EVIDENCE-Substantial Evidence

Somollo, Deanne Mitzi LLB 3A

1) Asian International Manpower Services, Inc., v. DOLE

Facts: Surveillance was conducted by the Anti-Illegal Recruitment Branch of the

POEA on Asian International Manpower Services, Inc. (AIMS) with office address at
1653 Taft Avenue comer Pedro Gil Street, Malate, Manila to determine whether it
was operating as a recruitment agency despite the cancellation of its license on
August 28, 2006. As there was no pertinent information obtained a second
surveillance was recommended. This time the POEA operatives observed that there
were people standing outside its main entrance, and there were announcements of
job vacancies posted on the main glass door of the office. Through the flyer, they
learned that AIMS was hiring hotel workers for deployment to Macau and grape
pickers for California. The POEA operatives later confirmed through the POEA
Verification System that AIMS had regained its license and good standing on
December 6, 2006, but that it had no existing approved job orders yet at that time.
A Show Cause Order was thereafter issued. In compliance thereto, Danilo P. Pelagio,
AIMS President, wrote to the POEA on April 3, 2007 maintaining that AIMS was not
liable for any recruitment misrepresentation. It was alleged by Pelagio that the
poseurs were advised that there were no job vacancies yet and this was also
admitted by the poseurs. POEA held AIMS liable. AIMS filed a motion for
reconsideration before the DOLE. It alleged that its right to due process was violated
because the POEA did not furnish it with a copy of the Surveillance Report dated
February 21, 2007, which was the basis of the POEA Administrator's factual findings,
DOLE affirmed the order of the POEA, asserting that due process was observed. It
cited AIMS's letter-answer to POEA's Show Cause Order dated April 3, 2007 denying
POEA's charge of misrepresentation.

Issue: Whether or not the right to due process was violated

Ruling: Yes, the right of AIMS to due process was violated. The CA overlooked the
crucial fact that, as the POEA itself admitted, it did not furnish AIMS with a copy of
its Surveillance Report dated February 21, 2007, which contains the factual
allegations of misrepresentation supposedly committed by AIMS. It is
incomprehensible why the POEA would neglect to furnish AIMS with a copy of the
said report, since other than the fact that AIMS was represented at the hearing on
May 9, 2007, there is no showing that Lugatiman was apprised of the contents
thereof. In fact, as AIMS now claims, the alleged recruitment flyer distributed to its
applicants was not even presented.

Doctrine Ruling on Evidence:

It is true that in administrative proceedings, as in the case above, only substantial

evidence is needed, or such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. Unfortunately, there is no evidence against AIMS
to speak of, much less substantial evidence. Clearly, AIMS 's right to be informed of
the charges against it, and its right to be held liable only upon substantial evidence,
have both been gravely violated.

The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to

administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity
to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. In the application of
the principle of due process, what is sought to be safeguarded is not lack of
previous notice but the denial of the opportunity to be heard.

Due process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and
given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. The observance of fairness in the
conduct of an investigation is at the very heart of procedural due process. As long
 EVIDENCE-Substantial Evidence
Somollo, Deanne Mitzi LLB 3A
as he is given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he is not denied
due process. In administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving
reasonable opportunity to the person charged to answer the accusations against
him constitute the minimum requirements of due process.

2) Republic v. Arias

Facts: Florendo B. Arias was the Assistant Bureau Director of the Bureau of
Equipment (BOE), Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWIH). Respondent,
along with other DPWH officials Burt B. Favorito, Director of Administrative
Manpower and Management Service; Emily M. Tanquintic, Director of
Comptrollership and Financial Management Service; Oscar D. Abundo, Director of
Legal Service; Abraham S. Divina, Jr., Director of BOE, and several unnamed
presidential and non-presidential appointees of DPWH, were charged with violation
of Republic Act No. 3019 and of Republic Act No. 6713. Respondent denied the
charges that capital outlay funds were wrongfully used for emergency repairs of
DPWH-owned vehicles because according to the Department of Budget and
Management, emergency repairs of service/motor vehicles may be charged against
the 3.5% Engineering and Overhead of the projects of DPWH. The PAGC found the
respondent liable for the offenses charged. His appeal to the Office of the President
also yielded the same result. Upon appeal to the CA the petition and the
administrative charges filed against respondent were dismissed.

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in acquitting the respondent.

Ruling: The CA is wrong. It hinges its ruling on the following: after examination and
evaluation of the pertinent documents, the appellate court found no sufficient basis
to hold respondent administratively liable. The appellate court observed that the
aforesaid documents appear to be regular on their faces as the requisite signatures
of the proper officials, particularly the three members of the Special Inspectorate
Team who were tasked to conduct pre-repair and post-repair inspection of the
subject vehicles appear thereon, and it was only after inspection of these
documents did respondent recommend the approval of the emergency repair of the
three (3) service vehicles and the payment thereof. However the evidence as
presented clearly established the guilt of Arias. He cannot escape liability when
faced with glaring evidence of the irregularity he thus committed.

Doctrine Ruling on Evidence:

The quantum of evidence necessary to find an individual administratively liable in

administrative cases is substantial evidence.

Substantial evidence does not necessarily mean preponderant proof as required in

ordinary civil cases, but such kind of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion or evidence commonly accepted by
reasonably prudent men in the conduct of their affairs. The respondent cannot be
exonerated from administrative liability for mere reliance on his subordinates in
view of the glaring irregularities on the documents.

While respondent is not expected to scrutinize each and every transaction covered
by the RSEs and other documents, he should have at least verified the contents of
these documents and seen to it that each requisition complied with existing
safeguards on emergency purchases and/or repairs.
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Somollo, Deanne Mitzi LLB 3A
The failure of respondent to exercise his functions diligently when he recommended
for approval documents for emergency repair and purchase in the absence of the
signature and certification by the enduser, in complete disregard of existing DPWH
rules, constitute gross neglect of duty and grave misconduct which undoubtedly
resulted in loss of public funds thereby causing undue injury to the government.