NEYPES vs.

CA

Petitioners Domingo Neypes, Luz Faustino, Rogelio Faustino, Lolito Victoriano,

Jacob Obania and Domingo Cabacungan filed an action for annulment of
judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with
preliminary injunction before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 43, of Roxas,
Oriental Mindoro, against the Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of
Lands, Land Bank of the Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo,
namely, Fe, Corazon, Josefa, Salvador and Carmen.

In the course of the proceedings, the parties (both petitioners and

respondents) filed various motions with the trial court. Among these were: (1)
the motion filed by petitioners to declare the respondent heirs, the Bureau of
Lands and the Bureau of Forest Development in default and (2) the motions
to dismiss filed by the respondent heirs and the Land Bank of the Philippines,
respectively.

In an order dated May 16, 1997, the trial court, presided by public respondent
Judge Antonio N. Rosales, resolved the foregoing motions as follows: (1) the
petitioners motion to declare respondents Bureau of Lands and Bureau of
Forest Development in default was granted for their failure to file an answer,
but denied as against the respondent heirs of del Mundo because the
substituted service of summons on them was improper; (2) the Land Banks
motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action was denied because there were
hypothetical admissions and matters that could be determined only after
trial, and (3) the motion to dismiss filed by respondent heirs of del Mundo,
based on prescription, was also denied because there were factual matters
that could be determined only after trial.[1]

The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying
their motion to dismiss on the ground that the trial court could very well
resolve the issue of prescription from the bare allegations of the complaint
itself without waiting for the trial proper.

In an order[2] dated February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed petitioners
complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners
allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on
the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for
reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the trial court issued another order
dismissing the motion for reconsideration[3] which petitioners received on
July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of
appeal[4] and paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998.

On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the notice of appeal, holding that
it was filed eight days late.[5] This was received by petitioners on July 31,
1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in
an order dated September 3, 1998.[6]

Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal
before the Court of Appeals.

In the appellate court, petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their
notice of appeal. They argued that the 15-day reglementary period to appeal
started to run only on July 22, 1998 since this was the day they received the
final order of the trial court denying their motion for reconsideration. When
they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998, only five days had elapsed
and they were well within the reglementary period for appeal.[7]

On September 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition. It
ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from
March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order
dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was
the final order appealable under the Rules. It held further:

Perforce the petitioners tardy appeal was correctly dismissed for the
(P)erfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and in the manner
prescribed by law is jurisdictional and non-compliance with such legal
requirement is fatal and effectively renders the judgment final and executory.
[8]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforementioned decision.
This was denied by the Court of Appeals on January 6, 2000.

In this present petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules, petitioners
ascribe the following errors allegedly committed by the appellate court:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE

PETITIONERS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS AND IN AFFIRMING
THE ORDER OF THE HON. JUDGE ANTONIO N. ROSALES WHICH DISMISSED
THE PETITIONERS APPEAL IN CIVIL CASE NO. C-36 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 43, ROXAS, ORIENTAL MINDORO, EVEN AFTER THE
PETITIONERS HAD PAID THE APPEAL DOCKET FEES.

II

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN RULING AND

AFFIRMING THE DECISION OR ORDER OF THE RESPONDENT HON. ANTONIO M.
ROSALES THAT PETITIONERS APPEAL WAS FILED OUT OF TIME WHEN
PETITIONERS RECEIVED THE LAST OR FINAL ORDER OF THE COURT ON JULY
22, 1998 AND FILED THEIR NOTICE OF APPEAL ON JULY 27, 1998 AND PAID
THE APPEAL DOCKET FEE ON AUGUST 3, 1998.

III

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FURTHER ERRED IN RULING THAT THE

WORDS FINAL ORDER IN SECTION 3, RULE 41, OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE WILL REFER TO THE [FIRST] ORDER OF RESPONDENT JUDGE
HON. ANTONIO M. MORALES DATED FEBRUARY 12, 1998 INSTEAD OF THE
LAST AND FINAL ORDER DATED JULY 1, 1998 COPY OF WHICH WAS RECEIVED
BY PETITIONERS THROUGH COUNSEL ON JULY 22, 1998.

IV.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FINALLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE

DECISION IN THE CASE OF DENSO, INC. V. IAC, 148 SCRA 280, IS APPLICABLE
IN THE INSTANT CASE THEREBY IGNORING THE PECULIAR FACTS AND
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE AND THE FACT THAT THE SAID DECISION WAS
RENDERED PRIOR TO THE ENACTMENT OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE.[9]

The foregoing issues essentially revolve around the period within which
petitioners should have filed their notice of appeal.

First and foremost, the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of
due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in
the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who
seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the
Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal.[10] The
period to appeal is fixed by both statute and procedural rules. BP 129,[11] as
amended, provides:

Sec. 39. Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,
judgments, or decisions of any court in all these cases shall be fifteen (15)
days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment,
or decision appealed from. Provided, however, that in habeas corpus cases,
the period for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the notice of
judgment appealed from. x x x

Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:

SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen
(15) days from the notice of the judgment or final order appealed from.
Where a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of
appeal and a record on appeal within thirty (30) days from the notice of
judgment or final order.

The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial
or reconsideration shall be allowed. (emphasis supplied)

Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the
notice of judgment or final order appealed from. A final judgment or order is
one that finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do
with respect to it. It is an adjudication on the merits which, considering the
evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and
obligations of the parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that
dismisses an action.[12]

As already mentioned, petitioners argue that the order of July 1, 1998

denying their motion for reconsideration should be construed as the final
order, not the February 12, 1998 order which dismissed their complaint. Since
they received their copy of the denial of their motion for reconsideration only
on July 22, 1998, the 15-day reglementary period to appeal had not yet
lapsed when they filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998.

What therefore should be deemed as the final order, receipt of which triggers
the start of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal the February 12, 1998
order dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998 order dismissing the MR?

In the recent case of Quelnan v. VHF Philippines, Inc.,[13] the trial court
declared petitioner Quelnan non-suited and accordingly dismissed his
complaint. Upon receipt of the order of dismissal, he filed an omnibus motion
to set it aside. When the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the 15-day
period to appeal the order had lapsed. He later on received another order,
this time dismissing his omnibus motion. He then filed his notice of appeal.
But this was likewise dismissed for having been filed out of time.

The court a quo ruled that petitioner should have appealed within 15 days
after the dismissal of his complaint since this was the final order that was
appealable under the Rules. We reversed the trial court and declared that it
was the denial of the motion for reconsideration of an order of dismissal of a
complaint which constituted the final order as it was what ended the issues
raised there.

This pronouncement was reiterated in the more recent case of Apuyan v.

Haldeman et al.[14] where we again considered the order denying petitioner
Apuyans motion for reconsideration as the final order which finally disposed
of the issues involved in the case.

Based on the aforementioned cases, we sustain petitioners view that the

order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration was the
final order contemplated in the Rules.

We now come to the next question: if July 1, 1998 was the start of the 15-day
reglementary period to appeal, did petitioners in fact file their notice of
appeal on time?

Under Rule 41, Section 3, petitioners had 15 days from notice of judgment or
final order to appeal the decision of the trial court. On the 15th day of the
original appeal period (March 18, 1998), petitioners did not file a notice of
appeal but instead opted to file a motion for reconsideration. According to the
trial court, the MR only interrupted the running of the 15-day appeal period.
[15] It ruled that petitioners, having filed their MR on the last day of the 15-
day reglementary period to appeal, had only one (1) day left to file the notice
of appeal upon receipt of the notice of denial of their MR. Petitioners,
however, argue that they were entitled under the Rules to a fresh period of
15 days from receipt of the final order or the order dismissing their motion for
reconsideration.

