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Euro-Med
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Introduction
Integration:
can we talk of a
This paper revisits the debate on Euro-
Mediterranean integration to reassess its observed
and expected impact on the economic growth of
cost of the non-
the South and East Mediterranean countries
(SEMCs).
The broadly accepted results of this process are The fragmentation of the South Mediterranean
somewhat mixed (Jarreau, 2011). Although the markets, continued trade protection of services
opening up of markets has helped to introduce and agricultural products, persistent economic
macroeconomic discipline (mainly regarding rents, the size of the public sector, red tape and
inflation and budget deficits), it has not gone cumbersome regulations are all constraints to a
hand in hand with an upward climb of the SEMCs virtuous Euro-Mediterranean integration that
growth paths. Their virtually unchanged export would drive economic growth. Would greater
structure, the high concentration and rigidity of trade openness, chiefly through better resource
their production apparatus are symptomatic of a allocation and a reduction in economic rents, be
structural weakness regarding their competitiveness. beneficial?
Table of contents
In this sense, there would be a cost of the non-
Mediterranean or, in other words, an opportunity cost
to not completing the liberalisation of the regional 1 / EURO-MED TRADE LIBERALISATION
trade, which would thus cause a loss of potential economic HAD LIMITED MACROECONOMIC AND
growth for each member country [ 1]. SECTORAL IMPACT DURING THE 2000S
This hypothesis, very widely circulated by the inter- 1.1. The effects on economic growth
national institutions and deeply embedded in the
1.2. Sectoral effects
economic policies of the SEMCs, is nonetheless
debatable. A review of the historic trends of trade between 1.3. Euro-Med trade relations weakened
the SEMCs and European countries and the long-run by globalisation
simulation of their future trends seem to show that this
cost of the non-Mediterranean is relatively low.
2 / A DEEPENING OF EURO-MED TRADE
Drawing on innovative empirical research and partnered LIBERALISATION ALONE WILL NOT
by the Centre dEtudes Prospectives et dInformations INCREASE THE SEMCS GROWTH
Internationales (CEPII Center for International POTENTIAL
Prospective Studies), in the first section of this paper, 2.1. Choice of trade liberalisation scenarios
we will show that the logic of SEMC integration into
2.2. Limited growth potential
global trade takes precedence over that of their
regional integration, leading to a dilution of the Euro- 2.3. Uneven effects on economic diversification
Mediterranean link. In the second section, we use four 2.4. Marginal impact of SEMC regional integration
liberalisation scenarios to underline how trade open-
ness would have a weak macroeconomic and sectoral
impact. To conclude, in the final section, we will identify 3 / CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK
a number of lessons to be learnt and question the
3.1. The cost of the non-Mediterranean turns
growth policies of the SEMCs.
out to be less than expected
3.2. The need to rehabilitate the States role
3.3. Redefining long-run growth levers
APPENDIX
LIBERALISATION SCENARIOS
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS
REFERENCES
[1] Analogy to the cost of the non-Maghreb, which according to World Bank studies would have a real opportunity cost leading to a loss of 1 to 2 percentage
points of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) for each country.
Figure 1 Figure 2
Export values to EU25 (base 100 in 1995) Import values to EU25 (base 100 in 1995)
600 600
500 500
400 400
300 300
200 200
100 100
0 0
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
Source: computations based on data from the World Trade Database, BACI. Source: computations based on BACI data.
/ Euro-Med Growth and Trade Integration: can we talk of a cost of the non-Mediterranean? / 3
However, the uptrend over the whole period is to a share over the same period. On the other side,
large extent due to the increase in commodity prices, although the EU remains by far the Mediterraneans
as the changes in volume are much more modest. [ 2] biggest partner with 45% market share in 2009, it has
An analysis of market share (in value) in the SEMCs lost 10 percentage points since 1995 (cf. Figure 4).
and in the EU also puts the apparent trade dynamic This fall-off has been to the advantage of emerging
between the two regions into sharper perspective. countries like China and Russia, whose market share
On one side, SEMC market share in the EU, which in the decade starting in 2000 exceeded that of the
does not exceed 5%, has remained at the same level Mediterranean countries in their intra-SEMC trade
since 1995 (cf. Figure 3). At the same time, some (respectively 9.4% et 4.8%, against 3.5% of their
emerging countries have deepened their access to the imports in 2009).
