Trans-Asia Shipping Lines vs.

CA
(GR 118126, 4 March 1996)

FACTS:

Respondent Atty. Renato Arroyo, a public attorney, bought a ticket from herein petitioner for the voyage of
M/V Asia Thailand vessel to Cagayan de Oro City from Cebu City on November 12, 1991.

At around 5:30 in the evening of November 12, 1991, respondent boarded the M/V Asia Thailand vessel
during which he noticed that some repairs were being undertaken on the engine of the vessel. The vessel
departed at around 11:00 in the evening with only one (1) engine running.

After an hour of slow voyage, the vessel stopped near Kawit Island and dropped its anchor thereat. After
half an hour of stillness, some passengers demanded that they should be allowed to return to Cebu City
for they were no longer willing to continue their voyage to Cagayan de Oro City. The captain acceded to
their request and thus the vessel headed back to Cebu City.

In Cebu City, plaintiff together with the other passengers who requested to be brought back to Cebu City,
were allowed to disembark. Thereafter, the vessel proceeded to Cagayan de Oro City. Petitioner, the next
day, boarded the M/V Asia Japan for its voyage to Cagayan de Oro City, likewise a vessel of defendant.

On account of this failure of defendant to transport him to the place of destination on November 12, 1991,
respondent Arroyo filed before the trial court an action for damage arising from bad faith, breach of
contract and from tort, against petitioner. The trial court ruled only for breach of contract. The CA
reversed and set aside said decision on appeal.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner Trans-Asia was negligent?

HELD:

Yes.

Before commencing the contracted voyage, the petitioner undertook some repairs on the cylinder head of
one of the vessels engines. But even before it could finish these repairs, it allowed the vessel to leave the
port of origin on only one functioning engine, instead of two. Moreover, even the lone functioning engine
was not in perfect condition as sometime after it had run its course, it conked out. This caused the vessel
to stop and remain adrift at sea, thus in order to prevent the ship from capsizing, it had to drop anchor.
Plainly, the vessel was unseaworthy even before the voyage began. For a vessel to be seaworthy, it must
be adequately equipped for the voyage and manned with a sufficient number of competent officers and
crew.[21] The failure of a common carrier to maintain in seaworthy condition its vessel involved in a
contract of carriage is a clear breach of is duty prescribed in Article 1755 of the Civil Code.
 SINGSON vs. COURT OF APPEALS and CATHAY PACIFIC AIRWAYS

(G.R. No. 119995. November 18, 1997)

FACTS:

Petitioner CARLOS SINGSON and his cousin Crescentino Tiongson bought from respondent
Cathay Pacific Airways two (2) open-dated, identically routed, round trip plane tickets (Manila to
LA and vice versa). Each ticket consisted of six (6) flight coupons, each would be detached at
the start of each leg of the trip.

Singson failed to obtain a booking in LA for their to Manila; apparently, the coupon
corresponding to the 5th leg of the trip was missing and instead the 3rd was still attached. It was
not until few days later that the defendant finally was able to arrange for his return to Manila.

Singson commenced an action for damages based on breach of contract of carriage against
CATHAY before the Regional Trial Court.

CATHAY alleged that there was no contract of carriage yet existing such that CATHAYs refusal
to immediately book him could not be construed as breach of contract of carriage.

The trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioner herein holding that CATHAY was guilty
of gross negligence amounting to malice and bad faith for which it was adjudged to pay
petitioner P20,000.00 for actual damages with interest at the legal rate of twelve percent (12%)
per annum from 26 August 1988 when the complaint was filed until fully paid, P500,000.00 for
moral damages, P400,000.00 for exemplary damages, P100,000.00 for attorneys fees, and, to
pay the costs.

On appeal by CATHAY, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts finding that there was
gross negligence amounting to bad faith or fraud and, accordingly, modified its judgment by
deleting the awards for moral and exemplary damages, and the attorneys fees as well.

ISSUES:

1.) whether a breach of contract was committed by CATHAY when it failed to confirm the
booking of petitioner.

2.) whether the carrier was liable not only for actual damages but also for moral and exemplary
damages, and attorneys fees.

