Documenti di Didattica
Documenti di Professioni
Documenti di Cultura
1. Capa v. CA DOMINGO NEYPES, LUZ FAUSTINO, ROGELIO FAUSTINO, LOLITO W/N petitioners timely filed their appeal Yes. This case established the fresh
VICTORIANO, JACOB OBANIA AND DOMINGO CABACUNGAN, Petitioners v. period rule for appeals under Rules 40-43 and 45. So the 15-day period is counted
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF BERNARDO DEL MUNDO, LAND BANK from the receipt of the denial of the MR, which is considered as a final order in
OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON. ANTONIO N. ROSALES, Presiding Judge, itself (or the decision itself in case no MR was filed).
Branch 43, RTC, Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, Respondents.
BP 129, as amended, provides:
Petitioners Domingo Neypes, et al. filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of Sec. 39. Appeals. The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards,
land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC, judgments, or decisions of any court in all these cases shall be fifteen (15) days
Branch 43, of Roxas against the Bureau of Forest Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or
of the Philippines and the heirs of Bernardo del Mundo. decision appealed from. Provided, however, that in habeas corpus cases, the period
for appeal shall be (48) forty-eight hours from the notice of judgment appealed
The parties filed several motions: (1) the motion filed by petitioners to declare the respondent from. x x x
heirs, the Bureau of Lands and the Bureau of Forest Development in default and (2) the
motions to dismiss filed by the respondent heirs and the Land Bank of the Philippines, Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure states:
respectively. SEC. 3. Period of ordinary appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen
(15) days from the notice of the judgment or final order appealed from. Where
RTC resolved the foregoing motions as follows: (1) the petitioners motion to declare a record on appeal is required, the appellant shall file a notice of appeal and a
respondents Bureau of Lands and Bureau of Forest Development in default was granted for record on appeal within thirty (30) days from the notice of judgment or final order.
their failure to file an answer, but denied as against the respondent heirs of del Mundo The period to appeal shall be interrupted by a timely motion for new trial or
because the substituted service of summons on them was improper; (2) the Land Banks reconsideration. No motion for extension of time to file a motion for new trial or
motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action was denied because there were hypothetical reconsideration shall be allowed.
admissions and matters that could be determined only after trial, and (3) the motion to dismiss
filed by respondent heirs of del Mundo, based on prescription, was also denied because there Based on the foregoing, an appeal should be taken within 15 days from the notice
were factual matters that could be determined only after trial. of judgment or final order appealed from. A final judgment or order is one that
finally disposes of a case, leaving nothing more for the court to do with
The respondent heirs filed a motion for reconsideration of the order denying their motion to respect to it. It is adjudication on the merits, which, considering the evidence
dismiss on the ground that the trial court could very well resolve the issue of prescription presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the
from the bare allegations of the complaint itself without waiting for the trial proper. parties are; or it may be an order or judgment that dismisses an action.
[Important] In an order dated February 12, 1998, the trial court dismissed petitioners ITC: Petitioners argue that the order of July 1, 1998 denying their motion for
complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly reconsideration should be construed as the final order, not the February 12, 1998
received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day order which dismissed their complaint. Since they received their copy of the denial
thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a motion for reconsideration. On July 1, 1998, the of their motion for reconsideration only on July 22, 1998, the 15-day reglementary
trial court issued another order dismissing the motion for reconsideration which petitioners period to appeal had not yet lapsed when they filed their notice of appeal on July
received on July 22, 1998. Five days later, on July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of 27, 1998.
appeal (not mentioned in the case pero jic sir asks, siguro Rule 41 to kasi RTC to CA) and
paid the appeal fees on August 3, 1998. SC sustained petitioners view that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their
motion for reconsideration was the final order contemplated in the Rules.
RTC: denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late.
We now come to the next question: if July 1, 1998 was the start of the 15-day
MR denied. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65. reglementary period to appeal, did petitioners in fact file their notice of appeal on
Petitioners claimed that they had seasonably filed their notice of appeal. They argued that the time?
In previous cases, the SC ruled that there is no fresh period. In Quelnan and
Apuyan, both petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the
trial court. SC ruled there that they only had the remaining time of the 15-day
appeal period to file the notice of appeal. SC consistently applied this rule in
similar cases, premised on the long-settled doctrine that the perfection of an appeal
in the manner and within the period permitted by law is not only mandatory but
also jurisdictional.
However, to standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford
litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to
allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the
Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a
new trial or motion for reconsideration. This fresh period rule shall also apply to
Rule 40 governing appeals from the Municipal Trial Courts to the Regional Trial
Courts; Rule 42 on petitions for review from the Regional Trial Courts to the
Court of Appeals; Rule 43 on appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of
Appeals and Rule 45 governing appeals by certiorari to the Supreme Court. The
new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to be counted from
receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration
(whether full or partial) or any final order or resolution.
We thus hold that petitioners seasonably filed their notice of appeal within the
fresh period of 15 days, counted from July 22, 1998 (the date of receipt of notice
denying their motion for reconsideration). This pronouncement is not inconsistent
with Rule 41, Section 3 of the Rules which states that the appeal shall be taken
within 15 days from notice of judgment or final order appealed from. The use of
the disjunctive word or signifies disassociation and independence of one thing
from another. The use of or in the above provision supposes that the notice of
appeal may be filed within 15 days from the notice of judgment or within 15 days
from notice of the final order, which we already determined to refer to the July 1,
1998 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration.
To recapitulate, a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days
from receipt of the Regional Trial Courts decision or file it within 15 days from
Petitioners here filed their notice of appeal on July 27, 1998 or five days from
receipt of the order denying their motion for reconsideration on July 22, 1998.
Hence, the notice of appeal was well within the fresh appeal period of 15 days, as
already discussed.
Other doctrines:
The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a
statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance
with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must
comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss
of the right to appeal. The period to appeal is fixed by both statute (BP 129) and
procedural rules (Rules of Court).
Prior to the passage of BP 129, Rule 41, Section 3 of the 1964 Revised Rules of
Court read:
Sec. 3. How appeal is taken. Appeal maybe taken by serving upon the adverse
party and filing with the trial court within thirty (30) days from notice of
order or judgment, a notice of appeal, an appeal bond, and a record on
appeal. The time during which a motion to set aside the judgment or order or for
new trial has been pending shall be deducted, unless such motion fails to satisfy
the requirements of Rule 37.
But where such motion has been filed during office hours of the last day of the
period herein provided, the appeal must be perfected within the day following that
in which the party appealing received notice of the denial of said motion.
(emphasis supplied)
2. Navaros v. CHARITO NAVAROSA, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, [NOT RELEVANT] Issue on filing fees.
Comelec HONORABLE DEAN R. TELAN, AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL Estoppel has set in precluding petitioner Navarosa from questioning the
COURT, BRANCH 9, KALIBO, AKLAN AND ROGER M. ESTO, RESPONDENTS. incomplete payment of the COMELEC filing fee, and in effect assailing the
exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court over the election protest. At this stage, the
The trial court granted respondent Esto's motion subject to the filing of a P300,000 bond. [Ramas v. COMELEC] summarized the circumstances qualifying as "good
However, in the same order, the trial court also granted petitioner Navarosa's prayer to stay reasons" justifying execution pending appeal:
the execution pending appeal, upon filing a P600,000 supersedeas bond. (1) the public interest involved or the will of the electorate;
Unlike Sec. 2, Rule 39 where the grant of execution pending appeal is (2) the shortness of the remaining portion of the term of the contested office; and
conditioned upon the presence of the "good and valid reason" for its grant, (3) the length of time that the election contest has been pending.
Sec. 3, Rule 39 does not provide for any condition precedent before the
discretionary execution of Rule 2 may be stayed. All that it requires is that a ITC: The trial court in the present case, relying on cases reviewed in Ramas,
sufficient supersedeas bond must be approved by the court conditioned upon invoked two "good reasons" to justify its order allowing execution pending appeal.
the performance of the judgment allowed to be executed in case it shall be First, the order will "give substance and meaning to the people's mandate."
finally sustained in whole or in part. Under this section, therefore, the filing of Second, "more than 10 months or nearly 1/3 of the 3-year term" of the office in
a supersedeas bond sufficient in amount is enough to stay the execution question had already lapsed. The COMELEC found these "good reasons"
granted under Sec. 2. sufficient.
(Both MRed. Both denied)
WoN Section 3 Rule 39 is applicable to Election Protest Cases. NO
Respondent Esto filed a petition for certiorari with the COMELEC against the Order. Unlike the Election Code of 1971,[27] which expressly provided for execution
Petitioner Navarosa raised for the first time the issue of the trial court's failure to acquire pending appeal of trial courts' rulings in election protests, the present election laws
jurisdiction over the election protest because of respondent Esto's failure to pay the are silent on such remedy. Nevertheless, Section 2, Rule 39 ("Section 2") of the
COMELEC filing fee. Rules of Court (now 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) applies in suppletory
character to election cases, thus allowing execution pending appeal in the
COMELEC Second Division: affirmed the trial court's Order granting execution pending discretion of the court.
appeal and nullified the stay of the execution. By granting the immediate execution, the RTC
recognized that the "good reasons" cited in the questioned Order constitute superior In election contests involving elective municipal officials, which are cognizable by
circumstances demanding urgency that will outweigh the injuries or damages to the adverse courts of general jurisdiction; and those involving elective barangay officials,
party if the decision is reversed. By declaring that petitioner Esto is the duly elected Mayor of which are cognizable by courts of limited jurisdiction, execution of judgment
Libacao, Aklan, the trial court gave substance and meaning to the people's mandate as pending appeal under Section 2 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court are permissible
expressed in the ballot, especially since it has established petitioner Esto's right to the office. pursuant to Rule 143 of the Rules of Court, which is now Section 4, Rule 1 of the
The trial court cannot indirectly reverse its substantial finding of "good reasons" by a rule of 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
procedure which does not strictly apply in election protest cases when it allowed the filing of
a supersedeas bond under Section 3, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. To allow SEC 4. In what cases not applicable.- These Rules shall not
the application of the said procedural relief would defeat the right of the winning candidate in apply to election cases, land registration, cadastral,
R64 to SC As to election cases involving regional, provincial, and city officials, which fall
within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the COMELEC, Section 3 of Article
IX-C of the Constitution vests the COMELEC with the authority to promulgate its
rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies.
