Republic of the Philippines The factual and procedural antecedents of the case, as
SUPREME COURT summarized by the CA, are as follows: The late Beatriz S.
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 208828-29 August 13, 2014
RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR., Petitioner,
vs.
RICARDO S. SILVERIO, JR., CITRINE HOLDINGS,
INC., MONICA P. OCAMPO and ZEE2 RESOURCES,
INC., Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, to reverse and
set aside the Decision1 dated March 8, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) insofar as CA-G.R. SP Nos. 121173 and
122024 are concerned, and Resolution2 dated July 4, 2013
denying petitioner's Motion for Partial Reconsideration. The
CA nullified the preliminary injunction issued by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City ("intestate
court"), Branch 57 in Sp. Proc. No. M-2629 and reversed
said court's Order dated August 18, 2011 declaring the sales
and derivative titles over two properties subject of intestate
proceedings as null and void.
Silverio died without leaving a will on October 7, 1987. She
was survived by her legal heirs, namely: Ricardo C. Silverio,
Sr. (husband), Edmundo S. Silverio (son), Edgardo S.
Silverio (son), Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr. (son), Nelia
S.Silverio-Dee (daughter), and Ligaya S. Silverio (daughter).
Subsequently, an intestate proceeding (SP PROC. NO. M-
2629) for the settlement of her estate was filed by
SILVERIO, SR.
In the course of the proceedings, the parties filed different
petitions and appeal challenging several orders ofthe
intestate court that went all the way up to the Supreme
Court. To better understand the myriad of factual and
procedural antecedents leading to the instant consolidated
case, this court will resolve the petitions in seriatim.
The Petitions
CA-G.R. SP No. 121172
The first petition of the three consolidated petitions is CA-
G.R. SP No. 121172 wherein petitioner, RICARDO S.
SILVERIO JR. ("SILVERIO JR.") assails the Order ofthe
intestate court dated 16 June 2011 reinstating RICARDO
SILVERIO SR. ("SILVERIO SR.") as administrator to the
estate of the late Beatriz Silverio.
The administrator first appointed by the Court was
EDGARDO SILVERIO ("EDGARDO"), but by virtue of a
Joint Manifestation dated 3 November 1999 filed by the
heirs of BEATRIZ D. SILVERIO, the motion to withdraw as
administrator filed by EDGARDO was approved by the
intestate court and in his stead, SILVERIO SR. was
appointed as the new administrator. Thereafter, an active
exchange of pleadings to remove and appoint a new
administrator ensued between SILVERIO SR. and
SILVERIO JR. The flip-flopping appointment of
administrator is summarized below:
In an Order dated 3 January 2005, SILVERIO SR. was
removed as administrator and in his stead, SILVERIO, JR.
was designated as the new administrator. A motion for
reconsideration was separately filed by SILVERIO SR. and
Nelia Silverio-Dee ("SILVERIO-DEE") and on 31 May
2005, the intestate court issued an Omnibus Order affirming
among others, the Order of 3 January 2005. Inthe same
Order, the intestate court also granted the motion of
SILVERIO JR. to take his oath as administrator effective
upon receipt of the order and expunged the inventory report
filed by SILVERIO SR.
On 12 December 2005 the intestate court acting on the
motion filed by SILVERIO SR. recalled the Order granting
letters of administration to SILVERIO JR. and reinstated
SILVERIO SR. as administrator. Then again, the intestate
court acting on the motion for partial consideration to the
Order dated 12 December 2005 filed by SILVERIO JR.
issued an Omnibus Order dated 31 October 2006 upholding
the grant of Letters of Administration to SILVERIO JR. and
removed SILVERIO SR., ad administrator for gross
violation of his duties and functions under Section 1, Rule 81
of the Rules of Court.
SILVERIO SR. moved for reconsideration of the above
Order whereas SILVERIO-DEE on the other hand, filed a
Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 97196. On 28 August 2008, the Court of
Appeals (Seventh Division) rendered a decision reinstating
SILVERIO, SR. as administrator, the decretal portion of the
Order reads:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The portions of
the Omnibus Order upholding the grant of letters of
administration to and the taking of an oath of administration
by Ricardo Silverio, Jr., as well as the removal of Ricardo
Silverio, Sr. as administrator to the Estate of Beatriz Silverio,
are declared NULL and VOID. The writ of preliminary
injunction earlier issued is MADE PERMANENT in regard
to the said portions. Respondent RTC is ORDERED to
reinstate Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator to the Estate
of Beatriz Silverio. Costs against the Private Respondents.
SO ORDERED."
SILVERIO JR. filed a Petition for review on Certioraribefore
the Supreme Court docketed as G.R. No. 185619 challenging
the 28 Augsut 2008 decision of the Court of Appeals. On 11
February 2009, the Supreme Court issued a resolution
denying the petition for failure to sufficiently show any
reversible error inthe assailed judgment to warrant the
exercise by the Court of discretionary appellate jurisdiction.
Acting on SILVERIO JR.s motion for reconsideration, the
Supreme Court on 11 February 2011, denied the motion with
finality. An entry of judgment was made on 29 March 2011.
On 25 April 2011 SILVERIO SR. filed before the intestate
court, an urgent motion to be reinstated as administrator of
the estate. Acting on the motion, the intestate court issued
the now challenged Order dated 16 June 2011, the pertinent
portion of the Order reads:
xxxx
"WHEREFORE, upon posting of a bond in the sum of TEN
MILLION PESOS, the same to be approved by this Court,
Mr. Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. is hereby ordered reinstated as
the Administrator to the estate of the late Beatriz Silverio
and to immediately take his oath as such, and exercise his
duties and functions as are incumbent under the law upon the
said position. xxx."
xxxx
CA-G.R. SP No. 121173
xxxx
On 15 March 2011, heirs SILVERIO JR., EDMUNDO and
LIGAYA represented by her legal guardian moved for the
disqualification and/or inhibition of JUDGE GUANLAO,
JR. based on the following grounds: (1) Absence of the
written consent of all parties in interest allowing JUDGE
GUANLAO, JR. to continue hearing the case considering
that he appeared once as counsel in the intestate proceedings;
(2) JUDGE GUANLAO, JR. has shown bias and partiality in
favor of SILVERIO SR. by allowing the latter to pursue
several motions and even issued a TRO in violation of the
rules against forum shopping; (3) Heir LIGAYAs Petition
for Support and Release of Funds for Medical Support has
not been resolved; and (4) It is in the best interest of all the
heirs that the proceedings be presided and decided by the
cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
On 23 March 2011, JUDGE GUANLAO, JR. issued an order
denying the Motion for Disqualification and/or Inhibition.
The movants filed a motion for reconsideration but the same
was denied in an order dated 14 June 2011. Hence, the
instant petition.
xxxx
CA-G.R. SP NO. 122024
xxxx
The intestate court in its Omnibus Order dated 31 October
2006, ordered among others, the sale of certain properties
belonging to the estate. The portion of the order which is
pertinent to the present petition reads:
"WHEREFORE, above premises considered, this Court for
the foregoing reasons resolves to grant the following:
(1) xxx
(2) xxx
(3) Allowing the sale of the properties located at (1)
No. 82 Cambridge Circle, Forbes Park, Makati City,
covered by T.C.T. No. 137155 issued by Register of
Deeds of Makati City; (2) No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes
Park, Makati City covered by T.C.T. No. 4137154
issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati City; and
(3) No. 19 Taurus St., Bel-Air Subd. Makati City
covered by TCT No. 137156 issued by the Register
of Deeds of Makati City to partially settle the
intestate estate of the late Beatriz S. Silverio, and
authorizing the Administrator to undertake the
proper procedure or transferring the titles involved
to the name of the estate; and
(4) To apply the proceeds of the sale mentioned in
Number 3 above to the payment of taxes, interests,
penalties and other charges, if any, and todistribute
the residue among the heirs Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr.,
Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr., Ligaya S. Silverio
represented by Legal Guardian Nestor S. Dela
Merced II, Edmundo S. Silverio and Nelia S.
SilverioDee in accordance with the law on intestacy.
SO ORDERED."
By virtue of the aforesaid Order, SILVERIO, JR. on 16
October 2007 executed a Deed of Absolute Salein favor of
CITRINE HOLDINGS, Inc. ("CITRINE") over the property
located at No. 3 Intsia Road, Forbes Park, Makati City.
CITRINE became the registered owner thereof on 06
September 2010 as evidenced by TCT No. 006-201000063.
A Deed of Absolute Sale was likewise executed in favor of
Monica P. Ocampo (notarized on September 16, 2010) for
the lot located at No. 82 Cambridge Circle, Forbes Park,
Makati City. On 23 December 2010, TCT No. 006-
2011000050 was issued toMonica P. Ocampo. The latter
subsequently sold said property to ZEE2 Resources, Inc.
(ZEE2) and TCT No. 006-2011000190 was issued on 11
February 2011 under its name.
In the interim, or on 12 December 2006 SILVERIO-DEE
filed a petition for certioraribefore the Court of Appeals
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 with prayer for
injunctive relief. As prayed for, the Court of Appeals issued a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on 5 February 2007.
On 4 July 2007, the Court issueda Writ of Preliminary
Injunction conditioned upon the posting of the bond in the
amount of two million pesos (Php2,000,000.00). SILVERIO-
DEE posted the required bond on February 5, 2007 but in an
order dated 3 January 2008, the Court ruled that the bond
posted by SILVERIO-DEE failed to comply with A.M. No.
04-7-02-SC. The Court, however, did not reverse the ruling
granting the injunction but instead ordered SILVERIO-DEE
to comply with A.M. No. 04-7-02-SC. The Court also
increased the bond from two million to ten million. On 29
February 2008, the Court issued a Resolution approving the
ten million bond and issued the Writ of Preliminary
Injunction. Eventually, on 28 August 2008 the Court of
Appeals (Seventh Division) issued a decision reinstating
SILVERIO SR. as administrator and declaring the Writ of
Preliminary Injunction permanent in regard to the
appointment of administrator.
On 04 February 2011 SILVERIO SR. filed an Urgent
Application for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining
Order/Preliminary Prohibitory Injunction (With Motion For
the Issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum and Subpoena
Duces Tecum) praying among others, that a TRO be issued
restraining and/or preventing SILVERIO, JR., MONICA
OCAMPO, CITRINE HOLDINGS, INC. and their
successors-in-interest from committing any act that would
affect the titles to the three properties.
On 14 February 2011, SILVERIO SR. filed an Urgent
Omnibus Motion (a) To Declare as Null and Void the Deed
of Absolute Sale dated 16 September 2010; (b) To cancel the
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 006-2011000050; and (c) To
reinstate the Transfer Certificate of Title No. 2236121 in the
name of Ricardo C. SilverioSr. and the Intestate Estate of the
late Beatriz S. Silverio.
On 28 February 2011 the Intestate Court issued an Order
granting a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining
SILVERIO JR., their agent or anybody acting in their behalf
from committing any act that would affect the titles to the
properties and enjoining the Register of Deeds of Makati
City from accepting, admitting, approving, registering,
annotating or in any way giving due course to whatever
deeds, instruments or any other documents involving
voluntary or involuntary dealings which may have the effect
of transferring, conveying, encumbering, ceding, waiving,
alienating, or disposing in favor of any individual or any
entity of the subject properties. Subpoena ad
testificandumand duces tecumwas also issued by the
intestate court requiring SILVERIO, JR., MONICA
OCAMPO and ALEXANDRA GARCIA of CITRINE to
testify and bring with them any books and documents under
their control to shed light on the circumstances surrounding
the transaction involving the properties in question.
On 9 March 2011, SILVERIO Sr. filed a Supplement to the
Urgent Omnibus Motion dated 14 February 2011. On 18
August 2011, the intestate court rendered the now assailed
Order the decretal portion of the Order is quoted hereunder:
"WHEREFORE, this Court hereby orders that:
1. The Deed of Absolute Sale dated 16 September
2010 as VOID:
2. The Transfer Certificate of Title No. 006-
2011000050 in the name of defendant MONICA
OCAMPO or any of her successors-in-
interestincluding all derivative titles, as NULL AND
VOID;
3. The Transfer Certificate of Title TCT No. 006-
2011000190 in the name of ZEE2 RESOURCES,
INC. or any of its successors-in-interest including all
derivative titles, as NULL AND VOID;
4. (T)he Register of Deeds of Makati City to
CANCEL Transfer Certificate of Title No. 006-
2011000050, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 006-
2011000190 and all of its derivative titles; and 5.
Reinstating the Transfer Certificate of Title No.
2236121 in the name of RICARDO C. SILVERIO,
SR. AND THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE
LATE BEATRIZ SILVERIO, and AS TO THE
INTSIA PROPERTY:
1. The Register of Deeds ofMakati City to
CANCEL Transfer Certificate ofTitle No.
006-2010000063, in the name of CITRINE
HOLDINGS, INC. and all of its derivative
titles; and
2. The reinstatement of Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 223612 in the name of
RICARDO C. SILVERIO, SR. and the
INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE
BEATRIZ SILVERIO.
SO ORDERED."
x x x x3
The consolidated petitions for certiorari filed by respondent
Ricardo S. Silverio, Jr. ("Silverio, Jr.") before the CA
questioned the following issuances of the intestate court:
CA-G.R. SP No. 121172 Order dated June 16, 2011
reinstating Silverio, Sr. as Administrator; CA-G.R. SP No.
121173 (1) Order dated March 23,2011 granting Silverio,
Sr.s application for preliminary injunction enjoining
Silverio, Jr. or anyone acting on their behalf from
committing any act that would affect the titles to the subject
properties and enjoining the Register of Deeds of Makati
City from accepting, admitting, approving, registering,
annotating or in any way giving due course to whatever
deeds, instruments or any other documents involving the
Cambridge and Intsia properties, (2) Order dated March 23,
2011 which denied Silverio, Jr.s motion or disqualification
and/or inhibition of Judge Guanlao, Jr., and (3) Order dated
June 14, 2011 denying the motion for reconsideration of the
March 23, 2011 Order (granting application for preliminary
injunction); and in CA-G.R. SP No. 122024 Order dated
August 18, 2011 declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale, TCT
and all derivative titles over the Cambridge and
Intsiaproperties as null and void.
On March 8, 2013, the CA rendered its Decision, the falloof
which reads:
WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing premises, the Court
hereby disposes and orders the following:
1. The petition in CA G.R. SP No. 121172is
DENIEDfor lack of merit. Accordingly, the 16 June
2011 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, Branch 57 reinstating MR. RICARDO C.
SILVERIO, SR. as Administrator is AFFIRMED.
2. The petition in CA GR. S.P. No. 121173is partly
DENIEDfor lack of merit insofar as it questions the
23 March 2011 Order denying RICARDO
SILVERIO, JRs Motion for Disqualification and/or
Inhibition of Judge Honorio E. Guanlao, Jr. The
petition is partly GRANTEDin that the Preliminary
Injunction issued by the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 57 is herebydeclared NULL and
VOID for being issued with grave abuse of
discretion.
3. The petition in CA G.R.-S.P. No. 122024is
GRANTED. Accordingly, the 18 August 2011 Order
declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale, Transfer
Certificate of Title and all derivative titles over the
Cambridge and Intsia Property null and void is
hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.4
Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. (petitioner) filed a Motion for Partial
Reconsideration5 "insofar as its ruling in CA-G.R. SP No.
122024" praying that the August 18, 2011 Order of the
intestate court be affirmed. By Resolution dated July 4,
2013, the CA denied his motion for partial reconsideration.
Hence, this petition contending thatthe CA committed a
reversible error in upholding the validity of the Intsia and
Cambridgeproperties upon the ground that the intestate court
cannotannul the sales as it has a limited jurisdiction only and
which does not includeresolving issues of ownership. It is
asserted that the CA should nothave stopped there and
looked into the nature of the properties sold, which formed
part of the conjugal partnership of Ricardo Silverio, Sr. and
Beatriz S. Silverio.
Petitioner seeks the reinstatement of the order of the intestate
court annulling the sales of the Cambridge and Intsia
properties. In the alternative, should the said sales be upheld,
petitioner prays that this Court (1) declare the sales to be
valid only to the extent of 50% net remainder share of the
late Beatriz less the corresponding shares therefrom of
petitioner and the other legal compulsory heirs, and (2) order
respondent Silverio, Jr. to account for the proceeds of sales
for distribution of the residue among the legal/compulsory
heirs.
In their Comment, respondents Silverio, Jr., Monica Ocampo
and Citrine Holdings, Inc. argued that the intestate court
should not have ruled on the validity of the sale of the
subject properties to third parties after it itself had authorized
their disposal in partial settlementof the estate, especially so
when separate actions assailing the new titles issued to said
third parties were already instituted by petitioner.
As to the issue of alleged lack ofprior consent of petitioner to
the aforesaid sales as the surviving spouses with a 50%
conjugal share in the subject properties, respondents point
out that such is belied by the October 31, 2006 Order of the
intestate court, which clearly showed that counsels of all the
heirs were present at the hearing of June 16, 2006 and no
objection was made by them to the sale of the properties and
the partial settlement of the Estate of Beatriz S. Silverio,
together with the transfer of titles of these properties in the
name of the Estate as prayed for in petitioners Manifestation
and Motion dated April 19, 2006. Petitioner had not
challenged or appealed the said order authorizing the sale of
the subject properties. Thus, it is too late in the day for
petitioner to raise this factual issue before this Court, not to
mention that it cannot be ventilated in the present appeal by
certiorari as thisCourt is not a trier of facts.
Respondent ZEE2 Resources Corporation filed its Comment
contending that the intestate court improperly nullified the
titles despite the fact that the present registered owners, who
are indispensable parties, were not impleaded. Indeed, a
Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked and may be
cancelled only in a direct proceeding brought for the
purpose. Respondent points out that petitioner himself
recognized thata direct action is required to annul a Torrens
title ashe initially instituted two civil complaints before the
RTC of Makati City seeking to annul, among others, the
TCTs issued to respondent Ocampo for the Cambridge
property. After failing to secure restraining orders in these
two civil cases, petitioner filed in the intestate court his
Urgent OmnibusMotion dated February 14, 2011 to annul
the said titles, including that of ZEE2. In any case,
respondent maintains that it is a buyer of good faith and for
value, of which the intestate court never made a
determination nor did the aforesaid Urgent Omnibus Motion
and Supplement to the Omnibus Motion dated March 4,
2011 contain allegations indicating that respondent ZEE2
was not a buyer in good faith and for value.
According to respondent ZEE2, petitioners act of filing a
separate complaint with application for a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction on
January 31, 2011 in another court (Civil Case Nos. 11-084 of
the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143) constitutes willful and
deliberate forum shopping asthe former also prayedsimilar
primary reliefs and setting up the alleged nullity of the
subject deeds of absolute sale as those raised in the Urgent
Omnibus Motion and Supplement to the Urgent Omnibus
Motion filed in the intestate court.
At the outset, we emphasize that the probate court having
jurisdiction over properties under administration has the
authority not only to approve any disposition or conveyance,
but also to annul an unauthorized sale by the prospective
heirs or administrator. Thus we held in Lee v. Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 856:
Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez sold specific properties of
the estate, without court approval. It is well-settled that court
approval is necessary for the validity of any disposition of
the decedents estate. In the early case of Godoy vs.
Orellano, we laid down the rule that the sale of the property
of the estate by an administrator without the order of the
probate court is void and passes no title to the purchaser.
And in the case of Dillena vs. Court of Appeals, we ruled
that: x x x x
It being settled that property under administration needs the
approval of the probate court before it can be disposed of,
any unauthorized disposition does not bind the estate and is
null and void. Asearly as 1921 in the case of Godoy vs.
Orellano(42 Phil 347), We laid down the rule that a sale by
an administrator of property of the deceased, which is not
authorized by the probate court is null and void and title does
not pass to the purchaser.
There is hardly any doubt that the probate court can declare
null and void the disposition of the property under
administration, made by private respondent, the same having
been effected without authority from said court. It is the
probate court that has the power to authorize and/or approve
the sale (Section 4 and 7, Rule 89), hence, a fortiori, it is said
court that can declare it null and void for as long as the
proceedings had not been closed or terminated. To uphold
petitioners contention that the probate court cannot annul
the unauthorized sale, would render meaningless the power
pertaining to the said court. (Bonga vs. Soler, 2 SCRA 755).
(italics ours) Our jurisprudence is therefore clear that (1) any
disposition of estate property by an administrator or
prospective heir pending final adjudication requires court
approval and (2) any unauthorized disposition of estate
property can be annulled by the probate court, there being no
need for a separate action to annul the unauthorized
disposition. (Emphasis supplied.)
In this case, the sale of the subject properties was executed
by respondent Silverio, Jr. with prior approval of the
intestate court under its Omnibus Order dated October 31,
2006. Subsequently, however, the sale was annulled by the
said court on motion by petitioner.
In reversing the intestate courts order annulling the sale of
the subject properties, the CA noted that said ruling is
anchored on the fact that the deeds of sale were executed at
the time when the TRO and writ of preliminary injunction
issued in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 was still in effect. It then
concluded that the eventual decision in the latter case
making the writ of preliminary injunction permanent only
with respect to the appointment of petitioner as administrator
and not to the grant of authority to sell mooted the issue of
whether the sale was executed at the time when the TRO and
writ of preliminary injunction were in effect.
The CAs ruling on this issue is hereunder quoted:
The more crucial question that needs to be addressed is:
Whether the authority to sell the properties in question
granted under the October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order, was
nullified by the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 97196. A look at the dispositive portion of the
decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 would lead us to
reasonably conclude that the grant of authority to sell is still
good and valid. The fallo of the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The portions of
the Omnibus Order upholding the grant of letters of
administration to and the taking of an oath of administration
by Ricardo Silverio, Jr., as well as the removal of Ricardo
Silverio, Sr. as administrator to the Estate of Beatriz Silverio,
are declared NULL and VOID. The writ of preliminary
injunction earlier issued is made permanent in regard to the
said portions. Respondent RTC is ORDERED to reinstate
Ricardo Silverio, Sr. as administrator of the Estate of Beatriz
Silverio. Costs against the Private Respondents.
SO ORDERED."
The October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order of the testate [sic]
court in so far as it authorizes the saleof the three properties
in question was not declared by the Court of Appeals,
Seventh Division as null and void.It is axiomatic that it is the
dispositive portion of the decision that finally invests rights
upon the parties, sets conditions for the exercise of those
rights, and imposes the corresponding duties or obligations.
From all the foregoing, We declare that it was grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the intestate court when it ordered
the sale of the Cambridge Property and Intsia Property as
NULL and VOID citing as justification the decision of the
Court of Appeals, Seventh Division in CAG.R. SP No.
97196. To reiterate, the injunction order which was made
permanent by the Court of Appeals (Seventh Division) was
declared to be limited only to the portion ofthe Omnibus
Order that upheld the grant of letters of administrationby
SILVERIO, JR. and the removal of SILVERIO, SR. as
administrator and nothing else.
Anent the preliminary injunction issued by the intestate court
in its Order dated 23 March 2011 and challenged by
SILVERIO JR. in CA-G.R. SP No. 121173, we find that it
was issued with grave abuse of discretion as it was directed
against acts which were already [fait]accompli. The
preliminary injunction sought to: 1) restrain SILVERIO JR.,
their agents, or anybody acting in their behalf or any person
from committing any act that would affect the titles to the
subject properties belonging to the Intestate Estate of the late
Beatriz Silverio and (2) enjoining the Register of Deeds of
Makati City from accepting, admitting, approving,
registering, annotating or in any giving due course to
whatever deeds, instruments or any other documents
involving voluntary or involuntary dealings which may have
the effect of transferring, conveying, encumbering, ceding,
waiving, alienating or disposing in favor of any individual or
any entity the above-enumerated properties belonging to the
Intestate Estate of the late Beatriz Silverio. However, the
records show that when the preliminary injunction was
issued on 23 March 2011 new titles over the disputed
properties were already issued to CITRINE HOLDINGS,
INC. and ZEE2 RESOURCES INC.7(Emphasis supplied.)
We affirm the CA.
It bears to stress that the October 31, 2006 Omnibus Order
was issued by the intestate court acting upon pending
motions filed by petitioner and respondent Silverio, Jr.,
father and son, respectively, who are the central figures in
the now decade-old controversy over the Intestate Estate of
the late Beatriz S. Silverio. The intestate court flip-flopped in
appointing as administrator of the estate petitioner and
respondent Silverio, Jr., their personal conflicts becoming
more evident to the intestate court as the proceedings
suffered delays. At the hearing of the urgent motion filed by
Edmundo Silverio to sell the subject properties and partially
settle the estate, the much awaited opportunity came when
the heirs represented by their respective counsels interposed
no objection to the same.
While it is true that petitioner was eventually reinstated as
Administrator pursuant to the August 28, 2008 decision in
CA-G.R. SP No. 97196 (petition for certiorari filed by Nelia
Silverio-Dee), weagree with the CA that the permanent
injunction issued under the said decision, as explicitly stated
in its fallo, pertained only to the portions of the October 31,
2006 Omnibus Order upholding the grant of letters of
administration to and taking of an oath of administration by
respondent Silverio, Jr., as otherwise the CA would have
expressly set aside as well the directive in the same Omnibus
Order allowing the sale of the subject properties. Moreover,
the CA Decision attained finality only on February 11, 2011
when this Court denied with finality respondent Silverio,
Jr.s motion for reconsideration of the February 11, 2009
Resolution denyinghis petition for review (G.R. No.
185619).1wphi1
The CA therefore did not err in reversing the August 18,
2011 Order of the intestate court annulling the sale of the
subject properties grounded solely on the injunction issued
in CA-G.R. SP No. 97196. Respondents Ocampo, Citrine
and ZEE2 should not be prejudiced by the flip-flopping
appointment of Administrator by the intestate court, having
relied in good faith that the sale was authorized and with
prior approval of the intestate court under its Omnibus Order
dated October 31, 2006 which remained valid and subsisting
insofar as it allowed the aforesaid sale.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated

March 8, 2013 and Resolution dated July 4, 2013 of the
Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP Nos. 121173 and 122024 are
AFFIRMED.

With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 September 12, 1995 2 and January 31, 1996 3Resolutions of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP.
Republic of the Philippines Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998
SUPREME COURT Resolution 4 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
Manila
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of
THIRD DIVISION Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former
governor of the Province of Laguna. During his lifetime,
G.R. No. 133743 February 6, 2007 Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was
with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner, born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda,
vs. Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent. predeceased Felicisimo.

x ---------------------------------------------------- x Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry

Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on
G.R. No. 134029 February 6, 2007
October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a
Complaint for Divorce 5 before the Family Court of the First
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner,
Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America (U.S.A.),
vs.
which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and
FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN
Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. 6
LUIS, Respondent.
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad
DECISION
San Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr.
William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. 7 He
had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the
years from the time of their marriage up to his death on
February 4, 1998 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
December 18, 1992.
G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set aside the
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their
conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimos
estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters
of administration 8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati
City, docketed as SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to
Branch 146 thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that,
at the time of his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San
Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro
Manila; that the decedents surviving heirs are respondent as
legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son
by his second marriage; that the decedent left real properties,
both conjugal and exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more
or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts.
Respondent prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be
liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the
children of Felicisimo by his first marriage, filed a motion to
dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and failure to
state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for
letters of administration should have been filed in the
Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimos place of
residence prior to his death. He further claimed that
respondent has no legal personality to file the petition
because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the
latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to
Merry Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and
joined her brother Rodolfo in seeking the dismissal 10 of the
petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued an
Order 11 denying the two motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent
filed on March 5, 1994 her opposition 12 thereto. She
submitted documentary evidence showing that while
Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in
Laguna, he regularly went home to their house in New
Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought
sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of
absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First
Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of
Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus,
she claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry
her by virtue of paragraph 2, 13 Article 26 of the Family
Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo,
Jr. 14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San
Luis, separately filed motions for reconsideration from the
Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They asserted that
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given
retroactive effect to validate respondents bigamous marriage
with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in
derogation of Article 256 16 of the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo
from his first marriage, filed a motion to disqualify Acting
Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an
Order 17 denying the motions for reconsideration. It ruled
that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the
legal standing to file the petition and that venue was properly
laid. Meanwhile, the motion for disqualification was deemed
moot and academic 18 because then Acting Presiding Judge
Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan
pending the resolution of said motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition 19 against Judge Tensuan
on November 16, 1994. On even date, Edgar also filed a
motion for reconsideration 20 from the Order denying their
motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not state the
facts and law on which it was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an
Order 21 granting the motion for inhibition. The case was re-
raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995, 22 the trial court required the parties to
submit their respective position papers on the twin issues of
venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the petition.
On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested 23 that he is adopting the
arguments and evidence set forth in his previous motion for
reconsideration as his position paper. Respondent and
Rodolfo filed their position papers on June 14, 24 and June
20, 25 1995, respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition
for letters of administration. It held that, at the time of his
death, Felicisimo was the duly elected governor and a
resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition
should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in
Makati City. It also ruled that respondent was without legal
capacity to file the petition for letters of administration
because her marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus,
void ab initio. It found that the decree of absolute divorce
dissolving Felicisimos marriage to Merry Lee was not valid
in the Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a
Filipino citizen. It also ruled that paragraph 2, Article 26 of
the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it
would impair the vested rights of Felicisimos legitimate
children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration 26 and for the
disqualification 27 of Judge Arcangel but said motions were
denied. 28
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed
and set aside the orders of the trial court in its assailed
Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion of
which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and
January 31, 1996 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE;
the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are
REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED
to the trial court for further proceedings. 29
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of
the Rules of Court, the term "place of residence" of the
decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement
of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical
habitation, or actual residence or place of abode of a person
as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It noted
that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as
governor in Laguna, he actually resided in Alabang,
Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of administration
was properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal
capacity to marry respondent by virtue of paragraph 2,
Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr. 30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera. 31 It found that the
marriage between Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly
dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute divorce issued
by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As
a result, under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was
capacitated to contract a subsequent marriage with
respondent. Thus
With the well-known rule express mandate of paragraph 2,
Article 26, of the Family Code of the Philippines, the
doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and
philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, there
is no justiciable reason to sustain the individual view
sweeping statement of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article
26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy
of our state against divorce in any form whatsoever." Indeed,
courts cannot deny what the law grants. All that the courts
should do is to give force and effect to the express mandate
of the law. The foreign divorce having been obtained by the
Foreigner on December 14, 1992,32 the Filipino divorcee,
"shall x x x have capacity to remarry under Philippine laws".
For this reason, the marriage between the deceased and
petitioner should not be denominated as "a bigamous
marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the
petitioner as the surviving spouse can institute the judicial
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x
x x 33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for
reconsideration 34 which were denied by the Court of
Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant
petition for review on certiorari. 35 Rodolfo later filed a
manifestation and motion to adopt the said petition which
was granted. 36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo
insist that the venue of the subject petition for letters of
administration was improperly laid because at the time of his
death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They
contend that pursuant to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray 37 and
Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 38 "residence" is
synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which when absent, one intends to
return. They claim that a person can only have one domicile
at any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his
domicile, the petition for letters of administration should
have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondents marriage to
Felicisimo was void and bigamous because it was performed
during the subsistence of the latters marriage to Merry Lee.
They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be
retroactively applied because it would impair vested rights
and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such, respondent
cannot be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo;
hence, she has no legal capacity to file the petition for letters
of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly
laid, and (2) whether respondent has legal capacity to file the
subject petition for letters of administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1, 39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the
petition for letters of administration of the estate of
Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of the
province "in which he resides at the time of his death." In the
case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, 40 we laid down the
doctrinal rule for determining the residence as
contradistinguished from domicile of the decedent for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual
residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or
domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and
"residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light
of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statutes and rules
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such
nature residence rather than domicile is the significant
factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still
it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the
technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the
terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in
statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey
the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words,
"resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular
sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of
a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this
popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is,
personal residence, not legal residence or domicile.
Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant
in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in
that place and also an intention to make it ones domicile. No
particular length of time of residence is required though;
however, the residence must be more than
temporary. 41 (Emphasis supplied)
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of the estate of
Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The rulings in
Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case
because they involve election cases. Needless to say, there is
a distinction between "residence" for purposes of election
laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of
actions. In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are
treated as synonymous terms, that is, the fixed permanent
residence to which when absent, one has the intention of
returning. 42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under the
Rules of Court, the "residence" of a person is his personal,
actual or physical habitation, or actual residence or place of
abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or
domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency. 43 Hence, it is possible that a person may have
his residence in one place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that
Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent
proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang,
Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death.
Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute
Sale 44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased
purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing
statements 45 from the Philippine Heart Center and Chinese
General Hospital for the period August to December 1992
indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico,
Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented
proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang
Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club, Inc., 47 letter-
envelopes 48from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceaseds
children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceaseds
calling cards 49 stating that his home/city address is at "100
San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his
office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz,
Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of
Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the
settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject petition
for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional
Trial Court 50 which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang,
Muntinlupa. The subject petition was filed on December 17,
1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and
the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Judicial Region which had territorial jurisdiction
over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per
Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3. 51 Thus, the
subject petition was validly filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidads legal personality to
file the petition for letters of administration, we must first
resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is divorced by
his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil
Code, considering that Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo
was solemnized on June 20, 1974, or before the Family Code
took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we
need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family
Code, particularly Art. 26, par. (2) considering that there is
sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the
affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 52 involved a marriage
between a foreigner and his Filipino wife, which marriage
was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained
abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid
under Philippine law, the alien spouse alleged that his
interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership
should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the
validity of the divorce and held that the alien spouse had no
interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino wife after
the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the standards of
American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the
United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond
of matrimony by a competent jurisdiction are to change the
existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and
to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus
severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband
without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to
the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty,
that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well
as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the
former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no
longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing
to sue in the case below as petitioners husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own countrys Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before
said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court
ruled that she should no longer be considered married to the
alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform
her marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our
laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to
private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil
Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to private respondent. The latter should not continue
to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her
own country if the ends of justice are to be
served. 54 (Emphasis added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-
Somera 55 where the Court recognized the validity of a
divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that the
alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit
against his Filipino wife. The Court stated that "the
severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating
the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of
one would not affect or cast obloquy on the other." 56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals, 57 the Court stated
that where a Filipino is divorced by his naturalized foreign
spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies. 58 Although decided
on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was
obtained in 1954 when the Civil Code provisions were still
in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of
limited recognition of divorce in the Philippines cannot be
denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as severing
marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and
capacitating the Filipino spouse to remarry as a necessary
consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce obtained
abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M.
Tolentino cited Van Dorn stating that "if the foreigner
obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse shall
have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." 59 In Garcia
v. Recio, 60 the Court likewise cited the aforementioned case
in relation to Article 26. 61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III, 62 the historical
background and legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article
26 of the Family Code were discussed, to wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into
law Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the
"Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article
26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37,
and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original
Family Code, Executive Order No. 227 was likewise signed
into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family
Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so
amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in
accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1),
(4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner
is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to
remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
xxxx
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations
showed that the intent of Paragraph 2 of Article 26,
according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil
Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien
spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin
to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. The Van
Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce
decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the
Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is
capacitated to remarry under Philippine law. 63 (Emphasis
added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a
situation where a divorce is validly obtained abroad by the
alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code and
paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the
law already established through judicial
precedent.1awphi1.net
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by
rendering its continuance intolerable to one of the parties and
productive of no possible good to the community, relief in
some way should be obtainable. 64 Marriage, being a mutual
and shared commitment between two parties, cannot
possibly be productive of any good to the society where one
is considered released from the marital bond while the other
remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the
alien spouse obtains a valid divorce abroad against the
Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 15 65 and 17 66 of the Civil Code in
stating that the divorce is void under Philippine law insofar
as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this Courts
rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse
should not be discriminated against in his own country if the
ends of justice are to be served. 67 In Alonzo v. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 68 the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its
results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a
cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first
concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions
the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should
never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as
this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable
part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives
of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of
but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are
inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are
some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary
when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar
circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound,
because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just
the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do
instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that
justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not
unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots
to the literal command without regard to its cause and
consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to
the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes
again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond
them."
xxxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as
the constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due."
That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses
the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision.
Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions.
Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way
that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of
the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with
justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce
decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely
allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad
with the legal personality to file the present petition as
Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the records show
that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the
divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In
Garcia v. Recio, 70 the Court laid down the specific
guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce
judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce
decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and
due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25
of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an
official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the
officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is
not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a)
accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic
or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed
in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office. 71
With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly
solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies
of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text 72 of the
Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that
their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As
stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. 73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for
further reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained
by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and
Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry
respondent in 1974, nevertheless, we find that the latter has
the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of
administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of
Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired
through their joint efforts during their cohabitation.
Section 6, 74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters
of administration may be granted to the surviving spouse of
the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof also
provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A
petition for letters of administration must be filed by an
interested person and must show, as far as known to the
petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would
be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a
claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must
be material and direct, and not merely indirect or
contingent. 75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested
person who has a direct interest in the estate of Felicisimo by
virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of which was not
denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the
divorce and Felicisimos capacity to remarry, but fails to
prove that her marriage with him was validly performed
under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as
a co-owner under Article 144 76 of the Civil Code. This
provision governs the property relations between parties who
live together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It
provides that the property acquired by either or both of them
through their work or industry or their wages and salaries
shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-
ownership, it is not necessary that the property be acquired
through their joint labor, efforts and industry. Any property
acquired during the union is prima facie presumed to have
been obtained through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions
belonging to the co-owners shall be presumed equal, unless
the contrary is proven. 77
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both
the divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision would
be Article 148 of the Family Code which has filled the hiatus
in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the
property relations of couples living together as husband and
wife but are incapacitated to marry. 78In Saguid v. Court of
Appeals, 79 we held that even if the cohabitation or the
acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code
took effect, Article 148 governs. 80 The Court described the
property regime under this provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing
the union of parties who are not legally capacitated to marry
each other, but who nonetheless live together as husband and
wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation
in proportion to their respective contributions. Co-ownership
will only be up to the extent of the proven actual
contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of
the extent thereof, their contributions and corresponding
shares shall be presumed to be equal.
xxxx
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez,
which involved the issue of co-ownership of properties
acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an
adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of
actual contribution in the acquisition of the property is
essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the
party who, as determined by the pleadings or the nature of
the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be
proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on
the strength of the partys own evidence and not upon the
weakness of the opponents defense. x x x81
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondents legal
capacity to file the subject petition for letters of
administration may arise from her status as the surviving
wife of Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of
the Civil Code or Article 148 of the Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals reinstating and affirming the February 28,
1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied
petitioners motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order
which dismissed petitioners motion for reconsideration is
AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court
for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
 DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before us are the consolidated petitions for review

on certiorari of petitioners Sebastian G. Agtarap (Sebastian)
[1]
and Eduardo G. Agtarap (Eduardo), [2] assailing the
Decision dated November 21, 2006[3]and the Resolution
dated March 27, 2007[4] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 73916.