European market, doubling if not tripling their market
Figure 3 Figure 4
30 30 80
25 25 70
60
20 20
50
15 15 40
10 10 30
20
5 5
10
0 0 0
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009
Turkey MED 7
Turkey MED 7
Russia China
Russia China
Japon United States
Japon United States
EU (right scale)
Source: computations based on BACI data. Source: computations based on BACI data.
The trends in market shares indicate that the Euro- Similarly, the positive impact of trade openness on
Med trade liberalisation has not had the expected the SEMCs economic growth failed to materialise, as
results on trade between the two regions. Quite the is shown by the absence of economic convergence
opposite, in fact. Not only did their respective market with the European countries. The only country that
shares not improve, but they also tended to decline seems to have engaged on a convergence path narrowing
due to the effect of stronger international competition the gap between their GDP per capita and that of the
from emerging countries and countries with low EU since the early 2000s (cf. Figure 5) is Turkey and,
labour costs. Geographical proximity does not seem to a lesser extent, Tunisia. This evolution is nonethe-
to have had any decisive impact on Euro- less limited as the Turkish and Tunisian GDPs per
Mediterranean trade integration. capita amounted to barely 50% and 30% respectively
[2] Export and import volumes stagnated in most cases and show a significant rise only for Algeria and Turkey (a doubling of trade over the period).
of European GDP per capita in 2011. The other the end of the period (cf. Figure 6). Their GDP per
SEMCs except for Lebanon experienced no capita remained under 30% of European GDP per
convergence, despite a slight reduction in the gaps at capita.
Figure 5 Figure 6
GDP/pc PPP* of the Med countries (2005 GDP/pc PPP of the Med countries (2005
constant USD, in % of the average GDP/pc of constant USD, in % of the average GDP/pc of
EU25) EU25)
50
50
40 40
30 30
20 20
10 10
0
0
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011
1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 2009 2011
Lebanon Jordania
Turkey Tunisia
Algeria Morocco
Egypt
1.2. Sectoral effects market share increase in these three sectors was not
sufficient to offset the sharp drop observed in the
A first look at the changes in SEMC market shares in textile sector. SEMC textile exports to the EU were
the EU by sector (cf. Figure 7) and of the EUs in the adversely affected by competition from Asia, parti-
SEMCs (cf. Figure 8) shows that the SEMCs were able cularly China, Pakistan and Bangladesh following the
to consolidate their positions in some export sectors removal of the Multi-fibre Arrangement in 2005
from 1995 onward. Conversely, the EUs market (World Bank, 2006a). Overall, SEMC market share in
shares in the SEMCs declined over the period in all the EU was down in the industrial sector taken as a
sectors of activity. whole. This trend indicates, at the very least, the
industrialisation process is losing impetus, which
For the SEMCs, the sectors that consolidated their translates into a loss of competitiveness in their tradi-
export market shares are capital goods, agricultural tional specialisations and the inability to redeploy
products and other manufactured products. Yet, the their comparative advantages in new industries.
/ Euro-Med Growth and Trade Integration: can we talk of a cost of the non-Mediterranean? / 5
Figure 7 Figure 8
SEMC market share in EU25, by sector (%) EU25 market share in the SEMCs, by sector (%)
70
25
60
20
50
15 40
10 30
20
5
10
0
0
Other Metal Capital
Textiles Agriculture Mining Capital Other Metal
Manuf. products goods Textiles Agriculture Mining
goods Manuf. prod.
1995 1995
2002 2002
2009 2009
Note: The sectors are broken down as follows: textiles, capital goods, metal products, other manufacturing products (agri-food products, chemicals, plastics, wood
products, leather), mining, agriculture.
Source: computations based on BACI data. Source: computations based on BACI data.
An analysis of the determinants of the trade flows ture to analyse the determinants of bilateral trade. A
helps to explain the decline of SEMC shares in the EU first original contribution of this study was to dis -
market. The CEPII-AFD study (2012) uses a gravity aggregate the trade into three main sectors (agricul-
model based on Baier and Bergstrand (2009) to analyse tural, agri-food distinct from the other branches of
the impact of trade agreements between the SEMCs the industry and manufacturing) so as to reveal the
and the EU between 2001 and 2007 (cf. Box 1). This differentiated sectoral effects.
econometric tool is widely used in the economic litera-
The gravity model or equation is an empirical relationship that explains trade between two countries by their
economic mass and the distance separating them, by analogy with Newtons universal law of gravity. This
empirical relationship is very widely used for international trade as it provides some of the most stable and
robust econometric results.
