Chuaquico Jett I.
ISSUE: Whether or not, Capili can still be convicted
Title 12: Crimes Against Civil Status
Capili vs. People: The nullity of the second marriage
does not bar the prosecution and conviction of
bigamy so long as the 1 st marriage is not yet declared
annulled
FACTS: James Walter Capili is charged with the
crime of bigamy by marrying Karla Capili before his
first marriage is declared void by the court
Defense of Petitioner: filed a Motion to Suspend
Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil
case for declaration of nullity of the second marriage
before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y.
Medina-Capili; (2) in the event that the marriage is
declared null and void, it would exculpate him from
the charge of bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the
civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second
marriage serves as a prejudicial question in the
instant criminal case.
In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City rendered a
decision declaring the voidness or incipient invalidity
of the second marriage between petitioner and private
respondent on the ground that a subsequent marriage
contracted by the husband during the lifetime of the
legal wife is void from the beginning.
Thereafter, the petitioner accused filed his
Manifestation and Motion (to Dismiss) praying for
the dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy filed
against him on the ground that the second marriage
between him and private respondent had already been
declared void by the RTC.
RTCs decision: Dismissed the criminal case on the
ground that the 2nd bigamous marriage has been
annulled by the court
CAs decision: Reversed the decision of RTC
affirming the conjecture of prosecution: that the
issues raised in the civil case are not similar or
intimately related to the issue in this above-captioned
case and that the resolution of the issues in said civil
case would not determine whether or not the criminal
action may proceed.
for the crime of Bigamy notwithstanding the nullity
of the 2nd bigamous marriage
RULING: Yes, he can still be prosecuted
In the present case, it appears that all the elements of
the crime of bigamy were present when the
Information was filed on June 28, 2004.
It is undisputed that a second marriage between
petitioner and private respondent was contracted on
December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid
first marriage between petitioner and Karla Y.
Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999.
Notably, the RTC of Antipolo City itself declared the
bigamous nature of the second marriage between
petitioner and private respondent. Thus, the
subsequent judicial declaration of the second
marriage for being bigamous in nature does not bar
the prosecution of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the
accused may still be charged with the crime of
bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of
the nullity of the second marriage, so long as the first
marriage was still subsisting when the second
marriage was celebrated.
In Jarillo v. People, the Court affirmed the accuseds
conviction for bigamy ruling that the crime of
bigamy is consummated on the celebration of the
subsequent marriage without the previous one having
been judicially declared null and void, viz.:
The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of
the first marriage was immaterial because prior to the
declaration of nullity, the crime had already been
consummated. Moreover, petitioners assertion would
only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases
considering that an accused could simply file a
petition to declare his previous marriage void and
invoke the pendency of that action as a prejudicial
question in the criminal case. We cannot allow that.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of
petitioners marriage to [private complainant] had no
bearing upon the determination of petitioners
innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy,
because all that is required for the charge of bigamy
to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at
the time the second marriage is contracted.
Thus, under the law, a marriage, even one which is
void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared
otherwise in a judicial proceeding. In this case, even
if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration that his
first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the
first and the second marriage were subsisting before
the first marriage was annulled.
In like manner, the Court recently upheld the ruling
in the aforementioned case and ruled that what makes
a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he
contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid first marriage. It further held
that the parties to the marriage should not be
permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the
same must be submitted to the judgment of
competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so
long as there is no such declaration the presumption
is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who
contracts a second marriage before the judicial
declaration of the first marriage assumes the risk of
being prosecuted for bigamy.
People vs. Odtuhan: The crime of bigamy can still
be prosecuted even after the declaration of nullity for
the 1st marriage provided that the 2nd marriage is
contracted before a court declaration that the 1 st
marriage is terminated
FACTS: Edgardo Odtuhan is charged with the crime
of bigamy by marrying Eleanor Alagon after
marrying Jasmin Modina
Defense of Respondent: Sometime in August 1994,
he filed a petition for annulment of his marriage with
Modina. On February 23, 1999, the RTC of Pasig
City, Branch 70 granted respondents petition and
declared his marriage with Modina void ab initio for
lack of a valid marriage license. On November 10,
2003, Alagon died. In the meantime, in June 2003,
private complainant Evelyn Abesamis Alagon learned
of respondents previous marriage with Modina. She
thus filed a Complaint-Affidavit charging respondent
with Bigamy.