The antecedent facts and proceedings

SECOND DIVISION
On September 15, 1994, Eduardo filed with the Regional
EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, G.R. No. 177099 Trial Court (RTC), Branch 114, Pasay City, a verified
Petitioner, petition for the judicial settlement of the estate of his
deceased father Joaquin Agtarap (Joaquin).It was docketed
- versus -
as Special Proceedings No. 94-4055.
SEBASTIAN AGTARAP, JOSEPH AGTARAP,
TERESA AGTARAP, WALTER DE SANTOS, and The petition alleged that Joaquin died intestate on
ABELARDO DAGORO, November 21, 1964 in Pasay City without any known debts
Respondents. or obligations. During his lifetime, Joaquin contracted two
marriages, first with Lucia Garcia (Lucia), [5] and second with
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
Caridad Garcia (Caridad). Lucia died on April 24,
SEBASTIAN G. AGTARAP, 1924. Joaquin and Lucia had three childrenJesus (died
Petitioner, G.R. No. 177192 without issue), Milagros, and Jose (survived by three
children, namely, Gloria, [6] Joseph, and Teresa[7]). Joaquin
Present:
married Caridad on February 9, 1926. They also had three
- versus - CARPIO, J., childrenEduardo, Sebastian, and Mercedes (survived by her
Chairperson, daughter Cecile). At the time of his death, Joaquin left two
NACHURA, parcels of land with improvements in Pasay City, covered by
PERALTA, Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. 873-(38254) and
ABAD, and
874-(38255). Joseph, a grandson of Joaquin, had been
EDUARDO G. AGTARAP, JOSEPH AGTARAP, MENDOZA, JJ.
TERESA AGTARAP, WALTER DE SANTOS, and
ABELARDO DAGORO, Promulgated:
Respondents.
June 8, 2011
leasing and improving the said realties and had been
appropriating for himself P26,000.00 per month since April
1994.
Eduardo further alleged that there was an imperative
need to appoint him as special administrator to take
possession and charge of the estate assets and their civil
fruits, pending the appointment of a regular administrator. In
addition, he prayed that an order be issued (a) confirming
and declaring the named compulsory heirs of Joaquin who
would be entitled to participate in the estate; (b) apportioning
and allocating unto the named heirs their aliquot shares in
the estate in accordance with law; and (c) entitling the
distributees the right to receive and enter into possession
those parts of the estate individually awarded to them.
On September 26, 1994, the RTC issued an order
setting the petition for initial hearing and directing Eduardo
to cause its publication.
On December 28, 1994, Sebastian filed his
comment, generally admitting the allegations in the petition,
and conceding to the appointment of Eduardo as special
administrator.
Joseph, Gloria, and Teresa filed their
answer/opposition. They alleged that the two subject lots
belong to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin with Lucia,
and that, upon Lucias death in April 1924, they became
the pro indiviso owners of the subject properties. They said
that their residence was built with the exclusive money of
their late father Jose, and the expenses of the extensions to
the house were shouldered by Gloria and Teresa, while the
restaurant (Manongs Restaurant) was built with the exclusive
money of Joseph and his business partner. They opposed the
appointment of Eduardo as administrator on the following
grounds: (1) he is not physically and mentally fit to do so;
(2) his interest in the lots is minimal; and (3) he does not
possess the desire to earn. They claimed that the best
interests of the estate dictate that Joseph be appointed as
special or regular administrator.
On February 16, 1995, the RTC issued a resolution
appointing Eduardo as regular administrator of Joaquins
estate. Consequently, it issued him letters of administration.
On September 16, 1995, Abelardo Dagoro filed an
answer in intervention, alleging that Mercedes is survived
not only by her daughter Cecile, but also by him as her
husband. He also averred that there is a need to appoint a
special administrator to the estate, but claimed that Eduardo
is not the person best qualified for the task.
After the parties were given the opportunity to be
heard and to submit their respective proposed projects of
partition, the RTC, on October 23, 2000, issued an Order of
Partition,[8] with the following disposition
In the light of the filing by the heirs
of their respective proposed projects of
partition and the payment of inheritance
taxes due the estate as early as 1965, and
there being no claim in Court against the
estate of the deceased, the estate of
JOAQUIN AGTARAP is now consequently
ripe for distribution among the heirs minus
the surviving spouse Caridad Garcia who
died on August 25, 1999.
 St., Pasay City, covered by Transfer
Considering that the bulk of the Certificate of Title Nos. 38254 and 38255
estate property were acquired during the and registered with the Registry of Deeds of
existence of the second marriage as shown Pasay City, Metro Manila, described as
by TCT No. (38254) and TCT No. (38255) follows:
which showed on its face that decedent was
married to Caridad Garcia, which fact TCT NO. LOT NO. AREA/SQ.M. ZONAL
oppositors failed to contradict by evidence VALUE AMOUNT
other than their negative allegations, the 38254 745-B-1 1,335 sq.
greater part of the estate is perforce m. P5,000.00 P6,675,000.00
accounted by the second marriage and the 38255 745-B-2 1,331 sq.
compulsory heirs thereunder. m. P5,000.00 P6,655,000.00
TOTAL--------------------------------------------
The Administrator, Eduardo Agtarap -----------------P13,330,000.00
rendered a true and just accounting of his
administration from his date of assumption II BUILDINGS AND IMPROVEMENTS:
up to the year ending December 31, 1996
per Financial and Accounting Report dated BUILDING I (Lot # 745-B-1)
June 2, 1997 which was approved by the ------------------------------ P350,000.00
Court. The accounting report included the BUILDING II (Lot # 745-B-2)
income earned and received for the period ----------------------------- 320,000.00
and the expenses incurred in the Building Improvements
administration, sustenance and allowance of -------------------------------------- 97,500.00
the widow. In accordance with said Restaurant
Financial and Accounting Report which was ------------------------------------------------------
duly approved by this Court in its 80,000.00
Resolution dated July 28, 1998 the deceased TOTAL
JOAQUIN AGTARAP left real properties ------------------------------------------------------
consisting of the following: --- P847,500.00

I LAND: TOTAL NET WORTH

----------------------------------------- P14,177,5
Two lots and two buildings with one garage 00.00
quarter located at #3030 Agtarap
WHEREFORE, the net assets of the estate WALTER DE SANTOS - P236,291.66
of the late JOAQUIN AGTARAP with a SEBASTIAN AGTARAP - P236,291.66
total value of P14,177,500.00, together with EDUARDO AGTARAP - P236,291.66
whatever interest from bank deposits and all
other incomes or increments thereof Jose Agtarap died in 1967. His compulsory
accruing after the Accounting Report of heirs are as follows:
December 31, 1996, after deducting
therefrom the compensation of the COMPULSORY HEIRS:
administrator and other expenses allowed by 1) GLORIA (deceased) represented by
the Court, are hereby ordered distributed as Walter de Santos
follows: - P295,364.57
2) JOSEPH AGTARAP - P295,364.57
TOTAL ESTATE P14,177,500.00 3) TERESA AGTARAP - P295,364.57
CARIDAD AGTARAP of the estate as her 4) PRISCILLA
conjugal share P7,088,750.00, the other half AGTARAP - P295,364.57
of P7,088,750.00 to be divided among the
compulsory heirs as follows: Hence, Priscilla Agtarap will
inherit P295,364.57.
1) JOSE (deceased) - P1,181,548.30
2) MILAGROS (deceased) - P1,181,548.30 Adding their share from Milagros Agtarap,
3) MERCEDES (deceased) - P1,181,548.30 the following heirs of the first marriage
4) SEBASTIAN - P1,181,548.30 stand to receive the total amount of:
5) EDUARDO - P1,181,548.30
6) CARIDAD - P1,181,548.30 HEIRS OF THE FIRST MARRIAGE:

The share of Milagros Agtarap as 1) JOSEPH AGTARAP - P236,291.66

compulsory heir in the amount
of P1,181,548.30 and who died in 1996 will
go to Teresa Agtarap and Joseph Agtarap,
Walter de Santos and half brothers Eduardo
and Sebastian Agtarap in equal proportions.
TERESA AGTARAP - P236,291.66
JOSEPH AGTARAP - P236,291.66
share from Milagros Agtarap
P295,364.57 as compulsory heir of
P531,656.23 Jose Agtarap
2) TERESA AGTARAP - P236,291.66
share from Milagros Agtarap
P295,364.57 as compulsory heir of
P531,656.23 Jose Agtarap

3) WALTER DE SANTOS - P236,291.66
share from Milagros Agtarap
P295,364.57 as compulsory heir of
P531,656.23 Jose Agtarap
HEIRS OF THE SECOND MARRIAGE:
a) CARIDAD AGTARAP - died on August 25, 1999
P7,088,750.00 - as conjugal share
P1,181,458.30 - as compulsory heir
Total of P8,270,208.30
b) SEBASTIAN AGTARAP - P1,181,458.38 as
compulsory heir
P 236,291.66 share from Milagros
c) EDUARDO AGTARAP - P1,181,458.38
compulsory heir
P 236,291.66 share from Milagros
d) MERCEDES - as represented
Abelardo Dagoro as the
surviving spouse of a compulsory heir
P1,181,458.38
REMAINING HEIRS OF CARIDAD
AGTARAP:
1) SEBASTIAN AGTARAP
2) EDUARDO AGTARAP
MERCEDES AGTARAP (Predeceased
Caridad Agtarap)
In sum, Sebastian Agtarap and Eduardo
Agtarap stand to inherit:
SEBASTIAN P4,135,104.10 share from
Caridad Garcia
P1,181,458.30 as compulsory heir
P 236,291.66 share from Milagros
P5,522,854.06
EDUARDO P4,135,104.10 share from
Caridad Garcia
P1,181,458.30 as compulsory heir
P 236,291.66 share from Milagros
P5,522,854.06
as
SO ORDERED.[9]
Eduardo, Sebastian, and oppositors Joseph and
Teresa filed their respective motions for reconsideration.
by On August 27, 2001, the RTC issued a
resolution[10] denying the motions for reconsideration of
Eduardo and Sebastian, and granting that of Joseph and
Teresa. It also declared that the real estate properties
belonged to the conjugal partnership of Joaquin and Lucia. It
also directed the modification of the October 23, 2000 Order
of Partition to reflect the correct sharing of the
heirs. However, before the RTC could issue a new order of
partition, Eduardo and Sebastian both appealed to the CA.
 On November 21, 2006, the CA rendered its Milagros Agtarap - of Lucia
Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads Mendiettas share. But since
she died in 1996 without
WHEREFORE, premises issue, 5/8 of her inheritance
considered, the instant appeals shall be inherited by Gloria
are DISMISSED for lack of merit. The (represented by her husband
assailed Resolution dated August 27, 2001 Walter de Santos and her
is AFFIRMED and pursuant thereto, the daughter Samantha), Joseph
subject properties (Lot No. 745-B-1 [TCT Agtarap and Teresa Agtarap,
No. 38254] and Lot No. 745-B-2 [TCT No. (in representation of
38255]) and the estate of the late Joaquin Milagros brother Jose
Agtarap are hereby partitioned as follows: Agtarap) and 1/8 each shall
be inherited by Mercedes
The two (2) properties, together (represented by her husband
with their improvements, embraced by TCT Abelardo Dagoro and her
No. 38254 and TCT No. 38255, daughter Cecile),
respectively, are first to be distributed Sebastian Eduardo, all
among the following: surnamed Agtarap.

Lucia Mendietta - of the property. But Jose Agtarap - of Lucia Mendiettas

since she is deceased, her share shall
be inherited by Joaquin, Jesus,
Milagros and Jose in equal shares.
Joaquin Agtarap - of the property and of
the other half of the property which
pertains to Lucia Mendiettas share.
Jesus Agtarap - of Lucia Mendiettas
share. But since he is already
deceased (and died without issue),
his inheritance shall, in turn, be
acquired by Joaquin Agtarap.
share. But since he died in
1967, his inheritance shall
be acquired by his wife
Priscilla, and children
Gloria (represented by her
husband Walter de Santos
and her daughter
Samantha), Joseph Agtarap
and Teresa in equal shares.
Then, Joaquin Agtaraps estate, comprising
three-fourths (3/4) of the subject properties
and its improvements, shall be distributed as
follows:

Caridad Garcia - 1/6 of the estate. But since she died
in 1999, her share shall be inherited by her
children namely Mercedes Agtarap
(represented by her husband Abelardo
Dagoro and her daughter Cecilia),
Sebastian Agtarap and Eduardo Agtarap in
their own right, dividing the inheritance in
equal shares.
Milagros Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since she
died in 1996 without issue, 5/8 of her
inheritance shall be inherited by Gloria
(represented by her husband Walter de
Santos and her daughter Samantha), Joseph
Agtarap and Teresa Agtarap, (in
representation of Milagros brother Jose
Agtarap) and 1/8 each shall be inherited by
Mercedes (represented by her husband
Abelardo Dagoro and her daughter Cecile),
Sebastian and Eduardo, all surnamed
Agtarap.
Jose Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since he died in
1967, his inheritance shall be acquired by
his wife Priscilla, and children Gloria
(represented by her husband Walter de
Santos and her daughter Samantha), Joseph
Agtarap and Teresa Agtarap in equal
shares.
Mercedes Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate. But since she
died in 1984, her inheritance shall be
acquired by her husband Abelardo Dagoro
and her daughter Cecile in equal shares.
Sebastian Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate.
Eduardo Agtarap - 1/6 of the estate.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Aggrieved, Sebastian and Eduardo filed their
respective motions for reconsideration.
In its Resolution dated March 27, 2007, the CA
denied both motions. Hence, these petitions ascribing to the
appellate court the following errors:
G.R. No. 177192
1. The Court of Appeals erred in not
considering the aforementioned important
facts[12] which alter its Decision;
2. The Court of Appeals erred in not
considering the necessity of hearing the
issue of legitimacy of respondents as heirs;
3. The Court of Appeals erred in
allowing violation of the law and in not
applying the doctrines of collateral attack,
estoppel, and res judicata.[13]
G.R. No. 177099
THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER REGISTERED IN THE NAME OF
TWELFTH DIVISION) DID NOT JOAQUIN AGTARAP, CASADO
ACQUIRE JURISDICTION OVER THE CON CARIDAD GARCIA. UNDER
ESTATE OF MILAGROS G. AGTARAP EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE, THE
AND ERRED IN DISTRIBUTING HER PROBATE COURT HAS NO POWER TO
INHERITANCE FROM THE ESTATE OF DETERMINE THE OWNERSHIP OF THE
JOAQUIN AGTARAP PROPERTY DESCRIBED IN THESE
NOTWITHSTANDING THE EXISTENCE CERTIFICATES OF TITLE WHICH
OF HER LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT SHOULD BE RESOLVED IN AN
IN VIOLATION OF THE DOCTRINE OF APPROPRIATE SEPARATE ACTION FOR
PRECEDENCE OF TESTATE A TORRENS TITLE UNDER THE LAW IS
PROCEEDINGS OVER INTESTATE ENDOWED WITH INCONTESTABILITY
PROCEEDINGS. UNTIL IT HAS BEEN SET ASIDE IN THE
MANNER INDICATED IN THE LAW
II. ITSELF.[14]

THE COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER

TWELFTH DIVISION) ERRED IN As regards his first and second assignments of error,
DISMISSING THE DECISION Sebastian contends that Joseph and Teresa failed to establish
APPEALED FROM FOR LACK OF by competent evidence that they are the legitimate heirs of
MERIT AND IN AFFIRMING THE their father Jose, and thus of their grandfather Joaquin. He
ASSAILED RESOLUTION DATED draws attention to the certificate of title (TCT No. 8026) they
AUGUST 27, 2001 OF THE LOWER submitted, stating that the wife of their father Jose is
COURT HOLDING THAT THE PARCELS Presentacion Garcia, while they claim that their mother is
OF LAND COVERED BY TCT NO. 38254 Priscilla. He avers that the marriage contracts proffered by
AND TCT (NO.) 38255 OF THE Joseph and Teresa do not qualify as the best evidence of
REGISTRY OF DEEDS FOR THE CITY Joses marriage with Priscilla, inasmuch as they were not
OF PASAY BELONG TO THE authenticated and formally offered in evidence. Sebastian
CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP OF also asseverates that he actually questioned the legitimacy of
JOAQUIN AGTARAP MARRIED TO Joseph and Teresa as heirs of Joaquin in his motion to
LUCIA GARCIA MENDIETTA exclude them as heirs, and in his reply to their opposition to
NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR the said motion. He further claims that the failure of
REGISTRATION UNDER THEIR Abelardo Dagoro and Walter de Santos to oppose his motion
EXISTING CERTIFICATES OF TITLE AS to exclude them as heirs had the effect of admitting the
allegations therein. He points out that his motion was denied
by the RTC without a hearing.
With respect to his third assigned error, Sebastian
maintains that the certificates of title of real estate properties
subject of the controversy are in the name of Joaquin
Agtarap, married to Caridad Garcia, and as such are
conclusive proof of their ownership thereof, and thus, they
are not subject to collateral attack, but should be threshed out
in a separate proceeding for that purpose. He likewise argues
that estoppel applies against the children of the first
marriage, since none of them registered any objection to the
issuance of the TCTs in the name of Caridad and Joaquin
only. He avers that the estate must have already been settled
in light of the payment of the estate and inheritance tax by
Milagros, Joseph, and Teresa, resulting to the issuance of
TCT No. 8925 in Milagros name and of TCT No. 8026 in the
names of Milagros and Jose. He also alleges that res
judicata is applicable as the court order directing the deletion
of the name of Lucia, and replacing it with the name of
Caridad, in the TCTs had long become final and executory.
In his own petition, with respect to his first
assignment of error, Eduardo alleges that the CA erroneously
settled, together with the settlement of the estate of Joaquin,
the estates of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, Gloria, and
Milagros, in contravention of the principle of settling only
one estate in one proceeding. He particularly questions the
distribution of the estate of Milagros in the intestate
proceedings despite the fact that a proceeding was conducted
in another court for the probate of the will of Milagros,
bequeathing all to Eduardo whatever share that she would
receive from Joaquins estate. He states that this violated the
rule on precedence of testate over intestate proceedings.
Anent his second assignment of error, Eduardo
contends that the CA gravely erred when it affirmed that the
bulk of the realties subject of this case belong to the first
marriage of Joaquin to Lucia, notwithstanding that the
certificates of title were registered in the name of Joaquin
Agtarap casado con (married to) Caridad Garcia. According
to him, the RTC, acting as an intestate court with limited
jurisdiction, was not vested with the power and authority to
determine questions of ownership, which properly belongs to
another court with general jurisdiction.
The Courts Ruling
As to Sebastians and Eduardos common issue on the
ownership of the subject real properties, we hold that the
RTC, as an intestate court, had jurisdiction to resolve the
same.
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court,
either as a probate or an intestate court, relates only to
matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or
settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not
extend to the determination of questions of ownership that
arise during the proceedings.[15] The patent rationale for this
rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited
jurisdiction.[16] As held in several cases, [17] a probate court or
one in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or
intestate, cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties
claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to
belong to outside parties, not by virtue of any right of
inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of
the deceased and his estate. All that the said court could do
as regards said properties is to determine whether or not they
should be included in the inventory of properties to be
administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute,
there poses no problem, but if there is, then the parties, the
administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an
ordinary action before a court exercising general jurisdiction
for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as
justified by expediency and convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon
in an intestate or a testate proceeding the question of
inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of
property without prejudice to the final determination of
ownership in a separate action.[18] Second, if the interested
parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of
collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the
assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights
of third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is
competent to resolve issues on ownership. [19] Verily,
its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to
the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the
determination of the status of each heir and whether the
property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of
the deceased spouse.[20]
We hold that the general rule does not apply to the
instant case considering that the parties are all heirs of
Joaquin and that no rights of third parties will be impaired by
the resolution of the ownership issue. More importantly, the
determination of whether the subject properties are conjugal
is but collateral to the probate courts jurisdiction to settle the
estate of Joaquin.
It should be remembered that when Eduardo filed
his verified petition for judicial settlement of Joaquins estate,
he alleged that the subject properties were owned by Joaquin
and Caridad since the TCTs state that the lots were registered
in the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Caridad
Garcia. He also admitted in his petition that Joaquin, prior to
contracting marriage with Caridad, contracted a first
marriage with Lucia. Oppositors to the petition, Joseph and
Teresa, however, were able to present proof before the RTC
that TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255 were derived from a mother
title, TCT No. 5239, dated March 17, 1920, in the name
of FRANCISCO VICTOR BARNES Y JOAQUIN AGTARAP,
el primero casado con Emilia Muscat, y el Segundo con
Lucia Garcia Mendietta (FRANCISCO VICTOR
BARNES y JOAQUIN AGTARAP, the first married to
Emilia Muscat, and the second married to Lucia Garcia
Mendietta).[21] When TCT No. 5239 was divided between
Francisco Barnes and Joaquin Agtarap, TCT No. 10864, in
the name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Lucia Garcia
Mendietta, was issued for a parcel of land, identified as Lot
No. 745 of the Cadastral Survey of Pasay, Cadastral Case
No. 23, G.L.R.O. Cadastral Record No. 1368, consisting of
8,872 square meters. This same lot was covered by TCT No.
5577 (32184)[22] issued on April 23, 1937, also in the name
of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Lucia Garcia Mendietta.
The findings of the RTC and the CA show that Lucia
died on April 24, 1924, and subsequently, on February 9,
1926, Joaquin married Caridad. It is worthy to note that TCT
No. 5577 (32184) contained an annotation, which reads
Ap-4966 NOTA: Se ha enmendado el
presente certificado de titulo, tal como
aparece, tanchando las palabras con Lucia
 Garcia Mendiet[t]a y poniendo en su lugar,
entre lineas y en tinta encarnada, las
palabras en segundas nupcias con Caridad
Garcia, en complimiento de un orden de
fecha 28 de abril de 1937, dictada por el
Hon. Sixto de la Costa, juez del Juzgado de
Primera Instancia de Rizal, en el expediente
cadastal No. 23, G.L.R.O. Cad. Record No.
1368; copia de cual orden has sido
presentada con el No. 4966 del Libro Diario,
Tomo 6.0 y, archivada en el Legajo T-No.
32184.
Pasig, Rizal, a 29 abril de 1937.[23]
Thus, per the order dated April 28, 1937 of Hon. Sixto de la
Costa, presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
the phrase con Lucia Garcia Mendiet[t]a was crossed out
and replaced by en segundas nuptias con Caridad Garcia,
referring to the second marriage of Joaquin to Caridad. It
cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that prior to the replacement of
Caridads name in TCT No. 32184, Lucia, upon her demise,
already left, as her estate, one-half (1/2) conjugal share in
TCT No. 32184. Lucias share in the property covered by the
said TCT was carried over to the properties covered by the
certificates of title derivative of TCT No. 32184, now TCT
Nos. 38254 and 38255. And as found by both the RTC and
the CA, Lucia was survived by her compulsory heirs
Joaquin, Jesus, Milagros, and Jose.
Section 2, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court provides
that when the marriage is dissolved by the death of the
husband or the wife, the community property shall be
inventoried, administered, and liquidated, and the debts
thereof paid; in the testate or intestate proceedings of the
deceased spouse, and if both spouses have died, the conjugal
partnership shall be liquidated in the testate or intestate
proceedings of either.Thus, the RTC had jurisdiction to
determine whether the properties are conjugal as it had to
liquidate the conjugal partnership to determine the estate of
the decedent. In fact, should Joseph and Teresa institute a
settlement proceeding for the intestate estate of Lucia, the
same should be consolidated with the settlement proceedings
of Joaquin, being Lucias spouse. [24] Accordingly, the CA
correctly distributed the estate of Lucia, with respect to the
properties covered by TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255 subject of
this case, to her compulsory heirs.
Therefore, in light of the foregoing evidence, as correctly
found by the RTC and the CA, the claim of Sebastian and
Eduardo that TCT Nos. 38254 and 38255 conclusively show
that the owners of the properties covered therein were
Joaquin and Caridad by virtue of the registration in the name
of Joaquin Agtarap casado con (married to) Caridad Garcia,
deserves scant consideration. This cannot be said to be a
collateral attack on the said TCTs. Indeed, simple possession
of a certificate of title is not necessarily conclusive of a
holders true ownership of property.[25] A certificate of title
under the Torrens system aims to protect dominion; it cannot
be used as an instrument for the deprivation of ownership.
[26]
Thus, the fact that the properties were registered in the
name of Joaquin Agtarap, married to Caridad Garcia, is not
sufficient proof that the properties were acquired during the
spouses coverture.[27] The phrase married to Caridad Garcia
in the TCTs is merely descriptive of the civil status of
Joaquin as the registered owner, and does not necessarily
prove that the realties are their conjugal properties. [28]
Neither can Sebastians claim that Joaquins estate could have
already been settled in 1965 after the payment of the
inheritance tax be upheld. Payment of the inheritance
tax, per se, does not settle the estate of a deceased person. As
provided in Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court
SECTION 1. When order for
distribution of residue made. -- When the
debts, funeral charges, and expenses of
administration, the allowance to the widow,
and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the
estate in accordance with law, have been
paid, the court, on the application of the
executor or administrator, or of a person
interested in the estate, and after hearing
upon notice, shall assign the residue of the
estate to the persons entitled to the same,
naming them and the proportions, or parts,
to which each is entitled, and such persons
may demand and recover their respective
shares from the executor or administrator, or
any other person having the same in his
possession. If there is a controversy before
the court as to who are the lawful heirs of
the deceased person or as to the distributive
share to which each person is entitled under
the law, the controversy shall be heard and
decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed
until the payment of the obligations above
mentioned has been made or provided for,
unless the distributees, or any of them, give
a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court,
conditioned for the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court
directs.
Thus, an estate is settled and distributed among the heirs
only after the payment of the debts of the estate, funeral
charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow,
and inheritance tax. The records of these cases do not show
that these were complied with in 1965.
As regards the issue raised by Sebastian on the legitimacy of
Joseph and Teresa, suffice it to say that both the RTC and the
CA found them to be the legitimate children of Jose. The
RTC found that Sebastian did not present clear and
convincing evidence to support his averments in his motion
to exclude them as heirs of Joaquin, aside from his negative
allegations. The RTC also noted the fact of Joseph and
Teresa being the children of Jose was never questioned by
Sebastian and Eduardo, and the latter two even admitted this
in their petitions, as well as in the stipulation of facts in the
August 21, 1995 hearing.[29]Furthermore, the CA affirmed
this finding of fact in its November 21, 2006 Decision. [30]
Also, Sebastians insistence that Abelardo Dagoro and Walter
de Santos are not heirs to the estate of Joaquin cannot be
sustained. Per its October 23, 2000 Order of Partition, the
RTC found that Gloria Agtarap de Santos died on May 4,
1995, and was later substituted in the proceedings below by
her husband Walter de Santos. Gloria begot a daughter with
Walter de Santos, Georgina Samantha de Santos. The RTC
likewise noted that, on September 16, 1995, Abelardo
Dagoro filed a motion for leave of court to intervene,
alleging that he is the surviving spouse of Mercedes Agtarap
and the father of Cecilia Agtarap Dagoro, and his answer in
intervention. The RTC later granted the motion, thereby
admitting his answer on October 18, 1995. [31] The CA also
noted that, during the hearing of the motion to intervene on
October 18, 1995, Sebastian and Eduardo did not interpose
any objection when the intervention was submitted to the
RTC for resolution.[32]
Indeed, this Court is not a trier of facts, and there
appears no compelling reason to hold that both courts erred
in ruling that Joseph, Teresa, Walter de Santos, and Abelardo
Dagoro rightfully participated in the estate of Joaquin. It was
incumbent upon Sebastian to present competent evidence to
refute his and Eduardos admissions that Joseph and Teresa
were heirs of Jose, and thus rightful heirs of Joaquin, and to
timely object to the participation of Walter de Santos and
Abelardo Dagoro. Unfortunately, Sebastian failed to do
so. Nevertheless, Walter de Santos and Abelardo Dagoro had
the right to participate in the estate in representation of the
Joaquins compulsory heirs, Gloria and Mercedes,
respectively.[33]
This Court also differs from Eduardos asseveration
that the CA erred in settling, together with Joaquins estate,
the respective estates of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, and
Gloria. A perusal of the November 21, 2006 CA Decision
would readily show that the disposition of the properties
related only to the settlement of the estate of
Joaquin. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of
Court, as cited above, the RTC was specifically granted
jurisdiction to determine who are the lawful heirs of Joaquin,
as well as their respective shares after the payment of the
obligations of the estate, as enumerated in the said
provision. The inclusion of Lucia, Jesus, Jose, Mercedes, and
Gloria in the distribution of the shares was merely a
necessary consequence of the settlement of Joaquins estate,
they being his legal heirs.
However, we agree with Eduardos position that the CA erred
in distributing Joaquins estate pertinent to the share allotted
in favor of Milagros. Eduardo was able to show that a
separate proceeding was instituted for the probate of the will
allegedly executed by Milagros before the RTC, Branch
108, Pasay City.[34] While there has been no showing that the
alleged will of Milagros, bequeathing all of her share from
Joaquins estate in favor of Eduardo, has already been
probated and approved, prudence dictates that this Court
refrain from distributing Milagros share in Joaquins estate.
It is also worthy to mention that Sebastian died on January
15, 2010, per his Certificate of Death. [35] He is survived by
his wife Teresita B. Agtarap (Teresita) and his children
Joaquin Julian B. Agtarap (Joaquin Julian) and Ana Ma.
Agtarap Panlilio (Ana Ma.).
Henceforth, in light of the foregoing, the assailed November
21, 2006 Decision and the March 27, 2007 Resolution of the
CA should be affirmed with modifications such that the
share of Milagros shall not yet be distributed until after the
final determination of the probate of her purported will, and
that Sebastian shall be represented by his compulsory heirs.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 177192
is DENIED for lack of merit, while the petition in G.R. No.
177099 is PARTIALLY GRANTED, such that the Decision
dated November 21, 2006 and the Resolution dated March
27, 2007 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS: that the share awarded in
favor of Milagros Agtarap shall not be distributed until the
final determination of the probate of her will, and that
petitioner Sebastian G. Agtarap, in view of his demise on
January 15, 2010, shall be represented by his wife Teresita
B. Agtarap and his children Joaquin Julian B. Agtarap and
Ana Ma. Agtarap Panlilio.