HELD:

1.) Yes. x x x the round trip ticket issued by the carrier to the passenger was in itself a complete
written contract by and between the carrier and the passenger. It had all the elements of a
complete written contract, to wit: (a) the consent of the contracting parties manifested by the fact
that the passenger agreed to be transported by the carrier to and from Los Angeles via San
Francisco and Hong Kong back to the Philippines, and the carriers acceptance to bring him to
his destination and then back home; (b) cause or consideration, which was the fare paid by the
passenger as stated in his ticket; and, (c) object, which was the transportation of the passenger
from the place of departure to the place of destination and back, which are also stated in his
ticket. In fact, the contract of carriage in the instant case was already partially executed as the
carrier complied with its obligation to transport the passenger to his destination, i.e., Los
Angeles. , x x x the loss of the coupon was attributable to the negligence of CATHAYs agents
and was the proximate cause of the non-confirmation of petitioner's return flight.

2.) Yes. x x x Although the rule is that moral damages predicated upon a breach of contract of
carriage may only be recoverable in instances where the mishap results in the death of a
passenger, or where the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad faith, there are situations where the
negligence of the carrier is so gross and reckless as to virtually amount to bad faith, in which
case, the passenger likewise becomes entitled to recover moral damages.

x x x these circumstances reflect the carriers utter lack of care and sensitivity to the needs of its
passengers, clearly constitutive of gross negligence, recklessness and wanton disregard of the
rights of the latter, acts evidently indistinguishable or no different from fraud, malice and bad
faith. As the rule now stands, where in breaching the contract of carriage the defendant airline is
shown to have acted fraudulently, with malice or in bad faith, the award of moral and exemplary
damages, in addition to actual damages, is proper.

However, the P500,000.00 moral damages and P400,000.00 exemplary damages awarded by
the trial court have to be reduced. The well-entrenched principle is that the grant of moral
damages depends upon the discretion of the court based on the circumstances of each case.
This discretion is limited by the principle that the "amount awarded should not be palpably and
scandalously excessive" as to indicate that it was the result of prejudice or corruption on the part
of the trial court. Damages are not intended to enrich the complainant at the expense of the
defendant. They are awarded only to alleviate the moral suffering that the injured party had
undergone by reason of the defendant's culpable action. There is no hard-and-fast rule in the
determination of what would be a fair amount of moral damages since each case must be
governed by its own peculiar facts.

In the instant case, the injury suffered by petitioner is not so serious or extensive as to warrant
an award amounting to P900,000.00. The assessment of P200,000.00 as moral damages and
P50,000.00 as exemplary damages in his favor is, in our view, reasonable and realistic.

On the issue of actual damages, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the amount of
P20,000.00 granted by the trial court to petitioner should not be disturbed.

As regards attorney's fees, they may be awarded when the defendant's act or omission has
compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest. It
was therefore erroneous for the Court of Appeals to delete the award made by the trial court;
consequently, petitioner should be awarded attorney's fees and the amount of P25,000.00,
instead of P100,000.00 earlier awarded, may be considered rational, fair and reasonable.
Mapa vs. CA
Post under case digests, Commercial Law at Wednesday, March 14, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: Plaintiffs Cornelio Mapa and Purita Mapa entered into contract of air transportation with defendant
TWA as evidenced by TWA tickets. Said TWA tickets are for Los Angeles-New York-Boston-St. Louis-
Chicago.

The domicile of carrier TWA is Kansas City, Missouri, USA. Its principal place of business is Kansas City,
Missouri, USA. TWA's place of business through which the contracts were made is Bangkok, Thailand.
The place of destination is Chicago, USA.

On August 10, 1990, plaintiffs Carmina (daughter of Cornelio and Purita) and Purita left Manila on board a
PAL flight for Los Angeles. Carmina was to commence schooling and thus was accompanied by Purita to
assist her in settling down at the University.

They arrived Los Angeles on the same date and stayed there until August 14, 1990 when they left for
New York City on a TWA flight. On August 27, 1990, plaintiffs Purita and Carmina S. Mapa departed for
Boston, checking in seven (7) pieces of luggage at the TWA counter in the JFK Airport. They were issued
receipts for the said baggage.

Upon arriving in Boston, plaintiffs Purita and Carmina proceeded to the carousel to claim
their baggages and found only three out of the seven they checked in. Plaintiffs immediately reported the
loss of their four baggages to the TWA Baggage Office at Logan Airport. TWA's representative confidently
assured them that their baggageswould be located within 24 hours and not more than 48 hours.

They were requested to accomplish a passenger property questionnaire to facilitate a further intensive
and computerized search for the lost luggage, which they duly accomplished. The total value of the lost
items amounted to $11,283.79.