In Quelnan and Apuyan, both petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of

the decision of the trial court. We ruled there that they only had the
remaining time of the 15-day appeal period to file the notice of appeal. We
consistently applied this rule in similar cases,[16] premised on the long-
settled doctrine that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the
period permitted by law is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional.[17] The
rule is also founded on deep-seated considerations of public policy and sound
practice that, at risk of occasional error, the judgments and awards of courts
must become final at some definite time fixed by law.[18]
Prior to the passage of BP 129, Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1964 Revised Rules
of Court read:

Sec. 3. How appeal is taken. Appeal maybe taken by serving upon the
adverse party and filing with the trial court within thirty (30) days from notice
of order or judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on
appeal. The time during which a motion to set aside the judgment or order or
for new trial has been pending shall be deducted, unless such motion fails to
satisfy the requirements of Rule 37.

But where such motion has been filed during office hours of the last day of
the period herein provided, the appeal must be perfected within the day
following that in which the party appealing received notice of the denial of
said motion.[19] (emphasis supplied)

According to the foregoing provision, the appeal period previously consisted

of 30 days. BP 129, however, reduced this appeal period to 15 days. In the
deliberations of the Committee on Judicial Reorganization[20] that drafted BP
129, the raison d etre behind the amendment was to shorten the period of
appeal[21] and enhance the efficiency and dispensation of justice. We have
since required strict observance of this reglementary period of appeal.
Seldom have we condoned late filing of notices of appeal,[22] and only in
very exceptional instances to better serve the ends of justice.

In National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority and Authority v. Municipality

of Libmanan,[23] however, we declared that appeal is an essential part of our
judicial system and the rules of procedure should not be applied rigidly. This
Court has on occasion advised the lower courts to be cautious about not
depriving a party of the right to appeal and that every party litigant should be
afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just disposition of his
cause, free from the constraint of technicalities.

In de la Rosa v. Court of Appeals,[24] we stated that, as a rule, periods which

require litigants to do certain acts must be followed unless, under exceptional
circumstances, a delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds
of substantial justice. There, we condoned the delay incurred by the
appealing party due to strong considerations of fairness and justice.

In setting aside technical infirmities and thereby giving due course to tardy
appeals, we have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary
situations that merit liberal application of the Rules. In those situations where
technicalities were dispensed with, our decisions were not meant to
undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. But we hasten
to add that in those rare cases where procedural rules were not stringently
applied, there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a
grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to
maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural
laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity for
the just and proper disposition of his cause.[25]

The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts.[26] It has
the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more
simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In
the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals, particularly
Rules 42,[27] 43[28] and 45,[29] the Court allows extensions of time, based
on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These
extensions may consist of 15 days or more.

To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants
fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a
fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the
Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for
a new trial or motion for reconsideration. [30]

Henceforth, this fresh period rule shall also apply to Rule 40 governing
appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial Courts; Rule 42
on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of Appeals;
Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies[31] to the Court of Appeals
and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court.[32] The
new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted
from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for
reconsideration (whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.

We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within
the fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of
notice denying their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not
inconsistent with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal
shall be taken within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed
from. The use of the disjunctive word or signifies disassociation and
independence of one thing from another. It should, as a rule, be construed in
the sense in which it ordinarily implies.[33] Hence, the use of or in the above
provision supposes that the notice of appeal may be filed within 15 days from
the notice of judgment or within 15 days from notice of the final order, which
we already determined to refer to the July 1, 1998 order denying the motion
for a new trial or reconsideration.

Neither does this new rule run counter to the spirit of Section 39 of BP 129
which shortened the appeal period from 30 days to 15 days to hasten the
disposition of cases. The original period of appeal (in this case March 3-18,
1998) remains and the requirement for strict compliance still applies. The
fresh period of 15 days becomes significant only when a party opts to file a
motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. In this manner, the trial
court which rendered the assailed decision is given another opportunity to
review the case and, in the process, minimize and/or rectify any error of
judgment. While we aim to resolve cases with dispatch and to have
judgments of courts become final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to
deliver justice fairly.

In this case, the new period of 15 days eradicates the confusion as to when
the 15-day appeal period should be counted from receipt of notice of
judgment (March 3, 1998) or from receipt of notice of final order appealed
from (July 22, 1998).

To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15
days from receipt of the Regional Trial Courts decision or file it within 15 days
from receipt of the order (the final order) denying his motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed
of only if either motion is filed; otherwise, the decision becomes final and
executory after the lapse of the original appeal period provided in Rule 41,
Section 3.

Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from
receipt of the order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998.
Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15
days, as already discussed.[34]
We deem it unnecessary to discuss the applicability of Denso (Philippines),
Inc. v. IAC[35] since the Court of Appeals never even referred to it in its
assailed decision.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, let the records of
this case be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings.

ST. MARTIN FUNERAL HOME vs. NLRC

The present petition for certiorari stemmed from a complaint for illegal
dismissal filed by herein private respondent before the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch No. III, in San
Fernando, Pampanga. Private respondent alleges that he started working as
Operations Manager of petitioner St. Martin Funeral Home on February 6,
1995. However, there was no contract of employment executed between him
and petitioner nor was his name included in the semi-monthly payroll. On
January 22, 1996, he was dismissed from his employment for allegedly
misappropriating P38,000.00 which was intended for payment by petitioner
of its value added tax (VAT) to the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).[1]

Petitioner on the other hand claims that private respondent was not its
employee but only the uncle of Amelita Malabed, the owner of petitioner St.
Martins Funeral Home. Sometime in 1995, private respondent, who was
formerly working as an overseas contract worker, asked for financial
assistance from the mother of Amelita. Since then, as an indication of
gratitude, private respondent voluntarily helped the mother of Amelita in
overseeing the business.

In January 1996, the mother of Amelita passed away, so the latter she took
over the management of the business. She then discovered that there were
arrears in the payment of taxes and other government fees, although the
records purported to show that the same were already paid. Amelita then
made some changes in the business operation and private respondent and
his wife were no longer allowed to participate in the management thereof. As
a consequence, the latter filed a complaint charging that petitioner had
illegally terminated his employment.[2]
Based on the position papers of the parties, the labor arbiter rendered a
decision in favor of petitioner on October 25, 1996 declaring that no
employer-employee relationship existed between the parties and, therefore,
his office had no jurisdiction over the case.[3]

Not satisfied with the said decision, private respondent appealed to the NLRC
contending that the labor arbiter erred (1) in not giving credence to the
evidence submitted by him; (2) in holding that he worked as a volunteer and
not as an employee of St. Martin Funeral Home from February 6, 1995 to
January 23, 1996, or a period of about one year; and (3) in ruling that there
was no employer-employee relationship between him and petitioner.[4]

On June 13, 1997, the NLRC rendered a resolution setting aside the
questioned decision and remanding the case to the labor arbiter for
immediate appropriate proceedings.[5] Petitioner then filed a motion for
reconsideration which was denied by the NLRC in its resolution dated August
18, 1997 for lack of merit,[6] hence the present petition alleging that the
NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion.[7]

Before proceeding further into the merits of the case at bar, the Court feels
that it is now exigent and opportune to reexamine the functional validity and
systemic practicability of the mode of judicial review it has long adopted and
still follows with respect to decisions of the NLRC. The increasing number of
labor disputes that find their way to this Court and the legislative changes
introduced over the years into the provisions of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
442 (The Labor Code of the Philippines and Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P. No.)
129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980) now stridently call for and
warrant a reassessment of that procedural aspect.