These cases are hereby remanded to the Regional Trial

Court, Branch 114, Pasay City, for further proceedings in the
settlement of the estate of Joaquin Agtarap. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED

SECOND DIVISION
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
IN THE MATTER OF THE G.R. No. 183053 -------x
INTESTATE ESTATE OF
CRISTINA AGUINALDO- Present:
SUNTAY; EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY DECISION
III, CARPIO, J.,
Petitioner, Chairperson, NACHURA, J.:
NACHURA,
PERALTA, Unlike Pope Alexander VI[1] who, faced with the impasse
ABAD, and between Spain and Portugal, deftly and literally divided the
- versus - PEREZ,* JJ. exploration, or more appropriately, the riches of the New
World by issuing the Inter Caetera,[2] we are confronted with
Promulgated: the difficult, albeit, all too familiar tale of another family
imbroglio over the estate of a decedent.[3]
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, June 16, 2010
the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision of the Court of
Respondent
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949, [4] reversing the
.
decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 78,
Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-
95.[5]
Before anything else, we disentangle the facts.
On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-
Suntay (Cristina), married to Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico),
died intestate. In 1979, their only son, Emilio Aguinaldo
Suntay (Emilio I), predeceased both Cristina and Federico.
At the time of her death, Cristina was survived by her
husband, Federico, and several grandchildren, including
herein petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and
respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay.
During his lifetime, Emilio I was married to Isabel
Cojuangco, and they begot three children, namely: herein
respondent, Isabel; Margarita; and Emilio II, all surnamed
Cojuangco-Suntay. Emilio Is marriage to Isabel Cojuangco
was subsequently annulled. Thereafter, Emilio I had two
children out of wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita Suntay Taedo
(Nenita), by two different women, Concepcion Mendoza and
Isabel Santos, respectively.
Despite the illegitimate status of Emilio III, he was
reared ever since he was a mere baby, nine months old, by
the spouses Federico and Cristina and was an acknowledged
natural child of Emilio I. Nenita is an acknowledged natural
child of Emilio I and was likewise brought up by the spouses
Federico and Cristina.
As previously adverted to, the marriage between
Emilio I and Isabel was annulled.[6] Consequently,
respondent and her siblings Margarita and Emilio II, lived
with their mother on Balete Drive, Quezon City, separately
from their father and paternal grandparents.
Parenthetically, after the death of Emilio I, Federico
filed a petition for visitation rights over his grandchildren:
respondent Isabel, Margarita, and Emilio II. Although the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court in Quezon City
granted the petition and allowed Federico one hour of
visitation monthly, initially reduced to thirty minutes, it was
altogether stopped because of a manifestation filed by
respondent Isabel, articulating her sentiments on the
unwanted visits of her grandparents.
Significantly, Federico, after the death of his spouse,
Cristina, or on September 27, 1993, adopted their
illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita. [7]
On October 26, 1995, respondent filed a petition for
the issuance of letters of administration in her favor,
containing the following allegations:
[A]t the time of [the decedents] death, [she]
was a resident of the Municipality of
Hagonoy, Province of Bulacan; that the
[decedent] left an estate of real and personal
properties, with a probable gross value
of P29,000,000.00; that the names, ages and
residences of the surviving heirs of the
[decedent] are: (1) Federico C. Suntay, 89
years old, surviving spouse and a resident of
x x x; (2) Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay, 36 years
old, legitimate granddaughter and a resident
of x x x; (3) Margarita Cojuangco-Suntay,
39 years old, legitimate granddaughter and a
 resident of x x x; and (4) Emilio Cojuangco-
Suntay, 35 years old, legitimate grandson
and a resident of x x x; and that as far as
[respondent] knew, the decedent left no
debts or obligation at the time of her death.[8]
Disavowing the allegations in the petition of his grandchild,
respondent Isabel, Federico filed his opposition on
December 21, 1995, alleging, among others, that:
[B]eing the surviving spouse of Cristina, he
is capable of administering her estate and he
should be the one appointed as its
administrator; that as part owner of the mass
of conjugal properties left by Cristina, he
must be accorded legal preference in the
administration thereof; that Isabel and her
family had been alienated from their
grandparents for more than thirty (30) years;
that the enumeration of heirs in the petition
was incomplete as it did not mention the
other children of his son[,] namely: Emilio
III and Nenita S. Taedo; that he is better
situated to protect the integrity of the estate
of Cristina as even before the death of his
wife[,] he was already the one who managed
their conjugal properties; that the probable
value of the estate as stated in the petition
was grossly overstated (sic); and that Isabels
allegation that some of the properties are in
the hands of usurpers is untrue.[9]
Meanwhile, after a failed attempt by the parties to
settle the proceedings amicably, Federico filed a
Manifestation dated March 13, 1999, nominating his adopted
son, Emilio III, as administrator of the decedents estate on
his behalf, in the event he would be adjudged as the one with
a better right to the letters of administration.
Subsequently, the trial court granted Emilio IIIs
Motion for Leave to Intervene considering his interest in the
outcome of the case. Emilio III filed his Opposition-In-
Intervention, which essentially echoed the allegations in his
grandfathers opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his
stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than respondent to
administer and manage the estate of the decedent, Cristina.
Additionally, Emilio III averred his own qualifications that:
[he] is presently engaged in aquaculture and banking; he was
trained by the decedent to work in his early age by involving
him in the activities of the Emilio Aguinaldo Foundation
which was established in 1979 in memory of her
grandmothers father; the significant work experiences
outside the family group are included in his curriculum vitae;
he was employed by the oppositor [Federico] after his
graduation in college with management degree at F.C.E.
Corporations and Hagonoy Rural Bank; x x x.[10]
In the course of the proceedings, on November 13,
2000, Federico died.
After the testimonies of both parties witnesses were
heard and evidence on their respective allegations were
adduced, the trial court rendered a decision on November 9,
2001, appointing herein petitioner, Emilio III, as
administrator of decedent Cristinas intestate estate, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel
Cojuangco[-]Suntay is DENIED and the
Opposition[-]in[-]Intervention is
GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Intervenor, Emilio A.M.
Suntay, III is hereby appointed administrator
of the estate of the decedent Cristina
Aguinaldo Suntay, who shall enter upon the
execution of his trust upon the filing of a
bond in the amount of P200,000.00,
conditioned as follows:
(1) To make and return
within three (3) months, a true and complete
inventory;
(2) To administer the estate
and to pay and discharge all debts, legatees,
and charge on the same, or dividends
thereon;
(3) To render a true and
just account within one (1) year, and at any
other time when required by the court, and
(4) To perform all orders of
the Court.
Once the said bond is approved by the court,
let Letters of Administration be issued in his
favor.
SO ORDERED.[11]
Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before the
CA, which reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC,
revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III,
and appointed respondent as administratrix of the intestate
estate of the decedent, Cristina, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the
foregoing, the assailed decision dated
November 9, 2001 of Branch 78, Regional
Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan in SPC No.
117-M-95 is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the letters of administration
issued by the said court to Emilio A.M.
Suntay III, if any, are consequently revoked.
Petitioner Isabel Cojuangco[-]Suntay is
hereby appointed administratrix of the
intestate estate of Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay.
Let letters of administration be issued in her
favor upon her filing of a bond in the
amount of Two Hundred Thousand
(P200,000.00) Pesos.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[12]
The motion for reconsideration of Emilio III having been
denied, he appeals by certiorari to this Court, raising the
following issues:
A. IN THE APPOINTMENT OF AN
ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE
UNDER SECTION 6 OF RULE 78 OF
 THE RULES OF COURT, WHETHER
ARTICLE 992 OF THE CIVIL CODE
APPLIES; and
B. UNDER THE UNDISPUTED FACTS
WHERE HEREIN PETITIONER WAS
REARED BY THE DECEDENT AND HER
SPOUSE SINCE INFANCY, WHETHER
ARTICLE 992 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE
APPLIES SO AS TO BAR HIM FROM
BEING APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR
OF THE DECEDENTS ESTATE.[13]
In ruling against the petition of herein respondent, the RTC
ratiocinated, thus:
Evidence objectively assessed and carefully
evaluated, both testimonial and
documentary, the court opines that it is to
the best interest of the estate of the decedent
and all claimants thereto, that the Intervenor,
Emilio A.M. Suntay III, be appointed
administrator of the estate in the above-
entitled special proceedings.
Based on the evidence and demeanor of the
parties in court, [respondents immediate]
family and that of the decedent are
apparently estranged. The root cause of
which, is not for this court to ascertain nor is
this the right time and the proper forum to
dwell upon. What matters most at this time
is the welfare of the estate of the decedent in
the light of such unfortunate and bitter
estrangement.
The Court honestly believes that to appoint
the petitioner would go against the wishes of
the decedent who raised [Emilio III] from
infancy in her home in Baguio City as her
own child. Certainly, it would go against the
wishes of the surviving spouse x x x who
nominated [Emilio III] for appointment as
administrator.
As between [respondent] and the oppositor
[Federico], the latter is accorded preference
as the surviving spouse under Sec 6(a), Rule
78, Rules of Court. On the basis of such
preference, he vigorously opposed the
appointment of the petitioner and instead
nominated [Emilio III], his grandchild and
adopted child. Such nomination, absent any
valid and justifiable reason, should not be
imperiously set aside and insouciantly
ignored, even after the oppositor [Federico]
has passed away, in order to give effect to
the order of preference mandated by law.
Moreover, from the viewpoint of the estate,
the nomination of [Emilio III] appear[s]
intrinsically meritorious. For the benefit of
the estate and its claimants, creditors, as
well as heirs, the administrator should be
one who is prepared, academically and by
experience, for the demands and
responsibilities of the position. While
[respondent], a practicing physician, is not
 unqualified, it is clear to the court that when
it comes to management of real estate and
the processing and payment of debts,
[Emilio III], a businessman with an
established track record as a manager has a
decided edge and therefore, is in a position
to better handle the preservation of the
estate.[14]
In marked contrast, the CA zeroed in on Emilio IIIs
status as an illegitimate child of Emilio I and, thus, barred
from representing his deceased father in the estate of the
latters legitimate mother, the decedent. On the whole, the CA
pronounced that Emilio III, who was merely nominated by
Federico, and which nomination hinged upon the latters
appointment as administrator of the decedents estate, cannot
be appointed as the administrator of the decedents estate for
the following reasons:[15]
1. The appointment of Emilio III was subject to a
suspensive condition, i.e., Federicos appointment as
administrator of the estate, he being the surviving spouse of
Cristina, the decedent. The death of Federico before his
appointment as administrator of Cristinas estate rendered his
nomination of Emilio III inoperative;
2. As between the legitimate offspring (respondent)
and illegitimate offspring (Emilio III) of decedents son,
Emilio I, respondent is preferred, being the next of kin
referred to by Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, and
entitled to share in the distribution of Cristinas estate as an
heir;
3. Jurisprudence has consistently held that Article
992[16] of the Civil Code bars the illegitimate child from
inheriting ab intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother. Thus, Emilio III, who is
barred from inheriting from his grandmother, cannot be
preferred over respondent in the administration of the estate
of their grandmother, the decedent; and
4. Contrary to the RTCs finding, respondent is as
much competent as Emilio III to administer and manage the
subject estate for she possesses none of the disqualifications
specified in Section 1,[17] Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.
The pivotal issue in this case turns on who, as
between Emilio III and respondent, is better qualified to act
as administrator of the decedents estate.
We cannot subscribe to the appellate courts ruling
excluding Emilio III in the administration of the decedents
undivided estate. Mistakenly, the CA glosses over several
undisputed facts and circumstances:
1. The underlying philosophy of our law on intestate
succession is to give preference to the wishes and presumed
will of the decedent, absent a valid and effective will;
2. The basis for Article 992 of the Civil Code,
referred to as the iron curtain bar rule, [18] is quite the opposite
scenario in the facts obtaining herein for the actual
relationship between Federico and Cristina, on one hand, and
Emilio III, on the other, was akin to the normal relationship
of legitimate relatives;
 3. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the
decedent, Cristina, and her husband, Federico, who both
acknowledged him as their grandchild;
4. Federico claimed half of the properties included in
the estate of the decedent, Cristina, as forming part of their
conjugal partnership of gains during the subsistence of their
marriage;
5. Cristinas properties forming part of her estate are
still commingled with that of her husband, Federico, because
her share in the conjugal partnership, albeit terminated upon
her death, remains undetermined and unliquidated; and
6. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico,
entitled to share in the distribution of the latters estate as a
direct heir, one degree from Federico, not simply
representing his deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I.
From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the CA
erred in excluding Emilio III from the administration of the
decedents estate. As Federicos adopted son, Emilio IIIs
interest in the estate of Cristina is as much apparent to this
Court as the interest therein of respondent, considering that
the CA even declared that under the law, [Federico], being
the surviving spouse, would have the right of succession
over a portion of the exclusive property of the
decedent, aside from his share in the conjugal
partnership. Thus, we are puzzled why the CA resorted to a
strained legal reasoning Emilio IIIs nomination was subject
to a suspensive condition and rendered inoperative by reason
of Federicos death wholly inapplicable to the case at bar.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the
order of preference in the appointment of an administrator of
an estate:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of
administration granted. If no executor is
named in the will, or the executor or
executors are incompetent, refuse the trust,
or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the
case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as
such surviving husband or wife, or next of
kin, requests to have appointed, if competent
and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the
case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or
unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or
next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days
after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other
person, it may be granted to one or more of
the principal creditors, if competent and
willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and
willing to serve, it may be granted to such
other person as the court may select.

However, the order of preference is not absolute for it
depends on the attendant facts and circumstances of each
case.[19] Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an
administrator lies in the sound discretion of the trial court.
[20]
In the main, the attendant facts and circumstances of this
case necessitate, at the least, a joint administration by both
respondent and Emilio III of their grandmothers, Cristinas,
estate.
In the case of Uy v. Court of Appeals,[21] we upheld the
appointment by the trial court of a co-administration
between the decedents son and the decedents brother, who
was likewise a creditor of the decedents estate. In the same
vein, we declared in Delgado Vda. de De la Rosa v. Heirs of
Marciana Rustia Vda. de Damian[22] that:
[i]n the appointment of an
administrator, the principal consideration is
the interest in the estate of the one to be
appointed. The order of preference does not
rule out the appointment of co-
administrators, specially in cases where
justice and equity demand that opposing
parties or factions be represented in the
management of the estates, a situation which
obtains here.
Similarly, the subject estate in this case calls to the
succession other putative heirs, including another
illegitimate grandchild of Cristina and Federico, Nenita
Taedo, but who was likewise adopted by Federico, and the
two (2) siblings of respondent Isabel, Margarita and Emilio
II. In all, considering the conflicting claims of the putative
heirs, and the unliquidated conjugal partnership of Cristina
and Federico which forms part of their respective estates, we
are impelled to move in only one direction, i.e., joint
administration of the subject estate.
One final note. Counsel for petitioner meticulously
argues that Article 992 of the Civil Code, the successional
bar between the legitimate and illegitimate relatives of a
decedent, does not apply in this instance where facts
indubitably demonstrate the contrary Emilio III, an
illegitimate grandchild of the decedent, was actually treated
by the decedent and her husband as their own son, reared
from infancy, educated and trained in their businesses, and
eventually legally adopted by decedents husband, the
original oppositor to respondents petition for letters of
administration.
We are not unmindful of the critiques of civilists of a
conflict and a lacuna in the law concerning the bone of
contention that is Article 992 of the Civil Code, beginning
with the eminent Justice J.B.L. Reyes:
In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right
of representation was admitted only within
the legitimate family; so much so that
Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an
illegitimate child can not inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father and mother. The Civil
Code of the Philippines apparently adhered
to this principle since it reproduced Article
943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992,
but with fine inconsistency, in subsequent
 articles (990, 995 and 998) our Code allows
the hereditary portion of the illegitimate
child to pass to his own descendants,
whether legitimate or illegitimate. So that
while Art. 992 prevents the illegitimate issue
of a legitimate child from representing him
in the intestate succession of the
grandparent, the illegitimates of an
illegitimate child can now do so. This
difference being indefensible and
unwarranted, in the future revision of the
Civil Code we shall have to make a choice
and decide either that the illegitimate issue
enjoys in all cases the right of
representation, in which case Art. 992 must
be suppressed; or contrariwise maintain said
article and modify Articles 995 and 998. The
first solution would be more in accord with
an enlightened attitude vis--vis illegitimate
children.[23]
Manresa explains the basis for the rules on intestate
succession:
The law [of intestacy] is founded on the
presumed will of the deceased Love, it is
said, first descends, then ascends, and,
finally, spreads sideways. Thus, the law first
calls the descendants, then the ascendants,
and finally the collaterals, always preferring
those closer in degree to those of remoter
degrees, on the assumption that the deceased
would have done so had he manifested his
last will Lastly, in default of anyone called
to succession or bound to the decedent by
ties of blood or affection, it is in accordance
with his presumed will that his property be
given to charitable or educational
institutions, and thus contribute to the
welfare of humanity.[24]
Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case
accurately reflect the basis of intestate succession, i.e., love
first descends, for the decedent, Cristina, did not distinguish
between her legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren.
Neither did her husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally
raised the status of Emilio III from an illegitimate grandchild
to that of a legitimate child. The peculiar circumstances of
this case, painstakingly pointed out by counsel for petitioner,
overthrow the legal presumption in Article 992 of the Civil
Code that there exist animosity and antagonism between
legitimate and illegitimate descendants of a deceased.
Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial
restraint impels us to refrain from making a final declaration
of heirship and distributing the presumptive shares of the
parties in the estates of Cristina and Federico, considering
that the question on who will administer the properties of the
long deceased couple has yet to be settled.
Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata[25] on the
same issue remains good law:
[T]he declaration of heirs made by the lower
court is premature, although the evidence
sufficiently shows who are entitled to
 succeed the deceased. The estate had hardly 95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan
been judicially opened, and the proceeding is likewise directed to make a determination and to declare
has not as yet reached the stage of the heirs of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay according to
distribution of the estate which must come the actual factual milieu as proven by the parties, and all
after the inheritance is liquidated. other persons with legal interest in the subject estate. It is
further directed to settle the estate of decedent Cristina
Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.
depart from the foregoing admonition:
SO ORDERED.
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of
residue is made. x x x. If there is a
controversy before the court as to who are
the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as
to the distributive shares to which each
person is entitled under the law, the
controversy shall be heard and decided as in
ordinary cases.

No distribution shall be allowed until the

payment of the obligations above mentioned
has been made or provided for, unless the
distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in
a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned
for the payment of said obligations within
such time as the court directs.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision

of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Letters of Administration
over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall
issue to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and
respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment by each
of a bond to be set by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78,
Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 146006. February 23, 2004]
JOSE C. LEE AND ALMA AGGABAO, in their
capacities as President and Corporate Secretary,
respectively, of Philippines Internationl Life
Insurance Company, and FILIPINO LOAN
ASSISTANCE GROUP, petitioners,
vs. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON
CITY BRANCH 85 presided by JUDGE PEDRO
M. AREOLA, BRANCH CLERK OF COURT
JANICE Y. ANTERO, DEPUTY SHERIFFS
ADENAUER G. RIVERA and PEDRO L.
BORJA, all of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City Branch 85, MA. DIVINA
ENDERES claiming to be Special Administratrix,
and other persons/ public officers acting for and
in their behalf, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the decision [1] of the
Court of Appeals, First Division, dated July 26, 2000, in CA
G.R. 59736, which dismissed the petition for certiorari filed
by petitioners Jose C. Lee and Alma Aggabao (in their
capacities as president and secretary, respectively, of
Philippine International Life Insurance Company) and
Filipino Loan Assistance Group.
The antecedent facts follow.
 Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez incorporated the Philippine
International Life Insurance Company, Inc. on July 6,
1956. At the time of the companys incorporation, Dr. Ortaez
owned ninety percent (90%) of the subscribed capital stock.
On July 21, 1980, Dr. Ortaez died. He left behind a wife
(Juliana Salgado Ortaez), three legitimate children (Rafael,
Jose and Antonio Ortaez) and five illegitimate children by
Ligaya Novicio (herein private respondent Ma. Divina
Ortaez-Enderes and her siblings Jose, Romeo, Enrico
Manuel and Cesar, all surnamed Ortaez).[2]
On September 24, 1980, Rafael Ortaez filed before the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch (now
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City) a petition for letters of
administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Ortaez, docketed
as SP Proc. Q-30884 (which petition to date remains pending
at Branch 85 thereof).
Private respondent Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes and her
siblings filed an opposition to the petition for letters of
administration and, in a subsequent urgent motion, prayed
that the intestate court appoint a special administrator.
On March 10, 1982, Judge Ernani Cruz Pao, then
presiding judge of Branch 85, appointed Rafael and Jose
Ortaez joint special administrators of their fathers estate.
Hearings continued for the appointment of a regular
administrator (up to now no regular administrator has been
appointed).
As ordered by the intestate court, special administrators
Rafael and Jose Ortaez submitted an inventory of the estate
of their father which included, among other properties,
2,029[3] shares of stock in Philippine International Life
Insurance Company (hereafter Philinterlife), representing
50.725% of the companys outstanding capital stock.
On April 15, 1989, the decedents wife, Juliana S.
Ortaez, claiming that she owned 1,014 [4] Philinterlife shares
of stock as her conjugal share in the estate, sold said shares
with right to repurchase in favor of herein petitioner Filipino
Loan Assistance Group (FLAG), represented by its
president, herein petitioner Jose C. Lee. Juliana Ortaez failed
to repurchase the shares of stock within the stipulated period,
thus ownership thereof was consolidated by petitioner FLAG
in its name.
On October 30, 1991, Special Administrator Jose
Ortaez, acting in his personal capacity and claiming that he
owned the remaining 1,011[5] Philinterlife shares of stocks as
his inheritance share in the estate, sold said shares with right
to repurchase also in favor of herein petitioner FLAG,
represented by its president, herein petitioner Jose C. Lee.
After one year, petitioner FLAG consolidated in its name the
ownership of the Philinterlife shares of stock when Jose
Ortaez failed to repurchase the same.
It appears that several years before (but already during
the pendency of the intestate proceedings at the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 85), Juliana Ortaez and
her two children, Special Administrators Rafael and Jose
Ortaez, entered into a memorandum of agreement dated
March 4, 1982 for the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of
Dr. Juvencio Ortaez, partitioning the estate (including the
Philinterlife shares of stock) among themselves. This was the
basis of the number of shares separately sold by Juliana
Ortaez on April 15, 1989 (1,014 shares) and by Jose Ortaez
on October 30, 1991 (1,011 shares) in favor of herein
petitioner FLAG.
On July 12, 1995, herein private respondent Ma. Divina
OrtaezEnderes and her siblings (hereafter referred to as
private respondents Enderes et al.) filed a motion for
appointment of special administrator of Philinterlife shares
of stock. This move was opposed by Special Administrator
Jose Ortaez.
On November 8, 1995, the intestate court granted the
motion of private respondents Enderes et al. and appointed
private respondent Enderes special administratrix of the
Philinterlife shares of stock.
On December 20, 1995, Special Administratrix Enderes
filed an urgent motion to declare void ab initio the
memorandum of agreement dated March 4, 1982. On
January 9, 1996, she filed a motion to declare the partial
nullity of the extrajudicial settlement of the decedents estate.
These motions were opposed by Special Administrator Jose
Ortaez.
On March 22, 1996, Special Administratrix Enderes
filed an urgent motion to declare void ab initio the deeds of
sale of Philinterlife shares of stock, which move was again
opposed by Special Administrator Jose Ortaez.
On February 4, 1997, Jose Ortaez filed an omnibus
motion for (1) the approval of the deeds of sale of the
Philinterlife shares of stock and (2) the release of Ma. Divina
Ortaez-Enderes as special administratrix of the Philinterlife
shares of stock on the ground that there were no longer any
shares of stock for her to administer.
On August 11, 1997, the intestate court denied the
omnibus motion of Special Administrator Jose Ortaez for the
approval of the deeds of sale for the reason that:
Under the Godoy case, supra, it was held in substance that a
sale of a property of the estate without an Order of the
probate court is void and passes no title to the purchaser.
Since the sales in question were entered into by Juliana S.
Ortaez and Jose S. Ortaez in their personal capacity without
prior approval of the Court, the same is not binding upon the
Estate.
WHEREFORE, the OMNIBUS MOTION for the approval
of the sale of Philinterlife shares of stock and release of Ma.
Divina Ortaez-Enderes as Special Administratrix is hereby
denied.[6]
 On August 29, 1997, the intestate court issued another
order granting the motion of Special Administratrix Enderes
for the annulment of the March 4, 1982 memorandum of
agreement or extrajudicial partition of estate. The court
reasoned that:
In consonance with the Order of this Court dated August 11,
1997 DENYING the approval of the sale of Philinterlife
shares of stocks and release of Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes as
Special Administratrix, the Urgent Motion to Declare
Void Ab Initio Memorandum of Agreement dated December
19, 1995. . . is hereby impliedly partially resolved insofar as
the transfer/waiver/renunciation of the Philinterlife shares of
stock are concerned, in particular, No. 5, 9(c), 10(b) and
11(d)(ii) of the Memorandum of Agreement.
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby declares the Memorandum
of Agreement dated March 4, 1982 executed by Juliana S.
Ortaez, Rafael S. Ortaez and Jose S. Ortaez as partially
void ab initio insofar as the transfer/waiver/renunciation of
the Philinterlife shares of stocks are concerned. [7]
Aggrieved by the above-stated orders of the intestate
court, Jose Ortaez filed, on December 22, 1997, a petition
for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
denied his petition, however, ruling that there was no legal
justification whatsoever for the extrajudicial partition of the
estate by Jose Ortaez, his brother Rafael Ortaez and mother
Juliana Ortaez during the pendency of the settlement of the
estate of Dr. Ortaez, without the requisite approval of the
intestate court, when it was clear that there were other heirs
to the estate who stood to be prejudiced thereby.
Consequently, the sale made by Jose Ortaez and his mother
Juliana Ortaez to FLAG of the shares of stock they invalidly
appropriated for themselves, without approval of the
intestate court, was void.[8]
Special Administrator Jose Ortaez filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision but it was
denied. He elevated the case to the Supreme Court via
petition for review under Rule 45 which the Supreme Court
dismissed on October 5, 1998, on a technicality. His motion
for reconsideration was denied with finality on January 13,
1999. On February 23, 1999, the resolution of the Supreme
Court dismissing the petition of Special Administrator Jose
Ortaez became final and was subsequently recorded in the
book of entries of judgments.
Meanwhile, herein petitioners Jose Lee and Alma
Aggabao, with the rest of the FLAG-controlled board of
directors, increased the authorized capital stock of
Philinterlife, diluting in the process the 50.725% controlling
interest of the decedent, Dr. Juvencio Ortaez, in the
insurance company.[9] This became the subject of a separate
action at the Securities and Exchange Commission filed by
private respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes against
petitioner Jose Lee and other members of the FLAG-
controlled board of Philinterlife on November 7, 1994.
Thereafter, various cases were filed by Jose Lee as president
of Philinterlife and Juliana Ortaez and her sons against
private respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes in the
SEC and civil courts.[10] Somehow, all these cases were
connected to the core dispute on the legality of the sale of
decedent Dr. Ortaezs Philinterlife shares of stock to
petitioner FLAG, represented by its president, herein
petitioner Jose Lee who later became the president of
Philinterlife after the controversial sale.
On May 2, 2000, private respondent-Special
Administratrix Enderes and her siblings filed a motion for
execution of the Orders of the intestate court dated August
11 and August 29, 1997 because the orders of the intestate
court nullifying the sale (upheld by the Court of Appeals and
the Supreme Court) had long became final. Respondent-
Special Administratrix Enderes served a copy of the motion
to petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao as president and
secretary, respectively, of Philinterlife, [11] but petitioners
ignored the same.
On July 6, 2000, the intestate court granted the motion
for execution, the dispositive portion of which read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, let a writ of execution
issue as follows:
1. Confirming the nullity of the sale of the
2,029 Philinterlife shares in the name of
the Estate of Dr. Juvencio Ortaez to
Filipino Loan Assistance Group
(FLAG);
2. Commanding the President and the Corporate
Secretary of Philinterlife to reinstate in
the stock and transfer book of
Philinterlife the 2,029 Philinterlife
shares of stock in the name of the
Estate of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez as the
owner thereof without prejudice to
other claims for violation of pre-
emptive rights pertaining to the said
2,029 Philinterlife shares;
3. Directing the President and the Corporate
Secretary of Philinterlife to issue stock
certificates of Philinterlife for 2,029
shares in the name of the Estate of Dr.
Juvencio P. Ortaez as the owner thereof
without prejudice to other claims for
violations of pre-emptive rights
pertaining to the said 2,029 Philinterlife
shares and,
4. Confirming that only the Special
Administratrix, Ma. Divina Ortaez-
Enderes, has the power to exercise all
the rights appurtenant to the said
shares, including the right to vote and
to receive dividends.
 5. Directing Philinterlife and/or any other
person or persons claiming to represent
it or otherwise, to acknowledge and
allow the said Special Administratrix to
exercise all the aforesaid rights on the
said shares and to refrain from resorting
to any action which may tend directly
or indirectly to impede, obstruct or bar
the free exercise thereof under pain of
contempt.
6. The President, Corporate Secretary, any
responsible officer/s of Philinterlife, or
any other person or persons claiming to
represent it or otherwise, are hereby
directed to comply with this order
within three (3) days from receipt
hereof under pain of contempt.
7. The Deputy Sheriffs Adenauer Rivera and
Pedro Borja are hereby directed to
implement the writ of execution with
dispatch to forestall any and/or further
damage to the Estate.
SO ORDERED.[12]
In the several occasions that the sheriff went to the
office of petitioners to execute the writ of execution, he was
barred by the security guard upon petitioners instructions.
Thus, private respondent-Special Administratrix Enderes
filed a motion to cite herein petitioners Jose Lee and Alma
Aggabao (president and secretary, respectively, of
Philinterlife) in contempt.[13]
Petitioners Lee and Aggabao subsequently filed before
the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari, docketed as CA
G.R. SP No. 59736. Petitioners alleged that the intestate
court gravely abused its discretion in (1) declaring that the
ownership of FLAG over the Philinterlife shares of stock
was null and void; (2) ordering the execution of its order
declaring such nullity and (3) depriving the petitioners of
their right to due process.
On July 26, 2000, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition outright:
We are constrained to DISMISS OUTRIGHT the present
petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction in the light of the following considerations:
1. The assailed Order dated August 11, 1997 of
the respondent judge had long become
final and executory;
2. The certification on non-forum shopping is
signed by only one (1) of the three (3)
petitioners in violation of the Rules;
and
 3. Except for the assailed orders and writ of
execution, deed of sale with right to
repurchase, deed of sale of shares of
stocks and omnibus motion, the petition
is not accompanied by such pleadings,
documents and other material portions
of the record as would support the
allegations therein in violation of the
second paragraph, Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
Petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.[14]
The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Lee
and Aggabao of the above decision was denied by the Court
of Appeals on October 30, 2000:
This resolves the urgent motion for reconsideration filed by
the petitioners of our resolution of July 26, 2000 dismissing
outrightly the above-entitled petition for the reason, among
others, that the assailed Order dated August 11, 1997 of the
respondent Judge had long become final and executory.
Dura lex, sed lex.
WHEREFORE, the urgent motion for reconsideration is
hereby DENIED, for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.[15]
On December 4, 2000, petitioners elevated the case to
the Supreme Court through a petition for review under Rule
45 but on December 13, 2000, we denied the petition
because there was no showing that the Court of Appeals in
CA G.R. SP No. 59736 committed any reversible error to
warrant the exercise by the Supreme Court of its
discretionary appellate jurisdiction.[16]
However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioners Lee and Aggabao, the Supreme Court granted the
motion and reinstated their petition on September 5, 2001.
The parties were then required to submit their respective
memoranda.
Meanwhile, private respondent-Special Administratrix
Enderes, on July 19, 2000, filed a motion to direct the branch
clerk of court in lieu of herein petitioners Lee and Aggabao
to reinstate the name of Dr. Ortaez in the stock and transfer
book of Philinterlife and issue the corresponding stock
certificate pursuant to Section 10, Rule 39 of the Rules of
Court which provides that the court may direct the act to be
done at the cost of the disobedient party by some other
person appointed by the court and the act when so done shall
have the effect as if done by the party. Petitioners Lee and
Aggabao opposed the motion on the ground that the intestate
court should refrain from acting on the motion because the
issues raised therein were directly related to the issues raised
by them in their petition for certiorari at the Court of Appeals
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 59736. On October 30, 2000, MISTAKE IN APPREHENDING THE
the intestate court granted the motion, ruling that there was FACTS HAD BECOME PATENT AND
no prohibition for the intestate court to execute its orders EVIDENT FROM THE MOTION FOR
inasmuch as the appellate court did not issue any TRO or RECONSIDERATION AND THE
writ of preliminary injunction. COMMENT OF RESPONDENT
ENDERES WHICH HAD ADMITTED
On December 3, 2000, petitioners Lee and Aggabao THE FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS OF
filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, PETITIONERS IN THE PETITION AS
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 62461, questioning this time WELL AS IN THE MOTION FOR
the October 30, 2000 order of the intestate court directing the RECONSIDERATION. MOREOVER,
branch clerk of court to issue the stock certificates. They also THE RESOLUTION OF THE
questioned in the Court of Appeals the order of the intestate APPELLATE COURT DENYING THE
court nullifying the sale made in their favor by Juliana MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Ortaez and Jose Ortaez. On November 20, 2002, the Court of WAS CONTAINED IN ONLY ONE
Appeals denied their petition and upheld the power of the PAGE WITHOUT EVEN TOUCHING
intestate court to execute its order. Petitioners Lee and ON THE SUBSTANTIVE MERITS OF
Aggabao then filed motion for reconsideration which at THE EXHAUSTIVE DISCUSSION OF
present is still pending resolution by the Court of Appeals. FACTS AND SUPPORTING LAW IN
THE MOTION FOR
Petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao (president and RECONSIDERATION IN VIOLATION
secretary, respectively, of Philinterlife) and FLAG now raise OF THE RULE ON ADMINISTRATIVE
the following errors for our consideration: DUE PROCESS;