On February 5, 2008, respondent filed an Omnibus
Motion praying that he be allowed to present
evidence to support his motion; that his motion to
quash be granted; and that the case be dismissed.
Respondent moved for the quashal of the information
on two grounds, to wit: (1) that the facts do not
charge the offense of bigamy; and (2) that the
criminal action or liability has been extinguished.
RTCs decision: facts alleged in the information that
there was a valid marriage between respondent and
Modina and without such marriage having been
dissolved, respondent contracted a second marriage
with Alagon constitute the crime of bigamy. The
trial court further held that neither can the
information be quashed on the ground that criminal
liability has been extinguished, because the
declaration of nullity of the first marriage is not one
of the modes of extinguishing criminal liability.
CAs decision: Reversed the decision of RTC on the
grounds that since the 1st marriage has already been
annulled by court, the 1st element of the crime of
bigamy is already absent thus bars conviction and
warrants dismissal of criminal case
ISSUE: Whether or not, the nullity of the 1st marriage
bars the conviction for the 2nd marriage contracted by
the respondent before the judicial declaration of
nullity of the 1st marriage
RULING: No, it does not bar conviction and
respondent can be charged for the crime of bigamy
Respondent and CA stems their argument on the
jurisprudences of Antone and Montaez where
respondent moved to quash the information on the
grounds that the facts do not charge the offense of
bigamy and that his criminal liability has been
extinguished both because of the declaration of
nullity of the first marriage. The RTC refused to
quash the information. On petition for certiorari, the
CA, however, reached a different conclusion.
As defined in Antone, "a motion to quash information
is the mode by which an accused assails the validity
of a criminal complaint or information filed against
him for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for
defects which are apparent in the face of the
information." It is a hypothetical admission of the
facts alleged in the information. The fundamental test
in determining the sufficiency of the material
averments in an Information is whether or not the
facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically
admitted, would establish the essential elements of
the crime defined by law. Evidence aliunde or matters
extrinsic of the information are not to be considered.
To be sure, a motion to quash should be based on a
defect in the information which is evident on its fact.
Thus, if the defect can be cured by amendment or if it
is based on the ground that the facts charged do not
constitute an offense, the prosecution is given by the
court the opportunity to correct the defect by
amendment. If the motion to quash is sustained, the
court may order that another complaint or
information be filed except when the information is
quashed on the ground of extinction of criminal
liability or double jeopardy.
Here, the information contained the following
allegations: (1) that respondent is legally married to
Modina; (2) that without such marriage having been
legally dissolved; (3) that respondent willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously contracted a second
marriage with Alagon; and (4) that the second
marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
Respondents evidence showing the courts
declaration that his marriage to Modina is null and
void from the beginning because of the absence of a
marriage license is only an evidence that seeks to
establish a fact contrary to that alleged in the
information that a first valid marriage was subsisting
at the time he contracted the second marriage. This
should not be considered at all, because matters of
defense cannot be raised in a motion to quash.
It is not proper, therefore, to resolve the charges at
the very outset without the benefit of a full blown
trial. The issues require a fuller examination and it
would be unfair to shut off the prosecution at this
stage of the proceedings and to quash the information
on the basis of the document presented by
respondent. With the presentation of the court decree,
no facts have been brought out which destroyed the
prima facie truth accorded to the allegations of the
information on the hypothetical admission thereof
The Family Code has settled once and for all the
conflicting jurisprudence on the matter.1wphi1 A
declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is
now explicitly required either as a cause of action or
a ground for defense. It has been held in a number of
cases that a judicial declaration of nullity is required
before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted;
or else, what transpires is a bigamous marriage,
reprehensible and immoral.
What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is
when he contracts a second or subsequent marriage
during the subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to
the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted
to the judgment of competent courts and only when
the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be
held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration, the presumption is that the marriage
exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage
before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy.
