Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 194445

Plaintiff,
Present:

CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
BRION
- versus - PEREZ,
SERENO, and
REYES, JJ.

ROGER POSADA y URBANO and EMILY

POSADA y SARMIENTO, Promulgated:
Accused.
March 12, 2012

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

REYES, J.:

As we decide this appeal involving a couple who allegedly violated Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A.
9165), otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, we should bear in
mind the words emanating from the pen of former Justice Isagani A. Cruz:

We need only add that the active support of everyone is

needed to bolster the campaign of the government against the evil
of drug addiction. The merchants of all prohibited drugs, from the
rich and powerful syndicates to the individual street "pushers,"
must be hounded relentlessly and punished to the full extent of the
law, subject only to the inhibitions of the Bill of Rights.[1]

The Case

Accused-appellants Roger Posada (Roger) and Emily Posada (Emily) were convicted by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 43, Virac, Catanduanes, in Criminal Case No. 3490 for
selling twelve (12) pieces of transparent sealed plastic sachet, containing Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride or shabu with a total weight of 0.4578 grams, in violation of Section 5, Article II
of R.A. No. 9165.[2]
Roger was also convicted by the same RTC in Criminal Case No. 3489 for possession of one
piece of torn plastic sachet, containing residue of a crystalline substance (allegedly shabu), a
piece of small aluminum foil, a pair of small scissors, and fifteen (15) pieces of used lighter all of
which are intended to be used for smoking or introducing dangerous drugs into the body of a
person, in violation of Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.[3]

Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, the accused-appellants filed an appeal before the Court of
Appeals (CA) which, via a Decision[4] dated June 17, 2010, affirmed the RTC Decision as to the
accused-appellants' conviction in Criminal Case No. 3490 but acquitted Roger in Criminal Case
No. 3489 on the ground of reasonable doubt.

Now, the accused-appellants ask this Court for a complete exoneration from the offense charged
in Criminal Case No. 3490 on the ground that the prosecution failed to establish the chain of
custody and integrity of the seized illegal items and to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

Antecedent Facts

According to the evidence of the prosecution, P/CI Gil Francis Tria (P/CI Tria), the Chief of
Police of Virac Municipal Police Station and representative of the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency (PDEA), ordered surveillance on the activities of the accused-appellants and a certain
Johnjohn Urbano (Urbano).[5] As a result of the said surveillance, PO1 Roldan Area (PO1 Area)
was able to buy one sachet of shabu from Emily for P250.00 on August 2, 2005.[6]

Consequently, after the August 2, 2005 test-buy yielded positive result, P/CI Tria applied for a
search warrant, which the Honorable Jaime E. Contreras granted. [7] Thus, at noontime of August
3, 2005, P/CI Tria and his team proceeded to Barangay Concepcion and coordinated
with Punong Barangay Antonio Asuncion, Jr. (Asuncion) in the operation against the accused-
appellants.[8]

When the team of P/CI Tria reached the place of operation, they found Emily standing in front of
her house. PO1 Area, who was the poseur-buyer, called her and when she came near him, he told
her that he would buy shabu. PO1 Area then handed to Emily P250.00, consisting of two pieces
of P100.00 bill and one piece of P50.00 bill. After receiving the money from PO1 Area, Emily
immediately went to her house and got a coin purse. When she returned at the scene of the
operation, Emily gave PO1 Area one sachet of shabu, which she got from the coin purse.
Subsequently, Roger appeared and handed to Emily 12 plastic sachets of shabu which Emily
placed inside the coin purse. At this point, PO1 Area identified himself as a police officer while
giving the signal to his team that the buy-bust turned positive. He arrested Emily while Roger ran
away and went inside their house. PO1 Area informed Emily of her constitutional rights, but the
latter failed to utter any word.[9]

While PO1 Area was holding the arm of Emily, who still had in her hands the coin purse where
she got the sachet of shabu and the buy-bust money, P/CI Tria took pictures of the incident using
his cellphone while the official photographer was also taking pictures. After the search, a coin
purse containing sachets of shabu and a bundle of money was found in Emily's possession.
[10]
PO1 Area then prepared a Receipt for Property Seized (RPS). [11] Asuncion, Kagawad Eva
Sarmiento (Sarmiento) and a certain Robert Vargas (Vargas) witnessed the preparation of the said
receipt.[12]

Meanwhile, when Roger left Emily at the scene of the buy-bust operation, he went inside his
house and closed the door. Armed with the search warrant, SPO1 Salvador Aldave, Jr. (SPO1
Aldave) forced the door open. SPO1 Aldave was the first person to enter the house, followed by
the barangay officials and his fellow officers, SPO1 Roger Masagca (SPO1 Masagca) and PO1
Ronnie Valeza (PO1 Valeza). The search warrant was shown to Roger. In his presence and in the
presence of Kagawad Jena Arcilla (Arcilla), the raiding team recovered one piece of aluminum
foil, one plastic sachet containing residue of white crystalline substance, and one small pair of
green scissors beside the bed inside a room, and 15 pieces of used lighters from an improvised
altar on top of a wooden table. A search of Roger's pocket yielded two pieces of P50.00 bill and
one piece of P100.00 bill. SPO1 Aldave as the seizing officer prepared and signed an
RPS. Asuncion, Arcilla and Barangay Tanod Juan Gonzales(Gonzales) witnessed the preparation
and signing of the said RPS. Roger, however, refused to sign the same. The couple was then
brought to the police station.[13]

At the Virac Police Station, a body search on Emily resulted in the seizure of bills of
different denominations, totaling P2,720.00. Some of these bills were identified as those bills
photocopied and submitted to the Provincial Prosecution Office.[14]

On August 4, 2005, immediately after the operation and the execution of the search warrant, P/CI
Tria requested for a laboratory examination of a piece of small size heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachet, containing white crystalline substance marked with initial R; 12 pieces of small
size heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets, containing white crystalline substance with sub-
markings R-1 to R-12; and one small size crumpled aluminum foil and small size plastic sachet.
The request of P/CI Tria for laboratory examination dated August 4, 2005 was received by a
certain PO2 Abanio [Abao] and Police Inspector Sta. Cruz, J. (P/Insp. Sta. Cruz). The sachet
with the initial R was the sachet of shabu sold to PO1 Area during the buy bust operation while
the sachets of shabu marked as R-1 to R-12 were the sachets of shabu which Roger handed to
Emily and which were found in the possession of Emily after PO1 Area identified himself as a
police officer.[15]

Subsequently, witness Police Senior Inspector Josephine Macura Clemen (PSI Clemen), the
forensic expert, received personally from the receiving clerk (PO2 Abanio) the above-mentioned
marked pieces of evidence. She then immediately conducted laboratory examination, yielding a
result that the 12 pieces of plastic sachets (with markings R-1 to R-12), the one heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet with marking R, the one aluminum foil strip, and a small size plastic
sachet contained methamphetamine hydrochloride.[16]
The accused-appellants were subsequently charged in two separate Informations, [17] both dated
August 4, 2005, with violation of Sections 5, 11 and 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which were
respectively docketed as Criminal Case No. 3490 and Criminal Case No. 3489. The Informations
state as follows:

Criminal Case No. 3490

The undersigned Provincial Prosecutor accuses Roger Posada y Urbano and

Emily Posada y Sarmiento of Violation of R.A. 9165 defined and penalized under
Section 5 of said Law, committed as follows:

That on or about the 3rd day of August 2005 at noontime along Imelda Blvd. in
barangay Concepcion, municipality (sic) of Virac, [P]rovince of Catanduanes,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named
accused without the authority of law, conspiring, confederating and helping
one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sell,
deliver and give away to another 12 pieces of transparent sealed plastic
sachet containing Methamphetamine Hydrochloride[,] locally known as shabu[,]
with a total weight of 0.9 gram [-] a prohibited drug[,] and several marked money
bills.[18] [Emphasis supplied]

Criminal Case No. 3489

The undersigned Provincial Prosecutor accuses Roger Posada y Urbano of

Violation of R.A. 9165 defined and penalized under Section 12 of said law,
committed as follows:

That on or about the 3rd day of August 2005 in the afternoon in Barangay
Concepcion, municipality (sic) of Virac, province (sic) of Catanduanes,
Philippines, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused
without the authority of law did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously possess and in control of one (1) piece of teared plastic sachet
containing residue of a crystalline substance[,] locally known as shabu, (1) piece
small aluminum foil, (1) piece small scissors (sic) and 15 pieces of used lighter[,]
which paraphernalia are (sic) fit or intended for smoking or introducing any
dangerous drug into the body of a person.[19]

However, the Information for Criminal Case No. 3490 was later amended, [20] to reflect a change
in the weight of the seized drugs from 0.9 gram to 0.4578 gram.

Meanwhile, on the part of the accused-appellants, they simply denied the accusations against
them. Roger claimed that on April 3, 2005 (which was even a misleading date since the event
happened on August 3, 2005), at around 12 noon, he was putting his three year-old child to sleep
inside their house, while his wife Emily was washing their clothes at his parents' house. He then
peeped through the window jalousies when he heard his wife calling out his name. He saw a
policeman, later identified as PO1 Area, pulling Emily towards the road. Roger claimed that PO1
Valeza later poked a gun at him, preventing him to move from the window. Thereafter, the door
of Roger's house was forced open, allowing SPO1 Aldave, SPO1 Masagca, PO1 Valeza
and Barangay Tanod Vic Vargas (Vargas) to enter his house. Inside the house, PO1 Valeza
allegedly took down the jackets hanging on the wall and searched them; SPO1 Aldave took
pictures while Vargas and SPO1 Masagca went inside the room and searched the cabinets where
toys were kept. Roger further claims that nothing was found in his house. After the search, Roger
was brought to the patrol car where his wife Emily was taken.[21]

Meanwhile, Emily testified that on that fateful day of August 3, 2005, she was washing clothes at
her mother-in-law's house when a man, whom she could not identify, approached her and asked
her if she was Emily Posada. She alleged that the man immediately held her hands, shouting
Police! Police! after which police officers Tria and Aldave arrived. Her picture was taken.
Subsequently, she was brought to the patrol car where her husband Roger later joined her. Both
Roger and Emily were then transported to the police station. Roger was placed behind bars while
Emily was placed at the detention cell of the Bureau of Jail Management and Penology (BJMP).
[22]

The couple claimed that the police officers did not inform them why they were brought to the
police station and subsequently detained. Emily denied that a buy-bust operation was conducted
against her, but she was aware of the search conducted in their house because her husband
informed her at the police station. Meanwhile, Roger also denied that the police officers
presented to him a search warrant. Likewise, both alleged that the money taken from Emily's
wallet were the proceeds of the sale of their chickens, which Roger gave to Emily. The said
money amounted to more or less P3,000.00.[23]

Issues

Considering that the accused-appellants did not file a supplemental brief and that appellee People
of the Philippines adopted its brief before the CA, we now rule on the matter based on the
issues[24] which the accused-appellants raised in their brief before the CA, to wit:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-

APPELLANTS NOTWITHSTANDING THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO
ESTABLISH THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY AND INTEGRITY OF THE
ALLEGED SEIZED ILLEGAL ITEMS.

II

THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-

APPELANTS DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO PROVE THEIR
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[25]

Our Ruling

While we give due credence to the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses absent
any showing that the elements of the crime have been overlooked, misapprehended, or
misapplied, we will take pains in taking a second hard look on the issues the accused-appellants
raised, considering they are husband and wife whose imprisonment will greatly affect the
children they will leave behind once they are declared guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

Now, we are going to discuss the case following the issues the accused-appellants raised.

The prosecution has established the chain of

custody and integrity of the seized illegal items.

The accused-appellants alleged that the prosecution failed to establish the chain of custody and
integrity of the seized illegal items because:

(1) The apprehending officers allegedly failed to submit the seized illegal items to the
PNP Crime Laboratory Service for a qualitative and quantitative examination within the
mandatory 24-hour period from confiscation; and

(2) There is an alleged discrepancy as to the number of plastic sachets recovered from the
accused-appellants and those submitted to forensic chemist PSI Clemen.

On the first factual issue, we find that the records of the case and the testimonies of witnesses
belie the accused-appellants' contention.