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
REVERSIBLE ERROR:
A. IN FAILING TO RECONSIDER ITS
PREVIOUS RESOLUTION DENYING
THE PETITION DESPITE THE FACT
THAT THE APPELLATE COURTS
B. IN FAILING TO SET ASIDE THE VOID
ORDERS OF THE INTESTATE COURT
ON THE ERRONEOUS GROUND THAT
THE ORDERS WERE FINAL AND
EXECUTORY WITH REGARD TO
PETITIONERS EVEN AS THE LATTER
 WERE NEVER NOTIFIED OF THE
PROCEEDINGS OR ORDER
CANCELING ITS OWNERSHIP;
C. IN NOT FINDING THAT THE
INTESTATE COURT COMMITTED
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION (1) WHEN IT ISSUED
THE OMNIBUS ORDER NULLIFYING
THE OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONER
FLAG OVER SHARES OF STOCK
WHICH WERE ALLEGED TO BE PART
OF THE ESTATE AND (2) WHEN IT
ISSUED A VOID WRIT OF
EXECUTION AGAINST PETITIONER
FLAG AS PRESENT OWNER TO
IMPLEMENT MERELY PROVISIONAL
ORDERS, THEREBY VIOLATING
FLAGS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
AGAINST DEPRIVATION OF
PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS;
D. IN FAILING TO DECLARE NULL AND
VOID THE ORDERS OF THE
INTESTATE COURT WHICH
NULLIFIED THE SALE OF SHARES
OF STOCK BETWEEN THE
LEGITIMATE HEIR JOSE S. ORTAEZ
AND PETITIONER FLAG BECAUSE
OF SETTLED LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE, I.E., THAT AN HEIR
HAS THE RIGHT TO DISPOSE OF THE
DECEDENTS PROPERTY EVEN IF
THE SAME IS UNDER
ADMINISTRATION PURSUANT TO
CIVIL CODE PROVISION THAT
POSSESSION OF HEREDITARY
PROPERTY IS TRANSMITTED TO THE
HEIR THE MOMENT OF DEATH OF
THE DECEDENT (ACEDEBO VS.
ABESAMIS, 217 SCRA 194);
E. IN DISREGARDING THE FINAL
DECISION OF THE SUPREME COURT
IN G.R. NO. 128525 DATED
DECEMBER 17, 1999 INVOLVING
SUBSTANTIALLY THE SAME
PARTIES, TO WIT, PETITIONERS JOSE
C. LEE AND ALMA AGGABAO WERE
RESPONDENTS IN THAT CASE
WHILE RESPONDENT MA. DIVINA
ENDERES WAS THE PETITIONER
THEREIN. THAT DECISION, WHICH
CAN BE CONSIDERED LAW OF THE
CASE, RULED THAT PETITIONERS
CANNOT BE ENJOINED BY
RESPONDENT ENDERES FROM
 EXERCISING THEIR POWER AS
DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS OF
PHILINTERLIFE AND THAT THE
INTESTATE COURT IN CHARGE OF
THE INTESTATE PROCEEDINGS
CANNOT ADJUDICATE TITLE TO
PROPERTIES CLAIMED TO BE PART
OF THE ESTATE AND WHICH ARE
EQUALLY CLAIMED BY PETITIONER
FLAG.[17]
The petition has no merit.
Petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao, representing
Philinterlife and FLAG, assail before us not only the validity
of the writ of execution issued by the intestate court dated
July 7, 2000 but also the validity of the August 11, 1997
order of the intestate court nullifying the sale of the 2,029
Philinterlife shares of stock made by Juliana Ortaez and Jose
Ortaez, in their personal capacities and without court
approval, in favor of petitioner FLAG.
We cannot allow petitioners to reopen the issue of
nullity of the sale of the Philinterlife shares of stock in their
favor because this was already settled a long time ago by the
Court of Appeals in its decision dated June 23, 1998 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 46342. This decision was effectively upheld by
us in our resolution dated October 9, 1998 in G.R. No.
135177 dismissing the petition for review on a technicality
and thereafter denying the motion for reconsideration on
January 13, 1999 on the ground that there was no compelling
reason to reconsider said denial. [18] Our decision became
final on February 23, 1999 and was accordingly entered in
the book of entry of judgments. For all intents and purposes
therefore, the nullity of the sale of the Philinterlife shares of
stock made by Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez in favor of
petitioner FLAG is already a closed case. To reopen said
issue would set a bad precedent, opening the door wide open
for dissatisfied parties to relitigate unfavorable decisions no
end. This is completely inimical to the orderly and efficient
administration of justice.
The said decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 46342 affirming the nullity of the sale made by Jose
Ortaez and his mother Juliana Ortaez of the Philinterlife
shares of stock read:
Petitioners asseverations relative to said [memorandum]
agreement were scuttled during the hearing before this Court
thus:
JUSTICE AQUINO:
Counsel for petitioner, when the
Memorandum of Agreement was executed,
did the children of Juliana Salgado know
already that there was a claim for share in the
inheritance of the children of Novicio?
ATTY. CALIMAG:
 Your Honor please, at that time, Your
Honor, it is already known to them.
JUSTICE AQUINO:
What can be your legal justification for
extrajudicial settlement of a property subject
of intestate proceedings when there is an
adverse claim of another set of heirs, alleged
heirs? What would be the legal justification
for extra-judicially settling a property under
administration without the approval of the
intestate court?
ATTY. CALIMAG:
Well, Your Honor please, in that extra-
judicial settlement there is an approval of the
honorable court as to the propertys partition x
x x. There were as mentioned by the
respondents counsel, Your Honor.
ATTY. BUYCO:
No
JUSTICE AQUINO:
The point is, there can be no
adjudication of a property under intestate
proceedings without the approval of the court.
That is basic unless you can present
justification on that. In fact, there are two
steps: first, you ask leave and then execute the
document and then ask for approval of the
document executed. Now, is there any legal
justification to exclude this particular
transaction from those steps?
ATTY. CALIMAG:
None, Your Honor.
ATTY BUYCO:
With that admission that there is no
legal justification, Your Honor, we rest the
case for the private respondent. How can the
lower court be accused of abusing its
discretion? (pages 33-35, TSN of January 29,
1998).
Thus, We find merit in the following postulation by private
respondent:
What we have here is a situation where some of the heirs of
the decedent without securing court approval have
appropriated as their own personal property the properties of
[the] Estate, to the exclusion and the extreme prejudice of
the other claimant/heirs. In other words, these heirs, without
court approval, have distributed the asset of the estate among
themselves and proceeded to dispose the same to third
parties even in the absence of an order of distribution by the
Estate Court. As admitted by petitioners counsel, there was
absolutely no legal justification for this action by the heirs.
There being no legal justification, petitioner has no basis for
demanding that public respondent [the intestate court]
approve the sale of the Philinterlife shares of the Estate by
Juliana and Jose Ortaez in favor of the Filipino Loan
Assistance Group.
It is an undisputed fact that the parties to the Memorandum
of Agreement dated March 4, 1982 (see Annex 7 of the
Comment). . . are not the only heirs claiming an interest in
the estate left by Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez. The records of this
case. . . clearly show that as early as March 3, 1981 an
Opposition to the Application for Issuance of Letters of
Administration was filed by the acknowledged natural
children of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez with Ligaya Novicio. . .
This claim by the acknowledged natural children of Dr.
Juvencio P. Ortaez is admittedly known to the parties to the
Memorandum of Agreement before they executed the same.
This much was admitted by petitioners counsel during the
oral argument. xxx
Given the foregoing facts, and the applicable jurisprudence,
public respondent can never be faulted for not approving. . .
the subsequent sale by the petitioner [Jose Ortaez] and his
mother [Juliana Ortaez] of the Philinterlife shares belonging
to the Estate of Dr. Juvencio P. Ortaez. (pages 3-4 of Private
Respondents Memorandum; pages 243-244 of the Rollo)
Amidst the foregoing, We found no grave abuse of discretion
amounting to excess or want of jurisdiction committed by
respondent judge.[19]
From the above decision, it is clear that Juliana Ortaez,
and her three sons, Jose, Rafael and Antonio, all surnamed
Ortaez, invalidly entered into a memorandum of agreement
extrajudicially partitioning the intestate estate among
themselves, despite their knowledge that there were other
heirs or claimants to the estate and before final settlement of
the estate by the intestate court. Since the appropriation of
the estate properties by Juliana Ortaez and her children
(Jose, Rafael and Antonio Ortaez) was invalid, the
subsequent sale thereof by Juliana and Jose to a third party
(FLAG), without court approval, was likewise void.
An heir can sell his right, interest, or participation in the
property under administration under Art. 533 of the Civil
Code which provides that possession of hereditary property
is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption from
the moment of death of the decedent. [20] However, an heir
can only alienate such portion of the estate that may be
allotted to him in the division of the estate by the probate or
intestate court after final adjudication, that is, after all
debtors shall have been paid or the devisees or legatees shall
have been given their shares.[21] This means that an heir may
only sell his ideal or undivided share in the estate, not any
specific property therein. In the present case, Juliana Ortaez
and Jose Ortaez sold specific properties of the estate (1,014
and 1,011 shares of stock in Philinterlife) in favor of
petitioner FLAG. This they could not lawfully do pending
the final adjudication of the estate by the intestate court
because of the undue prejudice it would cause the other
claimants to the estate, as what happened in the present case.
Juliana Ortaez and Jose Ortaez sold specific properties
of the estate, without court approval. It is well-settled that
court approval is necessary for the validity of any disposition
of the decedents estate. In the early case of Godoy vs.
Orellano,[22] we laid down the rule that the sale of the
property of the estate by an administrator without the order
of the probate court is void and passes no title to the
purchaser. And in the case of Dillena vs. Court of Appeals,
[23]
we ruled that:
[I]t must be emphasized that the questioned properties
(fishpond) were included in the inventory of properties of the
estate submitted by then Administratrix Fausta Carreon
Herrera on November 14, 1974. Private respondent was
appointed as administratrix of the estate on March 3, 1976 in
lieu of Fausta Carreon Herrera. On November 1, 1978, the
questioned deed of sale of the fishponds was executed
between petitioner and private respondent without notice and
approval of the probate court. Even after the sale,
administratrix Aurora Carreon still included the three
fishponds as among the real properties of the estate in her
inventory submitted on August 13, 1981. In fact, as stated by
the Court of Appeals, petitioner, at the time of the sale of the
fishponds in question, knew that the same were part of the
estate under administration.
xxxxxxxxx
The subject properties therefore are under the jurisdiction of
the probate court which according to our settled
jurisprudence has the authority to approve any disposition
regarding properties under administration. . . More emphatic
is the declaration We made in Estate of Olave vs. Reyes (123
SCRA 767) where We stated that when the estate of the
deceased person is already the subject of a testate or intestate
proceeding, the administrator cannot enter into any
transaction involving it without prior approval of the probate
court.
Only recently, in Manotok Realty, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals
(149 SCRA 174), We held that the sale of an immovable
property belonging to the estate of a decedent, in a special
proceedings, needs court approval. . . This pronouncement
finds support in the previous case of Dolores Vda. De Gil vs.
Agustin Cancio (14 SCRA 797) wherein We emphasized that
it is within the jurisdiction of a probate court to approve the
sale of properties of a deceased person by his prospective
heirs before final adjudication. x x x
It being settled that property under administration needs the
approval of the probate court before it can be disposed of,
any unauthorized disposition does not bind the estate and is
null and void. As early as 1921 in the case of Godoy vs.
Orellano (42 Phil 347), We laid down the rule that a sale by
an administrator of property of the deceased, which is not
authorized by the probate court is null and void and title does
not pass to the purchaser.
There is hardly any doubt that the probate court can declare
null and void the disposition of the property under
administration, made by private respondent, the same having
been effected without authority from said court. It is the
probate court that has the power to authorize and/or
approve the sale (Section 4 and 7, Rule 89), hence, a
fortiori, it is said court that can declare it null and void for
as long as the proceedings had not been closed or
terminated. To uphold petitioners contention that the probate
court cannot annul the unauthorized sale, would render
meaningless the power pertaining to the said court. (Bonga
vs. Soler, 2 SCRA 755). (emphasis ours)
Our jurisprudence is therefore clear that (1) any
disposition of estate property by an administrator or
prospective heir pending final adjudication requires court
approval and (2) any unauthorized disposition of estate
property can be annulled by the probate court, there being no
need for a separate action to annul the unauthorized
disposition.
The question now is: can the intestate or probate court
execute its order nullifying the invalid sale?
We see no reason why it cannot. The intestate court has
the power to execute its order with regard to the nullity of an
unauthorized sale of estate property, otherwise its power to
annul the unauthorized or fraudulent disposition of estate
property would be meaningless. In other words, enforcement
is a necessary adjunct of the intestate or probate courts
power to annul unauthorized or fraudulent transactions to
prevent the dissipation of estate property before final
adjudication.
Moreover, in this case, the order of the intestate court
nullifying the sale was affirmed by the appellate courts (the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46342 dated June 23,
1998 and subsequently by the Supreme Court in G.R. No.
135177 dated October 9, 1998). The finality of the decision
of the Supreme Court was entered in the book of entry of
judgments on February 23, 1999. Considering the finality of
the order of the intestate court nullifying the sale, as affirmed
by the appellate courts, it was correct for private respondent-
Special Administratrix Enderes to thereafter move for a writ
of execution and for the intestate court to grant it.
Petitioners Jose Lee, Alma Aggabao and FLAG,
however, contend that the probate court could not issue a
writ of execution with regard to its order nullifying the sale
because said order was merely provisional:
The only authority given by law is for respondent judge to
determine provisionally whether said shares are included or
excluded in the inventory In ordering the execution of the
orders, respondent judge acted in excess of his jurisdiction
and grossly violated settled law and jurisprudence, i.e., that
the determination by a probate or intestate court of whether
a property is included or excluded in the inventory of the
estate being provisional in nature, cannot be the subject of
execution.[24] (emphasis ours)
Petitioners argument is misplaced. There is no question,
based on the facts of this case, that the Philinterlife shares of
stock were part of the estate of Dr. Juvencio Ortaez from the
very start as in fact these shares were included in the
inventory of the properties of the estate submitted by Rafael
Ortaez after he and his brother, Jose Ortaez, were appointed
special administrators by the intestate court. [25]
The controversy here actually started when, during the
pendency of the settlement of the estate of Dr. Ortaez, his
wife Juliana Ortaez sold the 1,014 Philinterlife shares of
stock in favor petitioner FLAG without the approval of the
intestate court. Her son Jose Ortaez later sold the remaining
1,011 Philinterlife shares also in favor of FLAG without the
approval of the intestate court.
We are not dealing here with the issue of inclusion or
exclusion of properties in the inventory of the estate because
there is no question that, from the very start, the Philinterlife
shares of stock were owned by the decedent, Dr. Juvencio
Ortaez. Rather, we are concerned here with the effect of
the sale made by the decedents heirs, Juliana Ortaez and
Jose Ortaez, without the required approval of the
intestate court. This being so, the contention of petitioners
that the determination of the intestate court was merely
provisional and should have been threshed out in a separate
proceeding is incorrect.
The petitioners Jose Lee and Alma Aggabao next
contend that the writ of execution should not be executed
against them because they were not notified, nor they were
aware, of the proceedings nullifying the sale of the shares of
stock.
We are not persuaded. The title of the purchaser like
herein petitioner FLAG can be struck down by the intestate
court after a clear showing of the nullity of the alienation.
This is the logical consequence of our ruling in Godoy and in
several subsequent cases. [26] The sale of any property of the
estate by an administrator or prospective heir without
order of the probate or intestate court is void and passes
no title to the purchaser. Thus, in Juan Lao et al. vs. Hon.
Melencio Geneto, G.R. No. 56451, June 19, 1985, we
ordered the probate court to cancel the transfer certificate of
title issued to the vendees at the instance of the administrator
after finding that the sale of real property under probate
proceedings was made without the prior approval of the
court. The dispositive portion of our decision read:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the
assailed Order dated February 18, 1981 of the respondent
Judge approving the questioned Amicable Settlement is
declared NULL and VOID and hereby SET ASIDE.
Consequently, the sale in favor of Sotero Dioniosio III and
by the latter to William Go is likewise declared NULL and
VOID. The Transfer Certificate of Title issued to the latter is
hereby ordered cancelled.
It goes without saying that the increase in Philinterlifes
authorized capital stock, approved on the vote of petitioners
non-existent shareholdings and obviously calculated to make
it difficult for Dr. Ortaezs estate to reassume its controlling
interest in Philinterlife, was likewise void ab initio.
Petitioners next argue that they were denied due
process.
We do not think so.
The facts show that petitioners, for reasons known only
to them, did not appeal the decision of the intestate court
nullifying the sale of shares of stock in their favor. Only the
vendor, Jose Ortaez, appealed the case. A careful review of
the records shows that petitioners had actual knowledge of
the estate settlement proceedings and that they knew private
respondent Enderes was questioning therein the sale to them
of the Philinterlife shares of stock.
It must be noted that private respondent-Special
Administratrix Enderes filed before the intestate court (RTC
of Quezon City, Branch 85) a Motion to Declare Void Ab
Initio Deeds of Sale of Philinterlife Shares of Stock on
March 22, 1996. But as early as 1994, petitioners already
knew of the pending settlement proceedings and that the
shares they bought were under the administration by the
intestate court because private respondent Ma. Divina
Ortaez-Enderes and her mother Ligaya Novicio had filed a
case against them at the Securities and Exchange
Commission on November 7, 1994, docketed as SEC No.
11-94-4909, for annulment of transfer of shares of stock,
annulment of sale of corporate properties, annulment of
subscriptions on increased capital stocks, accounting,
inspection of corporate books and records and damages with
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order.[27] In said case, Enderes and her mother
questioned the sale of the aforesaid shares of stock to
petitioners. The SEC hearing officer in fact, in his resolution
dated March 24, 1995, deferred to the jurisdiction of the
intestate court to rule on the validity of the sale of shares of
stock sold to petitioners by Jose Ortaez and Juliana Ortaez:
Petitioners also averred that. . . the Philinterlife shares of Dr.
Juvencio Ortaez who died, in 1980, are part of his estate
which is presently the subject matter of an intestate
proceeding of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 85.
Although, private respondents [Jose Lee et al.] presented the
documents of partition whereby the foregoing share of
stocks were allegedly partitioned and conveyed to Jose S.
Ortaez who allegedly assigned the same to the other private
respondents, approval of the Court was not presented. Thus,
the assignments to the private respondents [Jose Lee et al.]
of the subject shares of stocks are void.
 xxxxxxxxx
With respect to the alleged extrajudicial partition of the
shares of stock owned by the late Dr. Juvencio Ortaez, we
rule that the matter properly belongs to the jurisdiction of the
regular court where the intestate proceedings are currently
pending.[28]
With this resolution of the SEC hearing officer dated as
early as March 24, 1995 recognizing the jurisdiction of the
intestate court to determine the validity of the extrajudicial
partition of the estate of Dr. Ortaez and the subsequent sale
by the heirs of the decedent of the Philinterlife shares of
stock to petitioners, how can petitioners claim that they were
not aware of the intestate proceedings?
Futhermore, when the resolution of the SEC hearing
officer reached the Supreme Court in 1996 (docketed as G.R.
128525), herein petitioners who were respondents therein
filed their answer which contained statements showing that
they knew of the pending intestate proceedings:
[T]he subject matter of the complaint is not within the
jurisdiction of the SEC but with the Regional Trial Court;
Ligaya Novicio and children represented themselves to be
the common law wife and illegitimate children of the late
Ortaez; that on March 4, 1982, the surviving spouse Juliana
Ortaez, on her behalf and for her minor son Antonio,
executed a Memorandum of Agreement with her other sons
Rafael and Jose, both surnamed Ortaez, dividing the estate of
the deceased composed of his one-half (1/2) share in the
conjugal properties; that in the said Memorandum of
Agreement, Jose S. Ortaez acquired as his share of the estate
the 1,329 shares of stock in Philinterlife; that on March 4,
1982, Juliana and Rafael assigned their respective shares of
stock in Philinterlife to Jose; that contrary to the contentions
of petitioners, private respondents Jose Lee, Carlos Lee,
Benjamin Lee and Alma Aggabao became stockholders of
Philinterlife on March 23, 1983 when Jose S. Ortaez, the
principal stockholder at that time, executed a deed of sale of
his shares of stock to private respondents; and that the right
of petitioners to question the Memorandum of Agreement
and the acquisition of shares of stock of private respondent is
barred by prescription.[29]
Also, private respondent-Special Administratrix
Enderes offered additional proof of actual knowledge of the
settlement proceedings by petitioners which petitioners
never denied: (1) that petitioners were represented by Atty.
Ricardo Calimag previously hired by the mother of private
respondent Enderes to initiate cases against petitioners Jose
Lee and Alma Aggaboa for the nullification of the sale of the
shares of stock but said counsel made a conflicting turn-
around and appeared instead as counsel of petitioners, and
(2) that the deeds of sale executed between petitioners and
the heirs of the decedent (vendors Juliana Ortaez and Jose
Ortaez) were acknowledged before Atty. Ramon Carpio who,
during the pendency of the settlement proceedings, filed a
motion for the approval of the sale of Philinterlife shares of
stock to the Knights of Columbus Fraternal Association, Inc.
(which motion was, however, later abandoned). [30] All this
sufficiently proves that petitioners, through their counsels,
knew of the pending settlement proceedings.
Finally, petitioners filed several criminal cases such as
libel (Criminal Case No. 97-7179-81), grave coercion
(Criminal Case No. 84624) and robbery (Criminal Case No.
Q-96-67919) against private respondents mother Ligaya
Novicio who was a director of Philinterlife, [31] all of which
criminal cases were related to the questionable sale to
petitioners of the Philinterlife shares of stock.
Considering these circumstances, we cannot accept
petitioners claim of denial of due process. The essence of
due process is the reasonable opportunity to be heard. Where
the opportunity to be heard has been accorded, there is no
denial of due process.[32] In this case, petitioners knew of the
pending instestate proceedings for the settlement of Dr.
Juvencio Ortaezs estate but for reasons they alone knew,
they never intervened. When the court declared the nullity of
the sale, they did not bother to appeal. And when they were
notified of the motion for execution of the Orders of the
intestate court, they ignored the same. Clearly, petitioners
alone should bear the blame.
Petitioners next contend that we are bound by our ruling
in G.R. No. 128525 entitled Ma. Divina Ortaez-Enderes vs.
Court of Appeals, dated December 17, 1999, where we
allegedly ruled that the intestate court may not pass upon the
title to a certain property for the purpose of determining
whether the same should or should not be included in the
inventory but such determination is not conclusive and is
subject to final decision in a separate action regarding
ownership which may be constituted by the parties.
We are not unaware of our decision in G.R. No.
128525. The issue therein was whether the Court of Appeals
erred in affirming the resolution of the SEC that Enderes et
al. were not entitled to the issuance of the writ of
preliminary injunction. We ruled that the Court of Appeals
was correct in affirming the resolution of the SEC denying
the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction because
injunction is not designed to protect contingent rights. Said
case did not rule on the issue of the validity of the sale of
shares of stock belonging to the decedents estate without
court approval nor of the validity of the writ of execution
issued by the intestate court. G.R. No. 128525 clearly
involved a different issue and it does not therefore apply to
the present case.
Petitioners and all parties claiming rights under them
are hereby warned not to further delay the execution of the
Orders of the intestate court dated August 11 and August 29,
1997.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. S.P. No. 59736
dated July 26, 2000, dismissing petitioners petition
for certiorari and affirming the July 6, 2000 order of the trial
court which ordered the execution of its (trial courts) August
11 and 29, 1997 orders, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

SYLLABUS

1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS;

SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE; ALLOWANCE FOR
SUPPORT; SHOULD NOT BE LIMITED TO
MINOR OR INCAPACITATED CHILD-REN. - It is
settled that allowances for support under Section 3 of
Rule 83 should not be limited to the minor or
incapacitated children of the deceased. Article 188 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, the substantive law in
force at the time of the testators death, provides that
during the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the
deceaseds legitimate spouse and children, regardless of
their age, civil status or gainful employment, are
entitled to provisional support from the funds of the
estate. The law is rooted on the fact that the right and
duty to support, especially the right to education, subsist
even beyond the age of majority.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DOES NOT EXTEND TO

DECEASEDS GRANDCHILDREN. - The law
 clearly limits the allowance to widow and children and
does not extend it to the deceaseds grandchildren,
regardless of their minority or incapacity.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN DISTRIBUTION OF
ESTATE PROPERTIES CAN BE MADE. In
settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the
estate properties can only be made: (1) after all the
debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration,
allowance to the widow, and estate tax have been paid;
or (2) before payment of said obligations only if
the distributees or any of them gives a bond in a sum
fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs, or
when provision is made to meet those obligations.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF ESTATE TAX; AN
OBLIGATION THAT MUST BE PAID BEFORE
THE DISTRIBUTION OF ESTATE. The estate tax is
one of those obligations that must be paid before
distribution of the estate. If not yet paid, the rule
requires that the distributees post a bond or make such
provisions as to meet the said tax obligation in
proportion to their respective shares in the inheritance.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; PURPOSE OF PROBATE. The probate of
a will is conclusive as to its due execution and extrinsic
validity and settles only the question of whether the
testator, being of sound mind, freely executed it in
accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.
Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy of the
provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or
legacy may be raised even after the will has been
authenticated.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; RIGHT OF AN EXECUTOR OR
ADMINISTRATOR OVER PROPERTIES OF THE
DECEASED. - The right of an executor or
administrator to the possession and management of the
real and personal properties of the deceased is not
absolute and can only be exercised so long as it is
necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of
administration.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Henedino M. Brondial for petitioner.
De Jesus & Associates for private respondents.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 118671. January 29, 1996]
THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND
RUIZ, Executor, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS (Former Special Sixth Division),
MARIA PILAR RUIZ-MONTES, MARIA
 CATHRYN RUIZ, CANDICE ALBERTINE
RUIZ, MARIA ANGELINE RUIZ and THE
PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF PASIG, BRANCH
156, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and
set aside the decision dated November 10, 1994 and the
resolution dated January 5, 1995 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 33045.
The facts show that on June 27, 1987, Hilario M.
1
Ruiz executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his
only son, Edmond Ruiz, his adopted daughter, private
respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three
granddaughters, private respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice
Albertine and Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond Ruiz.
The testator bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash,
personal and real properties and named Edmond Ruiz
executor of his estate.2
On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately
thereafter, the cash component of his estate was distributed
among Edmond Ruiz and private respondents in accordance
with the decedents will. For unbeknown reasons, Edmond,
the named executor, did not take any action for the probate
of his fathers holographic will.
On June 29, 1992, four years after the testators death, it
was private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes who filed
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, a
petition for the probate and approval of Hilario Ruizs will
and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond
Ruiz.3 Surprisingly, Edmond opposed the petition on the
ground that the will was executed under undue influence.
On November 2, 1992, one of the properties of the
estate - the house and lot at No. 2 Oliva Street, Valle Verde
IV, Pasig which the testator bequeathed to Maria Cathryn,
Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline 4 - was leased out by
Edmond Ruiz to third persons.
On January 19, 1993, the probate court
ordered Edmond to deposit with the Branch Clerk of Court
the rental deposit and payments totalling P540,000.00
representing the one-year lease of the Valle Verde property.
In compliance, on January 25, 1993, Edmond turned over the
amount of P348,583.56, representing the balance of the rent
after deducting P191,416.14 for repair and maintenance
expenses on the estate.5
In March 1993, Edmond moved for the release of
P50,000.00 to pay the real estate taxes on the real properties
of the estate. The probate court approved the release of
P7,722.006
 On May 14, 1993, Edmond withdrew his opposition to
the probate of the will. Consequently, the probate
court, on May 18, 1993, admitted the will to probate and
ordered the issuance of letters testamentary
to Edmondconditioned upon the filing of a bond in the
amount of P50,000.00. The letters testamentary were issued
on June 23, 1993.
On July 28, 1993, petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario
Ruiz as executor, filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Release of
Funds. It prayed for the release of the rent payments
deposited with the Branch Clerk of Court.Respondent
Montes opposed the motion and concurrently filed a Motion
for Release of Funds to Certain Heirs and Motion for
Issuance of Certificate of Allowance of Probate Will. Montes
prayed for the release of the said rent payments to Maria
Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline and for the
distribution of the testators properties, specifically the Valle
Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments, in
accordance with the provisions of the holographic will.
On August 26, 1993, the probate court denied
petitioners motion for release of funds but granted
respondent Montes motion in view of petitioners lack of
opposition. It thus ordered the release of the rent payments to
the decedents three granddaughters. It further ordered the
delivery of the titleds to and possession of the properties
bequeathed to the three granddaughters and respondent
Montes upon the filing of a bond of P50,000.00.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration alleging that he
actually filed his opposition to respondent Montes motion
for release of rent payments which opposition the court
failed to consider. Petitioner likewise reiterated his previous
motion for release of funds.
On November 23, 1993, petitioner, through counsel,
manifested that he was withdrawing his motion for release of
funds in view of the fact that the lease contract over Valle
Verde property had been renewed for another year.7
Despite petitioners manifestation, the probate court, on
December 22, 1993, ordered the release of the funds to
Edmond but only such amount as may be necessary to cover
the espenses of administration and allowanceas for support
of the testators three granddaughters subject to collation and
deductible from their share in the inheritance. The court,
however, held in abeyance the release of the titles to
respondent Montes and the three granddaughters until the
lapse of six months from the date of firast publication of the
notice to creditors.8 The Court stated thus:
xxx xxx xxx
After consideration of the arguments set forth thereon by the
parties, the court resolves to allow Administrator Edmond
M. Ruiz to take possession of the rental payments deposited
with the Clerk of Court, Pasig Regional Trial Court, but only
such amount as may be necessary to cover the expenses of
administration and allowances for support of Maria Cathryn
Veronique, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeli, which are
subject to collation and deductible from the share in the
inheritance of said heirs and insofar as they exceed the fruits
or rents pertaining to them.
As to the release of the titles bequeathed to petitioner Maria
Pilar Ruiz-Montes and the above-named heirs, the same is
hereby reconsidered and held in abeyance until the lapse of
six (6) months from the date of first publication of Notice to
Creditors.
WHEREFORE, Administrator Edmond M. Ruiz is hereby
ordered to submit an accounting of the expenses necessary
for administration including provisions for the support Of
Maria Cathryn Veronique Ruiz, Candice Albertine Ruiz and
Maria Angeli Ruiz before the amount required can be
withdrawn and cause the publication of the notice to
creditors with reasonable dispatch.9
Petitioner assailed this order before the Court of Appeals.
Finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent judge, the appellate court dismissed the petition
and sustained the probate courts order in a decision
dated November 10, 199410 and a resolution
dated January 5, 1995.11
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that:
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN AFFIRMING AND CONFIRMING
THE ORDER OF RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF PASIG, BRANCH 156, DATED DECEMBER
22, 1993, WHICH WHEN GIVEN DUE COURSE AND IS
EFFECTED WOULD: (1) DISALLOW THE
EXECUTOR/ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF
THE LATE HILARIO M. RUIZ TO TAKE POSSESSION
OF ALL THE REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTIES OF
THE ESTATE; (2) GRANT SUPPORT, DURING THE
PENDENCY OF THE SETTLEMENT OF AN ESTATE, TO
CERTAIN PERSONS NOT ENTITLED THERETO; AND
(3) PREMATURELY PARTITION AND DISTRIBUTE THE
ESTATE PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE
HOLOGRAPHIC WILL EVEN BEFORE ITS INTRINSIC
VALIDITY HAS BEEN DETERMINED, AND DESPITE
THE EXISTENCE OF UNPAID DEBTS AND
OBLIGATIONS OF THE ESTATE.12
The issue for resolution is whether the probate court,
after admitting the will to probate but before payment of the
estates debts and obligations, has the authority: (1) to grant
an allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of
the testators grandchildren; (2) to order the release of the
titles to certain heirs; and (3) to grant possession of all
properties of the estate to the executor of the will.
 On the matter of allowance, Section 3 of Rule 83 of the
Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. - The widow and
minor or incapacitated children of a deceased person, during
the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom under the
direction of the court, such allowance as are provided by law.
Petitioner alleges that this provision only gives the
widow and the minor or incapacitated children of the
deceased the right to receive allowances for support during
the settlement of estate proceedings. He contends that the
testators three granddaughters do not qualify for an
allowance because they are not incapacitated and are no
longer minors but of legal age, married and gainfully
employed. In addition, the provision expressly states
children of the deceased which excludes the latters
grandchildren.
It is settled that allowances for support under Section 3
of Rule 83 should not be limited to the minor or
incapacitated children of the deceased. Article 188 13 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, the substantive law in force at
the time of the testators death, provides that during the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the deceaseds
legitimate spouse and children, regardless of their age, civil
status or gainful employment, are entitled to provisional
support from the funds of the estate. 14 The law is rooted on
the fact that the right and duty to support, especially the right
to education, subsist even beyond the age of majority.15
Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to
provisional support from the funds of the decedents estate.
The law clearly limits the allowance to widow and children
and does not extend it to the deceaseds grandchildren,
regardless of their minority or incapacity.16 It was error,
therefore, for the appellate court to sustain the probate courts
order granting an allowance to the grandchildren of the
testator pending settlement of his estate.
Respondent courts also erred when they ordered the
release of the titles of the bequeathed properties to private
respondents six months after the date of first publication of
notice to creditors. An order releasing titles to properties of
the estate amounts to an advance distribution of the estate
which is allowed only under the following conditions:
Sec. 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. -
Nothwithstanding a pending controversy or appeal in
proceedings to settle the estate of a decedent, the court may,
in its discretion and upon such terms as it may deem proper
and just, permit that such part of the estate as may not be
affected by the controversy or appeal be distributed among
the heirs or legatees, upon compliance with the conditions
set forth in Rule 90 of these Rules.17
And Rule 90 provides that:
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue made. - When
the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of administration,
the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any,
chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have been
paid, the court, on the application of the executor or
administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after
hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to
the persons entitled to the same, naming them and the
proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, and such
persons may demand and recover their respective shares
from the executor or administrator, or any other person
having the same in his possession. If there is a controversy
before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the
deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which
each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall
be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the
obligations above-mentioned has been made or provided
for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond,
in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the
payment of said obligations within such time as the court
directs.18
In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the
estate properties can only be made: (1) after all the debts,
funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the
widow, and estate tax have been paid; or (2) before payment
of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them
gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon
the payment of said obligations within such time as the court
directs, or when provision is made to meet those
obligations.19
In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release
of the titles to the Valle Verde property and the Blue
Ridge apartments to the private respondents after the lapse of
six months from the date of first publication of the notice to
creditors. The questioned order speaks of notice to creditors,
not payment of debts and obligations. Hilario Ruiz allegedly
left no debts when he died but the taxes on his estate had not
hitherto been paid, much less ascertained. The estate tax is
one of those obligations that must be paid before distribution
of the estate. If not yet paid, the rule requires that the
distributees post a bond or make such provisions as to meet
the said tax obligation in proportion to their respective shares
in the inheritance.20 Notably, at the time the order was issued
the properties of the estate had not yet been inventoried and
appraised.
It was also too early in the day for the probate court to
order the release of the titles six months after admitting the
will to probate. The probate of a will is conclusive as to its
due execution and extrinsic validity21 and settles only the
question of whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely
executed it in accordance with the formalities prescribed by
law.22 Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy of
the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or legacy
may be raised even after the will has been authenticated. 23
The intrinsic validity of Hilarios holographic will was
controverted by petitioner before the probate court in his
Reply to Montes Opposition to his motion for release of
funds24 and his motion for reconsideration of the August 26,
1993 order of the said court.25 Therein, petitioner assailed the
distributive shares of the devisees and legatees inasmuch as
his fathers will included the estate of his mother and
allegedly impaired his legitime as an intestate heir of his
mother. The Rules provide that if there is a controversy as to
who are the lawful heirs of the decedent and their
distributive shares in his estate, the probate court shall
proceed to hear and decide the same as in ordinary cases. 26
Still and all, petitioner cannot correctly claim that the
assailed order deprived him of his right to take possession of
all the real and personal properties of the estate. The right of
an executor or administrator to the possession and
management of the real and personal properties of the
deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised so long as
it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of
administration,27 Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules
of Court explicitly provides:
Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to
pay debts, and to administer estate not willed. - An executor
or administrator shall have the right to the possession and
management of the real as well as the personal estate of the
deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the
debts and expenses for administration.28
When petitioner moved for further release of the funds
deposited with the clerk of court, he had been previously
granted by the probate court certain amounts for repair and
maintenance expenses on the properties of the estate, and
payment of the real estate taxes thereon. But petitioner
moved again for the release of additional funds for the same
reasons he previously cited. It was correct for the probate
court to require him to submit an accounting of the necessary
expenses for administration before releasing any further
money in his favor.
It was relevantly noted by the probate court that
petitioner had deposited with it only a portion of the one-
year rental income from the Valle Verde property. Petitioner
did not deposit its succeeding rents after renewal of the
lease.29 Neither did he render an accounting of such funds.
Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership
over the properties of his father is merely inchoate as long as
the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned. 30 As
executor, he is a mere trustee of his fathers estate. The funds
of the estate in his hands are trust funds and he is held to the
duties and responsibilities of a trustee of the highest
order.31 He cannot unilaterally assign to himself and possess
all his parents properties and the fruits thereof without first
submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real and personal
properties of the deceased, rendering a true account of his
administration, the expenses of administration, the amount of
the obligations and estate tax, all of which are subject to a
determination by the court as to their veracity, propriety and
justness.32

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision and resolution of

the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33045 affirming the
order dated December 22, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 156, Pasig in SP Proc. No. 10259 are affirmed with
the modification that those portions of the order granting an
allowance to the testators grandchildren and ordering the
release of the titles to the private respondents upon notice to
creditors are annulled and set aside.
SECOND DIVISION
Respondent judge is ordered to proceed with dispatch in
the proceedings below. [G.R. No. 149926. February 23, 2005]

SO ORDERED. UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

EDMUND SANTIBAEZ and FLORENCE
SANTIBAEZ ARIOLA, respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

 Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court which seeks the
reversal of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated May
30, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 48831 affirming the
dismissal[2] of the petitioners complaint in Civil Case No.
18909 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 63.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit
Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M. Santibaez entered into a
loan agreement[3] in the amount of P128,000.00. The amount
was intended for the payment of the purchase price of one
(1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor.
In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a
promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum
payable in five equal annual amortizations of P43,745.96
due on May 31, 1981 and every May 31st thereafter up to
May 31, 1985.
On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered
into another loan agreement,[4] this time in the amount
of P123,156.00. It was intended to pay the balance of the
purchase price of another unit of Ford 6600 Agricultural All-
Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories, and one (1) unit
Howard Rotamotor Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim and his
son, Edmund, executed a promissory note for the said
amount in favor of the FCCC. Aside from such promissory
note, they also signed a Continuing Guaranty
Agreement[5] for the loan dated December 13, 1980.
Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a
holographic will.[6] Subsequently in March 1981, testate
proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City,
Branch 7, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 2706. On
April 9, 1981, Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed as
the special administrator of the estate of the decedent.
[7]
During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the
surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence Santibaez
Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement[8] dated July 22, 1981,
wherein they agreed to divide between themselves and take
possession of the three (3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors
for Edmund and one (1) tractor for Florence. Each of them
was to assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC,
corresponding to the tractor respectively taken by them.
On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with
Assumption of Liabilities[9] was executed by and between
FCCC and Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the
FCCC as the assignor, among others, assigned all its assets
and liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank.
Demand letters[10] for the settlement of his account were
sent by petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) to
Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the same and refused to
pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, the petitioner filed a
Complaint[11] for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim
Santibaez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of Makati
City, Branch 150, docketed as Civil Case No. 18909.
Summonses were issued against both, but the one intended
for Edmund was not served since he was in the United States
and there was no information on his address or the date of
his return to the Philippines.[12] Accordingly, the complaint
was narrowed down to respondent Florence S. Ariola.
On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S. Ariola
filed her Answer[13] and alleged that the loan documents did
not bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering
that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother
Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null
and void; hence, she was not liable to the petitioner under
the joint agreement.
On January 29, 1990, the case was unloaded and re-
raffled to the RTC of Makati City, Branch 63.
[14]
Consequently, trial on the merits ensued and a decision
was subsequently rendered by the court dismissing the
complaint for lack of merit. The decretal portion of the RTC
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING
the complaint for lack of merit.[15]
The trial court found that the claim of the petitioner
should have been filed with the probate court before which
the testate estate of the late Efraim Santibaez was pending,
as the sum of money being claimed was an obligation
incurred by the said decedent. The trial court also found that
the Joint Agreement apparently executed by his heirs,
Edmund and Florence, on July 22, 1981, was, in effect, a
partition of the estate of the decedent. However, the said
agreement was void, considering that it had not been
approved by the probate court, and that there can be no valid
partition until after the will has been probated. The trial court
further declared that petitioner failed to prove that it was the
now defunct Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the
FCCC had assigned its assets and liabilities. The court also
agreed to the contention of respondent Florence S. Ariola
that the list of assets and liabilities of the FCCC assigned to
Union Savings and Mortgage Bank did not clearly refer to
the decedents account. Ruling that the joint agreement
executed by the heirs was null and void, the trial court held
that the petitioners cause of action against respondent
Florence S. Ariola must necessarily fail.
The petitioner appealed from the RTC decision and
elevated its case to the Court of Appeals (CA), assigning the
following as errors of the trial court:
 1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THE JOINT AGREEMENT (EXHIBIT
A) SHOULD BE APPROVED BY THE
PROBATE COURT.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING
THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID
PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS UNTIL
AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT
FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD
WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE
CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE
PROCEEDING.[16]
The petitioner asserted before the CA that the obligation
of the deceased had passed to his legitimate children and
heirs, in this case, Edmund and Florence; the unconditional
signing of the joint agreement marked as Exhibit A estopped
respondent Florence S. Ariola, and that she cannot deny her
liability under the said document; as the agreement had been
signed by both heirs in their personal capacity, it was no
longer necessary to present the same before the probate court
for approval; the property partitioned in the agreement was
not one of those enumerated in the holographic will made by
the deceased; and the active participation of the heirs,
particularly respondent Florence S. Ariola, in the present
ordinary civil action was tantamount to a waiver to re-litigate
the claim in the estate proceedings.
On the other hand, respondent Florence S. Ariola
maintained that the money claim of the petitioner should
have been presented before the probate court. [17]
The appellate court found that the appeal was not
meritorious and held that the petitioner should have filed its
claim with the probate court as provided under Sections 1
and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. It further held that the
partition made in the agreement was null and void, since no
valid partition may be had until after the will has been
probated. According to the CA, page 2, paragraph (e) of the
holographic will covered the subject properties (tractors) in
generic terms when the deceased referred to them as all other
properties. Moreover, the active participation of respondent
Florence S. Ariola in the case did not amount to a waiver.
Thus, the CA affirmed the RTC decision, viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.[18]
In the present recourse, the petitioner ascribes the
following errors to the CA:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE JOINT AGREEMENT SHOULD BE
APPROVED BY THE PROBATE COURT.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT
THERE CAN BE NO VALID PARTITION AMONG THE
HEIRS OF THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ UNTIL
AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD WAIVED HER RIGHT
TO HAVE THE CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE
PROCEEDING.
IV.
RESPONDENTS CAN, IN FACT, BE HELD JOINTLY
AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE PRINCIPAL
DEBTOR THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ ON THE
STRENGTH OF THE CONTINUING GUARANTY
AGREEMENT EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER-
APPELLANT UNION BANK.
V.
THE PROMISSORY NOTES DATED MAY 31, 1980 IN
THE SUM OF P128,000.00 AND DECEMBER 13, 1980 IN
THE AMOUNT OF P123,000.00 CATEGORICALLY
ESTABLISHED THE FACT THAT THE RESPONDENTS
BOUND THEMSELVES JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY
LIABLE WITH THE LATE DEBTOR EFRAIM
SANTIBAEZ IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER UNION
BANK.[19]
The petitioner claims that the obligations of the
deceased were transmitted to the heirs as provided in Article
774 of the Civil Code; there was thus no need for the probate
court to approve the joint agreement where the heirs
partitioned the tractors owned by the deceased and assumed
the obligations related thereto. Since respondent Florence S.
Ariola signed the joint agreement without any condition, she
is now estopped from asserting any position contrary thereto.
The petitioner also points out that the holographic will of the
deceased did not include nor mention any of the tractors
subject of the complaint, and, as such was beyond the ambit
of the said will. The active participation and resistance of
respondent Florence S. Ariola in the ordinary civil action
against the petitioners claim amounts to a waiver of the right
to have the claim presented in the probate proceedings, and
to allow any one of the heirs who executed the joint
agreement to escape liability to pay the value of the tractors
under consideration would be equivalent to allowing the said
heirs to enrich themselves to the damage and prejudice of the
petitioner.
 The petitioner, likewise, avers that the decisions of both
the trial and appellate courts failed to consider the fact that
respondent Florence S. Ariola and her brother Edmund
executed loan documents, all establishing the vinculum
juris or the legal bond between the late Efraim Santibaez and
his heirs to be in the nature of a solidary obligation.
Furthermore, the Promissory Notes dated May 31, 1980 and
December 13, 1980 executed by the late Efraim Santibaez,
together with his heirs, Edmund and respondent Florence,
made the obligation solidary as far as the said heirs are
concerned. The petitioner also proffers that, considering the
express provisions of the continuing guaranty agreement and
the promissory notes executed by the named respondents, the
latter must be held liable jointly and severally liable thereon.
Thus, there was no need for the petitioner to file its money
claim before the probate court. Finally, the petitioner stresses
that both surviving heirs are being sued in their respective
personal capacities, not as heirs of the deceased.
In her comment to the petition, respondent Florence S.
Ariola maintains that the petitioner is trying to recover a sum
of money from the deceased Efraim Santibaez; thus the
claim should have been filed with the probate court. She
points out that at the time of the execution of the joint
agreement there was already an existing probate proceedings
of which the petitioner knew about. However, to avoid a
claim in the probate court which might delay payment of the
obligation, the petitioner opted to require them to execute the
said agreement.
According to the respondent, the trial court and the CA
did not err in declaring that the agreement was null and void.
She asserts that even if the agreement was voluntarily
executed by her and her brother Edmund, it should still have
been subjected to the approval of the court as it may
prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties. Furthermore,
she had not waived any rights, as she even stated in her
answer in the court a quo that the claim should be filed with
the probate court. Thus, the petitioner could not invoke or
claim that she is in estoppel.
Respondent Florence S. Ariola further asserts that she
had not signed any continuing guaranty agreement, nor was
there any document presented as evidence to show that she
had caused herself to be bound by the obligation of her late
father.
The petition is bereft of merit.
The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: a)
whether or not the partition in the Agreement executed by
the heirs is valid; b) whether or not the heirs assumption of
the indebtedness of the deceased is valid; and c) whether the
petitioner can hold the heirs liable on the obligation of the
deceased.
At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court
has the jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the
deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be
included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered.[20] The said court is primarily concerned with
the administration, liquidation and distribution of the estate.
[21]
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid
partition among the heirs until after the will has been
probated:
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among
the heirs until after the will has been probated. The law
enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it,
because unless a will is probated and notice thereof given to
the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his
property by will may be rendered nugatory. The
authentication of a will decides no other question than such
as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the compliance
with those requirements or solemnities which the law
prescribes for the validity of a will.[22]
This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be
partitioned are the same properties embraced in the will.
[23]
In the present case, the deceased, Efraim Santibaez, left a
holographic will[24] which contained, inter alia, the provision
which reads as follows:
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and
may be discovered later after my demise, shall be distributed
in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding
paragraph in favor of Edmund and Florence, my children.
We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted
is an all-encompassing provision embracing all the
properties left by the decedent which might have escaped his
mind at that time he was making his will, and other
properties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the
three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any partition
involving the said tractors among the heirs is not valid. The
joint agreement[25] executed by Edmund and Florence,
partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid,
specially so since at the time of its execution, there was
already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late
fathers holographic will covering the said tractors.
It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had
already acquired jurisdiction over all the properties of the
deceased, including the three (3) tractors. To dispose of them
in any way without the probate courts approval is tantamount
to divesting it with jurisdiction which the Court cannot
allow.[26] Every act intended to put an end to indivision
among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a
partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an
exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction. [27] Thus,
in executing any joint agreement which appears to be in the
nature of an extra-judicial partition, as in the case at bar,
court approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest
the court of its jurisdiction over that part of the estate.
Moreover, it is within the jurisdiction of the probate court to
determine the identity of the heirs of the decedent. [28] In the
instant case, there is no showing that the signatories in the
joint agreement were the only heirs of the decedent. When it
was executed, the probate of the will was still pending before
the court and the latter had yet to determine who the heirs of
the decedent were. Thus, for Edmund and respondent
Florence S. Ariola to adjudicate unto themselves the three
(3) tractors was a premature act, and prejudicial to the other
possible heirs and creditors who may have a valid claim
against the estate of the deceased.
The question that now comes to fore is whether the
heirs assumption of the indebtedness of the decedent is
binding. We rule in the negative. Perusing the joint
agreement, it provides that the heirs as parties thereto have
agreed to divide between themselves and take possession
and use the above-described chattel and each of them to
assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel taken
as herein after stated which is in favor of First Countryside
Credit Corp.[29] The assumption of liability was conditioned
upon the happening of an event, that is, that each heir shall
take possession and use of their respective share under the
agreement. It was made dependent on the validity of the
partition, and that they were to assume the indebtedness
corresponding to the chattel that they were each to receive.
The partition being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in
effect did not receive any such tractor. It follows then that
the assumption of liability cannot be given any force and
effect.
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the
decedent. The petitioner, purportedly a creditor of the late
Efraim Santibaez, should have thus filed its money claim
with the probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86
of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If
not filed barred; exceptions. All claims for money against
the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied,
whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims
for funeral expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and
judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed
within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are
barred forever, except that they may be set forth as
counterclaims in any action that the executor or
administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an
executor or administrator commences an action, or
prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased in
his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he
has against the decedent, instead of presenting them
independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual
claims may be set off against each other in such action; and
if final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the
amount so determined shall be considered the true balance
against the estate, as though the claim had been presented
directly before the court in the administration proceedings.
Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their
present value.
 The filing of a money claim against the decedents estate
in the probate court is mandatory.[30] As we held in the
vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:[31]
This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate
of the deceased by informing the executor or administrator
of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each
claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which
should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule
is the speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased and the
early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or
heirs. `The law strictly requires the prompt presentation and
disposition of the claims against the decedent's estate in
order to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible,
pay off its debts and distribute the residue.[32]
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could
hold private respondent Florence S. Ariola accountable for
any liability incurred by her late father. The documentary
evidence presented, particularly the promissory notes and the
continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and signed
only by the late Efraim Santibaez and his son Edmund. As
the petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate
court, at most, it may only go after Edmund as co-maker of
the decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing
guaranty, of course, subject to any defenses Edmund may
have as against the petitioner. As the court had not acquired
jurisdiction over the person of Edmund, we find it
unnecessary to delve into the matter further.
We agree with the finding of the trial court that the
petitioner had not sufficiently shown that it is the successor-
in-interest of the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to
which the FCCC assigned its assets and liabilities. [33] The
petitioner in its complaint alleged that by virtue of the Deed
of Assignment dated August 20, 1981 executed by and
between First Countryside Credit Corporation and Union
Bank of the Philippines[34] However, the documentary
evidence[35] clearly reflects that the parties in the deed of
assignment with assumption of liabilities were the FCCC,
and the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, with the
conformity of Bancom Philippine Holdings, Inc. Nowhere
can the petitioners participation therein as a party be found.
Furthermore, no documentary or testimonial evidence was
presented during trial to show that Union Savings and
Mortgage Bank is now, in fact, petitioner Union Bank of the
Philippines. As the trial court declared in its decision:
[T]he court also finds merit to the contention of defendant
that plaintiff failed to prove or did not present evidence to
prove that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now the
Union Bank of the Philippines. Judicial notice does not
apply here. The power to take judicial notice is to [be]
exercised by the courts with caution; care must be taken that
the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt
upon the subject should be promptly resolved in the
negative. (Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 107 SCRA 504).[36]
 This being the case, the petitioners personality to file
the complaint is wanting. Consequently, it failed to establish
its cause of action. Thus, the trial court did not err in
dismissing the complaint, and the CA in affirming the same.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition

is hereby DENIED. The assailed Court of Appeals Decision
is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 189121 July 31, 2013
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZON, JENNETH QUIAZON
and MARIA JENNIFER QUIAZON, Petitioners,
vs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN, for and in behalf of MARIA
LOURDES ELISE QUIAZON, Respondent.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed pursuant to
Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court, primarily assailing
the 28 November 2008 Decision rendered by the Ninth
Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
88589,1 the decretal portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby
DENIED. The assailed Decision dated March 11, 2005, and
the Order dated March 24, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 275, Las Pias City are AFFIRMED in toto.2
The Facts
This case started as a Petition for Letters of Administration
of the Estate of Eliseo Quiazon (Eliseo), filed by herein
respondents who are Eliseos common-law wife and
daughter. The petition was opposed by herein petitioners
Amelia Garcia-Quaizon (Amelia) to whom Eliseo was
married. Amelia was joined by her children, Jenneth
Quiazon (Jenneth) and Maria Jennifer Quiazon (Jennifer).
Eliseo died intestate on 12 December 1992.
On 12 September 1994, Maria Lourdes Elise Quiazon
(Elise), represented by her mother, Ma. Lourdes Belen
(Lourdes), filed a Petition for Letters of Administration
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Pias City.3 In
her Petition docketed as SP Proc. No. M-3957, Elise claims
that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived
and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated
to marry each other. Insisting on the legal capacity of Eliseo
and Lourdes to marry, Elise impugned the validity of
Eliseos marriage to Amelia by claiming that it was
bigamous for having been contracted during the subsistence
of the latters marriage with one Filipito Sandico (Filipito).
To prove her filiation to the decedent, Elise, among others,
attached to the Petition for Letters of Administration her
Certificate of Live Birth4 signed by Eliseo as her father. In
the same petition, it was alleged that Eliseo left real
properties worth P2,040,000.00 and personal properties
worth P2,100,000.00. In order to preserve the estate of
Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value, Elise
sought her appointment as administratrix of her late fathers
estate.
Claiming that the venue of the petition was improperly laid,
Amelia, together with her children, Jenneth and Jennifer,
opposed the issuance of the letters of administration by filing
an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss.5 The petitioners asserted
that as shown by his Death Certificate, 6 Eliseo was a
resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Pias City, at the
time of his death. Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 73 of the
Revised Rules of Court,7 the petition for settlement of
decedents estate should have been filed in Capas, Tarlac and
not in Las Pias City. In addition to their claim of improper
venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and
legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseos
estate.
In a Decision8 dated 11 March 2005, the RTC directed the
issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting
the necessary bond. The lower court ruled that the venue of
the petition was properly laid in Las Pias City, thereby
discrediting the position taken by the petitioners that Eliseos
last residence was in Capas, Tarlac, as hearsay. The
dispositive of the RTC decision reads:
Having attained legal age at this time and there being no
showing of any disqualification or incompetence to serve as
administrator, let letters of administration over the estate of
the decedent Eliseo Quiazon, therefore, be issued to
petitioner, Ma. Lourdes Elise Quiazon, after the approval by
this Court of a bond in the amount of P100,000.00 to be
posted by her.9
On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto
in the 28 November 2008 Decision10 rendered by the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R.CV No. 88589. In validating the
findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise
was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as
husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No.
26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City,
from 1975 up to the time of Eliseos death in 1992. For
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseos
estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached
by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Pias
City. The petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied
by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution11 dated 7 August
2009.
The Issues
The petitioners now urge Us to reverse the assailed Court of
Appeals Decision and Resolution on the following grounds:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
IN AFFIRMING THAT ELISEO QUIAZON WAS A
RESIDENT OF LAS PIAS AND THEREFORE,
THE PETITION FOR LETTERS OF
ADMINISTRATION WAS PROPERLY FILED
WITH THE RTC OF LAS PIAS;
 II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED
IN DECLARING THAT AMELIA GARCIA-
QUIAZON WAS NOT LEGALLY MARRIED TO
ELISEO QUIAZON DUE TO PREEXISTING
MARRIAGE; AND
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS OVERLOOKED
THE FACT THAT ELISE QUIAZON HAS NOT
SHOWN ANY INTEREST IN THE PETITION
FOR LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION.12
The Courts Ruling
We find the petition bereft of merit.
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition
for letters of administration of the estate of a decedent
should be filed in the RTC of the province where the
decedent resides at the time of his death:
Sec. 1. Where estate of deceased persons settled. If the
decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his
death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved,
or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in
the Court of First Instance now Regional Trial Court in the
province in which he resides at the time of his death, and if
he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First
Instance now Regional Trial Court of any province in which
he had estate. The court first taking cognizance of the
settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the
place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his
estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except
in an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the
want of jurisdiction appears on the record. (Emphasis
supplied).
The term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence"
as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This
term "resides," like the terms "residing" and "residence," is
elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or
purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the
application of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73
of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence
rather than domicile is the significant factor.13 Even where
the statute uses word "domicile" still it is construed as
meaning residence and not domicile in the technical
sense.14 Some cases make a distinction between the terms
"residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes
fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the
same meaning as the term "inhabitant."15 In other words,
"resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular
sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of
a person, actual residence or place of abode. 16 It signifies
physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. 17 Venue
for ordinary civil actions and that for special proceedings
have one and the same meaning.18 As thus defined,
"residence," in the context of venue provisions, means
nothing more than a persons actual residence or place of
abode, provided he resides therein with continuity and
consistency.19
Viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the Court of
Appeals cannot be faulted for affirming the ruling of the
RTC that the venue for the settlement of the estate of Eliseo
was properly laid in Las Pias City. It is evident from the
records that during his lifetime, Eliseo resided at No. 26
Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City. For
this reason, the venue for the settlement of his estate may be
laid in the said city.
In opposing the issuance of letters of administration, the
petitioners harp on the entry in Eliseos Death Certificate
that he is a resident of Capas, Tarlac where they insist his
estate should be settled. While the recitals in death
certificates can be considered proofs of a decedents
residence at the time of his death, the contents thereof,
however, is not binding on the courts. Both the RTC and the
Court of Appeals found that Eliseo had been living with
Lourdes, deporting themselves as husband and wife, from
1972 up to the time of his death in 1995. This finding is
consistent with the fact that in 1985, Eliseo filed an action
for judicial partition of properties against Amelia before the
RTC of Quezon City, Branch 106, on the ground that their
marriage is void for being bigamous.20 That Eliseo went to
the extent of taking his marital feud with Amelia before the
courts of law renders untenable petitioners position that
Eliseo spent the final days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia
and her children. It disproves rather than supports
petitioners submission that the lower courts findings arose
from an erroneous appreciation of the evidence on record.
Factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the
appellate court, must be held to be conclusive and binding
upon this Court.21
Likewise unmeritorious is petitioners contention that the
Court of Appeals erred in declaring Amelias marriage to
Eliseo as void ab initio. In a void marriage, it was though no
marriage has taken place, thus, it cannot be the source of
rights. Any interested party may attack the marriage directly
or collaterally. A void marriage can be questioned even
beyond the lifetime of the parties to the marriage. 22 It must
be pointed out that at the time of the celebration of the
marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, the law in effect was the
Civil Code, and not the Family Code, making the ruling in
Nial v. Bayadog23 applicable four-square to the case at
hand. In Nial, the Court, in no uncertain terms, allowed
therein petitioners to file a petition for the declaration of
nullity of their fathers marriage to therein respondent after
the death of their father, by contradistinguishing void from
voidable marriages, to wit:
Consequently, void marriages can be questioned even after
the death of either party but voidable marriages can be
assailed only during the lifetime of the parties and not after
death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring
will be left as if the marriage had been perfectly valid. That
is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible,
unlike voidable marriages where the action prescribes. Only
the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper
interested party may attack a void marriage. 24
It was emphasized in Nial that in a void marriage, no
marriage has taken place and it cannot be the source of
rights, such that any interested party may attack the marriage
directly or collaterally without prescription, which may be
filed even beyond the lifetime of the parties to the
marriage.25
Relevant to the foregoing, there is no doubt that Elise, whose
successional rights would be prejudiced by her fathers
marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such
marriage even after the death of her father. The said marriage
may be questioned directly by filing an action attacking the
validity thereof, or collaterally by raising it as an issue in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased
spouse, such as in the case at bar. Ineluctably, Elise, as a
compulsory heir,26 has a cause of action for the declaration of
the absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and
Amelia, and the death of either party to the said marriage
does not extinguish such cause of action.
Having established the right of Elise to impugn Eliseos
marriage to Amelia, we now proceed to determine whether
or not the decedents marriage to Amelia is void for being
bigamous.
Contrary to the position taken by the petitioners, the
existence of a previous marriage between Amelia and
Filipito was sufficiently established by no less than the
Certificate of Marriage issued by the Diocese of Tarlac and
signed by the officiating priest of the Parish of San Nicolas
de Tolentino in Capas, Tarlac. The said marriage certificate
is a competent evidence of marriage and the certification
from the National Archive that no information relative to the
said marriage exists does not diminish the probative value of
the entries therein. We take judicial notice of the fact that the
first marriage was celebrated more than 50 years ago, thus,
the possibility that a record of marriage can no longer be
found in the National Archive, given the interval of time, is
not completely remote. Consequently, in the absence of any
showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the time
Amelia and Eliseos marriage was solemnized, the
inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is
bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.27
Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners
contention that Elise has not shown any interest in the
Petition for Letters of Administration.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down
the preferred persons who are entitled to the issuance of
letters of administration, thus:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.
If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or
executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give
bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be
granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case
may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of
the court, or to such person as such surviving
husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case
may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by
them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband
or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days
after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that administration be
granted to some other person, it may be granted to
one or more of the principal creditors, if competent
and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing
to serve, it may be granted to such other person as
the court may select.
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a
petition for Letters of Administration must be filed by an
interested person, thus:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A
petition for letters of administration must be filed by an
interested person and must show, so far as known to the
petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and
the names and residences of the creditors, of the
decedent;
(c) The probable value and character of the property
of the estate;
(d) The name of the person for whom letters of
administration are prayed.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of
letters of administration.
An "interested party," in estate proceedings, is one who
would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who
has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in
estate proceedings, the phrase "next of kin" refers to those
whose relationship with the decedent Is such that they are
entitled to share in the estate as distributees. 28
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to
be benefited by the distribution of Eliseos estate, is deemed
to be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on
record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the
petitioners pounding on her lack of interest in the
administration of the decedents estate, is just a desperate
attempt to sway this Court to reverse the findings of the
Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be
appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good
grounds. It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir,
who, under the law, is entitled to her legitimate after the
debts of the estate are satisfied. 29Having a vested right in the
distribution of Eliseos estate as one of his natural children,
Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party
within the purview of the law. THIRD DIVISION

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is

DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Court of
Appeals assailed 28 November 2008 Decision and 7 August
2009 Resolution, arc AFFIRMED in toto.
G.R. No. 150175
SO ORDERED. ERLINDA PILAPIL and HEIRS OF
DONATA ORTIZ BRIONES, namely:
ESTELA, ERIBERTO AND VIRGILIO
SANTOS, ANA SANTOS CULTURA,
ELVIRA SANTOS INOCENTES, ERNESTO Present:
MENDOZA, RIZALINA SANTOS, ADOLFO
MENDOZA and PACITA MENDOZA,

Petitioners, YNARES-SANTIAGO

Chairperson,
- versus-
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
CALLEJO, SR., and
HEIRS OF MAXIMINO R. BRIONES, CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
namely: SILVERIO S. BRIONES, PETRA Complaint for partition, annulment, and
BRIONES, BONIFACIO CABAHUG, JR., recovery of possession filed by the heirs
ANITA TRASMONTE, CIRILITA of Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-5794 is
FORTUNA, CRESENCIA BRIONES, hereby DISMISSED.
FUGURACION MEDALLE and
MERCEDES LAGBAS,
Respondents. On 10 May 2006, a Motion for Reconsideration[3] of the
foregoing Decision was filed by Atty. Celso C. Reales of
the Reales Law Office on behalf of the respondents, heirs
Promulgated: of Maximino R. Briones. On 19 May 2006,
petitioners Erlinda Pilapil and the other co-heirs
of Donata Ortiz Vda. de Briones, through counsel, filed an
Opposition to Respondents Motion for Reconsideration, [4] to
February 5, 2007
which the respondents filed a Rejoinder [5] on 23 May
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
2006. Thereafter, Atty. Amador F. Brioso, Jr. of the
- - - - - - - - - -x Canto Brioso Arnedo Law Office entered his appearance as
collaborating counsel for the respondents.[6] Atty. Brioso then
filed on 11 June 2006 and 16 June 2006, respectively, a
Reply[7] and Supplemental Reply[8] to the petitioners
Opposition to respondents Motion for
RESOLUTION
Reconsideration. Finally, petitioners filed a Rejoinder [9] to
the respondents Reply and Supplemental Reply on 5 July
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
2006.
On 10 March 2006, this Court promulgated its
[1]
Decision in the above-entitled case, ruling in favor of the
The facts of the case, as recounted in the Decision, [10] are as
petitioners. The dispositive portion[2] reads as follows:
follows
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING,
Petitioners are the heirs of the
the assailed Decision of the Court of
late Donata Ortiz-Briones (Donata),
Appeals in CA-GR CV No. 55194, dated 31
consisting of her surviving
August 2001, affirming the Decision of
sister, Rizalina Ortiz-Aguila (Rizalina); Riza
the Cebu City RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-
linas daughter, Erlinda Pilapil (Erlinda); and
5794, dated 28 September 1986, is hereby
the other nephews and nieces of Donata, in
REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and the
representation of her two other sisters who
had also passed away. Respondents, on the Register of Deeds, and by virtue thereof,
other hand, are the heirs of the received new TCTs, covering the said
late Maximino Briones (Maximino), properties, now in her name.
composed of his nephews and nieces, and
grandnephews and grandnieces, in Donata died on 1 November
representation of the deceased siblings 1977. Erlinda, one of Donatas nieces,
of Maximino. instituted with the RTC a petition for the
administration of the intestate estate
xxxx of Donata. Erlinda and her husband,
Gregorio, were appointed by the RTC as
Maximino was married administrators of Donatas intestate
to Donata but their union did not produce estate. Controversy arose
any children. When Maximino died on 1 among Donatas heirs when Erlinda claimed
May 1952, Donata instituted intestate exclusive ownership of three parcels of land,
proceedings to settle her husbands estate covered by TCTs No. 21542, 21545, and
with the CebuCity Court of First Instance 58684, based on two Deeds of Donation,
(CFI), 14th Judicial District, designated as both dated 15 September 1977, allegedly
Special Proceedings No. 928-R. On 8 July executed in her favor by her
1952, the CFI issued Letters of aunt Donata. The other heirs
Administration appointing Donata as of Donata opposed Erlindas claim. This
the administratrix of Maximinos estate. She Court, however, was no longer informed of
submitted an Inventory the subsequent development in the intestate
of Maximinos properties, which included, proceedings of the estate of Donata; and as
among other things, the following parcels of far as this Petition is concerned, all the heirs
land x x x. of Donata, including Erlinda, appear to be
on the same side.
xxxx
On 21 January
The CFI would subsequently issue 1985, Silverio Briones (Silverio), a nephew
an Order, dated 2 October 1952, awarding of Maximino, filed a Petition with the RTC
ownership of the aforementioned real for Letters of Administration for the
properties to Donata. On 27 June intestate estate of Maximino, which was
1960, Donata had the said CFI Order initially granted by the RTC. The RTC also
recorded in the Primary Entry Book of the issued an Order, dated 5 December 1985,
allowing Silverio to collect rentals
from Maximinos properties. But then,
Gregorio filed with the RTC a Motion to Set
Aside the Order, dated 5 December 1985,
claiming that the said properties were
already under his and his wifes
administration as part of the intestate estate
of Donata. Silverios Letters of
Administration for the intestate estate
of Maximino was subsequently set aside by
the RTC.
On 3 March 1987, the heirs
of Maximino filed a Complaint with the
RTC against the heirs of Donata for the
partition, annulment, and recovery of
possession of real property, docketed as
Civil Case No. CEB-5794. They later filed
an Amended Complaint, on 11 December
1992. They alleged that Donata,
as administratrix of the estate of Maximino,
through fraud and misrepresentation, in
breach of trust, and without the knowledge
of the other heirs, succeeded in registering in
her name the real properties belonging to the
intestate estate of Maximino.
xxxx
After trial in due course, the RTC
rendered its Decision, dated 8 April 1986, in
favor of the heirs of Maximino x x x.
xxxx
x x x[T]he RTC declared that the heirs
of Maximino were entitled to of the real
properties covered by TCTs No. 21542,
21543, 21544, 21545, 21546, and 58684. It
also ordered Erlinda to reconvey to the heirs
of Maximino the said properties and to
render an accounting of the fruits thereof.
The heirs of Donata appealed the
RTC Decision, dated 8 April 1986, to the
Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in
its Decision, promulgated on 31 August
2001, affirmed the RTC Decision, x x x.
xxxx
Unsatisfied with the afore-quoted
Decision of the Court of Appeals, the heirs
of Donata filed the present Petition, x x x.
In its Decision, dated 10 March 2006, this
Court found the Petition meritorious and,
reversing the Decisions of the Court of Appeals
and the Regional Trial Court (RTC), dismissed the
Complaint for partition, annulment, and
recovery of possession of real property filed by
the heirs of Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-
5794. This Court summed up its findings,[11] thus
 In summary, the heirs
of Maximino failed to prove by
clear and convincing evidence
that Donata managed, through
fraud, to have the real properties,
belonging to the intestate estate
of Maximino, registered in her
name. In the absence of fraud, no
implied trust was established
between Donata and the heirs
of Maximino under Article 1456 of
the New Civil Code. Donata was
able to register the real properties
in her name, not through fraud or
mistake, but pursuant to an Order,
dated 2 October 1952, issued by
the CFI in Special Proceedings No.
928-R. The CFI Order, presumed to
be fairly and regularly issued,
declared Donata as the sole,
absolute, and exclusive heir
of Maximino; hence,
making Donata the singular owner
of the entire estate of Maximino,
including the real properties, and
not merely a co-owner with the
other heirs of her deceased
husband. There being no basis for
the Complaint of the heirs
of Maximino in Civil Case No. CEB-
5794, the same should have been
dismissed.
Respondents move for the
reconsideration of the Decision of this Court
raising still the arguments
that Donata committed fraud in securing the
Court of First Instance Order, dated 2 October
1952, which declared her as the sole heir of her
deceased husband Maximino and authorized her
to have Maximinos properties registered
exclusively in her name; that respondents right
to succession to the disputed properties was
transmitted or vested from the moment
of Maximinos death and which they could no
longer be deprived of; that Donata merely
possessed and held the properties in trust for
her co-heirs/owners; and that, by virtue of this
Courts ruling in Quion v. Claridad[12] and Sevilla,
et al. v. De Los Angeles,[13] respondents action to
recover title to and possession of their shares
in Maximinos estate, held in trust for their
benefit by Donata, and eventually, by
petitioners as the latters successors-in-interest,
is imprescriptible. Respondents also advance a
fresh contention that the CFI Order, dated 2
October 1952, being based on the fraudulent
misrepresentation of Donata that she
was Maximinos sole heir, was a void order,
which produced no legal effect. Lastly,
respondents asseverate that, by relying on
certain procedural presumptions in its Decision,
dated 10 March 2006, this Court has sacrificed
their substantive right to succession, thus,
making justice subservient to the dictates of
mere procedural fiats.[14]
While this Court is persuaded to reexamine and
clarify some points in its previous Decision in this case, it
does not find any new evidence or argument that would
adequately justify a change in its previous position.
On the finding of fraud
As this Court declared in its Decision, the existence of any
trust relations between petitioners and respondents shall be
examined in the light of Article 1456 of the New Civil Code,
which provides that, [i]f property is acquired through
mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law,
considered a trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the
person from whom the property comes. Hence, the foremost
question to be answered is still whether an implied trust
under Article 1456 of the New Civil Code had been
sufficiently established in the present case.
In the Decision, this Court ruled in the negative, since there
was insufficient evidence to establish that Donata committed
fraud. It should be remembered that Donata was able to
secure certificates of title to the disputed properties by virtue
of the CFI Order in Special Proceedings No. 928-R (the
proceedings she instituted to settle Maximinos intestate
estate), which declared her as Maximinos sole heir. In the
absence of proof to the contrary, the Court accorded to
Special Proceedings No. 928-R the presumptions of
regularity and validity. Reproduced below are the relevant
portions[15] of the Decision
At the onset, it should be emphasized
that Donata was able to secure
the TCTs covering the real properties
belonging to the estate of Maximino by
virtue of a CFI Order, dated 2 October
1952. It is undisputed that the said CFI
Order was issued by the CFI in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R, instituted
by Donata herself, to settle the intestate
estate of Maximino. The petitioners, heirs
of Donata, were unable to present a copy of
the CFI Order, but this is not surprising
considering that it was issued 35 years prior
to the filing by the heirs of Maximino of
their Complaint in Civil Case No. CEB-
5794 on 3 March 1987. The existence of
such CFI Order, nonetheless, cannot be
denied. It was recorded in the Primary Entry
Book of the Register of Deeds on 27 June
1960, at 1:10 p.m., as Entry No. 1714. It was
annotated on the TCTs covering the real
properties as having declared Donata the
sole, absolute, and exclusive heir
of Maximino. The non-presentation of the
actual CFI Order was not fatal to the cause
of the heirs of Donata considering that its
authenticity and contents were never
questioned. The allegation of fraud by the
heirs of Maximino did not pertain to the CFI
Order, but to the manner or procedure by
which it was issued in favor
of Donata.Moreover, the non-presentation of
the CFI Order, contrary to the declaration by
the RTC, does not amount to a willful
suppression of evidence that would give rise
to the presumption that it would be adverse
to the heirs of Donata if produced. x x x.
xxxx
The CFI Order, dated 2 October
1952, issued in Special Proceedings No.
928-R, effectively settled the intestate estate
of Maximino by declaring Donata as the
sole, absolute, and exclusive heir of her
deceased husband. The issuance by the CFI
of the said Order, as well as its conduct of
the entire Special Proceedings No. 928-R,
enjoy the presumption of validity pursuant
to the Section 3(m) and (n) of Rule 131 of
the Revised Rules of Court, reproduced
below
SEC. 3. Disputable
presumptions. The
following presumptions are
satisfactory
if uncontradicted, but may
be contradicted and
overcome by other
evidence:
xxxx