If we allow respondents line of defense and the
CAs ratiocination, a person who commits bigamy
can simply evade prosecution by immediately filing a
petition for the declaration of nullity of his earlier
marriage and hope that a favorable decision is
rendered therein before anyone institutes a complaint
against him.
To conclude, the issue on the declaration of nullity of
the marriage between petitioner and respondent only
after the latter contracted the subsequent marriage is,
therefore, immaterial for the purpose of establishing
that the facts alleged in the information for Bigamy
does not constitute an offense. Following the same
rationale, neither may such defense be interposed by
the respondent in his motion to quash by way of
exception to the established rule that facts contrary to
the allegations in the information are matters of
defense which may be raised only during the
presentation of evidence.
Santos vs. Santos: Annulment of judgment based on
extrinsic fraud can be used as a remedy to nullify the
2nd marriage and its effect rather than the remedy of
affidavit of appearance
FACTS: On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court
of Tarlac City declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos
(Celerina) presumptively dead after her husband,
respondent Ricardo T. Santos (Ricardo), had filed a
petition for declaration of absence or presumptive
death for the purpose of remarriage on June 15,
2007. Ricardo remarried on September 17, 2008.
Contention of Ricardo: Ricardo claimed that their
business did not prosper. As a result, Celerina
convinced him to allow her to work as a domestic
helper in Hong Kong. Ricardo initially refused but
because of Celerina's insistence, he allowed her to
work abroad. She allegedly applied in an
employment agency in Ermita, Manila, in February
1995. She left Tarlac two months after and was never
heard from again.
Ricardo further alleged that he exerted efforts to
locate Celerina. He went to Celerina's parents in
Cubao, Quezon City, but they, too, did not know their
daughter's whereabouts. He also inquired about her
from other relatives and friends, but no one gave him
any information.
Ricardo claimed that it was almost years from the
date of his Regional Trial Court petition since
Celerina left. He believed that she had passed away.
RTCs decision: Granted the petition
Contention of Celerina: Celerina claimed that she
learned about Ricardo's petition only sometime in
October 2008 when she could no longer avail the
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or
other appropriate remedies.
Celerina claimed that she never resided in Tarlac.
She also never left and worked as a domestic helper
abroad. Neither did she go to an employment agency
in February 1995. She also claimed that it was not
true that she had been absent for 12 years. Ricardo
was aware that she never left their conjugal dwelling
in Quezon City. It was he who left the conjugal
dwelling in May 2008 to cohabit with another
woman. Celerina referred to a joint affidavit executed
by their children to support her contention that
Ricardo made false allegations in his petition.
She argued that she was deprived her day in court
when Ricardo, despite his knowledge of her true
residence, misrepresented to the court that she was a
resident of Tarlac City.
CAs decision: dismissing Celerina's petition for
annulment of judgment for being a wrong mode of
remedy. According to the Court of Appeals, the
proper remedy was to file a sworn statement before
the civil registry, declaring her reappearance in
accordance with Article 42 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not the proper remedy is sworn
statement of re-appearance and not annulment of
judgment
RULING: The proper remedy is annulment of
judgment based on extrinsic fraud
Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the
Regional Trial Court's judgment, order, or resolution
has become final, and the "remedies of new trial,
appeal, petition for relief (or other appropriate
remedies) are no longer available through no fault of
the petitioner."
The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic
fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
Celerina alleged in her petition for annulment of
judgment that there was fraud when Ricardo
deliberately made false allegations in the court with
respect to her residence. Ricardo also falsely claimed
that she was absent for 12 years. There was also no
publication of the notice of hearing of Ricardo's
petition in a newspaper of general circulation.
Celerina claimed that because of these, she was
deprived of notice and opportunity to oppose
Ricardo's petition to declare her presumptively dead.
Celerina alleged that all the facts supporting
Ricardo's petition for declaration of presumptive
death were false. Celerina further claimed that the
court did not acquire jurisdiction because the Office
of the Solicitor General and the Provincial
Prosecutor's Office were not given copies of
Ricardo's petition.
These are allegations of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. Celerina alleged in her petition with the
Court of Appeals sufficient ground/s for annulment of
judgment.
