indicators that imply a high level of risk can immediately be
detected and then be studied in more detail.
5. The performance measure limit-state criterion assesses whether the risk of collapse of a bridge is
acceptable, but it was observed that very low safety factors might be counterbalanced by other
high risk indicators. To avoid this problem, an additional requirement on the factor of safety,
calculated without partial safety factors, has been imposed.
The application examples included in chapter 9 have shown that the proposed methodology allows a
consistent performance rating of existing bridges. Although justification is given for the proposed
standardising curves, these will always contain some subjectivity: the mapping of the condition classes
to the factor of safety, or the mapping of the warning margin to the consequences of failure, may not suit
a particular bridge-owning organisation; but the proposed methodology can still be employed, as it may
easily be adapted to the organisations preferences.
The proposed approach focuses on the ultimate limit state, but bridge serviceability problems are
implicitly included in the condition evaluation risk indicator. Acceptance of a bridges collapse risk
depends therefore on the physical condition of the bridge. This ensures that the confidence of the public
in the bridge network is not eroded.
10.4.7 Implications of the proposed risk assessment methodology
Although the proposed methodology was only used here for the determination of the performance level
with regard to the risk of collapse of different bridges, its implications are greater. The same approach
could be used to find the optimal intervention strategy for a sub-standard bridge; for this purpose the
bridge would be analysed by taking into account each of the different intervention options, such as
reducing traffic or strengthening the bridge. Each of these would then lead to different factors of safety,
consequences of failure, warning levels and subsequently, performance measures.
The proposed methodology could also serve to determine acceptable factors of safety, depending on the
level of warning, the consequences of failure, the deterioration rate and condition of the bridge; these
target factors could then be used in a traditional safety assessment.
Finally, with some modifications in the calculation of the risk indicators, the risk assessment
methodology could also be used for other types of structures such as buildings.
10.5 FURTHER WORK
The proposed practical method can lead to an improved bridge assessment over traditional safety-based
approaches, but further refinements which may include the subjective opinions of the assessing bridge
organisation are possible. Different areas for further work could complement this thesis:
Long span bridges. The study was limited to bridges with spans of up to 50 metres. For longer span
bridges the dead load becomes very important, and some of the risk indicator values, such as
consequences of failure or warning level, will be different from those of shorter span bridges.
Different modes of failure and materials. The thesis was concerned with reinforced concrete
bridges and mainly flexural failure. Other materials such as prestressed concrete, steel or timber and
failure modes such as shear failure or combined shear-flexural failures could be studied to extend
the application domain of the proposed methodology.
More advanced deterioration models. The degradation model used in this thesis is basic and
limited to corrosion. Including other deterioration mechanisms and modelling deterioration more
site-specifically might help to better assess the factor of safety at the time of the next assessment.
Nonlinear grillage analysis software. The nonlinear grillage method presented in section 4.3.2.4
could be implemented in a computer program facilitating the more rapid calculation of the system
failure load.
Non-destructive testing. Reliable monitoring techniques that are more efficient than visual
inspection could help to evaluate the condition state of a structure, and relate the results to structural
safety.
Computerised risk assessment. The proposed risk assessment methodology could be implemented
in a computer program; the user would introduce the non-standardised risk indicators, and the
software would automatically produce the risk spiderweb graph, the outcome of the performance
limit-state criterion and the risk indicators which should be investigated in more detail.
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Appendix A. Bridge collapse database A1
APPENDIX A. BRIDGE COLLAPSE DATABASE
No. Date Bridge Type Country Failure cause Fatalities Injuries Collapse Details Time References
1 1444 Third Rialto Bridge, Venice (Canale Grande) Foot Italy Overloading complete Too many people on bridge during wedding of Duke of Ferrara in service 1
2 1813 Steinbogen-Bridge, Munich (Isar River) Road Germany Natural hazard 100 complete Flooding in service 1
3 1837 Donaustauf-Bridge near Regensburg Road Germany Impact 20-30 partial Ship impact in service 1
4 1839 Menai Strait (suspension) Bridge, Wales - Great Britain Natural hazard complete Hurricane in service 16
5 1845 Yarmouth Suspension bridge, Norfolk - Great Britain Overloading 80 complete Collapse as hundreds of people crowded on bridge to see a clown ride down the in service 13,14
river, bridge was found to have been constructed to an inferior quality
6 1846 Barentin Viaduct between Rouen and Le Havre Rail France Human error 0 complete Insufficient pier foundations, original design with stones replaced with debris construction 1
filling
7 1847 Iron Bridge in Cheshire (Dee River) Rail Great Britain Limited knowledge 5 18 complete Brittle cast iron, unknown buckling-bending behaviour in service 1,14,16,66
8 1849 Britannia and Conway Bridge Rail Great Britain Design error - Several deficiencies in the positioning equipment construction 1
9 1850 Cable suspension bridge near Angers (Maine River) Road France Limited knowledge 200 complete Vibrations due to marching army in service 1,4
10 1852 Cable suspension bridge Roche Bernard near Geneva Road Switzerland Natural hazard complete Storm, not enough stiffeners in service 1
11 1852 Cable suspension bridge, Peney Road Switzerland Natural hazard 0 complete Load test with sandbags, rain adds additional weight to sandbags construction 1
12 1854 Cable suspension bridge near Wheeling (Ohio River) Road United States Natural hazard complete Storm in service 1
13 1864 Cable suspension bridge Lewiston-Queenston (Niagara) Road United States Natural hazard complete Storm in service 1
14 1869 Hammer parabolic truss railbridge Rail Germany Impact 12 partial Ship impact, ship captain does not wait for helping boat in service 1
15 1873 Steel truss bridge near Payerne Road Switzerland Human error complete During load tests, loads are thrown off the bridge construction 1
16 1876 6-span truss bridge near Riesa (Elbe River) Rail Germany Natural hazard partial Flooding destroys piers, 4 spans destroyed in service 1
17 1876 Ashtabula (cast iron) bridge, Ohio Rail United States Overloading 80 complete Very heavy train, snow storm, fatigue not excluded in service 1,4,14,16,17
18 1877 Timber truss bridge near Uschgorod Rail Hungary Overloading complete Increased loading in service 1
19 1879 Bridge between Edinburgh and Dundee over Firth of Tay Rail Great Britain Natural hazard 90 partial Winds, gale, bad condition of bridge due to lacking maintenance in service 1,4,13,14,16,17
20 1879 Truss bridge near St. Charles (Missouri River) Rail United States Impact 2 partial Derailed train impact on bridge in service 1
21 1881 Morelos Bridge Rail Mexico Vandalism 214 complete Deliberately set fire in service 1
22 1881 Steel truss bridge Miramont Road France Limited knowledge complete Buckling of compression members construction 1
23 1882 Cast iron bridge Inverythan, Scotland Rail Great Britain Limited knowledge 4 complete Fatigue in service 1,66
24 1882 Osijeg Bridge (Drau River) Rail Serbia Natural hazard 26 partial Flooding + scour of piers, train load in service 1
25 1883 Truss bridge, Tss River Road Switzerland Limited knowledge 1 5 complete Buckling of compression members construction 1
26 1884 Bridge near Douarnenez, Britanny - France Natural hazard complete Storm construction 1
27 1884 Bridge near Evaux, Britanny - France Natural hazard complete Storm construction 1
28 1884 Truss bridge near Salez Road Switzerland Design error 0 2 complete Bad construction detail: gusset plate construction 1
29 1886 2-span truss bridge near Fish's Eddy, New York Rail United States Impact complete Derailed train impact on bridge in service 1
30 1886 Truss bridge of the Salzburg-Tiroler Bah near Rail Austria Overloading 3 - Heavy goods train, failure of brittle bottom chord element in service 1
Hopfengarten
31 1887 Bridge near Louisville, Nashville (Alabama River) Rail United States Natural hazard complete Wood in water destroys bridge in service 1
32 1887 Bussey bridge near Forest Hill (Boston) Road United States Design error 26 115 - Error in design and construction in service 1
33 1887 Small wooden bridge in North Chatsworth, Illinois Rail United States Natural hazard 82 complete Bridge caught fire after weeds had been burnt along the track earlier. A six in service 13,14
coach Niagara Falls Special train unable to stop in time.
Risk assessment of existing bridge structures A2
34 1887 Staunton Bridge, Virginia Rail United States Human error partial Weakening of steel member by overheating (as timber bridge is replaced by construction 1
steel bridge)
35 1891 Bergbrcke, truss bridge Road Austria Limited knowledge complete Buckling because of lacking lateral supports construction 1
36 1891 Cast iron bridge Norwood Junction, London Rail Great Britain Limited knowledge complete Fatigue in service 1,66
37 1891 Truss bridge near Mnchenstein (Basle) Rail Switzerland Design error 73 131 complete Not strong enough and excentric diagonals of space truss in service 1,14
38 1891 Biwajima wooden carriage bridge (Shonaigawa River) Road Japan Natural hazard complete Earthquake in service 24
39 1892 Bridge in Chicago Rail United States Impact complete Ship impact, error of ship captain in service 1
40 1892 Covington Bridge Road United States Design error complete Cable failure construction 1
41 1892 Ljubitschewo truss bridge Road Serbia Design error 0 0 partial Design of joint of two compression members insufficient construction 1
42 1892 Strathglass truss bridge, Scotland Road Great Britain Limited knowledge 0 0 complete Insufficient stiffness of top members about weak axis construction 1
43 1892 Truss bridge near Frankfurt (Nidda River) Road Germany Overloading 0 complete Steamroller on road, not enough stiffening in service 1
44 1893 Bridge near Ljubitschewo (Morava River) - Serbia Design error 0 - Underdesigned, collapse during load test in service 4