We prefatorily delve into the legal history of the NLRC. It was first established
in the Department of Labor by P.D. No. 21 on October 14, 1972, and its
decisions were expressly declared to be appealable to the Secretary of Labor
and, ultimately, to the President of the Philippines.

On May 1, 1974, P.D. No. 442 enacted the Labor Code of the Philippines, the
same to take effect six months after its promulgation.[8] Created and
regulated therein is the present NLRC which was attached to the Department
of Labor and Employment for program and policy coordination only.[9]
Initially, Article 302 (now, Article 223) thereof also granted an aggrieved
party the remedy of appeal from the decision of the NLRC to the Secretary of
Labor, but P.D. No. 1391 subsequently amended said provision and abolished
such appeals. No appellate review has since then been provided for.

Thus, to repeat, under the present state of the law, there is no provision for
appeals from the decision of the NLRC.[10] The present Section 223, as last
amended by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, instead merely provides that the
Commission shall decide all cases within twenty days from receipt of the
answer of the appellee, and that such decision shall be final and executory
after ten calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties.

When the issue was raised in an early case on the argument that this Court
has no jurisdiction to review the decisions of the NLRC, and formerly of the
Secretary of Labor, since there is no legal provision for appellate review
thereof, the Court nevertheless rejected that thesis. It held that there is an
underlying power of the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on
questions of law and jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by
statute; that the purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative
agency within its jurisdiction and protect the substantial rights of the parties;
and that it is that part of the checks and balances which restricts the
separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications.[11]

Pursuant to such ruling, and as sanctioned by subsequent decisions of this

Court, the remedy of the aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for
reconsideration as a precondition for any further or subsequent remedy,[12]
and then seasonably avail of the special civil action of certiorari under Rule
65,[13] for which said Rule has now fixed the reglementary period of sixty
days from notice of the decision. Curiously, although the 10-day period for
finality of the decision of the NLRC may already have lapsed as contemplated
in Section 223 of the Labor Code, it has been held that this Court may still
take cognizance of the petition for certiorari on jurisdictional and due process
considerations if filed within the reglementary period under Rule 65.[14]

Turning now to the matter of judicial review of NLRC decisions, B.P. No. 129
originally provided as follows:

SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. - The Intermediate Appellate Court shall exercise:

(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari,

habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether
or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of

Regional Trial Courts; and

(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,

resolutions, orders, or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, boards, or commissions, except those falling
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third
paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the
Judiciary Act of 1948.

The Intermediate Appellate Court shall have the power to try cases and
conduct hearings, receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary
to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its original and
appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new trials or
further proceedings.

These provisions shall not apply to decisions and interlocutory orders issued
under the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals.[15]

Subsequently, and as it presently reads, this provision was amended by R.A.

No. 7902 effective March 18, 1995, to wit:

SEC. 9. Jurisdiction. - The Court of Appeals shall exercise:

(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari,
habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes, whether
or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;

(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over actions for annulment of judgments of

Regional Trial Courts; and

(3) Exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions,

resolutions, orders or awards of Regional Trial Courts and quasi-judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, including the Securities
and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, the Employees
Compensation Commission and the Civil Service Commission, except those
falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance
with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential
Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of this Act, and of subparagraph
(1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4) of the fourth paragraph of
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

The Court of Appeals shall have the power to try cases and conduct hearings,
receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual
issues raised in cases falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction,
including the power to grant and conduct new trials or further proceedings.
Trials or hearings in the Court of Appeals must be continuous and must be
completed within, three (3) months, unless extended by the Chief Justice.

It will readily be observed that, aside from the change in the name of the
lower appellate court,[16] the following amendments of the original
provisions of Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 were effected by R.A. No. 7902, viz.:

1. The last paragraph which excluded its application to the Labor Code of the
Philippines and the Central Board of Assessment Appeals was deleted and
replaced by a new paragraph granting the Court of Appeals limited powers to
conduct trials and hearings in cases within its jurisdiction.
2. The reference to the Labor Code in that last paragraph was transposed to
paragraph (3) of the section, such that the original exclusionary clause
therein now provides except those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the
Philippines under Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, the provisions of
this Act, and of subparagraph (1) of the third paragraph and subparagraph (4)
of the fourth paragraph of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. (Italics
supplied)

3. Contrarily, however, specifically added to and included among the quasi-

judicial agencies over which the Court of Appeals shall have exclusive
appellate jurisdiction are the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Social
Security Commission, the Employees Compensation Commission and the Civil
Service Commission.

This, then, brings us to a somewhat perplexing impass, both in point of

purpose and terminology. As earlier explained, our mode of judicial review
over decisions of the NLRC has for some time now been understood to be by
a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This is, of course,
a special original action limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues, that
is, lack or excess of jurisdiction and, in almost all cases that have been
brought to us, grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

It will, however, be noted that paragraph (3), Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 now
grants exclusive appellate jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals over all final
adjudications of the Regional Trial Courts and the quasi-judicial agencies
generally or specifically referred to therein except, among others, those
falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance
with x x x the Labor Code of the Philippines under Presidential Decree No.
442, as amended, x x x. This would necessarily contradict what has been
ruled and said all along that appeal does not lie from decisions of the NLRC.
[17] Yet, under such excepting clause literally construed, the appeal from the
NLRC cannot be brought to the Court of Appeals, but to this Court by
necessary implication.

The same exceptive clause further confuses the situation by declaring that
the Court of Appeals has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions falling within
the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the provisions of B.P. No. 129, and those specified cases in
Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948. These cases can, of course, be
properly excluded from the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals. However, because of the aforementioned amendment by
transposition, also supposedly excluded are cases falling within the appellate
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the Labor Code. This is
illogical and impracticable, and Congress could not have intended that
procedural gaffe, since there are no cases in the Labor Code the decisions,
resolutions, orders or awards wherein are within the appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court or of any other court for that matter.

A review of the legislative records on the antecedents of R.A. No. 7902

persuades us that there may have been an oversight in the course of the
deliberations on the said Act or an imprecision in the terminology used
therein. In fine, Congress did intend to provide for judicial review of the
adjudications of the NLRC in labor cases by the Supreme Court, but there was
an inaccuracy in the term used for the intended mode of review. This
conclusion which we have reluctantly but prudently arrived at has been
drawn from the considerations extant in the records of Congress, more
particularly on Senate Bill No. 1495 and the Reference Committee Report on
S. No. 1495/H. No. 10452.[18]

In sponsoring Senate Bill No. 1495, Senator Raul S. Roco delivered his
sponsorship speech[19] from which we reproduce the following excerpts:

The Judiciary Reorganization Act, Mr. President, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
reorganized the Court of Appeals and at the same time expanded its
jurisdiction and powers. Among others, its appellate jurisdiction was
expanded to cover not only final judgment of Regional Trial Courts, but also
all final judgment(s), decisions, resolutions, orders or awards of quasi-judicial
agencies, instrumentalities, boards and commissions, except those falling
within the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution, the provisions of BP Blg. 129 and of subparagraph 1 of the third
paragraph and subparagraph 4 of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act of 1948.