Celerina filed her petition for annulment of judgment
on November 17, 2008. This was less than two years
from the July 27, 2007 decision declaring her
presumptively dead and about a month from her
discovery of the decision in October 2008. The
petition was, therefore, filed within the four-year
period allowed by law in case of extrinsic fraud, and
before the action is barred by laches, which is the
period allowed in case of lack of jurisdiction.
There was also no other sufficient remedy available
to Celerina at the time of her discovery of the fraud
perpetrated on her.
The Family Code provides the presumptively dead
spouse with the remedy of terminating the subsequent
marriage by mere reappearance.
The filing of an affidavit of reappearance is an
admission on the part of the first spouse that his or
her marriage to the present spouse was terminated
when he or she was declared absent or presumptively
dead.
Moreover, a close reading of the entire Article 42
reveals that the termination of the subsequent
marriage by reappearance is subject to several
conditions: (1) the non-existence of a judgment
annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void
ab initio; (2) recording in the civil registry of the
residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage of
the sworn statement of fact and circumstances of
reappearance; (3) due notice to the spouses of the
subsequent marriage of the fact of reappearance; and
(4) the fact of reappearance must either be undisputed
or judicially determined.
The existence of these conditions means that
reappearance does not always immediately cause the
subsequent marriage's termination. Reappearance of
the absent or presumptively dead spouse will cause
the termination of the subsequent marriage only when
all the conditions enumerated in the Family Code are
present.
Hence, the subsequent marriage may still subsist
despite the absent or presumptively dead spouse's
reappearance (1) if the first marriage has already
been annulled or has been declared a nullity; (2) if
the sworn statement of the reappearance is not
recorded in the civil registry of the subsequent
spouses' residence; (3) if there is no notice to the
subsequent spouses; or (4) if the fact of reappearance
is disputed in the proper courts of law, and no
judgment is yet rendered confirming, such fact of
reappearance.
When subsequent marriages are contracted after a
judicial declaration of presumptive death, a
presumption arises that the first spouse is already
dead and that the second marriage is legal. This
presumption should prevail over the continuance of
the marital relations with the first spouse. The second
marriage, as with all marriages, is presumed valid.
The burden of proof to show that the first marriage
was not properly dissolved rests on the person
assailing the validity of the second marriage.
A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even
if it was contracted after a court declaration of
presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a well-
founded belief that the spouse is already dead. The
first marriage will not be considered as. validly
terminated. Marriages contracted prior to the valid
termination of a subsisting marriage are generally
considered bigamous and void. Only a subsequent
marriage contracted in good faith is protected by law.
Therefore, the party who contracted the subsequent
marriage in bad faith is also not immune from an
action to declare his subsequent marriage void for
being bigamous. The prohibition against marriage
during the subsistence of another marriage still
applies.
If, as Celerina contends, Ricardo was in bad faith
when he filed his petition to declare her
presumptively dead and when he contracted the
subsequent marriage, such marriage would be
considered void for being bigamous under Article
35(4) of the Family Code. This is because the
circumstances lack the element of "well-founded
belief under Article 41 of the Family Code, which is
essential for the exception to the rule against
bigamous marriages to apply.
Celerina does not admit to have been absent. She also
seeks not merely the termination of the subsequent
marriage but also the nullification of its effects. She
contends that reappearance is not a sufficient remedy
because it will only terminate the subsequent
marriage but not nullify the effects of the declaration
of her presumptive death and the subsequent
marriage.
Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed subsequent
marriage under Article 42 of the Family Code is valid
until terminated, the "children of such marriage shall
be considered legitimate, and the property relations
of the spouse[s] in such marriage will be the same as
in valid marriages.