45 1893 Chester truss bridge Rail United States Human error 40 complete Train enters bridge on which some load-bearing elements were removed construction 1
46 1893 Louisville truss bridge - United States Human error 22 partial Parts of scaffolding removed before bracing of bridge put in place, strong winds construction 1
47 1894 Bridge near Paularo (Chiarso River) - Italy Overloading - Collapse under test load in service 1
48 1894 Stargard RC arch bridge Road Germany Design error complete Pile length too short, groundwater level higher than in calculations construction 1
49 1896 Bedford Bridge, Ohio Rail United States Limited knowledge complete Not enough stiffened in service 1
50 1896 Bridge between Victoria and Esquimalt Rail Canada Overloading complete Tramway loading far in excess of the legal (10t) weight in service 14
51 1897 Bridge near Spartanburg, South Carolina Rail United States Impact complete Derailed train impact on bridge in service 1
52 1898 Thames Iron Works bridge, Blackwall (London) - Great Britain Overloading 36 - Little bridge holding about 300 people collapsed as the 'Albion' was launched. in service 13,14
Police could not hinder people entering the bridge
53 1902 Cornelius Bridge in Munich (Isar River) - Germany Design error 2 35 complete Scaffolding collapses under weight of fresh concrete construction 1
54 1902 Mangapatnan Bridge Rail India Natural hazard complete Flooding due to Monsoon rain destroys bridge with train on it in service 14
55 1904 Porter's Draw timber railroad bridge, north of Pueblo, Rail United States Natural hazard 97 - complete 30 feet of floodwater that swept through the normally dry channel, washing out in service 61
Colorado the county bridge. The bridge floated downstream and severely damaged the
wooden railroad bridge. Train caused weakened bridge to collapse
56 1905 Heidelberg truss bridge Rail Germany Limited knowledge 0 0 partial Insufficient stiffness of top members about weak axis construction 1
57 1907 7-span bridge near Ponts de C (Loire River) Rail France Impact 28 partial Derailed train impact on bridge, no anti-derailment system present in service 1
58 1907 La rasse steel truss bridge Road France Design error 0 0 complete Insufficient anchorage and wind (incremental launch) construction 1
59 1907 Quebec truss bridge (St Lawrence River) Rail Canada Design error 74 complete Buckling of bottom members during cantilevered construction phase construction 1,4,16,17,66
60 1908 Herrenbrcke, Swing bridge near Lbeck Road Germany Impact partial Ship impact, error of ship captain in service 1
61 1910 Prinzregenten Bridge in Munich (Isar River) Road Germany Natural hazard complete Flooding in service 1
62 1911 3 arches Auburn bridge, California - United States Design error 3 16 complete Scaffolding collapses under weight of fresh concrete construction 1
63 1912 Glen Loch bridge, Pennsylvania Rail United States Limited knowledge 4 ? complete Fatigue in service 1
64 1913 concrete arch bridge near Deep (Rega River) Road Germany Natural hazard complete Flooding + gales lead to scour and collapse in service 1
65 1913 Truss bridge near Gtikhausen Road Switzerland Human error 0 2 complete Inadmissible removal of bars during strengthening (-> buckling) construction 1
66 1913 Truss bridge near Prerow (Bodden River) Rail Germany Natural hazard complete Flooding + gales lead to scour and collapse in service 1
67 1914 Carr (masonry) bridge, Baddengorm Burn Rail Great Britain Natural hazard complete Heavy rain, scouring, train enters collapsed bridge in service 14
68 1916 Quebec truss bridge, 2nd accident Rail Canada Design error 13 partial Cantilevered bridge, when middle part is being installed hangers slip construction 1,4,66
69 1922 11-span bridge leading to Sheppey-Island (Swale River) Road Great Britain Impact partial Ship impact intermediate pier in service 1
70 1923 8-span Kiaochow-bridge (Yun River) Rail China Limited knowledge 0 partial Resonance train-superstructure in service 1,4
71 1923 Stone arch bridge in Flensburg (over railway lines) Road Germany Design error complete Too less thought out sequence of dismantling scaffolding construction 1
72 1924 Coos-Bay-bridge Oregon Rail United States Impact partial Ship impact underside of deck in service 1
73 1925 3-hinge concrete arch bridge near Aller (Sieg River) Road Germany Natural hazard partial Flooding leads to scour and then collapse in service 1
74 1925 Mozyrow bridge Rail Russia Human error complete Bad quality concrete used for piles construction 1
75 1926 3-span concrete arch bridge (Milcov River) Rail Romania Natural hazard 0 no Settlement of pier due to scour in service 1
76 1926 Gartz RC arch bridge Rail Germany Human error 3 9 partial Underwater concrete not firm enough, not enough support for arch reaction construction 1
77 1927 Ohio Falls truss bridge Rail United States Design error 1 partial Insufficient bracing of intermediate scaffolding (cantilevered construction) construction 1
78 1927 Poughkeepsie suspension bridge Road United States Human error partial Quality of ground much worse than expected construction 1
79 1927 Second Narrows (Gerber hinge) Bridge, Vancouver Road Canada Impact 0 partial Ship impact into deck in service 1
80 1931 Bordeaux suspension bridge Road France Design error 15 40 complete Collapse during load test with 9 fully loaded trucks construction 1
81 1933 4-span beam and slab bridge (Anacostia River) Rail United States Natural hazard partial Scour, lacking inspection in service 1
82 1935 Steel truss swing bridge near Copenhagen Road Denmark Impact 0 partial Ship impact, missed opened state of swing bridge in service 1
83 1936 Bridge over Hardenbergstrasse in Berlin Road Germany Limited knowledge 0 0 no New high yield strength, but brittle steel in service 1,66
84 1937 Steel truss bridge near Manassas, Virginia Road United States Impact complete Truck impact on compression strut of the truss in service 1
85 1937 Truss bridge near Pagosa Springs in Colorado Road United States Overloading complete High concentration of vehicles in service 1
86 1937 Whiteson Bridge near Minnville, Oregon (North Yamhill Road United States Impact complete Height of truck bigger than maximum headroom of portal frame in service 1
River)
87 1938 Bridge near the Niagara Falls (Niagara River) Road United States Natural hazard 0 complete Ice-induced pressure on arch abutments leads to collapse in service 1,4,17
88 1938 Valley bridge Rdersdorf near Berlin Road Germany Limited knowledge 0 0 no New high yield strength, but brittle steel in service 1,4
89 1938 Vierendeelbridge near Hasselt (Albert canal) Road Belgium Limited knowledge 0 0 complete New high yield strength, but brittle steel in service 1,4,66
90 1939 Plate girder Gerber hinge bridge near New York Road United States Impact partial Ship impact of ship with loose anchor construction 1
91 1939 Reinforced concrete arch bridge near Sand (Angermanlv - Sweden Design error 18 complete Scaffolding collapses under weight of fresh concrete construction 1,4,17,66
River)
92 1940 Herenthalsoolen Bridge - Belgium Limited knowledge - Steel tied arch failed by brittle fracture in service 66
93 1940 Haulille Bridge - Belgium Limited knowledge - Steel tied arch failed by brittle fracture in service 66
94 1940 Motorway bridge near Frankenthal Road Germany Design error 42 partial Failure of lifting equipment construction 1
95 1940 Tacoma Narrows suspension bridge Road United States Limited knowledge 0 0 complete Insufficient bending- and torsion stiffness, aerodynamic instability in service 1,3,4,13,14,17
96 1941 Two U-section bridges south of Le Mars, Iowa (Floyd River) Road United States Natural hazard 0 partial Fire due to collision of two vehicles in service 1
97 1944 2-span truss bridge over Mississippi in Chester, Illinois Road United States Design error 0 complete Uplifting wind load not considered in service 1,4,66
98 1945 Hindenburg bridge in Cologne (Rhein River) Road Germany Human error - Collapse during refurbishment in service 1
99 1945 Swing bridge in Boston-Charlestown, Massachusetts Road United States Impact 0 partial Ship impact in half-open swing bridge in service 1
100 1946 John Grace-Memorial Bridge (Cooper River), South Road United States Impact 0 partial Ship forced by wind into bridge deck in service 1
Carolina
101 1947 All the bridges in the town of Bremen (Weser River) - Germany Natural hazard complete Flooding + floating ice + ships lead to collapse of all the bridges in service 1
102 1947 Bridge near Fresno, California (King's Slough River) Road United States Overloading complete Agriculture vehicle train in service 1
103 1947 Bridge near Koblenz (Mosel River) Rail Germany Natural hazard complete Floating ice in service 1
104 1947 Rockport-Bridge, Maine (Goose River) Road United States Impact complete Truck impact on truss in service 1
105 1949 Hinton truss bridge, West Virginia Road United States Design error 5 4 partial Insufficient capacity of cantilever arm during construction phase construction 1
106 1950 Elbow Grade Bridge, Willamette National Forest, timber Road United States Design error complete Parts of truss underdesigned in service 1
truss
107 1951 Duplessis bridge, plate girder composite bridge, 2-span, Road Canada Limited knowledge 4 partial Brittle failure of new steel in service 1,4
between Montreal and Quebec (St-Maurice River)
108 1952 Sullivan Square motorway bridge, Boston Road United States Design error 0 complete Instability of scaffolding construction 4
109 1953 Walouru Bridge Rail New Zealand Natural hazard 150 complete Volcano eruption destroys dam, flooding destroys bridge with train on it in service 14
110 1954 Motorway composite bridge near Kaiserslautern Road Germany Limited knowledge 0 partial Insufficient stiffness of top members about weak axis construction 1
111 1956 Eric bridge, Cleveland, Ohio Rail United States Natural hazard complete Winds in service 63
112 1956 Nordbrcke Dsseldorf Road Germany Human error 1 partial Two ship cranes used for construction badly coordinated, load of 410t-girder construction 1
transferred to just one of them. Insufficient crane capacity to carry double load.
113 1957 Dawson-Creek suspension bridge (Peace River), British Road Canada Human error 0 0 partial Movement of anchorages on footings which were not fixed properly in service 1,4,17,66
Columbia
114 1957 St John's Bridge, London - Great Britain Impact - Derailed train rams steel pier of 350t-girder bridge, bridge collapses on train in service 14
115 1958 Second Narrows (Gerber hinge) Bridge, Vancouver Road Canada Human error 18 20 complete Bad construction details detected, but never action taken construction 1,4,13,14,17
116 1959 Barton bridge, Lancashire - Great Britain Design error 4 - Buckling of temporary props construction 1,66