Mr. President, the purpose of the law is to ease the workload of the Supreme
Court by the transfer of some of its burden of review of factual issues to the
Court of Appeals. However, whatever benefits that can be derived from the
expansion of the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals was cut short
by the last paragraph of Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 which
excludes from its coverage the decisions and interlocutory orders issued
under the Labor Code of the Philippines and by the Central Board of
Assessment Appeals.

Among the highest number of cases that are brought up to the Supreme
Court are labor cases. Hence, Senate Bill No. 1495 seeks to eliminate the
exceptions enumerated in Section 9 and, additionally, extends the coverage
of appellate review of the Court of Appeals in the decision(s) of the Securities
and Exchange Commission, the Social Security Commission, and the
Employees Compensation Commission to reduce the number of cases
elevated to the Supreme Court. (Emphases and corrections ours)

xxx

Senate Bill No. 1495 authored by our distinguished Colleague from Laguna
provides the ideal situation of drastically reducing the workload of the
Supreme Court without depriving the litigants of the privilege of review by an
appellate tribunal.

In closing, allow me to quote the observations of former Chief Justice

Teehankee in 1986 in the Annual Report of the Supreme Court:

x x x Amendatory legislation is suggested so as to relieve the Supreme Court

of the burden of reviewing these cases which present no important issues
involved beyond the particular fact and the parties involved, so that the
Supreme Court may wholly devote its time to cases of public interest in the
discharge of its mandated task as the guardian of the Constitution and the
guarantor of the peoples basic rights and additional task expressly vested on
it now to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

We used to have 500,000 cases pending all over the land, Mr. President. It
has been cut down to 300,000 cases some five years ago. I understand we
are now back to 400,000 cases. Unless we distribute the work of the
appellate courts, we shall continue to mount and add to the number of cases
pending.

In view of the foregoing, Mr. President, and by virtue of all the reasons we
have submitted, the Committee on Justice and Human Rights requests the
support and collegial approval of our Chamber.

xxx

Surprisingly, however, in a subsequent session, the following Committee

Amendment was introduced by the said sponsor and the following
proceedings transpired:[20]

Senator Roco. On page 2, line 5, after the line Supreme Court in accordance
with the Constitution, add the phrase THE LABOR CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES
UNDER P.D. 442, AS AMENDED. So that it becomes clear, Mr. President, that
issues arising from the Labor Code will still be appealable to the Supreme
Court.

The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Roco. On the same page, we move that lines 25 to 30 be deleted.

This was also discussed with our Colleagues in the House of Representatives
and as we understand it, as approved in the House, this was also deleted, Mr.
President.

The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the

amendment is approved.

Senator Roco. There are no further Committee amendments, Mr. President.

Senator Romulo. Mr. President, I move that we close the period of Committee
amendments.

The President. Is there any objection? (Silence) Hearing none, the

amendment is approved. (Italics supplied)

xxx

Thereafter, since there were no individual amendments, Senate Bill No. 1495
was passed on second reading and being a certified bill, its unanimous
approval on third reading followed.[21]; Record of the Senate, Vol. V, No. 63,
pp. 180-181.21 The Conference Committee Report on Senate Bill No. 1495
and House Bill No. 10452, having theretofore been approved by the House of
Representatives, the same was likewise approved by the Senate on February
20, 1995,[22] inclusive of the dubious formulation on appeals to the Supreme
Court earlier discussed.

The Court is, therefore, of the considered opinion that ever since appeals
from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the legislative
intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the
proper vehicle for judicial review of decisions of the NLRC. The use of the
word appeal in relation thereto and in the instances we have noted could
have been a lapsus plumae because appeals by certiorari and the original
action for certiorari are both modes of judicial review addressed to the
appellate courts. The important distinction between them, however, and with
which the Court is particularly concerned here is that the special civil action
of certiorari is within the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court and the
Court of Appeals;[23] whereas to indulge in the assumption that appeals by
certiorari to the Supreme Court are allowed would not subserve, but would
subvert, the intention of Congress as expressed in the sponsorship speech on
Senate Bill No. 1495.

Incidentally, it was noted by the sponsor therein that some quarters were of
the opinion that recourse from the NLRC to the Court of Appeals as an initial
step in the process of judicial review would be circuitous and would prolong
the proceedings. On the contrary, as he commendably and realistically
emphasized, that procedure would be advantageous to the aggrieved party
on this reasoning:

On the other hand, Mr. President, to allow these cases to be appealed to the
Court of Appeals would give litigants the advantage to have all the evidence
on record be reexamined and reweighed after which the findings of facts and
conclusions of said bodies are correspondingly affirmed, modified or reversed.

Under such guarantee, the Supreme Court can then apply strictly the axiom
that factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and may not be
reversed on appeal to the Supreme Court. A perusal of the records will reveal
appeals which are factual in nature and may, therefore, be dismissed outright
by minute resolutions.[24]

While we do not wish to intrude into the Congressional sphere on the matter
of the wisdom of a law, on this score we add the further observations that
there is a growing number of labor cases being elevated to this Court which,
not being a trier of fact, has at times been constrained to remand the case to
the NLRC for resolution of unclear or ambiguous factual findings; that the
Court of Appeals is procedurally equipped for that purpose, aside from the
increased number of its component divisions; and that there is undeniably an
imperative need for expeditious action on labor cases as a major aspect of
constitutional protection to labor.

Therefore, all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to

supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and
hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65.
Consequently, all such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the
Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of
courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired.

Apropos to this directive that resort to the higher courts should be made in
accordance with their hierarchical order, this pronouncement in Santiago vs.
Vasquez, et al.[25] should be taken into account:
One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case a propensity
on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the same may be said of a
number of litigants who initiate recourses before us, to disregard the
hierarchy of courts in our judicial system by seeking relief directly from this
Court despite the fact that the same is available in the lower courts in the
exercise of their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by
law to be sought therein. This practice must be stopped, not only because of
the imposition upon the precious time of this Court but also because of the
inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of
the case which often has to be remanded or referred to the lower court as the
proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve
the issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore, reiterate the
judicial policy that this Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the
redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or where
exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy
within and calling for the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, under the foregoing premises, the instant petition for certiorari
is hereby REMANDED, and all pertinent records thereof ordered to be
FORWARDED, to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action and disposition
consistent with the views and ruling herein set forth, without pronouncement
as to costs.

EMMANUEL M. RELAMPAGOS, petitioner,

vs.

ROSITA C. CUMBA and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
revives the issue of whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
has jurisdiction over petitions for, certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus in
election cases where it has exclusive appellate jurisdiction In the split
decision of 4 March 1992 in the consolidated cases of Garcia vs. De Jesus and
Uy vs. Commission on Elections, 1 this Court ruled in the negative because of
the absence of any specific conferment upon the COMELEC, either by the
constitution or by legislative fiat, of jurisdiction to issue such extraordinary
writs. It held that jurisdiction or the legal power to hear and determine a
cause or causes of action, must exist as a matter of law, whether the
jurisdiction is original or appellate, and since these two classes of jursdiction
are exclusive of each other, each must expressly conferred by law. One does
not flow, nor is inferred, from the other. This Court proceeded to state that in
the Philippine setting, the authority to issue the aforesaid writs involves the
exercise of original jurisdiction which has always been expressly conferred
either by Constitution or by law. It is never derived by implication. Although
the Constitution grants the COMELEC appellate jurisdiction, it does not grant
it any power to exercise original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition, and mandamus unlike the case of this Court which is specifically
conferred with such authority in Section 5(1) of Article VIII. It also pointed out
that the doctrines laid down in Pimentel vs. COMELEC 2 that neither the
Constitution nor any law has conferred jurisdiction on the COMELEC to issue
such writs still finds application under the 1987 Constitution.