(m) That official
duty has been regularly
performed;
(n) That a court, or
judge acting as such,
whether in
the Philippines or
elsewhere, was acting in the
lawful exercise of
jurisdiction.
By reason of the foregoing
provisions, this Court must presume, in the
absence of any clear and convincing proof to
the contrary, that the CFI in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R had jurisdiction of
the subject matter and the parties, and to
have rendered a judgment valid in every
respect; and it could not give credence to the
following statements made by the Court of
Appeals in its Decision.
xxxx
There was totally no evidentiary basis for
the foregoing pronouncements. First of all,
the Petition filed by Donata for Letters of
Administration in Special Proceedings No.
928-R before the CFI was not even referred
to nor presented during the course of the
trial of Civil Case No. CEB-5794 before the
RTC. How then could the Court of Appeals
make a finding that Donata willfully
excluded from the said Petition the names,
ages, and residences of the other heirs
of Maximino? Second, there was also no
evidence showing that the CFI actually
failed to send notices of Special Proceedings
No. 928-R to the heirs of Maximino or that
it did not require presentation of proof of
service of such notices. It should be
remembered that there stands a presumption
that the CFI Judge had regularly performed
his duties in Special Proceedings No. 928-R,
which included sending out of notices and
requiring the presentation of proof of service
of such notices; and, the heirs
of Maximino did not propound sufficient
evidence to debunk such presumption. They
only made a general denial of knowledge of
Special Proceedings No. 928-R, at least until
1985. There was no testimony or document
presented in which the heirs
 of Maximino categorically denied receipt of
notice from the CFI of the pendency of
Special Proceedings No. 928-R. The only
evidence on record in reference to the
absence of notice of such proceedings was
the testimony of Aurelia Briones (Aurelia),
one of the heirs of Maximino, x x x.
xxxx
Aurelias testimony deserves scant credit
considering that she was not testifying on
matters within her personal knowledge. The
phrase I dont think is a clear indication that
she is merely voicing out her opinion on
how she believed her uncles and aunts
would have acted had they received notice
of Special Proceedings No. 928-R.
It is worth noting that, in its foregoing ratiocination,
the Court was proceeding from an evaluation of the evidence
on record, which did not include an actual copy of the CFI
Order in Special Proceedings No. 928-R. Respondents only
submitted a certified true copy thereof on 15 June 2006,
annexed to their Supplemental Reply to petitioners
opposition to their motion for reconsideration of this Courts
Decision.Respondents did not offer any explanation as to
why they belatedly produced a copy of the said Order, but
merely claimed to have been fortunate enough to obtain a
copy thereof from the Register of Deeds of Cebu.[16]
Respondents should be taken to task for
springing new evidence so late into the
proceedings of this case. Parties should present
all their available evidence at the courts below
so as to give the opposing party the opportunity
to scrutinize and challenge such evidence
during the course of the trial. However, given
that the existence of the CFI Order in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R was never in issue and
was, in fact, admitted by the petitioners; that
the copy submitted is a certified true copy of
the said Order; and that the said Order may
provide new information vital to a just resolution
of the present case, this Court is compelled to
consider the same as part of the evidence on
record.
The CFI Order[17] in question reads in full as
ORDER
This is with reference to the Motion
of the Administratrix, dated January 5, 1960,
that she be declared the sole heir of her
deceased husband, Maximino Suico Briones,
the latter having died without any legitimate
 ascendant nor descendant, nor any legitimate
brother or sister, nephews or nieces.
At the hearing of this incident today,
nobody appeared to resist the motion, and
based on the uncontradicted testimony
of Donata G. Ortiz that she was the nearest
surviving relative of the
deceased Maximino Suico Brionesat the
time of the latters death, and pursuant to the
pertinent provisions of the new Civil Code
of the Philippines, the Court hereby
declares the aforesaid Donata G. Ortiz the
sole, absolute and exclusive heir of the
estate of the
deceased Maximino Suico Briones, and she
is hereby entitled to inherit all the residue of
this estate after paying all the obligations
thereof, which properties are those contained
in the Inventory, dated October 2, 1952.
Cebu City, January 15, 1960.
From the contents of the afore-quoted Order, this
Court is able to deduce that the CFI Order was in fact issued
on 15 January 1960 and not 2 October 1952, as earlier stated
in the Decision. It was the inventory of properties, submitted
by Donata as administratrix of Maximinos intestate estate,
which was dated 2 October 1952.[18] Other than such
observation, this Court finds nothing in the CFI Order which
could change its original position in the Decision under
consideration.
While it is true that since the CFI was not informed
that Maximino still had surviving siblings and so the court
was not able to order that these siblings be given personal
notices of the intestate proceedings, it should be borne in
mind that the settlement of estate, whether testate or
intestate, is a proceeding in rem,[19] and that the publication
in the newspapers of the filing of the application and of the
date set for the hearing of the same, in the manner prescribed
by law, is a notice to the whole world of the existence of the
proceedings and of the hearing on the date and time
indicated in the publication. The publication requirement of
the notice in newspapers is precisely for the purpose of
informing all interested parties in the estate of the deceased
of the existence of the settlement proceedings, most
especially those who were not named as heirs or creditors in
the petition, regardless of whether such omission was
voluntarily or involuntarily made.
This Court cannot stress enough that the CFI Order
was the result of the intestate proceedings instituted
by Donata before the trial court. As this Court pointed out in
its earlier Decision, the manner by which the CFI judge
conducted the proceedings enjoys the presumption of
regularity, and encompassed in such presumption is the order
of publication of the notice of the intestate proceedings. A
review of the records fails to show any allegation or concrete
proof that the CFI also failed to order the publication in
newspapers of the notice of the intestate proceedings and to
require proof from Donata of compliance therewith. Neither
can this Court find any reason or explanation as to
why Maximinos siblings could have missed the published
notice of the intestate proceedings of their brother.
 In relying on the presumptions of the regular
performance of official duty and lawful exercise of
jurisdiction by the CFI in rendering the questioned Order,
dated 15 January 1960, this Court is not, as counsel for
respondents allege, sacrificing the substantive right of
respondents to their share in the inheritance in favor of mere
procedural fiats. There is a rationale for the establishment of
rules of procedure, as amply explained by this Court
in De Dios v. Court of Appeals[20]
Procedural rules are designed to
insure the orderly and expeditious
administration of justice by providing for a
practical system by which the parties to a
litigation may be accorded a full and fair
opportunity to present their respective
positions and refute each other's submissions
under the prescribed requirements,
conditions and limitations. Adjective law is
not the counterfoil of substantive law. In
fact, there is a symbiotic relationship
between them. By complying faithfully with
the Rules of Court, the bench and the bar are
better able to discuss, analyze and
understand substantive rights and duties and
consequently to more effectively protect and
enforce them. The other alternative is
judicial anarchy.
Thus, compliance with the procedural rules is the general
rule, and abandonment thereof should only be done in the
most exceptional circumstances. The presumptions relied
upon by this Court in the instant case are disputable
presumptions, which are satisfactory, unless contradicted or
overcome by evidence. This Court finds that the evidence
presented by respondents failed to overcome the given
presumptions.
Although Donata may have alleged before
the CFI that she was her husbands sole heir, it
was not established that she did so knowingly,
maliciously and in bad faith, so as for this Court
to conclude that she indeed committed
fraud. This Court again brings to the fore the
delay by which respondents filed the present
case, when the principal actors involved,
particularly, Donata and Maximinos siblings,
have already passed away and their lips forever
sealed as to what truly transpired between
them. On the other hand, Special Proceedings
No. 928-R took place when all these principal
actors were still alive and each would have been
capable to act to protect his or her own right
to Maximinos estate. Letters of Administration
of Maximinos estate were issued in favor
of Donata as early as 8 July 1952, and the CFI
Order in question was issued only on 15 January
1960. The intestate proceedings for the
settlement of Maximinos estate were thus
pending for almost eight years, and it is the
burden of the respondents to establish that their
parents or grandparents, Maximinos surviving
siblings, had absolutely no knowledge of the
said proceedings all these years. As established
in Ramos v. Ramos ,[21] the degree of proof to
establish fraud in a case where the principal
actors to the transaction have already passed
away is proof beyond reasonable doubt, to wit
"x x x But length of time
necessarily obscures all human evidence;
and as it thus removes from the parties all
the immediate means to verify the nature
of the original transactions, it operates by
way of presumption, in favor of innocence,
and against imputation of fraud. It would
be unreasonable, after a great length of time,
to require exact proof of all the minute
circumstances of any transaction, or to
expect a satisfactory explanation of every
difficulty, real or apparent, with which it
may be encumbered. The most that can
fairly be expected, in such cases, if the
parties are living, from the frailty of
memory, and human infirmity, is, that the
material facts can be given with certainty to
a common intent; and, if the parties are
dead, and the cases rest in confidence, and
in parol agreements, the most that we can
hope is to arrive at probable conjectures, and
to substitute general presumptions of law,
for exact knowledge. Fraud, or breach of
trust, ought not lightly to be imputed to the
living; for, the legal presumption is the
other way; as to the dead, who are not here
to answer for themselves, it would be the
height of injustice and cruelty, to disturb
their ashes, and violate the sanctity of the
grave, unless the evidence of fraud be
clear, beyond a reasonable
doubt (Prevost vs. Gratz, 6 Wheat. [U.S.],
481, 498).
Moreover, even if Donatas allegation that
she was Maximinos sole heir does constitute
fraud, it is insufficient to justify abandonment of
the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960,
[22]
considering the nature of intestate
proceedings as being in rem and the disputable
presumptions of the regular performance of
official duty and lawful exercise of jurisdiction by
the CFI in rendering the questioned Order, dated
15 January 1960, in Special Proceedings No.
928-R.
On prescription of the right to recover
based on implied trust
Assuming, for the sake of argument,
that Donatas misrepresentation constitutes fraud that would
impose upon her the implied trust provided in Article 1456
of the Civil Code, this Court still cannot sustain respondents
contention that their right to recover their shares
in Maximinos estate is imprescriptible. It is already settled in
jurisprudence that an implied trust, as opposed to an express
trust, is subject to prescription and laches.
The case of Ramos v. Ramos[23] already provides an
elucidating discourse on the matter, to wit
"Trusts are either express or
implied. Express trusts are created by the
intention of the trustor or of the parties.
Implied trusts come into being by operation
of law" (Art. 1441, Civil Code). "No express
trusts concerning an immovable or any
interest therein may be proven by oral
evidence. An implied trust may be proven by
oral evidence" (Ibid; Arts. 1443 and 1457).
"No particular words are required
for the creation of an express trust, it being
sufficient that a trust is clearly intended"
(Ibid; Art. 1444; Tuason de Perez
vs. Caluag, 96 Phil. 981; Julio vs. Dalandan,
L-19012, October 30, 1967, 21 SCRA 543,
546). "Express trusts are those which are
created by the direct and positive acts of the
parties, by some writing or deed, or will, or
by words either expressly or impliedly
evincing an intention to create a trust" (89
C.J. S. 122).
"Implied trusts are those which,
without being expressed, are deducible from
the nature of the transaction as matters of
intent, or which are superinduced on the
transaction by operation of law as matters
of equity, independently of the particular
intention of the parties" (89 C.J.S. 724).
They are ordinarily subdivided into resulting
and constructive trusts (89 C.J.S. 722).
"A resulting trust is broadly defined
as a trust which is raised or created by the
act or construction of law, but in its more
restricted sense it is a trust raised
by implication of law and presumed always
to have been contemplated by the parties,
the intention as to which is to be found in
the nature of their transaction, but not
expressed in the deed or instrument of
conveyance" (89 C.J.S. 725). Examples of
resulting trusts are found in Article 1448 to
1455 of the Civil Code. See Padilla vs.
Court of Appeals, L-31569, September 28,
1973, 53 SCRA 168, 179).
On the other hand, a constructive
trust is a trust "raised by construction of law,
or arising by operation of law." In a more
restricted sense and as contradistinguished
from a resulting trust, a constructive trust is
"a trust not created by any words, either
expressly or impliedly evincing a direct
intention to create a trust, but by the
construction of equity in order to satisfy the
demands of justice. It does not arise by
agreement or intention but by operation of
law." (89 C.J.S. 726-727). "If a person
obtains legal title to property by fraud or
concealment, courts of equity will impress
upon the title a so-called constructive trust
in favor of the defrauded party." A
constructive trust is not a trust in the
technical sense (Gayondato vs. Treasurer of
the P.I., 49 Phil. 244; See Art. 1456, Civil
Code).
There is a rule that a trustee cannot
acquire by prescription the ownership of
property entrusted to him (Palma
vs. Cristobal, 77 Phil. 712), or that an action
to compel a trustee to convey property
registered in his name in trust for the benefit
of the cestui qui trust does not prescribe
(Manalang vs. Canlas, 94 Phil.
776; Cristobal vs. Gomez, 50 Phil. 810), or
that the defense of prescription cannot be set
up in an action to recover property held by a
person in trust for the benefit of another
(Sevilla vs. De los Angeles, 97 Phil. 875), or
that property held in trust can be recovered
by the beneficiary regardless of the lapse of
time (Marabilles vs. Quito, 100 Phil.
64; Bancairen vs. Diones, 98 Phil. 122,
126; Juan vs. Zuiga, 62 O.G. 1351; 4 SCRA
1221; Jacinto vs. Jacinto, L-17957, May 31,
1962. See Tamayo vs. Callejo, 147 Phil. 31,
37).
That rule applies squarely to express
trusts. The basis of the rule is that the
possession of a trustee is not adverse. Not
being adverse, he does not acquire by
prescription the property held in trust. Thus,
Section 38 of Act 190 provides that the law
of prescription does not apply "in the case of
a continuing and subsisting trust" (Diaz
vs. Gorricho and Aguado, 103 Phil. 261,
266; Laguna vs. Levantino, 71 Phil.
566; Sumira vs. Vistan, 74 Phil.
138; Golfeo vs. Court of Appeals, 63 O.G.
4895, 12 SCRA 199; Caladiao vs. Santos,
63 O.G. 1956, 10 SCRA 691).
The rule of imprescriptibility of the
action to recover property held in trust may
possibly apply to resulting trusts as long as
the trustee has not repudiated the trust
(Heirs of Candelaria vs. Romero, 109 Phil.
500, 502-3; Martinez vs. Grao, 42 Phil.
35; Buencamino vs. Matias, 63 O. G. 11033,
16 SCRA 849).
The rule of imprescriptibility was
misapplied to constructive trusts (Geronimo
and Isidoro vs. Nava and Aquino, 105 Phil.
145, 153. Compare with Cuison vs.
Fernandez and Bengzon, 105 Phil. 135,
139; De Pasion vs. De Pasion, 112 Phil.
403, 407).
Acquisitive prescription may bar the
action of the beneficiary against the trustee
in an express trust for the recovery of the
property held in trust where (a) the trustee
has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of
the cestui qui trust; (b) such positive acts of
repudiation have been made known to
the cestui qui trust and (c) the evidence
thereon is clear and conclusive (Laguna
vs. Levantino, supra; Salinas vs. Tuason, 55
Phil. 729. Compare with the rule regarding
co-owners found in the last paragraph of
Article 494, Civil Code; Casaas vs. Rosello,
50 Phil. 97; Gerona vs. De Guzman, L-
19060, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 153, 157).
With respect to constructive trusts,
the rule is different. The prescriptibility of
an action for reconveyance based on
constructive trust is now
settled (Alzona vs. Capunitan, L-10228,
February 28, 1962, 4 SCRA 450; Gerona vs.
De Guzman, supra; Claridad vs. Henares, 97
Phil. 973; Gonzales vs. Jimenez, L-19073,
January 30, 1965, 13 SCRA
80; Boaga vs. Soler, 112 Phil. 651; J.
M. Tuason & Co., vs. Magdangal, L-15539,
January 30, 1962, 4 SCRA 84). Prescription
may supervene in an implied
trust (Bueno vs. Reyes, L-22587, April 28,
1969, 27 SCRA 1179; Fabian vs. Fabian, L-
20449, January 29, 1968; Jacinto vs.
Jacinto, L-17957, May 31, 1962, 5 SCRA
371).
And whether the trust is resulting
or constructive, its enforcement may be
barred by laches (90 C.J.S. 887-889; 54
Am Jur. 449-450; Diaz
vs. Gorricho and Aguado, supra; Compare
with Mejia vs. Gampona, 100 Phil. 277).
[Emphases supplied.]
A present reading of
the Quion[24] and Sevilla[25] cases, invoked by respondents,
must be made in conjunction with and guided accordingly by
the principles established in the afore-quoted case. Thus,
while respondents right to inheritance was transferred or
vested upon them at the time of Maximinos death, their
enforcement of said right by appropriate legal action may be
barred by the prescription of the action.
Prescription of the action for reconveyance of the
disputed properties based on implied trust is governed by
Article 1144 of the New Civil Code, which reads
ART. 1144. The following actions
must be brought within ten years from the
time the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by
law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
Since an implied trust is an obligation created by law
(specifically, in this case, by Article 1456 of the New Civil
Code), then respondents had 10 years within which to bring
an action for reconveyance of their shares
in Maximinos properties. The next question now is when
should the ten-year prescriptive period be reckoned
from. The general rule is that an action for reconveyance of
real property based on implied trust prescribes ten years
from registration and/or issuance of the title to the property,
[26]
not only because registration under the Torrens system is
a constructive notice of title, [27] but also because by
registering the disputed properties exclusively in her name,
Donata had already unequivocally repudiated any other
claim to the same.
By virtue of the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960,
in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, Donata was able to
register and secure certificates of title over the disputed
properties in her name on 27 June 1960.The respondents
filed with the RTC their Complaint for partition, annulment,
and recovery of possession of the disputed real properties,
docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-5794, only on 3 March
1987, almost 27 years after the registration of the said
properties in the name of Donata. Therefore, respondents
action for recovery of possession of the disputed properties
had clearly prescribed.
Moreover, even though respondents Complaint
before the RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-5794 also prays for
partition of the disputed properties, it does not make their
action to enforce their right to the said
properties imprescriptible. While as a general rule, the action
for partition among co-owners does not prescribe so long as
the co-ownership is expressly or impliedly recognized, as
provided for in Article 494, of the New Civil Code, it bears
to emphasize that Donata had never recognized respondents
as co-owners or co-heirs, either expressly or impliedly.
[28]
Her assertion before the CFI in Special Proceedings No.
928-R that she was Maximinos sole heir necessarily
excludes recognition of some other co-owner or co-heir to
the inherited properties; Consequently, the rule on non-
prescription of action for partition of property owned in
common does not apply to the case at bar.
On laches as bar to recovery
Other than prescription of action, respondents right
to recover possession of the disputed properties, based on
implied trust, is also barred by laches. The defense of laches,
which is a question of inequity in permitting a claim to be
enforced, applies independently of prescription, which is a
question of time. Prescription is statutory; laches is
equitable.[29]
Laches is defined as the failure to assert a right for
an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, warranting
a presumption that the party entitled to assert it has either
abandoned or declined to assert it. This equitable defense is
based upon grounds of public policy, which requires the
discouragement of stale claims for the peace of society.[30]
This Court has already thoroughly discussed in its
Decision the basis for barring respondents action for
recovery of the disputed properties because of laches. This
Court pointed out therein[31] that
In further support of their contention
of fraud by Donata, the heirs
of Maximino even emphasized
that Donata lived along the same street as
some of the siblings of Maximino and, yet,
she failed to inform them of the CFI Order,
dated [15 January 1960], in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R, and the issuance in properties, in exclusion of all others, which
her name of new TCTs covering the real must have already put the heirs
properties which belonged to the estate of Maximino on guard if they truly believed
of Maximino. This Court, however, that they still had rights thereto.
appreciates such information differently. It
actually works against the heirs
of Maximino. Since they only lived
nearby, Maximinos siblings had ample The heirs of Maximino knew he
opportunity to inquire or discuss died on 1 May 1952. They even attended his
with Donata the status of the estate of their wake. They did not offer any explanation as
to why they had waited 33 years
deceased brother. Some of the real
from Maximinos death before one of
properties, which belonged to the estate them, Silverio, filed a Petition for Letters of
of Maximino, were also located within the Administration for the intestate estate
same area as their residences in Cebu City, of Maximino on 21 January 1985. After
and Maximinossiblings could have regularly learning that the intestate estate
observed the actions and behavior of Maximino was already settled in Special
of Donata with regard to the said real Proceedings No. 928-R, they waited another
two years, before instituting, on 3 March
properties. It is uncontested that from the
1987, Civil Case No. CEB-5794, the
time of Maximinos death on 1 May Complaint for partition, annulment and
1952, Donata had possession of the real recovery of the real property belonging to
properties. She managed the real properties the estate of Maximino. x x x
and even collected rental fees on some of
them until her own death on 1 November
1977. After Donatas death, Erlinda took
possession of the real properties, and
continued to manage the same and collect Considering the circumstances in the
the rental fees thereon. Donata and, afore-quoted paragraphs, as well as
subsequently, Erlinda, were so obviously respondents conduct before this Court,
exercising rights of ownership over the real particularly the belated submission of evidence
and argument of new issues, respondents are
consistently displaying a penchant for delayed
action, without any proffered reason or
justification for such delay.
It is well established that the law serves
those who are vigilant and diligent and not
those who sleep when the law requires them to
act. The law does not encourage laches,
indifference, negligence or ignorance. On the
contrary, for a party to deserve the
considerations of the courts, he must show that
he is not guilty of any of the aforesaid failings. [32]
On void judgment or order
Respondents presented only in their Reply and
Supplemental Reply to the petitioners Opposition to their
Motion for Reconsideration the argument that the CFI Order,
dated 15 January 1960, in Special Proceedings No. 928-R is
void and, thus, it cannot have any legal effect. Consequently,
the registration of the disputed properties in the name
of Donata pursuant to such Order was likewise void.
This Court is unconvinced.
In the jurisprudence referred to by the respondents,
[33]
an order or judgment is considered void when rendered
by the court without or in excess of its jurisdiction or in
violation of a mandatory duty, circumstances which are not
present in the case at bar.
Distinction must be made between a void
judgment and a voidable one, thus
"* * * A voidable judgment is one
which, though not a mere nullity, is liable to
be made void when a person who has a right
to proceed in the matter takes the proper
steps to have its invalidity declared. It
always contains some defect which may
become fatal. It carries within it the means
of its own overthrow. But unless and until it
is duly annulled, it is attended with all the
ordinary consequences of a legal judgment.
The party against whom it is given may
escape its effect as a bar or an obligation,
but only by a proper application to have it
vacated or reversed. Until that is done, it
will be efficacious as a claim, an estoppel, or
a source of title. If no proceedings are ever
taken against it, it will continue throughout
its life to all intents a valid sentence. If
emanating from a court of general
jurisdiction, it will be sustained by the
ordinary presumptions of regularity, and it is
not open to impeachment in any collateral
action. * * *"
 But it is otherwise when the
judgment is void. "A void judgment is in
legal effect no judgment. By it no rights are
divested. From it no rights can be obtained.
Being worthless in itself, all proceedings
founded upon it are equally worthless. It
neither binds nor bars any one. All acts
performed under it and all claims flowing
out of it are void. The parties attempting to
enforce it may be responsible as trespassers.
The purchaser at a sale by virtue of its
authority finds himself without title and
without redress." (Freeman on Judgments,
sec. 117, citing Campbell vs. McCahan, 41
Ill., 45; Roberts vs. Stowers, 7 Bush,
295, Huls vs. Buntin, 47 Ill.,
396; Sherrell vs. Goodrum, 3 Humph., 418;
Andrews vs. State, 2 Sneed, 549;
Hollingsworth vs. Bagley, 35 Tex., 345;
Morton vs. Root, 2 Dill., 312; Commercial
Bank of Manchester vs. Martin, 9 Smedes &
M., 613; Hargis vs. Morse, 7 Kan., 259. See
also Cornell vs. Barnes, 7 Hill, 35; Dawson
and Another vs. Wells, 3 Ind., 399;
Meyer vs. Mintonye, 106 Ill., 414;
Olson vs. Nunnally, 47 Kan., 391; White vs.
Foote L. & M. Co., 29 W. Va., 385.)
It is not always easy to draw the line
of demarcation between a void judgment
and a voidable one, but all authorities agree
that jurisdiction over the subject-matter is
essential to the validity of a judgment and
that want of such jurisdiction renders it void
and a mere nullity. In the eye of the law it is
non-existent. (Fisher vs. Harnden, 1 Paine,
55; Towns vs. Springer, 9 Ga., 130;
Mobley vs. Mobley, 9 Ga., 247; Beverly and
McBride vs. Burke, 9 Ga., 440; Central
Bank of Georgia vs. Gibson, 11 Ga., 453;
Johnson vs. Johnson, 30 Ill., 215; St. Louis
and Sandoval Coal and Mining Co. vs.
Sandoval Coal and Mining Co., 111 Ill.,
32; Swiggart vs. Harber, 4 Scam., 364;
Miller vs. Snyder, 6 Ind., 1; Seely vs. Reid, 3
Greene [Iowa], 374.)[34]
The fraud and misrepresentation fostered
by Donata on the CFI in Special Proceedings No. 928-R did
not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction over the subject-
matter of the case, namely, the intestate estate
of Maximino. Donatas fraud and misrepresentation may
have rendered the CFI Order, dated 15 January
1960, voidable, but not void on its face. Hence, the said
Order, which already became final and executory, can only
be set aside by direct action to annul and enjoin its
enforcement.[35] It cannot be the subject of a collateral attack
as is being done in this case. Note that respondents
Complaint before the RTC in Civil Case No. CEB-5794 was
one for partition, annulment, and recovery of possession of
the disputed properties. The annulment sought in the
Complaint was not that of the CFI Order, dated 15 January
1960, but of the certificates of title over the properties issued
in Donatas name. So until and unless respondents bring a
direct action to nullify the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960,
in Special Proceedings No. 928-R, and attain a favorable
judgment therein, the assailed Order remains valid and
binding.

Nonetheless, this Court also points out that an action

to annul an order or judgment based on fraud must be
brought within four years from the discovery of the fraud.
[36]
If it is conceded that the respondents came to know
of Donatas fraudulent acts only in 1985, during the course of
the RTC proceedings which they instituted for the settlement
of Maximinos estate, then their right to file an action to
annul the CFI Order, dated 15 January 1960, in Special
Proceedings No. 928-R (earlier instituted by Donata for the
settlement of Maximinos estate), has likewise prescribed by
present time.

In view of the foregoing, the Motion for

Reconsideration is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. P-01-1448 June 25, 2013

(Formerly OCA IPI No. 99-664-P)
RODOLFO C. SABIDONG, Complainant,
vs.
NICOLASITO S. SOLAS (Clerk of Court
IV), Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
The present administrative case stemmed from a sworn
letter-complaint1 dated May 29, 1999 filed before this Court
by Rodolfo C. Sabidong (complainant) charging respondent
Nicolasito S. Solas, Clerk of Court IV, Municipal Trial Court
in Cities (MTCC), Iloilo City with grave and serious
misconduct, dishonesty, oppression and abuse of authority.
The Facts
Trinidad Sabidong, complainants mother, is one of the
longtime occupants of a parcel of land, designated as Lot 11
(Lot 1280-D-4-11 of consolidation-subdivision plan [LRC]
Pcs-483) originally registered in the name of C. N. Hodges
and situated at Barangay San Vicente, Jaro, Iloilo City.2 The
Sabidongs are in possession of one-half portion of Lot 11 of
the said Estate (Hodges Estate), as the other half-portion was
occupied by Priscila Saplagio. Lot 11 was the subject of an
ejectment suit filed by the Hodges Estate, docketed as Civil
Case No. 14706 of the MTCC Iloilo City, Branch 4 ("Rosita
R. Natividad in her capacity as Administratrix of C.N.
Hodges Estate, plaintiff vs. Priscila Saplagio, defendant").
On May 31, 1983, a decision was rendered in said case
ordering the defendant to immediately vacate the portion of
Lot 11 leased to her and to pay the plaintiff rentals due,
attorneys fees, expenses and costs.3 At the time, respondent
was the Clerk of Court III of MTCC, Branch 3, Iloilo City.
Sometime in October 1984, respondent submitted an Offer to
Purchase on installment Lots 11 and 12. In a letter dated
January 7, 1986, the Administratrix of the Hodges Estate
rejected respondents offer in view of an application to
purchase already filed by the actual occupant of Lot 12, "in
line with the policy of the Probate Court to give priority to
the actual occupants in awarding approval of Offers". While
the check for initial down payment tendered by respondent
was returned to him, he was nevertheless informed that he
may file an offer to purchase Lot 11 and that if he could put
up a sufficient down payment, the Estate could immediately
endorse it for approval of the Probate Court so that the
property can be awarded to him "should the occupant fail to
avail of the priority given to them."4
The following day, January 8, 1986, respondent again
submitted an Offer to Purchase Lot 11 with an area of 234
square meters for the amount of P35,100. Under the Order
dated November 18, 1986 issued by the probate court
(Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 27) in Special
Proceedings No. 1672 ("Testate Estate of the Late Charles
Newton Hodges, Rosita R. Natividad, Administratrix"),
respondents Offer to Purchase Lot 11 was approved upon
the courts observation that the occupants of the subject lots
"have not manifested their desire to purchase the lots they
are occupying up to this date and considering time restraint
and considering further, that the sales in favor of the x x x
offerors are most beneficial to the estate x x x". On January
21, 1987, the probate court issued another Order granting
respondents motion for issuance of a writ of possession in
his favor. The writ of possession over Lot 11 was eventually
issued on June 27, 1989.5
On November 21, 1994, a Deed of Sale With Mortgage
covering Lot 11 was executed between respondent and the
Hodges Estate represented by its Administratrix, Mrs. Ruth
R. Diocares. Lot 11 was thereby conveyed to respondent on
installment for the total purchase price of P50,000.
Consequently, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
11836 in the name of C. N. Hodges was cancelled and a new
certificate of title, TCT No. T-107519 in the name of
respondent was issued on December 5, 1994. Lot 11 was
later subdivided into two lots, Lots 11-A and 11-B for which
the corresponding titles (TCT Nos. T-116467 and T-116468),
also in the name of respondent, were issued on February 28,
1997.6
On motion of Ernesto Pe Benito, Administrator of the
Hodges Estate, a writ of demolition was issued on March 3,
1998 by the probate court in favor of respondent and against
all adverse occupants of Lot 11.7
On June 14, 1999, this Court received the sworn letter-
complaint asserting that as court employee respondent
cannot buy property in litigation (consequently he is not a
buyer in good faith), commit deception, dishonesty,
oppression and grave abuse of authority. Complainant
specifically alleged the following:
3. Complainant and his siblings, are possessors and
occupants of a parcel of land situated at Brgy. San
Vicente, Jaro, Iloilo City, then identified as Lot No.
1280-D-4-11, later consolidated and subdivided and
became known as Lot 11, then registered and titled
in the name of Charles Newton Hodges. The
Sabidong family started occupying this lot in 1948
and paid their monthly rentals until sometime in
1979 when the Estate of Hodges stopped accepting
rentals. x x x
4. Upon knowing sometime in 1987 that the property
over which their house is standing, was being
offered for sale by the Estate, the mother of
complainant, TRINIDAD CLAVERIO SABIDONG
(now deceased), took interest in buying said
property, Lot 11;
5. TRINIDAD CLAVERIO SABIDONG, was then
an ordinary housekeeper and a laundrywoman, who
never received any formal education, and did not
even know how to read and write. When Trinidad
Claverio Sabidong, together with her children and
the complainant in this case, tried to negotiate with
the Estate for the sale of the subject property, they
were informed that all papers for transaction must
pass through the respondent in this case, Nicolasito
Solas. This is unusual, so they made inquiries and
they learned that, Nicolasito Solas was then the
Clerk of Court 111, Branch 3, Municipal Trial Court
in Cities, Iloilo City and presently, the City Sheriff
of Iloilo City;
6. The respondent Nicolasito Solas, then Clerk of
Court III, MTCC, Iloilo City, has knowledge, by
reason of his position that in 1983 Hodges Estate
was ejecting occupants of its land. x x x Taking
advantage of this inside information that the land
subject of an ejectment case in the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Iloilo City, whom respondent is a
Clerk of Court III, the respondent surreptitiously
offered to buy the said lot in litigation. x x x
7. Complainant nor any member of his family did
not know that as early as 1984, the respondent had
offered to purchase the subject lot from the estate x x
x. After receiving the notice of denial of his offer to
purchase, dated January 7, 1986, respondent made a
second offer to purchase the subject property the
following day, January 8, 1986, knowing fully well
that the subject property was being occupied. x x x
8. Because of this denial, respondent met with the
family of the complainant and negotiated for the sale
of the property and transfer of the title in favor of the
latter. Respondent made the complainant and his
family believed that he is the representative of the
estate and that he needed a downpayment right
away. All the while, the Sabidong family (who were
carpenters, laundrywomen, a janitor, persons who
belong to the underprivileged) relied on the
representations of the respondent that he was
authorized to facilitate the sale, with more reason
that respondent represented himself as the City
Sheriff;
9. That between 1992-1993, a sister of the
complainant who was fortunate to have worked
abroad, sent the amount of Ten Thousand
(P10,000.00) Pesos to complainants mother, to be
given to respondent Nicolasito Solas. x x x After
receiving the money, respondent assured the
Sabidong family that they will not be ejected from
the lot, he being the City Sheriff will take care of
everything, and taking advantage of the illiteracy of
Trinidad Claverio Sabidong, he did not issue any
receipt;
10. True enough, they were not ejected instead it
took the respondent some time to see them again and
demanded additional payment. In the meanwhile, the
complainant waited for the papers of the supposed
sale and transfer of title, which respondent had
promised after receiving the downpayment
of P10,000.00;
11. That sometime again in 1995, respondent again
received from the mother of complainant the amount
of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos, allegedly for
the expenses of the documentation of sale and
transfer of title, and again respondent promised that
the Sabidong family will not be ejected;
12. To the prejudice and surprise of the complainant
and his family, respondent was able to secure an
order for the approval of his offer to purchase x x x
in Special Proceedings No. 1672 x x x;
13. Worse, respondent moved for the issuance of a
Writ of Possession in his favor, which the probate
court acted favorably x x x. A writ of possession was
issued on June 27, 1989 x x x;
14. x x x respondent took advantage of the trust and
confidence which the Sabidong family has shown,
considering that respondent was an officer of the
court and a City Sheriff at that. The complainant and
his family thought that respondent, being a City
Sheriff, could help them in the transfer of the title in
their favor. Never had they ever imagined that while
respondent had been receiving from them hard-
earned monies purportedly for the sale of the subject
property, respondent was also exercising acts of
ownership adverse to the interest of the complainant
and his family;
15. Being an officer of the court and supposed to be
an embodiment of fairness and justice, respondent
acted with malice, with grave abuse of confidence
and deceit when he represented that he can facilitate
the sale and titling of the subject property in favor of
the complainant and his family;
16. That when several thousands of pesos were
given to the respondent as payment for the same and
incidental expenses relative thereto, he was able to
cause the transfer of the title in his favor. x x x;
17. After the death of Trinidad Claverio Sabidong x
x x the respondent received from the complainant
the amount of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos x x
x When a receipt was demanded, respondent refused
to issue one, and instead promised and assured the
complainant that they will not be ejected;
xxxx
19. The complainant again, through his sister-in-law,
Socorro Sabidong, delivered and gave to the
respondent the amount of Three Thousand
(P3,000.00) Pesos as expenses for the subdivision of
the subject lot. The respondent facilitated the
subdivision and after the same was approved, the
complainant did not know that two (2) titles were
issued in the name of the respondent. x x x;
20. Meanwhile, respondent prepared a Contract to
Sell, for the complainant and his neighbor Norberto
Saplagio to affix their signatures, pursuant to their
previous agreement for the buyers to avail of a
housing loan with the Home Development Mutual
Fund (PAG-IBIG). Complainant attended the
seminar of the HDMF for seven (7) times, in his
desire to consummate the sale. However, when the
complainant affixed his signature in the contract, he
was surprised that the owner of the subject property
was the respondent. When complainant raised a
question about this, respondent assured complainant
that everything was alright and that sooner
complainant will be the owner of the property.
Complainant and his family, all these years, had
believed and continued to believe that the owner was
the estate of Hodges and that respondent was only
the representative of the estate;
21. The Contract to Sell, appeared to have been
notarized on June 3, 1996, however, no copy thereof
was given to the complainant by the respondent.
Respondent then, took the papers and documents
required by the HDMF to be completed, from the
complainant allegedly for the purpose of personally
filing the same with the HDMF. Complainant freely
and voluntarily delivered all pertinent documents to
the respondent, thinking that respondent was helping
in the fast and easy release of the loan. While the
said documents were in the possession of the
respondent, he never made any transaction with the
HDMF, worse, when complainant tried to secure a
copy of the Contract to Sell, the copy given was not
signed by the Notary Public, x x x;
22. The complainant [was] shocked to learn that
respondent had canceled the sale and that respondent
refused to return the documents required by the
HDMF. Respondent claimed that as Sheriff, he can
cause the demolition of the house of the complainant
and of his family. Respondent threatened the
complainant and he is capable of pursuing a
demolition order and serve the same with the
assistance of the military. x x x;
23. After learning of the demolition order,
complainant attempted to settle the matter with the
respondent, however, the same proved futile as
respondent boasted that the property would now cost
at Four Thousand Five Hundred (P4,500.00) Pesos;
24. The threats of demolition is imminent. Clearly,
complainant and his family were duped by the
respondent and are helpless victims of an officer of
 the court who took advantage of their good faith and
trust. Complainant later was informed that the
subject property was awarded to the respondent as
his Sheriffs Fees, considering that respondent
executed the decisions in ejectment cases filed by
the Hodges estate against the adverse occupants of
its vast properties;
25. A civil case for the Annulment of Title of the
respondent over the subject property is pending
before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 37
and a criminal complaint for Estafa is also pending
preliminary investigation before the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Iloilo City, known as I.S. No.
1559-99, both filed [by] the complainant against the
respondent.8
Acting on the complaint, Court Administrator Alfredo L.
Benipayo issued a 1st Indorsement9 dated July 8, 1999,
requiring respondent to file his comment on the Complaint
dated May 29, 1999. On October 21, 1999, respondent
submitted his Comment.10
In a Resolution11 dated July 19, 1999, Public Prosecutor
Constantino C. Tubilleja dismissed the Estafa charge against
respondent for insufficiency of evidence.
On November 29, 2000, Court Administrator Benipayo
issued an Evaluation and Recommendation12 finding
respondent guilty of violating Article 149113 of the Civil
Code. Said rule prohibits the purchase by certain court
officers of property and rights in litigation within their
jurisdiction. Court Administrator Benipayo recommended
that:
1. this administrative complaint be treated as an
administrative matter;
2. respondent Nicolasito S. Solas, Clerk of Court IV,
OCC, MTCC, Iloilo City be SUSPENDED for six
(6) months, with warning that a repetition of the
same offense in the future will be dealt with more
severely;
3. inasmuch as there are factual issues regarding the
delivery of substantial amounts which complainant
alleged and which defendant denied, this issue
should be investigated and the Executive Judge of
the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City should be
designated to hear the evidence and to make a report
and recommendation within sixty (60) days from
receipt.14
In a Resolution15 dated January 22, 2001, this Court adopted
the recommendation of the Court Administrator to treat the
present administrative action as a regular administrative
matter and to designate the Executive Judge of the RTC of
Iloilo City to hear the evidence of the parties.
The Court, however, noted without action the Court
Administrators recommendation to suspend respondent for
six months.
On March 13, 2001, Acting Court Administrator Zenaida N.
Elepao forwarded the records of this case to Executive
Judge Tito G. Gustilo of the Iloilo City RTC.16 In a
Resolution17 dated July 18, 2001, the Court referred this case
to the Executive Judge of the RTC of Iloilo City for
investigation, report and recommendation within 60 days
from notice. By Order18 dated August 30, 2001, Executive
Judge Gustilo set the case for reception of evidence.
On March 19, 2004, the RTC of Iloilo, Branch 37, dismissed
the case for annulment of title, damages and injunction
against respondent for lack of merit.19
In a Resolution20 dated June 15, 2005, the Court resolved to
reassign the instant administrative case to Executive Judge
Rene S. Hortillo for investigation, report and
recommendation within 60 days from notice. In a
Letter21dated September 15, 2005, Executive Judge Hortillo
informed the Court that per the records, the parties have
presented their testimonial and documentary evidence before
retired Executive Judge Tito G. Gustilo.
On September 12, 2005, Executive Judge Hortillo required
the parties to file their respective memoranda within 60 days
from notice, upon submission of which the case shall be
deemed submitted for resolution.22
In his Memorandum,23 respondent maintained that his
purchase of the subject land is not covered by the prohibition
in paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code. He pointed
out that he bought Lot 11-A a decade after the MTCC of
Iloilo, Branch 3, had ordered the ejectment of Priscila
Saplagio and Trinidad Sabidong from the subject lot. He
insisted that public trust was observed when complainant
was accorded his right of first refusal in the purchase of Lot
11-A, albeit the latter failed to avail said right. Asserting that
he is a buyer in good faith and for value, respondent cited the
dismissal of the cases for Estafa and annulment of title and
damages which complainant filed against him.
On September 10, 2007, respondent compulsorily retired
from service. Prior to this, he wrote then Senior Deputy
Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepao, requesting for the
release of his retirement benefits pending resolution of the
administrative cases against him. 24 In a Memorandum25 dated
September 24, 2007, Senior Deputy Court Administrator
Elepao made the following recommendations:
a) The request of Nicolasito S. Solas, former Clerk
of Court, MTCC, Iloilo City for partial release of his
retirement benefits be GRANTED; and
b) Atty. Lilian Barribal Co, Chief, Financial
Management Office, Office of the Court
Administrator be DIRECTED to (1) WITHHOLD
the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000.00) from the retirement benefits of
 Nicolasito S. Solas to answer for any administrative
liability that the Court may find against him in A.M.
No. P-01-1448 (Formerly Administrative Matter
OCA IPI No. 99-664-P); OCA IPI No. 99-659-P;
OCA IPI No. 99-670-P; and OCA IPI No. 99-753-P;
and (2) RELEASE the balance of his retirement
benefits.26
Eventually, the case was assigned to Judge Roger B. Patricio,
the new Executive Judge of the Iloilo City RTC for
investigation, report and recommendation.
On June 2, 2008, Judge Patricio submitted his final Report
and Recommendation27 finding respondent liable for grave
misconduct and dishonesty under A.M. No. 03-06-13-SC or
the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel. Based on the
evidence presented, Judge Patricio concluded that
respondent misappropriated the money which he received for
the filing of complainants loan application. Such money
could not have been used for the partition of Lot No. 1280-
D-4-11 since the same was already subdivided into Lots 11-
A and 11-B when respondent presented the Contract to Sell
to complainant. And despite respondents promise to keep
complainant and his family in peaceful possession of the
subject property, respondent caused the issuance of a writ of
demolition against them. Thus, Judge Patricio recommended
the forfeiture of respondents salary for six months to be
deducted from his retirement benefits.
In a Resolution28 dated September 29, 2008, the Court noted
Judge Patricios Investigation Report and referred the same
to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) for
evaluation, report and recommendation.
Findings and Recommendation of the OCA
In a Memorandum29 dated January 16, 2009, then Court
Administrator Jose P. Perez found respondent liable for
serious and grave misconduct and dishonesty and
recommended the forfeiture of respondents salary for six
months, which shall be deducted from his retirement
benefits.
The Court Administrator held that by his unilateral acts of
extinguishing the contract to sell and forfeiting the amounts
he received from complainant and Saplagio without due
notice, respondent failed to act with justice and equity. He
found respondents denial to be anchored merely on the fact
that he had not issued receipts which was belied by his
admission that he had asked money for the expenses of
partitioning Lot 11 from complainant and Saplagio. Since
their PAG-IBIG loan applications did not materialize,
complainant should have returned the amounts given to him
by complainant and Saplagio.
On February 11, 2009, the Court issued a
Resolution30 requiring the parties to manifest whether they
are willing to submit the case for decision on the basis of the
pleadings and records already filed with the Court. However,
the copy of the Resolution dated February 11, 2009 which
was sent to complainant was returned unserved with the
postal carriers notation "RTS-Deceased." Meanwhile, in a
Compliance31 dated August 24, 2009, respondent expressed
his willingness to submit the case for decision and prayed for
an early resolution of the case.
Our Ruling
Article 1491, paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibits court
officers such as clerks of court from acquiring property
involved in litigation within the jurisdiction or territory of
their courts. Said provision reads:
Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by
purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in
person or through the mediation of another:
xxxx
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior
and inferior courts, and other officers and employees
connected with the administration of justice, the property
and rights in litigation or levied upon an execution before the
court within whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise
their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of
acquiring by assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with
respect to the property and rights which may be the object of
any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their
profession.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
The rationale advanced for the prohibition is that public
policy disallows the transactions in view of the fiduciary
relationship involved, i.e., the relation of trust and
confidence and the peculiar control exercised by these
persons.32 "In so providing, the Code tends to prevent fraud,
or more precisely, tends not to give occasion for fraud,
which is what can and must be done."33
For the prohibition to apply, the sale or assignment of the
property must take place during the pendency of the
litigation involving the property.34 Where the property is
acquired after the termination of the case, no violation of
paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code attaches. 35
In the case at bar, when respondent purchased Lot 11-A on
November 21, 1994, the Decision in Civil Case No. 14706
which was promulgated on May 31, 1983 had long become
final. Be that as it may, it can not be said that the property is
no longer "in litigation" at that time considering that it was
part of the Hodges Estate then under settlement proceedings
(Sp. Proc. No. 1672).
A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some
contest or litigation over it in court, but also from the
moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the
judge.36 A property forming part of the estate under judicial
settlement continues to be subject of litigation until the
probate court issues an order declaring the estate
proceedings closed and terminated. The rule is that as long
as the order for the distribution of the estate has not been
complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed
closed and terminated.37 The probate court loses jurisdiction
of an estate under administration only after the payment of
all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs
entitled to receive the same.38 Since there is no evidence to
show that Sp. Proc. No. 1672 in the RTC of Iloilo, Branch
27, had already been closed and terminated at the time of the
execution of the Deed of Sale With Mortgage dated
November 21, 1994, Lot 11 is still deemed to be "in
litigation" subject to the operation of Article 1491 (5) of the
Civil Code.
This notwithstanding, we hold that the sale of Lot 11 in favor
of respondent did not violate the rule on disqualification to
purchase property because Sp. Proc. No. 1672 was then
pending before another court (RTC) and not MTCC where
he was Clerk of Court.
On the charges against the respondent, we find him liable for
dishonesty and grave misconduct.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and
definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior
as well as gross negligence by a public officer. To warrant
dismissal from service, the misconduct must be grave,
serious, important, weighty, momentous and not trifling. The
misconduct must imply wrongful intention and not a mere
error of judgment. The misconduct must also have a direct
relation to and be connected with the performance of the
public officers official duties amounting either to
maladministration or willful, intentional neglect, or failure to
discharge the duties of the office.39
Dishonesty is the "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, defraud
or betray; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of
honesty, probity, or integrity in principle; and lack of fairness
and straightforwardness."40
In this case, respondent deceived complainants family who
were led to believe that he is the legal representative of the
Hodges Estate, or at least possessed of such power to
intercede for overstaying occupants of the estates properties
like complainant. Boasting of his position as a court officer,
a City Sheriff at that, complainants family completely relied
on his repeated assurance that they will not be ejected from
the premises. Upon learning that the lot they were occupying
was for sale and that they had to negotiate for it through
respondent, complainants family readily gave the amounts
he demanded and, along with Saplagio, complied with the
requirements for a loan application with PAG-IBIG. All the
while and unknown to complainants family, respondent was
actually working to acquire Lot 11 for himself.
Thus, while respondent was negotiating with the Hodges
Estate for the sale of the property to him, he collected as
down payment P5,000 from complainants family in July
1986. Four months later, on November 18, 1986, the probate
court approved respondents offer to purchase Lot 11. The
latter received further down payment from complainant in
the amount of P10,000 between 1992 and 1993, or before the
Deed of Sale with Mortgage41dated November 21, 1994
could be executed in respondents favor.
Thereafter, respondent demanded P3,000 from complainant
supposedly for the subdivision of Lot 11 between the latter
and the Saplagios. Yet, it was not until respondent obtained
title over said lot that the same was subdivided into Lots 11-
A and 11-B. The records42 of the case show that the
Subdivision Plan dated April 25, 1996, duly approved by the
Land Management Services (DENR) subdividing Lot 11 into
sublots 11-A and 11-B, was inscribed on February 28, 1997
two years after TCT No. T-107519 covering Lot 11 was
issued in respondents name on December 5, 1994.
Finally, in 1995, respondent received the amount of P2,000
to defray the expenses for documentation and transfer of title
in complainants name. In the latter instance, while it may be
argued that respondent already had the capacity to sell the
subject property, the sum of all the circumstances belie an
honest intention on his part to convey Lot 11-A to
complainant. We note the inscription in TCT No. T-
1183643 in the name of C.N. Hodges that respondent
executed a Request dated February 19, 1997 "for the
issuance of separate titles in the name of the registered
owner."44 Soon after, TCT No. T-11646745 covering Lot 11-A
and TCT No. T-11646846 covering Lot 11-B were issued in
the name of respondent on February 28, 1997 only eight
months after he executed the Contract to Sell47 in favor of
complainant on June 3, 1996.
Respondents bare denials were correctly disregarded by the
Court Administrator in the light of his own admission that he
indeed asked money from both complainant and Saplagio.
The evidence on record clearly established that by
misrepresenting himself as the estates representative and as
a court officer having the power to protect complainants
family from eviction, respondent was able to collect sums
totaling P20,000 from complainants family. Even after the
latter realized they were duped since respondent was already
the owner of Lot 11, they still offered to buy the property
from him. Respondent, however, changed his mind and no
longer wanted to sell the property after nothing happened to
the loan applications of complainant and Saplagio. This
subsequent unilateral cancellation by respondent of the
contract to sell with complainant may have been an
afterthought, and plainly unjustified, based merely on his
own assumption that complainant could not make full
payment. But it did not negate the deception and fraudulent
acts perpetrated against complainants family who were
forced into submission by the constant threat of eviction.
Such acts constitute grave misconduct for which respondent
should be held answerable.
In Re: Complaint Filed by Paz De Vera Lazaro Against Edna
Magallanes, Court Stenographer III, RTC Br. 28 and
Bonifacio G. Magallanes, Process Server, RTC Br. 30,
Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya,48 the Court stressed that to
preserve decency within the judiciary, court personnel must
comply with just contractual obligations, act fairly and
adhere to high ethical standards. In that case, we said that
court employees are expected to be paragons of uprightness,
fairness and honesty not only in their official conduct but
also in their personal dealings, including business and
commercial transactions to avoid becoming the courts
albatross of infamy.49
More importantly, Section 4(c) of Republic Act No.
671350 or the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for
Public Officials and Employees mandates that public
officials and employees shall remain true to the people at all
times. They must act with justness and sincerity and shall not
discriminate against anyone, especially the poor and the
underprivileged.1wphi1 They shall at all times respect the
rights of others, and shall refrain from doing acts contrary to
law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order,
public safety and public interest.
Under Section 52,51 Rule IV of the Uniform Rules on
Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, dishonesty and
grave misconduct are classified as grave offenses with the
corresponding penalty of dismissal for the first offense.
Section 58(a) states that the penalty of dismissal shall carry
with it the cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of retirement
benefits, and the perpetual disqualification for reemployment
in the government service.
Section 53 further provides that mitigating circumstances
attendant to the commission of the offense should be
considered in the determination of the penalty to be imposed
on the erring government employee. However, no such
mitigating circumstance had been shown. On the contrary,
respondent had been previously held administratively liable
for irregularities in the performance of his duties as Clerk of
Court. In A.M. No. P-01-1484,52 this Court imposed on
respondent a fine of P5,000 for acting imprudently in
notarizing documents and administering oath on matters
alien to his official duties. And in A.M. Nos. P-08-2567
(formerly OCA IPI No. 99-670-P) and P-08-2568 (formerly
OCA IPI No. 99-753-P),53 respondent was found liable for
simple misconduct and ordered to pay a fine equivalent to
his three (3) months salary to be deducted from his
retirement benefits.
Since respondent had compulsorily retired from service on
September 10, 2007, for this additional administrative case
he should be fined in an amount equivalent to his salary for
six months which shall likewise be deducted from his
retirement benefits.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Nicolasito S.
Solas, retired Clerk of Court IV, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, Iloilo City, LIABLE FOR GRAVE MISCONDUCT
AND DISHONESTY. Respondent is FINED in an amount
equivalent to his salary for six (6) months to be deducted
from his retirement benefits.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 156407, January 15, 2014
THELMA M. ARANAS, Petitioner, v. TERESITA V.
MERCADO, FELIMON V. MERCADO,
CARMENCITA M. SUTHERLAND, RICHARD V.
MERCADO, MA. TERESITA M. ANDERSON, AND
FRANKLIN L. MERCADO, Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of
ownership of properties for purposes of their inclusion or
exclusion from the inventory to be submitted by the
administrator, but its determination shall only be provisional
unless the interested parties are all heirs of the decedent, or
the question is one of collation or advancement, or the
parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the
probate court and the rights of third parties are not impaired.
Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to
the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the
determination of the status of each heir and whether property
included in the inventory is the conjugal or exclusive
property of the deceased spouse.
Antecedents
Emigdio S. Mercado (Emigdio) died intestate on January 12,
1991, survived by his second wife, Teresita V. Mercado
(Teresita), and their five children, namely: Allan V. Mercado,
Felimon V. Mercado, Carmencita M. Sutherland, Richard V.
Mercado, and Maria Teresita M. Anderson; and his two
children by his first marriage, namely: respondent Franklin
L. Mercado and petitioner Thelma M. Aranas (Thelma).
Emigdio inherited and acquired real properties during his
lifetime. He owned corporate shares in Mervir Realty
Corporation (Mervir Realty) and Cebu Emerson
Transportation Corporation (Cebu Emerson). He assigned
his real properties in exchange for corporate stocks of Mervir
Realty, and sold his real property in Badian, Cebu (Lot 3353
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252) to Mervir
Realty.

