Digests Art. X

CASE DIGESTS
ARTICLE X: LOCAL GOVERNMENT
SECTION 2:
SAN JUAN V CSC (1991)
Facts: The position of Provincial Budget Officer in the province of Rizal. Petitioner appointed another person as acting
officer, and informed the DBM regarding such vacancy and recommended the appointment of said person to the position.
Petitioner also sent his three nominees.
By virtue of Local Budget Circular No. 31 which grants the DBM the right to fill up any existing vacancies where none of the
nominees of the local chief executive meet the prescribed requirements, DBM appointed private respondent, who was not
included in the list, to be the PBO of Rizal. Respondent DBM contends that the petitioners recommendees did not meet
minimum requirements.
When the matter was raised by the petitioner to the CSC, the latter affirmed the decision of the DBM, and interpreted the
recommending powers as merely directory.
Issue: W/N there was grave abuse of discretion when public respondent appointed an officer not included in the nominees of
the petitioner
Held: Yes
1. Recommending powers of the local chief executive is not purely directory, but a condition sine qua non to the exercise of
the DBMs duty to appoint.
-When the CSC interpreted the recommending powers of the governor as purely directory, it went against the letter and
spirit of the constitutional provisions on local autonomy.
-If the DBM Secretary jealously hoards the entirety of the budgetary powers and ignores that right of the local government
to develop self-reliance and resoluteness in the handling of their own funds, the goal of meaningful local autonomy is
frustrated and set back.
2. LBC No. 21 was held ultra vires and set aside.

-The DBM may appoint only from the list of qualified recommendees nominated by the governor. If none is qualified, he
must return the list to the governor explaining why no one meets the legal requirements and ask for new recommendees who
have the necessary eligibilities and qualifications.
3. This was further aggravated when the regional director of DBM asked the petitioner to submit three other nominees which
were more qualified than the first set of names AFTER the appointment of the private respondent.
-It was a complete disregard of the local governments prerogative and the smug belief that the DBM has absolute wisdom,
authority, and discretion are manifest.
LLDA V CA (1994)
Facts: Members of the Task Force Camarin Dumpsite Our Lady of Lourdes Parish in Brgy. Camarin filed a complaint with
the LLDA to stop the operation of the dumpsite in Tala Estate, Brgy. Camarin due to its harmful effects on the health of the
residents and the possibility of water contamination of the surrounding area. LLDA investigated upon the matter and found
that the City of Caloocan was operating without clearance from certain agencies, including the former. Acting on the
complaint, LLDA issued a cease and desist order, enjoining the City of Caloocan from operating the dumpsite, due to the
effects of the leachate to the receiving waters and to the Marilao River. The respondent local government adhered to such
order, but continued its operation after the City of Caloocan, the Task Force, and the LLDA failed to settle the problem. LLDA
once again issued a cease and desist order, in which the respondent government unit contested with the RTC, claiming that
the City Government of Caloocan is the sole authority empowered to promote the health and safety and enhance the right of
the people in Caloocan City to a balanced ecology within its territorial jurisdiction. Upon the issuance of a resolution from the
SC, CA assumed jurisdiction over the case, and held that the cease and desist order be lifted. Petitioner filed an instant
petition for certiorari on review regarding the decision of the CA.
Issue: W/N the LLDA had the power and authority to issue a cease and desist order against the City Government of
Caloocan
Held: YES
-The LLDA has inherent authority, conferred to it by virtue of of EO No. 927, to make, alter, or modify orders requiring the
discontinuance of pollution. To issue cease and desist orders is well within their mandate. Petitioner had authority, conferred
to it by RA 4850, to promote and accelerate the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the
surrounding provinces of Rizal and Laguna and the cities of San Pablo, Manila, Pasay, Quezon and Caloocan regarding
1 CASTANEDA, GUERRERO, LAYNO, PEREZ, PUERTO, YOUNG

prevention of pollution. Therefore, the City Government of Caloocan, even though it has territorial jurisdiction over the
political subdivision, had no jurisdiction over the matter.
-The City Government of Caloocan did not obtain the necessary clearances from LLDA and other government agencies to
operate the dumpsite. LLDA only exercised its mandate to institute necessary legal proceedings against any person who
shall commence or implement or continue the implementation of any project, plan, or program within the Laguna de Bay
Region without previous clearance from LLDA.
It is worthy to note that in a previous LLDA case, the Court held that the specific power of LLDA must prevail over the general
power of governments.
MAGTAJAS V PRYCE PROPERTIES (1994)
Facts: PAGCOR leased the property owned by Pryce Properties to expand their operations in Cagayan de Oro. The
Sangguniang Panglunsod of CDO issued 2 ordinances prohibiting the issuance of business permits and cancels the existing
business permits of any establishment operating as a casino, by virtue of its territorial jurisdiction. Respondent and PAGCOR
contested that the ordinances were not reasonable, and these are in contravention to PD 1869, conferring PAGCOR to help
centralize and regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and sear within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines. Petitioners claim that the city is empowered by the LGC to enact ordinances to preserve the general welfare of
its constituents, and is therefore authorized to regulate the practice of gambling and other prohibited games of chance.
Issue: W/N said ordinances issued by the Sangguniang Panglunsod of CDO are valid
Held: NO
1. Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, gambling in the Local Government Code refers to those which are prohibited.
Gambling activities operated by PAGCOR are legal by virtue of PD 1869.
2. The rule of interpretation that any provision of any LGU shall be liberally interpreted in favor of local autonomy cannot be
applied here, since these ordinances are in contravention of PD 1869 as these enjoin PAGCOR to exercise its mandate to
operate a casino in CDO.
3. In the repealing clause of the LGC, PD 1869 was not included, in comparison to the statutes EXPRESSLY enumerated to
be repealed. As a rule, implied repeals are frowned upon. Therefore, PAGCORs power remains unimpaired since it is not
modified by the LGC.
PHIL. PETROLEUM CORP V MUNICIPALITY OF PILLILA (1991)
Facts: PPC is engaged in the manufacture of lubricated oil basestock, which is a petroleum product, with it refinery plant in
Pililla, Rizal.
January 9, 1973 - PC No. 26 A-73 refrained City treasurers from collecting tax imposed in tax ordinances on or before the
effectivity of the Local Tax Code on July 1, 1973 on business engaged with petroleum products subject to specific tax under
the NIRC.
June 28, 1973 - PD no. 231 was issued governing the taxing powers of political subdivisions. Sections 19 and 19(a) of said
statute provide that the municipality may impose taxes on BUSINESS, except on those for which fixed taxes are provided on
manufacturers, importers, and producers of any article of commerce of whatever kind or nature.
Dec. 27, 1973 - Sec. of Finance issued PC no. 26-73 to refrain treasurers from collecting any local tax in old or new tax
ordinances in the business of manufacturing, wholesaling, retailing, or dealing in petroleum products subject to specific tax
under the NIRC.
March 30, 1974 - PD No. 426 was issued amending PD 213 but retaining Section 19 and 19(a).
April 13, 1974 - PD. 436 increased specific taxes on petroleum products and granting political subdivisions (except
barangays) certain shares in the specific tax on such products in lieu of local taxes imposed on petroleum products.
June 14, 1974 - The Pililla Tax Code of 1974 was enacted. Section 9 and 10 imposed business tax, except for those for
which fixes taxes are provided in the Local Tax Code.
March 13, 1977 - PC No. 6-77 was also issued all city and municipal treasures to refrain from collecting the so-called storage
fee on flammable or combustible materials under the local tax ordinance of their locality. Said fee partakes of the nature of
strictly revenue measure or service charge.
June 3, 1977 - PD 1158 or 1977 NIRC states that specific taxes are to be imposed on refined and manufactured mineral oils
and motor fuels.
PPC was assessed for business tax from 1979 to 1986; storage permit fees from 1975-1986; and mayors permit and
sanitary inspection fees from 1975-1984.
Issue: W/N petitioner PPC, whose oil products are subject to specific taxes under NIRC, is still liable to pay (a) business tax,
(b) storage fees and (c) Mayors permit and sanitary inspection fee
Held: YES, with reservations


1. on business taxes (business taxes incurred prior to 1976 shall not be paid as these have already prescribed)
-PC 26-73 is repealed by PD 426 amending the Local Tax Code. No exemptions are granted to the imposition of business
tax to those entities engaged in the petroleum business. A continuous effectivity of PC 26-73 would restrict the LGUs power
to tax.
-PD 436 did not amend provisions of PD 231 where the municipality can impose business taxes on manufacturers, importers,
producers of any article of commerce of whatever kind or nature.
-However, since the Local Tax Code did not provide the prescriptive period for the collection of local taxes, the Civil Code
applied. An action upon an obligation created by law prescribed within 10 years from the right of action accrues.
2. Storage fees are not to be paid
-storage fees are imposed on the usage of the municipalitys storage facilities as a revenue tax or service charge
-PPC uses its own tanks, there cannot be charged for service by the municipality
3. permit fees are to be paid
-Such imposition by Pilillas tax ordinance is allowed under the amended local tax code
DADOLE V COA (2002)
Facts: RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City started receiving monthly allowances through as appropriation ordinance by
the Sangguniang Panglungsod. This was further increased after a number of years. DBM issued LBC 55 in dispute of such
allowance, stating that such allowance was not in compliance with how the IRA should be spent. Upon receipt of the circular,
the City Auditor decreased the allowance and ordered the reimbursement of the allowance in excess of the stipulated amount
in the said circular. Hence, the petition.
Issue: 1. W/N LBC 55 is void for going beyond the supervisory powers of the President
2. W/N the ordinance that provides additional allowances to judges contravenes the annual appropriation laws enacted by
Congress
Held: Yes and No

1. LBC 55 is void for going beyond the supervisory powers of the President
-President or its alter egos, by virtue of Sec 4, Art. X, can only exercise general supervision over local governments.
-RA 7160 (or the Local Government Code), which is the legal basis of the said circular, allows the grant of additional
allowances to judges when the finances of the city government allow. It does not authorize setting a definite max limit to
additional allowances granted to the judges.
-The DBM over-stepped its power of supervision over LGUs by imposing a prohibition that did not correspond with
the law it sought to implement.
-LBC 55 is also void due to the lack of publication.
2. The ordinance does not contravene any law.

-COA contends that it was the IRA that enabled Mandaue City to incur a surplus, since the city incurred deficits in
prior years. Further, it contravenes the corresponding GAA by using the IRA in expenditures not allowed by law.
-However, COA was not able to prove that the City of Mandaue used the IRA and not from the citys own revenues.
-Further, DBM has been estopped from questioning the legality of the ordinance by not taking positive action within
90 days from receipt of the said ordinance. RA 7160 provides that the DBM shall review ordinance within 90 days from its
receipt. If no action was taken, the same shall be deemed to have been reviewed and shall continue to be in full force and
effect.
JOHN HAY PEOPLES ALTERNATIVE COALITION V LIM (2003)
Facts: Pursuant to RA No. 7227, the BCDA is to declare Camp John Hay into a Special Economic Zone. By such
declaration, this would exempt the camps property and the economic activity therein from local and national taxation. Also,
President Ramos issued a proclamation stating which areas as to be established as SEZ in Camp John Hay and officially
declaring the tax exemptions of those entities within the area. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of said proclamation for
interfering with local autonomy.
Issues/Held:
1. W/N the Proclamation is constitutional by providing national and local tax exemption within and granting other economic
incentives to the John Hay SZE = YES
-No where in RA 7227 is there a grant of tax exemption to John Hay SEZ. All tax exemptions in the said RA are granted to
the Subic SEZ only.
-Tax exemptions cannot be implied. If it were the intention of the legislature to grant such exemptions to the John Hay SEZ, it
would have said so expressly.
2. W/N the proclamation is constitutional for limiting or interfering with the local autonomy of Baguio City = NO

-It is stated in RA 7227 that the BCDA is entrusted to own, hold and/or administer the military reservations of John Hay Air
Station. BCDA virtually has control over it.
LEYNES V COA (2003)
Facts: Petitioner received his representation and transportation allowance (RATA) from the Supreme and from the local
funds of the Municipality of Naujan. However, COA denied this grant and ordered the petitioner to reimburse the RATA
released. Respondents contend that this was in contravention of the GAA of 1993, which had allegedly repealed clauses in
the 1991 LGC (in which it allows the municipality to grant allowances when the funds are enough), in which it provides that
RATA cannot come from more than one source, and that the municipality did not meet the conditions in LBC no. 53 to grant
allowances. Hence, this petition.
Issue: W/N the Municipality of Naujan can validly provide additional RATA to petitioner, aside from the RATA provided by the
SC
Held: YES
1. National Compensation Circular No. 67 and its basis, GAA of 1993, did not repeal the 1991 LGC
-Nothing in the GAA expressly repealed the provisions in the 1991 LGC. The GAA only provided rates of RATA payable to
govt employees.
-An administrative circular cannot supersede a statute. NCC no. 67 cannot therefore modify, alter, or repeal the 1991 LGC.
-Further, NCC no. 67, in which it states no allowances can come from more than one source, means that allowances cannot
come from another national agency. This is from reading the circular AS A WHOLE.
-TO rule against the power of LGUs to grant allowances will subvert the principle of local autonomy. The 1991 LGC provides
that the municipality can grant allowance when its fund allow it.
2. LBC no. 53 is invalid, even if it is within the general supervision of the President, in so far as the prohibitions against
granting similar allowances are concerned.
-The circular provided more conditions aside from those that were already enumerated in the 1991 LGC. A circular must
conform to the law it seeks to implement.
-By prohibiting LGUs to grant similar allowances granted by the national government, the circular prohibits the powers
granted by the 1991 LGC which allows them to provide allowances.
3. The resolution granting the RATA to the petitioner is valid as it is in accordance with the law.
BATANGAS CATV V CA (2004)
Facts: Petitioner, a CATV provider, assails the resolution passed by Sangguniang Panglunsod of Batangas City, in which it
regulated the subscription rates of the former. Petitioner contends that by virtue of EO 205, only NTC can regulate subscriber
rates. Meanwhile, the respondents submit that through its general welfare powers, it can regulate subscription prices.
Issue: W/N respondent LGU can validly regulate subscriber rates = NO
Held: 1. NTC has the SOLE power to regulate subscriber rates.

-Ordinances and resolutions should not violate laws of general application.
-The resolution passed by the sanggunian encroaches on the NTCs authority conferred to it by the EO.
-Technical matters concerning CATV operations are within the exclusive regulatory power of the NTC.
2. The resolution is in contravention of the States deregulation policy.

-EO 436 provides that the CATV industry shall enjoy minimum reasonable government regulations. LGUs are bound to follow
this policy.
-There is no law authorizing LGUs to grant franchises to operate the CATV system. Only NTC can do this.
CAMP JOHN HAY DEVELOPMENT CORP V CBAA

(GR No. 169234, 2 October 2013)
Key-takeaway:
1. The restriction upon the power of the courts to impeach tax assessment without a prior payment, under protest, of the
taxes assessed is consistent with the doctrine that taxes are the lifeblood of the nation, and as such, their collection cannot
be curtailed by injunction or any like action.

2. The local government unit shall be crippled in dispensing the needed services to the people, and its machinery gravely
disabled. The right of the local government units to collect taxes due must always be upheld to avoid severe erosion. This
consideration is consistent with the State policy to guarantee the autonomy of local government units and the objective of
1991 LGC that they enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to empower them to achieve their fullest development as
self-reliant communities and make them effective partners in the attainment of national goals.
Facts:
Petitioner received a tax assessment against their property in the City of Baguio. Petitioner questioned the assessment
because it allegedly lacked legal basis due to the failure of the assessor to identify the specific properties being taxes, and for
being allegedly exempt from paying national and local taxes, including real property tax, pursuant to the Bases Conversion
and Development Act of 1992. The Board of Tax Assessment Appeals enjoined petitioner to first pay the payment under
protest before the hearing of its appeal. The Central Board of Assessment Appeals remanded the case back to the BTAA
subject to the up to date payment of the property tax. CTA dismissed the petition when elevated to them by the petitioner to
respect the hierarchy of courts.
Issue: W/N petitioner is exempt from real property tax = NO
Held:
1. Claim from tax exemption should follow the rules in the LGC. Entity claiming such should file within 30 days from the date
of declaration of real property sufficient documentary evidence in support of the claim of exemption (charter, title of
ownership, AOI, bylaws, contracts, etc). If required evidence is not submitted within the period prescribed, the property shall
be deemed taxable.
-Petitioner did not deny factual allegations regarding the ownership of properties being taxes. They also expressly admitted
this.
-Petitioner did not submit documentary evidence required.
-There was no grant of tax exemption for the JHSEZ. The BCDA only granted this to the Subic SEZ.
2. Before the courts can decide on the validity of the assessments, petitioner should pay first the tax and mark it as under
protest. This is in compliance with the 1991 LGC, which provides that any real property tax payer not satisfied with the action
of the assessor shall, within 60 days from receipt of the notice of assessment, appeal to the Board of Assessment Appeals
by filing a petition under oath in the form prescribed for the purpose, together with the copy of tax declarations and such
affidavits or documents submitted in support of the appeal. This is also not suspend the collection of the corresponding realty
taxes. This is in consonance with the lifeblood theory of tax. The right of LGUs to collect taxes must always be upheld to
avoid severe erosion and to respect the autonomy of LGUs.
-Payment under protest is a condition sine qua non before a protest or an appeal questioning the correctness of an
assessment of real property tax may be entertained. Correctness of assessments is under the jurisdiction of the LBAA, as
this constitutes a question of fact.
-Petitioner, by not paying the tax under protest, did not comply with the requirements provided in the LGC before the courts
can pass upon its validity. Petitioner's claim of tax exemption is not meritorious also, as stated above.
-CBAA and CTA correctly ruled that taxes should be paid before the appeal can be entertained. The remanding of the case
back to LBAA was proper.
IMBONG V OCHOA
(GR NO. 2004819, 8 April 2014)
Facts: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the RH Law as in violates the principle of local autonomy of local
governments and the ARMM. By providing RH measures at the local government level and the ARMM, it infringes upon the
powers devolved to the LGUs and ARMM under the LGC.
Issues/Held: W/N the RH Law is unconstitutional for violating the principle of local autonomy = NO
1.LGUs are not mandated to act on projects funded by the national government, except when the LGU concerned is
designated as the implementing agency. LGUs are also encourage, not required, to provide RH services.
2.The Organic Law of ARMM did not abdicate the States power to enact legislation that will benefit general welfare.
-ARMM does not have an imperium in imperio (an empire within an empire) relationship with the State.
-Therefore, the Congress can exercise its powers which covers general matters.

BELGICA V OCHOA
GR No. 208556, 19 November 2013)
Facts: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the Congressional Pork Barrel (CBP) as it contravenes the principle of local
autonomy of LGUs, insofar that it allows district representatives, who are are national officers, to substitute their judgements
in utilizing public funds for local development.
Pork Barrel System refers to collective body of rules and practices that govern the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary
funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized through the respective participations of the Legislative and Executive
branches of the government, including its members.
Congressional Pork Barrel: lump sum, discretionary fund wherein legislators either individually or collectively organized into
communities, are able to control certain aspects of the funds utilization through various post enactment measures and/or
practices.
Issues/Held: W/N the Congressional Pork Barrel is constitutional insofar as legislators are allowed to intervene in purely
local matters = NO
1.The CBP does not make the unequal equal.