Thus, a primordial public interest to obviate a hollow victory for the duly
elected candidate as determined by the trial court lies behind the present rule
giving suppletory application to Section 2. Only a more compelling contrary
policy consideration can prevent the suppletory application of Section 2.
Petitioner: insists that the simple expedient of posting a supersedeas bond can stay
execution pending appeal. Petitioner Navarosa neither claims nor offers a more
compelling contrary policy consideration. Instead, she merely contends that
Section 3 of Rule 39 ("Section 3") applies also in a suppletory character because
its "Siamese twin" provision, Section 2, is already being so applied.
Such simplistic reasoning both ignores and negates the public interest underlying
Section 2's application. We cannot countenance such argument.
Furthermore, a supersedeas bond under Section 3 cannot fully protect the interests
of the prevailing party in election protest cases.
Such bond, in the event the appealed case is affirmed and the execution pending
appeal is proven to be meritorious, cannot adequately answer for the deprivation of
a duly elected candidate of his post, and his constituents of their leader of
choice, such deprivation being unquantifiable.
ITC: the supersedeas bond petitioner Navarosa filed can only answer for that
portion of the trial court's ruling ordering her to pay to respondent Esto actual
damages, attorney's fees and the cost of the suit. It cannot secure execution of that
portion proclaiming respondent Esto duly elected mayor
3. International INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, INC. (MANILA), PETITIONER, VS. HON. COURT OF W/N special civil action for certiorari filed before the CA to assail an order for
School v. CA APPEALS, SPOUSES ALEX AND OPHELIA TORRALBA, RESPONDENTS. execution pending appeal was proper - YES
RTC-QC rendered a decision in Civil Case involving a Complaint for Damages due to the SC: Certiorari lies against an order granting execution pending appeal where the
death of plaintiffs' (Sps. Torralba) only son, Ericson, while in the custody of ISM and its same is not founded upon good reasons. Also, the fact that the losing party had
officers. It found ISM liable to pay plaintiffs damages (moral-4M; exemplary-1M; actual-2M; appealed from the judgment does not bar the certiorari action filed in respondent
and attys fees-300k). court as the appeal could not be an adequate remedy from such premature
execution.
ISM appealed to the CA. During its pendency, Sps. Torralba filed a motion for execution
pending appeal before the lower court on the grounds that the appeal is merely dilatory and That petitioner could have resorted to a supersedeas bond to prevent execution
that the filing of a bond is another good reason for the execution of a judgment pending pending appeal, as suggested by the two lower courts, is not to be held against
appeal. ISM filed its opposition. him. The filing of such bond does not entitle him to the suspension of
execution as a matter of right. It cannot, therefore, be categorically considered as
RTC granted execution pending appeal upon the posting of a bond of Php5M by Sps. a plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Hence, no rule requires a losing party so
Torralba. Pursuant to the writ of execution, ISM's bank deposits with Citibank in the amount circumstanced to adopt such remedy in lieu or before availment of other remedial
of P5,500,000.00 were placed on 'hold/pledge'. options at hand.
In the meantime, ISM filed MR or for approval of supersedeas of Php5.6M. Furthermore, a rational interpretation of Section 3, Rule 39 should be that the
requirement for a supersedeas bond presupposes that the case presents a
RTC issued an order directing Citibank to release to the Deputy Sheriff in cash or check the presumptively valid occasion for discretionary execution. Otherwise, even if no
amount of Php5.5M subject of the Notice of Garnishment. The following day, Sps. Torralba good reason exists to warrant advance execution, the prevailing party could
filed an urgent ex parte motion to encash and receive the proceeds of the amount garnished in unjustly compel the losing party to post a supersedeas bond through the simple
execution. expedient of filing a motion for, and the trial court improvidently granting, a writ
of execution pending appeal although the situation is violative of Section 2, Rule
However, ISM filed an urgent motion to stop delivery of garnished funds to Sps. Torralba. 39. This could not have been the intendment of the rule, hence we give our
RTC issued an Order suspending the execution process there being no opposition filed in imprimatur to the propriety of petitioner's action for certiorari in respondent
ISM filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. ISM sought the nullification of the SC: It must be stressed that Sps. Torralbas motion/application for an execution
assailed orders for having been issued in excess of jurisdiction and with GAD. pending appeal was premised on the ff: that the appeal was being taken for
purpose of delay and that they are filing a bond, which grounds were adopted by
CA: DISMISSED the petition for lack of merit in that the grounds relied upon by the RTC in the RTC in granting the motion.
granting execution pending appeal, and which were raised by the plaintiffs-spouses in their
motion - that the appeal taken by the defendant school is merely dilatory and the filing of a In upholding the writ of execution pending appeal, CA observed that the lower
bond - constitute good reasons. CA agreed with the lower court that ISM's appeal appears to court had, prior to its issuance, duly noted the presence of the circumstances laid
be dilatory in view of its "virtual admission of fault when it adopted the project "Code Red" down by Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, allowing execution as an
consisting of safety and emergency measures, only after the death of plaintiffs-spouses exception, or pending appeal, even before final judgment, to wit:
Torralba's only son"; and that the delay has already affected the plaintiffs-spouses Torralba (a) There must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse
financially. CA also denied ISMs MR. party;
(b) There must be good reasons for issuing the execution; and
(c) The good reasons must be stated in a special order.
CA also accepted as `good reasons' that ISM's appeal appears to be dilatory in
view of its virtual admission of fault when it adopted the project "Code Red" only
after the death of Sps. Torralba's son, and the delay of the case which already
affected the Torralbas financially.
ITC: The "admission of fault or negligence" adverted to in the RTCs order and
subsequently adopted by CA in its decision, was based on the ff exchange between
the spouses' counsel and ISM's swimming coach, to wit:
"ATTY. GUERRERO: Issue of Vol. 48, No. 2 of October 1993.
Mr. Reloj, you said that you have read this. There is here an article which says on
the front page "Introducing Code Red." And in this article it says and I quote "It
was introduced last year by the administration to prevent further incidents like the
tragic death of Freshman Ericson Torralba in August 1991 who collapsed while
taking the swimming competency test.
Due to school's lack of emergency procedures and equipments, valuable time was
lost in coordinating medical efforts in bringing him to the Makati Medical Center.
WITNESS: Yes, I read that portion.
Q. That's all I want from you.
Now likewise Mr. Witness on page 8 or Exhibit AA, by the way your Honor, may
For purposes only of determining the correctness of the writ of execution pending
appeal, we cannot see how the lower courts came upon the conclusion of virtual
admission of fault or negligence by ISM based on the above-quoted exchange
where ISM's swimming coach admitted that he read the school paper article
introducing "Code Red". As correctly pointed out by ISM, the article was not an
official statement of the school, but merely an opinion of its author. Moreover, we
cannot see how the statement that he read the article on "Code Red" can be
construed as an admission of liability by the school. Clearly then, the conclusion
of the lower courts that the appeal is dilatory based solely on the foregoing
exchange rests on shaky ground.
DOCTRINE: The mere filing of a bond by the successful party is not a good
reason for ordering execution pending appeal, as "a combination of circumstances
is the dominant consideration which impels the grant of immediate execution, the
requirement of a bond is imposed merely as an additional factor, no doubt for the
protection of the defendant's creditor." Since we have already ruled that the
reason that an appeal is dilatory does not justify execution pending appeal,
neither does the filing of a bond, without anything more, justify the same.
The Court also held that awards for moral and exemplary damages cannot be
the subject of execution pending appeal, to wit:
The execution of any award for moral and exemplary damages is dependent on
the outcome of the main case. Unlike the actual damages for which the petitioners
may clearly be held liable if they breach a specific contract and the amounts of
which are fixed and certain, liabilities with respect to moral and exemplary
damages as well as the exact amounts remain uncertain and indefinite pending
resolution by the Intermediate Appellate Court and eventually the Supreme Court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the assailed decisions of the Court of
Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The writ of execution issued by
the lower court pursuant to its order of June 19, 1996 is hereby ANNULLED.
4. Manacop v. JOSE F. MANACOP, HARISH C. RAMNANI, CHANDRU P. PESSUMAL AND [not so important]: w/n CA should have dismissed the petitions of Equitable
Equitable Bank MAUREEN M. RAMNANI, PETITIONERS, VS. EQUITABLE PCIBANK, LAVINE Bank and Lavine [remember they filed a petition for certiorari, instead of filing
LOUNGEWEAR MANUFACTURING INC., PHILIPPINE FIRE AND MARINE a Notice of Appeal on the RTCs judgment] = YES, the CA should have dismissed
INSURANCE CORPORATION AND FIRST LEPANTO-TAISHO INSURANCE the petitions.
CORPORATION, RESPONDENTS.