Based on the records, the buy-bust operation, the arrest of the accused-appellants and the
confiscation of the illegal items happened at around 12 noon of August 3, 2005. [26] PO1 Area
received from Emily one sachet of shabu and after PO1 Area introduced himself and arrested
Emily, 12 more sachets of shabu were found in the possession of Emily. The said 12 sachets
of shabu were inside a coin purse, with a bundle of money.[27] PO1 Area prepared on the same
day an RPS[28] in the presence of Asuncion, Kagawad Sarmiento and Vargas.[29] On August 4,
2005, P/CI Tria requested for a laboratory examination of a piece of small size heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet, containing white crystalline substance marked with initial R; 12 pieces
of small size heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets, containing white crystalline substance with
sub-markings R-1 to R-12; and one small size crumpled aluminum foil and small size plastic
sachet. The request of P/CI Tria for laboratory examination dated August 4, 2005 was received
by PO2 Abanio and P/Insp. Sta. Cruz on the same date.[30]

The accused-appellants wanted us to believe that a day had lapsed before P/CI Tria submitted the
illegal drugs to PNP Crime Laboratory Service, contrary to the mandate of Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165. They even cited the testimony of P/CI Tria where the latter allegedly admitted
submitting the subject seized items on August 4, 2005. However, a close look at the testimony of
P/CI Tria[31] will reveal that nothing in it would show that he submitted the alleged illegal drugs
beyond the 24-hour reglementary period. In fact, even the Laboratory Examination Request
dated August 4, 2005 does not indicate violation of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. [32] Clearly, from
the foregoing, the accused-appellants failed to adduce any evidence to prove their contention.
The age-old but familiar rule that he who alleges must prove his allegation applies[33] in this case.
The accused-appellants' failure to show evidence that the police officers did not comply with
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 gives us no other recourse but to respect the findings of trial court
and of the CA.

Furthermore, the CA is correct in giving credence to the testimonies of the police officers as
regards the timely submission of the subject illegal drugs since they are presumed to have
regularly performed their duties, unless there is evidence suggesting ill-motive on the part of the
police officers.[34] In this case, the accused-appellants failed to contradict the presumption. What
goes against the accused-appellants is the fact that they have not offered any evidence of ill-
motive against the police officers. Emily even admitted that she did not know PO1 Area, the
poseur-buyer.[35] Considering that there was no existing relationship between the police officers
and the accused-appellants, the former could not be accused of improper motive to falsely testify
against the accused-appellants. In People v. Dumangay,[36] we upheld the findings of the lower
court on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties because there was no
proof of ill-motive. Therein, the accused-appellants self-serving and uncorroborated defenses did
not prevail over the trial court's findings on the credibility of witnesses. The same may be said in
the present case.

Finding the accused-appellants' arguments without a leg to stand on, the apprehending police
officers are presumed to have timely submitted the seized illegal items to the PNP Crime
Laboratory Service for a qualitative and quantitative examination within the mandatory 24-hour
period from confiscation.

On the second factual issue, we find the accused-appellants' claim not supported by evidence.

The accused-appellants alleged that the integrity of the seized illegal items was compromised
and their evidentiary value diminished because of the alleged discrepancy between the number of
plastic sachets recovered from the accused-appellants and those submitted to forensic chemist
PSI Clemen. They insisted that based on the Informations in Criminal Case Nos. 3489 and 3490
and the testimonies of witnesses Asuncion [37] and SPO1 Aldave,[38] only fourteen (14) plastic
sachets were recovered from the accused-appellants, while PSI Clemen allegedly testified that a
total of 15 sachets were submitted for examination.[39]

However, a review of the defense-quoted testimony of PSI Clemen would show that she received
one piece of small size heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with marking R, [40] 12 pieces small
size heat-sealed marked as R-1 to R-12 [41] and one small size crumpled aluminum foil and small
size plastic sachet[42] totaling to 15 items. PSI Clemen's testimony tallies with the Laboratory
Examination Request (Exhibit J) of P/CI Tria. We reproduce Exhibit J below, to wit:

Republic of the Philippines

NATIONAL POLICE COMMISSION
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
Virac Municipal Police Station
Virac, Catanduanes
MEMORANDUM:

FOR : The Chief

PNP Crime Laboratory Service
Camp Gen Simeon A Ola
Legaspi City

SUBJECT : Laboratory Examination request for

DATE : 04 August 2005
----------------------------------------------------------------------

1. Request conduct laboratory examination on the accompanying

specimen to determine whether the white crystalline granules
inside Thirteen (13) pcs small size transparent heat seald (sic)
plastic sachets are Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or SHABU
and also whether the one (1) pc small size crumpled aluminum foil
and small size transparent plastic sachet contains residue or
granules of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or Shabu.

EXHIBIT QUANTITY/ DESCRIPTION

A One (1) pc small size heat sealed transparent
plastic sachet sachet (sic) containing white
crystalline substance with marking initial R the
initial of PO1 ROLDAN AREA who acted as
posuer (sic) buyer during the drug buy bust
operation.

B Twelve (12) pcs small size heat sealed

transparent plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance with markings R1-R12
found/confiscated from the suspect during drug
buy bust operation.

C One (1) small size crumpled aluminum foil and

small size plastic sachet confiscated/found in
the possession of suspect during the execution
of search warrant number 37 issued by Hon[.]
Judge Jaime E[.] Contreras of RTC Branch 43.

SUSPECT/S Roger Posada y Urbano

Emily Posada y Sarmiento
John-John Bryan Urbano y Zafe

COMPLAINANT Officer-in-Charge
Virac MPS

FACTS OF THE CASE: Evidence submitted for laboratory

examination was bought and others were confiscated by the PNP
team of Virac during Buy Bust (sic) operation and the
effect/execution of search warrant number 37 on August 3, 2005 in
[B]arangay Concepcion Virac, Catanduanes.

2. Request acknowledge reciept (sic) and furnish this office

Laboratory examination result as soon as possible for subsequent
submission/filing same in court as supporting documents to this
case.
 GIL FRANCIS G[.] TRIA
Pol Chief Inspector
Officer-in-Charge[43]

Based on the cited exhibit, we find that in Exhibit A we have the first item, marked with R.
Under Exhibit B, we have the next 12 items marked as R-1 to R-12. Under Exhibit C, we have
the remaining two items submitted to the crime laboratory, namely one small size crumpled
aluminum foil and small size plastic sachet confiscated and found in the possession of Roger. All
these items total to 15 items consistent with the testimony of PSI Clemen. Thus, evidence shows
no discrepancy as to the number of plastic sachets recovered from the accused-appellants and
those submitted to forensic chemist PSI Clemen.

Finally, we say that the prosecution has established the chain of custody and integrity of the
seized illegal items.

After PO1 Area arrested Emily and confiscated the 13 sachets of shabu (one bought by PO1 Area
from Emily and 12 found in Emily's coin purse after she received the same from her husband
Roger),[44] P/CI Tria took pictures of the incident using his cellphone while the official
photographer was also taking pictures.[45] Then PO1 Area prepared an RPS,[46] which Asuncion,
Sarmiento and Vargas witnessed.[47] Meanwhile, SPO1 Aldave, seizing officer went inside the
house of the accused-appellants, prepared and signed an RPS after the raiding team found a piece
of aluminum foil, one plastic sachet containing residue of white crystalline substance, one small
pair of green scissors beside the bed inside a room, 15 pieces of used lighters, and two pieces
of P50.00 bill and one piece of P100.00 bill. Asuncion, Arcilla and Gonzales witnessed the
preparation and signing of the said RPS.[48] Thereafter, on August 4, 2005, P/CI Tria requested
for a laboratory examination of a piece of small size heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet,
containing white crystalline substance marked with initial R; 12 pieces of small size heat sealed
transparent plastic sachets, containing white crystalline substance with sub-markings R-1 to R-
12; and one small size crumpled aluminum foil and small size plastic sachet. The request of P/CI
Tria for laboratory examination dated August 4, 2005 was received by a certain PO2 Abanio and
P/Insp. Sta. Cruz.[49] Subsequently, witness PSI Clemen, the forensic expert, received personally
from PO2 Abanio the above-mentioned marked pieces of evidence. She then immediately
conducted a laboratory examination, yielding a result that the 12 pieces of plastic sachets (with
markings R-1 to R-12), the one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with marking R and the one
aluminum foil strip contained methamphetamine hydrochloride.[50] In open court, the above-
mentioned pieces of evidence were identified and marked.[51]

From the foregoing, the prosecution, without an iota of doubt, has established the chain of
custody and integrity of the seized illegal items. The Supreme Court in People v. Sanchez,
[52]
clearly discussed how chain of custody should be proven, to wit:

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding
that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include
 testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was
picked up to the time it is offered into evidence, in such a way that every
person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was
received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness'
possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which
it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then
describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the
condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have
possession of the same.[53]

In the instant case, the prosecution was able to present, not only the corpus delicti, but the
testimonies of the people involved in each link in the chain of custody.

The prosecution failed to prove beyond

reasonable doubt that the accused-appellants
sold 12 sachets of shabu, but it has proven the
accused-appellants' guilt beyond reasonable
doubt of possession of the same number
of shabu in violation of Section 11, Article II of
R.A. No. 9165.

Before we proceed in discussing the guilt of the couple, we must first take into account a
discrepancy in the Information for Criminal Case No. 3490. In the said information, the accused-
appellants were charged for selling 12 pieces of transparent sealed plastic sachet of shabu.
However, based on the evidence which the prosecution adduced, Emily sold to PO1 Area one
sachet of shabu, which was worth P250.00. Then, after she handed the one sachet of shabu to the
poseur-buyer, Emily received additional 12 sachets of shabu from her husband Roger and when
PO1 Area informed the couple of the buy-bust, Emily had in her possession the 12 sachets
of shabu.[54] Subsequently, the confiscated sachets of shabu were marked. The one sold to PO1
Area was marked with R, while the 12 sachets of shabu Roger handed to Emily before their
arrest were marked as R-1 to R-12.[55]

The unfortunate fact of this case is that rather than separately charging Emily for the sale of the
one sachet of shabu and charging both Emily and Roger for possession of the 12 sachets
of shabu, the public prosecutor lumped the charges together to sale of 12 sachets of shabu. This
is wrong. The Information is defective for charging the accused-appellants of selling 12 sachets
of shabu when, in fact, they should have been charged of selling one sachet of shabu and
possessing 12 sachets of shabu. From the evidence adduced, Emily and Roger never sold the 12
sachets of shabu. They possessed them. Thus, they should have not been convicted for selling the
12 sachets ofshabu. However, this was exactly what was done both by the trial court and the CA.
Without basis in fact, they convicted the couple for selling the 12 sachets of shabu.

Indeed, it must be pointed out that the prosecution filed a defective Information. An Information
is fatally defective when it is clear that it does not really charge an offense[56] or when an
essential element of the crime has not been sufficiently alleged. [57] In the instant case, while the
prosecution was able to allege the identity of the buyer and the seller, it failed to particularly
allege or identify in the Information the subject matter of the sale or the corpus delicti. We must
remember that one of the essential elements to convict a person of sale of prohibited drugs is to
identify with certainty the corpus delicti. Here, the prosecution took the liberty to lump together
two sets of corpora delicti when it should have separated the two in two different informations.
To allow the prosecution to do this is to deprive the accused-appellants of their right to be
informed, not only of the nature of the offense being charged, but of the essential element of the
offense charged; and in this case, the very corpus delictiof the crime.

Furthermore, when ambiguity exists in the complaint or information, the court has no other
recourse but to resolve the ambiguity in favor of the accused. [58] Here, since there
exists ambiguity as to the identity of corpus delicti, an essential element of the offense charged,
it follows that such ambiguity must be resolved in favor of the accused-appellants. Thus, from
the foregoing discussion, we have no other choice but to acquit the accused-appellants of sale of
12 sachets of shabu.

Truly, both the trial court and the CA were wrong in convicting the couple for selling 12 sachets
of shabu because the prosecution failed to show that the husband and wife had indeed sold the 12
sachets of shabu. Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 provides:

SEC. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and

Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential
Chemicals. The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from
Five hundred thousand pesos ([P]500,000.00) to Ten million pesos
([P]10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by
law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another,
distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and
all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall
act as a broker in any of such transactions.