117 1959 Goteborg arch bridge Road Sweden Limited knowledge 0 0 no Transverse oscillations construction 1
118 1959 Motorway bridge near Salzburg Road Austria Natural hazard complete Flooding in service 14
119 1960 Continuous truss bridge near Leer (Leda River) Rail Germany Design error no Earth pressure horizontal load not considered in service 1
120 1960 Crediton Bridge, Devon Rail Great Britain Natural hazard partial Two spans collapsed when foundations washed away by flood in service 66
121 1960 Severn Railway Bridge, multiple span Rail Great Britain Impact 5 partial Two ships get together in the mist and destroy piers, negligence of ship in service 1,14,45,66
122 1960 Bridge over Valdivia River Road Chile Natural hazard partial 9.5 Earthquake in service 28
123 1961 Continuous motorway bridge near Limburg Road Germany Design error 3 11 partial Settlement of temporary foundations, load redistribution and scaffolding collapse construction 1
124 1962 Fife bridge Road Great Britain Design error 3 - Buckling of scaffolding, load transfer because of settlements construction 1,66
125 1962 King Street Bridge in Melbourne (Yarra River) Road Australia Limited knowledge 0 0 no Brittle failure of new steel in service 1,4,17,66
126 1962 Interstate 29 West Bridge, Sioux City, Iowa Road United States Natural hazard complete Scour in service 62
127 1963 3-span prestressed concrete bridge near Kristiansund Road Norway Impact 0 partial Ship impact, error of ship captain in service 1
128 1963 Heidingsfeld motorway composite bridge Road Germany Design error 0 0 partial Temporary concrete support plates underdesigned construction 1
129 1964 Lake Pontchartrain bridge (Lake Pont) Road United States Impact 6 partial Ship impact, error of ship captain in service 1,14,66
130 1964 Maracaibo stay-cable bridge Road Venezuela Impact 6 partial Ship impact, failure in electronic guidance system of ship in service 1,14,66
131 1964 Showa Bridge Road Japan Natural hazard partial 7.5 Niigata Earthquake, movement of the pier foundations in service 26
132 1965 Bridge near Charleston, South Carolina (Cooper River) Rail United States Natural hazard 0 0 no Scour, pier failure in service 1
133 1965 Roofed timber bridge between Oberbchel and Bangs Road Switzerland Natural hazard 0 0 complete Strong winds construction 1
134 1966 Arch bridge in Ottawa (Rideau River) - Canada Design error 29 62 - Scaffolding collapses under weight of fresh concrete construction 1
135 1966 Bridge between Antwerp and Luttich (Nette canal) Road Belgium Natural hazard 2 13 complete Scour in service 1
136 1966 Bridge on Antwerpen-Aachen line Rail Belgium Natural hazard 2 16 complete Erosion in service 1
137 1966 Vorland Rees-Kalkar plate girder bridge Road Germany Design error 0 1 partial Temporary supports underdesigned construction 1
138 1967 Bridge in Mexico City Road Mexico - 21 - - construction 1
139 1967 Calder Bridge, Yorkshire - Great Britain Design error 4 - 76 m concrete span collapsed due to low strength and inadequate bracing of construction 66
steel beams in temporary supports
140 1967 Silver bridge, chain suspension bridge (Ohio River) Road United States Limited knowledge 46 9 complete Fatigue in service 1,4,16,17,45
141 1967 Steel bridge with orthotropic deck in Willemstad Road Netherlands Human error 20 - Anchorage cable failure, probably because of unpermitted welding construction 1
142 1967 Bickton Meadows Footbridge in Hampshire Foot Great Britain Deterioration - Segmental construction with thin mortar joints, precast units and thin mortar in service 18
joints of extremely poor quality, corrosion of top bonded tendons (post-
tensioned bridge)
143 1967 Steel bridge in Willemstad - Curaao Human error 20 - Bridge collapsed due to brittle fracture of anchor bars at unauthorized welds construction 66
144 1968 A2 bridge near Lichtendorf near Schwerte Road Germany Limited knowledge 0 no Moving supports due to creep, shrinkage and low temperature -> pier head in service 1
destroyed -> settlement of bridge
145 1968 Bridge between Pisa and Florence (Arno River) Road Italy Natural hazard 0 complete Flooding during maintenance works in service 1
146 1968 Bridge in Titograd (Moraca River), Montenegro Foot Serbia Overloading 6 21 complete - in service 1
147 1968 Bridge in Udine province (Dogna River) Rail Italy Natural hazard complete Flooding in service 1
148 1969 Esslingen bridge Road Germany Natural hazard 3 partial Water enters sheet pile wall caisson construction 1
149 1969 Fourth Danube bridge (plate box girder bridge), Vienna Road Austria Limited knowledge 0 partial Plate buckling of bottom chord in compression construction 1,4,66
150 1970 A1 Cable stayed bridge in Hamburg (Nordelbe River) Road Germany Limited knowledge complete Wind vibrations in service 1
151 1970 Bridge in Illinois (Kaslaski River) Rail United States Design error complete Not anchored against uplift in service 1
152 1970 Britannia tube bridge (Menai Straits) Rail Great Britain Natural hazard no Impregnated timber roof with and tar paints help fire, superstructure deflections in service 1
of up to 0.75 m
153 1970 Buckman Bridge near Jacksonville, Florida - United States Limited knowledge partial Voided pier fills with sea water during construction, anaerobic bacteria produce in service 1
methan gas --> expansion of pier --> partial collapse of bridge
154 1970 Cleddau Bridge, Milford Haven Road Great Britain Limited knowledge 4 complete Incremental launch, plate buckling over support construction 1,4,16,66
155 1970 Prestressed bridge between Rio de Janeiro and Niteroi Road Brazil Design error 8 partial Faulty calculations construction 1
156 1970 Soboth prestressed concrete bridge Road Austria Human error 3 2 complete Collapse during cantilevered construction, prestressing bars badly put in place construction 1,66
157 1970 Westgate bridge, Melbourne (Yarra River) Road Australia Design error 34 18 complete Plate buckling, not well thought out construction sequence construction 1,4,13,14,66
158 1970 Chesapeake Bay Bridge, Annapolis - United States Impact - Military ship gets out of control and hits the bridge during one hour and stormy in service 14
weather, 5 spans collapse, 11 other spans damaged
159 1971 Bridge near Wenigsen, Niedersachsen Road Germany Design error 1 2 partial Scaffolding collapses under weight of fresh concrete construction 1
160 1971 Bridge of the West motorway near Ringsted (over railway Road Denmark Design error - Scaffolding collapses under weight of fresh concrete construction 1
line)
161 1971 Motorwaybridge, Junction Antelope Valley Road United States Natural hazard partial Earthquake in service 4
162 1971 Paulo de Fronton Viaduct in Tijuja, near Rio de Janeiro Rail Brazil Design error 24 40 complete Scaffolding collapses before prestressing is applied construction 1
163 1971 Prestressed bridge in Rio de Janeiro Road Brazil Human error 24 complete Truck on bridge before prestressing took place construction 1,66
164 1971 Steel box girder bridge Koblenz (Rhine River) Road Germany Limited knowledge 13 partial Plate buckling of bottom chord in compression (cantilevered construction) construction 1,4,14,66
165 1972 10-span precast element bridge of the Hillerd-motorway Road Denmark Natural hazard 0 partial Settlement of pier foundation in service 1
166 1972 2-span girder bridge near Katerini Rail Greece Natural hazard 1 partial Flooding leads to scour, train load on bridge in service 1
167 1972 Bridge neaqr Victoria (Loddon River) - Australia Design error 3 - Scaffolding collapses under weight of fresh concrete construction 1
168 1972 Continuous Hangbrcke near Koblenz (over Laubachtal) Road Germany Design error 5 15 partial Scaffolding collapses under weight of fresh concrete construction 1, 66
169 1972 Motorway bridge near Pasadena, California (Arroyo Seco Road United States Design error 6 partial Scaffolding collapses under weight of fresh concrete construction 1, 66
River)
170 1972 Prestressed concrete bridge Cannavino, cantilevered Road Italy Natural hazard complete Temperature gradient accumulates all deformations in one crack (not adherent construction 1
construction prestress)
171 1972 Sidney-Lanier Bridge Brunswick, Georgia Road United States Impact 10 partial Ship impact, misunderstanding captain - staff in service 1,14,66
172 1972 Steel-timber bridge in Naga City Road Philippines Overloading 145 200 complete Procession of 1000 people over 240m2 in service 1
173 1972 Loddon Bridge, Berkshire - Great Britain Design error 3 - 24 m span collapsed during placing of concrete due to failure of falsework construction 66
174 1972 Chesapeake Bay Bridge, Annapolis - United States Impact - Ship impact, 2 spans collapse, 5 other spans damaged in service 14
175 1973 Bridge near Redwitz (Rodach River) Road Germany Overloading - Bridge collapses under Ready-mix concrete mixer in service 1
176 1973 Composite box bridge Illarsaz Road Switzerland Design error 0 complete Unexpected friction forces and direction of them (influence of bending moments construction 1,4
in concrete slab and steel plates due to transverse guidance forces and
excentricity of friction forces)
177 1973 Drimsallie Bridge, Inverness, Scotland Rail Great Britain Natural hazard partial One span of bridge collapsed due to washout of abutment in flood in service 66
178 1973 Composite bridge in Valengin Road Switzerland Design error 0 7 complete Incremental launch downhill (slope 6.5%), too optimistic assumption of friction construction 1,4
angle
179 1973 Steel box girder bridge Zeulenroda Road Germany Limited knowledge 4 5 partial Plate buckling of bottom chord (cantilevered construction) construction 1,14
180 1973 Vorland bridge Hochheim Road Germany Natural hazard 0 partial high temperature make support plates moving in service 1
181 1974 Bridge near Kempten (Leubas River) Road Germany Design error 9 complete Scaffolding collapses under weight of fresh concrete construction 1,66
182 1974 Brohtalbridge, segmental construction Road Germany Human error 0 0 partial Incremental launch construction, not respected cover specifications (and thus construction 1
bad compacted zones with holes) lead to concrete crushing when low
prestressing cable position are over support, settlements
183 1974 Lake Pontchartrain bridge (Lake Pont) Road United States Impact 3 partial Ship impact, captain slept!! in service 1,14,66
184 1974 Timber bridge near Zell am See, Pinzgau Foot Austria Deterioration 8 16 complete Rotten piers not detected during inspection in service 1
185 1974 Truss bridge near Luttre Rail Belgium Impact 17 80 partial Derailed train impact on bridge, fire of waggons in service 1
186 1975 3-span bridge in Lafayette Street, St-Paul, Minnesota Road United States Limited knowledge 0 no Brittle failure of new steel in service 1,4
187 1975 Bridge near Vranje (Morava River) Rail Serbia Natural hazard 13 complete Flooding leads to bridge collapse as train passes in service 1