Lasanas vs. People: Bigamy would arise prior to
acquiring a judicial declaration of nullity for the first
marriage
FACTS: Noel Lansanas is charged with the crime of
bigamy for marrying Josefa Eslaban while the nullity
for his 1st marriage is still pending
Defense of Petitioner: On February 16, 1968, Judge
Carlos B. Salazar of the Municipal Trial Court of San
Miguel, Iloilo solemnized the marriage of accused
Noel Lasanas and Socorro Patingo without the
benefit of a marriage license. The records show that
Lasanas and Patingo had not executed any affidavit
of cohabitation to excuse the lack of the marriage
license. On August 27, 1980, Lasanas and Patingo
reaffirmed their marriage vows in a religious
ceremony before Fr. Rodolfo Tamayo at the San Jose
Church in Iloilo City. They submitted no marriage
license or affidavit of cohabitation for that purpose.
Both ceremonies were evidenced by the
corresponding marriage certificates. In 1982, Lasanas
and Patingo separated de facto because of
irreconcilable differences.
On December 27, 1993, the accused contracted
marriage with Josefa Eslaban in a religious ceremony
solemnized by Fr. Ramon Sequito at the Sta. Maria
Church in Iloilo City. Their marriage certificate
reflected the civil status of the accused as single.
On July 26, 1996, the accused filed a complaint for
annulment of marriage and damages against Socorro
in the RTC in Iloilo City, which was docketed as
Civil Case No. 23133 and raffled to Branch 39 of the
RTC. The complaint alleged that Socorro had
employed deceit, misrepresentations and fraud in
securing his consent to their marriage; and that
subsequent marital breaches, psychological
incompatibilities and her infidelity had caused him to
suffer mental anguish, sleepless nights and social
humiliation warranting the award of damages.
RTCs decision for the nullity: dismissed hi petition
and declare the marriage as valid
RTC and CAs decision for bigamy: Finding him
guilty for the crime of bigamy
ISSUE: Whether or not, he can be guilty for the
crime of bigamy notwithstanding that his 1 st marriage
is void for lack of marriage license of affidavit of
cohabitation to excuse such requirement
RULING: Yes, he is still guilty for the crime of
bigamy
This Court concedes that the marriage between
accused-appellant Lasanas and private complainant
Patingo was void because of the absence of a
marriage license or of an affidavit of cohabitation.
The ratificatory religious wedding ceremony could
not have validated the void marriage. Neither can the
church wedding be treated as a marriage in itself for
to do so, all the essential and formal requisites of a
valid marriage should be present. One of these
requisites is a valid marriage license except in those
instances when this requirement may be excused.
There having been no marriage license nor affidavit
of cohabitation presented to the priest who presided
over the religious rites, the religious wedding cannot
be treated as a valid marriage in itself.
But then, as the law and jurisprudence say, petitioner
should have first secured a judicial declaration of the
nullity of his void marriage to private complainant
Patingo before marrying Josefa Eslaban. Actually, he
did just that but after his marriage to Josefa Eslaban.
Consequently, he violated the law on bigamy.
Based on the findings of the CA, this case has all the
foregoing elements attendant.
The first and second elements of bigamy were
present in view of the absence of a judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage between the
accused and Socorro. The requirement of securing a
judicial declaration of nullity of marriage prior to
contracting a subsequent marriage is found in Article
40 of the Family Code, to wit:
Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage
on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such
previous marriage void.
The Family Code has settled once and for all the
conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A declaration
of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly
required either as a cause of action or a ground for
defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous
marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be
free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring
the previous marriage void.
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of absolute
nullity of a marriage is also for the protection of the
spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is
illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial
declaration of the nullity of his or her marriage, the
person who marries again cannot be charged with
bigamy.
If petitioners contention would be allowed, a person
who commits bigamy can simply evade prosecution
by immediately filing a petition for the declaration of
nullity of his earlier marriage and hope that a
favorable decision is rendered therein before anyone
institutes a complaint against him. We note that in
petitioners case the complaint was filed before the
first marriage was declared a nullity. It was only the
filing of the Information that was overtaken by the
declaration of nullity of his first marriage. Following
petitioners argument, even assuming that a
complaint has been instituted, such as in this case, the
offender can still escape liability provided that a
decision nullifying his earlier marriage precedes the
filing of the Information in court. Such cannot be
allowed. To do so would make the crime of bigamy
dependent upon the ability or inability of the Office
of the Public Prosecutor to immediately act on
complaints and eventually file Informations in court.