In its augmented version, the gravity model may also include barriers to trade other than geographical dis-
tance. Apart from the bilateral barriers (such as customs barriers) affecting bilateral trade, Anderson and van
Wincoop (2003) have also identified what they call multilateral resistances to trade, which correspond to
barriers vis--vis the rest of the world and which are experienced by every country. The underlying idea is that
the lower the bilateral costs and the higher the opportunity cost of trading with the rest of the world, the
more two countries would trade with each other. Thus two countries experiencing high resistance to trade
with the rest of the world will trade more between themselves than will those countries with better access to
the rest of the world. In other words, the aim is to capture the possible diversion effects on the trade between
two countries resulting from the trade agreements that either country has signed with the rest of the world.
Baier and Bergstrand (2009) simplify the inclusion of the multilateral barriers identified by Anderson and Van
Wincoop by proposing an original and straightforward econometric approach. Using this simplified approach,
the CEPII-AFD study (2012) estimates a gravity equation augmented by variables measuring tariff barriers at
both bilateral and multilateral levels. We will see below that multilateral tariff barriers can have a strong
impact on SEMC bilateral trade with the EU.
The results show that, overall, the Euro-Med trade from the manufacturing sector (cf. Figure 9). This
openness policies (measured by the lowering of bilateral disparity can be largely explained by the fact that the
barriers between the EU and the SEMCs) had little trade openness effects on the manufacturing sector
effect on their bilateral trade flows between 2001 and mainly happened prior to and at the very beginning
2007. A more nuanced picture of this finding is none- of the period analysed. Thus from 2001 to 2007,
theless provided by a sectoral breakdown of their export growth in the manufacturing sector did not
trade patterns. In fact, trade liberalisation between exceed 5%, and was even negative in the case of
the two regions brought greater benefit to exports Turkey (-1%).
from the agricultural and agri-food sectors than those
/ Euro-Med Growth and Trade Integration: can we talk of a cost of the non-Mediterranean? / 7
Figure 9 Figure 10
Net change in exports from SEMCs to EU25, Net change in imports to SEMCs from EU25,
20012007 (%) 20012007 (%)
30 30
20 20
10 10
0 0
-10 -10
- 41,4 %
-20 -20
Tunisia
Morocco
Jordan
Lebanon
Egypt
Algeria
Israel
Turkey
Tunisia
Morocco
Jordan
Lebanon
Egypt
Algeria
Israel
Turkey
Agriculture Agriculture
Agri-food Agri-food
Manufacturing Manufacturing
Note: the estimated net changes subsequent to the lowering of tariff barriers between 2001 and 2007.
On the other hand, export growth in the agricultural agreements for agriculture covering the whole of the
sector, and even more in the agri-food sector was Euro-Mediterranean area had not yet been negotiated
substantial. The effects on the agri-food sector are or signed.
particularly homogeneous: except for Tunisia, whose
exports dropped by 10%, all the SEMCs saw their On the other hand, imports from the EU to the
agri-food exports rise, up to 14% in Lebanon and 27% SEMCs increased very little overall (cf. Figure 10),
in Jordan. The impact of openness on agricultural with the exception of Morocco (+18%) and Algeria
exports generally benefited the SEMCs, but the (+12%) in the manufacturing sector, and Tunisia
results are very heterogeneous: certainly, agricultural (+8%) in the agricultural sector. EU exports seem to
exports went up by 11% in Lebanon and 13% in Egypt have suffered from trade diversions linked to the
but, at the same time, they fell by 15% in Morocco trade agreements signed between the SEMCs and
and 6% in Jordan. These mixed effects are mainly third countries, either on a bilateral basis (with the
explained by the fact that EU tariff reductions depend United States) or within a regional framework
on the country and the product. In fact, there were ( Greater Arab Free Trade Agreement GAFTA and
still numerous exceptions to tariff reductions in force the Agadir Agreement).
in the agricultural sector, since the preferential
Euro-Med trade relations weakened third countries is integrated, the net change in the
1.3. by globalisation trade of manufactured products is shown to have
decreased.