Two months later, TWA offered to amicably settle the case by giving plaintiffs-appellants two options: (a)
transportation credit for future TWA travel or (b) cash settlement. Five months lapsed without any result
on TWA's intensive search.

Plaintiffs-appellant opted for transportation credit for future TWA travel. TWA disregarded plaintiffs' option
and unilaterally declared the payment of $2,560.00 as constituting full satisfaction of the plaintiffs' claim.
Plaintiffs accepted the check for $2,560.00, as partial payment for the actual cost of their
lost baggages and their contents.
Despite demands by plaintiffs, TWA failed and refused without just cause to indemnify and redress
plaintiffs for the grave injury and damages they have suffered.

Petitioners then filed a complaint for damages and complaint forbreach of contract of carriage against
TWA in the RTC. The trial court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction in light of Article 28(1) of the
Warsaw Convention.

The CA affirmed the order of the trial court. It held that the Warsaw Convention is the law which governs
the dispute between the petitioners and TWA because what is involved is international transportation
defined by said Convention in Article I(2). This holding is founded on its determination that the two TWA
tickets for LosAngeles-New York-Boston-St. Louis-Chicago purchased in Bangkok, Thailand, were issued
in conjunction with, and therefore formed part of, the contract of transportation performed from Manila,
Philippines, to the United States.

The respondent court further held that the cause of action of the petitioners arose from the loss of the four
checked pieces of baggage, which then falls under Article 18(1), Chapter III (Liability of the Carrier) of the
Warsaw Conventions. Pursuant to Article 24(1) of the Convention, all actions for damages, whether based
on tort, code law or common law, arising from loss of baggage under Article 18 of the Warsaw
Convention, can only be brought subject to the conditions and limits set forth in the Warsaw Convention.
Article 28(1) thereof sets forth conditions and limits in that the action for damages may be instituted only
in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties, before the court of (1) the domicile of the carrier, (2)
the carrier's principal place of business, (3) the place of business through which the contract has been
made, or (4) the place of destination. Since the Philippines is not one of these places, a Philippine Court,
like the RTC, has no jurisdiction over the complaint for damages.

Issue: Whether the Warsaw Convention is applicable to this case

Held: No, the Warsaw Convention is not applicable because the carriage or transportation was not
international in character. The RTC is directed to proceed with pre-trial.

It appears clear to us that TWA itself, the trial court, and the Court of Appeals impliedly admit that if the
sole basis were the two TWA tickets for Los Angeles-New York-Boston-St. Louis-Chicago, the contracts
cannot be brought within the term "international transportation," as defined in Article I(2) of the Warsaw
Convention. As provided therein, a contract is one of international transportation only if according to the
contract made by the parties, the place of departure and the place of destination, whether or not there be
a break in the transportation or a transshipment, are situated either within the territories of two High
Contracting Parties, or within the territory of a single High Contracting Party, if there is an agreed stopping
place within a territory subject to the sovereignty, mandate or authority of another power, even though that
power is not a party to this convention.

There are then two categories of international transportation, (1) that where the place of departure and
the place of destination are situated within the territories of two High Contracting Parties regardless of
whether or not there be a break in the transportation or a transshipment; and (2) that where the place of
departure and the place of destination are within the territory of a single High Contracting Party if there is
an agreed stopping place within a territory subject to the sovereignty, mandate, or authority of another
power, even though the power is not a party of the Convention.

The contracts of transportation in this case are evidenced by the two TWA tickets, both purchased and
issued in Bangkok, Thailand. On the basis alone of the provisions therein, it is obvious that the place of
departure and the place of destination are all in the territory of the United States, or of a single High
Contracting Party. The contracts, therefore, cannot come within the purview of the first category of
international transportation. Neither can it be under the second category since there was NO agreed
stopping place within a territory subject to the sovereignty, mandate, or authority of another power.

The only way to bring the contracts between Purita and Carmina Mapa, on the one hand, and TWA, on
the other, within the first category of "international transportation" is to link them with, or to make them an
integral part of, the Manila-Los Angeles travel of Purita and Carmina through PAL aircraft. The "linkages"
which have been pointed out by the TWA, the trial court, and the Court of Appeals are (1) the handwritten
notations, on the two TWA tickets; and (2) the entries made by petitioners Purita and Carmina Mapa in
column YOUR COMPLETE ITINERARY in TWA's Passenger Property Questionnaire, wherein they
mentioned their travel from Manila to Los Angeles in flight PR 102.