-A district representative of a highly urbanized city gets the same funding as a representing of a far-flung province.
-Senators, who do not represent districts, also receive funding.
-Legislators justifies that the relatively small projects implemented under the CBP is in line with the national development
goals. This enables district representatives to identify projects which the LGU cannot afford since this officer is closer to its
constituents.
-But the criteria of funds (PDAF) allocation is only based on office, and not the specific interests and peculiarities of the
district the legislator represents. This does not take into account that economic or geographic indicators.
2. Legislator control over funding is contradicts the functions of Local Development Councils tasked to assist the sanggunian
in managing local affairs.
-Programs of the LDCs cannot be overridden nor duplicated by individual legislators.
Legislators cannot act alone.
-Legislator are national officers that have no law-making authority except only when acting a one Congress.
-With PDAF, a Congressman can simply bypass the LDC and initiate projects on his own, and even take sole credit for its
execution.
GENERAL SANTOS CITY V COA

April 22, 2014
Facts: Former Mayor Acharon of General Santos City issued E.O. No. 40, series of 2008, creating management teams
pursuant to its organization development program. In addition to, E.O. No. 13, series of 2009 was also adopted embodying
the organization development masterplan. This was followed by Resolution No. 004, series of 2009, requesting for the
mayors support for GenSan SERVES, an early retirement program to be proposed to the Sangguniang Panlungsod
Consequently, Ordinance No. 08, series of 2009, was passed together with its IRR. The ordinance provides for
separation benefits for sickly employees who have not yet reached the age of retirement. COA assails constitutionality of
Ordinance No. 08
Issue: Does the constitutional mandate for local autonomy grant local governments the power to streamline and reorganize
as well as the authority to create a separate or supplementary retirement benefit plan?
Held: Yes, only with respect to the power to streamline and reorganize. This power is inferred from section 16 of the LGC on
organizational structure and staffing pattern, and section 16 otherwise known as the general welfare clause. In this case, the
constitutional mandate for local autonomy supports petitioner citys issuance and E.O. No. 40, series of 2008, creating
change management teams as an initial step for its organization development masterplan.
The supplementary retirement plan, however, is invalid in so far as it violates section 28(b) of Commonwealth Act
No. 186 (Government Service Insurance Act) which bans all supplementary retirement or pension plans for government
employees in order to prevent undue and iniquitous proliferation of such plans.
SJS V LIM
November 23, 2014
Facts: During the incumbency of former Mayor Atienza, the Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Ordinance No. 8027
reclassifying the use of the land in Pandacan, Sta. Ana, and its adjoining areas from Industrial II to Commercial I. The owners

and operators of the business thus affected by the reclassification were given 6 months from the date of effectivity of the
ordinance within which to stop the operation of their businesses. Writs of preliminary prohibitory injunctions were issued in
favour of the oil depot operators.
During the incumbency of Mayor Lim, The Sangguniang Panlungsod enacted Ordinance No. 8187. The new
ordinance repealed, amended and rescinded Ordinance No. 8026 and other ordinances inconsistent therewith, allowing once
again the operation of oil depots.
Issue: Is Manila Ordinance No. 8187 valid and constitutional?

Held: No. The best interest of the public elaborated in Ordinance No. 8207 which was intended to safeguard the rights to life,
security and safety of all the inhabitants of Manila guided the Court in resolving this issue. The Pandacan oil depot remains a
target of terrorism even if the contents have been lessened. In the absence of any convincing reasons to persuade this court
that the life, security and safety of inhabitant of Manila are no longer at risk by the presence of depots, Ordinance No. 8187
shall remain invalid. This is also invalid in so far as Section 16 of Republic Act No. 7160 known as the Local Government
Code, which defines the scope of the general welfare clause is concerned.
SECTION 3:
SANCHEZ V COMELEC
January 24, 1991
Doctrine: BP blg. 337 on Recall; Until such time that a more responsive and effective local government code is
enacted, the present code shall remain in full force and effect.
Facts: Private respondents Emmanuel Balanon and Manuel Canete filed separate notices of recall against petitioners,
Guillermo Sanchez and Carlito Tan, incumbent city mayor and vice mayor, respectively, of Btutuan City. On February 9,
1990, respondent City Election Registrar Pizarro approved the schedule of signing thru Minute Resolution No. 1612 to be
conducted on Mondays to Fridays beginning February 14, 1990 to march 15, 1990. Private respondents filed a proposal to
amend the recall proceedings, where the petitioners filed their oppositions thereto, contending that there is no valid ground to
justify to ammend the schedule of recall proceedings already underway.
In answer to petitioners, COMELEC issued Minute Resolution No. 90-0590 declaring as null and void the signing process
conducted under Resolution No. 1612, having been superseded by Resolution No. 2272, setting the date for signing process
on August 11, 18, and 25, 1990.
Alleging lack or excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, petitioners filed this instant petition for prohibition and
injunction with prayer for issuance of a TRO. Petitioners assail constitutionality of Resolution No. 2272, there being no
legislative enactment yet on mechanism of recall as provided under Sec 3, Art. X of the Constitution.
Issue/s: W/N COMELEC Minute Resolution No. 2272 on providing for recall proceedings constitutional
Held: No. Petition is granted on the grounds that Resolution No. 2272 did not have a retroactive effect, which held Resolution
No. 1612 valid and enforceable. Resolution No. 2272 did not effectively superseded Resolution No. 1612.
While it is true that Sec. 3 Art X of the Constitution mandates Congress to enact a local government code providing
for an effective mechanism of recall, nothing in said provision could be inferred the repeal of BP 337, the local government
code existing prior to the adoption of the 1987 Constitution from which the COMELEC exercised its power in issuing
Resolution Nos. 1613 and 2272.
GARCIA V COMELEC
October 5, 1993
Doctrine: There is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely suggest that the people have the sole and
exclusive right to decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding. The Constitution did not provide for any mode,
let alone a single mode. Of initiating recall elections. Neither did it prohibit the adoption of multiple modes of
initiating recall elections. What the constitution strictly required is that the mechanisms of recall, whether one or
many, to be chosen by Congress, should be effective.
Facts: Enrique T. Garcia was elected governor of Bataan in the 1992 elections. Some mayors, vice-mayors and members
of the Sangguniang Bayan of the twelve (12) municipalities of the province constituted themselves into a Preparatory Recall
Assembly to initiate the recall election of petitioner Garcia. They issued Resolution No. 1 as formal initiation of the recall
proceedings. COMELEC scheduled the recall for the gubernatorial position of Bataan.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with writ of preliminary injunction to annul the Resolution
of the COMELEC because the PRAC failed to comply with the "substantive and procedural requirement" laid down in Section
70 of R.A. 7160 (Local Government Code 1991). They contend that
Issue/s: W/N the people have the sole and exclusive right to initiate recall proceedings.

Held: No. There is nothing in the Constitution that will remotely suggest that the people have the "sole and exclusive right to
decide on whether to initiate a recall proceeding." The Constitution did not provide for any mode, let alone a single mode, of
initiating recall elections.
The mandate given by section 3 of Article X of the Constitution is for Congress to "enact a local government code
which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure through a system of decentralization
with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum." By this constitutional mandate, Congress was clearly given
the power to choose the effective mechanisms of recall as its discernment dictates.
What the Constitution simply required is that the mechanisms of recall, whether one or many, to be chosen by
Congress should be effective. Using its constitutionally granted discretion, Congress deemed it wise to enact an alternative
mode of initiating recall elections to supplement the former mode of initiation by direct action of the people. The legislative
records reveal there were two (2) principal reasons why this alternative mode of initiating the recall process thru an assembly
was adopted, viz: a) to diminish the difficulty of initiating recall through direct action/ initiative of the people, and b) to cut
down on its expenses.
LAMP V SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT

April 24, 2012
Doctrine: In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the court does not lose sight of the
presumption of validity accorded to the statutory acts of Congress. To justify nullification of the law or its
implementation, there must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful breach of the Constitution.
Facts: Petitioner Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (LAMP) sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or
TRO to enjoin respondent Secretary of Budget and Management (DBM) from making, and thereafter, releasing budgetary
allocations to individual members of Congress as pork barrel funds out of PDAF as provided for in RA 9206 or the General
Appropriations Act of 2004 (GAA 2004). Petitioner contends that the situation runs afoul the principle of separation of powers
because in receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of the Congress in effect
intrudes into the executive function. Further, the authority to propose and select projects does not pertain to legislation. It is a
non-legislative function devoid of constitutional sanction, and therefore, impermissible and must be considered nothing less
than malfeasance.
Respondents posit that the perceptions of LAMP on the implementation of PDAF must not be based merely on
speculations circulated in news media preaching the evils of pork barrel.
Issue: W/N the implementation of PDAF is unconstitutional or illegal
Held: No. Petition is dismissed. In determining whether or not a statute is unconstitutional, the court does not lose sight of
the presumption of validity accorded to the statutory acts of Congress. To justify nullification of the law or its implementation,
there must be a clear and unequivocal, not a doubtful breach of the Constitution. In case of doubt and insufficiency of proof
establishing unconstitutionality, the Court sustain legislation because to invalidate [a law] based on baseless supposition is
an affront to the wisdom not only of the legislature that passed it, but also of the executive which approved it.
The petition is miserably wanting in this regard. No convincing proof was presented showing that, indeed, there
were direct releases of funds to the Members of Congress, who actually spend them according to their sole discretion.
Devoid of any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form of kickbacks has become a common
exercise of unscrupulous Members of Congress, the Court cannot indulge the petitioners request for rejection of a law which
is outwardly legal and capable of lawful enforcement.
On Pork Barrel:
The Members of Congress are then requested by the President to recommend projects and programs which may be
funded from the PDAF. The list submitted by the Members of Congress is endorsed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives to the DBM, which reviews and determines whether such list of projects submitted are consistent with the
guidelines and the priorities set by the Executive.33 This demonstrates the power given to the President to execute
appropriation laws and therefore, to exercise the spending per se of the budget.
As applied to this case, the petition is seriously wanting in establishing that individual Members of Congress receive
and thereafter spend funds out of PDAF. So long as there is no showing of a direct participation of legislators in the actual
spending of the budget, the constitutional boundaries between the Executive and the Legislative in the budgetary process
remain intact.
JALOVER V OSMENA
September 23, 2014
Doctrine: The Law does not require a person to be at his home 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to fulfil the residency
requirement.
Facts:
Private respondent John Henry Osmena file his certificate of candidacy to run for the position of mayor, Toledo City,
Cebu on October 3, 202. Osmena indicated in his COC that he had been a resident of Toledo City for 15 years prior to the

rd
May 2013 elections and that he had actually served as representative of the 3 Congressional District of the Province of
Cebu from 1995 to 1998, which includes Toledo City.
Petitioners filed before COMELEC a petition to deny due course and to cancel the COC and disqualify respondent
on ground that he made material misrepresentations of fact in the latters COC and likewise failed to comply with the
residency requirement under section 39 of the Local Government Code. COMELEC second division and COMELEC En Banc
both ruled in favour of the respondent.
Issue/s:
W/N COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion and lack or excess of jurisdiction
Held:
No. Petition is dismissed. As COMELEC aptly found, Osmena has sufficiently established his residence in Toledo
City, Cebu. The existence of Osmenas headquarters in Bato, Toledo City, was even confirmed by Mr. Orlando Casia,
witness for the petitioners. He has always maintained profound political and soci0-civic linkages in Toledo City- a fact which
the petitioners never disputed.
The Court cannot rely on the statements that Osmena was hardly seen in Toledo City, Cebu. The Law does not
require a person to be at his home 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to fulfil the residency requirement. In Fernandez v HRET,
the court ruled that the fact that a few barangay health workers attested that they have failed to see petitioner whenever they
allegedly made rounds in Villa de Toledo is of no moment, especially considering that there were witnesses that were in turn
presented by the petitioner to prove that he was actually a resident of Villa de Toledo, in the address he stated in his COC. It
may be that whenever these health workers do their rounds petitioner was out of the house to attend to his own employment
or business.
Under the circumstance, evidences submitted by petitioners do not conclusively prove that Osmena did not in fact
reside in Toledo City for at least a year before elections.
DRILON V LIM
August 4, 1994
Doctrine: Control v Supervision; the first being the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the
latter, while the second is the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in
accordance with law.
Facts: Then Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon, pursuant to the authority granted upon him by Section 187 of the LGC,
declared the Manila Revenue Code null and void for non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of local
tax ordinancs and for th containing provisions contrary to law and public policy. Upon appeal to RTC, the trial judg reversed
the order of the petitioner, and in addition, declared Section 187 unconstitutional as it gave the Secretary of Justice the power
of control over local governments in violation of the principle of local autonomy mandated by the Constitution. The RTC ruled
that the Executive only had the power of supervision and not control.
Issue/s: W/N Section 187 of LGC violates the Constitutional mandate of executive supervision over local government units in
Section 4, Art X of 1987 Constitution
Held: Yes. Section 187 of LGC is unconstitutional in so far as it empowered the Secretary of Justice to review tax ordinances
and inferentially, to annul them. There is a distinction between control and supervision, the first being the power of an officer
to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for the latter, while the second is the power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers
perform their functions in accordance with law.
Contrary to the provision of the law, the Secretary of Justice was given only the power to supervise, not control, in
that the Secretary of Justice could only determine the constitutionality or legality of the local tax ordinance and revoke them
on such grounds. The provision did not empower him to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of the LGU. He was
given no discretion on the matter. The Manila Revenue Code was upheld.
JOSON V TORRES
May 20, 1998
Doctrine: The power of the President over administrative disciplinary cases against elective local officials is derived
from his power of general supervision over local governments. The power of supervision means overseeing or the
authority of an officer to see that the subordinate officers perform their duties.
Facts: Petitioner Governor Joson was filed a complaint before the Office of the President for barging violently into the
session hall of the sangguiniang panlalawigan in the company of armed men. The case was endorsed to the DILG. For
failure to answer after 3 extensions, petitioner was declared in default and ordered a 60-day preventive suspension.

Petitioner filed a motion to conduct formal investigation, which the DILG denied. The executive secretary, by authority of the
President, adopted the findings and recommendation of DILG. The former imposed on the petitioner a penalty of suspension
from office for 6 months without pay. Petitioner questions the jurisdiction and authority of DILG secretary over the case, that
the power to discipline elective local officials lies with the President.
Issue/s: W/N the resolution of DILG Secretary is invalid on the ground of undue delegation; that it is the President who is
disciplining authority, not the DILG secretary.
Held: No. The power of the President over administrative disciplinary cases against elective local officials is derived from his
power of general supervision over local governments. The power of supervision means overseeing or the authority of an
officer to see that the subordinate officers perform their duties. Supervision is not incompatible with discipline.
The power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. The power to investigate delegated to the DILG
Secretary is not undue delegation. The president remains the disciplining authority. What is delegated is the power to
investigate, not to discipline. Such delegation to the DILG Secretary is based on the alter-ego principle or the doctrine of
qualified political agency.
PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL V COA

September 28, 2010
Doctrine: Control v Supervision
Facts: Petitioner, through an approved Sangguniang Panlalawigan resolution, granted and released payment for the health
care insurance benefits of the provinces officials and employees without prior approval from the President, as required by
Administrative Order 103. Respondent Commission on Audit disallowed the payment for such benefits because aside from
contravening the administrative order, it is allegedly also a form of additional compensation, which is against the Salary
Standardization Law.
Issue/s: W/N the Administrative Order 103 applies also to LGUs
Held: No. The president, pursuant to Section 4, Art X of the Constitution can only exercise general supervision, which is the
power of a superior officer to see to it that subordinates perform their functions according to law. This is different from the
power of control, which is to alter, modify, or set aside what a subordinate has done in performance of his duties. Thus, an
administrative order does not apply to LGUs but only to government offices/agencies, and GOCCs which are under control of
the president. The grants of additional compensation like health insurance benefits do not need prior approval of the
President.
LEAGUE OF PROVINCES V DENR

April 11, 2013
Doctrine: Administrative autonomy does not make local governments sovereign within the State. Administrative
autonomy may involve devolution of powers, but subject to limitations like following national policies or
standards, and those provided by the Local Government Code.
Facts: This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, praying that this Court order the following: ( 1) declare as
unconstitutional Section 17(b)(3)(iii) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code of
1991 and Section 24 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076, otherwise known as the People's Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991; (2)
prohibit and bar respondents from exercising control over provinces; and (3) declare as illegal the respondent Secretary of
the Department of Energy and Natural Resources' (DENR) nullification, voiding and cancellation of the Small-Scale Mining
permits issued by the Provincial Governor of Bulacan through its decision in favour of Atlantic Trading Mining Corporation,
granting the latter the Exploration Permit.
Issue/s: W/N Section 17(B)(3)(III) of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 24 of R.A. No. 7076 are unconstitutional for providing for
executive control and infringing upon the local autonomy of provinces.
Held: No. In this case, respondent DENR Secretary has the authority to nullify the Small-Scale Mining Permits issued by the
Provincial Governor of Bulacan, as the DENR Secretary has control over the PMRB, and the implementation of the Small-
Scale Mining Program is subject to control by respondent DENR. Paragraph 1 of Section 2, Article XII of the
Constitution provides that "the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State." Under said provision, the DENR has the duty to control and supervise the exploration,
development, utilization and conservation of the country's natural resources. Hence, the enforcement of small-scale mining
law in the provinces is made subject to the supervision, control and review of the DENR under the Local Government Code
of 1991, while the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 provides that the Peoples Small-Scale Mining Program is to be

implemented by the DENR Secretary in coordination with other concerned local government agencies. The Court has
clarified that the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution Art. X, Sec. 2 refers to the administrative
autonomy of local government units or the decentralization of government authority. It does not make local governments
sovereign within the State. The Local Government Code did not fully devolve the enforcement of the small-scale mining law
to the provincial government, as its enforcement is subject to the supervision, control and review of the DENR, which is in
charge, subject to law and higher authority, of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control and supervise the
exploration, development, utilization of the country's natural resources.
Before this Court determines the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of the Government, it bears
emphasis that ingrained in our jurisprudence is the time-honored principle that a statute is presumed to be valid. This
presumption is rooted in the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins upon the three coordinate departments of the
Government a becoming courtesy for each other's acts. This Court, however, may declare a law, or portions thereof,
unconstitutional where a petitioner has shown a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, leaving no doubt or
hesitation in the mind of the Court.
REPUBLIC V BAYAO
June 5, 2013
Doctrine: While the power to merge administrative regions is not provided for expressly in the Constitution, it is a
power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of power of general
supervision over local governments.
Facts: President GMA issued E.O. No. 304 on March 30, 2004 designating Koronadal City as the regional center and seat of
SOCCSKARGEN Region and providing that all departments, bureaus, and offices of the national government in
SOCCSKARGEN shall transfer their regional sea in Koronadal City. Pursuant to the E.O., Department of Agriculture
Undersecretary for Operations Edmund J. Sana directed OIC and Regional Director of DA-RFU XII Abusama M. Alid the
transfer of regional offices. Private respondents opposed alleging that president GMA made an pronouncement in one of her
visits that the regional seat of Region 12 shall remain in Cotabato City. They also cited reasons such as huge costs entailing
the physical transfer and the plight of employees already settled and established their homes in Cotabato City. OIC Alids
order of transfer on May 17, 2005 prompted respondents to file prayer for writ of injunction and TRO which the trial court
granted. The court of appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari, upholding the decision of the trial court.
Petitioners in this case argued that trial courts decision is contrary to DENR v DENR Region 12 Employees that
upheld the separation of powers between executive and judiciary on the wisdom of transfer of regional offices and that the
trial court interfered into this wisdom of the executive in the management of its affairs
Issue/s: W/N the decision of RTC against the transfer of the DA regional office to Koronadal City violates the separation of
powers between executive department and the judiciary as to the wisdom behind the transfer.
Held: The Court ruled that while the power to merge administrative regions is not provided for expressly in the Constitution, it
is a power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of power of general supervision
over local governments. This power of supervision is provided for in the constitution as well as in the Local Government Code
of 1991. Chiongbian v Orbos held further that the power of the President to reorganize administrative regions carries with it
the power to determine the regional center. The transfer of the regional center of SOCCSKARGEN region to Koronadal City
is an executive function. The judiciary cannot inquire into the wisdom or expediency of the acts of the executive. The principle
of the separation of powers ordains that each of the three great government branches has exclusive cognizance of and is
supreme in concerns falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere.
SECTION 5:
MANILA ELECTRIC V PROVINCE OF LAGUNA
(GR No. 131359, 5 May 1999)
Facts: Several municipalities in the Province of Laguna, by virture of exisiting laws then in effect, issued resolutions through
their respective municipal councils granting franchise in favor of Manila Electric Company (MERALCO) for the supply of
electric light, heat and power within their concerned areas. MERALCO was likewise granted a franchise by the National
Electrification Administration to operate an electric light and power service in the Municipality of Calamba, Laguna.
On September 12, 1991, Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, was enacted
and took effect on January 1, 1992 allowing local government units to create their own sources of revenue and to levy taxes,
fees and charges, subject to such limitations expressed therein, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Pursuant
to the provisions of the LGU Code, the Province enacted Laguna Provincial Ordinance No. 01-92, effective January 1, 1993,
providing in part, the imposition of a franchise tax for businesses enjoying a franchise at a rate of fifty percent (50%) of one
percent (1%) of the gross annual receipts, which shall include both cash sales and sales on account realized during the