In the decision of 29 July 1992 in Veloria vs. Commission on Elections, 3 this

Court reiterated the Garcia and Uy doctrine.

In the challenged resolution at bench, the respondent COMELEC adhered to

the affirmative view of the issue, citing as authority therefore its own decision
of 29 July 1993 in Dictado vs. Cosico and the last paragraph of Section 50 of
B. P. Blg. 697, which reads:

Sec. 50. Definition.

xxx xxx xxx

The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide
petitions for certiorari prohibition, and mandamus involving election cases.

The petitioner herein pleads that this resolution be set aside and nullified for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. He contends that while the COMELEC's position is
inherently compelling, it deserves scant consideration in view of Garcia and
Uy and Veloria and the nature and purpose of B. P. Blg. 697 which was to
govern solely the Batasang Pambansa election of 14 May 1984; hence, it was
a temporary statute which self-destructed after such election.

The antecedent facts that led to the filing of this action are uncomplicated
and undisputed.

In the synchronized elections of 11 May 1992, the petitioner and private

respondent Rosita Cumba were candidates for the position of Mayor in the
municipality of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte. The latter was proclaimed the
winning candidate, with a margin of only twenty-two votes over the former.

Unwilling to accept defeat, the petitioner filed an election protest with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Agusan del Norte, which was assigned to Branch
2 thereof in Butuan City.

On 29 June 1994, the trial court, per Judge Rosario F. Dabalos, found the
petitioner to have won with a margin of six votes over the private respondent
and rendered judgement in favor of the petitioner as follows:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing results, the court hereby declares the
protestant as having won the mayoralty election and as duly elected Mayor of
the Municipality of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte in the local election held on
May 11, 1992, the protestant having obtained six (6) votes more than that of
the protestee's votes.

Copies of the decision were sent to and received by the petitioner and the
private respondent on 1 July 1994.

On 4 July 1994, the private respondent appealed the decision to the

COMELEC by filing her notice of appeal and paying the appellate docket fees.
On 8 July 1994, the trial court gave due course to the appeal.

On 12 July 1994, the petitioner filed with the trial court a motion for execution
pending appeal, which the private respondent opposed on 22 July 1994.

On 3 August 1994, the trial court granted the petitioner's motion for
execution pending appeal. The corresponding writ of execution was forthwith
issued. Thereafter, the private respondent filed a motion for a reconsideration
of the order of execution and the sheriff held in abeyance the implementation
of the writ. This motion was denied on 5 August 1994.

The private respondent then filed with the respondent COMELEC a petition for
certiorari to annul the aforesaid other of the trial court granting the motion
for execution pending appeal and the writ of execution. The petition was
docketed as SPR No. 1-94.

On 9 February 1995, the COMELEC promulgated its resolution granting the

petition. 4 The dispositive portion thereof reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVES that is [sic]

has exclusive authority to hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus in election cases as authorized by law, and therefore,
assumes jurisdiction of the instant petition for certiorari which is hereby
GRANTED. The Order of the court a quo of August 3, 1994 is hereby declared
NULL and VOID and the Writ of Execution issued on August 4, 1994 LIFTED.

Accordingly, petitioner Rosita Cumba is ordered restored to her position .as

Municipality Mayor of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte, pending resolution of the
appeal before this Commission in the case of Relampagos vs. Cumba in EAC
No. 108-94.

In upholding its jurisdiction in certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus cases,

the respondent COMELEC maintains that there is a special law granting it
such jurisdiction, viz., Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697, which remains in full force
as it was not expressly repealed by the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg.
881),and that it is not exactly correct that this law self-destructed after the
May 1984 election. It further reasoned out that in the performance of its
judicial functions, the COMELEC, is the most logical body to issue the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in election cases
where it has appellate jurisdiction. It ratiocinated as follows:

It is therefore clear that if there is a law which specifically confers jurisdiction

to issue the prerogative Writs, then the Commission has jurisdiction.

Such a law exists. Section 50, B.P. Blg. 697 is that law.

B.P. Blg. 697, approved on March 14, 1984, is entitled "AN ACT TO GOVERN
THE ELECTION OF MEMBERS OF THE BATASANG PAMBANSA ON MAY 14, 1984
AND THE SELECTION OF SECTORAL REPRESENTATIVES THEREAFTER,
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. Section 50
provides:

Sec. 50. Definition. Pre-proclamation controversy refers to any question

pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the Board of Canvassers which
may be raised by any candidate, political party or coalition of political parties
before the board or directly with the Commission.

The Commission Elections shall be the sole judge and shall have exclusive
jurisdiction over all pre-proclamation controversies.

The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide
petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases.
(Emphasis supplied).

We have debated among ourselves whether Section 50, B.P. Blg. 697, has
been repealed. We have come to the conclusion that it has not been
repealed. The repealing provision in the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881,
December 3, 1985), provides:
Sec. 282. Repealing Clause. Presidential Decree No. 1296 otherwise
known as the The 1978 Election Code, as amended, is hereby repealed. All
other election Laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations or parts
thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Code is hereby repealed,
except Presidential Decree No. 1618 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 20 governing
the election of the members of the Sangguniang Pampook of Regions IX and
XII. (Emphasis supplied).

B.P. Blg. 697 has not been expressly repealed, and Section 50 thereof is not
inconsistent with the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code. Besides, in the
cited Garcia/Uy cases, as reiterated in the Veloria case, the Supreme Court
itself said, reiterating previous cases, that implied repeal of statutes is
frowned upon, thus:

Just as implied repeal of statutes frowned upon, so also should the grant of
original jurisdiction by mere implication to a quasi-judicial body be tabooed.
(Garcia/Uy/Veloria Cases: Emphasis supplied).

xxx xxx xxx

It is equally clear that Executive Order No. 90 . . . did not modify or repeal,
whether expressly or impliedly, Section 23 of P.D. No. 1752. It is common
place Learning that implied repeal are not favored in Law and are not casually
to be assumed. The first effort of a court must always be to reconcile or
adjust the provisions of one statute with those of another so as to give
sensible effect to both provisions (Jalandoni vs. Andaya, 55 SCRA 261 (1974);
Villegas vs. Subido, 41 SCRA 190, 196-197 (1971); National Power
Corporation vs. ARCA, 25 SCRA 931 (1968); U.S. vs. Palacios, 33 Phil. 208
(1916); and Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. vs. Feliciano, 13
SCRA 377(1965). Only when there is clear inconsistency and conflict
between the provisions of two (2) statutes, may a court hold that the
provisions later in point of time have impliedly repealed the earlier ones" that
(Philippine American Management Co., Inc., vs. Philippine American
Management Employees Association, 49 SCRA 194 (1973); and Villegas vs.
Subido, 41 SCRA 190 (1971) (Larga vs. Ranada, Jr., No. L-7976, August 3,
1984, 164 SCRA 25).
It was even suggested that Batas Pambansa Blg. 697 self-destructed after the
Batasang Pambansa elections of 1984; because of the provisions of Section 1
(Title and Applicability) which provides: "This act shall be known and cited as
"The Law on the 1984 Batasang Pambansa Election." It shall govern the
election for the regular Batasang Pambansa which shall be held on May 14,
1984, and the selection of sectoral representatives thereafter as provided by
the Constitution.