/ Euro-Med Growth and Trade Integration: can we talk of a cost of the non-Mediterranean? / 9
relative increases in its trade protection barriers vis-- In the agri-food sector, the differentiated direct and
vis its other trading partners: these either partially indirect effects on SEMC exports to the EU are similar
offset the direct negative effects (Tunisia, Morocco, to those observed in the agricultural sector (cf. Figure
Jordan), or reinforced the positive effects (Lebanon, 13), except that the net effects (direct and indirect)
Egypt). In addition, the agreements with non-Euro- are higher overall (Graphs 9 and 10): net creation of
Med countries had an amplifying effect on SEMC exports in almost all the countries, except Tunisia, [ 3]
exports to the EU, particularly in the case of Lebanon on average account for 9.8% of total agri-food
and Egypt. Conversely, the indirect effects on EU exports over the 20012007 period, compared to
exports to the SEMCs systematically evolved in the 7.4% in the agricultural sector. [4] The most pronounced
opposite direction to the direct effects, revealing that increases can be explained by the direct conse-
the competitiveness brought into play by the agree- quences of the EUs large tariff reductions vis--vis
ments signed between SEMCs and third countries had Jordan (-12% on average), Lebanon (-6%), Egypt and
an impact on EU exports. Certainly the direct effects Algeria (-3%). More significantly, agri-food exports
of the Euro-Med agreements are globally positive from Morocco, Turkey and Israel, impacted by modest
(except those with Turkey and Israel). However, the EU tariff increases (less that 2% on average), saw an
agreements concluded with non-Euro-Med partners overall rise between 2001 and 2007 resulting from a
have weakened (Tunisia, Algeria), if not cancelled out differential effect of tariff changes vis--vis the EUs
(Morocco, Egypt) the direct effects of the bilateral other trading partners (cf. Figure 13).
Euro-Med agreements.
Figure 12 Figure 13
Direct and indirect effects for the SEMC Direct and indirect effects for the SEMC
agricultural sector from 2001 to 2007 (%) agri-food sector from 2001 to 2007 (%)
Tunisia
Morocco
Jordan
Lebanon
Egypt
Algeria
Israel
Turkey
Tunisia
Morocco
Jordan
Lebanon
Egypt
Algeria
Israel
Turkey
Tunisia
Morocco
Jordan
Lebanon
Egypt
Algeria
Israel
Turkey
Indirect Indirect
Direct Direct
[3] Tunisia has been subject to EU tariff increases in the agri-food sector that are much higher than those in the agricultural or manufacturing sectors.
[4] This second average includes Tunisia, Lebanon, Egypt and Israel, which are the only countries to have seen a net increase of their agricultural exports.
Similarly, although Tunisian exports suffered from the countries (this is the case for Lebanon, Egypt and
direct effects of a substantial tariff rise, these were Algeria). But, above all, some countries such as
partly offset by the tariff increases vis--vis the EUs Tunisia and Morocco, and even more so Israel and
other trading partners. Turkey, were able to offset direct losses linked to EU
tariff increases in the agricultural and agri-food sectors,
The indirect effects of agreements signed with non- thanks to these indirect effects.
Euro-Med countries translate into a drop in EU
exports to the SEMCs despite large tariff reductions These findings show that the multilateral trade ties of
granted by the latter. both partner regions have a significant impact on
Euro-Med trade. Bensassi et al. (2012) thus show that
This analysis of direct and indirect gains highlights the a tariff reduction between two partner countries only
importance of the multilateral dimension in the Euro- brings gains over time since the partner countries
Med trade relations. Although the direct effects of protect themselves from competition ( i.e. indirect
tariff changes are essential, notably in the agricultural effects) by regularly renegotiating new preferential
and agri-food sectors, the effects of Euro-Med inte- trade agreements. Given the importance of the indi-
gration cannot be measured without taking into rect effects on Euro-Mediterranean trade, all of the
account the agreements signed by each of the parties agreements concluded by the EU and the SEMCs
with third countries. Thus, looking more closely at must be taken into account to a greater degree in the
SEMC exports to the EU, the effects of tariff reductions framework of bilateral negotiations to ensure that
applied to the SEMCs were sometimes amplified by they are adapted to regional integration.
the less favourable changes in EU tariffs vis--vis third
2.1. Choice of trade liberalisation scenarios Here, the impact of trade policies is analysed using a
computable general equilibrium model so as to
reconstitute, following a shock to relative prices, not
In this second section, we present the results of a only intersectoral relations at country level, but also
simulation of deepening trade liberalisation between at aggregate level (cf. Box 2). A change in relative
the two shores of the Mediterranean (Euro-Med prices subsequent to a lowering of tariff barriers
openness) and between the SEMCs (Med-Med modifies not only the allocation of factors of production
openness) to assess its potential impact on long-run between the different sectors but also, by extension,
economic growth. the countrys macroeconomic performance.