Plainly, petitioners strained reading of the law is
against its simple letter.
The accuseds defense of acting in good faith
deserves scant consideration especially because the
records show that he had filed a complaint for the
annulment of his marriage with Socorro prior to the
institution of the criminal complaint against him but
after he had already contracted his second marriage
with Josefa. But even such defense would abandon
him because the RTC (Branch 39) dismissed his
complaint for annulment of marriage after the
information for bigamy had already been filed against
him, thus confirming the validity of his marriage to
Socorro.
Ronul vs. People: Article 352
FACTS: Fr. Ronul of Aglipayan church is charged
with the crime of Article 352
Prosecutions version: Joey Umadac and Claire
Bingayen were scheduled to marry each other on
March 29, 2003 at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish
Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. However, on
the day of the wedding, the supposed officiating
priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused to solemnize the
marriage upon learning that the couple failed to
secure a marriage license. As a recourse, Joey, who
was then dressed in barong tagalong,and Claire, clad
in a wedding gown, together with their parents,
sponsors and guests, proceeded to the Independent
Church of Filipino Christians, also known as the
Aglipayan Church. They requested the petitioner, an
Aglipayan priest, to perform a ceremony to which the
latter agreed despite having been informed by the
couple that they had no marriage certificate.
The petitioner prepared his choir and scheduled a
mass for the couple on the same date. He conducted
the ceremony in the presence of the groom, the bride,
their parents, the principal and secondary sponsors
and the rest of their invited guests.
The prosecutions witnesses, Joseph and Mary Anne
Yere, testified on the incidents of the ceremony.
Joseph was the veil sponsor while Mary Anne was
the cord sponsor in the wedding. Mary Anne testified
that she saw the bride walk down the aisle. She also
saw the couple exchange their wedding rings, kiss
each other, and sign a document. She heard the
petitioner instructing the principal sponsors to sign
the marriage contract. Thereafter, they went to the
reception, had lunch and took pictures. She saw the
petitioner there. She also identified the wedding
invitation given to her by Joey.
Florida Umadac, the mother of Joey, testified that she
heard the couple declare during the ceremony that
they take each other as husband and wife. Days after
the wedding, she went to the municipal local civil
registrar of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte with Atty.
Mariano R. Nalupta Jr. where she was given a
certificate that no marriage license was issued to the
couple.
Defenses version: while admitting that he conducted
a ceremony, denied that his act of blessing the couple
was tantamount to a solemnization of the marriage as
contemplated by law.
MTC, RTC and CAs decision: Finding him guilty for
the crime under Art. 352
ISSUE: Whether or not, he is guilty for the crime of
solemnization of illegal marriage ceremony based on
his defense that he only gave his blessing thus does
not tantamount to marriage ceremony
RULING: Yes, he is still guilty for the crime under
Art. 352
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, penalizes an
authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform or
authorize any illegal marriage ceremony. The
elements of this crime are as follows: (1) authority of
the solemnizing officer; and (2) his performance of
an illegal marriage ceremony. In the present case, the
petitioner admitted that he has authority to solemnize
a marriage. Hence, the only issue to be resolved is
whether the alleged "blessing" by the petitioner is
tantamount to the performance of an "illegal marriage
ceremony" which is punishable under Article 352 of
the RPC, as amended.
While Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, does not
specifically define a "marriage ceremony" and what
constitutes its "illegal" performance, Articles 3(3) and
6 of the Family Code are clear on these matters.
These provisions were taken from Article 55 of the
New Civil Code which, in turn, was copied from
Section 3 of the Marriage Law with no substantial
amendments.
Article 6 of the Family Code provides that "[n]o
prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization
of the marriage is required. It shall be necessary,
however, for the contracting parties to appear
personally before the solemnizing officer and declare
in the presence of not less than two witnesses of legal
age that they take each other as husband and wife."
Pertinently, Article 3(3) mirrors Article 6 of the
Family Code and particularly defines a marriage
ceremony as that which takes place with the
appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration
that they take each other as husband and wife in the
presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
However, as correctly found by the CA, the law sets
the minimum requirements constituting a marriage
ceremony: first, there should be the personal
appearance of the contracting parties before a
solemnizing officer; and second, heir declaration in
the presence of not less than two witnesses that they
take each other as husband and wife.