More, jurisprudence holds that the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs can only be
successful when the following elements are established, namely:

(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and consideration of the sale; and

(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefore..[59]

To our minds, while there was indeed a transaction between Emily and PO1 Area, the
prosecution failed to show that the subject matter of the sale to PO1 Area was the 12 sachets
of shabu. Based on the testimony of PO1 Area, the 12 sachets of shabu were the sachets
of shabu which Roger handed to his wife Emily and were not sold, but which PO1 Area found in
her possession after the latter identified himself as a police officer.

In People v. Paloma,[60] we acquitted the accused for the prosecution's failure to prove the crime
of illegal sale of drugs, and we have set the standard in proving the same, to wit:
 Under the "objective" test set by the Court in People v. Doria,
the prosecution must clearly and adequately show the details of the
purported sale, namely, the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the
pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration, and,
finally, the accused's delivery of the illegal drug to the buyer, whether the latter be
the informant alone or the police officer. This proof is essential to ensure that law-
abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to commit the offense.[61]

In the instant case, PO1 Area's testimony showed no evidence that the transaction as to the sale
of the 12 sachets of shabu ever happened. Rather, PO1 Area adequately testified on the fact that
accused-appellant Roger handed the 12 sachets of shabu to Emily who kept them in a coin purse.
And after PO1 Area identified himself as a police operative, he found the 12 sachets of shabu in
Emily's possession.[62] From the foregoing, while the prosecution was able to prove the sale
of one sachet of shabu, it is patently clear that it never established with moral certainty all the
elements of illegal sale of the 12 sachets of shabu. And failure to show that indeed there was sale
means failure to prove the guilt of the accused for illegal sale of drugs, because what matters in
the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is to show proof that the sale actually
happened, coupled with the presentation in court of corpus delicti.[63] Here, the prosecution failed
to prove the existence of the sale of the 12 sachets ofshabu and also to prove that the 12 sachets
of shabu presented in court were truly the subject matter of the sale between the accused-
appellants and PO1 Area.

Notwithstanding the above-discussion, we convict both Roger and Emily of illegal possession of
prohibited drugs despite the fact that they were charged for the sale of illegal drugs, because
possession is necessarily included in sale of illegal drugs.

Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. When there is
variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that
proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the
offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is
included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in the
offense proved.

Since sale of dangerous drugs necessarily includes possession of the same, the accused-
appellants should be convicted of possession. We have consistently ruled that possession of
prohibited or dangerous drugs is absorbed in the sale thereof. [64] Then Associate Justice Artemio
Panganiban logically and clearly explained the rationale behind this ruling, to wit:

The prevailing doctrine is that possession of marijuana is absorbed in the

sale thereof, except where the seller is further apprehended in possession of
another quantity of the prohibited drugs not covered by or included in the sale and
which are probably intended for some future dealings or use by the seller.
 Possession is a necessary element in a prosecution for illegal sale of prohibited
drugs. It is indispensable that the prohibited drug subject of the sale be identified
and presented in court. That the corpus delicti of illegal sale could not be
established without a showing that the accused possessed, sold and delivered a
prohibited drug clearly indicates that possession is an element of the former. The
same rule is applicable in cases of delivery of prohibited drugs and giving them
away to another.[65] (Citations omitted)

For prosecution of illegal possession of dangerous drugs to prosper, the

following essential elements must be proven, namely: (1) the accused is in possession of an item
or object that is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law;
and (3) the accused freely and consciously possess the said drug.[66]

All these elements are obtaining and duly established in this case and we will discuss them
thoroughly below, since we are not ready to altogether exonerate the couple.

On Emily's Liability

To our minds, the testimony of PO1 Area is sufficient to establish concurrence of all the elements
necessary to convict Emily of violating Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165. PO1 Area vividly
narrated the details of the buy-bust operation. He recounted how on August 3, 2005 at around 12
noon, he acted as the poseur-buyer of shabu. He approached Emily, who was then standing in
front of their house, and told her that he would like to buy shabu, and then gave her the P250.00.
Emily then returned to her house and got a coin purse. Upon returning, Emily handed to PO1
Area a piece of sachet containing shabu. After receiving the sachet of shabu, PO1 Area saw
Roger hand the 12 sachets of shabu to Emily who kept them in a coin purse. After paying for and
receiving the sachet of shabu from Emily, PO1 Area arrested the latter and found in her
possession the 12 sachets of shabu.[67] From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the prosecution
established with moral certainty all the elements of illegal possession of shabu, that is: PO1 Area
found in Emily's physical and actual possession the 12 sachets of shabu; such possession of the
12 sachets of shabu was not authorized; and since Emily put the 12 sachets of shabu in the purse
after receiving them from her husband, she possessed the same freely and consciously.

Furthermore, PO1 Area's testimony was corroborated by the testimonies of the following:
(a) Barangay Kagawad Sarmiento who witnessed how PO1 Area caught Emily doing the illegal
act; (b) Barangay Captain Asuncion, Jr. who testified that he was with the raiding team when the
latter conducted the buy-bust operation and that he witnessed how money changed hands; (c)
P/CI Tria who witnessed the buy-bust operation and was one of the arresting officers; (d) SPO1
Aldave who executed the search warrant; and (e) Barangay Kagawad Arcilla who also
accompanied the raiding team in the search of the accused-appellants' house. All these witnesses
completed all the angles of the buy-bust operation and the search on Emily's person up to the
finding that she possessed the 12 sachets of shabu. Indeed, considering all of the above-findings
of facts, we cannot have other conclusion but to find Emily guilty beyond reasonable doubt for
possession of prohibited drugs.
Indeed, every accused deserves a second look before conviction. This is the essence of the
constitutional presumption of innocence. In the present case, we did not only take a second look
at the facts and laws of this case because the accused-appellants are both parents. We take a third,
a fourth up to a seventh look to ensure that no child will be left unattended because his parents
were imprisoned based on false accusations. Thus, after reviewing this case, the bare truth is
Emily was found in possession of 12 sachets of shabu on August 3, 2005.

On Roger's Liability

As to Roger, can we also convict him of possession of the same 12 sachets of shabu considering
that same had been found in the possession of his wife Emily?

We resolve in the affirmative.

In United States v. Juan,[68] we have clarified the meaning of the words having possession of. We
said that the said phrase included constructive possession, that is, the relation between the owner
of the drug and the drug itself when the owner is not in actual physical possession, but when it is
still under his control and management and subject to his disposition. [69] In other words, in that
case, we recognized the fact that a person remains to be in possession of the prohibited drugs
although he may not have or may have lost physical possession of the same.

To elucidate, we must go back to the circumstances surrounding the Juan case. A Chinaman
named Lee See arrived at the Bay of Calbayog, Samar through the steamer Ton-Yek. Upon
disembarking, he went to the house of therein appellant Chan Guy Juan, who was living in the
town of Calbayog. Lee See and Chan Guy Juan had a lengthy conversation. Chan Guy Juan then
hired a certain Isidro Cabinico (Cabinico) to go alongside of the steamer with his baroto, to carry
and deliver to him a sack which appellant Chan Guy Juan alleged was sugar. Cabinico went to
Lee See to get the said sack. However, on his way to the house of Chan Guy Juan, Cabinico was
arrested by the local authorities. Found in his possessions were a small amount of sugar and 28
cans of opium. The opium was confiscated and separate criminal charges were instituted against
the two Chinamen and Cabinico. After a thorough investigation, the provincial fiscal dismissed
the case against Cabinico because he had no knowledge of the content of the sack, while the two
Chinamen were eventually convicted. Chan Guy Juan appealed his conviction arguing that he did
not have actual physical possession or control of the 28 cans of opium. But we held that both
Chinese had constructive possession of the opium and that they were both guilty as principals.[70]

Our ruling in Juan applies to the present case. Admittedly, the 12 sachets of shabu were found in
the possession of Emily. But PO1 Area saw Roger hand the same 12 sachets of shabu to Emily.
While Roger had lost physical possession of the said 12 sachets of shabu, he had constructive
possession of the same because they remain to be under his control and management. In
the Juan case, Lee See gave the physical possession of the opium to Cabinico while Chan Guy
Juan had not yet received the same opium from Lee See, but both were held guilty of illegal
possession of opium. Thus, we can liken the instant case to that of Juan because while Roger had
lost physical possession of the 12 sachets of shabu to Emily, he maintained constructive
possession of the same.

Convicting both Emily and Roger of possession of illegal drugs deprives their children of
parents. But if we have to take care of our children and the family where each of us belongs, we
are obligated to put in jail all those, including fathers and mothers, who peddle illegal drugs.

Finally, we cannot let this case pass us by without emphasizing the need for the public prosecutor
to properly evaluate all the pieces of evidence and file the proper information to serve the ends of
justice. The public prosecutor must exert all efforts so as not to deny the People a remedy against
those who sell prohibited drugs to the detriment of the community and its children. Many drug
cases are dismissed because of the prosecutor's sloppy work and failure to file airtight cases. If
only the prosecution properly files the Information and prosecutes the same with precision, guilty
drug pushers would be punished to the extent allowed under the law, as in this case.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 17, 2010 is MODIFIED.
Accused-appellants ROGER POSADA and EMILY POSADA ARE FOUND GUILTY OF
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF TWELVE (12) SACHETS OF METHAMPETAMINE
HYDROCHOLORIDE OR SHABU, WITH A NET WEIGHT OF 0.4578 GRAMS AND
ARE HEREBY SENTENCED TO THE INDETERMINATE PENALTY OF TWELVE (12)
YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY, AS MINIMUM, TO FOURTEEN (14) YEARS AND EIGHT
(8) MONTHS, AS MAXIMUM AND A FINE OF P300,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice

ATT E S TAT I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

C E R T I F I C AT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's
Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

[1]
People v. Manalansan, G.R. Nos. 76369-70, September 14, 1990, 189 SCRA 619, 624.
[2]
CA rollo, pp. 45 and 51.
[3]
Id.
[4]
Penned by Associate Justice Antonio L. Villamor, with Associate Justices Jose C. Reyes, Jr.
and Elihu A. Ybaez, concurring; rollo, pp. 2-20.
[5]
CA rollo, p. 47.
[6]
Id.
[7]
Id.
[8]
Id.
[9]
Id. at 47-48.
[10]
TSN, October 31, 2006, pp. 13-14.
[11]
RTC records, Criminal Case No. 3490, p. 87.
[12]
TSN, October 31, 2006, pp. 9-10; TSN, May 10, 2006, pp. 12-17.
[13]
RTC records, Criminal Case No. 3490, p. 110.
[14]
CA rollo, pp. 48 and 160.
[15]
RTC records, Criminal Case No. 3490, p. 89.
[16]
Id.
[17]
Id.
[18]
RTC records, Criminal Case No. 3490, pp. 1-2.
[19]
RTC records, Criminal Case No. 3489, pp. 5-6.
[20]
RTC records, Criminal Case No. 3490, pp. 20-21.
[21]
TSN, August 28, 2007, pp. 3-6, 10, 12-18.
[22]
TSN, August 31, 2007, pp. 3-6.
[23]
Id.
[24]
CA rollo, p. 83.
[25]
Id.
[26]
RTC records, Criminal Case No. 3490, p.3; TSN, August 31, 2007, p. 3, Criminal Case No.
3489.
[27]
RTC records, Criminal Case No. 3490, p. 6
[28]
Supra note 11.
[29]
TSN, October 31, 2006, pp. 9-10.
[30]
TSN, October 31, 2006, pp. 8-9.
[31]
Accused-appellants cited TSN, October 31, 2006, p. 8.
[32]
Supra note 15.
[33]
Evangelista v. People, G.R. No.163267, May 5, 2010, 620 SCRA 134, 148, citing Samson v.
Daway, 478 Phil. 784, 795 (2004).
[34]
People v. Unisa, G.R. No. 185721, September 28, 2011.
[35]
TSN, August 31, 2007, pp. 8-10.
[36]
G.R. No. 173483, September 23, 2008, 566 SCRA 290.
[37]
TSN, May 10, 2006, p. 13-14.
[38]
TSN, May 8, 2006, p. 7.
[39]
TSN, May 19, 2006, pp. 7-8 for Criminal Case No. 3490.
[40]
Id. at p. 8.
[41]
TSN, May 19, 2006, pp. 3 and 5-6 for Criminal Case No. 3490.
[42]
Supra note 40.
[43]
Supra note 15.
[44]
Duplicate TSN, July 19, 2006, pp. 10-13, 22-24.
[45]
TSN, October 31, 2006, pp. 13-14.
[46]
Supra note 11.
[47]
TSN, October 31, 2006, pp. 9-10; TSN, May 10, 2006, pp. 12-17.
[48]
Supra note 13.
[49]
Supra note 15.
[50]
Id.
[51]
Duplicate TSN, July 19, 2006, pp. 11-12, 15, 17; TSN, May 19, 2006, pp. 3-9.
[52]
G.R. No. 175832, October 15, 2008, 569 SCRA 194, 216.
[53]
Id. at 216, citing Malillin v. People, G.R. No. 172953, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 619, 632-
633.
[54]
Supra note 44.
[55]
Supra note 15.
[56]
Dela Chica v. Sandiganbayan, 462 Phil. 712, 723 (2003).
[57]
People v. Galido, G.R. Nos. 148689-92, March 30, 2004, 426 SCRA 502.
[58]
People v. Ng Pek, 81 Phil. 562, 565 (1948).
[59]
Supra note 34; People v. Macatingag, G.R. No. 181037, January 19, 2009, 576 SCRA 354,
361-362.
[60]
G.R. No. 178544, February 23, 2011.
[61]
Id.
[62]
Duplicate TSN, July 19, 2006, pp. 7-12.
[63]
Please see People v. Macatingag, G.R. No. 181037, January 19, 2009, 576 SCRA 354,
362; People v. Dumangay, G.R. No. 173483, September 23, 2008, 566 SCRA 290, 298.
[64]
People v. Lacerna, 344 Phil. 100, 121 (1997); People v. Tabar, G.R. No. 101124, May 17,
1993, 222 SCRA 144, 152.
[65]
Id. at 120.
[66]
People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 182348, November 20, 2008, 571 SCRA 469, 474-475.
[67]
Supra note 9.
[68]
23 Phil. 105 (1912).
[69]
Id. at p. 107.
[70]
Id. at pp. 106-107.
 SECOND DIVISION[G.R. No. 139301. September 29, 2004]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. HUANG ZHEN HUA and
JOGY LEE, appellants.