preceding calendar within the province, including territorial limits on any city located in the province. On the basis of the said
ordinance, the Provincial Treasurer sent a demand letter to MERALCO for the corresponding tax payment. MERALCO
contended that the imposition of a franchise tax under the Laguna Provincial Ordinance No. 01-92, insofar as it concerned
MERALCO, contravened the provisions of PD 551 which read thus: Any provision of law or local ordinance to the contrary
notwithstanding, the franchise tax payable by all grantees of franchises to generate, distribute and sell electric current for
light, heat and power shall be two per cent (2%) of their gross receipts received from the sale of electric current and from
transactions incident to the generation, distribution and sale of electric current. Such franchise tax shall be payable to the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue or his duly authorized representative on or before the twentieth day of the month following
the end of each calendar quarter or month, as may beprovided in the respective franchise or pertinent municipal regulation
and shall, any provision of the Local Tax Code or any other law to the contrary notwithstanding, be in lieu of all taxes and assessments of whatever
nature imposed by any national or local authority on earnings, receipts, income and privilege of generation, distribution and sale
of electric current.
Issue: WON the LGU Code of 1991 has repealed, amended or modified PD No. 551 - YES
Held: Local governments do not have the inherent power to tax except to the extent that such power might be delegated to
them either by the basic law or by statute. Presently, under Article X of the 1987 Constitution, a general delegation of that
power has been given in favor of local government units. Under the now prevailing Constitution, where there is neither a
grant nor a prohibition by statute, the tax power must be deemed to exist although Congress may provide statutory limitations and guidelines.
The basic rationale for the current rule is to safeguard the viability and self-sufficiency of local government units by directly
granting them general and broad tax powers. Nevertheless, the fundamental law did not intend the delegation to be absolute
and unconditional; the consotutional objective obviously is to ensure that, while the local government units are being
strengthened and made more autonomous, the legislature must still see to it that (a) the taxpayer will not be over-burdened
or saddled with multiple and unreasonable impositions; (b) each local government unit will have its fair share of available
resources; (c) the resources of the national government will not be unduly disturbed; and (d) local taxation will be fair, uniform
and just. The LGU Code of 1991 has incorporated and adopted, by and large, the provisions of the now repealed Local Tax
Code. The 1991 Code explicitly authorizes provincial governments, notwithstanding "any exemption granted by any law or
other special law, . . . (to) impose a tax on businesses enjoying a franchise." Section 137 thereof provides: Sec. 137.
Franchise Tax Notwithstanding any exemption granted by any law or other special law, the province may impose a tax on
businesses enjoying a franchise, at a rate not exceeding fifty percent (50%) of one percent (1%) of the gross annual receipts
for the preceding calendar year based on the incoming receipt, or realized, within its territorial jurisdiction. In the case of a
newly started business, the tax shall not exceed one-twentieth (1/20) of one percent (1%) of the capital investment. In the
succeeding calendar year, regardless of when the business started to operate, the tax shall be based on the gross receipts
for the preceding calendar year, or any fraction thereof, as provided herein. Indicative of the legislative intent to carry out
the Constitutional mandate of vesting broad tax powers to local government units, the Local Government Code has
effectively withdrawn under Section 193 thereof, tax exemptions or incentives theretofore enjoyed by certain entities. This law
states: Sec. 193. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges Unless otherwise provided in this Code, tax exemptions or
incentives granted to, or presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical, including government-owned
or controlled corporations, except local water districts, cooperatives duly registered under R.A. No. 6938, non-stock and non-
profit hospitals and educational institutions, are hereby withdrawn upon the effectivity of this Code. The Code, in addition,
contains a general repealing clause in its Section 534; thus: Sec. 534. Repealing Clause. . . .(f) All general and special
laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations, or part or parts thereof
which are inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
NPC V CABANATUAN CITY

(GR No. 149110, 9 April 2003)
Facts: City of Cabanatuan filed a collection suit against NAPOCOR, a government-owned and controlled corporation
demanding that the latter pay the assessed franchise tax due, plus surcharge and interest. It alleged that NAPOCORs
exemption from local taxes has already been withdrawn by the Local Government Code. NAPOCOR submitted that it is not
liable to pay an annual franchise because the citys taxing power is limited to private entities that are engaged in trade or
occupation for profit, and that the NAPOCOR Charter, being a valid exercise of police power, should prevail over the LGC.
Issue: Whether NAPOCOR is liable to pay annual franchise tax to the City of Cabanatuan
Held: Yes. The power to tax is no longer vested exclusively on Congress; local legislative bodies are now given direct
authority to levy taxes, fees and other charges. Although as a general rule, LGUs cannot impose taxes, fees or charges of
any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities, this rule now admits of an exception, i.e., when
specific provisions of the LGC authorize the LGUs to impose taxes, fees or charges on the aforementioned entities. Nothing
prevents Congress from decreeing that even instrumentalities or agencies of the government performing government
functions may be subject to tax.
A franchise is a privilege conferred by government authority, which does not belong to citizens of the country generally as a
matter of common right. It may be construed in two senses: the right vested in the individuals composing the corporation and

the right and privileges conferred upon the corporation. A franchise tax is understood in the second sense; it is not levied on
the corporation simply for existing as a corporation but on its exercise of the rights or privileges granted to it by the
government. NAPOCOR is covered by the franchise tax because it exercises a franchise in the second sense and it is
exercising its rights or privileges under this franchise within the territory of the City.
PETRON CORPORATION V TIANGCO

(GR No. 158881, 16 August 2008)
Facts: Court records showed that Petron, which maintains a depot or bulk plant at the Navotas
Fishport Complex in Navotas, received a letter from respondent Navotas Mayor Tobias Tianco,wherein the
firm was assessed taxes covering its sale if diesel from 1997 to 2001. The Navotas City Government
demanded payment of P10.2 million representing petrons deficiency taxes. Petron filed with the Navotas a letter protest to
the notice of assessment pursuant to section 195 of the code. It argued that it was exempt from local business taxes in view of article 232 of
the implementing rules of the LGC as well as the ruling of the bureau of local government finance of the department of finance.
Owing to the denial of its protest, petron filed with the rtc in malabon a complaint for cancellation of assessment for deficiency
taxes with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction. On May 5, 2003, the RTC
in Malabon rendered its decision dismissing Petrons complaint and ordering the payment of the assessed
amount. After 11 days, Petron received a closure order from Tianco, directing it to cease and desist from operating the bulk plant, prompting
it to elevate the case tot he SC.
Issue: Whether the local government unit is empowered under the local government code to impose business taxes on persons or entities
engaged in the sale of petroleum products.
Held: The power of the municipality to impose business taxes derives from Sec. 143 of the LGU Code that specifically
enumerates several types of business on which it may impose taxes, including manufacturers, wholesalers, ditributors,
dealers of any article of commerce of whatever nature; those engaged in the export or commerce of essential commodities;
retailers; contractors and other independent contractors; banks and financial institutions; and peddlers engaged in the sale of
any merchandise or article of commerce. This obviously broad power is further supplemented by Section 143(h) which
authorizes the sanggunian to impose taxes on any other businessess not otherwise specified under Section 143 which the
sanggunian concerned may deem proper to tax but is not absolute because there is limitation provided under Sec. 133(h)
which states that: Unless otherwise provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays shall not exceed to the levy of the following: 1.) excise taxes on articles enumerated under the National Internal
Revenue Code, as amended and, 2.) taxes, fees or charges on petroleum products. This does not generally bar the
imposition of business taxes on articles burdened by excise taxes under the NIRC, it specifically prohibits local government
units from extending the levy of any kind of taxes, fees or charges on petroleum products. Accordingly, the subject tax
assessment is ultra vires and void. Evidently, Sec. 133 prescribes the limitations on the capacity of local governments to
exercise their taxinf powers granted by the LGC.
FILM DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES V SM PRIME HOLDINGS INC.

(GR No. 197937, 3 April 2013)
Facts: Respondent SM Prime Holdings, Inc. is the owner and operator of movie houses at SM Cebu in Cebu City. The LGU
Code of 1991 provides that owners, proprietors and lessees of the theaters and cinema houses are subject to amusement
tax (not more than 30% of the gross receipts from admission fees) as provided in Section 140, Title One of the Code.
RA No. 9167 created The Film Development Council of the Philippines, herein petitioner, has a mandate which includes the
development and implementation of an incentive and reward system for the producers based on merit to encourage the
production of quality films. Thus, the Cinema Evaluation Board (CEB) was established, its main function being to review and
grade films. According to Sec. 13 of RA No. 9167, the producers of the films graded A or B shall be entitiled to an
incentive equivalent to the amusement tax imposed and collected by highly urbanized and independent component cities in
the Philippines pursuant to Sec. 140 and 151 of the LGC, 100% of the amusement tax for films graded A and 65% for films
graded B (the remaining 35% shall accrue to the funds of the Council). On the other hand, Sec. 14 of the same law
mandates the remittance of the proceeds of the tax collected by the LGUs to petitioner.
Petitioner, through the OSG, sent a demand letter on January 27, 2009 to respondent for the payment of amusement tax
rewards due to producers of 89 films graded A and B which were shown at SM Cinemeas from September 11, 2003 to
Novemeber 4, 2008.
The City of Cebu petitioned in the Cebu RTC against the petitioner as it sought to seek invalid and unconstitutional Sec. 14
of RA No. 9167 on grounds that: 1.) it violates the basic policy on local autonomy; 2.) it constitutes an undue limitation of the
taxing powers of the LGUs; 3.) it unduly deprives LGUs of the revenue from the amusement tax imposed on theatre owners
and operators; and 4.) it amounts to technical malversation since revenue from the collection of amusement taxes would
otherwise accrue to and form part of the general fund of the LGU concerned would now be directly awarded to a private

entity the producers of the films-bypassing the budget process of the LGU and without the proper appropriation ordinance
from the sanggunian.
Several more petitions were raised in court yielding conflicting decisions. The last of these was about the petitioner filing a
comment praying for the dismissal of the case filed by the City of Cebu while respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing
that petitioners complaint merits outright dismissal considering that its claim had already been extinguished by respondents
prior payment or remittance of the subject amusement taxes to the City of Cebu.
Issue: WON Section 13 and 14 RA No. 9167 is unconstitutional as it conflicts with the provisions of the the LGU Code.
Held: The petition is denied. This case had failed in its procedural aspect. The court held that there are issues involving litis
pendentia first had to be resolved before the constitutionality issues may be raised. Since there were so many cases filed at
the same time regarding this subject, the Court looked on the technicalities of procedure.
The ponencia states It is evident that petitioners claim against the respondent hinges on the correct interpretation of the
conflicting provisions of the LGU Code of 1991 and RA No. 9167. There could be no doubt that a judgement in either case
would constitue as a judicata to the other.
The Court also used the criterion of the consideration of the interest of justice in Roa v Magsaysay in considering the
predicamanet of the respondent. In applying this standard, what was asked was which court would be in a better position to
serve the interests of justice, taking into account (a) the nature of the controversy, (b) the comparative accessibility of the
court to the parties and (c) other similar factors.
Therefore, in consideration of all the factors in this case, there can be no doubt a civil case in in the lower courts of Cebu is
the appropriate vehicle to determine the rights of both the petitioner and respondent.
PELIZLOY REALTY CORP. V THE PROVINCE OF BENGUET

(GR No. 183137, 10 April 2013)
Facts: Petitioner Pelizlor Realty Corporation (Pelizloy) is the owner of Palm Grove Resort located at Asin, Municipality of
Tuba, Province of Benguet. Said property is designed for recreation and has facilities like swimming pools, a spa and
function halls.
On December 8, 2005, the Provincial Board of the Province of Benguet approved Provincial Tax Ordinance No. 05-107,
otherwise known as the Benguet Revenue Code of 2005 (Tax Ordinance). Sec. 59, Article X of the said Code levied a ten
percent (10%) amusement tax on gross receipts from admissions to resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and
tourist spots.
Petitioner filed with the Secretary of Justice on January 27, 2006 a petiition/appeal. It was the petitioners position that the
Tax Ordinance, specifically Sec. 59 of Article X imposing a percentage tax is violative of the limitation on taxing powers of
LGUs under Section 133(i) of the LGU Code.
Respondent province argued that the phrase other places of amusement in Section 140(a) of the LGU Code encompasses
resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots since Article 220(b) of the LGU Code defines
amusement as pleasurable diversion and entertainment synonymous to relaxation, avocation, pastime or fun.
Issue: WON provinces are authorized to impose amusement taxes on admission to resorts, swimming pools, bath houses,
hot springs, and tourist spots for being amusement places under the LGC.
Held: The power of a province to tax is limited to the extent that such power is delegated to it either by the Constitution or by
statute. In Icard v City council of Baguio, it was settled that a municipal corporation unlike a sovereign state is clothed with no
inherent power of taxation. The charter or statute, must plainly show an intent to confer that power, otherwise the municipality
cannot assume it. The power to be granted is to be construed in strictissimi juris. Any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the
term used in granting that power must be resolved against the municipality. Inferences, implications, deductions all these
have no place in the interpretation of the taxing power of a municipal corporation.
Section 5 of Article X in the Constitution is clear on the subject that the power or provinces to tax is limited only to the extent
that such power is delegated to it either by the Constitution or by statute consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy.
Section 5 of Article X provides further that the power to tax is no longer vested exclusively on Congress; local legislative
bodies are now given direct authority to levy taxes, fees and other charges. Nevertheless, such authority is subject to
guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide.
Hence, Section 130 of the LGC provides for the following fundamental principles governing the taxing powers of LGUs:

1. Taxation shall be uniform in each LGU.
2. Taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall: (a) be equitable and based as far as practicable on the taxpayer's
ability to pay; (b) be levied and collected only for public purposes; (c) not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, or
confiscatory; (d) not be contrary to law, public policy, national economic policy, or in the restraint of trade;
3. The collection of local taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall in no case be let to any private person;
4. The revenue collected pursuant to the provisions of this Code shall inure solely to the benefit of, and be subject to
the disposition by, the local government unit levying the tax, fee, charge or other imposition unless otherwise
specifically provided herein; and,
5. Each local government unit shall, as far as practicable, evolve a progressive system of taxation.
Evidently, Section 140 of the LGC provides a clear exception to the general rule in Section 133(i). Section 140 expressly
allows for the imposition by provinces of amusement taxes on the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinemas,
concert halls, circuses, boxing stadia, and other places of amusement.
However, resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots are not among those places expressly
mentioned by Section1 40 of the LGC as being subject to amusement taxes. Thus, the determination of whether amusement
taxes may be levied on admission to resorts, swimming pools, bath houses, hot springs and tourist spots hinges on whether
the phrase other places of amusement encompasses those above mentioned.
Under the principle of ejusdem generis where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific
words of the same class or where the latter follows the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to
be restricted to persons, things or cases akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.
Therefore, petition is granted.
RUZOL V SANDIGANBAYAN
(GR No. 186739-960, 17 April 2013)
Facts: Petitioner was the mayor of General Nakar, Quezon from 2001 to 2004. Earlier in his term, he organized a Multi-
Sectoral Consultative Assembly composed of civil society groups, public officials and concerned stakeholders with the end in
view of regulating and monitoring the transportation of salvaged forest products within the vicinity of General Nakar. At the
organizational meeting for the assembly, the participants agreed that to regulate the salvaged forest products, the Office of
the Mayor, through Ruzol, shall issue a permit to transport after payment of the corresponding fees to the municipal
treasurer. From 2001-2004, 221 permits to transport salvaged forest products were issued to various recipients, of which 43
bore the signature of Ruzol while the remaining 178 were signed by his co-accused Guillermo Sabidura, then municipal
administrator of General Nakar.
221 Informations for violation of Art. 177 of the RPC or Usurpation of Authority or Official Functions were filed against Ruzol
and Sabidura. The informations claimed that the authority to issue such permits belonged to the DENR and not to the Office
of the Mayor.
The Sandiganbayan acquitted Sabidura but found Ruzol guilty as charged. The respondent court cited paragrapg 5 of PD
705 (Forestry Code) stating that the DENR shall be responsible for the protection, development, management, regeneration
and reforestation of forest lands; the regulation and supervision of the operation of licenses, lessees and permits for the
taking or use of forest products therefrom or the occupancy or use thereof. The Sandiganbayan likewise invoked EO 192
(Reorganization of the DENR) and also cited RA 7160 (LGU Code), which determined that such authority relative to salvaged
forest products was not included in the above enumeration of devolved functions, the correlative authority to issue transport
permits remains with the DENR, and thus cannot be exercised by the LGUs.
Issues:
1. WON the authority to monitor and regulate the transportation of salvaged forest product is solely with the DENR and
no one else. No
2. WON the permits to transport issued by Ruzol are valid. No
3. WON Ruzol is guilty of usurpation of official functions. No

Held:
1. The LGU has under the LGC od 1991 ample authority to promulgate rules, regulations and ordinances to monitor
and regulate salvaged forest products, provided that the parameters set forth by law for their enactment have been
faithfully complied with.
2. The permits to transport issued by Ruzol were invalid for his failure to comply with the procedural requirements set
forth by law for its enforcement. The LGC provides that the LGUs authority to manage and control communal forests
should be pursuant to national policies and is subject to supervision, control and review of DENR. Before an area
may be considered a communal forest, the following requirements must be accomplished: (1) and identification of
potential communal forest areas within the geographic jurisdiction of the concerned city/municipality; (2) a forest
land use plan which shall indicate, among other things, the site and location of the communal forests; (3) a request
to the DENR Secretary through a resolution passed by the Sangguniang Bayan concerned; and (4) an
administrative order issued by the DENR Secretary declaring the identified area as a communal forest. In this case,
the records are bereft of any showing that these requirements were complied with.
3. Razols guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC V MUNICIPALITY OF MALVAR

(GR No. 204429, 18 February 2014)
Facts: Petitioner, Smart Communications Inc (Smart), constructed a telecommunications tower within the territorial
jurisdiction of the Municipality of Malvar. Construction of the tower was for the purpose of receiving and transmitting cellular
communications within the covered area. On July 30, 2003, respondent Municipality passed Ordinance No. 18 series of
2003, entitled An Ordinance Regulating the Establishment of Special Projects. On August 24, 2004, Smart received from
the Permit and Licensing Division of the Office of the Mayor of the Municipality an assessment letter with a scheduled
payment for the total amount of P389,950 for Smarts telecommunications tower. Due to alleged arrears in the payment of
the assessment, the Municipality also caused the posting of a closure notice on said telecommunications tower.
In this regard, petitioner filed a protest, claiming lack of due process in the issuance of the assessment and closure notice.
Petitioner filed with the RTC an appeal/petition assailing the validity of Ordinance No. 18. They further claimed that the fees
in Ordinance No. 18 are actually taxes since they are not regulatory, but revenue-raising. Said ordinance does not provide for
the standards which Smart must satisfy prior to the issuance of the specified permits, clearly indicating that the fees are
revenue-raising in nature.
Respondent counters that the fees imposed are not taxes and that Ordinance No. 18 was validly enacted by virtue of the
LGUs power to levy fees pursuant to Sec. 5 Art X, 1987 Constitution; Sec. 142 and 147 of the LGC.
Issue:
1. WON the LGC has the authority to impose so-called fees on the basis of the ordinance Yes
2. WON Ordinance No. 18 is valid and constitutional Yes
Held:
1. The fees imposed under Ordinance No. 18 are not taxes. Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides that
each local government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenues and to levy taxes, fees and
charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide, consistent with the basic policy of
local autonomy. Such taxes, fees, and charges shall accrue exclusively to the local governments.
Consistent with this constitutional mandate, the LGC grants the taxing powers to each LGU. Specifically, Section
142 of the LGC grants municipalities the power to levy taxes, fees and charges not otherwise levied by provinces.
Section 143 of the LGC provides for the scale of taxes on business that may be imposed by municipalities on
business and occupation.
The LGC defines the term charges as referring to pecuniary liability, as rents or fees against persons or property,
while the term fee means a charge fixed by law or ordinance for the regulation or inspection of a business or
activity.
The purpose of Ordinance No. 18 is to regulate the enumerated activities particularly related to the construction and
maintenance of various structures. The fees in the said ordinance are not impositions on the building or structure
itself; rather, they are impositions on the activity subject of government regulation, such as the installation and
construction of the structures.