/ Euro-Med Growth and Trade Integration: can we talk of a cost of the non-Mediterranean? / 11
Box 2 Use of the MIRAGE model
With a general equilibrium model, all interactions between the goods and services markets as well as the
factors of production in each country can be taken into account in order to assess the effects of trade open-
ness on welfare, production and trade. The dynamic is determined by the change in exogenous variables
(population trends, labour supply, natural resources, growth of total factor productivity) and by the endoge-
nous accumulation of capital. To represent a countrys economic structure, this type of model uses detailed
data from a double-entry accounting framework known as the Social Accounting Matrix.
The model used in this study is the MIRAGE model developed by the CEPII. This is a multi-sector and multi-
country model (34 sectors and 23 countries/regions). The SEMCs are examined in the following way: Egypt,
Morocco, Tunisia, Turkey, Algeria/Libya, Rest of the Middle East. Some of these countries have been aggre-
gated on account of the statistical limits of the data source, Global Trade Analyses Project (GTAP), used to
calibrate the model. The results for those countries analysed individually are thus more robust.
The MIRAGE model is calibrated using the degree of trade openness observed in 2004, with projections up
to 2025. In other words, the projections are based on the tariff levels observed for the baseline year 2004.
Four trade openness scenarios, presented below, are compared to a baseline scenario that assumes an
unchanged situation in trade relations between the EU and the SEMCs, and among the SEMCs. EU tariff
barriers to SEMC industrial sectors imports are close to 0 in 2004. They are over 20%, and remain high, in
the agricultural and agri-food sectors. Services are to a large extent highly protected.
The four scenarios make it possible to assess the impact of a deepened trade openness in the main economic
sectors (industry, agriculture and services). The effects of trade liberalisation mainly stem from gains in the
allocation of resources, the accumulation of capital, terms of trade and welfare. [ 5]
With regard to political and social constraints, four It should be pointed out that this modelling frame-
credible reference scenarios of liberalisation have work has two kinds of limits. Firstly, the scarcity of
been chosen: [ 6] statistical data, their unreliability (notably for services)
and the volume of informal trade among the SEMCs
(i) scenario 1 Euro-Med liberalisation: complete made it necessary to simplify the model specification.
Euro-Med trade liberalisation for industrial The main consequence of these statistical constraints
goods and partial liberalisation for agricultural was that the projection scenarios necessarily referenced
products (excluding sensitive products); [ 7] 2004 as the baseline year, as this corresponded to the
(ii) scenario 2 Euro-Med + Med-Med liberalisation: data of the most recent social accounting matrix.
scenario (i) + partial Med-Med trade liberalisation Secondly, the intrinsic limits of the MIRAGE model,
for industrial goods and agricultural products owing to its specification assumptions, mean that the
(excluding sensitive products); results need to be qualified. One can consider that
static gains are overestimated due to the assumptions
(iii) scenario 3 liberalisation of services: scenario made on the competitive nature of the markets,
(ii) + partial Euro-Med liberalisation for services; which are considered to be perfect and undistorted [ 8]
(i.e. optimal reallocation of resources and adjustments
(iv) scenario 4 multilateral liberalisation: scenario driven by relative prices). Additionally, non-tariff barriers,
(iii) + complete liberalisation for goods with third which may increase following a reduction of tariffs, are
countries. not adequately captured by the model. On the other
hand, dynamic trade gains (stemming from increases share in the European countries foreign trade. Apart
induced by productivity, technology exchanges or from the oil-producing countries (Algeria and Libya),
learning effects) are underestimated, given that techno- imports would also increase significantly, but gene-
logy is treated as an exogenous variable (the impact in rally to a lesser extent, than exports, which would
terms of product varieties and to a selection of the have a positive impact on their balance of payments.