As to the first requirement, the petitioner admitted
that the parties appeared before him and this fact was
testified to by witnesses. On the second requirement,
we find that, contrary to the petitioners allegation,
the prosecution has proven, through the testimony of
Florida, that the contracting parties personally
declared that they take each other as husband and
wife.
In addition, the testimonies of Joseph and Mary
Anne, and even the petitioners admission regarding
the circumstances of the ceremony, support Floridas
testimony that there had indeed been the declaration
by the couple that they take each other as husband
and wife.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the
principle of separation of church and State precludes
the State from qualifying the church "blessing" into a
marriage ceremony. Contrary to the petitioners
allegation, this principle has been duly preserved by
Article 6 of the Family Code when it provides that no
prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization
of marriage is required. This pronouncement gives
any religion or sect the freedom or latitude in
conducting its respective marital rites, subject only to
the requirement that the core requirements of law be
observed.
We emphasize at this point that Article 15 of the
Constitution recognizes marriage as an inviolable
social institution and that our family law is based on
the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a
social institution in which the State is vitally
interested. The State has paramount interest in the
enforcement of its constitutional policies and the
preservation of the sanctity of marriage. To this end,
it is within its power to enact laws and regulations,
such as Article 352 of the RPC, as amended, which
penalize the commission of acts resulting in the
disintegration and mockery of marriage.
Under Article 3(3) of the Family Code, one of the
essential requisites of marriage is the presence of a
valid marriage certificate. In the present case, the
petitioner admitted that he knew that the couple had
no marriage license, yet he conducted the "blessing"
of their relationship.
Undoubtedly, the petitioner conducted the marriage
ceremony despite knowledge that the essential and
formal requirements of marriage set by law were
lacking. The marriage ceremony, therefore, was
illegal. The petitioners knowledge of the absence of
these requirements negates his defense of good faith.
We also do not agree with the petitioner that the lack
of a marriage certificate negates his criminal liability
in the present case. For purposes of determining if a
marriage ceremony has been conducted, a marriage
certificate is not included in the requirements
provided by Article 3(3) of the Family Code, as
discussed above.
From these perspectives, we find it clear that what
the petitioner conducted was a marriage ceremony, as
the minimum requirements set by law were complied
with. While the petitioner may view this merely as a
"blessing," the presence of the requirements of the
law constitutive of a marriage ceremony qualified
this "blessing" into a "marriage ceremony" as
contemplated by Article 3(3) of the Family Code and
Article 352 of the RPC, as amended.
On the issue on the penalty for violation of Article
352 of the RPC, as amended, this provision clearly
provides that it shall be imposed in accordance with
the provision of the Marriage Law. The penalty
provisions of the Marriage Law are Sections 39 and
44 which provide as follows: Section 39 of the
Marriage Law provides that:
Section 39. Illegal Solemnization of Marriage Any
priest or minister solemnizing marriage without being
authorized by the Director of the Philippine National
Library or who, upon solemnizing marriage, refuses
to exhibit the authorization in force when called upon
to do so by the parties or parents, grandparents,
guardians, or persons having charge and any bishop
or officer, priest, or minister of any church, religion
or sect the regulations and practices whereof require
banns or publications previous to the solemnization
of a marriage in accordance with section ten, who
authorized the immediate solemnization of a
marriage that is subsequently declared illegal; or any
officer, priest or minister solemnizing marriage in
violation of this act, shall be punished by
imprisonment for not less than one month nor more
than two years, or by a fine of not less than two
hundred pesos nor more than two thousand pesos.
Section 44. General Penal Clause Any violation of
any provision of this Act not specifically penalized,
or of the regulations to be promulgated by the proper
authorities, shall be punished by a fine of not more
than two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for not
more than one month, or both, in the discretion of the
court.
From a reading of the provisions cited above, we find
merit in the ruling of the CA and the MTC that the
penalty imposable in the present case is that covered
under Section 44, and not Section 39, of the Marriage
Law.