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque
[1]

City, Metro Manila, Branch 259, convicting the appellants of violation of Section 16,
Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended.

The Case for the Prosecution

Police operatives of the Public Assistance and Reaction Against Crime (PARAC)
under the Department of Interior and Local Government received word from their
confidential informant that Peter Chan and Henry Lao, and appellants Jogy Lee and
[2]

Huang Zhen Hua were engaged in illegal drug trafficking. The policemen also learned
that appellant Lee was handling the payments and accounting of the proceeds of the
illegal drug trafficking activities of Lao and Chan. PO3 Belliardo Anciro, Jr. and other
[3]

police operatives conducted surveillance operations and were able to verify that Lao
and appellant Lee were living together as husband and wife. They once spotted Chan,
Lao, the appellants and two others, in a seafood restaurant in Bocobo Street, Ermita,
Manila, late in the evening. On another occasion, the policemen saw Chan, Lao, and
the appellants, at the Celicious Restaurant along R. Sanchez Street, Ermita, Manila, at
about 8:30 p.m. They were spotted the third time at the Midtown Hotel at about 7:00
p.m. to 8:00 p.m. The police operatives also verified that Chan and Lao resided at
[4]

Room Nos. 1245 and 1247, Cityland Condominium, De la Rosa Street, Makati City, and
in a two-storey condominium unit at No. 19 Atlantic Drive, Pacific Grand Villa, Sto. Nio,
Paraaque, Metro Manila. [5]

On October 25, 1996, SPO2 Cesar N. Teneros of the PARAC secured Search
Warrant No. 96-801 for violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866 (illegal
possession of firearms and explosives) and Search Warrant No. 96-802, for violation of
Sections 12, 14 and 16 of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, from Judge William M.
Bayhon, Executive Judge of the RTC of Manila. Senior Police Inspector Lucio Margallo
[6]

supervised the enforcement of Search Warrant No. 96-801 at the Cityland

Condominium at about 11:00 p.m. on October 29, 1996. With him were PO3 Anciro, Jr.,
PO3 Wilhelm Castillo, SPO3 Roger Ferias and seven other policemen of the PARAC,
who were all in uniform, as well as a Cantonese interpreter by the name of Chuang.
While no persons were found inside, the policemen found two kilos of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, popularly known as shabu, paraphernalia for its
production, and machines and tools apparently used for the production of fake credit
cards.[7]

Thereafter, the police operatives received information that Lao and Chan would be
delivering shabu at the Furama Laser Karaoke Restaurant at the corner of Dasmarias
and Mancha Streets, Manila. The policemen rushed to the area on board their vehicles.
It was 2:00 a.m. of October 26, 1996. The policemen saw Chan and Lao on board the
latters Honda Civic car. As the two men alighted, one of the men approached them and
introduced himself, but Chan and Lao fired shots. Thus, a shoot-out ensued between
the members of the raiding team and the two suspects. Chan and Lao were shot to
death during the encounter. The policemen found two plastic bags, each containing one
kilo of shabu, in Laos car.
The policemen then proceeded to No. 19 Atlantic Drive, Pacific Grand Villa, to
enforce Search Warrant No. 96-802. When the policemen arrived at the place, they
coordinated with Antonio Pangan, the officer in charge of security in the building. The [8]

men found that the Condominium Unit No. 19 was leased to Lao under the name Henry
Kao Tsung. The policemen, Pangan and two security guards of the Pacific Grand Villa
proceeded to the condominium unit. Anciro, Jr. knocked repeatedly on the front door,
but no one responded. Pangan, likewise, knocked on the door. Appellant Lee peeped
[9]

through the window beside the front door. The men introduced themselves as
[10]

policemen, but the appellant could not understand them as she could not speak
[11]

English. The policemen allowed Pangan to communicate with appellant Lee by sign
[12]

language and pointed their uniforms to her to show that they were policemen. The
appellant then opened the door and allowed the policemen, Pangan and the security
guards into the condominium unit. The policemen brought appellant Lee to the second
[13]

floor where there were three bedrooms a masters bedroom and two other rooms. When
asked where she and Lao slept, appellant Lee pointed to the masters bedroom.
Anciro, Jr., Margallo and PO3 Wilhelm Castillo then searched the masters bedroom,
[14]

while Ferias and Pangan went to the other bedroom where appellant Zhen Hua was
sleeping. Ferias awakened appellant Zhen Hua and identified himself as a policeman.
[15]

Appellant Zhen Hua was surprised. [16]

Anciro, Jr. saw a small cabinet inside the masters bedroom about six feet high. He
stood on a chair, opened the cabinet and found two transparent plastic bags each
containing one kilo of shabu, a feeding bottle, a plastic canister and assorted
[17] [18]

paraphernalia. Inside the drawer of the beds headboard, Anciro, Jr. also found
[19]

assorted documents, pictures, bank passbooks issued by the Allied Banking

Corporation, credit cards, passports and identification cards of Lao and Lee. Anciro, Jr.
[20]

asked appellant Lee who was the owner of the crystalline substance, but the latter did
not respond because she did not know English. Anciro, Jr. asked Margallo for
[21]

instructions on what to do with the things he had found, and the latter told him to keep
the same for future reference, and as evidence against any other suspect for illegal
[22]

drug transactions. Anciro, Jr., Pangan and Margallo later showed the seized articles to
[23]

the other members of the team. [24]

Anciro, Jr. told appellant Lee to bring some of her clothes because they were
bringing her to the PARAC headquarters. Appellant Lee did as she was told and took
some clothes from the cabinet in the masters bedroom where Anciro, Jr. had earlier
found the shabu. [25]

The policemen brought the appellants to the PARAC headquarters. The following
articles were found and confiscated by the policemen in the condominium unit:

a. TWO (2) Big Transparent Plastic Bags containing about one (1) Kilo each of white
crystalline granules later tested to be Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or Shabu, a
regulated drug;

b. ONE (1) Transparent Plastic Baby Feeding Bottle containing an undetermined

quantity of suspected Shabu;

c. ONE (1) Small Plastic Cannister also containing undetermined amount of

suspected Shabu .

d. Assorted Pieces of Shabu Paraphernalia consisting of Improvised Tooters used for

sniffing shabu, Improvised Burners used for burning Shabu, aluminum foils, etc.; [26]
 Anciro, Jr. placed the articles he found in the cabinet inside a box. The appellants
[27]

were then brought to the PARAC headquarters where they were detained. Pangan
signed a Certification that the search conducted by the policemen had been orderly
[28]

and peaceful. Anciro, Jr. affixed his initials on the transparent plastic bags and their
contents, the transparent baby feeding bottle and the plastic cannister and their
contents. On October 26, 1996, he and Ferias brought the seized items to the PNP
[29]

Crime Laboratory for laboratory examination along with the letter-request thereon.
[30] [31]

On the same day, Forensic Chemist Officer Isidro L. Cario signed Chemistry Report
No. D-1243-96 which contained his findings on the laboratory examination of the items
which were marked as Exhibits A to A-4, viz:

SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:

Exh. A One (1) must de Cartier Paris carton containing the following:

Exh. A-1 One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic bag containing 1,000.40 grams of
white crystalline substance.

Exh. A-2 One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic bag containing 998.10 grams of white
crystalline substance.

Exh. A-3 One (1) transparent plastic Babyflo Nurser feeding bottle with pink cover
containing 18.52 grams of white crystalline substance.

Exh. A-4 One (1) transparent plastic container with white cover containing 3.28 grams
of white crystalline substance.

NOTE: The above-stated specimen were allegedly taken from the residence of the
above-named subjects. xxx

PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:

To determine the presence of prohibited and/or regulated drug.

FINDINGS:

Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimens, Exhs. A-1 through

A-4 gave POSITIVE result to the test for Methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
regulated drug. xxx[32]

The police officers executed an affidavit of arrest. Pangan and the two security
[33]

guards signed a certification stating that nothing was destroyed in the condominium unit
and that the search was orderly and peaceful. The policemen also accomplished an
[34]

inventory of the articles seized during the search. [35]

The appellants were charged of violation of Section 16, Rep. Act No. 6425, as
amended, in an Information filed in the RTC of Paraaque, Metro Manila, the accusatory
portion of which reads:

That on or about the 26th day of October 1996, in the Municipality of Paraaque, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring and confederating together and both of them mutually
helping and aiding one another, not being lawfully authorized to possess or otherwise
use any regulated drug and without the corresponding license or prescription, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have, in their possession and under
their control and custody, the following to wit:

A. One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic bag containing 1,000.40 grams of white
crystalline substance;

B. One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic bag containing 998.1 grams of white
crystalline substance;

C. One (1) transparent plastic Babyflo Nurser feeding bottle with pink cover
containing 18.52 grams of white crystalline substance;

D. One (1) transparent plastic container with white cover containing 3.28 grams of
white crystalline substance

which when examined were found to be positive for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride

(Shabu), a regulated drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW. [36]

Both appellants, assisted by counsel, were duly arraigned on November 29, 1992,
and pleaded not guilty to the charge.

The Case for the Appellants

Appellant Jogy Lee denied the charge. She testified that she was a resident of
Kwantong, China, a college graduate who could not speak nor understand English. She
was once employed in a real estate firm. One of her co-employees was Huang Zhen
Hua. She met Henry Lao in China sometime in 1995, and he brought her to Belgium
[37] [38]

that same year. Lao also helped her procure a Belguim passport, for he explained that if
she only had a Chinese passport, it would be difficult to secure visas from countries she
wanted to go to and visit; whereas many countries did not require a Belgian passport
holder to secure visas before allowing entry therein. In the process, he and Lao fell in
love and became lovers.
Upon Laos invitation, appellant Lee visited the Philippines as a tourist for the first
time in April 1996. Lao met her at the airport, and she was, thereafter, brought to a hotel
in Manila where she stayed for less than a month. She returned to the Philippines a
[39]

second time and was again billeted in a hotel in Manila. All her expenses were
shouldered by Lao, who was engaged in the garlic business. As far as she knew, Lao
[40]

was not engaged in any other business. In June 1996, she invited her friend, appellant
[41]

Huang Zhen Hua to visit the Philippines to enjoy the tourist spots. They were then in
[42]

China.
In the evening of October 1, 1996, appellant Lee returned to the Philippines on a
tourist visa. She was fetched by Lao, and she was brought to his condominium unit at
No. 19, Atlantic Drive, Pacific Grand Villa, Sto. Nio, Paraaque. She had been residing
there since then. She and Lao used to go to the shopping malls and she even saw
[43]

Chan once when he cleaned his Nissan car in Laos garage.