While that may be true with most of its provisions which were applicable only
for the particular election (like election and campaign periods, voting
constituency, etc.) most if not all of the remaining provisions could be
applicable to future elections. It is not lost to the Commission that B.P. Blg.
697 was passed also "for other purposes."

But the important consideration is that the authority granted to the

Commission under B.P. Blg. 697 is not inconsistent with our election laws. It
should be mentioned that the provisions of Republic Act No. 6638 which
governed the local elections of January 18, 1988, as to the number of
councilors in specified cities (Sec. 3) and the number of Sangguniang
members in different provinces and cities (Sec. 4) are still applicable up to
this day. In fact, it became one of the important controlling provision which
governed the May 11, 1992 elections. If provisions of Republic Act No. 6636
which are not inconsistent with the present election laws did not self-destruct,
why should Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697?

Another provision which did not self-destruct is that which provides that "any
city or municipal judge, who includes or excludes any voter without any legal
basis in inclusion and exclusion proceedings, shall be guilty of an election
offense," although this provision is found in Section 10 of Executive Order No.
134 supposedly with limited application as the enabling act for the elections
for Members of Congress on May 11, 1987 and for other purposes.

Clearly the intent of the law, was to give certiorari, jurisdiction to the
Commission on Elections because the Pimentel case said there was none, to
fill a void in the law, and avoid an incongruous situation.
A statute's clauses and phrases must not be taken separately but in its
relation to the statute's totality. Each statute must, in fact, be construed as to
"harmonized it with the pre-existing body of laws." Unless clearly repugnant,
provisions of statutes must be reconciled. . . . (Commissioner of Customs vs.
ESSO Standard Eastern, Inc. L-28329, August 7, 1975, 66 SCRA 113).

xxx xxx xxx

The statutory construction rule is: "When the Legislature enacts provision, it
is understood that it is aware of previous statutes relating to the same
subject matter and that in the absence of any express repeal or amendment
therein, the new provision should be deemed enacted pursuant to the
legislative policy embodied in the prior statutes." (Legaspi vs. Executive
Secretary, L-36153, November 28, 1975, 68 SCRA 253).

The Commission is the most logical body whenever it performs judicial

functions to take jurisdiction of petitions for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus because it has appellate jurisdiction in election cases granted by
the Constitution itself. The Court of Appeals has no more appellate jurisdiction
over such cases And in the case of the Supreme Court, Justice de Castro in
the Pimentel case pointed out, in his dissenting opinion that under the
Constitution the certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in election cases
should properly be limited to decisions, orders or rulings of the Commission
on Elections, not from lower courts.

It was of course different under the Election Code of 1971 (R.A. No. 6388,
September 2, 1971) because the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals
then had appellate jurisdiction in election case decided by the lower courts.

In the Veloria case, it now appears that only the Supreme Court and the Court
of Appeals have certiorari jurisdiction over election cases from the lower
courts because after reiterating the ruling in the Garcia and Uy cases, the
Supreme Court said:

In view of this pronouncement, an original civil action of certiorari, prohibition

or mandamus against a regional trial court in an election contest may be filed
only in the Court of Appeals or in this Court being the only courts given such
original jurisdiction under the Constitution and the Law. (Emphasis supplied).

While these two appellate Courts do have the jurisdiction under the
Constitution and the law, it is most logical for the Commission whenever it
performs judicial functions to have the authority to issue these prerogative
writs. . . .

...

In traversing the first issue, we are citing our decision laid down in the case of
Antonio Dictado vs. Hon. Rodrigo N. Cosico and Emilio Tiongco promulgated
on July 29, 1993. In this case, the Commission en banc had occasion to rule
on the question of whether or not the Commission has the authority to hear
and decide petitions for certiorari in election cases.

The Commission En Banc, speaking through Hon. Commissioner Regalado E.

Maambong, ruled that there is [a] law which grants the Commission, the
exclusive authority to issue special writs of certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus in election cases, and there are also Supreme Court decisions,
recent in fact, which declare that the Commission has no such authority
precisely because; according to the decisions, there is no law granting such
authority, and without any hint whatsoever of the existence of Sec. 50 of
Batas vs. Pambansa Blg. 697.

As gleaned from the case of Dictado, respondents were arguing that Sec. 50
of BP Blg. 697 was repealed by the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881,
December 3, 1985). Furthermore, in their answer, respondents cited Supreme
Court decisions where it was declared that, indeed, the Commission has no
jurisdiction to issue special writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

It is still the position of this Commission that Sec. 50, BP Blg. 697 has not
been repealed.
As defined in the Constitution, "Judicial power" includes the duty of the Courts
of Justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has
been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess, of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government (Sec. 1, par.
2, Art. VII).

Since the COMELEC, in discharging its appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Sec.

2 (2), Art. IX-C, acts as a court of justice performing judicial power and said
power includes the determination of whether or not there has been grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, it necessarily
follows that the Comelec, by constitutional mandate, is vested with
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. 5

It set aside, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, the trial
court's order of execution pending appeal and the writ of execution because

[a]t the time the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal was filed on July 12,
1994 the court a quo had already lost jurisdiction over the case for as early
as July 8, 1994, it had already acknowledged through its order issued on that
date, the perfection of the appeal of petitioner as in fact it ordered the
elevation of the records of the case to this Honorable Commission. 6

Aggrieved by the resolution, the petitioner filed the instant special civil
action.

In the resolution of 21 February 1985, the Court required the respondents to

comment on the petition and issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
the respondent COMELEC to cease and desist from enforcing is challenged
resolution.

As naturally expected, the private respondent, in her Comment, opposed the

petition by invoking the very arguments adduced by the respondent
COMELEC in its challenged the resolution and the dissenting opinion in the
Garcia and Uy cases.
In its comment filed by the Office of the Solicitor General, the respondent
COMELEC postulates that it issued the said resolution after it had taken
cognizance of the appeal interposed by the private respondent from the RTC
decision, unlike in the Garcia and Uy cases, and therefore, in the exercise of
its appellate jurisdiction, thus:

it cannot be gainsaid that [it] possesses inherent powers to employ means

necessary to carry into effect the powers conferred upon it by law (Sec. 6,
Rule 135 of the Revised Rules of Court) and verily, there was no need for any
statutory grant for that purpose. Indeed, in annulling the Order of Execution
of the Regional Trial Court, public respondent did not exceed its jurisdiction
since its action in this regard was necessary to preserve the subject of the
appeal and to maintain the status quo of the parties pending the final
outcome of its review of the correctness of the appealed decision. 7

It tried to show that in Pimentel and Garcia, the trial courts still had
jurisdiction over the cases unlike in the instant case where the trial court had
already given due course to the appeal and elevated the records of the case
to the COMELEC which had taken cognizance of the appeal.

This Court resolved to give due course to this petition and to decide it on its
merits.

The contention of the respondent COMELEC as advanced by the Office of the

Solicitor General is unacceptable. It goes against its theory in the assailed
resolution and is not supported by the facts. The challenged resolution
involves a case which the COMELEC docketed as a special relief case (SPR.
No. 1-94). Under Rule 28 of its Rules of Procedure, the special relief cases are
petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, and contempt proceedings.
The ordinary appeal from the RTC decision was, as disclosed in the
challenged resolution; docketed as EAC No. 108-94. 8 Clearly then, the
COMELEC had recognized and taken cognizance of two cases: one, the
ordinary appeal from the RTC decision (EAC No. 108-94), and two, the special
civil action for certiorari docketed as SPR No. 1-94. The two cases were not
consolidated. The dissimilarities between them need no further elaboration.
Since it issued the challenged resolution under the latter case, it cannot now
be heard to state that it issued it as an incident in the former, the ordinary
appeal. This erroneous contention of the Office of the of the Solicitor General
notwithstanding, the position taken by the COMELEC in its resolution now in
question paves the way for a re-examination of this Court's pronouncement in
the Garcia and Uy cases.