188 1975 Bridge over M62 Foot Great Britain Impact 2 2 complete Crane impact of crane on road below in service 1,66
189 1975 Prestressed concrete bridge Gmnd (Tauern motorway) Road Austria Human error 10 1 partial Concrete resistance not yet achieved, construction not in accordance with design construction 1,14,66
190 1975 Tasman-Bridge in Hobart, Tasmania (Derwent River) Road Australia Impact 15 partial Ship impact, unexperienced captain in service 1,13,14,45,66
191 1975 Fraser River Bridge, New Westminster/Vancouver - Canada Impact - Ship impact, 120 m-span collapses in service 14
192 1976 21-span, Pass Manchac Bridge, Louisiana Road United States Impact 2 2 partial Ship impact, error of ship captain in service 1,14
193 1976 Bridge in town centre of Tchesch (Opava River) Road Czech Republic Natural hazard 32 complete Gas pipeline under bridge bursts, explosion destroys bridge in service 1
194 1976 Fulton Yates Bridge near Henderson, Kentucky Road United States Overloading - Overloading during refurbishment in service 1,62
195 1976 Reichsbrcke over Danube River, Vienna Road Austria Deterioration 1 complete Water enters pier and freezing-thawing cycles destroy unreinforced pier, shear in service 1,4,14
failure, lacking inspection and maintenance
196 1976 Five-span steel-plate girder bridge in Agua Caliente Road Guatemala Natural hazard partial Earthquake (Montagua fault). Because of the poor detailing of the supports for in service 47
these spans (the short supported lengths) and the relative movement between
piers, the three central spans collapsed.
197 1976 Timber bridge in Vorarlberg Foot Austria Deterioration 8 complete Rotten structure, lacking inspection in service 1
198 1977 Benjamin Harrison Memorial Bridge near Hopewell, Road United States Impact 0 partial Ship impact, failure in electronic of ship guidance in service 1,14
Virginia
199 1977 Bridge in Assam Rail India Overloading 45 100 - Heavy train in service 1
200 1977 Bridge in Punjab province Road India Overloading 22 - Packed coach on bridge in service 1
201 1977 Bridge in Sao Paolo over motorway Road Brazil Natural hazard complete Explosion in service 1
202 1977 Bridge in the North of Genova (Scrivia River) Road Italy Natural hazard complete Flooding in service 1
203 1977 Bridge near Granville-station (Sidney) over railway line Rail Australia Impact 89 complete Derailed train impact under bridge in service 1,14
204 1977 Bridge over Beki River (North-East of India) Rail India Impact 50 complete Derailed train impact on bridge in service 1
205 1977 Motorway bridge between Turin and Milan Road Italy Natural hazard complete Flooding in service 1
206 1977 Pushkino bridge Foot Russia Overloading 20 100 complete 100 persons at same time on bridge, insufficient inspection and maintenance in service 1,13,14
207 1977 Timber truss Bad Cannstatt Foot Germany Design error 0 0 complete Not enough thought out construction sequence construction 1
208 1977 Truss bridge in Philippines Road Philippines Overloading - Heavy overloaded truck, corrosion in service 1
209 1977 Bridge over Passiac River, Union Avenue - United States Impact - Ship impact, 2 spans collapse in service 14
210 1977 Gothenburg Harbour Bridge, Tingstad - Sweden Impact - Ship impact, 2 spans collapse in service 14
211 1978 3-span concrete 3 girder beam-and-slab Mathabhanga Road Bangladesh Design error complete No bottom reinforcement cover in pile caps, punching of piers in service 1
Bridge
212 1978 Interstate 17 Bridge, Black Canyon, Arizona Road United States Natural hazard complete Flood in service 62
213 1978 Bridge in Bihar district Road India - 70 25 - - construction 1
214 1979 K&I Railroad Bridge, Louisville, Jefferson County, Kentucky Rail United States Overloading complete Vehicle exceeding weight limit in service 62
215 1978 Bridge near San Sebastian Foot Spain Overloading 7 - Gathering of people in service 1
216 1978 Suspension bridge near Bristol Road Great Britain Overloading - Unexpectedly heavy lorry traffic --> hanger failures, construction errors in service 1
217 1978 Southern Pacific Railroad Bridge (Berwick Bay), Louisiana Rail United States Impact - Ship impact, steel truss of 70 m falls into water and sinks in service 14
218 1979 13-span Rottachtal bridge near Oy Road Germany Human error 0 0 no Incremental launch, big cracks, inversed position of gliding plate (top/bottom) construction 1
219 1979 2-span bridge near Dortmund (over motorway A2) Road Germany Impact 1 6 complete Truck overtaking and high speed impact on piers in service 1
220 1979 Alabama Rail Bridge, Alabama Rail United States Impact complete Train impact in service 62
221 1979 2-span composite bridge near Duisburg (over motorway Road Germany Impact 8 complete Crane on back of lorry frees itself and impact in bridge deck in service 1
A3)
222 1979 Southern Rail Bridge, Indiana Rail United States Overloading complete Vehicle exceeding weight limit in service 62
223 1979 2-span continuous composite bridge near Sitensen (over Road Germany Impact 1 no Truck overtakes and looses control, impact on pier in service 1
motorway A1)
224 1979 Ayato prestressed concrete bridge Road Japan Human error 4 4 complete Incremental launch, when cantilevers coming from two sides are to be joined, construction 1
differences in length appear, temporary construction to correct it leads to
collapse of both cantilevers
225 1979 Bridge over the Hood canal, Washington - United States Natural hazard 0 complete Wind and storm in service 4
226 1979 Interstate 10 Bridge, Phoenix, Arizona Road United States Natural hazard partial Flood in service 62
227 1979 Concrete 5-span box girder bridge near Rockford Road United States Design error no Big cracks, failure of Epoxy-filled joint (not enough hardened to take shear force) construction 1
228 1980 Alm Sound Bridge, Tjrn - Sweden Impact complete Ship impact destroys abutments and complete bridge arch collapses in service 14
229 1980 Maracaibo stay-cable bridge Road Venezuela Deterioration 0 no Stay cable failure due to corrosion, lacking inspection and maintenance in service 1
230 1980 Sunshine Skyway Bridge near St.Petersburg, Florida Road United States Impact 35 partial Ship impact, not enough care of captain in bad weather in service 1,13,14,15
231 1980 Suspension bridge near Munster (Dortmund-Ems canal) Road Germany Impact 1 complete Truck impact on hanger due to ice in service 1
232 1980 Tjorn-Bridge, Goteburg (Askerfjord) Road Sweden Impact 8 complete Ship impact because of ice and mist in service 1,13,14,45
233 1980 Truss bridge in Trenton, Wisconsin (Milwaukee River) Road United States Impact 1 complete Truck impact on main truss in service 1
234 1981 Bridge in British Columbia Road Canada Natural hazard 6 partial Flooding and trees in water destroy bridge in service 1
235 1981 Bridge in Munich (over Mittl. Ring) Foot Germany Impact 4 complete Self-erected skip on dump truck impact in service 1
236 1981 Suspension bridge on Cheju Island Road Korea Design error 11 8 - Insufficient cable anchorage construction 1
237 1981 Suspension bridge with stiffening timber beams Foot Peru Overloading 50 complete During refurbishment works 80 people on bridge, failure of cable in service 1
238 1982 2-span truss bridge between Linz and Selzthal (Traun Rail Austria Natural hazard 0 partial Scour leads to loss of pier and partial collapse of bridge girder in service 1
239 1982 3-span arch bridge in Elwood - Canada Design error 1 8 complete Lateral buckling of scaffolding due to insufficient lateral supports construction 1,4
240 1982 Bridge near Dedensen Road Germany Human error 0 complete Lateral buckling of construction support girder during removing of lateral construction 1
supports
241 1982 Bridge over Brajamanbari Road Bangladesh Overloading 45 - Completely overloaded bus in service 1
242 1982 Multiple span box girder bridge in East Chicago, Road United States Design error 13 18 partial Scaffolding collapses under weight of fresh concrete construction 1,4,5,13,14
243 1982 Multiple stone arches bridge between Milan and Bologna Rail Italy Natural hazard partial Scour leads to loss of 2 piers, 3 arches destroyed in service 1
244 1982 Prestressed concrete precast box girder bridge, Saginaw Road United States Design error 0 partial Too weak temporary support elements construction 1
245 1982 Rheinbrcke near Hchst, Vorarlberg (Rhine River) - Austria Design error 2 - Scaffolding collapses under weight of fresh concrete construction 1
246 1982 Simple span, steel truss bridge Road Germany Design error 0 complete Too weak temporary support elements construction 1
247 1982 Syracuse bridge, New York Road United States Design error 1 5 partial Torsional buckling due to lacking lateral support construction 1
248 1983 Connecticut Turnpike Bridge near Greenwich (Mianus River)Road United States Deterioration 3 3 partial Corrosion of joint hangers (Gerber-joint), constraint stresses due to big in service 1,3,4,16,17,45
249 1983 Timber bridge on Cebu-Island Foot Philippines Overloading 20 - - in service 1
250 1984 Bridge between Jabalpur and Gondia (Madya Pradesh) Rail India Natural hazard 102 100 - Flooding destroys bridge under load of passing train in service 1
251 1984 Bridge in Tokyo West (Tama River) Road Japan Design error 4 14 complete Not well thought of scaffolding removing sequence construction 1
252 1984 Bridge on DB-line Lohr-Wertheim near Kreuzwertheim Rail Germany Human error 1 5 complete Use of uncertified lifting bars and too weak bolt nuts construction 1
253 1984 Composite bridge near Sept-Iles near Quebec Road Canada Design error 6 2 complete Faulty calculations construction 1
254 1985 (Composite) Czerny bridge, Heidelberg Road Germany Human error 0 3 partial Use of wrong bolts construction 1
255 1985 Walnut street viaduct over Interstate 20 in Denver, Road United States Design error 1 4 partial Failure of pier head sending eight 55-ton bridge girders onto road underneath construction 1,36
Colorado
256 1985 New (composite) Grosshessenlohe bridge, Munich Rail Germany Design error 0 1 partial Ignorance of load case "Displacement of mobile scaffolding" construction 1
257 1985 Suspension bridge Sully-sur-Loire (Loire River) Road France Limited knowledge 0 complete Bad quality of suspension cables, brittle failure at -20C in service 1
258 1985 Ynys-y-Gwas Bridge in West Glamorgan Road Great Britain Deterioration complete Segmental construction with thin mortar joints, highly permeable mortar at in service 18,45
joints allowed moisture, chlorides and oxyen ready access to tendons, corrosion
of longitudinal tendons at the segment joints
259 1987 Bridge in El Paso, Texas - United States Design error 1 7 - Inadequate scaffolding construction 4
260 1987 Glanrhyd Railway Bridge, near Llandeilo, Wales (River Rail Great Britain Natural hazard 4 complete Flooding, bridge collapsed as a train drove over it in service 13,14,45