The alleged "international tickets" mentioned in the notations in conjunction with which the two TWA
tickets were issued were not presented. Clearly then, there is at all no factual basis of the finding that the
TWA tickets were issued in conjunction with the international tickets, which are even, at least as of now,
non-existent.

As regards the petitioner's entry in Your Complete Itenerary column of the Passenger Property
Questionnaire wherein they included the Manila-Los Angeles travel, it must be pointed out that this was
made by petitioners Purita and Carmina Mapa, and only in connection with their claim for their lost pieces
of baggage. The entry can by no means be considered as a part of, or supplement to, their contracts of
transportation evidenced by the TWA tickets which covered transportation within the United States only.
It must be underscored that the first category of international transportation under the Warsaw Convention
is based on "the contract made by the parties." TWA does not claim that the Manila-Los Angeles contracts
of transportation which brought Purita and Carmina to Los Angeles were also its contracts. It does not
deny the assertion of the petitioners that those contracts were independent of the TWA tickets issued in
Bangkok, Thailand. No evidence was offered that TWA and PAL had an agreement concerning
transportation of passengers from points of departures not served with aircrafts of one or the other.

TWA relies on Article I(3) of the Convention, which provides as follows:

3. A carriage to be performed by several successive air carriers is deemed, for the purposes of this
Convention, to be one undivided carriage, if it has been regarded by the parties as a single operation,
whether it had been agreed upon under the form of a single contract or of a series of contracts, and it
shall not lose its international character merely because one contract or a series of contracts is to be
performed entirely within a territory subject to the sovereignty, suzerainty, mandate, or authority of the
same High Contracting Party.

The flaw of respondent's position is the presumption that the parties have "regarded" as an "undivided
carriage" or as a "single operation" the carriage from Manila to Los Angeles through PAL then to New
York-Boston-St. Louis-Chicago through TWA.

Cathay Pacific Airways vs. CA (1993)

Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed with modification that of the trial court by increasing the award of damages
in favor of private respondent Tomas L. Alcantara.
Facts: On 19 October 1975, respondent Tomas L. Alcantara was a first class
passenger of petitioner Cathay Pacific Airways from Manila to Hongkong and onward
from Hongkong to Jakarta. The purpose of his trip was to attend the following day,
October 20, 1975, a conference with the Director General of Trade of Indonesia. He
checked in his luggage which contained not only his clothing and articles for
personal use but also papers and documents he needed for the conference.
Upon his arrival in Jakarta, respondent discovered that his luggage was missing.
Private respondent was told that his luggage was left behind in Hongkong. For this,
respondent Alcantara was offered $20.00 as "inconvenience money" to buy his
immediate personal needs until the luggage could be delivered to him. The
respondent, as a result of the incident had to seek postponement of his pre-
arranged conference.
When his luggage finally reached Jakarta more than twenty four hours later, it was
not delivered to him at his hotel but was required by petitioner to be picked up by
an official of the Philippine Embassy.
Respondent filed a case for damages in the CFI of Lanao del Norte which ruled in his
favour.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals. Court of Appeals rendered its
decision affirming the decision of the CFI but by modifying its awards by increasing
the damages.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not applying the Warsaw
Convention to limit the liability of the respondent airline.

Ruling: No.
xxx although the Warsaw Convention has the force and effect of law in this
country, being a treaty commitment assumed by the Philippine government, said
convention does not operate as an exclusive enumeration of the instances for
declaring a carrier liable for breach of contract of carriage or as an absolute limit of
the extent of that liability. The Warsaw Convention declares the carrier liable for
damages in the enumerated cases and under certain limitations. However, it must
not be construed to preclude the operation of the Civil Code and other pertinent
laws. It does not regulate, much less exempt, the carrier from liability for damages
for violating the rights of its passengers under the contract of carriage, especially if
wilfull misconduct on the part of the carrier's employees is found or established,
which is clearly the case before Us. For, the Warsaw Convention itself provides in
Art. 25 that
"(1) The carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the provisions of this
convention which exclude or limit his liability, if the damage is caused by his wilfull
misconduct or by such default on his part as, in accordance with the law of the court
to which the case is submitted, is considered to be equivalent to wilfull misconduct."

(2) Similarly the carrier shall not be entitled to avail himself of the said provisions, if
the damage is caused under the same circumstances by any agent of the carrier
acting within the scope of his employment."