Since the main purpose of the assailed Ordinance is to regulate certain construction activities of the identified
special projects, which include cell sites or telecommunications towers, the fees imposed in Ordinance No. 18 are
primarily regulatory in nature, and not primarily revenue-raising. While the fees may contribute to the revenues of
the Municipality, such is merely incidental. Thus, the fees imposed in the ordinance are not taxes. Contrary to the
petitioners contentions, Ordinance No. 18 expressly provides for the standards which Smart must satisfy prior to the
issuance of the specified permits, clearly indicating that the fees are regulatory in nature.
2. The assailed Ordinance is valid. Petitioners failed to present any evidence to substantiate its claim that the
Ordinance violates Sec. 130(b)(3) and 186 of the LGC for being unjust, excessive, oppressive and confiscatory.
On the constitutionality issue, Smart merely pleaded for the declaration of unconstitutionality of Ordinance No. 18 in
the Prayer of the Petition, without any argument or evidence to support its plea. Nowhere in the body of the petition
was the issue specifically raised and discussed. Significantly, Smart failed to cite any constitutional provision
allegedly violated by the respondent when it issued Ordinance No. 18.
It is a settled rule that every law, in this case an ordinance, is presumed valid. To strike such as unconstitutional, the
petitioner has the burden to prove clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, which Smart failed to do.
VILLAFUERTE V ROBREDO
(GR No. 195390, 10 December 2014)
Facts: Petitioner Villafuerte, then Governor of Camarines Sur, filed a petition assailing the three memorandum circulars
issued by respondent then Secretary of the DILG Jesse Robredo. The circulars pertain to full disclosure of local budget and
finances and other guidelines regarding budget. Villafuerte argues that the circulars violate the principles of local and fiscal
autonomy of the LGU.
Issue: WON the assailed memorandum circulars violate the principles of local and fiscal autonomy enshrined in the
Constitution and the LGC. - No
Held: The petitioners arguments are untenable. The Constitution has expressly adopted the policy of ensuring the autonomy
of LGUs (Article X of the 1987 Constitution). It is also pursuant to the mandate of the Constitution that enhancing local
autonomy that the LGC was enacted. In order to safeguard the state polics on local autonomy, the Constitution confines the
power of the President over LGUs to mere supervision.
The petitioners contention that Robredo went beyond the confines of his supervisory powers, as alter ego of the President,
when he issued MC No. 2010-138. They argue that the mandatory nature of the circular, with the threat of imposition of
sanctions for non-compliance, evinces a clear desire to exercise control over LGUs. However, the Court perceives otherwise.
A reading of the MC No. 2010-138 shows that it is a mere reiteration to remind LGUs to faithfully observe the directive stated
in Section 287 of the LGC to utilize the 20% portion of the IRA for development projects. The assailed circular was issued in
response to the report of the COA that a substantial portion of the 20% development fund of some LGUs was not actually
utilized for development projects but was diverted to expenses more properly categorized as MOOE, in violation of Sec. 287
of the LGC. Issuance of MC No. 2010-138 was brought about by the report of the COA that the development fund was not
being utilized accordingly. To curb the alleged misuse of the development fund, the respondent deemed it proper to remid the
LGUs of the nature and purpose of the provision for the IRA through MC No. 2010-138.
The local autonomy granted to the LGU does not completely severe them from the national government or turn them into
impenetrable states. Thus, notwithstanding the local fiscal autonomy being enjoyed by the LGUs, they are still under the
supervision of the President and may be held accountable for mafeasance or violations of existing laws. It is well to
remember that fiscal autonomy does not leave LGUs with unbridled discretion in the disbursement of public funds. They
remain accountable to their constituency.
The assailed issuances were issued pursuant to the polics of promoting good governance through transparency,
accountability and participation. The action of the respondent is certainly within the constitutional bounds of his power as an
alter ego of the President.

SECTION 6:
PIMENTEL V AGUIRRE
(GR No. 132988, 19 July 2000)
Facts: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking to annul Section 1 of Administrative Order No. 372, issued by
the President, insofar as it requires local government units to reduce their expenditures by 25% of their authorized regular
appropriations for non-personal services and to enjoin respondents from implementing Section 4 of the Order, which
withholds a portion of their internal revenue allotments.
Issue: WON AO No. 372 is violative of the local fiscal autonomy of the LGU.
Held: Section 1 of the AO does not violate local fiscal autonomy. Local fiscal autonomy does not rule out any manner of
national government intervention by way of supervision, in order to ensure that local programs, fiscal and otherwise, are
consistent with national goals. AO 372 is merely directory and has been issued by the President consistent with his powers
of supervision over local governments. A directory order cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of
control. The AO is intended only to advise all government agencies and instrumentalities to undertake cost-reduction
measures that will help maintain economic stability in the country. It does not contain any sanction in case of
noncompliance. The Local Government Code also allows the President to interfere in local fiscal matters, provided that
certain requisites are met: (1) an unmanaged public sector deficit of the national government; (2) consultations with the
presiding officers of the Senate and the House of Representatives and the presidents of the various local leagues; (3) the
corresponding recommendation of the secretaries of the Department of Finance, Interior and Local Government, and Budget
and Management; and (4) any adjustment in the allotment shall in no case be less than 30% of the collection of national
internal revenue taxes of the third fiscal year preceding the current one. Section 4 of AO 372 cannot be upheld. A basic
feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the national internal revenue. This is
mandated by the Constitution and the Local Government Code. Section 4 which orders the withholding of 10% of the LGUs
IRA clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law.
ALTERNATIVE CENTER V ZAMORA

459 SCRA 578 (2005)
Facts: Pres. Estrada, pursuant to Sec 22, Art VII mandating the Pres to submit to Congress a budget of expenditures within
30 days before the opening of every regular session, submitted the National Expenditures program for FY 2000. The
President proposed an IRA of P121,778,000,000. This became RA 8760, AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE
OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER
THIRTY-ONE, TWO THOUSAND, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES also known as General Appropriations Act (GAA) for the
Year 2000. It provides under the heading ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS that the IRA for local
government units shall amount to P111,778,000,000. In another part of the GAA, under the heading UNPROGRAMMED
FUND, it is provided that an amount of P10,000,000,000 (P10 Billion), apart from the P111,778,000,000 mentioned above,
shall be used to fund the IRA, which amount shall be released only when the original revenue targets submitted by the
President to Congress can be realized based on a quarterly assessment to be conducted by certain committees which the
GAA specifies, namely, the Development Budget Coordinating Committee, the Committee on Finance of the Senate, and the
Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives. Thus, while the GAA appropriates P111,778,000,000 of IRA
as Programmed Fund, it appropriates a separate amount of P10 Billion of IRA under the classification of Unprogrammed
Fund, the latter amount to be released only upon the occurrence of the condition stated in the GAA. On August 22, 2000, a
number of NGOs and POs, along with 3 barangay officials filed with this Court the petition at bar, for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus With Application for Temporary Restraining Order, against respondents then Executive Secretary Ronaldo
Zamora, then Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management Benjamin Diokno, then National Treasurer Leonor
Magtolis-Briones, and the Commission on Audit, challenging the constitutionality of provision XXXVII (ALLOCATIONS TO
LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS) referred to by petitioners as Section 1, XXXVII (A), and LIV (UNPROGRAMMED FUND)
Special Provisions 1 and 4 of the GAA (the GAA provisions) Petitioners contend that the said provisions violates the LGUs
autonomy by unlawfully reducing the IRA allotted by 10B and by withholding its release by placing the same under
Unprogrammed funds. Although the effectivity of the Year 2000 GAA has ceased, this Court shall nonetheless proceed to
resolve the issues raised in the present case, it being impressed with public interest. Petitioners argue that the GAA violated
the constitutional mandate of automatically releasing the IRAs when it made its release contingent on whether revenue
collections could meet the revenue targets originally submitted by the President, rather than making the release automatic.

Issue: WON the subject GAA violates LGUs fiscal autonomy by not automatically releasing the whole amount of the allotted
IRA.
Held: Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution provides: SECTION 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as
determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them. Petitioners argue that the GAA
violated this constitutional mandate when it made the release of IRA contingent on whether revenue collections could meet
the revenue targets originally submitted by the President, rather than making the release automatic. Respondents
counterargue that the above constitutional provision is addressed not to the legislature but to the executive, hence, the same
does not prevent the legislature from imposing conditions upon the release of the IRA.Respondents thus infer that the subject
constitutional provision merely prevents the executive branch of the government from unilaterally withholding the IRA, but
not the legislature from authorizing the executive branch to withhold the same. In the words of respondents, This essentially
means that the President or any member of the Executive Department cannot unilaterally, i.e., without the backing of statute,
withhold the release of the IRA. As the Constitution lays upon the executive the duty to automatically release the just share
of local governments in the national taxes, so it enjoins the legislature not to pass laws that might prevent the executive from
performing this duty. To hold that the executive branch may disregard constitutional provisions which define its duties,
provided it has the backing of statute, is virtually to make the Constitution amendable by statute a proposition which is
patently absurd. If indeed the framers intended to allow the enactment of statutes making the release of IRA conditional
instead of automatic, then Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution would have been worded differently. Since, under Article X,
Section 6 of the Constitution, only the just share of local governments is qualified by the words as determined by law, and
not the release thereof, the plain implication is that Congress is not authorized by the Constitution to hinder or impede the
automatic release of the IRA. In another case, the Court held that the only possible exception to mandatory automatic
release of the IRA is, as held in Batangas:if the national internal revenue collections for the current fiscal year is less than
40 percent of the collections of the preceding third fiscal year, in which case what should be automatically released shall be a
proportionate amount of the collections for the current fiscal year. The adjustment may even be made on a quarterly basis
depending on the actual collections of national internal revenue taxes for the quarter of the current fiscal year. This Court
recognizes that the passage of the GAA provisions by Congress was motivated by the laudable intent to lower the budget
deficit in line with prudent fiscal management. The pronouncement in Pimentel, however, must be echoed: [T]he rule of law
requires that even the best intentions must be carried out within the parameters of the Constitution and the law. Verily,
laudable purposes must be carried out by legal methods. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. XXXVII and LIV Special
Provisions 1 and 4 of the Year 2000 GAA are hereby declared unconstitutional insofar as they set apart a portion of the IRA,
in the amount of P10 Billion, as part of the UNPROGRAMMED FUND.
LEAGUE OF CITIES V COMELEC

(GR No. 176951, 15 February 2011; 12 April 2011)
Facts: During the 11th Congress, Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However,
Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into
law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local
Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million
to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the mad rush
of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that
they are incapable of fiscal independence.
After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which
sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not
approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.
During the 13th Congress, the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and
forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the
advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The
16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement
in RA 9009.

On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood
bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law
(Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the Presidents signature.
The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality
approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city.
Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of
municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will
share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.
Issues: 1.) Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and 2.) Whether the Cityhood Laws
violate the equal protection clause.
Held: Petition granted. The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus
unconstitutional.
First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive
application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later.
Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local
Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.
Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the
national taxes to local government units.
Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a
municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction.
Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained
an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.
Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a
law passed in the 13th Congress.
Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the
exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.
SECTION 8:
BORJA V COMELEC
(GR No. 133495, 3 September 1998)
Facts: Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June
30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. For
the next two succeeding elections in 1992 and 1995, he was again re-elected as Mayor.
On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative to the May 11,
1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor, sought Capcos disqualification on the
theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore
be ineligible to serve for another term after that.

The Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled in favor of petitioner and declared private respondent Capco
disqualified from running for reelection as mayor of Pateros but in the motion for reconsideration, majority overturned the
original decision.
Issues: 1.) WON Capco has served for three consecutive terms as Mayor and, 2.) WON Capco can run again for Mayor in
the next election
Held:
1.) No. Capco was not elected to the office of mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it
by operation of law. Neither had he served the full term because he only continued the service, interrupted by the death, of
the deceased mayor. A textual analysis supports the ruling of the COMELEC that Art. X, Sec. 8 contemplates service by local
officials for three consecutive full terms as a result of election. It is not enough that an individual has served three
consecutive terms in an elective local officials, he must also have been elected to the same position for the same number of
times before the disqualification can apply.
2.) Yes. Although he has already first served as mayor by succession, he has not actually served three full terms in all for the
purpose of applying the three-term limit. The three-term limit shall apply when these 2 conditions concur: (1) the local official
concerned has been elected three consecutive times; and (2) he has fully served three consecutive terms.
DAVID v COMELEC
GR 127116. April 8, 1997
Facts: Two consolidated petitions (GR 127116, GR 128039)
GR 127116
David: Brgy. Chairman of Brgy. 77 Kalookan City and Pres. Of Liga ng mga Barangay sa Pilipinas
David (petitioner) filed petition of prohibition to prohibit holding of May 1997 brgy election.
GR 128039
Liga ng mga Barangay QC Chapter represented by Pres. Rillon filed petition for certiorari to declare unconstitutional:
1. Sec. 43(c) of RA 7160 (Local Government Code or LGC) which states that the term of office of barangay officals and
members of the SK shall be for 3 years.
2. COMELEC Resol. 2880 and 2887 fixing date of holding of barangay elections on May 12, 1997 and other related
activities.
3. Budgetary appropriation of 400 M in General Appropriations Act of 1997 for expenses of 1997 barangay elections.
Issue:
How long is the term of office of Barangay Chairmen and other barangay officials elected on May 1994? 3 years (according
to LGC) or 5 years (according to RA 6679)?
Petitioners arguments:
1. Sec. 2 of RA 6653 states that term of office of brgy officials is 5 yrs. The same stated in RA 6679.
Although Sec. 43(c) of the LGC reduced the term of local elective officials to 3 years, it does not apply to brgy officials,
because RA 6679 is a special law applicable only to brgys, while the LGC is a general law.
The LGC does not repeal RA 6679 regarding term of brgy officials.
2. The constitutional intention is to grant brgy officials any term except 3 years, because the Constitution fixes the term of
local elective officials to 3 yrs, excluding brgy officials, whose terms are to be fixed by law.
Held:
The term of Barangay Chairmen and other barangay officials is 3 years.
1. There is clear legislative intent to limit term to 3 years.

Sec. 43(c) of the LGC stating that the term of brgy officials is 3 years contradicts RA 6679, providing 5 year terms to the
same officials. LGC (RA 7160) was enacted later than RA 6679. The later enactment prevails.
Sec. 7 of RA 8189 states that a general registration of voters shall be held immediately after the 1997 brgy elections. This
shows the intention of the Congress to have brgy elections on May in accordance with Sec. 43(c) of the LGC.
The Sec. 43(c) of the LGC is not a general law, contrary to petitioners claim. It is specific in that it only applies to brgy
officials elected on May 1994. The LGC also repealed all general and special laws inconsistent with its provisions, again
contrary to position of petitioner.
2. Three year term not repugnant to Constitution
Sec. 8 Art. X of the Constitution: The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years [...]
The Constitution merely left the determination of such term to the Congress, without any specific limitation, thereby leaving to
lawmakers full discretion to fix such term.
ADORMEO v COMELEC
GR 147927. February 4, 2002
Petition for Certiorari with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO to nullify and set aside May 9, 2001
COMELEC resolution declaring Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. Qualified to run for Mayor of Lucena City.
Facts:
Talaga, Jr. (respondent) served as mayor in 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. He lost in the 1998 elections to Tagarao. In the
recall election of 2000, he won and served unexpired term of Tagarao until June 30, 2001. Talaga, Jr. is running again of
2001 elections.
Adormeo file with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Lucena City a Petition to Deny Due Course or Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy and/or Disqualification of Talaga, Jr. On the ground that the latter has already served 3 terms (1992,
1995, recall election of 2000).
COMELEC First Division disqualified Talaga, Jr, who filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that a recall election was
not a regular election, but a separate special one. Petitioner Adormeo countered that Sec. 8 Art. X speaks of term and not
tenure, and that Fr. Bernas commented that if one is elected representative to serve the unexpired term of another, the
replacement shall be considered as occupying one term.
COMELEC en banc ruled in favor Talaga, Jr. Petitioner filed this petition.
Issue:
Has Talaga, Jr. Already served 3 consecutive terms in office, and thus disqualified to run for the 2001 elections?
Held:
NO. Talaga, Jr. Has not served 3 consecutive terms. His term after the recall election of 2000 is not considered as one whole
term, because there was a gap (wherein he was a private citizen) between the end of his term in 1998 and the start of his
term as a result of the recall election, thus he has only served 2 terms.
Lonzanida v COMELEC: 2 conditions must concur in order to be disqualified under Sec. 8, Art X:
1. Official concerned has been elected for 3 consecutive terms in the same local govt post.
2. Fully served 3 consecutive terms.
Fr. Bernas comment is only applicable to the members of the House of Representatives. Also, there is no recall elections for
members of the Congress.
----
Note: There is a a provision in the LGC similar to Sec. 8 Art X. It provides:

Sec 43(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than 3 consecutive terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation
of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for
which the elective official concerned was elected.
SOCRATES v COMELEC
GR 154512. November 12, 2002
Petition for certiorari seeking for reversal of COMELEC resolutions in relation to the recall election of mayor of Puerto
Princesa City.
Facts:
A majority of the barangay officials of Puerto Princesa convened into a Preparatory Recall Assembly (PRA) to initiate recall of
Victorino Dennis M. Socrates, the incumbent mayor of Puerto Princesa. PRA designated Mark David M. Hagedorn as interim
chair.
PRA passed a resolution declaring loss of confidence in Socrates and called for his recall. It then requested COMELEC to
schedule recall election. COMELEC approved and scheduled the recall election. Hagedorn filed his certificate of candidacy
for mayor.
Several filed to disqualify Hagedorn on the ground that he has been elected city mayor for 3 consecutive full terms
immediately prior the recall election. COMELEC declared Hagedorn qualified.
Issues:
W/N Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor
Held:
YES. Any subsequent election, such as a recall election, is no longer covered by the prohibitions in Sec. 8 Art. X of the
Constitution and Sec. 43(b) of the LGC, because:
1. A subsequent election is no longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms.