Simultaneous filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and an ordinary
[So many unnecessary facts in the case. I only included the facts related to the discussion of appeal under Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure cannot be allowed
Rule 39.] Respondent Lavine insured its buildings and supplies against fire with PhilFire, since one remedy would necessarily cancel out the other. The existence and
Rizal Surety, TICO, First Lepanto, Equitable Insurance and Reliance Insurance. Except for availability of the right of appeal proscribes resort to certiorari because one of the
the insurance policy issued by First Lepanto, all policies provide that: Loss, if any, under requirements for availment of the latter is precisely that there should be no appeal.
this policy is payable to Equitable Banking Corporation-Greenhills Branch, as their interest It is elementary that for certiorari to prosper, it is not enough that the trial court
may appear subject to the terms, conditions, clauses and warranties under this policy. committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction;
the requirement that there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy
Meanwhile, Lavine is indebted to Equitable Bank. The loan is secured by REM. Lavine also in the ordinary course of law must likewise be satisfied. The case of Chemphil v.
made Equitable a benefiiary of the policies, hence its interest in this case. CA is similar to the present case wherein a co-party filed a Notice of Appeal and
Fire razed Lavines buildings and their contents so claims were made against the policies. the other, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Prior to the release of the proceeds, the insurance companies required Lavine to sign a Sworn
Statement in Proof of Loss and Subrogation Agreement whereby the former would be ITC: When Equitable Bank and Lavine filed their respective petitions before the
absolved from their liabilities upon payment of the proceeds to Equitable Bank. Only Harish Court of Appeals on April 24, 2002, the trial court had already rendered on April
(one of the petitioners) signed the document while the rest of Lavines directors refused to 2, 2002 a judgment on the merits. Both had notice of said final judgment as they
sign. even filed notices of appeal with the trial court. This only goes to show that
Instead of paying the policies to Lavine, certain insurance companies released the proceeds Equitable Bank and Lavine unwittingly recognized ordinary appeal as the proper
directly to Equitable Bank thus Chandru (an officer of Lavine) filed, in behalf of Lavine, a remedy in seeking reversal of the assailed decision.
Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction with Prayer for a Issue #2: w/n CA erred in declaring null and void the Special Order = NO, the
Temporary Restraining Order before the RTC of Pasig against PhilFire, Rizal Surety, CA did not err.
TICO, First Lepanto and Equitable Bank.
The general rule is that only judgments which have become final and executory
Harish, et al., the other officers of Lavine moved to intervene claiming they were Lavine's may be executed. However, discretionary execution of appealed judgments may
incumbent directors and that Harish was Lavine's authorized representative. They disclaimed be allowed under Section 2 (a) of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Chandru's designation as president of Lavine as well as his authority to file the action. They Procedure upon concurrence of the following requisites:
also denied having refused to sign the Sworn Statement in Proof of Loss and Subrogation (a) there must be a motion by the prevailing party with notice to the adverse party;
Agreement. The RTC granted the motion for intervention. (b) there must be a good reason for execution pending appeal; and
(c) the good reason must be stated in a special order.
The yardstick remains the presence or the absence of good reasons consisting of
exceptional circumstances of such urgency as to outweigh the injury or damage
Parties Pleading Allegation that the losing party may suffer, should the appealed judgment be reversed later.
Some insurers filed Notice of Appeal. On the other hand, Equitable Bank and Lavine,
without waiting for the RTC to rule on the Motion for Execution, filed a Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus before the CA. They initially filed a Notice of
Appeal but subsequently withdrew it.
RTC granted the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal through a Special Order, which
meant several properties of the insurers and Equitable Bank were seized. First Lepanto,
Philfire filed a petition under Rule 65 because of this. In view of the grant of the motion,
Lim | Miranda | Rivera | Santos | Yogue
4A | Remedial Law Review 2017 | Atty. Tranquil Salvador
Equitable Bank amended its original petition. The CA then consolidated the petitions.
CA declared null and void the Special Order of the RTC, and remanded the case for the
conduct of pre-trial conference on the Second Amended Answer-in-Intervention. The CA also
lifted the levy and notice of garnishment on the properties of the insurers.
The intervenors filed a petition for review in the SC.
5. Curata v. Copied this digest from the previous year. Huhu. Sorry. This case is just too long. Quick Held+ Ratio:
PPA The SC held that the appeal was correctly granted despite the non-payment of the
[Note from the copied digest: This is a super long case with 7 consolidated petitions. For our appeal fee. This case is an exception to the rule that the appeal fee is absolutely
purposes, I am sticking to the GR No. as specified in our syllabus, since that is where the mandatory, for it involves billions of pesos in public funds.
pertinent topic can be found anyway. The other GR Nos. are completely omitted from this As to the issue of execution pending appeal, it was held that no execution pending
digest.] appeal can ever be had against the government. PPAs monies, facilities and assets
are government properties. Ergo, they are exempt from execution whether by
Full Title: SPOUSES CURATA, et al. vs. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY, Respondent. virtue of a final judgment or pending appeal. PPA is a government instrumentality.
(G.R. Nos. 154211-12 June 22, 2009) Therefore, an undeniable conclusion is that the funds of PPA partake of
government funds, and such may not be garnished absent an allocation by its
Quick Facts: Board or by statutory grant. If the PPA funds cannot be garnished and its
The Batangas Port Zone was placed under the administrative jursidiction of the Philippine properties, being government properties, cannot be levied via a writ of execution
Ports Authority. Pursuant thereto, the PPA filed a complaint to expropriate 185 lots in pursuant to a final judgment, then the trial court likewise cannot grant
Batangas. The RTC split the affected owners according to their counsel, and pertinent to our discretionary execution pending appeal, as it would run afoul of the established
case is the Dimayacyac group (representing Curata, et al.). The RTC had 3 commissioners jurisprudence that government properties are exempt from execution.
come up with the fair market value of the lots, and they came up with a Php 4,800 per square
meter figure. The judge then ordered that the owners be compensated at the amount of Php Full HELD:
5,500 per square. PPA ultimately filed an appeal with the CA, and the latter court nullified the In G.R. Nos. 154211-12, the Court affirms the July 30, 2001 Decision of the CA
RTCs orders. The Dimayacyac group assails the orders the CA Order, arguing, primarily, and its July 11, 2002 Resolution in the consolidated cases CA-G.R. SP Nos. 60314
that the CA should not have entertained the appeal and that the RTC orders should be and 63576, which granted both petitions of PPA. (Court affirmed the annulment of
executed pending appeal. the Motion and Writ of Execution, the Garnishment, the Denial of Appeal)
Full Ratio:
FACTS: On the propriety of the granting of the appeal
385 and EO 431 delineated the BPZ (Batangas Port Zone, I think) and placed it under the We reiterate our consistent ruling that the payment of the appellate
administrative jurisdiction of the PPA. Pursuant thereto, the PPA instituted a Complaint for docket fees is mandatory for the perfection of an appeal and held that the
Expropriation of 185 lots before the RTC of Batangas City. above-quoted Sec. 13 of Rule 41, as amended in 2000, gives the
These lots, covering around 1.3M square meters, were meant to be developed into additional ground for the dismissal of an appeal on the nonpayment of
Phase II of the BPZ. the required appellate docket fees, which gave force to the ground
For convenience, the RTC divided the defendant-lot owners into three groups, named provided under the above-quoted Secs. 4 and 9 of Rule 41.
according to counsel Dimayacyac group (representing Curata, et al.), Ortega and Cruz As with most rules of procedure, however, exceptions are invariably
group, and the Agustin Group. recognized and the relaxation of procedural rules on appeals has been
The RTC eventually declared that the expropriation was for public purpose. No appeal was effected to obviate jeopardizing substantial justice. This case warrants an
taken from that Order. That was settled. application of the exception, as the public interest and the higher
It also appointed 3 commissioners to determine just compensation. interests of justice and fair play dictate that PPAs appeal should be
Basically, the commissioners determined the amount to be Php 4,800 per square meter. allowed.
The trial judge should have permitted the appeal to prosper in view of
When the PPA filed the complaint, it alleged that the FMV of the lots were around
the billions of pesos of taxpayers money, subject matter of the appeal.
Php 336 per square meter.
Fully aware of the wide disparity between the fair market values of the
The RTC rendered the First Compensation Order pertaining particularly to the Dimayacyac
lots ranging from PhP 2.10 to 3.50 per square meter based on the tax
group. (There will be a Second Compensation Order pertaining to the others, saying pretty
declarations and the amount of PhP 5,500 per square meter pegged as
much the same thing.)
just compensation, the judge cannot be said to have wielded his power to
6. Garcia v. JUANITO A. GARCIA and ALBERTO J. DUMAGO, Petitioners, v. PHILIPPINE Whether petitioners may collect their wages during the period between the
PAL AIRLINES, INC., Respondent. Labor Arbiters order of reinstatement pending appeal and the NLRC
decision overturning that of the Labor Arbiter, now that respondent has
An administrative charge was filed by PAL against its employees-herein petitioners after they exited from rehabilitation proceedings.