When petitioner airline misplaced respondent's luggage and failed to deliver it to its
passenger at the appointed place and time, some special species of injury must
have been caused to him. For sure, the latter underwent profound distress and
anxiety, and the fear of losing the opportunity to fulfill the purpose of his trip. In
fact, for want of appropriate clothings for the occasion brought about by the delay
of the arrival of his luggage, to his embarrassment and consternation respondent
Alcantara had to seek postponement of his pre-arranged conference with the
Director General of Trade of the host country.

In one case, his Court observed that a traveller would naturally suffer mental
anguish, anxiety and shock when he finds that his luggage did not travel with him
and he finds himself in a foreign land without any article of clothing other than what
he has on.

Thus, respondent is entitled to moral and exemplary damages. We however find the
award by the Court of Appeals of P80,000.00 for moral damages excessive, hence,
We reduce the amount to P30,000.00. The exemplary damages of P20,000.00 being
reasonable is maintained, as well as the attorney's fees of P25,000.00 considering
that petitioner's act or omission has compelled Alcantara to litigate with third
persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest.

Japan Airlines vs Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 118664)

Facts: Private respondents boarded a JAL flight in San Francisco, California bound for Manila. It
included an overnight stopover at Narita, Japan at JALs expense. Due to the Mt. Pinatubo
eruption, private respondents trip to Manila was cancelled. JAL rebooked all the Manila-bound
passengers and paid for the hotel expenses of their unexpected overnight stay. The flight of
private respondents was again cancelled due to NAIAs indefinite closure. JAL informed the
respondents that it would no longer defray their hotel and accommodation expense during their
stay in Narita. The respondents were forced to pay for their accommodations and meal expenses
for 5 days.

Issues:
 1. Whether or not JAL has the obligation to shoulder the hotel and meal
expenses even if the delay was caused by force majeure
2. Whether or not the award of damages was proper

Held:

1. When a party is unable to fulfill his obligation because of force majeure, the
general rule is that he cannot be held liable for damages for non-
performance. When JAL was prevented from resuming its flight to Manila due
to the effects of the eruption, whatever losses or damages in the form of
hotel and meal expenses the stranded passengers incurred cannot be
charged to JAL. The predicament of the private respondents was not due to
the fault or negligence of JAL. JAL had the duty to arrange the respondents
flight back to Manila. However, it failed to look after the comfort and
convenience of its passengers when it made the passengers arrange their
flight back to Manila on their own and after waiting in the airport for a whole
day.
2. Yes, the award of nominal damages is proper. Nominal damages are
adjudicated in order that a right of a plaintiff, which has been violated or
invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized and not for the
purpose of indemnifying any loss suffered by him.

PAL v. Court of Appeals 226 SCRA 423

Facts:
Zapatos purchased a ticket from Philippine Air Lines (PAL) wherein it was agreed that the
latter would transport him to Ozamiz City. The planes route was from Cebu-Ozamiz-
Cotabato. However, due to unfavoarable weather conditions and the fact that PAL did not
have an all-weather airport, PAL had bypassed Ozamiz City. PAL then informed Zapatos of
his options, to return to Cebu on the same day, or take the next flight to Cebu the following
day, or to take the next available flight to Ozamiz City. Zapatos chose to return to Ozamiz
City on the same day. However, there were only six (6) seats available and, the seats were
given to the passengers according to their check-in sequence at Cebu. Consequently,
Zapatos was stranded in Cotabato City, where a battle between the government and the
Muslims was ongoing.
During his stay in Cotabato City, PAL also failed to provide accomodations for Zapatos. It
also refused to have the latter hitch a ride with its employees on a ford truck bound for the
City. It also failed to return Zapatos luggage.

This prompted Zapatos to file a complaint for damages against Philippine Air Lines for
breach of contract.

PAL claimed that it should not be charged with the task of looking after the passengers'
comfort and convenience because the diversion of the flight was due to a fortuitous event,
and that if made liable, an added burden is given to PAL which is over and beyond its duties
under the contract of carriage.
Issue:

w/n the occurrence of a fortuitous event extinguished PALs duty to observe extraordinary
diligence towards its passengers?

Ruling:

No. The SC ruled in favor of Zapatos.