As earlier stated, in Garcia and Uy, 9 and later, in Veloria, 10 this Court ruled
that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the extraordinary writs of
certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus because there is no specific
constitutional or statutory conferment to it of such jurisdiction.

The respondent COMELEC, however, points out that Section 50 of B.P. Blg.
697 expressly granted it such jurisdiction. Indeed, it did. Nevertheless,
considering that the said law was, per Section 1 thereof, "to govern the
election for the regular Batasang Pambansa which shall be held on May 14,
1984, and the selection of sectoral representatives thereafter as provided by
the Constitution," and in view of the passage of the Omnibus Election Code
(B.P. Blg. 881) by the regular Batasang Pambansa, 11 this Court is then
confronted with the twin issues of whether said B.P. Blg. 697 became functus
officio after the 14 May 1984 election of members of the regular Batasang
Pambansa or the selection thereafter of the sectoral representatives at the
latest, and whether it was repealed by the Omnibus Election Code.

The Court agrees with the respondent COMELEC that there are provisions in
B.P. Blg. 697 whose lifetime go beyond the 14 May 1984 election or the
subsequent selection of sectoral representatives. In fact, by the very wording
of the last paragraph of its Section 50, to: wit:

Sec. 50. Definition.

xxx xxx xxx

The Commission is hereby vested with the exclusive authority to hear and
decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election
cases. (Emphasis supplied).
it is quite clear that the exercise of the power was not restricted within a
specific period of time. Taken in the context of the conspicuous absence of
such jurisdiction as ruled in Pimentel vs. Commission on Elections, 12 it
seems quite obvious that the grant was intended as a remedial legislation to
eliminate the seeming incongruity or irrationality resulting in a splitting of
jurisdiction pointed out in the dissenting opinion of Justice De Castro in the
said case.

But did not the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) repeal B.P. Blg. 697?
The repealing clause of the latter reads as follows:

Sec. 282. Repealing clause. Presidential decree No. 1296, otherwise

known as The 1978 Election Code, as amended, is hereby repealed. All other
election laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, or parts
thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed,
except Presidential Decree No. 1618 .and Batas Pambansa Blg. 20 governing
the election of the members of the Sangguniang Pampook of Regions IX and
XII.

The second sentence is in the nature of a general repealing clause. It has

been said:

An express general repealing clause to the effect that. all inconsistent

enactments are repealed; is in legal contemplation a nullity. Repeals must
either be expressed or result by implication. Although it has in some
instances been held to be an express recognition that there are acts in
conflict with the act in which it is included and as indicative of the legislative
intent to repeal such acts, a general repealing clause cannot be deemed an
express repeal because it fails to identify or designate any act to be repealed.
It cannot be determinative of an implied repeal for if does not declare any
inconsistency but conversely, merely predicates a repeal upon the condition
that a substantial conflict is found under application of the rules of implied
repeals. If its inclusion is more than mere mechahical verbiage, it is more
often a detriment than an aid to the establishment of a repeal, for such
clause is construed as an express limitation of the repeal to inconsistent acts.
13
This Court is not unaware of the equally settled rule in statutory construction
that in the revision or codification of laws, all parts and provisions of the old
laws that are omitted in the revised statute or code are deemed repealed,
unless the statute or code provides otherwise expressly or impliedly. 14

By the tenor of its aforequoted Repealing Clause, it does not evidently appear
that the Batasang Pambansa had intended to codify all prior election statutes
and to replace them with the new Code. It made, in fact, by the second
sentence, a reservation that all prior election statutes or parts thereof not
inconsistent with any provisions of the Code shall remain in force. That
sentence

predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict
must be found on existing and prior acts of the same subject matter. Such
being the case, the presumption against implied repeals and the rule on strict
construction regarding implied repeals apply ex proprio vigore. For the
legislature is presumed to know the existing laws so that, if repeal of
particular or specific law or laws is intended, the proper step is to express it.
The failure to add a specific repealing clause particularly mentioning the
statute to be repealed indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing
law on the matter, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy
exist in the terms of the new and the old laws. 15

This being the case, the Court painstakingly examined the aforesaid last
paragraph of Section 50 of the Omnibus Election Code to determine if the
former is inconsistent with any of the provisions of the latter, It found none.

In the face of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court must, as it now does,
abandon the ruling in the Garcia and Uy and Veloria cases, We now hold that
the last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P. Blg. 697 providing as follows:

The Commission is hereby vested with exclusive authority to hear and decide
petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases.

remains in full force and effect but only in such cases where, under paragraph
(2), Section 1, Article IX-C of the Constitution, it has exclusive appellate
jurisdiction. Simply put, the COMELEC has the authority to issue the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus only in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction.

The jurisdiction of the COMELEC having been settled, we now proceed to

review the substance of the challenged resolution.

That the trial court acted with palpable and whimsical abuse of discretion in
granting the petitioner's motion for execution pending appeal and in issuing
the writ of execution is all too obvious. Since both the petitioner and the
private respondent received copies of the decision on 1 July 1994, an appeal
therefrom may be filed within five days 16 from 1 July 1994, or on or before 6
July 1994. Any motion for execution pending appeal must be filed before the
period for the perfection of the appeal. Pursuant to Section 23 of the Interim
Rules Implementing B.P. Blg. 129, which is deemed to have supplementary
effect to the COMELEC Rules of Procedures pursuant to Rule 43 of the latter,
an appeal would be deemed perfected on the last day for any of the parties
to appeal, 17 or on 6 July 1994. On 4 July 1994, the private respondent filed
her notice of appeal and paid the appeal fee. On 8 July 1994, the trial court
gave due course to the appeal and ordered the elevation of the records of the
case to the COMELEC. Upon the perfection of the appeal, the trial court was
divested of its jurisdiction over the case. 18 Since the motion for execution
pending appeal was filed only on 12 July 1994, or after the perfection of the
appeal, the trial court could no longer validly act thereon. It could have been
otherwise if the motion was filed before the perfection of the appeal. 19
Accordingly, since the respondent COMELEC has the jurisdiction to issue the
extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, then it correctly
set aside the challenged order granting the motion for execution pending
appeal and writ of execution issued by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the challenged resolution of

9 February 1995 of the Commission on Elections in SPR No. 1-94 entitled
"Rosita Cumba vs. Manuel M. Relampagos, et al. " is AFFIRMED.

A. M. No. 08-1-16-SC January 22, 2008

This Resolution shall take effect on February 2, 2008, following its publication
in three (3) newspapers of general circulation.

THE RULE ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS DATA

SECTION 1. Habeas Data. - The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to

any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or
of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing
of data or information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.

SEC. 2. Who May File. - Any aggrieved party may file a petition for the writ of
habeas data. However, in cases of extralegal killings and enforced
disappearances, the petition may be filed by:

(a) Any member of the immediate family of the aggrieved party, namely: the
spouse, children and parents; or

(b) Any ascendant, descendant or collateral relative of the aggrieved party

within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity, in default of those
mentioned in the preceding paragraph; or

SEC. 3. Where to File. - The petition may be filed with the Regional Trial Court
where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has jurisdiction over
the place where the data or information is gathered, collected or stored, at
the option of the petitioner.