were allegedly caught in the act of sniffing shabu when a team of company security personnel
and law enforcers raided the PAL Technical Centers Toolroom Section. PAL dismissed Amplification of the First Ground
petitioners for transgressing the PAL Code of Discipline, prompting them to file a complaint It has been advanced that there is no point in releasing the wages to petitioners
for illegal dismissal and damages. since their dismissal was found to be valid, and to do so would constitute unjust
enrichment. SC ruled that the social justice principles of labor law outweigh or
LA: Ruled in favor of the employees, thus ordering PAL to, inter alia, immediately comply render inapplicable the civil law doctrine of unjust enrichment. The
with the reinstatement aspect of the decision. constitutional and statutory precepts portray the otherwise unjust situation as a
Prior to the promulgation of the Labor Arbiters decision, the SEC placed PAL, which was condition affording full protection to labor. The SC reaffirms the prevailing
suffering from severe financial losses, under a receiver. principle that even if the order of reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter is reversed on
appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages
NLRC: Reversed the LA and dismissed petitioners complaint for lack of merit. of the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the higher
The Labor Arbiter issued a Writ of Execution (Writ) respecting the reinstatement aspect of its court. It settles the view that the Labor Arbiter's order of reinstatement is
decision. He also issued a Notice of Garnishment (Notice). Respondent thereupon moved to immediately executory and the employer has to either re-admit them to work under
quash the Writ and to lift the Notice while petitioners moved to release the garnished amount. the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to their dismissal, or to reinstate
Respondent filed an Urgent Petition for Injunction with the NLRC. However, NLRC affirmed them in the payroll, and that failing to exercise the options in the alternative,
the validity of the Writ and the Notice issued by the Labor Arbiter but suspended and referred employer must pay the employees salaries. Furthermore, this does not require the
the action to the Rehabilitation Receiver for appropriate action. application for and issuance of a writ of execution as prerequisites for the
execution of a reinstatement since the very object and intent of Article 223 of
The test is two-fold: (1) there must be actual delay or the fact that the order of
reinstatement pending appeal was not executed prior to its reversal; and (2) the
delay must not be due to the employers unjustified act or omission. If the delay is
due to the employers unjustified refusal, the employer may still be required to pay
the salaries notwithstanding the reversal of the Labor Arbiters decision.
The new NLRC Rules of Procedure now require the employer to submit a report of
compliance within 10 calendar days from receipt of the Labor Arbiters decision,
disobedience to which clearly denotes a refusal to reinstate. The employee need
not file a motion for the issuance of the writ of execution since the Labor Arbiter
shall thereafter motu proprio issue the writ. With the new rules in place, there is
hardly any difficulty in determining the employers intransigence in
immediately complying with the order.
ITC: It is apparent that there was inaction on the part of respondent to reinstate
them, but whether such omission was justified depends on the onset of the
exigency of corporate rehabilitation. It is settled that upon appointment by the SEC
of a rehabilitation receiver, all actions for claims before any court, tribunal or
board against the corporation shall ipso jure be suspended. As stated early on,
during the pendency of petitioners complaint before the Labor Arbiter, the SEC
placed respondent under an Interim Rehabilitation Receiver. After the Labor
Arbiter rendered his decision, the SEC replaced the Interim Rehabilitation
Receiver with a Permanent Rehabilitation Receiver.
Case law recognizes that unless there is a restraining order, the implementation of
the order of reinstatement is ministerial and mandatory. This injunction or
While reinstatement pending appeal aims to avert the continuing threat or danger
to the survival or even the life of the dismissed employee and his family, it does
not contemplate the period when the employer-corporation itself is similarly in a
judicially monitored state of being resuscitated in order to survive.
In sum, the obligation to pay the employees salaries upon the employers failure to
exercise the alternative options under Article 223 of the Labor Code is not a hard
and fast rule, considering the inherent constraints of corporate rehabilitation.
7. Arcenas v. LEONARDO ARCENAS REPRESENTED BY HIS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT [NOT RELEVANT] Issue on summons. INVALID SERVICE, so RTC did not
CA CARMELITA ARCENAS VILLANUEVA, PETITIONERS, VS. THE COURT OF acquire jd over defendant.
APPEALS, HON. ARMIE E. ELMA, PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 153, If the defendant is temporarily out of the country, summons may, by leave of
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG CITY, AND JOSE DELA RIVA, court, be effected outside of the Philippines by substituted service or by
RESPONDENTS. publication. However, if the defendant does not reside and is not found in the
Philippines, summons may be effected, by leave of court, by personal service or by
1st Case: An action for annulment of the foreclosure sale of a barge. The Trial counrt publication; or other sufficient manner as determined by the court, provided that
rendered judgment dismissing plaintiffs complaint and sentencing plaintiff Emilio Espino to the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff residing in the Philippines; or
return the barge "Sta. Lucia Triumph I" to the possession of defendant Jose dela Riva, and to when the action relates to, or the subject of which involves property within the
pay the said defendant P46,000.00 a month as unrealized profit. "Both plaintiffs Espino and Philippines.
Leonardo Arcenas are also sentenced to pay jointly defendant Dela Riva moral damages in ITC: Petitioner is no longer residing and found in the Philippines. He left for the
the amount of P20,000.00 and exemplary damages of P10,000.00. Both plaintiffs are further United States in June of 1993 as evidenced by the Sheriffs Return. Hence,
ordered to pay jointly defendants Dela Riva and Antonio Sy, Sr., attorneys fees of summons may be served on him either personally or by publication. However,
P15,000.00 each, and the costs of the suit. since the complaint filed against him is one in personam (a personal action) and
does not involve the personal status of the private respondent, nor any property in
CA affirmed w/ modification reducing the moral and exemplary damages. the Philippines in which petitioner has or claim or an interest, or which the private
Such decision became final and executory. respondent has attached, summons should be served on him personally. The
deputy sheriff can not serve the summons by substituted service.
Private respondent filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution with the trial court, Having failed to serve the summons on the person of the petitioner, the Regional
which motion was granted. However, despite the writ of execution, private respondent failed Trial Court did not validly acquire jurisdiction over him. Consequently, the
to enforce the judgment. proceedings held is null and void.
2nd case: Five years from the time of the entry of judgment, private respondent filed a [RELEVANT] AND EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE RTC ACQUIRED JD
complaint for revival of judgment and sum of money with damages before the Regional OVER THE DEFENDANT, JUDGMENT RENDERED IS STILL A NULLITY
Trial Court of Pasig. BECAUSE. . .
W/N the RTC erred in modifying the judgment originally rendered when it
[Facts on summons. Not very important] The complaint alleged that petitioner could be gave due course to the revival of the case. YES
Petitioners contention: the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over his person because On the other hand, the revived judgment (2nd case) now subject of this case,
there has been no valid service of summons. He posits that the service of summons is substantially modified the original judgment by directing petitioner to pay private
improper and invalid since he was already living in the United States when the summons was respondent the sum of P171,022.00 representing double the value of the barge;
served and that it was served at the wrong address. Petitioner also contended that the decision P10,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; and 15% of the amount recoverable
of the trial court is void because it substantially amended the original decision of the RTC by way of attorneys fees.
in Civil Case No. 35349 absolving him of any liability with regard to the return of the barge.
These new monetary awards can not be allowed since they were not adjudged in
Court of Appeals rendered a decision dismissing the petition. Presumption of Regularity of the original judgment which had long become final and executory.
the service of summons.
The purpose of the action for revival of a judgment is not to modify the
[to the SC] original judgment subject of the action but is merely to give a creditor a new
Petitioners contention: The original decision of the Regional Trial Court as modified by the right of enforcement from the date of revival. The rule seeks to protect judgment
Court of Appeals and affirmed by the Supreme Court is already final and executory, hence, it creditors from wily and unscrupulous debtors who, in order to evade attachment or
could no longer be amended or altered. execution, cunningly conceal their assets and wait until the statute of limitation
sets in.
8. RCBC v. RIZAL COMMERCIAL BANKING CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. FEDERICO A. W/N THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RCBC IS
Serra SERRA, RESPONDENT. BARRED FROM HAVING ITS JANUARY 5, 1989 DECISION EXECUTED
THROUGH MOTION, CONSIDERING THAT UNDER THE
In 1975, Federico Serra and petitioner RCBC entered into a Contract of Lease with Option to CIRCUMSTANCES OBTAINING IN THIS CASE, RCBC WAS
Buy, wherein Serra agreed to lease his land in Masbate to RCBC for 25 years. Serra further UNLAWFULLY PREVENTED BY THE RESPONDENT FROM
granted RCBC the option to buy the land and improvement (property) within 10 years from ENFORCING THE SAID DECISION-
the signing of the Contract of Lease with Option to Buy.
Meanwhile, the CA, and later the SC, affirmed the order of the RTC Makati in the Specific ITC: RCBC seeks to enforce the decision which became final and executory on
Performance case. In a Decision dated 4 January 1994, this Court declared that the Contract April 15, 1994 which orders Serra to execute and deliver the proper deed of sale in
of Lease with Option to Buy was valid, effective, and enforceable. On 15 April 1994, the favor of RCBC. However, to evade his obligation to RCBC, Serra transferred
decision in the Specific Performance case became final and executory upon entry of the property to his mother Ablao, who then transferred it to Liok. Serras
judgment. action prompted RCBC to file the Annulment case. Clearly, the delay in the
execution of the decision was caused by Serra for his own advantage. Thus, the
In 2001, RTC Masbate ruled in favor of RCBC, declaring the donation in favor of Ablao and pendency of the Annulment case effectively suspended the five-year period to
the subsequent sale to Liok null and void, which Decision was affirmed by CA. CA held that enforce through a motion the decision in the Specific Performance case. Since
the donation to Ablao was simulated and was done solely to evade Serras obligation to the decision in the Annulment case attained finality on 3 March 2009 and
RCBC. Since Ablao had no right to transfer the property and Liok was not a buyer in good RCBCs motion for execution was filed on 25 August 2011, RCBCs motion is
faith, the subsequent sale to Liok was likewise null and void. deemed filed within the five-year period for enforcement of a decision
through a motion.