2. The intervening period constitutes an involuntary interruption in the continuity of service.
Hagedorns candidacy in the recall election is not an immediate reelection, because he did not run for the 2001 elections
(after occupying office for three terms: 1992, 1995, and 1998). From June 30, 2001 to Sept. 24, 2002 (nearly 15 months),
Hagedorn was not occupying office as mayor. This period is considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service as
mayor.
Interruption for any length of time as long as the cause is involuntary is sufficient to break an elective officials continuity in
service. One who wins and serves a recall term does not serve the full term of his predecessor but only the unexpired term,
and so winner in a recall election cannot be charged with the full term of 3 years.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.
Does not agree that Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor in the recall elections.
According to him, what is prohibited in Sec. 8, Art. X of this Constitution and Sec 43(b) of the LGC is the fourth term. His
position is that Hagedorn sought an immediate releection for a fourth term, because the fourth term in Hagedorns case is
from June 30, 2001 to June 30, 2004. When he won the recall election in Sept 2002, he was still within the period of his
supposed fourth term.
Contrary to the position of the majority, Hagedorn could not have suffered involuntary severance from office, because there
was nothing to be severed. He was not holding any office in the first place. What happened to Hagedorn was disqualification
and not involuntary severance.
CONCURRING
PUNO, J.
As shown in the discussions of the Constitutional Commission, the reasons of imposing the three term limit are:

1. Prevent monopoly of political power
2. Broaden choice of the people
3. No one is indispensible in running the affairs of the country.
The debates of the Commission on setting the term limit for the members of the House of Representatives show that the
rationale for the limit applies to both Representatives and elective officials.
LATASA v COMELEC
GR 154829. December 10, 2003
Petition for certiorari to challenge COMELEC First Division 2007 resolution, which denied due course to certificate of
candidacy of petitioner Arsenio Latasa, declaring him disqualified to run for mayor of Digos City, Davao Del Sur in the 2001
elections.
Facts:
Latasa was mayor of Municipality of Digos in the terms 1992, 1995, and 1998. During the third term, the Municipality was
declared a component city to be known as the City of Digos. This marked the end of Latasas tenure. However, under the
citys Charter, Latasa was mandated to serve in a hold-over capacity.
Sunga filed to disqualify Latasa for alleged false representation in his certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to run as
mayor. COMELEC disqualified Latasa.
Latasa filed a Motion for Reconsideration which remained unacted upon until the day of elections. Despite Sungas filing of
Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of TRO, Latasa was still proclaimed winner and eventually assumed office.
Petitioners argument: cities and municipalities have separate and distinct personalities.
Issue:
W/N Latasa is eligible to run as mayor of newly created City of Digos immediately after he served three consecutive terms as
mayor of Municipality of Digos.
Held:
NO. Substantial differences do exist between a municipality and a city. For example, there is a change in the political and
economic rights of the LGU. However, when the Municipality of Digos was converted into a City, the delineation of the metes
and bound of the City did not change.
Although the city acquired a new corporate existence, this does not mean that the office of the municipal mayor is a different
local government post of the office of the city mayor. Latasa never ceased from acting as chief executive of the LGU.
ONG V ALEGRE
GR 163295. January 23, 2006
2 separate petitions to nullify and set aside COMELEC en banc issuances.
GR 163295 petition for certiorari with Francis Ong impugning COMELEC en banc resolution granting Joseph Alegres motion
for reconsideration of COMELEC First Division 2004 resolution.
GR 163354 petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with application for injunctive relief file by Rommel Ong, Francis
Ongs brother, to stop COMELEC from enforcing its 2004 en banc resolution.
Facts:
Alegre filed to disqualify Francis on the ground that the latter violated the 3 consecutive term rule for running in the 2004
elections after serving as mayor in the terms 1995, 1998, and 2001.
In the 1998 elections, Francis was occupying mayors office, when Alegre filed an election protest. RTC declared Alegre as
the duly elected mayor. However, this decision only came out when Francis has already fully served the term for 1998-2001.
COMELEC First Division dismissed Alegres petition through its 2004 resolution, stating that Francis mayoral term from
1998-2001 cannot be considered, because he was not duly elected thereto.

COMELEC en banc reversed this decision and declared Francis disqualified. Because of this, Rommel Ong was nominated
by NPC, Francis political party, as substitute candidate.
Commissioner Garcillano issued a Memorandum ordering implementation of COMELEC en banc resolution. The
memorandum stated that the substitution is not proper of the candidacy is denied due course. It was recommended that the
CoC of Rommel Ong be denied course.
Alegre was proclaimed winner of mayoral race.
Issues:
W/N Francis Ongs assumption to office as Mayor of San Vicente for the mayoralty term of 1998-2001 should be considered
full service for the purpose of the 3 term limit rule, and thus disqualified to run for the same post in the 2004 elections.
Held:
YES. For the 3 term limit for LGU officials to apply, 2 conditions must concur:
1. Official has been elected for 3 consecutive terms in the same local government post
2. Fully served 3 consecutive terms.
The disqualifying requisites are present, thus barring Francis from running for mayor of San Vicent, Camarines Norte.
Francis assumption to office in 1998-2001 constitutes a full term and should be counted as a full term in contemplation of the
3 term limit. The RTC ruling was of no practical and legal value for being promulgated after the term of the contested office
has expired.
There was no interruption or break in the continuity of Francis service. He never ceased discharging his duties as mayor.
RIVERA v COMELEC
GR 167591, GR 170577. May 9, 2007
2 consolidated petitions for certiorari assailing COMELEC en banc Mar 14, 2005 and Nov 8, 2005 resolutions.
Facts:
GR 16759
In the May 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections, Mariano Boking Morales ran as candidate for Mayor of
Mabalacat, Pampanga for term 2004-2007.
Rivera and De Guzman filed for disqualification of Morales on the ground of the latters violation of the 3 consecutive term
rule. Morales admitted that he was in office as mayor for 3 consecutive terms. However, he added that in his second term
(1998-2001), he was occupying office only as caretaker or as a de facto officer, because his proclamation as mayor for
term 1998-2001 was declared void by the RTC, and was preventively suspended in an anti-graft case during the said term.
COMELEC Second Division disqualified Morales, who filed a motion for reconsideration. COMELEC en banc granted the
motion, stating that he was indeed only a de facto officer for term 1998-2001.
GR 170577
After Morales was proclaimed mayor for term 2004-2007, Anthony Dee filed a petition quo warranto against Morales, who
raised the same defenses as he did in the latter case. RTC dismissed the Dees petition. An appeal for the COMELEC was
also denied.
Issue:
W/N Morales 1998-2001 term has been fully served by him for the purpose of the 3 term rule, thus making him ineligible to
run for the 2004 elections.
Held:

YES. The ruling in Ong v Alegre applies to this case. In the latter case, Francis Ong assumed duties of mayor starting 1998,
but his proclamation was declared void by the RTC. However, the RTC ruling came out after the 1998-2001 term had already
terminated. The same situation can be seen in the present case.
Morales was elected to office for 3 consecutive terms, and he has already fully discharged his duties for the full terms,
including that for 1998. Notwithstanding the RTC decision, Morales served as mayor until June 30, 2001. He has been Mayor
of Mabalacat continuously without any break since July 1, 1995.
Whether as caretaker or de facto officer, he exercises the powers and enjoys the prerequisites of the office which enables
him to stay indefinitely.
MONTEBON v COMELEC
GR 180444. April 8, 2008
Petition for certiorari assailing COMELEC First Division resolution denying petition for disqualification by petitioners Frederico
Montebon and Eleanor Ondoy against Sesinando Potencioso, Jr.
Facts:
Petitioners Montebon and Ondoy and respondent Potencioso, Jr. Were candidates for municipal counselor of the Municipality
of Tuburan, Cebu for the 2007 elections. Petitioners filed to disqualify Potencioso, Jr. For having already served three terms
as municipal councilor.
Potencioso, Jr. Admitted that he has served the 3 consecutive terms. However, he claimed that he succeeded as vice
mayor of Tuburan due to retirement of Vice Mayor Mendoza.
Petitioners argue that Potencioso, Jr.s assumption of office as vice mayor was a voluntary renunciation of office as municipal
councilor.
COMELEC en banc upheld its First Divisions ruling, declaring that Potencioso, Jr.s assumption to office as vice mayor is not
a voluntary renunciation of councilors office.
Issue:
W/N Potenciano, Jr. Is deemed to have fully served his second term in view of his assumption of office as vice mayor of
Tuburan, Cebu.
Held:
NO. Succession in local government offices is by operation of law, thus Potenciano Jr.s assumption of office as vice mayor
is not a voluntary renunciation of office as municipal councilor. It was actually an involuntary severance from his office as
municipal councilor.
The LGC provides that if a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the vice mayor, the highest ranking sanggunian
member shall become vice mayor. The legal successor is not given any option under the law whether to accept the vacated
post or not.
LACEDA V LUMENA
GR 182867. November 25, 2008
Instant motion for reconsideration filed by Roberto Laceda, Sr. Insisting that COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
in issuing its Jan 15, 2008 and May 7, 2008 Resolutions.
Facts:
Petitioner Laceda Sr. And respondent Randy Limena were candidates for Punong Barangay of Brgy. Panlayaan, West
District, Sorsogon City in 2007 Brgy and SK elections. Limena filed to disqualify Laceda, Sr., contending that the latter has
served as Punong Barangay for 3 consecutive terms since 1994.
Laceda, Sr. Admitted having served the in position for 3 consecutive terms, but asserted that in his first two terms
Sorsogon was still a municipality, and that in his third term, Municipality of Sorsogon was merged with the Municipality of
Bacon to form the City of Sorsogon.

COMELEC declared Laceda disqualified.
Issue:
W/N Laceda Sr., is eligible to run for Punong Barangay given that the Municipality of Sorsogon was converted to a City
during his third term.
Held:
NO. It cannot be said that the office of Punong Barangay of Brgy. Panlayaan, Municipality of Sorsogon would now be
contrued as a different local government post that of the same office in the City of Sorsogon.
The present case is similar to that in Latasa v COMELEC, where a person has been elected for three consecutive terms as
municipal mayor and prior to the end of the termination of the term, the municipality was converted into a city. The prohibition
still applied, there being no break in the continuity of terms.
DIZON v COMELEC
GR 182088. January 30, 2009
Petition for certiorari and prohibition, with prayer for issuance of TRO and writ of preliminary injunction, seeking the reversal
of COMELEC Second Division 2007 resolution, which dismissed the petition to disqualify Mariano Morales CoC (same
Morales in Rivera v COMELEC).
Facts:
Dizon alleged that Morales was proclaimed municipal mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for 4 terms (1995, 1998, 2001, 2004).
Morales filed again his CoC for the same position for the 2007 elections. Because of this, according to Dizon, Morales
violated the 3 consecutive term rule.
Respondent Morales argued that he is still eligible, because he was not elected for the same position in the 1998 elections.
However, COMELEC Second Division still ruled against him. This was affirmed by the COMELEC en banc.
Issue:
W/N the 2007-2010 term is Morales fifth term
Held:
NO. In the Rivera case, where Morales 1998-2001 term was declared void by the trial court, but its decision came out after
the term has expired, the Court ruled that there was no interruption of his continuity of service. Because of this, he was
considered not a candidate in the 2004 elections. This now serves as a gap and allows him to run again in the 2007
elections.
Morales cannot be deemed to have served the full term of 2004-2007, because he was ordered to vacate his post before the
expiration of the term.
BOLOS v COMELEC
GR 184082. March 17, 2009
Petition for certiorari alleging that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing is Mar 4, 2008 and Aug 7,
2008 resolutions holding petitioner Bolos, Jr. Disqualified as candidate for the position of Punong Barangay of Brgy. Biking,
Dauis, Bohol on the ground that he has served the 3 term limit.
Facts:
Bolos, Jr. Has been the Punong Barangay of Brgy. Biking for 3 consecutive terms (1994, 1997, 2002). In May 2004, while he
was still sitting as Punong Barangay, he ran for Municipal Councilor of Dauis, Bohol. He won and assumed office in 2004,
leaving his post as Punong Barangay. He served the full term as Municipal Councilor until June 30, 2007.

Respondent Rey Cinconiegue filed to disqualify Bolos, Jr., contending that Bolos Jr.s relinquishment of the position of
Punong Barangay was voluntary.
Bolos Jr. Admitted that he was in the disputed position for 3 terms, but argued that having won as Municipal Councilor, his
election and assumption of office of the latter position was by operation of law (an involuntary interruption).
Issue:
W/N there was a voluntary renunciation of the Office of the Punong Barangay by Bolos Jr., when he assumed office as
Municipal Councilor.
Held:
YES. All the acts attending hid pursuit of his election as municipal councilor point out to an intent and readiness to give up up
his post as Punong Barangay once elected to the higher office.
He knew that his election as municipal councilor would entail abandonment of the position he held, and intended to forego of
it. Abandonment, like resignation, is voluntary.
Contrary to the position of the petitioner, his assumption of office as municipal mayor was not by operation of law. Operation
of law is defined by the Philippine Legal Encyclopedia as rights that may be acquired or lost by the effect of a legal rule
without any act of the person affected. Bolos Jr. Did not succeed to a vacancy by operation of law, but instead relinquished
his office as Punong Barangay, which is deemed a voluntary renunciation.
ALDOVINO v COMELEC
GR 184836. December 23, 2009
Petition seeks to annul COMELEC ruling, which declared that preventive suspension is an effective interruption.
Facts:
Respondent Wilfredo Asilo was elected councilor of Lucena City for 3 consecutive terms (1998, 2001, 2004). In September
2005, he was preventively suspended by the Sandiganbayan for 90 days. It was subsequently lifted by the Court, and Asilo
resumed performing his functions.
In the 2007 elections, Asilo filed his CoC for the same position. Petitioners Simon Aldovino, Jr. Et al. Sought to disqualify
Asilo for having already served 3 consecutive terms.
COMELEC Second Division ruled in favor of Asilo, reasoning out that the 3 term limit rule did not apply, because Asilo failed
to render complete service for the 2004-2007 term due to the preventive suspension. COMELEC en banc, however, reversed
this ruling.
Issue:
th
W/N Asilos preventive suspension constituted an interruption that allowed him to run for a 4 term.
Held:
NO. In all cases of preventive suspension, the suspended official is barred from performing the functions of his office.
However, while temporary incapacity in the exercise of power results, no position is vacated when a public official is
preventively suspended.
Though a preventive suspension is imposed by law and does not involve a voluntary act, it should still not be considered an
interruption that allows an elective official to stay in office beyond 3 terms. The best indicators of this are the absence of
permanent replacement and the lack of authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists.
ABAS KIDA v Senate

GR 196271. February 28, 2012
Several Motions for Reconsideration assail the Courts Oct 18, 2011 Decision where the constitutionality of RA 10153 was
upheld.

Facts:
nd nd
RA 10153 postponed the ARMM regional elections from 2 Monday of Aug 2011 to 2 Monday of May 2013 and recognized
the Presidents power to appoint Officers-in-Charge to temporarily assume positions upon expiration.
Issues:
1. W/N the Constitution mandates the synchronization of ARMM regional elections with the national and local elections
2. W/N the holdover provision in RA 9054 is constitutional
Held:
1. YES. While the Constitution does not expressly instruct the Congress to synchronize the national and local elections, the
intention can be inferred from the Transitory Provisions (Art XVIII) of the Constitution.
It can be seen from the discussion of the Constitutional Commission that they intended to have a single election in 1992 for
all, from the President up to the municipal officials (Commissioner Davide). The ARMM then has not been officially
organized at the time the Constitution was enacted, which is why it cannot be said that since the ARMM elections were not
mentioned in the Transitory Provisions, they do not include the ARMM.
The intention of Art X of the Constitution was to classify autonomous regions as local governments, and so when we speak of
the scope of local elections, according to the Court, it would encompass the ARMM.
2. YES. Contrary to the position of the petitioners, the ARMM regional officials should not be allowed to remain in their
respective positions until the May 2013 elections on the ground that there is no provision in the Constitution prohibiting them
from performing their duties in a hold-over capacity.
The law is clear. Sec 8, Art X of the Constitution provides a limitation on the period (3 term limit) within which all elective local
officials can occupy their offices. Since it has been established that ARMM officials are also local officials, they are bound by
the 3 term limit. Congress has no authority to extend the 3 year term limit by inserting a holdover provision in RA 9054.
It was noted by the Court that in the past, it recognized the validity of holdover provisions. However, those referred to
barangay or SK officials, whose terms are not specifically provided for in the Constitution, but are provided for by another
law. The present case refers to local elective officials whose terms fall within the scope set by Sec 8, Art X of the
Constitution.
ABUNDO v COMELEC
GR 201716. January 28, 2013
Petition for certiorari filed by petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. Assails and seeks to nullify COMELEC Second Division Feb 8,
2012 resolution and COMELEC en banc May 10, 2012 resolution. These issuance affirmed the decision of the RTC of Virac,
Catanduanes declaring Abundo ineligible, under the 3 term limit rule, to run in the 2010 elections for the position of mayor of
Viga, Catanduanes.
Facts:
Abundo vied for position of mayor for the terms (2001, 2004, 2007, and 2010). In 2001 and 2007 he was proclaimed mayor.
In 2004, Jose Torres was initially proclaimed winner. However, Abundo protested and he was eventually declared winner of
the 2004 elections. For this term, he assumed office in 2006 until the end of the term in 2007.
On 2010, before the COMELEC could resolve the disqualification case against Abundo, respondent Vega commenced a quo
warranto to unseat Abundo on the same grounds raised by Torres. COMELEC Second Division and COMELEC en banc
affirmed this ruling.
Issue:
W/N Abundo consecutively served for 3 consecutive terms even though he only served the remaining 1 year and 1 month of
the second term as result of the election protest.
Held:
NO. It is erroneous to say that Abundo merely was temporarily unavailable or disqualified to exercise the functions of an
elective post. He cannot claim that he could hold office of the mayor as a matter of right from Jun 30, 2004 to May 8, 2006,
because the title to hold such office still belonged to his opponent, Jose Torres.