On June 3, 1991, Thelma filed in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Cebu City a petition for the appointment of Teresita
as the administrator of Emigdios estate (Special Proceedings
No. 3094CEB).1 The RTC granted the petition considering
that there was no opposition. The letters of administration in
favor of Teresita were issued on September 7, 1992.
As the administrator, Teresita submitted an inventory of the
estate of Emigdio on December 14, 1992 for the
consideration and approval by the RTC. She indicated in the
inventory that at the time of his death, Emigdio had left no
real properties but only personal properties worth
P6,675,435.25 in all, consisting of cash of P32,141.20;
furniture and fixtures worth P20,000.00; pieces of jewelry
valued at P15,000.00; 44,806 shares of stock of Mervir
Realty worth P6,585,585.80; and 30 shares of stock of Cebu
Emerson worth P22,708.25.2
Claiming that Emigdio had owned other properties that were
excluded from the inventory, Thelma moved that the RTC
direct Teresita to amend the inventory, and to be examined
regarding it. The RTC granted Thelmas motion through the
order of January 8, 1993.
On January 21, 1993, Teresita filed a compliance with the
order of January 8, 1993,3 supporting her inventory with
copies of three certificates of stocks covering the 44,806
Mervir Realty shares of stock;4 the deed of assignment
executed by Emigdio on January 10, 1991 involving real
properties with the market value of P4,440,651.10 in
exchange for 44,407 Mervir Realty shares of stock with total
par value of P4,440,700.00;5 and the certificate of stock
issued on January 30, 1979 for 300 shares of stock of Cebu
Emerson worth P30,000.00.6
On January 26, 1993, Thelma again moved to require
Teresita to be examined under oath on the inventory, and that
she (Thelma) be allowed 30 days within which to file a
formal opposition to or comment on the inventory and the
supporting documents Teresita had submitted.
On February 4, 1993, the RTC issued an order expressing the
need for the parties to present evidence and for Teresita to be
examined to enable the court to resolve the motion for
approval of the inventory.7cralawred
On April 19, 1993, Thelma opposed the approval of the
inventory, and asked leave of court to examine Teresita on
the inventory.
With the parties agreeing to submit themselves to the
jurisdiction of the court on the issue of what properties
should be included in or excluded from the inventory, the
RTC set dates for the hearing on that issue.8cralawlawlibrary
Ruling of the RTC
After a series of hearings that ran for almost eight years, the
RTC issued on March 14, 2001 an order finding and holding
that the inventory submitted by Teresita had excluded
properties that should be included, and accordingly ruled:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises and
considerations, the Court hereby denies the administratrixs
motion for approval of inventory. The Court hereby orders
the said administratrix to redo the inventory of properties
which are supposed to constitute as the estate of the late
Emigdio S. Mercado by including therein the properties
mentioned in the last five immediately preceding paragraphs
hereof and then submit the revised inventory within sixty
(60) days from notice of this order.
The Court also directs the said administratrix to render an
account of her administration of the estate of the late
Emigdio S. Mercado which had come to her possession. She
must render such accounting within sixty (60) days from
notice hereof.
SO ORDERED.9ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On March 29, 2001, Teresita, joined by other heirs of
Emigdio, timely sought the reconsideration of the order of
March 14, 2001 on the ground that one of the real properties
affected, Lot No. 3353 located in Badian, Cebu, had already
been sold to Mervir Realty, and that the parcels of land
covered by the deed of assignment had already come into the
possession of and registered in the name of Mervir
Realty.10 Thelma opposed the motion.
On May 18, 2001, the RTC denied the motion for
reconsideration,11 stating that there was no cogent reason for
the reconsideration, and that the movants agreement as heirs
to submit to the RTC the issue of what properties should be
included or excluded from the inventory already estopped
them from questioning its jurisdiction to pass upon the issue.
Decision of the CA
Alleging that the RTC thereby acted with grave abuse of
discretion in refusing to approve the inventory, and in
ordering her as administrator to include real properties that
had been transferred to Mervir Realty, Teresita, joined by her
four children and her stepson Franklin, assailed the adverse
orders of the RTC promulgated on March 14, 2001 and May
18, 2001 by petition for certiorari, stating:
I
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF JURISDICTION (sic)
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT THE REAL
PROPERTY WHICH WAS SOLD BY THE LATE
EMIGDIO S. MERCADO DURING HIS LIFETIME TO A
PRIVATE CORPORATION (MERVIR REALTY
CORPORATION) BE INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY
OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMIGDIO S.
MERCADO.
II
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF JURISDICTION (sic)
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT REAL
PROPERTIES WHICH ARE IN THE POSSESSION OF
AND ALREADY REGISTERED IN THE NAME (OF)
PRIVATE CORPORATION (MERVIR REALTY
CORPORATION) BE INCLUDED IN THE INVENTORY
OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMIGDIO S.
MERCADO.
III
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE HAS
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE
NOW ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING ITS
JURISDICTION IN PASSING UPON THE ISSUE OF
WHAT PROPERTIES SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE
INVENTORY OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE EMIGDIO
MERCADO.12
On May 15, 2002, the CA partly granted the petition for
certiorari, disposing as follows:13
WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED,
this petition is GRANTED partially. The assailed Orders
dated March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 are hereby reversed
and set aside insofar as the inclusion of parcels of land
known as Lot No. 3353 located at Badian, Cebu with an area
of 53,301 square meters subject matter of the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated November 9, 1989 and the various
parcels of land subject matter of the Deeds of Assignment
dated February 17, 1989 and January 10, 1991 in the revised
inventory to be submitted by the administratrix is concerned
and affirmed in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
The CA opined that Teresita, et al. had properly filed the
petition for certiorari because the order of the RTC directing
a new inventory of properties was interlocutory; that
pursuant to Article 1477 of the Civil Code, to the effect that
the ownership of the thing sold shall be transferred to the
vendee upon its actual and constructive delivery, and to
Article 1498 of the Civil Code, to the effect that the sale
made through a public instrument was equivalent to the
delivery of the object of the sale, the sale by Emigdio and
Teresita had transferred the ownership of Lot No. 3353 to
Mervir Realty because the deed of absolute sale executed on
November 9, 1989 had been notarized; that Emigdio had
thereby ceased to have any more interest in Lot 3353; that
Emigdio had assigned the parcels of land to Mervir Realty as
early as February 17, 1989 for the purpose of saving, as in
avoiding taxes with the difference that in the Deed of
Assignment dated January 10, 1991, additional seven (7)
parcels of land were included; that as to the January 10,
1991 deed of assignment, Mervir Realty had been even at
the losing end considering that such parcels of land, subject
matter(s) of the Deed of Assignment dated February 12,
1989, were again given monetary consideration through
shares of stock; that even if the assignment had been based
on the deed of assignment dated January 10, 1991, the
parcels of land could not be included in the inventory
considering that there is nothing wrong or objectionable
about the estate planning scheme; that the RTC, as an
intestate court, also had no power to take cognizance of and
determine the issue of title to property registered in the name
of third persons or corporation; that a property covered by
the Torrens system should be afforded the presumptive
conclusiveness of title; that the RTC, by disregarding the
presumption, had transgressed the clear provisions of law
and infringed settled jurisprudence on the matter; and that
the RTC also gravely abused its discretion in holding that
Teresita, et al. were estopped from questioning its
jurisdiction because of their agreement to submit to the RTC
the issue of which properties should be included in the
inventory.
The CA further opined as follows:
In the instant case, public respondent court erred when it
ruled that petitioners are estopped from questioning its
jurisdiction considering that they have already agreed to
submit themselves to its jurisdiction of determining what
properties are to be included in or excluded from the
inventory to be submitted by the administratrix, because
actually, a reading of petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
dated March 26, 2001 filed before public respondent court
clearly shows that petitioners are not questioning its
jurisdiction but the manner in which it was exercised for
which they are not estopped, since that is their right,
considering that there is grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or in excess of limited jurisdiction when it issued the
assailed Order dated March 14, 2001 denying the
administratrixs motion for approval of the inventory of
properties which were already titled and in possession of a
third person that is, Mervir Realty Corporation, a private
corporation, which under the law possessed a personality
distinct and separate from its stockholders, and in the
absence of any cogency to shred the veil of corporate fiction,
the presumption of conclusiveness of said titles in favor of
Mervir Realty Corporation should stand undisturbed.
Besides, public respondent court acting as a probate court
had no authority to determine the applicability of the
doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction and even if
public respondent court was not merely acting in a limited
capacity as a probate court, private respondent nonetheless
failed to adjudge competent evidence that would have
justified the court to impale the veil of corporate fiction
because to disregard the separate jurisdictional personality of
a corporation, the wrongdoing must be clearly and
convincingly established since it cannot be presumed. 14
On November 15, 2002, the CA denied the motion for
reconsideration of Teresita, et al.15
Issue
Did the CA properly determine that the RTC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in directing the inclusion of certain properties in
the inventory notwithstanding that such properties had been
either transferred by sale or exchanged for corporate shares
in Mervir Realty by the decedent during his lifetime?
Ruling of the Court
The appeal is meritorious.
I
Was certiorari the proper recourse
to assail the questioned orders of the RTC?
The first issue to be resolved is procedural. Thelma contends
that the resort to the special civil action for certiorari to
assail the orders of the RTC by Teresita and her co
respondents was not proper.
Thelmas contention cannot be sustained.
The propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a
remedy depended on whether the assailed orders of the RTC
were final or interlocutory in nature. In PahilaGarrido v.
Tortogo,16 the Court distinguished
between final and interlocutory orders as follows:
The distinction between a final order and an interlocutory
order is well known. The first disposes of the subject matter
in its entirety or terminates a particular proceeding or action,
leaving nothing more to be done except to enforce by
execution what the court has determined, but the latter does
not completely dispose of the case but leaves something else
to be decided upon. An interlocutory order deals with
preliminary matters and the trial on the merits is yet to be
held and the judgment rendered. The test to ascertain
whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or
final is: does the order or judgment leave something to be
done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the
case? If it does, the order or judgment is interlocutory;
otherwise, it is final.
The order dated November 12, 2002, which granted the
application for the writ of preliminary injunction, was an
interlocutory, not a final, order, and should not be the subject
of an appeal. The reason for disallowing an appeal from an
interlocutory order is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a
single action, which necessarily suspends the hearing and
decision on the merits of the action during the pendency of
the appeals. Permitting multiple appeals will necessarily
delay the trial on the merits of the case for a considerable
length of time, and will compel the adverse party to incur
unnecessary expenses, for one of the parties may interpose
as many appeals as there are incidental questions raised by
him and as there are interlocutory orders rendered or issued
by the lower court. An interlocutory order may be the subject
of an appeal, but only after a judgment has been rendered,
with the ground for appealing the order being included in the
appeal of the judgment itself.
The remedy against an interlocutory order not subject of an
appeal is an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65,
provided that the interlocutory order is rendered without or
in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
Then is certiorari under Rule 65 allowed to be resorted to.
The assailed order of March 14, 2001 denying Teresitas
motion for the approval of the inventory and the order dated
May 18, 2001 denying her motion for reconsideration were
interlocutory. This is because the inclusion of the properties
in the inventory was not yet a final determination of their
ownership. Hence, the approval of the inventory and the
concomitant determination of the ownership as basis for
inclusion or exclusion from the inventory were provisional
and subject to revision at anytime during the course of the
administration proceedings.
In Valero Vda. De Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals,17 the
Court, in affirming the decision of the CA to the effect that
the order of the intestate court excluding certain real
properties from the inventory was interlocutory and could be
changed or modified at anytime during the course of the
administration proceedings, held that the order of exclusion
was not a final but an interlocutory order in the sense that it
did not settle once and for all the title to the San Lorenzo
Village lots. The Court observed there that:
The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining
whether a certain property should or should not be included
in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title
thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is
subject to the final decision in a separate action
regarding ownership which may be instituted by the
parties (3 Morans Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970
Edition, pages 4489 and 473; Lachenal vs. Salas, L42257,
June 14, 1976, 71 SCRA 262, 266).18 (Bold emphasis
supplied)
To the same effect was De Leon v. Court of Appeals,19 where
the Court declared that a probate court, whether in a testate
or intestate proceeding, can only pass upon questions of title
provisionally, and reminded, citing Jimenez v. Court of
Appeals, that the patent reason is the probate courts limited
jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title or
ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the
inventory of the property, can only be settled in a separate
action. Indeed, in the cited case of Jimenez v. Court of
Appeals,20 the Court pointed out:
All that the said court could do as regards the said properties
is determine whether they should or should not be included
in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by
the administrator. If there is a dispute as to the ownership,
then the opposing parties and the administrator have to
resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of
the conflicting claims of title because the probate court
cannot do so. (Bold emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, an appeal would not be the correct
recourse for Teresita, et al. to take against the assailed
orders. The final judgment rule embodied in the first
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 41, Rules of Court,21 which also
governs appeals in special proceedings, stipulates that only
the judgments, final orders (and resolutions) of a court of
law that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular
matter therein when declared by these Rules to be
appealable may be the subject of an appeal in due course.
The same rule states that an interlocutory order or resolution
(interlocutory because it deals with preliminary matters, or
that the trial on the merits is yet to be held and the judgment
rendered) is expressly made nonappealable.
Multiple appeals are permitted in special proceedings as a
practical recognition of the possibility that material issues
may be finally determined at various stages of the special
proceedings. Section 1, Rule 109 of the Rules of
Court enumerates the specific instances in which multiple
appeals may be resorted to in special proceedings, viz:
Section 1. Orders or judgments from which appeals may be
taken. An interested person may appeal in special
proceedings from an order or judgment rendered by a Court
of First Instance or a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court,
where such order or judgment:
(a) Allows or disallows a will;
(b) Determines who are the lawful heirs of a deceased
person, or the distributive share of the estate to which such
person is entitled;
(c) Allows or disallows, in whole or in part, any claim
against the estate of a deceased person, or any claim
presented on behalf of the estate in offset to a claim against
it;
(d) Settles the account of an executor, administrator, trustee
or guardian;
(e) Constitutes, in proceedings relating to the settlement of
the estate of a deceased person, or the administration of a
trustee or guardian, a final determination in the lower court
of the rights of the party appealing, except that no appeal
shall be allowed from the appointment of a special
administrator; and
(f) Is the final order or judgment rendered in the case, and
affects the substantial rights of the person appealing, unless
it be an order granting or denying a motion for a new trial or
for reconsideration.
Clearly, the assailed orders of the RTC, being interlocutory,
did not come under any of the instances in which multiple
appeals are permitted.
II
Did the RTC commit grave abuse of discretion
in directing the inclusion of the properties
in the estate of the decedent?
In its assailed decision, the CA concluded that the RTC
committed grave abuse of discretion for including properties
in the inventory notwithstanding their having been
transferred to Mervir Realty by Emigdio during his lifetime,
and for disregarding the registration of the properties in the
name of Mervir Realty, a third party, by applying the
doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate fiction.
Was the CA correct in its conclusion?
The answer is in the negative. It is unavoidable to find that
the CA, in reaching its conclusion, ignored the law and the
facts that had fully warranted the assailed orders of the RTC.
Under Section 6(a), Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, the letters
of administration may be granted at the discretion of the
court to the surviving spouse, who is competent and willing
to serve when the person dies intestate. Upon issuing the
letters of administration to the surviving spouse, the RTC
becomes dutybound to direct the preparation and
submission of the inventory of the properties of the estate,
and the surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the duty
and responsibility to submit the inventory within three
months from the issuance of letters of administration
pursuant to Rule 83 of the Rules of Court, viz:
Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within
three months. Within three (3) months after his
appointment every executor or administrator shall return to
the court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and
personal estate of the deceased which has come into his
possession or knowledge. In the appraisement of such
estate, the court may order one or more of the inheritance tax
appraisers to give his or their assistance.
The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra, demands the
inclusion of all the real and personal properties of the
decedent in the inventory.22 However, the word all is
qualified by the phrase which has come into his possession
or knowledge, which signifies that the properties must be
known to the administrator to belong to the decedent or are
in her possession as the administrator. Section 1 allows no
exception, for the phrase true inventory implies that no
properties appearing to belong to the decedent can be
excluded from the inventory, regardless of their being in the
possession of another person or entity.