Towy)
261 1987 Hderlisbrcke in the Schllenen gorge (Reuss River) Road Switzerland Natural hazard 0 complete Flooding washes away stone arch bridge in service 1
262 1987 Schoharie Bridge (New York) Road United States Natural hazard 0 partial Flooding and storm lead to collapse of two spans after scouring of a pier in service 1,3,4,17
263 1987 Wassen Bridge, N2-motorway viaduct (Reuss River) Road Switzerland Natural hazard partial Flood, Scouring of the pier foundations leads to vertical settlement of 1.2 m in service 23
accompanied by horizontal displacement of 0.7 m
264 1988 A3 bridge near Aschaffenburg (Main River) Road Germany Design error 1 7 complete Critical load case during incremental launch not included, shear failure construction 1,14
265 1988 Motorway bridge near Seattle Road United States Design error 0 - Girders not yet tied together by diaphragms, Domino effect construction 4
266 1988 Quilon Bridge Rail India Natural hazard complete Flooding, bridge collapsed as a train drove over it in service 14
267 1989 Box girder bridge in Los Angeles Road United States Design error 5 - Collapse when scaffolding was removed construction 4
268 1989 Bridge in Baltimore Road United States Design error 14 - Prestressing not in place, asymmetric loading construction 4
269 1989 Multispan masonry arch Ness viaduct in Inverness, Rail Great Britain Natural hazard complete Heavy floods washed multispan masonry arch bridge away, just after a freight in service 45,46
Scotland trainhad passed over it
270 1989 Bridge near Los Mochis between Mazatlan and Mexicali Rail Mexico Natural hazard 103 200 - Flooding destroys bridge under load of passing train in service 1
271 1989 Cypress Freeway, Oakland, California Road United States Natural hazard complete Loma Prieta earthquake in service 6
272 1989 Section of East span of San Francisco Oakland Bay Bridge, Road United States Natural hazard 1 partial Loma Prieta earthquake in service 4,17
California
273 1989 Truss bridge in Shepherdsville, Kentucky Rail United States Impact partial Litter collector is higher than bridge clearance in service 1,45
274 1990 5-span box girder Motorway bridge near Kufstein (Inn Road Austria Natural hazard 0 no Scouring leads to settlement and big damage of distorted superstructure in service 1,3,14,45
275 1990 Herbert C. Bonner Bridge, North Carolina - United States Impact - Ship impact, 4 piers damaged, 5 spans collapse in service 14
276 1991 Bridge in Chittagong (Carnafuli River) - Birma Impact complete Ship looses control during storm and knocks down bridge superstructure in service 14
277 1991 Bridge in Hiroshima - Japan Design error 14 - Stability problem, sliding construction 4
278 1991 Bridge in Xi'an Province - China Overloading 23 140 complete Crowded bridge collapsed during a Lunar New Year Festival in service 13,14
279 1992 Bridge near Kilosa (Udete River) Rail Tanzania Natural hazard 100 - Flooding destroys bridge, train drives onto collapsed bridge in service 1
280 1992 Motorwaybridge, jonction Antelope Valley Road United States Natural hazard partial One span collapses during earthquake in service 4
281 1992 New Haengju Bridge, Seoul (stay cable bridge) Road Korea Human error 0 0 partial Excentricity of load, unsatisfactory concrete quality construction 1
282 1992 Bridge over River Schelde - Belgium Deterioration complete Corrosion of post-tensioning through a hinged joint, tanker collided with bridge in service 18
and caught fire prior to the collapse
283 1993 Five-span bridge at Forteviot, 10km south of Perth (May Rail Great Britain Natural hazard 0 0 partial Flooding, erosion of the gravel bed beneath the downstream face of the shallow in service 56
River) founded pier, concrete bag scour protection washed away
284 1993 Cicero Bridge between Messina and Palermo (Mazarra Road Italy Natural hazard 4 1 partial Flooding destroys 3 piers in service 1
River)
285 1993 Stone arch bridge between Nairobi and Mombasa Rail Kenya Natural hazard 144 - Flooding destroys bridge, train drives onto collapsed bridge in service 1
(Ngailithia River)
286 1993 Truss bridge in Concord, New Hampshire Road United States Human error 2 7 complete Stiffener mounted mounted at wrong place construction 1
287 1993 Ottoman stone bridge in Mostar (Neretva River) Foot Bosnia and Vandalism complete Destroyed by croat militiamen during war in service 52
Herzegovina
288 1993 Truss bridge near Mobile, Alabama Rail United States Impact 47 partial Ship impact in service 1,14
289 1994 Sungsu truss bridge in Seoul (Han River) Road Korea Human error 32 17 partial Weld type and dimensions executed differ from drawing, much heavier traffic in service 1,4,13,14
load than design load
290 1994 Interstate 5 Bridge in Los Angeles, California Road United States Natural hazard 1 partial Earthquake measuring 6.6 on the Richter scale in service 54
291 1995 3-span 3-girder composite bridge near Clifton (Tennessee Road United States Human error 1 complete Executed construction sequence different from planned one construction 1,14
River)
292 1995 Approach bridge on Cologne-Wahn Airport, beam-and-slab Road Germany Design error 1 partial Scaffolding collapses under weight of fresh concrete construction 1
293 1995 Bridge in Aflou - Algeria Natural hazard 50 - Heavy rain in service 10,13,14
294 1995 Bridge in Braz, Vorarlberg Rail Austria Natural hazard 4 100 complete Express train plunges into ravine after mudslide had destroyed rail bridge in service 10
295 1995 Twin bridges, Interstate 5 (Arroyo Pasajero River), Road United States Natural hazard 7 complete Scour of bridge foundations in service 4,7,17
Coalinga, California
296 1995 Nishihomiya bridge Road Japan Natural hazard partial Hyogoken-Nanbu Earthquake, separation of the two supporting piers caused by in service 27
the lateral ground displacements
297 1995 Hanshin elevated expressway (Kobe-Osaka highway) Road Japan Natural hazard 12 complete Earthquake (7.2 on Richter Scale), five sections of the expressway were tossed in service 57
aside yet many of the concrete supports had been recently reinforced
298 1996 Grogol bridge Airport Jakarta (over other road) Road Indonesia Human error 4 19 partial Scaffolding dismantled too early construction 1
299 1996 Koror-Babelhuap-bridge (Toagle canal) Road Palau Limited knowledge 2 4 complete Big deformations due to creep and shrinkage, bad concrete quality, corrosion in service 1
300 1996 Walnut Street Bridge in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania Foot United States Natural hazard complete Scour and ice damage in service 4,8,17
(Susquehanna River)
301 1997 Yarkon River bridge in Tel Aviv Foot Israel Design error 4 70 complete Bridge over the polluted Yarkon River in Tel Aviv collapsed, at the opening in service 34
ceremony of the Maccabiah Games. About 100 of the Australian delegation's 380
members were on the bridge as it collapsed. Bridge was built haphazardly, with
no proper plan, foundation and supervision.
302 1998 2-span bridge near Eschede (over railway line) Road Germany Impact 100 88 complete Derailed train impact under bridge in service 1,4
303 1998 Bridge in Piura (Piura River) Road Peru Natural hazard 30 complete Flooding due to El Nio earthquake in service 4,12,13,14
304 1998 Seven span continuous Injaka Bridge In Mpumalanga - South Africa Design error 14 19 complete Incremental launching method. Steel launch nose not structurally stiff enough, construction 49
(Ngwaritsane River), near Bosbokrand incorrect temporary works slide path, incorrectly placed temporary bearings,
incorrect feeding of bearing pads, under-designed deck slab, lack of competent
personnel and supervision.
305 1999 Bridge near Covington, Tennessee (Hatchie River) Road United States Natural hazard partial Scouring and undermining of the foundations in service 3,45
306 1999 Bridges in Hebei, Pingshan - China Natural hazard 43 complete Overflowing mountain Rivers sweep 32 bridges away in service 11
307 1999 Chongqjng steel bridge, Sichuan Province - China Design error 40 14 complete Dereliction of duty and mistakes in engineering and construction in service 11
308 1999 Wuppertal Schwebebahn bridge (Wupper River) Rail Germany Human error 5 2 - Maintenance people left maintenance equipment on tracks, train derails in service 1
309 1999 Bridge near Akyazi in the Arifiye area(Sakarya River) Road Turkey Natural hazard complete Izmit earthquake (Kocaeli province) in service 25
310 1999 Transeuropean motorway bridge Road Turkey Natural hazard complete Izmit earthquake (Kocaeli province) in service 25
311 2000 Bridge over motorway in Concord, North Carolina Foot United States Overloading 80 complete Bridge snapped in half as tens of thousands of people left a motor speedway in service 13,14
event on Saturday evening and were crossing over it
312 2000 Kaoping Bridge (Kaoping Creek) Road Taiwan Natural hazard 22 partial Scour. Erosion of the riverbed which had been deepened by excessive gravel in service 51
quarrying. Also, some of the buttresses were poorly protected.
313 2001 Steel truss bridge between Castelo de Paiva and Penafiel Rail Portugal Natural hazard 70 complete Flooding and scouring, deterioration in service 4,9,14,50
(River Douro)
314 2001 Queen Isabella Causeway, Texas Road United States Impact 8 partial Four barges and a tugboat struck the bridge in service 22
315 2001 Bridge in Luzhai county (Guangxi Province) Road China Natural hazard 5 3 partial Flash floods in service 53
316 2001 Historic Tewksbury Township pony truss bridge, - United States Impact complete 30-ton tractor-trailer ignored signs warning of the bridge's 8-ton weight limit. in service 60
Hunterdon County, New Jersey Truck struck the bridge abutment and caused it to collapse.
317 2002 Bridges in Austria - Austria Natural hazard - Floodings in Thurnberg, Engelstein, Salzburg and other cities in service 14
318 2002 Bridges in Germany - Germany Natural hazard - Big floodings in South and East Germany in service 14
319 2002 Interstate 40 Bridge, Oklahoma (Webber Falls) Road United States Impact partial Ship collides with one of piers, bridge collapses on length of 150 m in service 14
320 2002 Marcy bridge (Utica-Rome Expressway project) Foot United States Design error 1 9 complete Global torsional buckling, bridge not braced properly as workers built it. The construction 44
braces could not hold the long, narrow bridge as workers poured the concrete
deck onto it.
321 2002 Turkey Creek Bridge, Sharon Springs, Kansas Rail United States Natural hazard complete Train on which brakes became very hot, stops on timber bridge which in turn in service 14
takes fire
322 2002 Bridge in Patagonia (Chubut River) Foot Argentina Overloading complete Bridge collapsed as a group of 70 schoolchildren were crossing. Wooden in service 35
structure supporting the bridge collapsed, since the bridge was not supposed to