most productive enterprises is not estimated, which Nonetheless, given the trade structure, which would
also leads to a underestimation of gains). remain unchanged, these countries would continue to
be highly vulnerable to external shocks (mainly
In fact, computable general equilibrium models, by through commodity prices).
construction, find a positive correlation between the
economic gains and the degree of trade openness, Although SEMC export gains would be significant
showing that multilateral liberalisation is always the overall, it should be pointed out that those specifi-
most favourable option. In this sense, an analysis may cally due to exports to European markets would
be open to bias when it rests on the formulation of a represent a smaller share, except in the case of
discourse stating that market opening would necessa- Tunisia. In fact, export gains would be markedly
rily produce the strongest impacts regardless of other higher vis--vis third countries with which the SEMCs
realities that may influence the behaviour of public have concluded trade agreements, thus reinforcing
and private actors. The results must be interpreted the diversion effect (and the weakening of the Euro-
with all other things being equal and in a context of Med relationship [ 9]) observed in the pre-2004 period.
perfect market equilibrium; this thus calls for a
degree of caution and must not preclude analysis of
the institutional determinants of the structural and Figure 14
sectoral dynamics of SEMC economies.
Changes of total exports between 2004 and
2025 compared to the baseline scenario (%)
16
While market opening between the SEMCs and the
12
EU in the pre-2004 period was limited to industrial
goods and implemented asymmetrically (European 8
markets being already largely open to industrial goods 4
exports from the SEMCs), the liberalisation scenarios 0
envisage reciprocal openness for agricultural products
-4
and for services.
Tunisia Egypt Morocco Turkey Algria Rest EU
Such trade openness would translate into an increase Libya of
Middle East
in trade. The simulations show that four countries
would see a significant rise in their exports compared
to the baseline scenario, which simulates a halt in the S1 S2 S3 S4
trade liberalisation process post-2004 (cf. Figure 14):
Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and Turkey. Export earnings
would be more pronounced in the agricultural and
Note: the results for the ROME group of countries are not significant given the groups
agri-food sectors. On the EU side, the knock-on effect heterogeneous and composite character.
on EU exports would be weaker owing to the relati-
vely small size of the SEMC markets and their limited Source : CEPII-AFD (2012).
[9] Meaning that the relations with non-Euro-Med partners have diluted the trade ties between the SEMCs and the EU.
/ Euro-Med Growth and Trade Integration: can we talk of a cost of the non-Mediterranean? / 13
Several factors may help to explain why the regionali- marked by high inertia in the goods and services trade
sation dynamics remain weak despite the expected structure.
gains due to proximity. On the one hand, maintaining
high non-tariff barriers which are not taken into Beyond these trade logics, the simulation also showed
account here would very strongly impact exports to that Euro-Med integration is strongly constrained by
European markets. On the other hand, the lack of the structural and institutional limits that typify the
productive foreign direct investment in the SEMCs SEMC economies. In this respect, a deeper regional
limits the transfer of technology and capital from the trade liberalisation would not translate into significant
EU. The lack of production integration through industrial gains in terms of economic growth (cf. Table 1).
subcontracting affects the trade integration dynamic,
Table 1 GDP growth between 2004 and 2025 compared to the baseline scenario (%)
Algeria Rest of
Scenarios Egypt Morocco Tunisia Turkey EU
Libya Middle East
In fact, Morocco, Egypt, Algeria and Libya would The consequences of trade liberalisation vary depen-
record modest GDP gains, and even in some cases a ding on the SEMC. For oil-importing countries, the
GDP loss, [ 10] in the three reference scenarios with a liberalisation of services would generate a gain in
higher degree of regional trade integration. Only volume GDP proportionally higher than the liberalisa-
Tunisia, and to a lesser extent Turkey, would benefit tion of agricultural products in Egypt and Turkey. In
from a stronger knock-on effect on economic growth, Morocco and Tunisia, the contribution of agricultural
both for GDP in value and in volume. Incidentally, the activities would on the other hand be relatively
pronounced difference between the effects on higher. The varyingly diversified initial production
constant price GDP and those on current price GDP structure in these countries would lead to more effi-
(notably for Morocco, Egypt, Algeria and Libya) is cient reallocation of resources and higher producti-
explained mainly by a more marked deterioration in vity gains, indicating a relatively stronger potential for
terms of trade (an adverse differential between the growth in the agricultural, agri-foods and services
price of exported goods and the price of imported sectors than in the industrial sector. Conversely, the
goods). oil-producing countries, whose economies are highly
concentrated, would not benefit from growth gains in
any of the liberalisation scenarios.