Thus, Liok filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 182478, while
Serra and Ablao filed a Petition for Certiorari, docketed as G.R. No. 182664, before this This Court has reiterated that the purpose of prescribing time limitations for
Court. In separate Resolutions dated 30 June 2008 and 22 October 2008, which became final enforcing judgments is to prevent parties from sleeping on their rights. Far from
and executory on 27 August 2008 and 3 March 2009, respectively, this Court found neither sleeping on its rights, RCBC has pursued persistently its action against Serra in
reversible error nor GAD on the CAs part. accordance with law. On the other hand, Serra has continued to evade his
obligation by raising issues of technicality. While strict compliance with the rules
On 25 August 2011, RCBC moved for the execution of the decision in the Specific of procedure is desired, liberal interpretation is warranted in cases where a strict
Performance case. RCBC alleged that it was legally impossible to ask for the execution of enforcement of the rules will not serve the ends of justice.
the decision prior to the annulment of the fraudulent transfers made by Serra. Thus, the WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We SET ASIDE the assailed Orders of
period to execute by motion was suspended during the pendency of the Annulment case. the Regional Trial Court of Makati City dated 16 February 2012 and 26 July 2012.
Serra argued that the motion for execution was already barred by prescription and laches, The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court on 3 December 2012 is
and that RCBC was at fault for failing to register as lien in the original title the Contract of made permanent. The Regional Trial Court of Makati City is DIRECTED to issue
Lease with Option to Buy. the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 10054 for the enforcement of the decision
therein. Costs against petitioner.
RTC Makati: DENIED RCBCs motion for execution. The RTC Makati opined that
[RCBC] should have asked for the execution of the deed of sale and have the same
registered with the Registry of Deeds, so that even if [Serra] sold or transferred the subject
property to any person the principle of caveat emptor would set in. RTC likewise denied
RCBCs MR.
Petition for Review on Certiorari before SC.
Petitioners MR was denied, so she came to the CA via certiorari. She alleges GADALEJ. The allegations in the complaint for revival of judgment determine whether it is a
Petitioner asserts that the complaint for specific performance and damages before the Makati real action or a personal action.
RTC is a personal action and, therefore, the suit to revive the judgment therein is also
personal in nature; and that, consequently, the venue of the action for revival of judgment is ITC: The complaint for revival of judgment alleges that a final and executory
either Makati City or Paraaque City where private respondent and petitioner respectively judgment has ordered herein petitioner to execute a deed of sale over a parcel of
reside, at the election of private respondent. land in Ayala Alabang Subdivision in favor of herein private respondent, among
others. The previous judgment has conclusively declared private respondent's right
CA ruled in favor of respondent. The CA held that since the judgment sought to be revived to have the title over the disputed property conveyed to it. It is, therefore,
was rendered in an action involving title to or possession of real property, or interest therein, undeniable that private respondent has an established interest over the lot in
the action for revival of judgment is then an action in rem which should be filed with the question; and to protect such right or interest, private respondent brought suit to
Regional Trial Court of the place where the real property is located. revive the previous judgment.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
The present case for revival of judgment being a real action, the complaint should
indeed be filed with the Regional Trial Court of the place where the realty is
located. A branch of the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its authority only over
a particular territory defined by the Supreme Court. Originally, Muntinlupa City
was under the territorial jurisdiction of the Makati Courts. According to BP 129,
RTC in Muntinlupa is created. Thus, it is now the Regional Trial Court in
Muntinlupa City which has territorial jurisdiction or authority to validly issue
orders and processes concerning real property within Muntinlupa City.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August 12, 2002 and
Resolution dated January 7, 2003 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.
10. Josef v. Albino Josef, Petitioner, vs. Otelio Santos, Respondent. W/N the levy and sale of the personal belongings of Josef's children as well as
Santos the attachment and sale on public auction of his family home to satisfy the
Petitioner Albino Josef was the defendant in a Civil Case, which is a case for collection of judgment award in favor of Santos is legal No. The levy and sale is illegal.
sum of money filed by Otelio Santos, who claimed that Josef failed to pay the shoe materials
which he bought on credit from Santos on various dates in 1994. Where a judgment or judicial order is void it may be said to be a lawless thing,
which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and
Being void, the RTCs Order granting Santos Motion for Issuance of the
Writ of Execution could not have conferred any right to Santos. Any writ of
execution based thereon is likewise VOID. Josef claimed exemption from
execution of his family home soon after Santos filed the motion for issuance of a
writ of execution, thus giving notice to the trial court and Santos that a property
exempt from execution may be in danger of being subjected to levy and sale.
Thereupon, the trial court is called to observe the procedure as herein laid out [see
above]; on the other hand, Santos should observe the procedure prescribed in
Article 160 of the Family Code, that is, to obtain an order for the sale on execution
of the Josef's family home, if so, and apply the proceeds - less the maximum
amount allowed by law under Article 157 of the Code which should remain with
the petitioner for the rebuilding of his family home - to his judgment credit.
Instead, both the trial court and Santos completely ignored Josef's argument that
the properties subject of the writ are exempt from execution.
11. D- D ARMOURED SECURITY AND INVESTIGATION AGENCY, INC., petitioner, vs. Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that petitioners monthly
Armoured ARNULFO ORPIA, LODUVICO ABUCEJO (others omitted), respondents. receivables from the Foremost Farms, Inc. (garnishee) are not exempt from
Security v. execution. NO. The exemptions from execution only pertains to natural persons.
Orpia Respondents, who were employed as security guards by D Armoured Security and
Investigation Agency, Inc. and assigned to Fortune Tobacco, Inc., filed with the Labor Arbiter An order of execution of a final and executory judgment, as in this case, is not
a complaint for illegal dismissal and various monetary claims against petitioner and Fortune appealable, otherwise, there would be no end to litigation. On this ground
Tobacco. alone, the instant petition is dismissible. But on the merits, the petition is still
unmeritorious.
LA: ruled in favor of the employees and required D Armoured to pay P1,077,124.29.
Section 13 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is plain and clear on what properties
Only Fortune Tobacco appealed to the NLRC, which dismissed the complaint against it. This are exempt from execution. Section 13 (i) of the Rules pertinently reads:
Decision became final and executory. Thus, the award specified in the Decision of the Arbiter
became the sole liability of petitioner. SECTION 13. Property exempt from execution. Except as otherwise expressly
provided by law, the following property, and no other, shall be exempt from
The records were then remanded to the Arbiter for execution. The LA then issued a writ of execution:
execution. The sheriff served a writ of garnishment upon the Chief Accountant of Foremost xxxxxxxxx
Farms, Inc., a corporation with whom petitioner has an existing services agreement. Thus, (i) So much of the salaries, wages or earnings of the judgment obligor for his
petitioners receivables with Foremost were garnished. personal services within the four months preceding the levy as are
necessary for the support of his family.
Petitioner filed with the NLRC a Motion to Quash/Recall Writ of Execution and Garnishment
which was denied. The NLRC also dismissed the appeal for petitioners failure to post a bond The exemption under this procedural rule should be read in conjunction with the
within the reglementary period. Civil Code, the substantive law which proscribes the execution of employees
wages, thus:
Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer
for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. CA denied hence, this petition for review on ART. 1708. The laborers wage shall not be subject to execution or
certiorari. attachment, except for debts incurred for food, shelter, clothing and
medical attendance.
Obviously, the exemption under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and Article 1708 of
the New Civil Code is meant to favor only laboring men or women whose works
are manual.
In this context, exemptions under this rule are confined only to natural persons
and not to juridical entities such as petitioner. Thus, the rule speaks of salaries,
wages and earning from the personal services rendered by the judgment obligor.
The rule further requires that such earnings be intended for the support of the
judgment debtors family.
Necessarily, petitioner which is a corporate entity, does not fall under the
exemption. If at all, the exemption refers to petitioners individual employees and
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, if properties used in business are exempt
from execution, there can hardly be an instance when a judgment claim can be
enforced against the business entity [Pentagon Security and Investigation Agency
vs. Jimenez, 192 SCRA 492 (1990)].
*********
Jic sir asks, heres another provision:
Section 1, Rule IV of the NLRC Manual on Execution of Judgment provides:
Rule IV
EXECUTION
SECTION 1. Properties exempt from execution. Only the properties of the
losing party shall be the subject of execution, except:
(a) The losing partys family home constituted in accordance with the Civil Code or
Family Code or as may be provided for by law or in the absence thereof, the
homestead in which he resides, and land necessarily used in connection therewith,
subject to the limits fixed by law;
(b) His necessary clothing, and that of his family;
(c) Household furniture and utensils necessary for housekeeping, and used for that
purpose by the losing party such as he may select, of a value not exceeding the
amount fixed by law;
(d) Provisions for individual or family use sufficient for three (3) months;
(e) The professional libraries of attorneys, judges, physicians, pharmacists,
dentists, engineers, surveyors, clergymen, teachers, and other professionals, not
exceeding the amount fixed by law;
(f) So much of the earnings of the losing party for his personal services within the
month preceding the levy as are necessary for the support of his family;
(g) All monies, benefits, privileges, or annuities accruing or in any manner
growing out of any life insurance;
(h) Tools and instruments necessarily used by him in his trade or employment of a
value not exceeding three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos;
(i) Other properties especially exempted by law.
12. Caja v. FLORENTINO A. CAJA, PETITIONER, VS. ATILANO G. NANQUIL, SHERIFF IV, WoN Sheriff Nanquil is guilty of Gross Misconduct. YES
Nanquil REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 72, OLONGAPO CITY, RESPONDENT.