be used by more than three people at a time.
323 2002 Highway 14 overpass, 60 miles south of Dallas, Texas Road United States Impact 1 1 complete Truck slammed into overpass, causing the bridge to collapse. in service 55
(over Interstate 45)
324 2003 Bridge in Daman (Damanganga River) Road India Human error 26 25 complete Irregularity of the administration in repairs, should have been replaced for 15 in service 2
years
325 2003 Pont de Giers, Givors (River Rhone) Road France Natural hazard partial Heavy rain increases water level and thus destroys foundations in service 14
326 2003 Imola Avenue Bridge, Napa, California Road United States Human error 1 7 partial Three 100-ton hydraulic jacks used to raise the project's falsework, constructed construction 39, 40
to support the poured-in-place concrete bridge deck, were placed up to 2 inches
off-center, predisposing them to shifting under the weight they supported.
327 2003 Cahir Bridge, County Tipperary Rail Ireland Impact 0 0 complete Structural collapse of the viaduct caused by the progressive derailment of the in service 38
train.
328 2004 Interstate 95 Bridge in Bridgeport, Connecticut Road United States Human error 0 partial Car collided with a 36'000 l home heating oil tanker. After the ignition, fuel oil in service 19
that had dropped through a drain onto a local road, also began to burn, partially
melting steel girders holding up I-95. The road dropped 1.2 m before firefighters
stabilised the steel's temperature with water.
329 2004 West Grove Bridge in Silver Lake, Kansas Rail United States Impact 0 0 - Bridge collapsed as a result of the derailment of forty of the coal train's 137 cars in service 20
330 2004 Ramu Bridge in Madang - Papua New Guinea Design error complete Poor design. Soil erosion, landslides and heavy debris contributed to collapse. in service 21
331 2004 Interstate 20 Bridge near Pecos, Texas (Salt Draw River) Road United States Natural hazard partial Normally dry river swollen with floodwaters from two days of heavy rain in service 29
332 2004 30 Bridges - Zambia Natural hazard 10 - Torrential rain, flooding in service 30
333 2004 Lee Roy Selmon Expressway, Tampa Bay, Florida Road United States Natural hazard partial Sinkhole developed under a concrete pier causing the bridge to drop 4.5 m, and construction 31
the elevated roadway being built on top of it sagged, causing the bridge to
buckle and collapse
334 2004 Bridge near Pawnee City, Nebraska Road United States Design error 3 partial Failure of falsework, bridge collapsed during concrete pouring construction 32
335 2004 Shannon Hills Drive Bridge, Arkansas Road United States Overloading - Road crews were using a crane to add a pedestrian crossing on the bridge. When in service 33
they finished, they drove the crane across the bridge; it collapsed from the
weight from the crane.
336 2004 Interstate 70 Bridge in Denver, Colorado Road United States Design error 3 partial A 40-ton girder was temporarily braced to the existing bridge with five metal construction 36
bars spaced along the 30 m length. The bracings, fastened to the bridge with
bolts, came loose as the girder collapsed. Girder fell on vehicle on road
underneath.
337 2004 Bridge in the Kratie province Road Cambodia Overloading 7 7 complete A vehicle's load exceeded a 15-tonne limit for the dilapidated bridge, built in in service 37
1977.
338 2004 Dombivli Railway station foot overbridge Foot India Design error 2 13 complete Faulty design, not enough resistance. construction 41
339 2004 Tianzhuangtai Bridge, 305 National Road, Liao River, Road China Overloading 8 partial A central section of the bridge collapsed sending vehicles plunging into the river in service 42
Panjin City (Liaoning Province) below.
340 2004 Suramadu Bridge (between Surabaya and Madura island in Road Indonesia Human error 1 7 complete Failure by workers to properly position the sixth slab, it fell and toppled the other construction 58
East Java province) five slabs. Part of the bridge should have been supported by 35 steel masts, but
in fact it was supported by only 27 masts.
341 2004 Mungo Bridge (Mungo River) Road Cameroon Impact 2 complete A truck transporting about 15,000 litres of fuel hit the rails of the Mungo Bridge, in service 48
capsized on its left side, caught fire and exploded in an inferno fuelled by 15,000-
litre of petroleum. The immense heat from the fire caused the metal bars holding
the bridge to give way.
342 2004 Bridge linking the townships of Tame and Saravena in Road Colombia Natural hazard 2 12 complete Flooding. The bridge was closed to traffic weeks ago because the rainy season in service 43
Arauca department (Banadia River) had swollen the river to dangerous levels, but people were still allowed to cross
it on foot.
343 2004 Cipunegara Bridge in Subang regency, north coast Road Indonesia Overloading 0 8 complete Overloading and "the age" of the bridge, which in fact was only built in 1978 and in service 59
highway in West Java opened for use three years later.
344 2004 Interstate 10 Bridge, Escambia Bay, Florida Road United States Natural hazard partial Hurricane Yvan in service 62
345 2004 McCormick County bridge east of Mount Carmel (Little Road United States Natural hazard 0 complete Debris from the remnants of Hurricane Jeanne stacked against the bridge's in service 64
River), South Carolina support piles in the 6 m-deep water and led to its collapse
346 2004 Bridge on Leningradskoye Shosse, north of Moscow Road Russia Impact 2 3 partial Truck slammed into a car before colliding with a pier supporting the bridge. in service 65
347 2004 Bridge northwest of Norcatur (Sappa Creek), Kansas Road United States Overloading 2 partial Heavy grain trucks over the bridge weakened its supports in service 67
A.1 REFERENCES IN APPENDIX A
[1] SCHEER, J., Versagen von Bauwerken (in German), Band 1: Brcken, Ernst & Sohn, Berlin, 2000.
[2] Natural catastrophes and man-made disasters in 2003, sigma No. 1/2004, Swiss Re, Zurich, 2004.
[3] LEVY, M., SALVADORI, M., Why Buildings Fall Down, W.W. Norton & Company, New York,
2002.
[4] BAILEY, S.F., ANTILLE, S., BEGUIN, P., IMHOF, D., BRHWILER, E., Niveau de scurite
requis pour lvaluation de ponts-routes existants (in French), Research project 84/99, Swiss
association of road and traffic experts (VSS), Zurich, 2002.
[5] http://www.in.gov/dot/programs/inmemoriam/35.html
[6] http://www.sfmuseum.net/cypress/response.html
[7] http://www.tfhrc.gov/pubrds/fall95/p95a2.htm
[8] http://iti.acns.nwu.edu/publications/bridges/harrisburg.html
[9] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1202214.htm
[13] http://www.basedn.freeserve.co.uk/bridge.htm
[14] http://www.brueckenweb.de/Themen/katastrophen/katastrophen.php (in German)
[15] http://www.geocities.com/pagesbydave/SunSkyDemoHis.html
[16] http://www.englib.cornell.edu/ice/lists/historytechnology/successfailures.html
[17] http://www.iti.nwu.edu/links/bridges/disasters.html
[18] Durability of Precast Segmental Bridges, NCHRP Web Doc 15, Final Report, The National
Academy of Sciences, Washington, 2000.
[19] http://www.newsday.com/news/nationworld/nation/ny-usmain273725186mar27,0,2627324.story
[20] http://www.casperstartribune.net/articles/2004/03/29/news/wyoming/
8211f8a24375fb6087256e660079bda2.txt
[21] http://www.thenational.com.pg/0330/nation2.htm
[22] http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/2009472.stm
[23] WALTHER, R., MIEHLBRADT, M., Dimensionnement des structures en bton (in French), Trait
du Gnie Civil, Volume 7, Presses polytechniques et universitaires romandes, Lausanne, 1990.
[24] http://www.nmsi.ac.uk/piclib/imagerecord.asp?id=10436483
[25] http://nisee.berkeley.edu/turkey/
[26] http://cee.uiuc.edu/sstl/education/liquefaction/SHOWA.html
[27] http://cee.uiuc.edu/sstl/education/liquefaction/NISH.html
A11 Risk assessment of existing bridge structures
[28] http://www.angelfire.com/nt/terremotoValdivia/
[29] http://www.kxan.com/Global/story.asp?S=1761274&nav=0s3dM2gG
[30] http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?click_id=84&art_id=qw1081861920562B251&set_id=1
[31] http://news.tbo.com/news/MGAU1Q0J0TD.html
[32] http://www.beatricedailysun.com/articles/2004/04/23/news/news1.txt
[33] http://www.katv.com/news/stories/0404/141620.html
[34] http://www.cjnews.com/pastissues/00/june15-00/international/int1.htm
[35] http://english.pravda.ru/main/2002/09/20/36929.html
[36] http://www.denverpost.com/Stories/0,1413,36~53~2151748,00.html
[37] http://www.news.com.au/common/story_page/0,4057,9577265%255E1702,00.html
[38] http://www.clonmel.ie/modules/news.asp?id=477
[39] http://enr.construction.com/news/transportation/archives/031205.asp
[40] http://www.kfty.com/news/local/story.aspx?content_id=991A9D5B-6CCA-439C-B805-
A0F1B28B7C6F
[41] http://cities.expressindia.com/fullstory.php?newsid=85838
[42] http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2004/06/10/1086749838012.html?oneclick=true
[43] http://www.news24.com/News24/World/News/0,,2-10-1462_1549705,00.html
[44] http://www.uticaod.com/archive/2004/07/01/news/36576.html
[45] MENZIES, J.B., Bridge Safety Targets, Report for the Highways Agency, Ref: HA5021C, 1996.
[46] http://neil.fraser.name/writing/bridges/viaduct.html
[47] http://nisee.berkeley.edu/bertero/html/damage_due_to_surface_faulting.html#j6-9
[48] http://homas.canalblog.com/
[49] http://www.projectpro.co.za/Project_Parade/Injaka_-_Lesson_Learned/body_injaka_-
_lesson_learned.html
[50] Portuguese bridge disaster blamed on illegal dredging, New Civil Engineer, 8 March 2001,
London, 2001, pp. 8-9.
[51] http://www.taiwanheadlines.gov.tw/20000904/20000904s1.html
[52] http://www.geocities.com/Heartland/1935/bridge.html
[53] http://www.japantoday.com/gidx/news35449.html
[54] 24 die as quake strikes LA, The Guardian, 18 January 1994, p.11 and 24.
[55] http://www.cnn.com/2002/US/09/08/texas.bridge.collapse/
[56] Washed away, New Civil Engineer, 28 January 1993, pp. 14-15.
[57] The big shock, The Sunday Times, 22 January 1995, p. 10.
[58] http://www.thejakartapost.com/detailnational.asp?fileid=20040715.D03&irec=5
[59] http://www.thejakartapost.com/detailheadlines.asp?fileid=20040726.A03&irec=6
[60] http://www.nj.com/news/expresstimes/nj/index.ssf?/base/news-5/1091264704141461.xml
[61] http://www.denverpost.com/Stories/0,1413,36~53~2321126,00.html
[62] http://www.e-commatrix.com/PBB/dnb-copy.html
[63] HARIK, I.E., SHAABAN, A.M., GESUND, H., VALLIS, G.Y.S., WANG, S.T., United States
Bridge Failures, 1951-1988, Journal of Performance of Constructed Facilities, Vol. 4, No. 4,
1990.
[64] http://www.wistv.com/Global/story.asp?S=2362782&nav=0RaPRQez
[65] http://www.interfax.ru/e/B/0/28.html?id_issue=10710904
[66] SMITH, D.W., Bridge failures, Proceedings of the Institution of Civil Engineers, Part 1, Vol. 60,
1976, pp. 367-382.
[67] http://www.mccookgazette.com/story/1079462.html
A13 Risk assessment of existing bridge structures

