C05157765 3.

5(c)
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Yuriy Viadimirovich ANDROPOV USSR

(Phonetic: ahnDRAWpuf)

General Secretary and lblember,

Politburo, Central Committee,
Communist Party of the Soviet
Union

Addressed as:
Mr. Secretary

Yuriy Andropov succeeded Leonid Brezhnev

as General Secretary of the CPSU on 12 November
1982, the day after Brezhnev's death was
announced. A member of the ruling Politburo since
1973, Andropov is one of only three people who
have dual status as full members and Central
Committee secretaries. When he took his new job,
he indicated that collective leadership would
continue to be the rule in the Soviet Union. At
present, however, he appears to be clearly in charge, even though the extent of his power has
not yet been defined. As the Soviet leader, Andropov faces formidable domestic challenges,
including an entrenched and aging bureaucratic structure, a Communist Party riddled with
cynicism and corruption, and an economy whose performance is in serious decline. We
believe that he bas the. resourcefulness, astuteness, and political skills needed to take on
these problems. 3.5(c)

Andropov is perhaps the most complicated and puzzling of all the current Soviet
l:;hders. A sophisticated man, he is probably better informed on foreign affairs, and on at
least some domestic matters, than any other Soviet party chief since Lenin. Throughout his
entire career, Andropov has shown a single-minded devotion to the Communist cause. He
appears to have a capacity for ruthlessness, but it is possible that what seems ruthless to a
non-Soviet observer is, to Andropov, merely an action to support or further the cause of
Communism and the supremacy of the Soviet state. 3.5(c)
Andropov does not fit the stereotype of the dull, gray bureaucrat. He is reserved and
unassuming; his quiet approach is unusual among Soviet leaders. Serious minded and
pragmatic, he exudes self-confidence. He is suave and gentlemanly--even when dealing with
his victims. He listens to new ideas, gathers information carefully, relies on exhaustive staff
work, evaluates consequences and possible actions cautiously, and acts resolutely. His
approach is to try to win through stratagem and maneuver but to resort to force when all
else fails and he deems the risks acceptable, 3.5(c)
Among his closest personal and professional friends, Andropov counts Defense Minister
Dmitriy Ustinov, Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko, and, paradoxically, former CPSU
Secretary Andrey Kirilenko- -one of those he edged out in the competition for leadership.
He appears to have been close to the late party ideologue Mikhail Suslov, the patron of
Soviet conservatives, whose views are still shared by many in the leadership. Andropov was
close to Brezhnev professionally for years, and the late General Secretary clearly regarded
him as an astute adviser 3.5(c)
At the same time, one of the most striking features of Andropov's background is his
independence. He is apolitical loner. Unlike many of his colleagues, he did not fawn upon
Brezhnev but treated him in a straightforward manner. Andropov is not regarded as the protege
of any senior Soviet leader past or present. By the same token, unusual for the Soviet system,
only a few men can be characterized as his own proteges. Even though he has long functioned
within a framework of collective decisionmaking, he is, by all accounts, his own man 3.5(c)

(cont.) 3.5(c)
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Views on Major Issues.

Andropov's views on major issues are known primarily from his public statements. He
has emphasized the need for a strong Soviet defense capability, but he has also said that
military strength alone will not maintain peace. He has warned that a nuclear war would
have catastrophic consequences and has spoken out in favor of East-West detente, arms
control, and the reduction of international tensions. Like other Soviet leaders, Andropov has
blamed Washington for the deterioration of East-West relations since the late 1970s while
professing optimism about the long-range prospects for detente. His remarks have been
distinguished by a sensitvity to the diversity of opinion among Western leaders 3.5(c)

When Andropov was chairman of the KGB during 1967-82, he spoke at greater length
than most Soviet leaders about external and internal threats to the Soviet system. He
maintained that human rights pledges signed by Moscow at the 1975 Helsinki Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe did not restrict Soviet actions against dissidents. He
has stressed the need for constant vigilance against the threat of Western-inspired
subversion. Andropov has consistently maintained that Moscow has a duty to assist
"national liberation" struggles in the Third World, particularly when they are opposed by
Western nations. His commen r the years have followed the dominant
leadership line of the moment. 3.5(c)

Career and Personal Data

During his career Andropov has alternated between party and government posts. After
holding positions in the Komsomol (Young Communists League) and party in the Karelo-
Finnish republic, he worked in the central party apparatus in Moscow before being
appointed Ambassador to Hungary in 1954. In that capacity, he was an intermediary
between the Soviet and Hungarian Governments at the time of the 1956 Hungarian revolt.
During 1957-67 he was in charge of party relations with Bloc Communist parties in the
CPSU Secretariat, and he was a party secretary from 1962 until 1967. Andropov spent the
next 15 years in the government as chairman of the KGB. t in May 1982,
when he was again elected a Central Committee secretary 3.5(c)

Despite press reports that the KGB became less repressive under Andropov's
chairmanship, the trend away from mass terror and toward lawful procedures had actually
begun earlier. Compared to the operations of the secret police during the Stalin years, KGB
operations under Andropov appeared restrained, tolerant, and restricted by the letter of
Soviet law--even though by Western standards, those operations were seen as repressive,
coercive, and sometimes brutal 3.5(c)

It is in the crippling of the Soviet dissident movement that Andropov's sophistication

and cleverness seem most apparent. Through a mixture of tactics from leniency to brutality,
the KGB largely eradicated the "dissident" movement in. the USSR, doing so without
derailing the Soviet policy of detente. There were some arrests, trials, and harsh sentences;
but there were also cases in which mild sentences were imposed or the subject of the
proceeding was allowed to emigrate or was expelled. Dissent seems to have been handled on
a case-by-case basis, with the emphasis on defusing each problem as it arose 3.5(c)
Andropov is an art collector and enjoys music and literature. He speaks English and
Hungarian. He had a heart attack several years ago but appears to be in fairly good health
at present. A recent press report states that Andropov, 68, is a widower. He has a grown son
and daughter.F---] 3.5(c)

2 11 January 1983
3.5(c)

Approved for Release: 2015/09/25 C05157765