As per first alleged violation of levying real properties before personal
This is a complaint for Grave Misconduct and Gross Ignorance of the Rules on Execution properties.
under the Rules of Court against Atilano G. Nanquil, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch
72, Olongapo City. It is clear in Section 8(a) of Rule 39 that satisfaction of the judgment must be
[back to the admin case] First, there was negligence on his part when he immediately levied the real
Complainant alleged that respondent sheriff committed the following irregularities property of complainant without checking if the latter has other personal properties
amounting to Gross Misconduct: that could satisfy the judgment. He could have easily asked the Land
Respondent sheriff levied defendants real property ahead of their personal properties; Transportation Office if complainant had vehicles registered in his name. If he had
Respondent sheriff made an excessive levy; done so, respondent sheriff could have known that complainant had vehicles which
Respondent sheriff levied defendants personal properties without serving a Notice of he could levy first before levying any real property. He should have exhausted all
Levy or issuing a receipt therefor; means before going after the real property. This, he did not do. It was only after
Respondent sheriff delivered the levied personal properties to the judgment creditor levying complainants real property and after discovering that said property was
without conducting an auction sale; and encumbered did he look for other personal property.
Respondent sold the levied personal properties in an auction sale almost four years after
being levied. Respondents contention: the levy on complainants real property was not
continued because it was previously mortgaged.
Respondents defense: admitted that he first levied real property under TCT No. T-46478 but
since the same was heavily mortgaged for P5,000,000.00, the judgment creditor, Triangle Ace [Court] Untenable. It was the sale of the levied real property in an execution sale
Corporation, desisted from proceeding with the levy. It was because of this that he levied the which did not push through.
personal properties consisting of the payloader, dump truck and G.I. sheets. He added that
although the aforesaid section provides that the officer shall first levy on the personal Levy is different from an execution sale. Levy has been defined as the act or acts
properties, if any, then on the real properties if the personal properties are insufficient to by which an officer sets apart or appropriates a part or the whole of a judgment
answer the judgment, this section has been nullified by the succeeding paragraph which says debtors property for the purpose of satisfying the command of the writ of
(w)hen there is more property of the judgment obligor that is sufficient to satisfy the execution. On the other hand, an execution sale is a sale by a sheriff or other
judgment and lawful fees, he must sell only so much of the personal or real property as is ministerial officer under the authority of a writ of execution which he has levied
sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees. on property of the debtor. In the case before us, there was a levy on real property
Respondent sheriffs act of levying complainants real property despite its being
mortgaged is tantamount to negligence. As an officer of the court, he knew fully
well that the property cannot be used to satisfy the judgment debt since the
mortgagee is the preferred creditor in relation to said property.
The rule is well-settled that a sheriff is guilty of misconduct where he failed to
limit the goods to be levied to the amount called for in the writ. A deputy sheriff
who made a levy far and in excess of the value of the judgment commits a
misconduct in office. In the case before us, respondent sheriff clearly made an
excessive levy when he levied complainants real property which was valued at
more than ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00).
As per fourth alleged violation of delivering the levied properties to the judgment
creditor without conducting an auction sale:
Respondents defense: Respondent sheriff argues that he never delivered said
personal properties to the judgment creditor but merely kept the same in a secured
place owned by the latter. He brought them there because the Sheriffs Office and
the Regional Trial Court of Olongapo City had no warehouse or place to keep
levied personal properties.
[Court]: A levying officer must keep the levied properties securely in his custody.
The levied property must be in the substantial presence and possession of the
levying officer who cannot act as special deputy of any party litigant. They should
not have been delivered to any of the parties or their representative. The courts
As per last alleged violation of conducting auction sale almost four years after
levy:
Respondent sheriff cannot be held liable for any delay of the scheduling of the
execution sale for he merely waited for the judge to rule on matters relative to the
properties he had levied.
13. Zamora v. ATTY. STANLEY G. ZAMORA, Complainant v. RAMON P. VILLANUEVA, Sheriff W/N respondent observed Sec. 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court relative to
Villanueva IV, Regional Trial Court, Branch 96, Quezon City, Respondent. the expenses of the execution sale
For resolution is a letter-complaint filed by Atty. Stanley Zamora, charging respondent It is undisputed that respondent demanded and received P10k from complainant.
Ramon Villanueva, Deputy Sheriff, RTC- QC, with Gross Misconduct. He, however, reasoned that the amount was to defray the expenses he incurred in
implementing the writ of execution and annotating the notice of levy on
Antecedents: defendants property in Nasugbu, Batangas. Nevertheless, his justifications for
Atty. Zamora is the counsel for plaintiff in Civil Case entitled Sps. Mario and Carmelita demanding and receiving the amount from complainant are futile attempts to
Cruel v. Sps. Ernesto Pe Lim and Lulu Yu Pe Lim whereby the RTC granted plaintiffs motion exculpate himself from liability under the law.
for the issuance of a writ of execution. Consequently, he informed respondent sheriff that the
defendant has real property in Nasugbu, Batangas and requested him to prepare the required Sec. 9, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court requires the sheriff to secure the courts prior
Notice of Levy. Respondent in turn demanded from complainant P10k allegedly to defray the approval of the estimated expenses and fees needed to implement the writ.
expenses for the execution proceedings. Complainant initially paid P5k; the balance to be Specifically, the Rules provide:
As regards the questioned auction sale, respondent contended that he was ready to proceed The rule requires the sheriff executing writs or processes to estimate the expenses
with the public auction, with complainants client as the only bidder. He then requested to be incurred. Upon the approval of the estimated expenses, the interested party
complainant to pay the corresponding Office Commission to the Clerk of Court pursuant to has to deposit the amount with the Clerk of Court and exofficio Sheriff. The
the Rules of Court. However, complainant refused to pay, claiming that the title should first expenses shall then be disbursed to the executing Sheriff subject to his liquidation
be consolidated. within the same period for rendering a return on the process or writ. Any unspent
amount shall be refunded to the party who made the deposit.
ITC: There was no evidence that respondent submitted to the court, for its
approval, the estimated expenses for the execution of the writ before he demanded
P10k. Neither was it shown that he rendered an accounting and liquidated the said
amount to the court. Any act deviating from these procedures laid down by the
Rules is misconduct that warrants disciplinary action.
As regards respondents refusal to proceed with the execution sale, allegedly due
to the parties refusal to pay the sales commission, nowhere in the Rules can it be
inferred that payment of any such commission is a prerequisite to an
execution sale. Respondents refusal to conduct the execution sale was baseless
and illegal.
SC: Sec. 22, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court clearly shows that a sheriff has no
blanket authority to adjourn the sale. It is only upon written consent of the
By the nature of their functions, sheriffs must conduct themselves with propriety
and decorum, to be above suspicion. Sheriffs are court officers and, like everyone
else in the judiciary, are called upon to discharge their sworn duties with great care
and diligence. They cannot afford to err in serving court writs and processes and in
implementing court orders lest they undermine the integrity of their office and the
efficient administration of justice.
14. Landrito v. SPS. MAXIMO LANDRITO, JR. AND PACITA EDGALANI, PETITIONERS, VS. THE W/N CA erred in affirming RTCs decision = NO.
CA HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS; SPS. BENJAMIN SAN DIEGO AND Republic Act No. 3135 (An Act to Regulate the Sale of Property Under Special
CARMENCITA SAN DIEGO; THE EX-OFFICIO SHERIFF AND CLERK OF COURT OF Powers Inserted In Or Annexed to Real Estate Mortgages), as amended by
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, MAKATI CITY; AND THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, Republic Act No. 4118, provides in Section 6 thereof, thus:
MAKATI CITY, RESPONDENTS. "Sec. 6. In all cases in which an extrajudicial sale is made under the special power
hereinbefore referred to, the debtor, his successors in interest or any judicial
[All about redemption period.] Spouses Landrito obtained a loan from Carmencita San Diego. creditor or judgment creditor of said debtor, or any person having a lien on the
To secure the payment, petitioners executed a deed of REM. Petitioners defaulted in paying property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust under which the property is
their loan and refused to pay despite repeated demands. So Carmencita filed with the Clerk sold, may redeem the same at any time within the term of one year from and
and Ex-Officio Sheriff of RTC-Makati a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure. After after the date of the sale; xxx" (Emphasis supplied)
complying with all the procedural requirements, the public sale was conducted, wherein The one-year redemption period should be counted not from the date of
Carmencita came out as the highest bidder. foreclosure sale, but from the time the certificate of sale is registered with the
She caused the registration of the sheriffs certificate of sale on 29 October 1993. Because Register of Deeds. And under Article 13 of the New Civil Code, a year is
petitioners failed to redeem the property within the one-year redemption period from date of understood to have three hundred sixty-five (365) days each.
inscription of sheriffs certificate of sale, Carmencita caused the consolidation of title over the
property in her name. ITC: It is not disputed that the sheriff's certificate of sale was registered on 29
October 1993. Thus, excluding the first day and counting from 30 October 1993
On 9 November 1994, petitioners filed a complaint for annulment of extrajudicial (under paragraph 3 of Article 13 of the New Civil Code), and bearing in mind that
foreclosure and auction sale with damages. Petitioners alleged that 1994 was a leap year, petitioners had only until 29 October 1994, the 365th day
(1) said foreclosure and auction sale were null and void for failure to comply with the after registration of the sheriff's certificate of sale on 29 October 1993, within
requirements of notice and publication, as mandated by Act 3135, as amended; which to redeem the foreclosed property in accordance with law. And since 29
(2) the mortgaged property was illegally foreclosed in the light of the settled rule that an October 1994 fell on a Saturday, petitioners had until the following working day,
action to foreclose a mortgage must be limited to the amount mentioned in the mortgage 31 October 1994, within which to exercise their right of redemption. From the
document, in this case, P1,000,000.00, which amount was allegedly bloated by respondent foregoing, it is clear that even the complaint filed by the petitioners with the trial
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the challenged decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.