The contract of air carriage is a peculiar one. Being imbued with public interest, the law
requires common carriers to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight
can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances. 20 In Air France v. Carrascoso, 21 we held that

A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from

any other contractual relation. And this, because of the relation which an air
carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly with the travelling
public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The
contract of air carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public
duty . . . . ( emphasis supplied).

The position taken by PAL in this case clearly illustrates its failure to grasp the exacting
standard required by law. Undisputably, PAL's diversion of its flight due to inclement
weather was a fortuitous event. Nonetheless, such occurrence did not terminate
PAL's contract with its passengers. Being in the business of air carriage and the
sole one to operate in the country, PAL is deemed equipped to deal with situations
as in the case at bar. What we said in one case once again must be stressed, i.e., the
relation of carrier and passenger continues until the latter has been landed at the
port of destination and has left the carrier's premises. 22 Hence, PAL necessarily
would still have to exercise extraordinary diligence in safeguarding the comfort,
convenience and safety of its stranded passengers until they have reached their
final destination. On this score, PAL grossly failed considering the then ongoing battle
between government forces and Muslim rebels in Cotabato City and the fact that the private
respondent was a stranger to the place.

CASE DIGEST (Transportation Law): Aboitiz vs. CA

ABOITIZ SHIPPING CORPORATION vs. COURT OF APPEALS, LUCILA C. VIANA, SPS.
ANTONIO VIANA and GORGONIA VIANA, and PIONEER STEVEDORING CORPORATION
(G.R. No. 84458 November 6, 1989)

FACTS:

Anacleto Viana boarded the vessel M/V Antonia, owned by Aboitiz Shipping Corporation, at the
port at San Jose, Occidental Mindoro, bound for Manila. After said vessel had landed, the
Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation took over the exclusive control of the cargoes loaded on said
vessel pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement between Pioneer and petitioner Aboitiz.

The crane owned by Pioneer was placed alongside the vessel and one (1) hour after the
passengers of said vessel had disembarked, it started operation by unloading the cargoes from
said vessel. While the crane was being operated, Anacleto Viana who had already disembarked
from said vessel obviously remembering that some of his cargoes were still loaded in the
vessel, went back to the vessel, and it was while he was pointing to the crew of the said vessel
to the place where his cargoes were loaded that the crane hit him, pinning him between the side
of the vessel and the crane. He was thereafter brought to the hospital where he later expired
three (3) days thereafter.

Private respondents Vianas filed a complaint for damages against petitioner for breach of
contract of carriage. Aboitiz denied responsibility contending that at the time of the accident, the
vessel was completely under the control of respondent Pioneer Stevedoring Corporation as the
exclusive stevedoring contractor of Aboitiz, which handled the unloading of cargoes from the
vessel of Aboitiz.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Aboitiz is negligent and is thus liable for the death.

HELD:

Yes.

x x x [T]he victim Anacleto Viana guilty of contributory negligence, but it was the negligence of
Aboitiz in prematurely turning over the vessel to the arrastre operator for the unloading of
cargoes which was the direct, immediate and proximate cause of the victim's death.

The rule is that the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the passenger has been
landed at the port of destination and has left the vessel owner's dock or premises. 11 Once
created, the relationship will not ordinarily terminate until the passenger has, after reaching his
destination, safely alighted from the carrier's conveyance or had a reasonable opportunity to
leave the carrier's premises. All persons who remain on the premises a reasonable time after
leaving the conveyance are to be deemed passengers, and what is a reasonable time or a
reasonable delay within this rule is to be determined from all the circumstances, and includes a
reasonable time to see after his baggage and prepare for his departure. 12 The carrier-
passenger relationship is not terminated merely by the fact that the person transported has
been carried to his destination if, for example, such person remains in the carrier's premises to
claim his baggage.

It is apparent from the foregoing that what prompted the Court to rule as it did in said case is the
fact of the passenger's reasonable presence within the carrier's premises. That reasonableness
of time should be made to depend on the attending circumstances of the case, such as the kind
of common carrier, the nature of its business, the customs of the place, and so forth, and
therefore precludes a consideration of the time element per se without taking into account such
other factors. It is thus of no moment whether in the cited case of La Mallorca there was no
appreciable interregnum for the passenger therein to leave the carrier's premises whereas in
the case at bar, an interval of one (1) hour had elapsed before the victim met the accident. The
primary factor to be considered is the existence of a reasonable cause as will justify the
presence of the victim on or near the petitioner's vessel. We believe there exists such a
justifiable cause.