The almost 2 year period during which Abundos opponent served as Mayor is considered an interruption of Abundos
continuity in service. Pending the favorable resolution of his election protest, Abundo was relegated to being an ordinary
constituent.
NAVAL V COMELEC
(GR No. 2078851, 8 July 2014)
Facts: Angel G. Naval is allegedly violating the three-term limit imposed upon elective local officials as provided for in Article
X, Section 84 of the 1987 Constitution, and Section 43(b)5 of the Local Government Code (LGC) as a member of
sangunian panglalawigan of Cam Sur. On Oct 2009, the President reapportioned the legislative disctricts in CamSur making
nd
the 2 District 8 towns instead of the original 10 (Milaor and Gainza were taken out).
Issue: Did She violate the 3 term limit?
Held: Yes.
Ratio:
The Constitution mandates the strict implementation of the three-term limit rule.
In Aldovino, the Court describes the three-term limit rule as inflexible." As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term
of a local elective office and limits an elective officials stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. This is the first
branch of the rule embodied in Section 8, Article X.
Significantly, this provision refers to a 'term' as a period of time three years during which an official has title to office and
can serve."
Third District is essentially, although not literally, the same as the old Second District. Hence, while Naval is correct in his
argument that Sanggunian members are elected by district, it does not alter the fact that the district which elected him for the
third and fourth time is the same one which brought him to office in 2004 and 2007.
Additional info (USEFUL FOR FINALS): In Latasa, the issue arose as a result of the conversion of a municipality into a city.
The then municipal mayor attempted to evade the application upon him of the three-term limit rule by arguing that the
position of a city mayor was not the same as the one he previously held. The Court was not convinced and, thus, declared
that there was no interruption of the incumbent mayors continuity of service.
In Lonzanida, a candidate ran for the mayoralty post and won in three consecutive elections. While serving his third term, his
opponent filed an election protest. Months before the expiration of the mayors third term, he was ousted from office. He ran
again for the same post in the immediately succeeding election. A petition was thereafter filed assailing his eligibility to run as
mayor on the ground of violation of the three-term limit rule. The Court ruled that the mayor could not beconsidered as having
served a full third term. An interruption for any length of time, if due to an involuntary cause, is enough to break the elected
officials continuity of service.
In Borja, the mayor of Pateros died and was succeeded in office by the vice mayor. In the two immediately succeeding
elections, the latter vied for and won the mayoralty post. When he ran for the same position for the third time, his
disqualification was sought for alleged violation of the three-term limit rule. The Court ruled that whenhe assumed the
position of mayor by virtue of succession, his service should not be treated as one full term. For the disqualification to apply,
the candidate should have been thrice elected for and had served the same post consecutively. In Aldovino, preventive
suspension was imposed upon an elected municipal councilor. The Court ruled that the said suspension did not interrupt the
elective officials term. Although hewas barred from exercising the functions of the position during the period of suspension,
his continued stay and entitlement tothe office remain unaffected.
In Bandillo, a case decided by the COMELEC, Gainza and Milaor were added to five of the ten towns, which used to
comprise Camarines Surs old First District, to form the new Second District. The COMELEC declined to apply the three-term
limit rule against the elected Provincial Board member on the ground that the addition of Gainza and Milaor distinctively
created a new district, with an altered territory and constituency.

SECTION 9:
SUPANGAN, JR. V SANTOS
(GR No. 84663, 24 August 1990)
Facts and Issue: The validity and legality of the designations/appointments made by the Secretary of the Department of
Local Government (DLG) of members/sectoral representatives to the local legislative bodies is the main issue presented in
these cases which were ordered consolidated by the Court. To fully understand the facts from which this controversy arose,
hereunder is a separate statement of facts for each of these cases.
Held: The president or the secretary of the department of local government can make designations/appointments without an
enabling law pursuant to sec 9 of Art X. The phrase "as may be prescribed by law is not prospective in character. Section 9
commands that all legislative bodies of local governments must have sectoral representatives among its members, and the
appointment or designation of individuals thereto must be done in accordance with provisions of law, whether that law exists
or has still to be passed. But in this case that law already exists in B.P. Blg. 337 particularly Sections 146 and 173 quoted
earlier.
In any event B.P. Blg. 337 is still operative, even after the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, because the Transitory
Provisions (Article XVIII) provides for the continued operation of all existing laws, etc. not inconsistent with it.
But, the designations must be in the manner prescribed by law and the qualifications must be complied with.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered
GRANTING 5 cases, DISMISSING 4 cases.
SECTION 10:
TAN V COMELEC
142 SCRA 727 (1986)
Facts: This case was prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885, An Act Creating a New Province in the
Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, effective Dec. 3, 1985. (Cities of Silay, Cadiz and San
Carlos and the municipalities of Calatrava, Taboso, Escalante, Sagay, Manapla, Victorias, E.R. Magalona, and Salvador
Benedicto proposed to belong to the new province).
Pursuant to and in implementation of this law, the COMELEC scheduled a plebiscite for January 3, 1986. Petitioners
opposed, filing a case for Prohibition and contending that the B.P. 885 is unconstitutional and not in complete accord with the
Local Government Code because:
The voters of the parent province of Negros Occidental, other than those living within the territory of the new province of
Negros del Norte, were not included in the plebiscite.
The area which would comprise the new province of Negros del Norte would only be about 2,856.56 sq. km., which is lesser
than the minimum area prescribed by the governing statute, Sec. 197 of LGC.
Issue: W/N the plebiscite was legal and complied with the constitutional requisites of the Consititution, which states that
Sec. 3. No province, city, municipality or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially
altered except in accordance with the criteria established in the Local Government Code, and subject to the approval by a
majority of the votes in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected?
Held: No.
Whenever a province is created, divided or merged and there is substantial alteration of the boundaries, the approval of a
majority of votes in the plebiscite in the unit or units affected must first be obtained. The creation of the proposed new
province of Negros del Norte will necessarily result in the division and alteration of the existing boundaries of Negros
Occidental (parent province).
Plain and simple logic will demonstrate that two political units would be affected. The first would be the parent province of
Negros Occidental because its boundaries would be substantially altered. The other affected entity would be composed of
those in the area subtracted from the mother province to constitute the proposed province of Negros del Norte.
Paredes vs. Executive (G.R. No. 55628) should not be taken as a doctrinal or compelling precedent. Rather, the dissenting
view of Justice Abad Santos is applicable, to wit:
when the Constitution speaks of the unit or units affected it means all of the people of the municipality if the municipality
is to be divided such as in the case at bar or of the people of two or more municipalities if there be a merger.

The remaining portion of the parent province is as much an area affected. The substantial alteration of the boundaries of the
parent province, not to mention the adverse economic effects it might suffer, eloquently argue the points raised by the
petitioners.
SC pronounced that the plebscite has no legal effect for being a patent nullity.
PADILLA, JR. V COMELEC

(GR No. 103328, 19 October 1992)
Facts: RA 7155 creates the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa in the Province of Camarines Norte to be composed of Barangays
Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I, Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot, and Calabasa, all in
the Municipality of Labo, same province.
Pursuant to said law, the COMELEC issued a resolution for the conduct of a plebiscite. The said resolution provides that the
plebiscite shall be held in the areas or units affected, namely the barangays comprising he proposed Municipality of Tulay-
Na-Lupa and the remaining areas of the mother Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. In the plebiscite held throughout the
Municipality of Labo, majority of the votes cast were against the creation of the Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa. Thus,
petitioner as Governor of Camarines Norte, seeks to set aside the plebiscite conducted throughout the Municipality of Labo
and prays that a new plebiscite be undertaken. It is the contention of petitioner that the plebiscite was a complete failure and
that the results obtained were invalid and illegal because the plebiscite, as mandated by COMELEC, should have been
conducted only in the political unit or units affected, i.e. the 12 barangays comprising the new Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa
namely Tulay-Na-Lupa, Lugui, San Antonio, Mabilo I,Napaod, Benit, Bayan-Bayan, Matanlang, Pag-Asa, Maot, and
Calabasa. Petitioner stresses that the plebiscites hould not have included the remaining area of the mother unit of the
Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. In support of his stand, petitioner argues that where a local unit is to be segregated
from a parent unit, only the voters of the unit to be segregated should be included in the plebiscite.
Issue: W/N the plebiscite conducted in the areas comprising the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa and the remaining
areas of the mother Municipality of Labo valid?
Held: Yes. When the law states that the plebiscite shall be conducted "in the political units directly affected," it means that
residents of the political entity who would be economically dislocated by the separation of a portion thereof have a right to
vote in said plebiscite. Evidently, what is contemplated by the phase "political units directly affected," is the plurality of
political units which would participate in the plebiscite. Logically, those to be included in such political areas are the
inhabitants of the 12 barangays of the proposed Municipality of Tulay-Na-Lupa as well as those living in the parent
Municipality of Labo, Camarines Norte. Thus, it was concluded that respondent COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion in promulgating the resolution
NAVARRO V. ERMITA
(GR No. 180050, 12 April 2011)
It must be borne in mind that the central policy considerations in the creation of local government units are economic viability,
efficient administration, and capability to deliver basic services to their constituents, and the criteria prescribed by the Local
Government Code (LGC), i.e., income, population and land area, are all designed to accomplish these results. In this light,
Congress, in its collective wisdom, has debated on the relative weight of each of these three criteria, placing emphasis on
which of them should enjoy preferential consideration. Without doubt, the primordial criterion in the creation of local
government units, particularly of a province, is economic viability. This is the clear intent of the framers of the LGC.
Facts:
1. Brief Recap
a. 2 Oct 1996: President approves RA 9355 creating Province of Dinagat Islands into law
i. Income : 82.69M/year
ii. Population : 106,951
iii. Land Area : 802.12 sq. km
1
b. 3 Dec 1996: COMELEC conducts mandatory plebiscite for ratification of creation of province. People from both the
mother province of Surigao del Norte and the Dinagat Islands voted.
1
LGC, SECTION. 10. Plebiscite Requirement.No creation, division, merger, abolition, or substantial alteration of boundaries of local
government units shall take effect unless approved by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose in the political unit or
units directly affected. Said plebiscite shall be conducted by the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) within one hundred twenty (120) days
from the date of effectivity of the law or ordinance effecting such action, unless said law or ordinance fixes another date.

Affirmative Votes: 69,943
Negative Votes: 63,502
c. President appoints interim set of provincial officials
d. 1 Jun 2007: New set of provincial officials elected and assume office
e. 10 Feb 2010: RA 9355 declared unconstitutional. (failed to meet min land area requirements)
2. Decision on 2010 case declared Final and Executory on 18 May 2010
3. This Resolution delves solely on the instant Urgent Motion to Recall Entry of Judgment of movants-intervenors, not on
the second motions for reconsideration of the original parties.
4. COMELEC Resolution 8790 declared that if the decision on the 2010 case was declared final and executory, the Dinagat
Islands would revert to its former status as a non-province. Consequently, the results of the May 2010 elections would
have to be nullified, and a special election would have to be conducted for various positions (Governor, Vice-Governor,
etc) for Surigao del Norte.
Hence the intervenors became real parties in interest with the declaration finality of the 2010 case decision. (Cong
Matugas etal had petitioned to intervene before, but were declared to have no standing since at that time, they were still
candidates in the May 2010 elections.)
Other Pertinent laws:

LGC. Sec 386. Barangay - no min land area requirement
LCG. Sec 442. Municipality - 50 sq km BUT
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created municipality shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The
requirement on land area shall not apply where the municipality proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or
more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 13. Municipalities.(a) Requisites for CreationA municipality shall not be created unless the
following requisites are present:
(iii) Land areawhich must be contiguous with an area of at least fifty (50) square kilometers, as certified by LMB. The
territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands. The requirement on land area shall not apply
where the proposed municipality is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territorial jurisdiction of a municipality
sought to be created shall be properly identified by metes and bounds.
LCG. Sec 450. City: 100 sq km BUT
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on
land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory
need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 11. Cities.(a) Requisites for creationA city shall not be created unless the following requisites on
income and either population or land area are present:
" The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed city is composed of one (1) or more islands. "
LGC. Sec 461 Province 2000sq km BUT

(b) The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities
which do not contribute to the income of the province.
LGC-IRR: ARTICLE 9. Provinces.(a) Requisites for creationA province shall not be created unless the following
requisites on income and either population or land area are present:
" The land area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is composed of one (1) or more islands.
"
Petitioners
1. Same arguments as in Navarro v. Ermita 2010 (did not meet requirements)
Respondents
1. Same arguments as in Navarro v. Ermita 2010 (met requirements)

Movants-Intervenors
1. The passage of R.A. No. 9355 operates as an act of Congress amending Section 461 of the LGC
2. The exemption from territorial contiguity, when the intended province consists of two or more islands, includes the
exemption from the application of the minimum land area requirement
3. The Operative Fact Doctrine is applicable in the instant case - matter of equity and fair play, undue burden on those
who have relied on the inoperative law.
Issue: WON a territory composed of more than 1 island is exempt from the minimum land area requirement?
Held: Yes
SC:
1. Congress breathed flesh and blood into that exemption in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR and transformed it into law
when it enacted R.A. No. 9355 creating the Island Province of Dinagat. The acts of Congress, in passing RA 9355,
definitively show the clear legislative intent to incorporate into the LGC that exemption from the land area
requirement
2. Please see pertinent laws

With respect to the creation of municipalities, component cities, and provinces, the three (3) indicators of viability
and projected capacity to provide services, i.e., income, population, and land area, are provided for.
But it must be pointed out that when the LGU to be created consists of one (1) or more islands, it is exempt from the
land area requirement as expressly provided in Section 442 and Section 450 of the LGC if the local government
unit to be created is a municipality or a component city, respectively.
This exemption is absent in the enumeration of the requisites for the creation of a province under Section 461 of the
LGC, although it is expressly stated under Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR.
It is, therefore, logical to infer that the genuine legislative policy decision was expressed in Section 442 (for
municipalities) and Section 450 (for component cities) of the LGC, but was inadvertently omitted in Section 461
(for provinces). Thus, when the exemption was expressly provided in Article 9(2) of the LGC-IRR, the inclusion
was intended to correct the congressional oversight in Section 461 of the LGCand to reflect the true legislative
intent.
3. Operative Fact Doctrine not really discussed. It does not apply in this case.
General Rule: An unconstitutional law produces no rights, imposes no duties and affords no protection. It has no
legal effect. It is, in legal contemplation, inoperative as if it has not been passed
Dispositive: Petition granted. RA 9355 and LGC-IRR Art 9 is constitutional.
Excerpt: Debates in congress regarding plebiscite and land area requirements
CHAIRMAN ALFELOR. ". The land area for Camiguin is only 229 square kilometers. So if we hard fast on requirements of,
we set a minimum for every province, palagay ko we just leave it to legislation, eh. Anyway, the Constitution is very clear that
in case we would like to divide, we submit it to a plebiscite. Pabayaan natin ang tao. Kung maglalagay tayo ng set ng
minimum, tila yata mahihirapan tayo, eh. Because what is really the thrust of the Local Government Code? Growth. To
devolve powers in order for the community to have its own idea how they will stimulate growth in their respective areas.
So, in every geographical condition, mayroon sariling id[i]osyncracies eh, we cannot make a generalization."
CAGAS V COMELEC
(GR No. 209185, 25 October 2013)
Facts: Marc Cagas, taxpayer and former representative of the first legislative district of Davao del Sur, seeks to prohibit the
COMELEC from conducting a plebiscite for the creation of the province of Davao Occidental simultaneously with the Oct
2013 Barangay elections within the whole province of Davao del Sur, except in Davao City. While Cagas was in office he
filed H.B. No. 4451, a bill creating the province of Davao Occidental. H.B. No. 4451 was signed into law as RA 10360 the
Charter of the Province of Davao Occidental. Section 46 of the RA provides for the date holding of a plebiscite:

The Province of Davao Occidental shall be created, as provided for in this Charter, upon approval by the majority of
the votes cast by the voters of the affected areas in a plebiscite to be conducted and supervised by the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) within sixty (60) days from the date of the effectivity of this Charter.
COMELEC moved the plebiscite to a different date contrary to sec 46 of the RA
Issue: Did the COMELEC act without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it resolved to hold the plebiscite for the creation of the Province of Davao Occidental on 28
October 2013, simultaneous with the Barangay Elections?
Held: No. The conduct of a plebiscite is necessary for the creation of a province (Sections 10 and 11 of Article X), and the
COMELECs power to administer elections includes the power to conduct a plebiscite beyond the schedule prescribed by
law. The Constitution grants the COMELEC the power to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall."23 The COMELEC has "exclusive charge of the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly and
honest elections."24 The text and intent of Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) is to give COMELEC "all the necessary and incidental
powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections." Sections 5 and 6 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (B.P. Blg. 881) the Omnibus Election Code, provide the COMELEC the power to set elections
to another date.
The tight time frame in the enactment, signing into law, and effectivity of R.A. No. 10360 on 5 February 2013, coupled with
the subsequent conduct of the National and Local Elections on 13 May 2013 as mandated by the Constitution, rendered
impossible the holding of a plebiscite for the creation of the province of Davao Occidental on or before 6 April 2013 as
scheduled in R.A. No. 10360.
SC directed the COMELEC to conduct special elections and stated that the deadline cannot defeat the right of suffrage of
the people.
The COMELEC thus has residual power to conduct a plebiscite even beyond the deadline prescribed by law. The date 28
October 2013 is reasonably close to 6 April 2013, and there is no reason why the plebiscite should not proceed as scheduled
by the COMELEC. The OSG points out that public interest demands that the plebiscite be conducted. PETITION
DISMISSED
Additional Info: In fixing the date for special elections the COMELEC should see to it that:
1. It should not be later than thirty (30) days after the cessation of the cause of the postponement or suspension of the
election or the failure to elect; and,
2. It should be reasonably close to the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in the failure to elect.
UMALI V COMELEC
(GR No. 203974, 22 April 2014)
Facts: On July 2011, the Sangguniang Panglungsod requesting the President to declare the conversion of Cabanatuan City
from a component city of the province of Nueva Ecija into a highly urbanized city (HUC). President issued Presidential
Proclamation No. 418, Series of 2012, proclaiming the City of Cabanatuan as an HUC subject to "ratification in a plebiscite by
the qualified voters therein, as provided for in Section 453 of the Local Government Code of 1991." COMELEC then passed
a resolution stating that only those registered residents of Cabanatuan City should participate in the plebiscite.
Issue: W/N the qualified registered voters of the entire province of Nueva Ecija or only those in Cabanatuan City can
participate in the plebiscite called for the conversion of Cabanatuan City from a component city into an HUC.
Held: Entire Province should vote.

Sec. 453 of the LGC should be interpreted in accordance with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution
The power to create, divide, merge, abolish or substantially alter boundaries of provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays,
which is pertinent in the case at bar, is essentially legislative in nature. The framers of the Constitution have, however,
allowed for the delegation of such power in Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution as long as
1. The criteria prescribed in the LGC is met and;
2. The creation, division, merger, abolition or the substantial alteration of the boundaries is subject to the approval by a
majority vote in a plebiscite.
Likewise, legislative power was delegated to the President under Sec. 453 of the LGC. In this case, the provision merely
authorized the President to make a determination on whether or not the requirements under Sec. 45210 of the LGC are
complied with. The provision makes it ministerial for the President, upon proper application, to declare a component city as
highly urbanized once the minimum requirements, which are based on certifiable and measurable indices under Sec. 452,
are satisfied. The mandatory language "shall" used in the provision leaves the President with no room for discretion.