15. Marmosy MARMOSY TRADING, INC. AND VICTOR MORALES, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT ISSUE: whether or not the decision dated 14 July 2005 [CA denying the 65 filed
Tradiing v. CA OF APPEALS, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, HON. LABOR by Marmosy] and the resolution dated 16 November 2005 [denial of Marmosys
ARBITER ELIAS H. SALINAS AND JOSELITO HUBILLA, RESPONDENTS. MR] of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 85989, which allowed the notice
of levy to be annotated on the title of the real property registered under a TCT in
Marmosy Trading, Inc. is a domestic corporation. It acts as a distributor of various chemicals the name of petitioner Victor Morales, are in accordance with law and existing
from foreign suppliers. Victor Morales is the President and General Manager of Marmosy jurisprudence YES!
Trading, Inc. Joselito Hubilla was hired as a Technical Salesman by Marmosy. Marmosy
Trading, Inc. terminated Huhillas services. Owing to his termination, Huhilla filed a case for When a final judgment becomes executory, it thereby becomes immutable
illegal dismissal, illegal deduction and diminution of benefits against Marmosy Trading, Inc and unalternable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even
before the LA. if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous
conclusion of law or fact, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted
LA rendered a Decision against Marmosy Trading Inc and declared the termination of the to be made by the court rendering it or by the highest court of the land. The only
services of Huhilla to be illegal and without just and valid cause. Marmosy Trading Inc are recognized exception are the correction of clerical errors or the making of so-
hereby ordered to reinstate Huhilla to his former position, or in case the same is no longer called nune pro tunc entries which cause no injury to any party, and, of course,
available, to other equivalent position without loss of seniority rights and other benefits and where the judgment is void. Trial and execution proceedings constitute one whole
privileges + full backwages and other benefits he should have received had his services not action or suit such that a case in which execution has been issued is regarded as
been terminated. still pending so that all proceedings in the execution are proceedings in the suit.
Marmosy again appealed to the NLRC but was dismissed for lack of merit. NLRC Resolution
mentioned that,
As borne by the records, individual respondent Victor H. Morales is the
President and General Manager of [respondent] Marmosy Trading Inc. As
correctly ruled being the President at the same time General Manager of the
Corporation, [Respondent] Morales is therefore to be held responsible for the
corporation's obligations to the workers including complainant especially when
as alleged the company had already closed its business operations. The
termination of the existence of a corporation requires the assumption of the
company's liabilities and there is no responsible officer but the President who
must assume full responsibility of the consequences of the closure.
MR was again filed but was denied in a Resolution, which Resolution became final and
executory on Oct 8, 2004.
Marmosy Trading Inc again elevated the case to the CA via petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 but this petition was denied in a Decision. Marmosy filed an MR but was also denied.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under rule 45 before the SC raising the lone issue
of whether or not the decision dated 14 July 2005 [CA denying the 65 filed by Marmosy] and
the resolution dated 16 November 2005 [denial of Marmosys MR] of the Court of Appeals in
CA G.R. SP No. 85989, which allowed the notice of levy to be annotated on the title of the
real property registered under a TCT in the name of petitioner Victor Morales, are in
accordance with law and existing jurisprudence.
16. Benitez v. GLORIA O. BENITEZ, complainant, vs. MEDEL P. ACOSTA, Sheriff IV, respondent. W/N Acosta is administratively liable YES.
Acosta
This is an administrative complaint against Medel P. Acosta, Sheriff IV, assigned to Regional Respondent is guilty of misfeasance and nonfeasance for his failure (a) to make a
Trial Court, Branch 19, Bacoor, Cavite, for grave misconduct, dishonesty, and conduct return on the writ; (b) to make the periodical reports required by the Rules of
prejudicial to the best interests of the service. Court; (c) to comply with Rule 39, 9 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure
regarding the disposition of proceeds of auction sales; (d) to conduct a public
Complainant Gloria Osila Benitez filed this case in representation of her mother, Amparo auction sale as contemplated by law which resulted in the simulation of the auction
Osila, the defendant in Civil Case No. GMA-97-02, entitled "Leon Basas vs. Amparo Osila", sale; and (e) for turning over the proceeds of the sale to parties not authorized by
filed with the 5th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Carmona and General Mariano Alvarez. It law to receive them.
would appear that judgment was rendered against Amparo Osila for a sum of money.
Complainant alleges that in implementing the writ of execution and conducting the execution SC agrees with the findings of the OCA for the following reasons:
sale to satisfy the judgment in Civil Case No. GMA-97-02, respondent committed the 1. The writ of execution directed the respondent:
following: (a) ignored the bid of Gloria Osila Benitez and Edna Samson; (b) sold the jeepney to likewise return this writ into (sic) the Court at any time, not less than ten days
to the highest bidder, Mario Timbol, who was absent and only sent his bid through Joe nor more than sixty days after its receipt with your proceedings endorsed
Castillo, who was also absent during the bidding; (c) sold the jeepney for an unconscionably thereon.
low price of P15,000.00; (d) used Mario Timbol and Joe Castillo merely as fronts because
respondent was interested in the jeepney; (e) failed to deliver the jeepney even as of April 2, As per the pertinent portion of the order issuing the writ of execution, respondent
1998; (f) did not make a return of the writ of execution until March 30, 1998; and (g) did not should have made a return on the writ within 60 days from his receipt of the order,
comply with the notice requirements in Rule 39, 14 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil or by February 9, 1998. To date, respondent has not submitted or made a return on
Procedure as there were no notices of posting attached to the certificate of sale. the writ and has violated a mandate of the court. It is well settled that the sheriff's
Because of the irregularities above pointed out, the public auction sale conducted
by respondent appear to have been simulated. Indeed, the MCTC declared the said
sale null and void. In effect, respondent failed to conduct a public auction sale.
Furthermore, SC have held that failure to make a return makes respondent guilty
of malicious nonfeasance warranting dismissal.
17. St. Aviation ST. AVIATION SERVICES CO., PTE., LTD., PETITIONER, VS. GRAND (1) whether the Singapore High Court has acquired jurisdiction over the
Services v. GIA INTERNATIONAL AIRWAYS, INC., RESPONDENT. person of respondent by the service of summons upon its office in the
Philippines YES
St. Aviation Services Co., Pte., Ltd., petitioner, is a foreign corporation based in Singapore. It (2) whether the judgment by default in Suit No. 2101 by the Singapore High
is engaged in the manufacture, repair, and maintenance of airplanes and aircrafts. Grand Court is enforceable in the Philippines. YES
International Airways, Inc., respondent, is a domestic corporation engaged in airline
operations. Generally, in the absence of a special contract, no sovereign is bound to give effect
within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country;
Petitioner and respondent executed an "Agreement for the Maintenance and Modification however, under the rules of comity, utility and convenience, nations have
of Airbus" (First Agreement). Under this stipulation, petitioner agreed to undertake established a usage among civilized states by which final judgments of foreign
maintenance and modification works on respondent's aircraft. The parties agreed on the mode courts of competent jurisdiction are reciprocally respected and rendered
and manner of payment by respondent of the contract price, including interest in case of efficacious under certain conditions that may vary in different countries. Certainly,
default. They also agreed that the "construction, validity and performance thereof" shall be the Philippine legal system has long ago accepted into its jurisprudence and
governed by the laws of Singapore. They further agreed to submit any suit arising from their procedural rules the viability of an action for enforcement of foreign judgment, as
agreement to the non- exclusive jurisdiction of the Singapore courts. well as the requisites for such valid enforcement, as derived from internationally
accepted doctrines.
The parties verbally agreed that petitioner will repair and undertake maintenance works on
respondent's other aircraft; and that the works shall be based on a General Terms of The conditions for the recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment in our
Agreement (GTA). The GTA terms are similar to those of their First Agreement. legal system are contained in Section 48, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure:
Petitioner undertook the contracted works and thereafter promptly delivered the aircrafts to SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a judgment or
respondent. Petitioner billed respondent in the total amount of US$303,731.67 or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to
S$452,560.18. But despite petitioner's repeated demands, respondent failed to pay. render the judgment or final order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the
Petitioner filed with the High Court of the Republic of Singapore an action for the sum of judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title to the thing; and
On motion of petitioner, the Singapore High Court rendered a judgment by default Under the above Rule, a foreign judgment or order against a person is merely
against respondent. presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties. It may be repelled, among
others, by want of jurisdiction of the issuing authority or by want of notice to the
Petitioner filed with the RTC, Pasay City, a Petition for Enforcement of Judgment party against whom it is enforced. The party attacking a foreign judgment has the
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on two grounds: (1) the Singapore High burden of overcoming the presumption of its validity.
Court did not acquire jurisdiction over its person; and (2) the foreign judgment sought to be
enforced is void for having been rendered in violation of its right to due process. Generally, matters of remedy and procedure such as those relating to the service of
RTC denied respondent's motion to dismiss, holding that "neither one of the two grounds (of process upon a defendant are governed by the lex fori or the internal law of the
Grand) is among the grounds for a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil forum, which in this case is the law of Singapore.
Procedure."