Appendix B. Example bridges B1
APPENDIX B. EXAMPLE BRIDGES
B.1 LARLING BRIDGE
Larling bridge carries the A11, a 2-lane trunk road, over the river Thet in Norfolk. Constructed in 1959,
it is a skewed, single span, simply supported reinforced concrete slab bridge (Figure B.1), with
orthotropic top and bottom reinforcement. The longitudinal reinforcement lies perpendicular to the face
of the abutments and the transverse steel parallel to it. The bridge has a high annual average daily traffic
count. The detour route in case of failure is relatively short (Table 7.6).
Figure B.1 - Geometry of Larling bridge

B2 Risk assessment of existing bridge structures
B.2 SANDHOLE BRIDGE
Sandhole bridge is a short-span, rectangular, simply-supported, 2-lane reinforced concrete slab bridge on
the A83 in Scotland. It was apparently constructed in two stages as indicated by a full-length
longitudinal construction joint (Figure B.2b). The site investigation report indicates variations in the
concrete strength and the amount of steel on either side of this joint [Middleton, 1995]. Only bottom
reinforcement is provided. The longitudinal steel lies perpendicular to the abutments and the transverse
lies parallel to it. The bridge carries a road with a low average daily traffic, but with a very long detour
route if there was a bridge failure (Table 7.6).
(a) Cross-section A-A (b) Plan
Figure B.2 - Geometry of Sandhole bridge (not to scale)
B.3 ALLT CHONOGHLAIS BRIDGE
Allt Chonoghlais bridge is a 3-span, skewed, continuous, 2lane reinforced concrete slab bridge on the
A82 in Scotland (Figure B.3). The end supports are shown on the plans to be cast integrally with the
abutments. However, without any continuity of the deck reinforcement, it has been assumed that the
deck will act as if simply supported at these locations. Alternate bottom longitudinal reinforcing bars are
turned up in the vicinity of the internal piers to provide hogging steel in this region. There is a single
layer of transverse bottom reinforcement running perpendicular to the sides of the bridge deck, rather
than parallel to the abutments. The spacing of the longitudinal bars is reduced in the region of the kerbs,
producing stronger edge regions.
Appendix B. Example bridges B3
(a) Cross-section A-A
(b) Elevation
610