Thus, the Court treats the phrase "by the qualified voters therein" in Sec. 453 to mean the qualified voters not only in the city
proposed to be converted to an HUC but also the voters of the political units directly affected by such conversion in order to
harmonize Sec. 453 with Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution. Alteration of Boundaries directly affect the political and
economic rights of the population of the entire area.
To limit the plebiscite to only the voters of the areas to be partitioned and seceded from the province is as absurd and
illogical as allowing only the secessionists to vote for the secession that they demanded against the wishes of the majority
and to nullify the basic principle of majority rule. WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby GRANTED.
Additional Info: operative fact doctrinethat the actual existence of a statute prior to such a determination is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
AMPATUAN V PUNO
(GR No. 190259, 7 June 2011)
Facts: On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and women, then President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946, placing the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of
Cotabato under a state of emergency. She directed the AFP and the PNP to undertake such measures as may be allowed
by the Constitution and by law to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in the named places. Under AO 273,
she also delegated to the DILG the supervision of the ARMM.
The petitioners claimed that the Presidents issuances encroached the ARMMs autonomy, that it constitutes an invalid
exercise of emergency powers, and that the President had no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency, especially in
the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent incidents occurred. They want Proc. 1946
and AO 273 be declared unconstitutional.
The respondents, however, said that its purpose was not to deprive the ARMM of its autonomy, but to restore peace and
order in subject places. It is pursuant to her calling out power as Commander-in-Chief. The determination of the need to
exercise this power rests solely on her wisdom.
The President merely delegated her supervisory powers over the ARMM to the DILG Secretary who was her alter ego any
way. The delegation was necessary to facilitate the investigation of the mass killings
Issue:
1. W/N President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out the AFP and the PNP to prevent
and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City?
2. W/N there is factual basis on the calling out of the Armed Forces
Held:
1. No. The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of emergency in the three places mentioned.
And she did not act pursuant to any law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers.
The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in such places is a power that the
Constitution directly vests in the President. She did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same.
2. Yes. The Presidents call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence springs from the power
vested in her under Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution. While it is true that the Court may inquire into the
factual bases for the Presidents exercise of the above power, unless it is shown that such determination was
attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will accord respect to the Presidents judgment.
SECTION 11:
MMDA V BEL-AIR VILLAGE

(GR No. 135962, 27 March 2000)
Facts: On Dec 1995, respondent received from petitioner a notice requesting the former to open its private road, Neptune
Street, to public vehicular traffic starting January 2, 1996. On the same day, respondent was apprised that the perimeter
separating the subdivision from Kalayaan Avenue would be demolished.
Respondent instituted a petition for injunction against petitioner, praying for the issuance of a TRO and preliminary injunction
enjoining the opening of Neptune Street and prohibiting the demolition of the perimeter wall.

Issue: W/N MMDA has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic as an agent of the state endowed with police
power?
Held: A local government is a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted by law and has substantial
control of local affairs. It is a body politic and corporate one endowed with powers as a political subdivision of the
National Government and as a corporate entity representing the inhabitants of its territory (LGC of 1991).
Our Congress delegated police power to the LGUs in Sec.16 of the LGC of 1991. It empowers the sangguniang
panlalawigan, panlungsod and bayan to enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare
of the [province, city or municipality] and its inhabitants pursuant to Sec.16 of the Code and in the proper exercise of the
[LGUs corporate powers] provided under the Code.
There is no syllable in RA 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies
of the LGUs, there is no grant of authority in RA 7924 that allows the MMDA to enact ordinances and regulations for the
general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is merely a development authority and not a political unit of
government since it is neither an LGU or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. The MMDA Chairman is not an
elective official, but is merely appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member.
In sum, the MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the LGUs, acting through their
respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power.
The Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune
Street, hence, its proposed opening by the MMDA is illegal.
MMDA V GARIN
(GR No. 130230, 15 April 2005)
Facts: Respondent Garin was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his drivers license was confiscated for parking
illegally. Garin wrote to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his license and expressed his
preference for his case to be file in Court. Without an immediate reply from the chairman, Garin filed for a preliminary
injunction assailing among others that Sec 5 (f) of RA 7924 violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of
legislative authority, allowing MMDA to fix and impose unspecified and unlimited fines and penalties. RTC rule in his favor,
directing MMDA to return his license and for the authority to desist from confiscating drivers license without first giving the
driver the opportunity to be heard in an appropriate proceeding. Thus, this petition.
Issue: W/N Sec 5(f) of RA 7924 which authorizes MMDA to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers license in the
enforcement of traffic rules and regulations constitutional?
Held: The MMDA is not vested with police power. It was concluded that MMDA is not a local government unit of a public
corporation endowed with legislative power and it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the
community. Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is the power vested in the legislature to make, ordain,
establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances either with penalties of without, not
repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge to be for good and welfare of the commonwealth and for subjects of the
same. There is no provision in RA 7924 that empowers MMDA or its council to enact ordinance, approve resolutions and
appropriate funds for the general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. It is an agency created for the purpose of laying
down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, Peoples Organizations, NGOs and private
sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of services. All its functions are administrative in nature.
SECTION 12:
ABELLA V. COMELEC
(GR 100710, 3 September 1991)
Facts:
- Petitions are for the review of COMELEC decisions and resolutions related to the local elections of February 1988.
- Adelina Larrazabal obtained the highest number of votes for Governor of Leyte. However, she was later declared by the
COMELEC to lack both residence and registration qualifications.
- Benjamin Abella obtained the second highest number of votes for the position but was not allowed by the COMELEC to
be proclaimed after the disqualification of Larrazabal.

- Leopoldo Petilla is the Vice-Governor of the province of Leyte. The court issued a TRO to maintain status quo before
the filing of this petition and to desist from assuming the office of Governor.
- The position of Abella is that Larrazabal is neither a resident nor a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte but that of Ormoc
City, a component city of the province of Leyte but independent of the province pursuant to Section 12, Article X, thereby
disqualifying her for the position. He wishes to be proclaimed governor.
- Larrazabal maintained that she had cancelled her registration in Ormoc, changed her residence and registration to
Kananga, Leyte, and entered into a contract of lease with option to buy property therein. However, said contract actually
indicates her as resident of Ormoc. The COMELEC expressed disbelief on her claims due to numerous inconsistencies
in the documents presented.
- Larrazabal now contends that Section 4 and 12 of Article X may prohibit voters from participating in the elections for
provincial office, but that voters are not prohibited from running for the provincial offices.
Issues:
- W.O.N. prohibition against Ormoc Citys registered voters electing the provincial officials necessarily means a prohibition
to be elected as provincial officials.
- W.O.N. a candidate with the second highest number of votes may be proclaimed if the candidate with the highest
number of votes is disqualified.
- Who is the rightful governor of the province of Leyte?
Held:
- Yes. Prohibition is for both electing and being elected as provincial officials. Section 89 of RA 179 creating the City of
Ormoc provides: Election of provincial governor and members of the Provincial Board of the Province f Leyte The
qualified voters of Ormoc City shall not be qualified and entitled to vote in the election of the provincial governor and the
members of the board of the Province of Leyte. It connotes 2 prohibitions: one from running and second from voting.
- No. Jurisprudence has established that in the event a candidate is voted for and is disqualified for not possessing the
eligibility requirements, the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes cannot assume the vacated
position.
- In sum, the Court does not find any reason to reverse the decision and resolution of the COMELEC. It has not acted in
GAOD. Wherefore, petitions are dismissed, COMELEC decision is affirmed, and the TRO for Vice-Governor Petilla to
desist from assuming the office of Governor is lifted.
CORDILLERA BROAD COALITION V. COA

(GR 82217, 29 January 1990)
Facts:
- The consolidated petitions assail the constitutionality of EO 220, dated July 15, 1987 on the ground that it pre-empts the
enactment of an organic act by Congress and the creation of the autonomous region in the Cordilleras.
- EO 220 created the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR), which covers the provinces of Abra, Benguet, Ifugao,
Kalinga-Apayao, Mountain Provinces and the City of Baguio. It was created to accelerate economic and social growth in
the region and to prepare for the establishment of the autonomous region. The CAR and its Assembly and Executive
Board shall exist until such time as the autonomous regional government is established and organized.
- During the pendency of this case, RA 6766 entitled An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous
Region was enacted and signed into law.
Issues:
- W.O.N. the President, by issuing EO 220, pre-empted Congress from its mandated task of enacting an organic act and
created an autonomous region in the Cordilleras.
- Collateral issue is W.O.N. the CAR is a territorial and political subdivision.
- Lastly, W.O.N. CAR contravened the constitutional guarantee of local autonomy.
Held:
- No. Petitioners assertions are all unfounded and the petitions are dismissed.
- A reading of EO 220 reveals that it envisions the consolidation and coordination of delivery services of line departments
and agencies of the National Government in the areas covered by CAR. It does not create the autonomous region
contemplated in the Constitution.
- The transitory nature of CAR does not mean it is the interim autonomous region of the Cordilleras. It created a region
for administrative purposes with the main objective of coordinating the planning and implementation of programs and
services. The bodies created y EO 220 do not supplant the existing local governmental structure, nor are they
autonomous government agencies.
- Subsequent to EO 220, the Congress, after it was convened, enacted RA 6658, which created the Cordillera Regional
Consultative Commission the first step in the complex procedure for the creation of an autonomous region. Thus, the
petitioners fear that EO 220 was a shortcut for its creation is unfounded.

- On the collateral issue, EO 220 did not create a new territorial and political subdivision. The CAR does not have a
separate juridical personality, unlike provinces, cities, and municipalities. The CAR may be considered as a regional
coordinating agency of the National Government, which the President may create under the Section 14, Article X of the
Constitution.
- Lastly, the CAR merely fills in the gap in the process of transforming a group of adjacent subdivisions already enjoying
local or administrative autonomy into an autonomous region vested with political autonomy. Petitioners failed to show
how the CAR has diminished local autonomy of the covered provinces and city.
PIMENTEL V. OCHOA
676 SCRA 551 (2012)
Facts:
- The case is a petition for certiorari and prohibition against the constitutionality of certain provisions of RA 10147 or the
GAA of 2011, which provides a 21bln budget allocation for the Conditional Cash Transfer Program (CCTP) headed by
the DSWD.
- Petitioners contend that it amounts to a recentralization of government functions that have already been devolved from
the National Government to the LGUs.
- DSWD had actually embarked on poverty reduction programs in 2007 and 2008. The current government intervention
scheme (CCTP) began in 2008. It provides cash grants to extremely poor households to allow them to meet human
development goals. Such annual subsidies are given under certain conditions. DSWD has instituted a coordinated
inter-agency network among the DepEd, DOH, DILG, NAPC and LGUs. The CCTP has been allocated increasing
budgets from 299mln in 2008 to 21bln in 2011.
- Petitioners are challenging the disbursement of these funds and the implementation of the CCTP which are alleged to
have encroached into the autonomy of the LGUs.
Issues:
- W.O.N. the 21bln CCTP budget allocation under DSWD violates Article II, Section 25 and Article X, Section 3 of the
Constitution in relation to Section 17 of the Local Government Code by providing for the recentralization of the National
Government of basic services already devolved to the LGUs.
Held:
- No. It does not violate the Constitution and petition is hereby dismissed.
- The court quoted Section 3 and Section 14 of Article X of the Constitution together with the pertinent provisions of
Section 17 of the Local Government Code regarding basic services and facilities. It explained that there is a reservation
of power by the national government that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has
no power over a program for which the funding has been provided by the national government under the GAA, even if
the program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.
- The national government is not precluded from taking a direct hand in the formulation and implementation of national
development programs. The allocation of a budget for an intervention program formulated by the national government
but implemented in partnership with the LGUs to achieve a common national goal of development and social progress is
not n encroachment upon the autonomy of local governments.
KULAYAN V. TAN
675 SCRA 482 (2012)
Facts:
- The case is a petition for certiorari filed by residents of Patikul, Sulu to question the power of the Governor to Declare a
State of Emergency and to Issue Proclamation No. 1-09.
- In January 2009, 3 members of the International Committee of the Red Cross were kidnapped by the Abu Sayyaf in
Pakitul, Sulu.
- Respondent Abdusakur Tan, the Provincial Governor of Sulu, convened the Sulu Crisis Management Committee and
organized the Civilian Emergency Force (CEF), a group of armed male civilians coming from different municipalities,
who were redeployed to surrounding areas of Patikul.
- The organization of the CEF was embodied in a secret Memorandum of Understanding among 3 parties: the provincial
government of Sulu represented by Gov. Tan, the AFP represented by Gen. Saban, and the PNP represented by
P/SUPT. Latag.
- In March 2009, Gov. Tan issued Proclamation No. 1-09 declaring a state of emergency in Sulu. It cited the kidnapping
as a terrorist act and invoked Section 465 of the Local Government Code to carry out emergency measures and call
upon the national law enforcement agencies to suppress disorder and lawless violence. It called upon the PNP and the
CEF to set up checkpoints and chokepoints, conduct general search and seizures including arrests, and other actions to
ensure public safety.
Issues:

- W.O.N. Section 465 of the Local Government Code authorizes the governor to declare a state of emergency, and
exercise the powers enumerated under Proclamation No. 1-09, specifically the conduct of general search and seizures.
- Secondary question of W.O.N. the provincial governor is similarly clothed with authority to convene the CEF under the
said provisions.
Held:
- No. Section 465 of the Local Government Code cannot be invoked to justify the powers enumerated under Proclamation
No. 1-09. Petitioners rightly assert that the general search and seizures including arrests are violative of the Bill of
Rights. Moreover, only the President is vested with calling-out powers as the Commander-in-Chief of the Republic. It is
only the President who is authorized to exercise emergency powers as provided under the Constitution. The provincial
governor does not possess the same calling-out powers as the President. In issuing the assailed proclamation, Gov. Tan
exceeded his authority when he declared a state of emergency, called upon the AFP, the police and his own CEF.
- No. The governor is not authorized to convene CEF. Its creation is invalid.
ABBAS V. COMELEC
179 SCRA 287 (1989)
Facts:
- These consolidated petitions pray that the Court enjoin the COMELEC from conducting the plebiscite on November 19,
1989 and the Secretary of Budget and Management from releasing funds to the COMELEC for that purpose and to declare
RA 6734, or parts thereof, as unconstitutional.
Issues:
- W.O.N. RA 6734, or parts thereof, violate the Tripoli Agreement and Constitution.
Held:
- No. The Tripoli Agreement is not a binding treaty, not having been entered into by the Republic with a sovereign state
and ratified. Thus the only standard for any inquiry on the validity of RA 6734 is provided for in the Constitution. The
Court ruled that RA 6734 does not violate the Constitution.
- Contrary to Abbas argument than RA 6734 unconditionally creates an autonomous region, Section 13 of the Act
incorporates substantially the same requirements of Section 18, Article X of the Constitution, including a plebiscite.
- Only provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous
region. The Constitution requires a simple majority of votes approving the Organic Act in individual constituent units, not
a double majority of votes of all constituent units as well as in the individual constituent units.
- Petitioner Mama-os contention that not all 13 provinces and 9 cities included in the Organic Act possess concurrence in
historical and cultural heritage is within the exclusive realm of the legislatures discretion, the wisdom of which the Court
cannot review without doing violence to the separation of governmental powers.
- Likewise, the Court may not be called upon to resolve what is merely perceived potential conflict between the provisions
of the Muslim Code and national law.
- Regarding the petitioners claim that the Constitution does not confer upon the President the power to merge regions, it
must be clarified that what is referred to in RA 6734 is a merger of administrative regions (not territorial or political
subdivisions), which is allowed by law under the Integrated Reorganizational Plan of 1972.
- Lastly, the creation of the autonomous region hinges only on the result of the plebiscite. The Oversight Committee to
supervise the transfer of powers to the autonomous region do not provide for a different date of effectivity.
- The petitions are dismissed for lack of merit.
CORDILLERA REGIONAL ASSEMBLY V. COMELEC (1990)
Facts:
- On January 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra, Kalinga-Apayao, and the
city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite pursuant to RA 6766 entitled An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR).
- It was overwhelmingly rejected by those above, with the exception of Ifugao.
- COMELEC issued a Resolution 2259 that the Organic Act was approved in the province of Ifugao. The Secretary of
Justice issued a memorandum to the President reiterating the COMELEC resolution that Ifugao alone constitutes the
CAR. The Congress enacted RA 6861 setting the elections for the CAR of Ifugao. The Executive Secretary issued a
memorandum to wind up the affairs of the Cordillera Executive Board and Regional Assembly under EO 220. The

President issued AO 160 declaring all offices created under EO 220 abolished in view of the ratification of the Organic
Act.
- Petitioners maintain that there can be no valid CAR in only one province as the Constitution and RA 6766 require the
Region to be composed of more than one constituent unit.
Issues:
- W.O.N. the province of Ifugao, being the only province that voted favorably for the creation of the CAR can, alone,
legally and validly constitute such Region.
Held:
- No. The petition is meritorious. The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the CAR.
- Key words in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution connote that region is to be made up of more than one
constituent unit as the term used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces.
- The entirety of RA 6766 creating the CAR is infused with provisions which rule against the sole province of Ifugao
constituting the Region, e.g. those regarding the how the regional government will consist of local government units,
their membership to the Cordillera Assembly, the creation of a Regional Planning and Development Board and
counterpart provincial coordinators, huge allotment for initial organization, and composition of Regional Commission of
Appointments.
- The Courts decision in Abbas v. COMELEC is not applicable in the case at bar. The issue is not whether Ifugao is to be
included in the CAR, but whether there shall be an autonomous region in the Cordillera.
- The petition is granted. COMELEC Resolution 2259, memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, memorandum of the
Executive Secretary, AO 160, and RA 6861 are declared null and void while EO 220 is declared to still be in force.
LEONOR V. CORDILLERA BODONG ADMINISTRATION

(GR 92649, 14 Feb 1991)
Facts:
- Spouses Leonor and Rosa Badua allegedly own a farm in Abra. In July 1989, they were forcibly ejected from the land
by virtue of a decision of the Cordillera Bodong Administration (CBA) in a case entitled David Quema v. Leonor
Badua.
- Quema claims to have mortgaged the land to Dra. Valera and was able to redeem it 22 years later after paying the
mortgagees heir. On the other hand, Rosa claims that the land was sold to her by Dra. Valera when the later was still
alive but could not produce the deed of sale, which was allegedly with Vice-Governor Benesa.
- Quema filed a case before the Barangay Council but it failed to settle the dispute so he filed the case with the tribal court
of Maeng Tribe. The Maeng Tribal Court decided in favor of Quema and ordered the spouses Badua to vacate the land
and to pay for expenses and fine. The Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army (CPLA) of the CBA issued a warning to the
spouses and even arrested and detained Rosa for 2 days.
- In April 1990, the Baduas filed this petition for Special and Extraordinary Reliefs, alleging that they were denied due
process and that CBA has no judicial power.
Issues:
- W.O.N. a tribal court of the CBA can render a valid and executory decision in a land dispute.
Held:
- No. The Court finds the petition to be meritorious. The Court en banc found that in the plebiscite that was held in
January 1990 pursuant to RA 6766, the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR) was rejected by all the
provinces and city of the region, except for Ifugao. Hence, the CAR did not come to be. As a logical consequence of
that judicial declaration, the CBA, indigenous and special courts, and the CPLA do not legally exist.
- Since the CAR did not come to legal existence, the Maeng Tribal Court was not constituted into an indigenous or special
court under RA 6766. Hence, it is an ordinary tribal court under the customs of an indigenous cultural community. They
are not part of the Philippine judicial system. Wherefore the decision rendered by the Maeng Tribal Court is annulled for
lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice to the filing of appropriate action in the proper courts.
ORDILLO V. COMELEC
192 SCRA 100 (1990)
Facts:
- On January 1990, the people of the provinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra, Kalinga-Apayao, and the
city of Baguio cast their votes in a plebiscite pursuant to RA 6766 entitled An Act Providing for an Organic Act for the
Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR).
- It was overwhelmingly rejected by those above, with the exception of Ifugao.
- COMELEC issued a Resolution 2259 that the Organic Act was approved in the province of Ifugao. The Secretary of
Justice issued a memorandum to the President reiterating the COMELEC resolution that Ifugao alone constitutes the