Respondents contention (before the CA): The extraterritorial service of summons on its ITC: petitioner moved for leave of court to serve a copy of the Writ of Summons
office in the Philippines is defective and that the Singapore court did not acquire jurisdiction outside Singapore. In an Order, the Singapore High Court granted "leave to serve a
over its person. Thus, its judgment sought to be enforced is void. copy of the Writ of Summons on the Defendant by a method of service
authorized by the law of the Philippines for service of any originating process
CA (R65): granted the petition. Set aside the order of the RTC. (without prejudice) issued by the Philippines at ground floor, APMC Building, 136 Amorsolo corner
Gamboa Street, 1229 Makati City, or elsewhere in the Philippines." This service
The complaint does not involve the personal status of plaintiff, nor any property in which the of summons outside Singapore is in accordance with Order 11, r. 4(2) of the Rules
defendant has a claim or interest, or which the private respondent has attached but purely an of Court 1996[6] of Singapore, which provides. . .
action for collection of debt. It is a personal action as well as an action in personam, not an
action in rem or quasi in rem. As a personal action, the service of summons should be Where in accordance with these Rules, an originating process is to
personal or substituted, not extraterritorial, in order to confer jurisdiction on the court. be served on a defendant in any country with respect to which
there does not subsist a Civil Procedure Convention providing for
To SC (R45) service in that country of process of the High Court, the originating
process may be served
xxx
xxx
c) by a method of service authorized by the law of that country
for service of any originating process issued by that country.
18. Makati v. CITY GOVERNMENT OF MAKATI, AS REPRESENTED BY HON. MAYOR JEJOMAR Whether petitioner undertook an improper remedy when it filed a Rule 43
Odena C. BINAY, PETITIONER, VS. EMERITA B. ODEA, RESPONDENT. Petition with the CA to question the Resolutions issued by the CSC-
This case involves respondent Emerita B. Odea (respondent) who was a teacher previously SC: Petitioner undertook the correct remedy in assailing the CSC Resolutions by
employed by petitioner. She was illegally dismissed and is now seeking full payment of her filing a Rule 43 Petition with the Court of Appeals.
backwages and other benefits.
Petitioner insists that its filing of a Rule 43 Petition to assail the CSC Resolutions
Some of the incidents of this case have been previously resolved by the SC in Elenita S. was proper, as these supposedly involved a new subject matter and were thus
Binay, in her capacity as Mayor of the City of Makati, Mario Rodriguez and Priscilla issued pursuant to CSCs exercise of its quasi-judicial function. They were not
Ferrolino v. Emerita Odea, in a Decision dated 08 June 2007 (the 2007 Decision). The SC merely incidental to the execution of this Courts 2007 Decision.
ruled therein that respondent had been illegally dismissed and was thus ordered to be
reinstated and paid her backwages, computed from date of dismissal up to date of Filing a Rule 43 Petition with the CA is the proper remedy to assail the CSC
reinstatement, but in no case to exceed five (5) years. Resolutions, but not for the reasons advanced by petitioner.
2007 Decision First, CAs jurisdiction over petitions for review under Rule 43 is not limited to
Respondent had been employed by petitioner as a teacher since 1980. In 2000, Mayor Binay judgments and final orders of the CSC, but can extend to appeals from awards,
issued a Memorandum dropping respondent from the roll of employees in view of the latters judgments, final orders or resolutions issued by the latter. Second, although the
absences without official leave (AWOL) starting on 10 November 1999. Respondents MR general rule is that an order of execution is not appealable, the CA failed to
was denied. Aggrieved, she appealed to the Civil Service Commission (CSC). consider that there are exceptions to this rule, as illustrated in this case.
The CSC ruled that the dropping of respondent from the roll of employees was not supported A writ of execution is a direct command of the court to the sheriff to carry out the
by evidence. Thus, by virtue of respondents illegal dismissal, CSC directed petitioner to: (1) mandate of the writ, which is normally the enforcement of a judgment. By
reinstate her; and (2) to pay her back salaries from the time of her separation up to her actual analogy, the CSC Resolutions were orders of execution and were issued in
reinstatement. CSC denied petitioners MR. connection with the implementation of this Courts 2007 Decision.
Petitioner filed a Rule 43 Petition appealing the findings of the CSC to the CA. The CA It is obvious from both the body and the dispositive portions of the CSC
denied the Petition and affirmed that respondent was illegally dismissed and also affirmed the Resolutions that they carried instructions to enforce this Courts 2007 Decision,
CSC Resolutions which ordered the reinstatement of respondent and payment of back albeit erroneously made.
salaries, but subject to the modification that an illegally terminated civil service employee,
like respondent, is entitled to back salaries limited to a maximum period of five (5) years, The CA was correct in treating the CSC Resolutions as orders of execution that
and not to full salaries from her illegal dismissal up to her reinstatement. were issued in connection with the implementation of this Courts 2007 Decision.
The CA, however erred in dismissing petitioners Rule 43 Petition for being
Thereafter, petitioner filed a Petition with the SC arguing that the CA committed serious error improper.
in ruling that the respondent had been illegally dismissed. In its 2007 Decision, SC dismissed
the Petition and affirmed the ruling of the CA in its entirety; more specifically, that To recall, the CA ruled that an order of execution is not appealable under Section
respondent had indeed been illegally dismissed and was thus entitled to payment of 1(f), Rule 41of the Rules of Court. It reasoned that the correct remedy should have
backwages to be computed from the date of dismissal up to the date of reinstatement, but been a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
not exceeding five (5) years.
Indeed, the general rule is that an order of execution is not appealable;
The 2007 Decision became final. After promulgation of the 2007 Decision, CSC, upon otherwise, a case would never end. The CA, however, failed to consider that there
motion of respondent, directed the incumbent Mayor of Makati to immediately reinstate are exceptions to this rule. This Court in Banaga v. Majaducon, citing Limpin v.
respondent to her former position and cause the payment of all her salaries and other benefits Intermediate Appellate Court, enumerated the exceptional circumstances where a
According to CA, the assailed Resolutions of the CSC arose merely as an incident of the Based on the Letter-Complaint, the respondent was assailing the award of
execution when the CSC modified the judgment award on account of private backwages for a period not exceeding five (5) years as decreed by this Court in the
respondents complaint wherein she sought to be paid more than what has been 2007 Decision. In the said Letter- Complaint, respondent expresses her dismay at
awarded to her by the Supreme Court. Such being the case, petitioners recourse to a the seemingly insufficient award of back wages, which were limited to five (5)
Petition for Review is unavailing. The filing of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule years vis--vis the period of almost eight (8) years that she was out of work.
65 was the proper remedy questioning an order of execution on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. CA denied petitioners MR. The CSC should have realized that it did not have any authority to entertain any
attempt to seek the reversal of the 2007 Decision. Indeed, while being well-aware
that the 2007 Decision had long become final and executory, and that any such
appeal by respondent would be futile and useless, it still erringly took cognizance
of the appeal and worse, modified the 2007 Decision, instead of dismissing the
Letter-Complaint outright.
As the final arbiter of all legal questions properly brought before it, our
decision in any given case constitutes the law of that particular case, from
which there is no appeal.
ITC: The 2007 Decision bars a further repeated consideration of the very same
issues that have already been settled with finality; more particularly, the illegal
dismissal of respondent, as well as the amount of back wages that she was entitled
to receive by reason thereof.
To once again reopen that issue through a different avenue would defeat the
existence of our courts as final arbiters of legal controversies. Having attained
finality, the decision is beyond review or modification even by this Court.
We likewise rule that the CSC Resolutions are void and ineffectual for varying
the tenor of our 2007 Decision. These Resolutions directed petitioner to pay
respondents back salaries for the entire period that she had not been reinstated;
more specifically, from the time of her illegal dismissal on 15 May 2000 until her
early retirement on 13 February 2008, contrary to our 2007 Decision limiting the
said award only to five (5) years.
ITC: When the CSC directed petitioner to pay respondent her backwages for a
period of almost eight (8) years, it erroneously modified the 2007 Decision of this
Court. The CSCs directive cannot be considered as mere correction of a clerical
error either, since it substantially altered the amount of benefits respondent was
entitled to as decreed by this Court.
The discussion in the 2007 Decision did not mention any qualification pertaining
to the five-year limit set by the CA on the amount of back wages to be received by
respondent. Rather, our 2007 Decision unequivocally affirmed the CA Decision
dated 14 May 2004 without modification. Since there is no qualification stated
in either the body or the dispositive portion, the ordinary and literal meaning
of the word affirm should prevail, that is, that the CA Decision had been
affirmed in its entirety; including the five-year limit imposed by the appellate
court.
We have often ruled that when the dispositive portion of a judgment is clear
and unequivocal, it must be executed strictly according to its tenor. A
definitive judgment is no longer subject to change, revision, amendment or
reversal. Upon finality of the judgment, the Court loses its jurisdiction to
amend, modify or alter it. The 2007 Decision had been clear and unambiguous to
Further, the rule is fundamental that after a judgment has been fully satisfied,
the case is deemed terminated once and for all. It cannot be modified or
altered.
ITC: The CSC gravely erred in modifying a judgment which had in fact already
been satisfied even before respondent filed her Letter-Complaint. It is undisputed
that the respondent received from the petitioner the amount of P558,944.19 as
backwages. Thus, upon satisfaction of the judgment, any subsequent
modification thereof ordered by the CSC was rendered useless and futile.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review filed by City of Makati is hereby
GRANTED. The Resolutions dated 23 October 2009 and 17 March 2010 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 108983 are REVERSED. The Release,
Waiver and Quitclaim signed by respondent, however, is without force and effect,
and should not foreclose her entitlement to retirement benefits. The City of Makati
is hereby likewise directed to immediately pay the same.