On October 22, 1996, appellant Zhen Hua arrived from China at the NAIA and was
met by Lao at the airport. He tried to check in at the Diamond Hotel but Lee told him that
he could stay in the condominium unit. Zhen Hua was brought to the Villa where he had
been staying since then. The appellants had made plans to visit Cebu.
 At about 6:00 a.m. on October 26, 1996, appellant Lee was sleeping in the masters
bedroom at the condominium unit. She had closed all the windows because she had
turned the air conditioning unit on. Zhen Hua was sleeping in the other bedroom in the
second floor beside the masters bedroom. Laos Honda Civic car and Chans Nissan car
were in the garage beside the condominium unit. Momentarily, Lee heard someone
knocking on the bedroom door. When she opened it, three (3) policemen barged into
the bedroom and at the room where appellant Zhen Hua was sleeping. Anciro, Jr. was
not among the men. Lee did not hear the policemen knock at the main door before they
entered. The policemen were accompanied by Chuang, a Cantonese interpreter, who
[44]

told her that the policemen were going to search the house. Appellant Lee saw a
[45]

policeman holding two papers, but no search warrant was shown to her. She was so
[46]

frightened.
The policemen placed two plastic bags on the bed before they searched the
masters bedroom. Appellant Lee went to the room of appellant Zhen Hua and when she
returned to the masters bedroom, she saw shabu on the bed. The policemen took her
[47]

ring, watch and the P600,000 owned by Lao which had earlier been placed in the
cabinet, her papers and documents, and those of Laos as well. She had never seen
any shabu in the room before the incident. Thereafter, she and appellant Zhen Hua
were brought to the PARAC headquarters where they were detained. Chuang, the
cantonese interpreter, informed her that shabu had been found in the condominium unit
and that the policemen were demanding P5,000,000 for her release. She was also told
that if she did not pay the amount, she would be charged with drug trafficking, and that
the leader of the group who arrested her would be promoted. However, she told Chuang
that she had no money. Since she could not pay the amount, she was boarded on a
PARAC owner-type jeep and returned to the condominium unit where the policemen
took all the household appliances, such as the television, compact discs, washing
machine, including laundry detergent. Only the sofa and the bed were not taken. About
ten (10) days later, the appellants secured the services of counsel.
Antonio Pangan testified that he and the policemen knocked on the door to the
condominium unit but that no one responded. He shouted, Sir Henry, referring to Lao,
but there was no response from inside the condominium. After about three (3) to five (5)
minutes, a policeman kicked the door open and they entered the house. They went to
the second floor and saw the appellants sleeping.
Pangan testified that he did not see any shabu that was seized by the policemen.
He learned that shabu had been found and taken from the condominium unit only when
he saw someone holding up the substance on television during the daily news program
TV Patrol. [48]

Appellant Zhen Hua also denied the charge. He corroborated the testimony of
appellant Lee that upon her invitation, he arrived in the Philippines on a tourist visa on
October 22, 1996. He claimed that he did not see Anciro, Jr. in the condominium unit
when policemen arrived and searched the house. He testified that aside from the
PARAC policemen, he was also investigated by policemen from Taiwan.
After trial, the court rendered judgment on January 10, 1999, convicting both
appellants of the crime charged. The decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, finding accused Jogy Lee and Huang

Zhen Hua GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Sec. 16, Art. III, RA
6425, as amended by RA 7659, and considering the absence of any aggravating
circumstances, this Court hereby sentences both accused to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 each. The properties seized in
accordance with the search warrants issued relative to this case are hereby ordered
confiscated in favor of the government and the Clerk of Court of this Court is directed
to turn over to the Dangerous Drugs Board, the drugs and paraphernalia subject hereof
for proper disposition.

The Clerk of Court is also directed to prepare the Mittimus for the immediate transfer
of both accused Jogy Lee and Huang Zhen Hua from the Paraaque City Jail to the
Bureau of Correccions (sic) in Muntinlupa City.

SO ORDERED. [49]

The Present Appeal

On appeal to this Court, appellant Zhen Hua, asserts that:

First. The evidence for the prosecution, as a whole, is so far as self-contradictory,

inherently improbable and palpably false to be accepted as a faithful reflection of the
true facts of the case;

Second. Appellant Huang Zhen Huas conviction was based merely on the trial courts
conclusion that he is not an epitome of first class tourist and that he appeared
nonchalant throughout the proceedings;

Third. In convicting said appellant, the court below completely disregarded the
glaring facts and admissions of the prosecutions principal witnesses that no regulated
drug was ever found in his possession;

Fourth. The trial court, likewise, ignored the fact that the appellants arrest was illegal
and in violation of his constitutional and basic rights against arrest without probable
cause as determined by a Judge and that his arraignment did not constitute a waiver of
such right;

Fifth. The trial court failed to consider the fact that the presumption of regularity of
performance of the police officers who took part in the search had been overcome by
prosecution's own evidence, thereby wrongly giving such presumption substance over
and above the constitutional presumption of innocence of the appellant. [50]

For her part, appellant Lee contends that:

1.01 THE ALLEGED TWO KILOS OF SHABU FOUND INSIDE ONE OF THE ROOMS
IN THE TOWNHOUSE RENTED BY HENRY LAU WERE MERELY PLANTED
BY PARAC OPERATIVES;
1.02 THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS HIGHLY
IRREGULAR, DUBIOUS AND UNREASONABLE AS THE SEARCH WARRANT
DID NOT CONTAIN ANY PARTICULAR DESCRIPTION OF THE ROOM TO BE
SEARCHED, NOR WAS THERE ANY INTERPRETER TO ASSIST AND GUIDE
JOGY LEE, WHO NEITHER KNEW NOR UNDERSTAND THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE, DURING THE SEARCH AND EVEN DURING THE TRIAL;
2. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED JOGY LEE UPON
THE GROUND THAT HER GUILT WAS NOT ESTABLISHED BY PROOF
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[51]
For its part, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) posits that appellant Zhen Hua
should be acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt, but that the conviction of
appellant Lee should be affirmed.
 The Courts Ruling

We shall delve into and resolve the assigned errors of the appellants Huang Zhen
Hua and Jogy Lee sequentially.
On Appellant Zhen Hua
The OSG contends that the prosecution failed to muster the requisite quantum of
evidence to prove appellant Zhen Huas guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
charged, thus:

Huang Zhen Hua denies having anything to do with the bags of shabu found in the
townhouse unit of Henry Lau. He claims that he arrived in the Philippines as a tourist
on October 22, 1996, upon the invitation of Jogy Lee. Allegedly, at the time of his
arrest, he had been in the Philippines for barely four days. He claims that he was just
temporarily billeted as a guest at the townhouse where Jogy Lee was staying. And that
he had no control whatsoever over said townhouse. He puts emphasis on the fact that
the search of his room turned out to be negative and that the raiding team failed to
seize or confiscate any prohibited or regulated drug in his person or possession. He,
therefore, prays for his acquittal.

The People submits that Huang Zhen Hua is entitled to acquittal. The prosecutions
evidence fails to meet the quantum of evidence required to overcome the
constitutional presumption of innocence; thus, regardless of the supposed weakness of
his defense, and his innocence may be doubted, he is nonetheless entitled to an
acquittal (Natividad v. Court of Appeals, 98 SCRA 335 (1980), cited in People v.
Fronda, G.R. No. 130602, March 15, 2000). The constitutional presumption of
innocence guaranteed to every individual is of primary importance, and the conviction
of the accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense but on the strength of the
evidence for the prosecution.

In the instant case, as pointed out by appellant Huang Zhen Hua, the trial court erred
when it did not give much weight to the admission made by the prosecution witnesses
that no regulated drug was found in his person. No regulated drug was also found
inside his room or in his other belongings such as suitcases, etc. Thus, he had no
actual or constructive possession of the confiscated shabu.

Moreover, it is not disputed that Huang Zhen Hua had only been in the country for
barely four (4) days at the time when he was arrested. The prosecution was unable to
show that in these four (4) days Huang Zhen Hua committed acts which showed that
he was in cahoots with the drug syndicate Henry Lau and Peter Chan. It was not even
shown that he was together with Henry Lau and Peter Chan on any occasion. As for
Huang Zhen Hua, therefore, there is no direct evidence of any culpability. Nor is there
any circumstantial evidence from which any culpability may be inferred. [52]

We agree with the OSG. In a case of recent vintage, this Court, in People vs. Tira,
ruminated and expostulated on the juridical concept of possession under Section 16,
[53]

Article III of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended, and the evidence necessary to prove the
said crime, thus:

The essential elements of the crime of possession of regulated drugs are the following:
(a) the accused is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the person is not
authorized by law or by duly constituted authorities; and, (c) the accused has
knowledge that the said drug is a regulated drug. This crime is mala prohibita, and, as
such, criminal intent is not an essential element. However, the prosecution must prove
that the accused had the intent to possess (animus posidende) the drugs. Possession,
under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive possession.
Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate physical possession or
control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession exits when the drug
is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise
dominion and control over the place where it is found. Exclusive possession or control
is not necessary. The accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise control
and dominion over the place where the contraband is located, is shared with another.

Thus, conviction need not be predicated upon exclusive possession, and a showing of
non-exclusive possession would not exonerate the accused. Such fact of possession
may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence and any reasonable inference
drawn therefrom. However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had
knowledge of the existence and presence of the drug in the place under his control and
dominion and the character of the drug. Since knowledge by the accused of the
existence and character of the drugs in the place where he exercises dominion and
control is an internal act, the same may be presumed from the fact that the dangerous
drug is in the house or place over which the accused has control or dominion, or
within such premises in the absence of any satisfactory explanation. [54]

In this case, the prosecution failed to prove that the appellant, at any time, had
actual or constructive possession of the regulated drug found in the masters bedroom
where appellant Lee was sleeping; or that the appellant had accessed the said room at
any given time; or that he had knowledge of the existence of shabu in appellant Lees
bedroom. Appellant Zhen Hua had arrived in the Philippines upon the invitation of
appellant Lee only on October 22, 1996 or barely four (4) days before the arrival of the
policemen and the search conducted in the condominium unit leased by Henry Lao. He
was a mere visitor of appellant Lee. There is no evidence that appellant Zhen Hua was
aware of the alleged illegal drug activities and/or transactions of Henry Lao, Peter Chan
and appellant Lee. The policemen did not find any regulated drug in the room where
appellant Zhen Hua was sleeping when they made their search.
The evidence of the prosecution against appellant Zhen Hua falls short of the
requisite quantum of evidence to prove conspiracy between him, appellant Lee and
Chan or Lao.
There is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a crime and decide
to commit it. Conspiracy cannot be presumed. Conspiracy must be proved beyond
[55] [56]

reasonable doubt like the crime subject of the conspiracy. Conspiracy may be proved
[57]

by direct evidence or by proof of the overt acts of the accused, before, during and after
the commission of the crime charged indicative of a common design. [58]

The bare fact that on two or three occasions after the arrival of appellant Zhen Hua
from China, and before the search conducted in Laos condominium unit, appellant Zhen
Hua had been seen with Lao, Chan and appellant Lee. Having dinner or lunch at a
restaurant does not constitute sufficient proof that he had conspired with them or with
any of them to possess the subject-regulated drug. Mere association with the principals
by direct participation or mere knowledge of conspiracy, without more, does not suffice.
Anciro, Jr. even admitted that during his surveillance, he could have mistaken
[59]

appellant Zhen Hua for another group of Chinese persons who were also being
watched. Appellant Zhen Hua should, thus, be acquitted.
[60]