33.5
5486
610

9420 10360 9420
(c) Plan
Figure B.3 - Geometry of Allt Chonoghlais bridge (not to scale)
B.4 WINTERBOURNE BRIDGE
Winterbourne Bridge is on the M4 motorway bridge just outside Bristol. The plans date from 1963. The
reinforced concrete deck slab of this 3 span-bridge is shown on the plans to be simply supported on
rubber bearing pads at each abutment and fully fixed at each of the internal pier supports (Figure B.4b).
Only the central span was analysed here and the supports at each end of this span were assumed to be
B4 Risk assessment of existing bridge structures
fully fixed. The complicated reinforcement arrangement consists of several bands of straight bars in both
top and bottom. The longitudinal reinforcement lies parallel to the traffic lanes and the transverse runs
parallel to the centreline of the piers. The bridge carries 5 traffic lanes and the daily traffic is much
higher than for Larling and Sandhole bridges (Table 7.6).
(a) Cross-section A-A (b) Plan
Figure B.4 - Geometry of the central span of Winterbourne bridge (not to scale)
Curriculum Vitae CV1
CURRICULUM VITAE
Name: Daniel IMHOF
Date of birth: 31st December 1973
Nationality: Swiss
Address: 37A Landstrasse

3904 Naters
Switzerland
E-mail: D.Imhof.01@cantab.net
ACADEMIC AND PROFESSIONAL QUALIFICATIONS
Diploma of Civil Engineering

Swiss Federal Institute of Technology EPFL, Lausanne
Member of the Swiss Institution of Engineers and Architects (SIA)

Member of Swiss Engineering (STV)
Graduate Member of the Institution of Structural Engineers, UK (IStructE)
Member of the International Association for Bridge Maintenance and Safety
(IABMAS)
Student member of the American Society of Civil Engineers (ASCE)
CAREER SUMMARY
2005 Ernst Basler & Partner, Zollikon, (Switzerland), Safety and Security Division.
2001-2004 University of Cambridge (UK), Department of Engineering, Structures Group,

Doctoral Candidate in Kings College.
CV2 Risk assessment of existing bridge structures
2003-2004 University of Cambridge (UK), Downing College, Undergraduate Tutor in

Structural Mechanics.
1999-2001 Swiss Federal Institute of Technology EPFL, Lausanne (Switzerland),

Institute for Steel Structures (ICOM), Research Engineer.
1997 Taylor & Boyd Consulting Engineers, Belfast (UK), Engineering Trainee.
1995 Swiss Army, Officer, Bandmaster of the Band of the 5th Infantry Regiment.
1993-1999 Swiss Federal Institute of Technology EPFL, Lausanne (Switzerland),

Undergraduate Student in Civil Engineering.
AWARDS AND SCHOLARSHIPS
2003 CERRA Fellowship 2003, Fellowship from the International Association for
Reliability and Risk Analysis (CERRA) for the paper Life quality method
versus cost-benefit analysis for short span slab bridges presented at the
ICASP9-conference in San Francisco, 2003.
2003 Werner Steiger Foundation Studentship.
2003 Royal Academy of Engineering Travel Grant to attend the International

Conference on Applications of Statistics and Probability in Civil Engineering
(ICASP9) in San Francisco, 2003.
2002 Mott MacDonald Scholarship.
2002 Model Analysis Award 2002 for the paper Improving the fatigue resistance of
steel girders using post-weld treatment, The Institution of Structural Engineers
(IStructE), London, 2002.
2001 Swiss Academy of Engineering (SATW) PhD Scholarship.
2001 Kings College Cambridge, Stanley Studentship.

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RISK ASSESSMENT OF EXISTING BRIDGE

A dissertation submitted to the University of Cambridge in partial fulfilment of the requirements

Kings College December 2004

Chief Engineer of the Grande Dixence dam in Switzerland

CHAPTER 2. BRIDGE ASSESSMENT...................................................................................................... 9

CHAPTER 3. BASIC VARIABLES .......................................................................................................... 29

CHAPTER 4. SAFETY ............................................................................................................................... 55

CHAPTER 5. WARNING LEVEL ............................................................................................................ 77

CHAPTER 6. CONDITION EVALUATION ......................................................................................... 103

CHAPTER 7. CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE .................................................................................. 117

7.5.1 Examples...................................................................................................................................... 130

CHAPTER 8. RISK................................................................................................................................... 135

CHAPTER 9. PRACTICAL RISK ASSESSMENT OF EXISTING BRIDGE STRUCTURES........ 161

CHAPTER 10. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS................................................................................ 197

APPENDIX A. BRIDGE COLLAPSE DATABASE ................................................................................. A1

APPENDIX B. EXAMPLE BRIDGES ........................................................................................................ B1

B.1 LARLING BRIDGE .....................................................................................................................................B1

CURRICULUM VITAE .....................................................................................................................................CV1

Bridge: A structure including supports erected over a depression or an obstruction, such as

Corrosion: Electrochemical mechanism of degradation of steel in concrete.

Maintenance: The upkeep of property of equipment. In bridge engineering maintenance includes

Scour: The undermining of a foundation through the action of moving water.

Strength: Structural resistance of the bridge.

Latin upper case

A(t) : Steel bar cross-sectional area at time t

VOC : Vehicle operating costs

Latin lower case

anom : Nominal geometric values

Greek upper case

( ) : Standard normal distribution function

Greek lower case

Latin upper case subscripts

Latin lower case subscripts

: Standardised risk indicator value

1.1 BACKGROUND AND MOTIVATION

1.2 AIM AND SCOPE

1.3 RISK ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY

Figure 1.2 Risk indicators for risk assessment

Figure 1.3 Organisation of the thesis

CHAPTER 2. BRIDGE ASSESSMENT

Beautiful Railway Bridge of the Silvry Tay!

William McGonagall (c.1825-1902), The Tay Bridge Disaster

2.2 WHY BRIDGES FALL DOWN

2.2.1 General considerations

2.2.1.1 What types of failure occur?

Bridge failure can be defined in different ways:

Failure of an individual element of the structure

ULS Complete collapse

Excessive cracks Number of failures

Settlement, deformation Insured loss

2.2.1.2 When do failures occur?

> 5 years of service

During service, time unknown

Figure 2.2 Time of failure (adapted from [Matousek, 1976])

2.2.1.3 What are the main causes of failure?

Design errors (19%)

Dynamic effects (12%)

Figure 2.3 Causes of bridge collapse (adapted from [Bailey, 2002])

2.2.2 Bridge collapse database

Rail (28%) Construction (32%)

(a) Type of failed bridges (b) Stage at failure

Figure 2.4 Imhof Database

Africa (2%) Australia (2%)

United Kingdom (8%)