It is of common knowledge that, by the very nature of petitioner's business as a shipper, the
passengers of vessels are allotted a longer period of time to disembark from the ship than other
common carriers such as a passenger bus. With respect to the bulk of cargoes and the number
of passengers it can load, such vessels are capable of accommodating a bigger volume of both
as compared to the capacity of a regular commuter bus. Consequently, a ship passenger will
need at least an hour as is the usual practice, to disembark from the vessel and claim his
baggage whereas a bus passenger can easily get off the bus and retrieve his luggage in a very
short period of time. Verily, petitioner cannot categorically claim, through the bare expedient of
comparing the period of time entailed in getting the passenger's cargoes, that the ruling in La
Mallorca is inapplicable to the case at bar. On the contrary, if we are to apply the doctrine
enunciated therein to the instant petition, we cannot in reason doubt that the victim Anacleto
Viana was still a passenger at the time of the incident. When the accident occurred, the victim
was in the act of unloading his cargoes, which he had every right to do, from petitioner's vessel.
As earlier stated, a carrier is duty bound not only to bring its passengers safely to their
destination but also to afford them a reasonable time to claim their baggage.

Singapore Airlines Ltd. vs. Fernandez, GR 142305, Dec. 10, 2003

FACTS:

Respondent Andion Fernandez is an acclaimed soprano in the Philippines and

abroad. At the time of the incident she was availing of an educational grant
from the Federal Republic of Germany pursuing a Masters Degree in Music
major in Voice. She was invited to sing before the King and Queen of
Malaysia on Feb. 3-4, 1991. For this purpose, she took an airline ticket from
Singapore Airlines (SAL) FOR THE Frankfurt-Manila-Malaysia route.
Respondent had to pass by Manila in order to gather her wardrobe and
rehearse with the pianist. SAL issued ticket for Flight SQ 27 leaving Frankfurt
on Jan. 27, 1991 for Singapore with connections to Manila in the morning of
Jan. 28, 1991. On Jan. 27, 1991 SQ 27 LEFT Frankfurt but arrived two hours
late in Singapore on Jan. 28, 1991. By then, the aircraft bound for Manila had
already left. Upon deplaning in Singapore, Fernandez approached the transit
counter at Changi Airport and was told by a lady employee that there were
no more flights to Manila on that day and that she had to stay in Singapore,
if she wanted, she could fly to HK but at her own expense. Respondent
stayed with a relative in Singapore for the night. The next day, she was
brought back to the airport and approached a counter for immediate booking
but was told by a male employee: Cant you see I am doing something. She
explained her predicament but was told: Its your problem, not ours.

The respondent never made it to Manila and was forced to take a direct flight
to Malaysia on Jan. 29, 1991 through the efforts of her mother and a travel
agency in Manila. Her mother had to travel to Malaysia with the wardrobe
which caused them to incur expenses of 50,000.

RTC Manila ordered SAL to pay respondent 50k as actual damages, 250k
as moral damages, 100k as exemplary damages, 75k as attorneys fees
and costs of suit.

CA affirmed RTC decision.

ISSUE:

Did SAL break the contract of carriage?

RULING:

Yes, when an airline issues a ticket to a passenger, confirmed for a particular

flight on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises. The passenger has
every right to expect that he be transported on that flight and on that date. If
he does not, then the carrier opens itself to a suit for a breach of contract of
carriage. A contract of carriage requires common carriers to transport
passengers safely as human care and foresight can provide (Art. 1755, NCC).
In an action for brech of a contract of carriage, the aggrieved party does not
have to prove that the common carrier was at fault or was negligent. All that
is necessary is to prove the existence of the contract and the fact of its non-
performance by the carrier.

SAL failed to inform of the delay in the turnaround aircraft in Frankfurt,

neither did it ask if the respondent and 25 other delayed passengers are
amenable to a stay in Singapore. Even SALs manual mandates that in cases
of urgent connections the head office of defendant in Singapore has to be
informed of delays so as to make needed arrangements for connecting
passengers.

When respondent conveyed her apprehension in Frankfurt of the impending

delay, she was assured by petitioners personnel in Frankfurt that she will be
transported to Manila on the same date. The lady employee at the counter in
Singapore only allowed respondent to use the phone upon threat of suit, the
male employee at the counter marked Immediate Attention to Passengers
with Immediate Booking was rude to her.

Petition is denied. CA decision affirmed.