On Appellant Lee
 Appellant Lee avers that certain irregularities were attendant in the issuance and
implementation of Search Warrant No. 96-802, as follows: (a) the policemen who
implemented the search warrant failed in their duty to show to her the said warrant,
inform her of their authority and explain their presence in the condominium unit; (b) the
policemen gained entry into the condominium unit by force while she was sleeping; and
(c) articles and personal effects owned by her and Lao were taken and confiscated by
the policemen, although not specified in the search warrant.
The appellant concludes that the articles procured by the policemen on the
occasion of the search of the condominium unit are inadmissible in evidence.
Appellant Lee, likewise, contends that she was a victim of a frame-up because the
policemen planted the regulated drug on her bed even before they searched the
bedroom. She went to the room of appellant Zhen Hua to find out if he was already
awake, and when she returned to the bedroom, she noticed shabu on her bed. She
avers that the sole testimony of Anciro, Jr., that he found the regulated drug in the
masters bedroom, is incredible because he was not with the policemen who barged into
the bedroom. She notes that even Pangan, the caretaker of the Villa, testified that he
did not see any illegal drug confiscated by the policemen.
According to appellant Lee, the trial court erred in convicting her of the crime
charged, considering that Lao and Chan were the suspects identified in the search
warrants, not her. She avers that she had no knowledge of the alleged illegal drug
transactions of her lover Lao. She contends that there was no probable cause for her
arrest as her mere presence in the condominium unit does not render her liable for
the shabu found in the masters bedroom of the condominium unit leased by Lao. She
further avers that the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution are inconsistent;
hence, barren of probative weight. The appellant also asserts that she was deprived of
her right to due process when the trial court conducted a trial without a Chinese
interpreter to assist her.
The OSG, for its part, avers that the police officers are presumed to have performed
their duties. Based on the testimony of Anciro, Jr., appellant Lee was shown the search
warrant, through the window, and the policemen identified themselves through their
uniforms. The security guards of the condominium also explained the search warrant to
the appellant. Although she was, at first, reluctant to open the door, appellant Lee later
voluntarily opened the door and allowed them entry into the unit. There was no
evidence of forcible entry into the unit and no breakage of any door. The OSG further
avers that the appellant had been in the country for quite sometime already and could
not have gotten around without understanding English. In fact, the OSG argues that
when Anciro, Jr. told the appellant to get some of her clothes since she would be
brought to the police headquarters in Quezon City, she did as she was told and took her
clothes from the cabinet where the shabu were found by the policemen.
The OSG further points out that Pangan, the chief of security of the subdivision who
was a witness for appellant Lee, even testified that the search was orderly. The OSG
contends that there was probable cause for the appellants arrest because an informant
had tipped off the arresting officers that the appellant was a member of a syndicate
dealing with illegal drugs, and that she handled the accounts of Lao and Chan. The
appellant was not a victim of frame-up because she was present when the policemen
searched the masters bedroom where she was sleeping and where she kept her
clothes, and witnessed the discovery of the regulated drugs and paraphernalia.
We agree with the contention of the appellant that the constitutional proscription
against unreasonable search and seizure applies to Filipino citizens, as well as to aliens
temporarily residing in the country. The rule against unreasonable search and seizure
forbids every search that is unreasonable; it protects all those suspected or known to be
offenders, as well as the innocent. The guarantee is as important and imperative as the
guarantee of the other fundamental rights of the citizens. All owes the duty for its
[61]
effective enforcement lest there shall be an impairment of the right for the purpose for
which it was adopted. [62]

Section 7, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

SEC. 7. Right to break door or window to effect search. The officer, if refused
admittance to the place of directed search after giving notice of his purpose and
authority, may break open any outer or inner door or window of a house or any part of
a house or anything therein to execute the warrant or liberate himself or any person
lawfully aiding him when unlawfully detained therein.

The police officers were obliged to give the appellant notice, show to her their
authority, and demand that they be allowed entry. They may only break open any outer
or inner door or window of a house to execute the search warrant if, after such notice
and demand, such officers are refused entry to the place of directed search. This is
known as the knock and announce principle which is embodied in Anglo-American Law.
The method of entry of an officer into a dwelling and the presence or absence of such
notice are as important considerations in assessing whether subsequent entry to search
and/or arrest is constitutionally reasonable. In Gouled v. The United States, it was
[63] [64]

held that a lawful entry is the indispensable predicate of a reasonable search. A search
would violate the Constitution if the entry were illegal, whether accomplished by force,
by illegal threat or mere show of force.
The principle may be traced to a statute in England way back in 1275 providing that
if a person takes the beasts of another and causes them to be driven into a castle or
fortress, if the sheriff makes a solemn demand for the deliverance of the beasts, and if
the person did not cause the beasts to be delivered incontinent, the king shall cause the
said castle or fortress to be beaten down without recovery. Common law courts
appended an important qualification:

But before he breaks it, he ought to signify the cause of his coming, and to make
request to open doors , for the law without a default in the owner abhors the
destruction or breaking of any house (which is for the habitation and safety of man)
by which great damage and inconvenience might ensue to the party, when no default
is in him; for perhaps he did not know of the process, of which, if he had noticed, it is
to be presumed that he would obey it [65]

Blackstone simply stated the principle that the sheriff may justify breaking open
doors if the possession be not quietly delivered. The principle was woven quickly into
[66]

the fabric of early American law and in the Fourth Amendment in the United States
Federal Constitution. It is an element of the reasonableness inquiry under the Fourth
Amendment as held in Wilson v. Arkansas. [67]

Generally, officers implementing a search warrant must announce their presence,

identify themselves to the accused and to the persons who rightfully have possession of
the premises to be searched, and show to them the search warrant to be implemented
by them and explain to them said warrant in a language or dialect known to and
understood by them. The requirement is not a mere procedural formality but is of the
essence of the substantial provision which safeguards individual liberty. No precise
[68]

form of words is required. It is sufficient that the accused has notice of the officers, their
authority and the purpose of the search and the object to be seized. It must be
emphasized that the notice requirement is designed not only for the protection of the
liberty of the person to be searched or of his property but also the safety and well-being
of the officers serving and implementing the search warrant. Unless the person to whom
the warrant is addressed and whose property is to be searched is notified of the search
warrant and apprised of the authority of the person serving the warrant, he may
consider the unannounced intrusion into the premises as an unlawful aggression on his
property which he will be justified in resisting, and in the process, may cause injury even
to the life of the officer implementing the warrant for which he would not be criminally
liable. Also, there is a very real possibility that the police serving and implementing the
search warrant may be misinformed as to the name or address of the suspect, or to
other material affirmations. Innocent citizens should not suffer the shock, fright, shame
or embarrassment attendant upon an unannounced intrusion. Indeed, a lawful entry is
[69]

the indispensable predicate of a reasonable search. A search would violate the

constitutional guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure if the entry were
illegal, whether accomplished by force, or by threat or show of force or obtained by
stealth, or coercion. [70]

Unannounced intrusion into the premises is permissible when (a) a party whose
premises or is entitled to the possession thereof refuses, upon demand, to open it; (b)
when such person in the premises already knew of the identity of the officers and of
their authority and persons; (c) when the officers are justified in the honest belief that
there is an imminent peril to life or limb; and (d) when those in the premises, aware of
the presence of someone outside (because, for example, there has been a knock at the
door), are then engaged in activity which justifies the officers to believe that an escape
or the destruction of evidence is being attempted. Suspects have no constitutional right
to destroy evidence or dispose of evidence. However, the exceptions above are not
[71]

exclusive or conclusive. At times, without the benefit of hindsight and ordinarily on the
spur of the moment, the officer must decide whether or not to make an unannounced
intrusion into the premises. Although a search and seizure of a dwelling might be
constitutionally defective, if the police officers entry was without prior announcement,
law enforcement interest may also establish the reasonableness of an unannounced
entry. Indeed, there is no formula for the determination of reasonableness. Each case
[72]

is to be decided on its own facts and circumstances. In determining the lawfulness of

[73]

an unallowed entry and the existence of probable cause, the courts are concerned only
with what the officers had reason to believe and the time of the entry. In Richards v.
[74]

Wisconsin, it was held that:

[75]

[1] In order to justify a no-knock entry, the police must have a reasonable suspicion
that knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular circumstances,
would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit the effective investigation of the
crime by, for example, allowing the destruction of evidence. This standardas opposed
to a probable-cause requirementstrikes the appropriate balance between the legitimate
law enforcement concerns at issue in the execution of search warrants and the
individual privacy interest affected by no-knock entries. [76]

As articulated in Benefield v. State of Florida, what constitutes breaking includes

[77]

the lifting of a latch, turning a door knob, unlocking a chain or hasp, removing a prop to
or pushing open a closed door of entrance to the house, even a closed screen door.
However, entry obtained through the use of deception, accomplished without force is
[78]

not a breaking requiring officers to first announce their authority and purpose because
the reasons behind the rule are satisfied there was no real likelihood of violence, no
unwarranted intrusion or privacy and no damage to the residence of the accused. [79]

As to how long an officer implementing a search warrant must wait before breaking
open any door cannot be distilled into a constitutional stopwatch. Each case has to be
decided on a case-to-case basis requiring an examination of all the circumstances.
The proper trigger point in determining, under the knock and announce rule, whether
[80]

the police waited long enough before entering the residence to execute a warrant, is
when those inside should have been alerted that the police wanted entry to execute a
warrant. [81]

In this case, we rule that the policemen complied with Section 7, Rule 126 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure before entering the condominium unit. Appellant
Lee admitted, when she testified, that the police officers were accompanied by Chuang,
a Cantonese interpreter, who informed her that his companions were police officers and
had a search warrant for the premises, and also explained to her that the officers were
going to search the condominium unit. The appellant was sufficiently aware of the
[82]

authority of the policemen, who wore PARAC uniforms, to conduct the search and their
purpose. Moreover, Anciro, Jr. told the appellant, in English, to bring some clothes with
her as she was to be brought to the police headquarters. Without such request being
interpreted to the appellant, the latter did as she was directed and took some clothes
from the cabinet atop the headboard. [83]

The evidence on record shows that the police officers knocked on the outer door
before entering the condominium unit, and after a while, the appellant opened the door
and allowed the policemen and Pangan to enter. Anciro, Jr. testified, thus:
Q Do you still recall Mr. Witness the identities of the security guards who helped you or
assisted you in implementing said search warrants at Grand Villa Subdivision?
A The OIC of the Home Owners Association, Antonio Pangan, and the OIC of the
Security Agency and two (2) other security guards.
Q Do you recall the names of those persons you mentioned Mr. Witness?
A I can hardly recall their names.
Q After having been assisted or coordinated with said security officers and the OIC of
the Home Owners Association, what did you do next?
A We told them that if we could ask them if they have a duplicate key and also knock
and introduce ourselves, knock on the said condominium.
Q Did they do that, the request?
A Yes, Sir.
Q Meaning to say, you arrived at #19 Atlantic Drive, Pacific Grand Villa?
A Yes, Sir.
Q While you were already at the door of that targeted house to implement said search
warrants, what happened next, if any? What did you do after that?
A We knocked on the door and tried to find out if there was somebody there because
the Home Owners Association doesnt have any key for the door. We asked them
to knock also because they are the ones who have access with the tenants.
Q And after knocking, what happened next?
A There were around 5 minutes, no one was trying to open the door. By that time, we
thought they were still asleep.
Q And then after that what did you do, if any?
A We asked Mr. Pangan to knock and introduce himself and another security guard to
try to knock on the kitchen which is on the back door.
Q And then after that?
A And then after that, it was a female person who showed up to (sic) the window of the
kitchen and asked who we are in a sign language.
Q And this female person who showed up to (sic) the window I withdraw. Were you
able to have a good look on that female person who showed herself thru the
window?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And who is this person Mr. Witness?
A She was identified as Jogy Lee, Sir.[84]
 The appellant failed to prove that the policemen broke open the door to gain entry
into the condominium unit. She could have asked the court for an ocular inspection to
show the door which was allegedly broken into by the policemen, or at least adduce in
evidence pictures showing the said breakage. The appellant failed to do so. The
testimony of the appellant is even belied by Pangan, who was a witness for the
appellant, who certified, along with three other security guards, that nothing was
destroyed and that the search was conducted in a peaceful and orderly manner. [85]