[10] Meaning that the relations with non-Euro-Med partners have diluted the trade ties between the SEMCs and the EU.
Table 2 Growth of the sectoral added value in 2025 compared to the baseline scenario
(%)
Algeria/ Rest of
Scenarios Egypt Morocco Tunisia Turkey EU
Libya the Middle East
/ Euro-Med Growth and Trade Integration: can we talk of a cost of the non-Mediterranean? / 15
Algeria/ Rest of
Scenarios Egypt Morocco Tunisia Turkey EU
Libya the Middle East
The foremost explanation may be that there is not value chain into activities with higher technological
enough economic complementarity between the content. Most of these countries are (historically)
SEMCs to generate a ripple effect on trade flows and vertically integrated with the EU through inter-industry
economic growth. The similarity of their production trade linkages that give rise to inflexible inter-company
structures, on the one hand between oil-producing relations.
countries and on the other between non-oil-producing
countries, severely limits the potential for intra- The decline of these specialisations in a context of
regional trade. In this context, the relatively higher trade openness resulted in the erosion of their
gains in Turkey provide an interesting insight, which compe titive advantage in European markets during a
echoes the results observed in sectoral reallocations. period when a large part of their production fabric
Only those countries following the path of advanced was exposed to fierce competition from cheap
diversification would be able to benefit from greater imports in their own markets.
trade openness between the SEMCs. Turkish exports The analysis of the SEMCs structural competitive
to other SEMCs would increase particularly in the weakness has produced a shared diagnosis (World
industrial sector. Bank, 2006 b ; Femise, 2007, 2012). There are many
Beyond the simulation results, the impact of trade possible explanations for the SEMCs structural
liberalisation depends on how diversified a countrys blockage: constraints to forming domestic productive
economy is initially. The greater the diversity of the capital (absence of large industrial groups, fragmented
initial production structure, the greater the likelihood SME fabric), low employment rates, structural rigidity
that trade liberalisation will lead to a reallocation of of the job market, unfavourable business climate
resources to new production activities. Conversely, (bureaucracy, inefficient administration, legal uncer-
the more concentrated the initial production struc- tainty, corruption), weak intermediation of financial
ture, the more trade liberalisation would tend to markets and persistent rent-seeking.
accentuate this. In addition, past consequences of trade openness in
What does past experience of the SEMCs show us? the SEMCs help shed some light on the simulation
Even the SEMCs whose initial level of diversification results. Structural competitive weakness, insufficient
was relatively higher (Tunisia, Morocco, Egypt) have economic diversification and no upgrade in the value
had their structural dynamics obstructed by speciali- chain are undoubtedly all factors to be overcome for
sations in low value-added industrial activities that a virtuous regional trade liberalisation to be imple-
have remained static over recent decades. This activity mented.
lock-in has prevented them from moving up the
/ Euro-Med Growth and Trade Integration: can we talk of a cost of the non-Mediterranean? / 17
3 / Conclusions and outlook
Four conclusions may be drawn from this studys This empirical evidence helps to feed the debate on
findings: the SEMCs paths to transitioning growth models. It
may also be interpreted in light of current macro -
while the Barcelona Process has so far not led to economic weaknesses brought on by the global crisis
greater Euro-Med integration, the SEMCs appear and even more by the political transitions facing some
to fall more within a trajectory of global trade of these countries.
integration; this integration has led to a weakening
of the effects of the Euro-Med integration; Indeed, the inertia of the SEMCs economic structures
should be put into a socio-economic context. First,
trade liberalisation would mainly benefit the agri- growth is no longer able to absorb the huge influx of
cultural and agri-food sectors; new entrants onto the labour market and, more gene-
a deepening of Euro-Med integration would not rally, to reduce serious social problems. Second,
significantly raise the growth potential of SEMCs although growth was more sustained during the
and would have a limited overall effect on economic 2000s, it was only weakly redistributive and its eco -
diversification; nomic gains were largely captured by private interests,
mostly those close to policy makers. This deep-rooted
regional integration between the SEMCs would crisis has triggered a strong social demand focussed
substantially increase the gains of Euro-Med inte- on access to employment, equity and the fight against
gration, but this alone would not have a positive corruption.
impact.