The petition may also be filed with the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals
or the Sandiganbayan when the action concerns public data files of
government offices.

SEC. 4. Where Returnable; Enforceable. - When the writ is issued by a

Regional Trial Court or any judge thereof, it shall be returnable before such
court or judge.

When issued by the Court of Appeals or the Sandiganbayan or any of its

justices, it may be returnable before such court or any justice thereof, or to
any Regional Trial Court of the place where the petitioner or respondent
resides, or that which has jurisdiction over the place where the data or
information is gathered, collected or stored.

When issued by the Supreme Court or any of its justices, it may be returnable
before such Court or any justice thereof, or before the Court of Appeals or the
Sandiganbayan or any of its justices, or to any Regional Trial Court of the
place where the petitioner or respondent resides, or that which has
jurisdiction over the place where the data or information is gathered,
collected or stored.

The writ of habeas data shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines.

Sec. 5. Docket Fees. - No docket and other lawful fees shall be required from
an indigent petitioner. The petition of the indigent shall be docked and acted
upon immediately, without prejudice to subsequent submission of proof of
indigency not later than fifteen (15) days from the filing of the petition.

SEC. 6. Petition. - A verified written petition for a writ of habeas data should
contain:

(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the respondent;

(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it
affects the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party;

(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to secure the data or
information;
(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the government office,
and the person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or
information, if known;

(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the updating, rectification,
suppression or destruction of the database or information or files kept by the
respondent.

In case of threats, the relief may include a prayer for an order enjoining
the act complained of; and

(f) Such other relevant reliefs as are just and equitable.

SEC. 7. Issuance of the Writ. - Upon the filing of the petition, the court, justice
or judge shall immediately order the issuance of the writ if on its face it ought
to issue. The clerk of court shall issue the writ under the seal of the court and
cause it to be served within three (3) days from the issuance; or, in case of
urgent necessity, the justice or judge may issue the writ under his or her own
hand, and may deputize any officer or person serve it.

The writ shall also set the date and time for summary hearing of the petition
which shall not be later than ten (10) work days from the date of its issuance.

SEC. 8. Penalty for Refusing to Issue or Serve the Writ. - A clerk of court who
refuses to issue the writ after its allowance, or a deputized person who
refuses to serve the same, shall be punished by the court, justice or judge for
contempt without prejudice to other disciplinary actions.

SEC. 9. How the Writ is Served. - The writ shall be served upon the
respondent by a judicial officer or by a person deputized by the court, justice
or judge who shall retain a copy on which to make a return of service. In case
the writ cannot be served personally on the respondent, the rules on
substituted service shall apply.
SEC. 10. Return; Contents. - The respondent shall file a verified written return
together with supporting affidavits within five (5) working days from service
of the writ, which period may be reasonably extended by the Court for
justifiable reasons. The return shall, among other things, contain the
following:

(a) The lawful defenses such as national security, state secrets, privileged
communications, confidentiality of the source of information of media and
others;

(b) In case of respondent in charge, in possession or in control of the data or

information subject of the petition;

(i) a disclosure of the data or information about the petitioner, the nature of
such data or information, and the purpose for its collection;

(ii) the steps or actions taken by the respondent to ensure the security and
confidentiality of the data or information; and,

(iii) the currency and accuracy of the data or information held; and,

(c) Other allegations relevant to the resolution of the proceeding.

A general denial of the allegations in the petition shall not be allowed.

SEC. 11. Contempt. - The court, justice or judge may punish with
imprisonment or fine a respondent who commits contempt by making a false
return, or refusing to make a return; or any person who otherwise disobeys or
resist a lawful process or order of the court.
SEC. 12. When Defenses May be Heard in Chambers. - A hearing in chambers
may be conducted where the respondent invokes the defense that the
release of the data or information in question shall compromise national
security or state secrets, or when the data or information cannot be divulged
to the public due to its nature or privileged character.

Sec. 13. Prohibited Pleadings and Motions. - The following pleadings and
motions are prohibited:

(a) Motion to dismiss;

(b) Motion for extension of time to file return, opposition, affidavit, position
paper and other pleadings;

(c) Dilatory motion for postponement;

(d) Motion for a bill of particulars;

(e) Counterclaim or cross-claim;

(f) Third-party complaint;

(g) Reply;

(h) Motion to declare respondent in default;

(i) Intervention;

(j) Memorandum;
(k) Motion for reconsideration of interlocutory orders or interim relief orders;
and

(l) Petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any interlocutory

order.

SEC. 14. Return; Filing. - In case the respondent fails to file a return, the court,
justice or judge shall proceed to hear the petition ex parte, granting the
petitioner such relief as the petition may warrant unless the court in its
discretion requires the petitioner to submit evidence.

SEC. 15. Summary Hearing. - The hearing on the petition shall be summary.
However, the court, justice or judge may call for a preliminary conference to
simplify the issues and determine the possibility of obtaining stipulations and
admissions from the parties.

SEC. 16. Judgment. - The court shall render judgment within ten (10) days
from the time the petition is submitted for decision. If the allegations in the
petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall enjoin the act
complained of, or order the deletion, destruction, or rectification of the
erroneous data or information and grant other relevant reliefs as may be just
and equitable; otherwise, the privilege of the writ shall be denied.

Upon its finality, the judgment shall be enforced by the sheriff or any lawful
officers as may be designated by the court, justice or judge within five (5)
working days.

SEC. 17. Return of Service. - The officer who executed the final judgment
shall, within three (3) days from its enforcement, make a verified return to
the court. The return shall contain a full statement of the proceedings under
the writ and a complete inventory of the database or information, or
documents and articles inspected, updated, rectified, or deleted, with copies
served on the petitioner and the respondent.
The officer shall state in the return how the judgment was enforced and
complied with by the respondent, as well as all objections of the parties
regarding the manner and regularity of the service of the writ.

SEC. 18. Hearing on Officers Return. - The court shall set the return for
hearing with due notice to the parties and act accordingly.

SEC. 19. Appeal. - Any party may appeal from the final judgment or order to
the Supreme Court under Rule 45. The appeal may raise questions of fact or
law or both.

The period of appeal shall be five (5) working days from the date of notice of
the judgment or final order.

The appeal shall be given the same priority as in habeas corpus and amparo
cases.

SEC. 20. Institution of Separate Actions. - The filing of a petition for the writ of
habeas data shall not preclude the filing of separate criminal, civil or
administrative actions.

SEC. 21. Consolidation. - When a criminal action is filed subsequent to the

filing of a petition for the writ, the latter shall be consolidated with the
criminal action.

When a criminal action and a separate civil action are filed subsequent to a
petition for a writ of habeas data, the petition shall be consolidated with the
criminal action.

After consolidation, the procedure under this Rule shall continue to govern
the disposition of the reliefs in the petition.
SEC. 22. Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. - When a criminal action has
been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The relief
under the writ shall be available to an aggrieved party by motion in the
criminal case.

The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs
available under the writ of habeas data.

SEC. 23. Substantive Rights. - This Rule shall not diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights.

SEC. 24. Suppletory Application of the Rules of Court. - The Rules of Court
shall apply suppletorily insofar as it is not inconsistent with this Rule.

SEC. 25. Effectivity. - This Rule shall take effect on February 2, 2008, following
its publication in three (3) newspapers of general circulation.

[PUBLISHED IN THE MANILA BULLETIN, THE PHILIPPINE STAR AND THE

PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER ON 25 JANUARY 2008]