We are not impervious of the testimony of Pangan that the policemen kicked the
outer door to gain entry into the condominium unit, which testimony is seemingly in
derogation of his certification. However, Pangan admitted that the policemen did so only
after knocking on the door for three (3) to five (5) minutes and after he had called Lao in
a loud voice and received no response from the appellants:
Q Did you come to know the persons wherein your presence was being required
according to your security guards?
A According to my security guards, they introduced themselves as police operatives.
Q Did you comply with the invitation of these police authorities?
A Yes, they called me and according to them, they will search Unit 19, that is what they
told me.
Q Can you please tell us what time did the police operatives conduct the search?
A I cannot recall anymore because the incident happened in 1996. I dont know what
time was that.
Q When they conducted the search, were you there?
A I was there because that unit cannot be opened if the caretaker is not present.
Q Are you trying to say that you were the one who opened the door of that unit
occupied by Henry Kau Chung?
A They kicked the door and when nobody opened the door, they pushed the door and
the door was opened.
Q They forcibly opened the door when nobody opened it?
A Kaya naman po ginawa yon dahil nandoon naman po ang caretaker, wala naman
pong masamang mangyayari dahil nandoon naman po ang namamahala.
Q From the time you knocked at the door of this unit up to the time that the police
operatives forcibly break open the door, how many minutes had elapsed?
A Matagal din po silang kumakatok sa pintuan. I said, Mr. Henry, pakibuksan nyo ang
pinto, would you mind to open the door, kasi merong mga police officers na
gustong ma-search itong unit mo. Then, when nobody was answering, they
forcibly opened the door.
Q Was there any other occupant other than Henry Kau Chung in that unit at that time?
A At the second floor, they saw this Jogy Lee and her male companion whom I do not
know.
Q But during the time that you were trying to seek entry to the door, there was no one
who responded, is that correct?
A Pardon, Sir?
Q At the time that you were trying to knock at the door, there was no one who
responded to your knocking at the door?
A Nobody was answering, Sir.
Q And that compelled the police operatives to open the door forcibly?
A Yes, Sir.[86]
 COURT:
From the first time you knocked at the door, how long a time lapsed before the
police officer broke open the door?
A Matagal din po.
Q For how long?
A Maybe for about three to five minutes.
Q When nobody was answering, they forced open the door?
A Yes, Your Honor.
COURT:
Continue.[87]
The appellant failed to prove, with clear and convincing evidence, her contention
that Anciro, Jr. placed the shabu on her bed before he continued his search in the
bedroom, and that she was a victim of frame-up by the policemen. She relied on her
testimony and those of Pangan and Ferias that they did not see Anciro, Jr. discover and
take custody of the shabu in the cabinet.
The appellants defense of frame-up is nothing new. It is a common and standard
line of defense in most prosecutions for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law. While
such defense cannot and should not always be considered as contrived, nonetheless, it
is generally rejected for it can easily be concocted but is difficult to prove. Police officers
are, after all, presumed to have acted regularly in the performance of their official
functions, in the absence of clear and convincing proof to the contrary, or that they are
motivated by ill-will.[88]

It is true, as testified by Pangan and Ferias that, they did not see Anciro, Jr. discover
and take custody of the shabu subject of this case. However, as explained by Pangan,
he remained in the ground floor of the condominium unit while Anciro, Jr., Castillo and
Margallo searched the bedroom of appellant Lee and her lover Lao, and Ferias
proceeded to the room occupied by appellant Zhen Hua where he conducted his
search. Thus, Pangan testified:
Q When the masters bedroom was searched where Jogy Lee was then, according to
you, sleeping, did you accompany the PARAC members?
A No, Sir, because I was talking to a member of the PARAC downstairs.
Q What about the members of the security force?
A They were outside, Sir.
Q During the search made on the masters bedroom?
A Yes, Sir.
Q How about when the search was made in the room occupied by Huang Zhen Hua,
were you present then?
A No, Sir, I was still downstairs.
Q How about the other guards?
A They were also outside.[89]
For his part, Ferias declared:
Q In other words, you did not go inside the biggest room?
A No, Sir.
Q You proceeded to another room where co-accused Huang Zhen Hua was then
sleeping?
A Yes, Sir.
 Q What happened next?
A We woke up Huang Zhen Hua and we introduced ourselves to him as police officers.
Q What was the reaction of Huang Zhenhua?
A He was surprised.[90]
Q In other words, you did not go inside the biggest room?
A No, Sir.
Q You proceeded to another room where co-accused Huang Zhen Hua was then
sleeping?
A Yes, Sir.
Q What happened next?
A We woke up Huang Zhen Hua and we introduced ourselves to him as police officers.
Q What was the reaction of Huang Zhen Hua?
A He was surprised.[91]
Pangan testified that before the police officers conducted their search in the second
floor of the condominium unit, he did not see them bring in anything:
Q But you are very sure that before the police officers searched the unit, you did not
see them bringing anything with them, they were all empty-handed?
A I did not see, Sir.[92]
No less than Pangan himself, a witness for the appellants, and three of the security
guards of the subdivision, who accompanied the policemen in implementing the search
warrants, certified that, what was found inside the condominium unit and confiscated by
the policemen were two plastic bags which contained white crystalline powder
substances suspected to be shabu. [93]

The appellant admitted that she saw shabu in her bedroom while the policemen
were there. She claimed that the policemen placed the plastic bag on the bed before
they started the search and that she noticed the shabu only after he returned from the
room of appellant Zhen Hua to see if he was already awake is hard to believe.
First. We find it incredible that the policemen placed the shabu on the appellants
bed, in her full view, for which the latter could be prosecuted for planting evidence and,
if convicted, sentenced to death under Section 19 of Rep. Act 7659:

SECTION 19. Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the
Dangerous Act of 1972, is hereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 24. Penalties for Government Officials and Employees and Officers and
Members of Police Agencies and the Armed Forces, Planting of Evidence. The
maximum penalties provided for [in] Section 3, 4(1), 5(1), 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12 and 13 of
Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15(1), 16 and 19 of Article III shall be imposed, if
those found guilty of any of the said offenses are government officials, employees or
officers, including members of police agencies and the armed forces.

Any such above government official, employee or officer who is found guilty of
planting any dangerous drugs punished in Sections 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 13 of Article II
and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act in the person or in the
immediate vicinity of another as evidence to implicate the latter, shall suffer the same
penalty as therein provided.
 Second. The appellant failed to inform her counsel of the alleged planting of
evidence by the policemen; if she had done so, for sure, the said counsel would have
prepared her affidavit and filed the appropriate motion in court for the suppression of the
things/articles seized by the policemen.
Third. The appellant failed to charge the policemen with planting of evidence before
or after she was charged of violation of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended.
Fourth. The appellant cannot even identify and describe the policeman or policemen
who allegedly planted the evidence.
The fact is that, as gleaned from the affidavit of arrest signed by Anciro, Jr. and
Ferias, the articles and substances found and confiscated from the condominium unit of
Lao and appellant Lee at Atlantic Drive and at the Cityland condominium unit of Lao and
Chan were itemized as follows:

a. TWO (2) Big Transparent Plastic Bags containing about one (1) kilo each of white
crystalline granules later tested to be Methamphetamine Hydrochloride or Shabu, a
regulated drug;

b. ONE (1) Transparent Plastic Baby Feeding Bottle containing undetermined quantity
of suspected Shabu;

c. ONE (1) Small Plastic Canister also containing undetermined amount of

suspected Shabu

d. Assorted Pieces of Shabu Paraphernalia consisting of Improvised Tooters used for

sniffing shabu, Improvised Burners used for burning Shabu, aluminum foils, etc.;

a. TWO (2) Kettles/Pots containing more or less 1 kilos of Raw Shabu or

Methamphetamine Hydrochloride;

b. Two (2) Big Transparent Plastic Bags containing more or less Two (2) Kilos
of Shabu;

c. Three (3) Plastic Basins, small, medium, large, used for containers of
finished/cooked Shabu;

c. Several pieces of Plastic Strainers used for draining out liquids from
finished Shabu;

e. One (1) Plastic Container with liquid chemical of undetermined element;

f. Several pieces of Spoons and ladles with traces of raw Shabu used in stirring
mixtures

g. One (1) Electric Cooking Stove w/one coil burner;

h. One (1) Unit Card Making Machine;

i. One (1) Unit Card Stamping Machine;

j. Several pieces of Credit Cards and Telephone Cards; [94]

 Anciro, Jr. placed his initials on the plastic bags containing white crystalline powder
which were found and confiscated at Atlantic Drive and, in the company of Ferias,
delivered the same to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination, per the request of
Police Superintendent Janice P. de Guzman, the chief of the PARAC.
We agree with the appellant that she was not one of the accused named in the
search warrants. However, such fact did not proscribe the policemen from arresting her
and charging her of violation of Rep. Act No. 6425, as amended. There was, in fine,
probable cause for her warrantless arrest independent of that found by Judge William
Bayhon when he issued the search warrants against Lao and Chan for search of the
condominium units at Atlantic Drive and Cityland.
Probable cause exists for the warrantless detention and arrest of one at the
premises being searched when the facts and circumstances within their knowledge and
of which they had reliable and trustworthy information are sufficient to themselves
warrant a reasonable belief of a cautious person that an offense has been or is being
committed. It has been held that:
[95]

Probable cause for the arrest of petitioner Diane Ker, while not present at the time the
officers entered the apartment to arrest her husband, was nevertheless present at the
time of her arrest. Upon their entry and announcement of their identity, the officers
were met not only by George Ker but also by Diane Ker, who was emerging from the
kitchen. Officer Berman immediately walked to the doorway from which she emerged
and, without entering, observed the brick-shaped package of marijuana in plain view.
Even assuming that her presence in a small room with the contraband in a prominent
position on the kitchen sink would not alone establish a reasonable ground for the
officers belief that she was in joint possession with her husband, that fact was
accompanied by the officers information that Ker had been using his apartment as a
base of operations for his narcotics activities. Therefore, we cannot say that at the time
of her arrest there were no sufficient grounds for a reasonable belief that Diane Ker, as
well as her husband, were committing the offense of possession of marijuana in the
presence of the officers.[96]

In Draper v. United States, it was held that informations from a reliable informant,
[97]

corroborated by the police officers observations as to the accuracy of the description of

the accused, and of his presence at a particular place, is sufficient to establish probable
cause. In this case, the police officers received reliable information and verified, after
surveillance, that appellant Lee and Lao were living together as husband and wife in the
condominium unit and that appellant Lee handled the accounting of the payments and
proceeds of the illegal drug trafficking activities of Lao. Indeed, the policemen found that
the appellant occupied the bedroom and slept in the same bed used by Lao. The
appellant took her clothes from the same cabinet where the subject shabu and
paraphernalia were found by Anciro, Jr. The appellant had been living in the same
condominium unit with Lao since October 1, 1996 until her arrest on October 25, 1996.
Along with Lao, the appellant thus had joint control and possession of the bedroom, as
well as of the articles, paraphernalia, and the shabu found therein. Such facts and
circumstances are sufficient on which to base a reasonable belief that the appellant had
joint possession of the regulated drugs found in the bedroom along with Lao, her live-in
partner, in line with our ruling in People v. Tira. For the purpose of prosecution for
[98]

violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law, possession can be constructive and need not be
exclusive, but may be joint. [99]

Admittedly, Anciro, Jr. seized and took custody of certain articles belonging to the
appellant and Lao which were not described in the search warrants. However, the
seizure of articles not listed in a search warrant does not render the seizure of the
articles described and listed therein illegal; nor does it render inadmissible in evidence
such articles which were described in the warrant and seized pursuant thereto.
Moreover, it bears stressing that Anciro, Jr. saw the unlisted articles when he and the
other policemen implemented the search warrants. Such articles were in plain view of
Anciro, Jr. as he implemented the search warrants and was authorized to seize the said
articles because of their close connection to the crime charged. As held in Coolidge, Jr.
v. New Hampshire: [100]

An example of the applicability of the plain view doctrine is the situation in which the
police have a warrant to search a given area for specified objects, and in the course of
the search come across some other article of incriminating character.