This context combining heightened social tensions exploitation of primary resources. Without structural
and political transition reveals the need for more change in the productive base, trade liberalisation
government. Not a demiurgic State, but a State that may increase vulnerability to external shocks and
will introduce mechanisms to redistribute wealth, exacerbate social inequalities.
combat systemic corruption and foster human and
social development. Against this backdrop of competitive weakness, trade
openness needs to be gradual in order to protect
Liberalisation, pursued indiscriminately since the nascent industries and high-growth sectors by allowing
1980s, has crippled national capacities for public them to accrue learning effects before any exposure
regulation, thus contributing to the collapse of the to competition (Rodrik, 2001). Moreover, opening up
emerging middle classes, the rise of rent-seeking trade stepwise would likely enhance the indirect
networks and the development of an informal economy. effects of regionalisation, since the SEMCs would
Certainly, democratisation cannot be disassociated benefit from preferential access to the European market,
from the existence of political checks and balances compared to the EUs other trading partners.
and the full expression of individual and collective
freedom, but it must also be accompanied by a Secondly, trade openness requires appropriate public
rebuilding of the State. Strengthening legal institutions, policies in order to escape the structural adjustment
restoring public administrations, bolstering the social paradigm that has led these countries to abandon
protection system and organising market regulation policies for long-run growth since the 1980s.
institutions will thus be major post-revolution challenges
(Rodrik, 2009). For the SEMCs, three types of major structural policies
may have a lever effect on economic growth: (i) an
industrial policy that would set out to identify and
protect key sectors with added value and job creation
3.3. Redefining long-run growth
potential (particularly in agro-industrial and service
levers
activities), and to foster technological innovation and
learning effects that would encourage value chain
Three lessons can be drawn to help reassess long-run upgrades in industrial activities (Hausmann and
growth policies. Rodrik, 2003), (ii) a policy to develop human capital
that would align training systems with labour market
First and foremost, pro-growth policies cannot be needs in view of stimulating structural changes in the
defined on the basis of trade liberalisation alone. production base and easing social tensions (Amin et
When some of the SEMCs (Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia, al. , 2012), and (iii) a proactive policy for public and
Jordan) entered into negotiations with the EU to private funding of the economy that would encourage
extend trade agreements to services and agricultural the formation of national productive capital by
products, what was the expected effect on economic facilitating private investment and modernising infra-
growth? The export-led model the cornerstone structure.
model for growth in emerging countries has largely
inspired pro-growth policies in the SEMCs since the Thirdly, increasing the potential for growth means
1990s. However, institutional and structural short - harnessing globalisation.
comings have hindered the onset of a virtuous dynamic
between trade and growth (Mezouaghi, 2010). High-growth countries all share the aptitude to dynami-
Competitive weakness has gradually eroded their cally integrate the global economy, to appropriate
comparative advantages in the European market. In technologies and foster learning effects, introduce
addition, trade openness has had limited effects on macroeconomic discipline and increase levels of
growth, since specialisations have locked production investment by mobilising domestic savings and
into activities with low added value or based on the enhancing their attractiveness (Commission on
/ Euro-Med Growth and Trade Integration: can we talk of a cost of the non-Mediterranean? / 19
Growth and Development, 2008). International The SEMCs should, in this regard, (re)define their
competition will continue to exert strong pressure on policy to promote investment attractiveness. This
the price competitiveness of goods and services, would encourage multinational firms to set up locally
prompting multinational firms to reduce production and would create spill-over effects on the economy as
costs by offshoring production lines or suppliers in a whole (creating externalities). Specifically, this
countries able to provide this competitive advantage. policy should target the formation of domestic
The constraint of proximity will also continue to hold productive capital and local learning capacity, which
sway for goods and services requiring just-in-time underpins the implementation of modern industrial
supply chain management. processes and the mobilisation of a skilled labour
force (Mezouaghi, 2009).
Appendix 1
Liberalisation scenarios
Baseline
Scenarios EU-MED MED-MED Euro-Med liberalisation of trade in goods
scenario
Multilateral liberalisation
/ Euro-Med Growth and Trade Integration: can we talk of a cost of the non-Mediterranean? / 21
List of acronyms and abbreviations
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