The objective of the Rules of Court in requiring the
inventory and appraisal of the estate of the decedent is to
aid the court in revising the accounts and determining the
liabilities of the executor or the administrator, and in making
a final and equitable distribution (partition) of the estate and
otherwise to facilitate the administration of the
estate.23 Hence, the RTC that presides over the
administration of an estate is vested with wide discretion on
the question of what properties should be included in the
inventory. According to Peralta v. Peralta,24 the CA cannot
impose its judgment in order to supplant that of the RTC on
the issue of which properties are to be included or excluded
from the inventory in the absence of positive abuse of
discretion, for in the administration of the estates of
deceased persons, the judges enjoy ample discretionary
powers and the appellate courts should not interfere with or
attempt to replace the action taken by them, unless it be
shown that there has been a positive abuse of
discretion.25 As long as the RTC commits no patently grave
abuse of discretion, its orders must be respected as part of
the regular performance of its judicial duty.
There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial court as
an intestate court is special and limited. The trial court
cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of
the estate but are claimed to belong to third parties by title
adverse to that of the decedent and the estate, not by virtue
of any right of inheritance from the decedent. All that the
trial court can do regarding said properties is to determine
whether or not they should be included in the inventory of
properties to be administered by the administrator. Such
determination is provisional and may be still revised. As the
Court said in Agtarap v. Agtarap:26
The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court,
either as a probate court or an intestate court, relates only to
matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or
settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not
extend to the determination of questions of ownership that
arise during the proceedings. The patent rationale for this
rule is that such court merely exercises special and limited
jurisdiction. As held in several cases, a probate court or one
in charge of estate proceedings, whether testate or intestate,
cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to
be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to
outside parties, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from
the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and
his estate. All that the said court could do as regards said
properties is to determine whether or not they should be
included in the inventory of properties to be administered by
the administrator. If there is no dispute, there poses no
problem, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator,
and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action
before a court exercising general jurisdiction for a final
determination of the conflicting claims of title.
However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as
justified by expediency and convenience.
First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an
intestate or a testate proceeding the question of inclusion
in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property
without prejudice to final determination of ownership in
a separate action. Second, if the interested parties are all
heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of
jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third
parties are not impaired, then the probate court is
competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its
jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the
settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the
determination of the status of each heir and whether the
property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive
property of the deceased spouse.27 (Italics in the original;
bold emphasis supplied)
It is clear to us that the RTC took pains to explain the factual
bases for its directive for the inclusion of the properties in
question in its assailed order of March 14, 2001, viz:
In the first place, the administratrix of the estate admitted
that Emigdio Mercado was one of the heirs of Severina
Mercado who, upon her death, left several properties as
listed in the inventory of properties submitted in Court in
Special Proceedings No. 306R which are supposed to be
divided among her heirs. The administratrix admitted, while
being examined in Court by the counsel for the petitioner,
that she did not include in the inventory submitted by her in
this case the shares of Emigdio Mercado in the said estate of
Severina Mercado. Certainly, said properties constituting
Emigdio Mercados share in the estate of Severina Mercado
should be included in the inventory of properties required to
be submitted to the Court in this particular case.
In the second place, the administratrix of the estate of
Emigdio Mercado also admitted in Court that she did not
include in the inventory shares of stock of Mervir Realty
Corporation which are in her name and which were paid by
her from money derived from the taxicab business which she
and her husband had since 1955 as a conjugal undertaking.
As these shares of stock partake of being conjugal in
character, onehalf thereof or of the value thereof should be
included in the inventory of the estate of her husband.
In the third place, the administratrix of the estate of Emigdio
Mercado admitted, too, in Court that she had a bank account
in her name at Union Bank which she opened when her
husband was still alive. Again, the money in said bank
account partakes of being conjugal in character, and so, one
half thereof should be included in the inventory of the
properties constituting as estate of her husband.
In the fourth place, it has been established during the hearing
in this case that Lot No. 3353 of Pls657D located in
Badian, Cebu containing an area of 53,301 square meters as
described in and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
3252 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cebu is
still registered in the name of Emigdio S. Mercado until now.
When it was the subject of Civil Case No. CEB12690
which was decided on October 19, 1995, it was the estate of
the late Emigdio Mercado which claimed to be the owner
thereof. Mervir Realty Corporation never intervened in the
said case in order to be the owner thereof. This fact was
admitted by Richard Mercado himself when he testified in
Court. x x x So the said property located in Badian, Cebu
should be included in the inventory in this case.
Fifthly and lastly, it appears that the assignment of several
parcels of land by the late Emigdio S. Mercado to Mervir
Realty Corporation on January 10, 1991 by virtue of the
Deed of Assignment signed by him on the said day (Exhibit
N for the petitioner and Exhibit 5 for the administratrix) was
a transfer in contemplation of death. It was made two days
before he died on January 12, 1991. A transfer made in
contemplation of death is one prompted by the thought that
the transferor has not long to live and made in place of a
testamentary disposition (1959 Prentice Hall, p. 3909).
Section 78 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977
provides that the gross estate of the decedent shall be
determined by including the value at the time of his death of
all property to the extent of any interest therein of which the
decedent has at any time made a transfer in contemplation of
death. So, the inventory to be approved in this case should
still include the said properties of Emigdio Mercado which
were transferred by him in contemplation of death. Besides,
the said properties actually appeared to be still registered in
the name of Emigdio S. Mercado at least ten (10) months
after his death, as shown by the certification issued by the
Cebu City Assessors Office on October 31, 1991 (Exhibit
O).28
Thereby, the RTC strictly followed the directives of
the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence relevant to the
procedure for preparing the inventory by the administrator.
The aforequoted explanations indicated that the directive to
include the properties in question in the inventory rested on
good and valid reasons, and thus was far from whimsical, or
arbitrary, or capricious.
Firstly, the shares in the properties inherited by Emigdio
from Severina Mercado should be included in the inventory
because Teresita, et al. did not dispute the fact about the
shares being inherited by Emigdio.
Secondly, with Emigdio and Teresita having been married
prior to the effectivity of the Family Code in August 3, 1988,
their property regime was the conjugal partnership of
gains.29 For purposes of the settlement of Emigdios estate, it
was unavoidable for Teresita to include his shares in the
conjugal partnership of gains. The party asserting that
specific property acquired during that property regime did
not pertain to the conjugal partnership of gains carried the
burden of proof, and that party must prove the exclusive
ownership by one of them by clear, categorical, and
convincing evidence.30 In the absence of or pending the
presentation of such proof, the conjugal partnership of
Emigdio and Teresita must be provisionally liquidated to
establish who the real owners of the affected properties
were,31and which of the properties should form part of the
estate of Emigdio. The portions that pertained to the estate of
Emigdio must be included in the inventory.
Moreover, although the title over Lot 3353 was already
registered in the name of Mervir Realty, the RTC made
findings that put that title in dispute. Civil Case No. CEB
12692, a dispute that had involved the ownership of Lot
3353, was resolved in favor of the estate of Emigdio, and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3252 covering Lot 3353 was
still in Emigdios name. Indeed, the RTC noted in the order
of March 14, 2001, or ten years after his death, that Lot 3353
had remained registered in the name of Emigdio.
Interestingly, Mervir Realty did not intervene at all in Civil
Case No. CEB12692. Such lack of interest in Civil Case
No. CEB12692 was susceptible of various interpretations,
including one to the effect that the heirs of Emigdio could
have already threshed out their differences with the
assistance of the trial court. This interpretation was probable
considering that Mervir Realty, whose business was
managed by respondent Richard, was headed by Teresita
herself as its President. In other words, Mervir Realty
appeared to be a family corporation.
Also, the fact that the deed of absolute sale executed by
Emigdio in favor of Mervir Realty was a notarized
instrument did not sufficiently justify the exclusion from the
inventory of the properties involved. A notarized deed of sale
only enjoyed the presumption of regularity in favor of its
execution, but its notarization did not per se guarantee the
legal efficacy of the transaction under the deed, and what the
contents purported to be. The presumption of regularity
could be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary.32 As the Court has observed in Suntay v. Court of
Appeals:33
x x x. Though the notarization of the deed of sale in question
vests in its favor the presumption of regularity, it is not the
intention nor the function of the notary public to validate and
make binding an instrument never, in the first place, intended
to have any binding legal effect upon the parties thereto. The
intention of the parties still and always is the primary
consideration in determining the true nature of a
contract. (Bold emphasis supplied)
It should likewise be pointed out that the exchange of shares
of stock of Mervir Realty with the real properties owned by
Emigdio would still have to be inquired into. That Emigdio
executed the deed of assignment two days prior to his death
was a circumstance that should put any interested party on
his guard regarding the exchange, considering that there was
a finding about Emigdio having been sick of cancer of the
pancreas at the time.34 In this regard, whether the CA
correctly characterized the exchange as a form of an estate
planning scheme remained to be validated by the facts to be
established in court.
The fact that the properties were already covered by Torrens
titles in the name of Mervir Realty could not be a valid basis
for immediately excluding them from the inventory in view
of the circumstances admittedly surrounding the execution of
the deed of assignment. This is because:
The Torrens system is not a mode of acquiring titles to lands;
it is merely a system of registration of titles to lands.
However, justice and equity demand that the titleholder
should not be made to bear the unfavorable effect of the
mistake or negligence of the States agents, in the absence of
proof of his complicity in a fraud or of manifest damage to
third persons. The real purpose of the Torrens system is to
quiet title to land and put a stop forever to any question as to
the legality of the title, except claims that were noted in the
certificate at the time of registration or that may arise
subsequent thereto. Otherwise, the integrity of the Torrens
system shall forever be sullied by the ineptitude and
inefficiency of land registration officials, who are ordinarily
presumed to have regularly performed their duties. 35
Assuming that only seven titled lots were the subject of the
deed of assignment of January 10, 1991, such lots should
still be included in the inventory to enable the parties, by
themselves, and with the assistance of the RTC itself, to test
and resolve the issue on the validity of the assignment. The
limited jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court might
have constricted the determination of the rights to the
properties arising from that deed,36 but it does not prevent
the RTC as intestate court from ordering the inclusion in the
inventory of the properties subject of that deed. This is
because the RTC as intestate court, albeit vested only with
special and limited jurisdiction, was still deemed to have all
the necessary powers to exercise such jurisdiction to make it
effective.37
Lastly, the inventory of the estate of Emigdio must be
prepared and submitted for the important purpose of
resolving the difficult issues of collation and advancement to
the heirs. Article 1061 of the Civil Code required every
compulsory heir and the surviving spouse, herein Teresita
herself, to bring into the mass of the estate any property or
right which he (or she) may have received from the
decedent, during the lifetime of the latter, by way of
donation, or any other gratuitous title, in order that it may be
computed in the determination of the legitime of each heir,
and in the account of the partition. Section 2, Rule 90 of
the Rules of Court also provided that any advancement by
the decedent on the legitime of an heir may be heard and
determined by the court having jurisdiction of the estate
proceedings, and the final order of the court thereon shall be
binding on the person raising the questions and on the heir.
Rule 90 thereby expanded the special and limited
jurisdiction of the RTC as an intestate court about the
matters relating to the inventory of the estate of the decedent
by authorizing it to direct the inclusion of properties donated
or bestowed by gratuitous title to any compulsory heir by the
decedent.38
The determination of which properties should be excluded
from or included in the inventory of estate properties was
well within the authority and discretion of the RTC as an
intestate court. In making its determination, the RTC acted
with circumspection, and proceeded under the guiding policy
that it was best to include all properties in the possession of
the administrator or were known to the administrator to
belong to Emigdio rather than to exclude properties that
could turn out in the end to be actually part of the estate. As
long as the RTC commits no patent grave abuse of
discretion, its orders must be respected as part of the regular
performance of its judicial duty. Grave abuse of
discretion means either that the judicial or quasijudicial
power was exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility, or that the respondent
judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually
refused to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or
board exercising judicial or quasijudicial powers acted in a
capricious or whimsical manner as to be equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction.39
In light of the foregoing, the CAs conclusion of grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the RTC was unwarranted and
erroneous.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review
on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision
promulgated on May 15, 2002; REINSTATES the orders
issued on March 14, 2001 and May 18, 2001 by the Regional
Trial Court in Cebu; DIRECTS the Regional Trial Court in
Cebu to proceed with dispatch in Special Proceedings No.
3094CEB entitled Intestate Estate of the late Emigdio
Mercado, Thelma Aranas, petitioner, and to resolve the case;
and ORDERS the respondents to pay the costs of
suit.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
 DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set
aside the Decision 1 and Resolution, 2 dated March 13, 2009
and April 23, 2009, respectively, of the Court Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 107347, Which affirmed the
Judgment 3 dated October 1, 2001 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Nasugbu, Batangas, Branch 14, in Civil Case
No. 217.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Republic of the Philippines On November 16, 1989, Pedro L. Rifioza died intestate,
SUPREME COURT leaving several heirs, including his_ children with his first
Manila wife, respondents Ma. Gracia R. Plazo and Ma. Fe Alaras, as
well as several properties including a resort covered by
THIRD DIVISION Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) No. 51354 and No.
51355, each with an area of 351 square meters, and a family
G.R. No. 187524 August 5, 2015 home, the land on which it stands is covered by TCT Nos.
40807 and 40808, both located in Nasugbu, Batangas. 4
SPOUSES MARIA BUTIONG and VILLAFRlA, DR.
RUEL B. SPOUSES MARIA FRANCISCO substituted In their Amended Complaint for Judicial Partition with
by VILLAFRIA, Petitioners, Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession 5 dated
vs. September 15, 1993, respondents alleged that sometime in
MA. GRACIA RINOZA PLAZO and MA. FE RINOZA March 1991, they discovered that their co-heirs, Pedros
ALARAS, Respondents. second wife, Benita"Tenorio and other children, had sold the
subject properties to petitioners, spouses Francisco Villafria
and Maria Butiong, who are now deceased and substituted
by their son, Dr. Ruel B. Villafria, without their knowledge
and consent. When confronted about the sale, Benita
acknowledged the same, showing respondents a document
she believed evidenced receipt of her share in the sale,
which, however, did not refer to any sort of sale but to a
previous loan obtoiined by Pedro and Benita from a
bank. 6 The document actually evidenced receipt from Banco
Silangan of the amount of P87, 352.62 releasing her and her
late husbands indebtedness therefrom. 7 Upon inquiry, the
Register of Deeds of Nasugbu informed respondents that he
has no record of any transaction involving the subject
properties, giving them certified true copies of the titles to
the same. When respondents went to the subject properties,
they discovered that 4 out of the 8 cottages in the resort had
been demolished. They were not, however, able to enter as
the premises were padlocked.
Subsequently, respondents learned that on July 18, 1991, a
notice of an extra-judicial settlement of estate of their late
father was published in a tabloid called Balita. Because of
this, They caused the annotation of their adverse claims over
the subject properties before the Register of Deeds of
Nasugbu and filed their complaint praying, among others,
for the annulment of all documents conveying the subject
properties to the petitioners and certificates of title issued
pursuant thereto. 8
In their Answer, 9 petitioners denied the allegations of the
complaint on the groun_d of lack of personal knowledge and
good faith in acquiring the subject properties. In the course
of his testimony during trial, petitioner Francisco further
contended that what they purchased was only the
resort. 10 He also presented an Extra-Judicial Settlement with
Renunciation, Repudiations and Waiver of Rights and Sale
which provides, among others, that respondents' co-heirs
sold the family home to the spouses Rolando and Ma.
Cecilia Bondoc for Pl million as well as a Deed of Sale
whereby Benita sold the resort to petitioners for P650,
000.00. 11
On October 1, 2001, the trial court nullified the transfer of
the subject Properties to petitioners and spouses Bondoc due
to irregularities in the Documents of conveyance offered by
petitioners .as well as the circumstances Surrounding the
execution of the same. Specifically, the Extra-Judicial
Settlement was notarized by a notary public that was not
duly commissioned as such on the date it was
executed. 12 The Deed of Sale was Undated, the date of the
acknowledgment therein was left blank, and the Typewritten
name "Pedro Rifioza, Husband" on the left side of the
document Was not signed. 13 The trial court also observed
that both documents were Never presented to the Office of
the Register of Deeds for registration and That the titles to
the subject properties were still in the names of Pedro and
His second wife Benita. In addition, the supposed notaries
and buyers of the Subject properties were not even presented
as witnesses whom supposedly witnessed the signing and
execution of the documents of conveyance. 14 On The basis
thereof, the triaI court ruled in favor of respondents, in its
Judgment, the pertinent portions of its fallo provide:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, judgment is
Hereby rendered as follows:
xxxx
4. A) Declaring as a nullity the ~'Extra-Judicial Settlement
with Renunciation, Repudiation and Waiver of Rights and
Sale" (Ex. "l ", Villafria) notarized on December 23, 1991 by
Notary Public Antonio G. Malonzo of Manila, Doc. No. 190,
Page No. 20, Book No. IXII, Series of 1991. .
b) Declaring as a nullity the Deed of Absolute Sale
(Ex. "2", Villafria), purportedly executed by Benita
T. Rifioza in favor of spouses Francisco Villafria and
Maria Butiong, purportedly notarized by one Alfredo
de Guzman marked Doc. No. 1136, Page No. 141,
and Book. No. XXX, Series of 1991.
c) Ordering the forfeiture of any and all
improvements introduced By defendants Francisco
Villafria and Maria Butiong in the properties
Covered by TCT No. 40807, 40808, 51354 and
51355 of the Register of Deeds for Nasugbu,
Batangas. .
5. Ordering defendant Francisco Villafria and all persons,
whose Occupancy within the premises of the four- (4)
parcels of land described in Par. 4-c above is derived from
the rights and interest of defendant Villafria, to vacate its
premises and to deliver possession thereof, and all
improvements existing thereon to plaintiffs, for and in behalf
of the estate of decedent Pedro L. Rifioza.
6. Declaring the plaintiffs and the defendants-heirs in the
Amended Complaint to be the legitimate heirs of decedent
Pedro L. Rifioza, each in the capacity and degree
established, as well as their direct successors-in interest, and
ordering the defendant Registrar of Deeds to issue the
co1Tesponding titles in their names in the proportion
established by law, pro in division, in TCT Nos. 40807,
40808, 51354, 51355 and 40353 (after restoration) within ten
(10) days from finality of this Decision, 4pon payment of
lawful fees, except TCT No. 40353, which shall be exempt
from all expenses for its restoration.
With no costs.
SO ORDERED. 15
On appeal, the CA affirmed the trial courts Judgment in its
Decision 16 dated October 31, 2006 in the following wise:
The person before whom the resort deed was acknowledged,
Alfredo de Guzman, was not commissioned as a notary
public from 1989 to July 3, 1991, the date the certification
was issued. Such being the case, the resort deed is not a
public document and the presumption of regularity accorded
to public documents will not apply to the same. As laid down
in Tigno, et al. v. Aquino, et al.:
The validity of a notarial certification necessarily derives
from the authority of the notarial officer. If the notary public
docs net have the capacity to notarize a document, but does
so anyway, then the document should be treated as A.
Unnotarized. The rule may strike as rather harsh, and
perhaps may prove to be prejudicial to parties in good faith
relying on the proferred authority of the notary public or the
person pretending to be one. Still, to admit otherwise would
render merely officious the elaborate process devised by this
Court in order that a lawyer may receive a notarial
commission. Without such a rule,
The notarization of a document by a duly appointed notary
public will have the same legal effect as one accomplished
by a non-lawyer engaged in pretense. The notarization of a
document carries considerable legal effect. Notarization of a
private document converts such document into a public one,
and renders it admissible in court without further proof of its
authenticity. Thus, notarization is not an empty routine; to
the contrary, it engages public interest in a substantial degree
and the protection of that interest requires preventing those
who are not qualified or authorized to act as notaries public
from imposing upon the public and the courts and
administrative offices generally.
Parenthetically, the settlement/family home deed cannot be
considered a public document. This is because the following
cast doubt on the document's authenticity, to wit: J.
1.) The date of its execution was not indicated;
2.) The amount of consideration was superimposed;
3.) It was not presented to the Registry of Deeds of Nasugbu,
Batangas for annotation; and
4.) Not even the supposed notary public," Alfredo de
Guzman, or the purported buyer, the Spouses Rolando and
Ma. Cecilia Bondoc, were presented as witnesses.
Concededly, the absence of notarization in the resort deed
and/or the lacking details in the settlement/family home deed
did not necessarily invalidate the transactions evidenced by
the said documents. However, since the said deeds are
private documents, perforce, their due execution and
authenticity becomes subject to the requirement of proof
under the Rules on Evidence, Section 20, Rule 132 of which
provides: Sec. 20. Proof of private document. - Before any
private. Document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its due execution a"Q.d. authenticity must be
proved either:
(a). By anyone who saw the document executed or
written; or
 (b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature
or handwriting of the maker.
The Complaining Heirs insist that the settlement/family
home and the resort deed are void, as their signatures thereon
are forgeries as opposed to the Villafrias who profess the
deeds' enforceability. After the Complaining Heirs presented
proofs in support of their claim that their signatures were
forged, the burden then fell upon the Villafrias to disprove
the ~ame2 or conversely, to prove the authenticity and due
execution of the said deeds. The Villafrias failed in this
regard.
As forestalled, the Villafrias did not present as witnesses (a)
the notary public who purportedly notarized the questioned
instrument, (b) the witnesses who appear [Ed] in the
instruments as eyewitnesses to the signing, or (c) an expert
to prove the authenticity and genuineness of all the
signatures appearing on the said instruments. Verily, the rule
that, proper foundation must be laid for the admission of
documentary evidence; that is, the identity and authenticity
of the document must be reasonably established as a pre
requisite to its admission, was prudently observed by the
lower court when it refused to admit the settlement/family
home and the resort deeds as their veracity are doubtful. 17
Aggrieved, petitioners, substituted by their son Ruel
Villafria, filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated
November 24, 2006 raising the trial courts lack of
jurisdiction. It was alleged that when the Complaint for
Judicial Partition with Annulment of Title and Recovery of
Possession was filed, there was yet no settlement of Pedro's
estate, determination as to the nature thereof, nor was there
an identification of the number of legitimate heirs. As such,
the trial court ruled on the settlement of the intestate estate of
Pedro in its ordinary jurisdiction when the action filed was
for Judidal Partition. Considering that the instant action is
really one for settlement of intestate estate, the trial court,
sitting merely in its probate jurisdiction, exceeded its
jurisdiction when it ruled upon the issues of forgery and
ownership. Thus, petitioner argued that. Said ruling is void
and has no effect for having been rendered without
jurisdiction. The Motion for Reconsideration was, however,
denied by the appellate court on February 26, 2007.
On appeal, this Court denied on June 20, 2007, petitioner's
Petition for Review on Certiorari for submitting a
verification of the petition, a certificate of non-forum
shopping and an affidavit of service that failed to comply
with the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice regarding
competent evidence of affiant' s identities. 18 In its
Resolution 19dated September 26, 2007, this Court also
denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in the
absence of any compelling reason to warrant a modification
of the previous denial. Thus, the June 20, 2007 Resolution
became final and executors on October 31, 2007 as certified
by the Entry of Judgment issued by the Court. 20 On January
16, 2008, the Court further denied petitioner' s motion for
leave to admit a second motion for reconsideration of its
September 26, 2007 Resolution, considering that the same is
a prohibited pleading under Section 2, Rule 52, in relation to
Section 4, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended. Furthennore, petitioner's letter dated December 18,
2007 pleading the Court to take a second. Look at his
petition for review on certiorari and that a decision thereon
be rendered based purely on its merits was noted without
action. 21
Unsatisfied, petitioner wrote a letter dated March 24, 2008
addressed to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno praying that
a decision on the case be rendered based on the. Merits and
not on formal requirements "as he stands to lose everything
his parents had left him just because the verification against
non-forum shopping is formally defective." However, in
view of the Entry of Judgment having been made on October
31, 2007, the Court likewise noted said letter without
action. 22
On November 27, 2008, the RTC issued an Order, issuing a
Part Writ of Execution of its October 1, 2001 Decision with
respect to the portions disposing of petitioner's claims as
affirmed by the CA.
The foregoing notwithstanding, petitioner filed, on February
11, 200 a Petition for Annulment of Judgment and Order
before the CA assailing October 1, 2001 Decision as well as
the November 27, 2008 Order of the RTC on the grounds of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. In Decision dated
March 13, 2009, however, the CA dismissed the petition a
affirmed the rulings of the trial court in the following wise:
Although the assailed Decision of the Court a quo has
already become final and executory and in fact entry of
judgment was issued on 31 October 2007, supra,
nevertheless, to put the issues to rest,We deem it apropos to
tackle the same.
The Petitioner argues that the assailed Decision and Order of
the Court a quo, supra, should be annulled and set aside on
the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
We are not persuaded.
xxxx
Section 2 of the Rules as stated above provides that the
annulment of a judgment may "be based only on grounds of
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction." In RP v. The Heirs
of Sancho Magdato, the High Tribunal stressed that: There is
extrinsic fraud when "the unsuccessful party had been
prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or
deception practiced on him by his opponent, as by keeping
him away from court, ... or where the defendant never had
knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of
the plaintiff; ... "
Otherwise put, extrinsic or collateral fraud pertains to such
fraud, which prevents the aggrieved party from having a
trial or presenting his case to the court, or is used to procure
the judgment without fair submission of the controversy.
This refers to acts intended to keep the unsuccessful party
away from the courts as when there is a false promise of
compromise or when one is kept in ignorance of the suit. The
pivotal issues before us are (1) whether. There was a time
during the proceedings below that the Petitioners ever
prevented from exhibiting fully their case, by fraud or
deception, practiced on them by Respondents, and (2)
whether the Petitioners were kept away from the court or
kept in ignorance by the acts of the Respondent?
We find nothing of that sort. Instead, what we deduced as We
carefully delved. Into the evidentiary facts surrounding the
instant case as well as the proceedings below as shown in the
36-page Decision of the Court a quo, is that the Petitioners
were given ample time to rebut the allegations of the
Respondents and had in fact addressed every detail of.
Respondent's cause of action against them. Thus, Petitioners'
allegation of the Court a quo s lack of jurisdiction is
misplaced.
Our pronouncement on the matter finds support in the
explicit ruling of the Supreme Court in Sps. Santos, et al. v.
Sps. Lumbao, thus: It is elementary that' the active
participation of a party in a case pending against him before
a court is tantamount to recognition of that court's
jurisdiction and willingness to abide by the resolution of the
case which will bar said party from later on impugning the
courts jurisdiction. ' In fine, under the circumstances
obtaining in this case the Petitioners are stopped from
assailing the Court a quo 's lack of jurisdiction. Too, We do
not find merit in the Petitioners' second issue, supra. As
mentioned earlier, entry of judgment had already been made
on the assailed Decision and Order as early as 31 October
2007.
xxxx
It maybe that the doctrine of finality of judgments permits
certain equitable remedies such as a petition for annulment.
But the I. Rules are clear. The annulment by the Court of
Appeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil
actions of the Regional Trial Courts is resorted to only where
the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief
or other appropriate remedies are no longer available
through no fault of the petitioner, supra.
If Petitioners lost their chance to avail themselves of the
appropriate remedies or appeal before the Supreme Court,
that is their own look out. The High Tribunal has
emphatically pointed out in Mercado, et al. v. Security Bank
Corporation, thus:
A principle almost repeated to satiety is that "an action for
annulment of judgment cannot and is not a substitute for the
lost remedy ofappeal." A party must have first availed of
appeal, a motion for new trial or a petition for relief before
an action for annulment can prosper. Its obvious rationale is
to prevent the party from benefiting from his inaction or
negligence. Also, the action for annulment of judgment must
be based either on (a) extrinsic fraud or (b) lack of
jurisdiction or denial of due process. Having failed to avail
of the remedies and there being 'a Clear showing that neither
of the grounds was present, the petition must be dismissed.
Only a disgruntled litigant would find such legal disposition
unacceptable. 23 When the appellate court denied
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration in its Resolution
dated April 23, 2009, petitioner filed the instant Petition for
Review on Certiorari on June 10, 2009, invoking the
following ground:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 14, NASUGBU, BATANGAS, ACTED
WITHOUT JURISDCITION IN ENTERTAINING THE
SPECIAL PROCEEDING FOR THE SETTLEMENT OF
ESTATE OF PEDRO RINOZA AND THE CIVIL ACTION
FOR ANNULMENT OF TITLE OF THE HEIRS AND
THIRD PERSONS IN ONE PROCEEDING. 24
Petitioner asserts that while the complaint filed by
respondents was captioned as "Judicial Partition with
Annulment of Title and Recovery of Possession," the
allegations therein show that the cause of action is actually
one for settlement of estate of decedent Pedro. Considering
that settlement of estate is a special proceeding cognizable
by a probate court of limited jurisdiction while judicial
partition with annulment of title and recovery of possession
are ordinary civil actions cognizable by a court of general
jurisdiction, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in
entertaining the latter while it was sitting merely in its
probate jurisdiction. This is in view of the prohibition found
in the Rules on the joiner of special civil actions and
ordinary civil actions. 25 Thus, petitioner argued that the
ruling of the trial court is void and has no effect for having
been rendered in without jurisdiction.
Petitioner also reiterates the arguments raised before the
appellate court that since the finding of forgery relates only
to the signature of respondents and not to their co-heirs, who
assented to the conveyance, the transaction should be
considered valid as to them. Petitioner also denies the
indings of the courts below that his parents are builders in
bad faith for they only took possession of the subject
properties after the execution of the transfer documents and
after they paid the consideration on the sale.
The petition is bereft of merit. Petitioner maintains that
since. Respondents complaint alleged the following causes
of action, the same is actually one for settlement of estate
and not of judicial partition: FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
1. That Pedro L. Rifi.oza, Filipino and resident of
Nasugbu, Batangas at the time of his death, died
intestate on November 16, 1989. Copy of his death
certificate is hereto attached as Annex "A";
 2. That Plaintiffs together with the Defendants
enumerated from paragraph 2-A to 2-J are the only
known heirs of the above-mentioned decedent. The
plaintiffs and the Defendants Rolando, Rafael,
Antonio, Angelita, Loma all surnamed Rifioza, and
Myrna R. Limon or Myrna R. Rogador, Epifania
Belo and Ma. Theresa R. Demafelix are the
decedents legitimate children with his first wife,
while Benita Tenorio Rifioza, is the decedents
widow and Bernadette Rifioza, the decedent's
daughter with said widow. As such, said parties are
co-owners by virtue of an intestate inheritance from
the decedent, of the properties enumerated in the
succeeding paragraph;
3. That the decedent left the following real
properties all located in Nasugbu, Batangas:
xxxx
16. That the estate of decedent Pedro L. Rifioza has
no known legal indebtedness;
17. That said estate remains undivided up to this date
and it will be to the best interest of all heirs that it be
partitioned judicially. 26.
Petitioner is mistaken. It is true that some of respondents'
causes of action pertaining to the properties left behind by
the decedent Pedro, his known heirs, and the nature and
extent of their interests thereon may fall under an action for
settlement of estate. However, a complete reading of the
complaint would readily show that, based on the nature of
the suit, the llegations therein, and the reliefs prayed for, the
action, is clearly one for udicial partition with annulment of
title and recovery of possession.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court proyides:
RULE 74
Summary Settlement of Estate
Section 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between
heirs. - If the decedent left no will and no debts and the heirs
are all of age5 or the minors are represented by their judicial
or legal representatives duly authorized for the purpose, the
parties may without securing letters of administration, divide
the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a
public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds,
and should they disagree, they may do so in an ordinary
action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may
adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an
affidavit filled in the office of the register of deeds. The
parties to an Extrajudicial settlement, whether by public
instrument or by stipulation in a pending action for partition,
or the sole heir who adjudicates the entire estate to himself
by means of an affidavit shall file, simultaneously with and
as a condition precedent to the filing of the public
instrument, or stipulation in the action for partition, or of the
affidavit in the office of the register of deeds, a bond with
the said register of deeds, in an amount equivalent to the
value of the personal property involved as certified to under
oath by the parties concerned and conditioned upon the
payment of any just claim that may be filed under section 4
of this rule. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no
debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of
administration within two (2) years after the death of the
decedent.
The fact of the Extrajudicial settlement or administration
shall be Published in a newspaper of general circulation in
the manner provided in the next succeeding section; but no
Extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person
who has not participated therein or had no notice thereof. 27
In this relation, Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court
provides:
Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate. - A
person having the right to compel the partition of real estate
may do so as provided in this Rule, setting forth in his
complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate
description of the real estate of which partition is demanded
and joining as defendants all other persons interested in the
property. 28
As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the
allegations of respondents in their complaint are but
customary, in fact, mandatory, to a complaint for partition of
real estate. Particularly, the complaint alleged: (1) that Pedro
died intestate; (2) that respondents, together with their co-
heirs, are all of legal age, with the exception of one who is
represented by a judicial representative duly authorized for
the purpose; (3) that the heirs enumerated are the only
known heirs of Pedro; (4) that there is an account and
description of all real properties left by Pedro; (5) that
Pedro's estate has no known indebtedness; and (6) that
respondents, as rightful heirs to the decedents estate, pray
for the partition of the same in accordance with the laws of
intestacy. It is clear, therefore, that based on the allegations
of the complaint, the case is one for judicial partition. That
the complaint alleged causes of action identifying the heirs
of the decedent, properties of the estate, and their rights
thereto, does not perforce make it an action for settlement of
estate.
It must be recalled that the general rule is that when a person
dies intestate, or, if testate, failed to name an executor in his
will or the executor o named is incompetent, or refuses the
trust, or. Fails to furnish the bond equipped by the Rules of
Court, then the decedent's estate shall be judicially
administered and the competent court shall appoint a
qualified administrator the order established in Section 6 of
Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. 29An exception to this rule,
however, is found in the aforequoted Section 1 of Rule 4
wherein the heirs of a decedent, who left no will and no
debts due from is estate, may divide the estate either
extrajudicially or in an ordinary action or partition without
submitting the same for judicial administration nor applying
for the appointment of an administrator by the court. 30 The
reasons that where the deceased dies without pending
obligations, there is no necessity for the appointment of an
administrator to administer the. Estate for hem and to
deprive the real owners of their possession to which they are
immediately entitled. 31
In this case, it was expressly alleged in the complaint, and
was not isputed, that Pedro died without a will, leaving his
estate without any ending obligations. Thus, contrary to
petitioners contention, respondents were under no legal
obligation to submit the subject properties of the estate of a
special proceeding for settlement of intestate estate, and are,
in fact, encouraged to have the same partitioned, judicially or
extrajudicially, by ereira v. Court of Appeals: 32
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Revised Rules of Court, however,
does not preclude the heirs from instituting administration
proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligations, if
they do not desire to resort for good reasons to an ordinary
action for partition. While Section 1 allows the heirs to
divide the estate among themselves as they may see fit, qr. to
resort to an ordinary action for partition, the said provision
does not compel them to do so if they have good reasons to
take a different course of action. It should be noted that
recourse to an administration proceeding even if the estate
has no debts is sanctioned only if the heirs have good
reasons for not resorting to an action for partition. Where
partition is possible, either in or out of court, the estate
should not be burdened with an administration proceeding
without good and compelling reasons.
Thus, it has been repeatedly 4eld that when a person dies
without leaving pending obligations to be paid, his heirs,
whether of age or not, are not bound to submit the property
to a judicial administration, which is always long and costly,
or to apply for the appointment of an administrator by the
Court. It has been uniformly held that in such case the
judicial administration and the appointment of an
administrator are superfluous and unnecessary
proceedings. 33
Thus, respondents committed no error in. filing an action for
judicial partition instead of a special proceeding for the
settlement of estate as law expressly permits the
same.1avvphi1 That the complaint contained allegations
inherent in an action for settlement of estate does not. Mean
that there was a prohibited joined of causes of action for
questions as to the estate's properties as well as a
determination of the heirs, their status as such, and the nature
and extent of their titles to the estate, may also be properly
ventilated in partition proceedings alone.34 In fact, a
complete inventory of the estate may likewise be done
during the partition proceedings, especially since the estate
has no debts.~5 Indeed, where the more expeditious remedy
9f partition is available to the heirs, then they may not be
compelled to submit to administration proceedings,
dispensing of the risks of delay and of the properties being
dissipated. 36
Moreover, the fact that respondents' complaint also prayed
for the annulment of title and recovery of possession does
not strip the trial court off of its jurisdiction to hear and
decide the case. Asking for the annulment of certain transfers
of property could very well be achieved in an action for
partition, 37 as can be seen in cases where 1-ourts determine
the parties' rights arising from complaints asking not only for
the partition of estates but also for the annulment of titles
and recovery of ownership and possession of property. 38 In
fact, in Bagayas v. Bagayas, 39wherein a complaint for
annulment of sale and partition was dismissed by the trial
court due to the impropriety of an action for annulment as it
constituted a collateral attack on the certificates of title of the
respondents therein, this Court found the dismissal to be
improper in the following manner:
In Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr. (Lacbayan) which is an action. For
partition premised on the existence or non-existence of co-
ownership between the parties, the Court categorically
pronounced that a resolution on the issue of ownership does
not subject the Torrens title issued over the disputed realties
'to a collateral attack. It must be borne in mind that what
cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and
not the title itself. As pronounced in Lacbayan:
There is no dispute that a Torrens certificate of title cannot
be collaterally attacked, but that rule is not material to the
case at bar. What cannot be collaterally attacked is the
certificate of title and not the title itself. The' certificate
referred to is that -document issued by the Register of Deeds
known as the TCT. In contrast, the title referred to by law
means ownership, which is, more often than not, represented
by that document. Petitioner c.pparently confuses title with
the certificate of title. Title as a concept of ownership should
not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of
such ownership although both are interchangeably used.
(Emphases supplied)
Thus, the RTC erroneously dismissed petitioner's petition for
annulment of sale on the ground that it constituted a
collateral attack since she was actually assailing Rogelio and
Orlando's title to the subject lands and not any Torrens
certificate oftitle over the same.
Indeed, an action for partition does not preclude the
settlement of the issue of ownership. In fact, the
determination as to the existence of the same is necessary in
the resolution of an action for partition, as held in
Municipality of Bifzanv. Garcia: 40
The first phase of a partition and/or accounting suit is taken
up with the determination of whether or not a co-ownership
in fact exists, and a partition is proper (i.e., not otherwise
legally proscribed) and may be made by voluntary
agreement of all the parties interested in the property. This
phase may end with a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled
to have a partition either because a co-ownership does not
exist, or partition is_ legally prohibited. It may end, on the
other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-ownership does in
truth exist, partition is proper in the premises and an
accounting of rents and profits received by the defendant
from the real estate in question is in order. x x x
The second phase commences when it appears that "the
parties are unable to agree upon the partition" directed by the
court. In that event [,] partition shall be done for the parties
by the [c] ourt with the assistance of not more than three (3)
commissioners. This second stage may well also deal with
the rendition of the accounting itself and its approval by the
[c] ourt after the. Parties have been accorded opportunity to
be heard Thereon, and an award for the recovery by the party
or parties thereto entitled of their just share in the rents and
profits of the real estate in question. xx x. 41
An action for partition, therefore, is premised on the
existence or non-existence of co-ownership between the
parties. 42 Unless and until the issue of co-ownership is
definitively resolved, it would be premature to effect a
partition of an estate. 43
In view of the foregoing, petitioner' s argument that the trial
court acted without jurisdiction in entertaining the action of
settlement of estate and annulment of title in a single
proceeding is clearly erroneous for the instant complaint is
precisely one for judicial partition with annulment of title
and recovery of possession, filed within the confines of
applicable law and jurisprudence. Under Section 144 of
Republic Act No. 7691 (RA 7691),45 amending Batas
Pambansa Big. 129, the RTC shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction over all civil actions in which the
subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
Since the action herein was not merely for partition and
recovery of ownership but also for annulment of title and
documents, the action is incapable of pecuniary estimation
and thus cognizable by the RTC. Hence, considering that the
trial court clearly had jurisdiction in rendering its decision,
the instant petition for annulment of judgment must
necessarily fail.
Note that even if the instant action was one for annulment of
title alone, without the prayer for judicial partition, the
requirement of instituting a separate special proceeding for
the determination of the status and rights of the respondents
as putative heirs may be dispensed with, in light of the fact
that the parties had voluntarily submitted the issue to the trial
court and had already presented evidence regarding the issue
of heirship. 46 In Portugal v. Portugal-Beltran, 47 the Court
explained:
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly
that she was the sole heir to Portugal's estate, executed on
February 15, 1988 the questioned Affidavit of Adjudication
under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the
Revised Rules of Court. Said rule is an exception to the
general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it
should be judicially administered and the competent court
should appoint a qualified administrator, in the order
established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no
will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor therein.
xxxx
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only
property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan
parcel of land, to still subject it, under the circumstances of
the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence,
not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners as
heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate
with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding.
And it is superfluous in light of the fact that the parties to the
evil case - subject of the present case, could and had already
in fact presented evidence before the trial court which
assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined
during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there
being no compelling reason to still subject Portugals estate
to administration proceedings since a determination of
petitioners status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case
filed by petitioners, the trial court should proceed to evaluate
the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and
render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during
pre-trial, x x x. 48
Thus, in view of the clarity of respondents' complaint and the
causes of action alleged therein, as well as the fact that the
trial court, in arriving at its decision, gave petitioner more
than ample opportunity to advance his claims, petitioner
cannot now be permitted to allege lack of jurisdiction just
because the judgment rendered was adverse to them. To
repeat, the action filed herein is one for judicial partition and
not for settlement of intestate estate. Consequently, that
respondents also prayed for the annulment of title and
recovery of possession in the same proceeding does not strip
the court off of its jurisdiction for asking for 'the annulment
of certain transfers of property could very well be achieved
in an action for partition.
As for petitioner's contention that the sale must be
considered valid as to the heirs who assented to the
conveyance as well as their allegation of good faith, this
Court does not find any compelling reason to deviate from
the ruling of the appellate court. As sufficiently found by
both courts below, the authenticity and due execution of the
documents on which petitioners claims are based were
inadequately proven. They were undated, forged, and
acknowledged before a notary public who was not
commissioned as such on the date they were executed. They
were never presented to the Register of Deeds for
registration. Neither were the supposed notaries and buyers
of the subject properties presented as witnesses.
While it may be argued that Benita, one of the co-heirs to the
estate, actually acknowledged the sale of the resort, the
circumstances surrounding the same militate against the fact
of its occurrence. Not only was the Deed of Sale supposedly
executed by Benita undated and unsigned by Pedro, but the
document she presented purportedly evidencing her receipt
of her share in the sale, did not refer to any sort of sale but to
a previous loan obtained by Pedro and Benita from a bank.
Moreover, credence must be given on the appellate courts
observations as to petitioners' actuations insofar as the
transactions alleged herein are concerned. First, they were
seemingly uncertain as to the number and/or identity of the
properties bought by them. 49 In their Answer, they gave the
impression 'that they bought both the resort and the family
home and yet, during trial, Francisco Villafria claimed they
only bought the resort. In fact, it was only then that they
presented the subject Extra Judicial Settlement and Deed of
Sale. 50 Second, they never presented any other document
which w0uld evidence their actual payment of consideration
to the selling heirs. 51Third, in spite of the. Blatant legal
infirmities of the subject documents of conveyance,
petitioners still took possession of the properties, demolished
several cottages, and introduced permanent improvements
thereon.
In all, the Court agrees with the appellate court: that
petitioners failed to adequately substantiate, with
convincing, credible and independently verifiable proof,
their claim that they had, in fact, purchased the subject
properties. The circumstances surrounding the purported
transfers cast doubt on whether they actually took place. In
substantiating their claim, petitioners relied solely on the
Extra-Judicial Settlement and Deed of Sale, who utterly
failed to prove their authenticity and due execution. They
cannot, therefore, be permitted to claim. Absolute ownership
of the subject lands based on the same.
Neither can they be considered as innocent purchasers for
value and builders in good faith. Good faith consists in the
belief of title builder that the land the latter is building on is
one's own without knowledge of any defect or flaw in one's.
Title. 52 However, in view of .the manifest defects in the
instruments conveying their titles, petitioners should have
been placed on guard. Yet, they still demolished several
cottages and constructed improvement on the properties.
Thus, their claim of. Good faith cannot be given credence.
Indeed, a judgment which has acquired finality becomes
immutable and unalterable, hence, may no longer be
modified in any respect except to correct clerical errors or
mistakes, all the issues between the parties being deemed
resolved and. laid to rest. 53 it is a fundamental principle in
our judicial system and essential to an effective and efficient
administration of justice that, once a judgment has become
final, the winning party be, not through a mere subterfuge,
deprived of the fruits of the verdict. 54 Exceptions to the
immutability of final judgment is allowed only under the
most extraordinary of circumstances. 55 Yet, when petitioner
is given more than ample opportunity to be heard,
unbridled access to the appellate courts, as well as unbiased
judgments rendered after a consideration of evidence
presented by the parties, as in the case at hand, the Court
shall refrain from reversing the rulings of the courts below in
the absence of any showing that the same were rendered
with fraud or lack of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, .the instant petition is
DENIED. The Decision and Resolution, dated March 13,
2009 and April 23, 2009, respectively, of the Court Appeals
for CA-G.R. SP No. 107347, which affirmed the Judgment
dated October 1, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court of
Nasugbu, Batangas, Branch 14, in Civil Case No. 217,
insofar as it conce1ns the resort covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title No. 513 54 and No. 51355, and family
home covered by TCT No. 40807 and 40808, are
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.