CAR. The Congress enacted RA 6861 setting the elections for the CAR of Ifugao. The Executive Secretary issued a
memorandum to wind up the affairs of the Cordillera Executive Board and Regional Assembly under EO 220. The
President issued AO 160 declaring all offices created under EO 220 abolished in view of the ratification of the Organic
Act.
- Petitioners maintain that there can be no valid CAR in only one province as the Constitution and RA 6766 require the
Region to be composed of more than one constituent unit.
Issues:
- W.O.N. the province of Ifugao, being the only province that voted favorably for the creation of the CAR can, alone,
legally and validly constitute such Region.
Held:
- No. The petition is meritorious. The sole province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the CAR.
- Key words in Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution connote that region is to be made up of more than one
constituent unit as the term used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces.
- The entirety of RA 6766 creating the CAR is infused with provisions which rule against the sole province of Ifugao
constituting the Region, e.g. those regarding the how the regional government will consist of local government units,
their membership to the Cordillera Assembly, the creation of a Regional Planning and Development Board and
counterpart provincial coordinators, huge allotment for initial organization, and composition of Regional Commission of
Appointments.
- The Courts decision in Abbas v. COMELEC is not applicable in the case at bar. The issue is not whether Ifugao is to be
included in the CAR, but whether there shall be an autonomous region in the Cordillera.
- The petition is granted. COMELEC Resolution 2259, memorandum of the Secretary of Justice, memorandum of the
Executive Secretary, AO 160, and RA 6861 are declared null and void while EO 220 is declared to still be in force.
BADUA V. CBA
194 SCRA 101 (1991)
Facts:
- Spouses Leonor and Rosa Badua allegedly own a farm in Abra. In July 1989, they were forcibly ejected from the land
by virtue of a decision of the Cordillera Bodong Administration (CBA) in a case entitled David Quema v. Leonor
Badua.
- Quema claims to have mortgaged the land to Dra. Valera and was able to redeem it 22 years later after paying the
mortgagees heir. On the other hand, Rosa claims that the land was sold to her by Dra. Valera when the later was still
alive but could not produce the deed of sale, which was allegedly with Vice-Governor Benesa.
- Quema filed a case before the Barangay Council but it failed to settle the dispute so he filed the case with the tribal court
of Maeng Tribe. The Maeng Tribal Court decided in favor of Quema and ordered the spouses Badua to vacate the land
and to pay for expenses and fine. The Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army (CPLA) of the CBA issued a warning to the
spouses and even arrested and detained Rosa for 2 days.
- In April 1990, the Baduas filed this petition for Special and Extraordinary Reliefs, alleging that they were denied due
process and that CBA has no judicial power.
Issues:
- W.O.N. a tribal court of the CBA can render a valid and executory decision in a land dispute.
Held:
- No. The Court finds the petition to be meritorious. The Court en banc found that in the plebiscite that was held in
January 1990 pursuant to RA 6766, the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region (CAR) was rejected by all the
provinces and city of the region, except for Ifugao. Hence, the CAR did not come to be. As a logical consequence of
that judicial declaration, the CBA, indigenous and special courts, and the CPLA do not legally exist.
- Since the CAR did not come to legal existence, the Maeng Tribal Court was not constituted into an indigenous or special
court under RA 6766. Hence, it is an ordinary tribal court under the customs of an indigenous cultural community. They
are not part of the Philippine judicial system. Wherefore the decision rendered by the Maeng Tribal Court is annulled for
lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice to the filing of appropriate action in the proper courts.
PROVINCE OF NORTH COTABATO V. GOVERNMENT OF THE ROP PEACE PANEL (GRP)
Facts:
- The subject of these consolidated cases is the extent of the powers of the President in pursuing the peace process.
- The 5 August 2008 signing of the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) aspect of the GRP-
MILF Tripoli Agreement of 2001did not materialize because of the TRO issued by SC upon motion of petitioners.

- The SG summarizes the MOA-AD by stating that the same contained, among others, the commitment of the parties to
pursue peace negotiations, protect and respect human rights, negotiate with sincerity in the resolution and pacific
settlement of the conflict, and refrain from the use of threat or force.
- Petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose the complete copies of the MOA-AD, holding of public consultation
thereon, and that the MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional.
Issues:
- W.O.N. the MOA-AD is unconstitutional.
(Given the numerous and diverse issues raised, the decisions lifted and summarized below are limited to those grounds
related to Article X of the Constitution.)
Held:
- Yes. The MOA-AD is declared contrary to law and the constitution. It cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution
and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship
envisioned between the GRP and the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE), are unconstitutional, for the concept
presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence
- The MOA-AD mentions the BJE to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral
lands of the Bangsamoro. The core of the BJE is defined as the present geographical area of the ARMM plus other
provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays, which will be subject to plebiscites to be held on different dates, years
apart from each other. The MOA-AD stipulates that the BJE shall have jurisdiction over natural resources, free to enter
into economic cooperation and trade relations with foreign countries, enter into environmental cooperation agreements,
modify and cancel concessions, licenses, contracts, agreements, and other instruments granted by the Philippine
Government, including those issued by the current ARMM. The MOA-AD describes the relationship of the central
government with the BJE as associative, characterized by shared authority and responsibility. The petitions allege that
the GRP drafted the MOA-AD without consulting LGUs and that its stipulations, in effect, guaranteed to the MILF
amendment of the Constitution.
- The above powers granted to the BJE exceed those granted to any LGU under present laws and even go beyond those
of the present ARMM, making BJE far more powerful than the autonomous region recognized in the constitution.
Moreover, the, concept of association is not recognized under the present Constitution.
- The MOA-AD violates Article X, Section 1 (territorial and political subdivisions of the RoP and the autonomous regions),
Sections 15 (creation of autonomous regions within the framework of the Constitution), Section 18 (only those
subdivisions voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region), and Section 20 (legislative
powers of autonomous regions subject to the provisions of the Constitution and national laws).
- It is also inconsistent with RA 9054 or the Organic Act of the ARMM (e.g. definition of Bangsamoro people and the
constituent units voted to be part of the ARMM, not the BJE).
Other the ponente Carpio-Morales, the following voted or wrote separate opinions:
Quisumbing, J, concur
Puno, CJ, Separate concurring opinion
Ynares-Santiago, J, Separate concurring opinion; concur with opinion of CJ Puno
Carpio, J, Concurring opinion
Austria-Martinez, J, concur with CJ
Corona, J, share dissent of Tinga
Tinga, J, dissent from result. Separate opinion
Chico-Nazario J, Dissenting opinion
Velaso, Jr., J, Dissenting opinion
Nachura, J, Dissenting opinion
Reyes, J, (Puno, CJ, certify that J. Reyes filed a separate opinion concurring
Leonardo-De Castro, J, Concurring and Dissenting opinion
Brion, J, Dissenting opinion
SEMA V. COMELEC
(GR 177597, 16 July 2008)
Facts:
- These consolidated petitions seek to annul Resolution 7902, dated 10 May 2007, of the COMELEC treating Cotabato
City as part of the legislative district of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan.
- The Ordinance appended to the 1987 Constitution apportioned 2 legislative districts for the Province of Maguindanao.
The first district consists of Cotabato City and 8 municipalties.
- Maguindanao forms part of ARMM under its Organic Act RA 6734 as amended by RA 9054.
- Although under the Ordinance, Cotabato is part of Maguindanaos first district, it is not part of ARMM but of Region XII,
having voted against its inclusion in the ARMM plebiscite in November 1989.
- In August 2006, the ARMM Regional Assembly, exercising its power to create provinces under Section 19, Article V of
RA 9054, enacted MMA 201 creating the province of Shariff Kabunsuan, composed of the 8 municipalities in the first

district of Maguindanao. Later, 3 new municipalities were carved out of the original 8, bringing the total number of
municipalities to 11.
- The voters of Maguindanao ratified Shariff Kabunsuans creation in a plebiscite.
- On 6 March 2007, COMELEC issued Resolution 07-0407 maintaining the status quo with Cotabato as part of Shariff
Kabunsuan in the first district, pending the enactment of the appropriate law by Congress.
- On 29 March 2007, COMELEC promulgated Resolution 7845 stating Maguindanaos first legislative district is composed
only of Cotabato.
- On 10 May 2007, COMELEC issued Resolution 7902 amending 07-0407 renaming the legislative district as Shariff
Kabunsuan Province wih Cotabato City (formerly First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato City.
- Sema, who was running as Representative of Shariff Kabunsuan with Cotabato City, prayed for the nullification of
Resoltion 7902 and the exclusion from canvassing of the votes cast in Cotabato. She claimed that COMELEC usurped
Congress power to create or reapportion legislative districts.
- Respondent Dilangalen countered that Sema is estopped from questioning Resolution 7902 because she indicated in
her COC that she was seeking election as representative of Shariff Kabunsuan including Cotabato. He added that the
resolution is constitutional because it did not reapportion but merely renamed Maguindanaos first district.
Issues:
- W.O.N. Section 19, Article V of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces is
constitutional, and if in the affirmative, whether a province created under it is entitled to one representative in the House
of Representatives without need of a national law creating a legislative district for the new province.
Held:
- No. Section 19, Article V of RA 9054, delegating to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces is not
constitutional. When a province is created, a legislative district is created by operation of the Constitution because the
Constitution provides that each province shall have at least one representative.
- The creation of LGUs is governed by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, i.e. it must follow the Local Government
Code, it must not conflict with the Constitution, and there must be a plebiscite in the political units affected. Moreover, as
earlier mentioned, a province cannot be created without a legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3), Article
VI of the Constitution.
- Under the constitution, the power to increase the allowable membership in the House of Representatives, and to
reapportion legislative districts, is vested exclusively in Congress.
- Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to create or
reapportion legislative districts for Congress.
- Even Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054 amending the ARMM Organic Act provides that National Elections is one of the
matters that are excluded from the list of legislative powers that the Regional Assembly may exercise. The office of a
legislative district representative is a national office and to allow the ARMM to create a national office is to allow it to
operate outside of the ARMMs territorial jurisdiction, which violates Section 20, Article X of the Constitution.
- The court ruled that MMA 201 creating the province of Shariff Kabunsuan is void and consequently, COMELEC
Resolution 7902 preserving the First District of Maguindanao with Cotabato is valid. Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054 is
declared unconstitutional.
Five other justices joined the Separate Dissenting Opinion of Tinga, J:
He stated that there is nothing in the Constitution that bars Congress from delegating the power to create provinces and
legislative districts to ARMM.
PANDI V. COURT OF APPEALS (2002)
Facts:
- This is a petition for certiorari seeking reversal of the decision of the CA in April 1994 and its resolution in August 1994
denying a motion for reconsideration. The CA granted the petition for quo warranto filed against Dr. Lampi and Dr.
Macacua in favor or respondent Dr. Saber. The CA declared Saber entitled to the position of OIC of the Integrated
Provincial Health Office Amai Pakpak General Hospital (IPHO-APGH), Lanao del Sur.
- In August 1993, Macacua in her capacity as Regional Director and Secretary of the DOH of the ARMM, designated
Pandi as OIC of IPHO-APGH in place of Dr. Sani who was moved to the DOH-ARMM Regional Office in Cotabato City.
- In September 1993, Lanao del Sur Provincial Governor Mutilan designated Saber also as OIC of IPHO-APGH.
- Sani filed a complaint challenging his transfer to Cotabato, alleging that he is the holder of a permanent appointment as
provincial health officer of IPHO-APGH.
- Saber filed for quo warranto with prayer for preliminary injunction claiming that he is the lawfully designated.
- Pandi and Macacua filed their comments on the petition and opposition to the application for writ of preliminary
injunction.
- In October 1993, President Ramos issued EO 133 transferring the powers and functions of the DOH in the region to the
Regional Government of ARMM.
- In November 1993, Macacua, again issued a memorandum reiterating Pandis designation and Santis transfer.

- In March 1994, Pandi and Macacua filed a motion to dismiss Sabers petition on the ground that it has become moot and
academic with the enactment of MMA 25 (ARMM Local Code) and the MOA between the DOH of the National
Government and the ARMM Regional Government.
- In April 1994, the CA rendered the assailed decision and denied the motion for reconsideration in August 1994.
- The CA maintained that the Organic Act of 1989 and the ARMM Local Code could not prevail over the 1991 LGU Code
where the power to appoint rests with the Provincial Governor.
Issues:
- W.O.N. an incumbent provincial health officer can be assigned to another province and who can order such assignment.
- Who can designate the OIC in the provincial health office the Provincial Governor or the ARMM Secretary of Health?
- Who is empowered to appoint the provincial health officer the Provincial Governor, the Regional Governor, or the
ARMM Secretary of Health?
Held:
- Yes. Under EO 199 which was in effect when he was transferred, the Secretary of Health, upon the recommendation of
the Regional Director, could assign provincial officers to any province within the region. However, since Sani was
actually appointed as provincial health officer in Region XII and not Lanao del Sur, he cannot claim any security of
tenure in that office. Thus, Macacuas initial order for his transfer in August 1993 was void. However, her second
Memorandum in November 1993, after the issuance of EO 133, was valid.
- It was only with the issuance of EO 133 in October 1993, that the supervision and control over all functions and activities
of the DOH of ARMM was vested in the Regional Secretary of Health. Thus, Macacuas initial designation of Pandi as
OIC in August 1993 was void but her second Memorandum in November 1993, after the issuance of EO 133, was valid.
Note however that the Regional Secretary of Health lost this authority after the effectivity of the ARMM Local Code in
1994, which passed this power to the Provincial Governor.
- (a) Prior to the Organic Act of 1989, the Minister of Health was the appointing power. (b) After the Organic Act of 1989,
the 1984 LGU Code applied until the region adopted its own code. Under the 1984 LGU Code, the provincial health
officers were not officials of the provincial government, and the appointing ower remained with the Secretary of Health of
the National Goverment. (c) After the LGU Code of 1991, the provincial health officer became a provincial government
official with the Provincial Governor as appointing power. However, later laws like the 1991 LGU Code and the Revised
Administration Code of 1987 which became effective in November 1989, did not amend the Organic Act of 1989
because it can only be amended through a ratification process laid out in the Organic Act itself. It was only in October
1993, after the issuance of EO 133 in accordance with the Organic Act that the appointing power transferred to the
Regional Governor. (d) After the effectivity of the ARMM Local Code, the appointing power depended on where the
salary came from. If it will come from regional funds, the Regional Governor shall appoint from a list of 3 recommendees
of the Provincial Governor. If it will come from provincial funds, the Provincial Governor is the appointing power. (e)
After the Organic Act of 2001, the LGUs within ARMM had the same devolved powers as those under the 1991 LGU
Code. Thus, the Provincial Governor appoints if the salary comes from provincial funds. If from regional funds, the
ARMM Local Code applies.
- Thus, petition is granted and the assailed decision of the CA is set aside. The designation of Saber as OIC of IPHO,
Lanao del Sur is void. The designation of Pandi as OIC of IPHO, Lanao del Sur and assignment of Sani to Cotabato are
valid.

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CASE DIGESTS

ARTICLE X: LOCAL GOVERNMENT

2. LBC No. 21 was held ultra vires and set aside.

1 CASTANEDA, GUERRERO, LAYNO, PEREZ, PUERTO, YOUNG

MAGTAJAS V PRYCE PROPERTIES (1994)

PHIL. PETROLEUM CORP V MUNICIPALITY OF PILLILA (1991)

Held: YES, with reservations

DADOLE V COA (2002)

Held: Yes and No

2. The ordinance does not contravene any law.

JOHN HAY PEOPLES ALTERNATIVE COALITION V LIM (2003)

3 CASTANEDA, GUERRERO, LAYNO, PEREZ, PUERTO, YOUNG

LEYNES V COA (2003)

BATANGAS CATV V CA (2004)

Issue: W/N respondent LGU can validly regulate subscriber rates = NO

Held: 1. NTC has the SOLE power to regulate subscriber rates.

2. The resolution is in contravention of the States deregulation policy.

CAMP JOHN HAY DEVELOPMENT CORP V CBAA

Issue: W/N petitioner is exempt from real property tax = NO

5 CASTANEDA, GUERRERO, LAYNO, PEREZ, PUERTO, YOUNG

1.The CBP does not make the unequal equal.

GENERAL SANTOS CITY V COA

6 CASTANEDA, GUERRERO, LAYNO, PEREZ, PUERTO, YOUNG

Issue: Is Manila Ordinance No. 8187 valid and constitutional?

7 CASTANEDA, GUERRERO, LAYNO, PEREZ, PUERTO, YOUNG

LAMP V SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT

Issue: W/N the implementation of PDAF is unconstitutional or illegal

8 CASTANEDA, GUERRERO, LAYNO, PEREZ, PUERTO, YOUNG

9 CASTANEDA, GUERRERO, LAYNO, PEREZ, PUERTO, YOUNG

PROVINCE OF NEGROS OCCIDENTAL V COA

Doctrine: Control v Supervision

Issue/s: W/N the Administrative Order 103 applies also to LGUs

LEAGUE OF PROVINCES V DENR

11 CASTANEDA, GUERRERO, LAYNO, PEREZ, PUERTO, YOUNG

NPC V CABANATUAN CITY

PETRON CORPORATION V TIANGCO

FILM DEVELOPMENT COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES V SM PRIME HOLDINGS INC.

13 CASTANEDA, GUERRERO, LAYNO, PEREZ, PUERTO, YOUNG

PELIZLOY REALTY CORP. V THE PROVINCE OF BENGUET

Therefore, petition is granted.

15 CASTANEDA, GUERRERO, LAYNO, PEREZ, PUERTO, YOUNG

SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC V MUNICIPALITY OF MALVAR

16 CASTANEDA, GUERRERO, LAYNO, PEREZ, PUERTO, YOUNG

17 CASTANEDA, GUERRERO, LAYNO, PEREZ, PUERTO, YOUNG

ALTERNATIVE CENTER V ZAMORA

LEAGUE OF CITIES V COMELEC

19 CASTANEDA, GUERRERO, LAYNO, PEREZ, PUERTO, YOUNG

20 CASTANEDA, GUERRERO, LAYNO, PEREZ, PUERTO, YOUNG

Facts: Two consolidated petitions (GR 127116, GR 128039)

The term of Barangay Chairmen and other barangay officials is 3 years.

1. There is clear legislative intent to limit term to 3 years.

21 CASTANEDA, GUERRERO, LAYNO, PEREZ, PUERTO, YOUNG

2. Three year term not repugnant to Constitution

22 CASTANEDA, GUERRERO, LAYNO, PEREZ, PUERTO, YOUNG

W/N Hagedorn is qualified to run for mayor

1. A subsequent election is no longer an immediate reelection after three consecutive terms.

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING

23 CASTANEDA, GUERRERO, LAYNO, PEREZ, PUERTO, YOUNG

2 separate petitions to nullify and set aside COMELEC en banc issuances.

24 CASTANEDA, GUERRERO, LAYNO, PEREZ, PUERTO, YOUNG

Alegre was proclaimed winner of mayoral race.

25 CASTANEDA, GUERRERO, LAYNO, PEREZ, PUERTO, YOUNG

W/N the 2007-2010 term is Morales fifth term

27 CASTANEDA, GUERRERO, LAYNO, PEREZ, PUERTO, YOUNG