Where the initial intrusion that brings the police within plain view of such an article is
supported, not by a warrant, but by one of the recognized exceptions to the warrant
requirement, the seizure is also legitimate. Thus, the police may inadvertently come
across evidence while in hot pursuit of a fleeing suspect. And an object that comes
into view during a search incident to arrest that is appropriately limited in scope under
existing law may be seized without a warrant. Finally, the plain view doctrine has
been applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused,
but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. [101]

It cannot be denied that the cards, passbook, passport and other documents and
papers seen by the policemen have an intimate nexus with the crime charged or, at the
very least, incriminating. The passport of the appellant would show when and how often
she had been in and out of the country. Her credit cards and bank book would indicate
how much money she had amassed while in the country and how she acquired or
earned the same. The pictures and those of the other persons shown therein are
relevant to show her relationship to Lao and Chan. [102]

Contrary to the claim of the appellant, it is not true that the trial court failed to
provide an interpreter when she testified. The records show that a Cantonese
interpreter attended the trial and interpreted her testimony. The Rules of Court does not
require the trial court to provide the appellant with an interpreter throughout the trial. An
interpreter is required only if the witness on the stand testifies in a language other than
in English or is a deaf- mute. The appellant may procure the services of an interpreter at
her own expense.
Contrary to the claim of appellant Lee, the prosecution adduced proof beyond
reasonable doubt of her guilt of the crime charged. She and Lao, her lover, had joint
possession of the shabu which the policemen found and confiscated from her bedroom.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appeal of appellant Huang Zhen Hua is
GRANTED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, convicting him of
the crime charged, is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The said appellant is ACQUITTED
of said charge. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is hereby directed to release
the said appellant from detention unless he is detained for another cause or charge, and
to submit to the Court, within five (5) days from notice hereof, a report of his compliance
with the directive of the Court.
The appeal of appellant Jogy Lee is DENIED. The Decision dated January 10,
1999, of the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, convicting her of violation of Section
16, Rep. Act No. 6425 is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Chico-Nazario, J., on leave.
[1]
Penned by Judge Zosimo V. Escano.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 199898 September 3, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
LEO DELA TRINIDAD y OBALLES, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
Before this Court is an appeal assailing the 24 March 2011 Decision 1 of the
Court of. Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04288. The CA affirmed the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 25, Naga City, Camarines
Sur finding the accused guilty of violating Section 11, Article II of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Drugs Act of
2002.
The Antecedents
On 22 October 2008, an Information was filed against accused Leo Dela
Trinidad yOballes (appellant) before the RTC, Naga City, Camarines Sur for
violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A No. 9165, to wit:
That on or about October 21, 2008, in the City of Naga, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of thisHonorable Court, the above-named accused,
without authority of law, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
criminally have in his possession, custody and control nine and one-half (9
) bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves with fruiting tops weighing
more or less 475 grams including its (sic) wrapper; two (2) big bricks of
suspected dried marijuana leaves with fruiting tops weighing more or less
550 grams including its (sic) wrapper; four (4) pieces of medium size cubes
of suspected dried marijuana leaves weighing more or less 41.1 grams
including its (sic) plastic containers; eighteen (18) pieces of small cubes of
suspected dried marijuana leaves with fruiting tops weighing more or less
55.4 grams including its (sic) plastic container; and seventy[-]seven (77)
pieces of small empty transparent plastic sachet, with a total weight of more
or less 1,121.5 grams, which is a dangerous drug, inviolation of the above-
cited law.2
Version of the Prosecution
On 27 September 2008, the Office of the Intelligence Section of the Naga
City Police (Intelligence Section) received an information concerning a certain
Leo De la Trinidad who was allegedly involved in drug trafficking. Police
Senior Inspector Benigno Albao, Sr. (PSI. Albao), Chief of the Intelligence
Section, interviewed the informant and after having been convinced that the
information was true,3 he referred the matter to Senior Police Officer 1
Feliciano Aguilar (SPO1 Aguilar) and SPO1 Fersebal Abrantes (SPO1 Abrantes)
for the conduct of a surveillance operation for further details.4
The surveillance operation confirmed the identity and exact location of
appellant. The police operatives also observed during the surveillance that
some suspected drug pushers visited the residence of appellant.5
After having verified the report thatappellant is indeed involved in drug
trade, a test-buy was conducted on 10 October 2008.6 The test-buy brought
forth positive result as the police asset was able to buy marijuana cubes,
dried marijuana leaves and fruiting tops worth P100.00 from appellant. After
the initial test-buy, the informant was directed by the police operatives to
continue monitoring appellant because there was a report that the latter is in
possession of quantities of marijuana by the kilo.7
On 13 October 2008, a discussion onthe use of code names was made by the
members of the team in order to conceal the identity of appellant and to
secure their operation.8 The code name is "Leonidas de Leon" and the name
of the plan is "Code Plan Sativa."9
On 16 October 2008, around 5:30 P.M., another test-buy took place through
SPO1 Aguilar and SPO1 Abrantesand again, the asset was able to purchase
one brick of dried marijuana leaves from appellant.10
On 17 October 2008, the bricks of marijuana purchased from appellant on 10
October 2008 and 16 October 2008 were submitted to the Camarines Sur
Police Provincial Office.11
On 20 October 2008, the police operatives applied for two search warrants
from the RTC, Branch 25 in Naga City.12 One search warrant was applied for
violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 while the other one was for
violation of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294 or for illegal
possession of firearmsand ammunitions because during the second test-buy,
the police asset saw appellant with a gun which was tucked in his
waist.13 Upon receipt of the search warrants, the team coordinated with the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), as shown by the Certificate of
Coordination. A pre-operation report was then submitted to the PDEA.14
The police operatives proceededto conduct a briefing for the execution of the
search warrants. The said briefing was made at the Conference Room of the
Naga City Police Office on 21 October 2008, at about 4:10 A.M.15 The briefing
of the teamwas photographed. Among those present are the members of the
raiding team16 and the mandatory witnesses, i.e.representative from the DOJ,
Carlo Lamberto Tayo; media representative, Roy Ranoco; elected punong
barangayof Sabang, Naga City Jose Jacobo and Kagawad Eugene Froyalde of
Sabang, Naga City.
Around 5:10 AM of 21 October 2008, the group proceeded to the residence of
appellant. They wereaccompanied by the DOJ and media representatives
together with the local barangayofficials. Upon reaching appellants house,
the raiding team knocked at his door and identified themselves as police
officers from the Naga City Police Office and informed him that they are
executing the search warrants issued by Judge Jaime Contreras. They told
appellant that they have witnesses with them, and read to him the contents
of the warrants and apprised him of his constitutional rights.17 PO2 Quintin
Tusara took picturesof everything that transpired while the operatives were
executing the warrants.18
When appellant was asked to produce the items enumerated in the search
warrant, if indeed he really had them, appellant voluntarily presented the
items which he took under his pillow. The items consisted of nine and a half
(9 ) bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves sealed with packaging tape,
two (2) big bricks of suspected dried marijuana leaves sealed with packaging
tape, four (4) medium sizecubes of suspected dried marijuana leaves placed
inside the small transparent plastic sachet, and eighteen (18) pieces of small
cubes of suspected dried marijuana leaves placed inside the small
transparent plastic sachet.19 Also found were seventy-seven (77) pieces of
empty transparent plastic sachets. SPO1 Aguilar, placed his initial, "FBA," in
the said items.20
No firearm was found at the residence of appellant. An inventory was then
conducted right inside the house of appellant and a certificate of inventory
was prepared by SPO1 Louie Ordonez.21 The Certificate of Inventory and
Certification of Orderly Search were duly signed by the witnesses in the
presence of appellant.22
After making the necessary markings, appellant and the items seized from
him were brought to the Naga City Police Station.23
The seized items were returned to the court of origin but were subsequently
withdrawn for laboratory examination.24 A request to the Camarines Sur
Provincial Office was subsequently madeby SPO1 Aguilar and the seized
items were immediately brought to the Crime Laboratory for field test
examination.25 The seized items were duly received by P/Insp. Edsel
Villalobos (P/Insp. Villalobos).26
When subjected to both initial and final test examinations by P/Insp.
Villalobos, the seized items were found positive for the presence of
marijuana.27
Version of the Defense
In the early morning of 21 October 2008, appellant was in his house located
in Sabang, Naga City together with his wife and children. Somebody knocked
at their door, so hepeeped through the window and asked who was knocking.
He noticed a lot of people outside and asked them who were they. Somebody
answered that he was Kapitan, so the witness opened the door. They entered
appellants house and immediately took pictures of it. He was told to just
stay at the side and asked him to bring out the gun and the illegal drugs.
When asked to bring out the illegal drugs, he heard somebody shouted, "I
have already found it." They went near the table, but he was not able to see
whatthey were doing because the table was surrounded by men. At that
time, the appellant was seated on a bamboo chair with his hands placed on
his nape. Thereafter, he was called and asked to sign on a piece of paper.
When he asked what was that for, they told him that they were for the things
found inhis house. A man approached him and read to him the contents of
the warrant. Then, he was handcuffed and brought to the police station.28
Ruling of the RTC
In a Decision dated 16 November 2009,the trial court found appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged. The RTC found that the
prosecution succeeded in proving beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the
appellant for violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. No. 9165.
Appellant was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to
pay a fine of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00).
The RTC ruled that the evidence presented during the trial adequately proved
all the elements of the offense.It held that appellant, not being authorized by
law, with full knowledge that the items were dangerous drugs, had actual
and exclusive possession, control and dominion over the drugs found in his
house.29 It likewise held that the officers strictly complied with the guidelines
prescribed by law on how drug operations should be conducted by law
enforcers and in taking custody and control of the seized drugs.30 On the
other hand, accused failed to present any substantial evidence to establish
his defense of frame-up. The RTC placed more weight on the affirmative
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, rather than the denials of the
accused because positive testimonies are weightier than negative
ones.31 With the positive identification made by the government witnesses as
the perpetrator of the crime, his self-serving denial is worthless.32 Since there
was nothing in the record to show that the arresting team and the
prosecution witnesses were actuated by improper motives, their affirmative
statements proving appellants culpability were respected by the trial court.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, upon a finding that all of the
elements of illegal sale of dangerous drug have been sufficiently established
by the prosecution. It found credible the statements of prosecution witnesses
about what transpired during and after the test-buy, service of search
warrant, and arrest of the accused. Further, it ruled that the prosecution has
proven as unbroken the chain of custody of evidence. The CA likewise upheld
the findings of the trial court that the entire operation conducted by the
police officers enjoyed the presumption of regularity, absent any showing of
illmotive on the part of those who conducted the same.
The CA likewise found appellants defenses of denial and frame-up
unconvincing and lacked corroboration. Itnoted that appellant did not even
present his wife, who was allegedly present during the search, to corroborate
his claim.33
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE
Appellant raised in his brief a loneerror on the part of the appellate court, to
wit:
The trial court gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime
charged despite the prosecutions failure to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
Our Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
Appellant submits that the trial court overlooked and misapplied some facts
of substance, which if considered, could have altered the verdict. He
maintains that he has no knowledge as to where the illegal drugs were found
as he was not in possession of the same, and alleged that the bricks of
marijuana were merely planted by the police operatives.34
Appellants contention is belied by the testimonies of the witnesses for the
prosecution. It bears to stress that the defense of denial or frame-up, like
alibi, has been invariably viewed with disfavor by this Court for it can easily
be concocted and is a common defense ploy in most prosecutions for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.35 They are self-serving evidence, and
unless substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, cannot be given
weight over the positive assertions of credible witnesses.36
In the prosecution of illegal possession of regulated or prohibited drugs, the
following elements must be established: (1) the accused is in possession of
an item or object, which is identified to be prohibited or regulated drug; (2)
such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the drug.37 As correctly ruled by the CA, these
elements were duly established by the prosecution. Jurisprudence is
consistent in that mere possession of a prohibited drug constitutes prima
facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an
accused in the absence of any satisfactory explanation.38
The ruling of this Court in People v. Lagman39 is instructive. It held that illegal
possession of regulated drugs is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent
is not an essential element. However, the prosecution must prove that the
accused had the intent to possess (animus posidendi) the drugs. Possession,
under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive
possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate
possession or control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive
possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the
accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the
place where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not necessary. The
accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion
over the place where the contraband is located, is shared with another.
It must be emphasized that the finding of illicit drugs and paraphernalia in a
house or building owned or occupied by a particular person raises the
presumption of knowledge and possession thereof which, standing alone, is
sufficient to convict.40 Here, accused-appellant failed to present any evidence
to overcome such presumption. He merely insisted that he was framed and
had no knowledge of where the prohibited drugs came from. In the absence
of any contrary evidence, he is deemed to be in full control and dominion of
the drugs found in his house. Accused-appellant argues that the corpus
delicti has not been clearly established. He points out that although SPO1
Aguilar allegedly placed his markings on the confiscated items, no such
marking was indicated in the certificate of inventory, nor were the weight of
the said specimens indicated thereon. He further argues that the markings
allegedly placed on the specimens seized were not even indicated in the
return of the search warrant.41 Thus, he centers his argument on the
contention that the integrity of the dangerous drugs was not ensured and its
identity was not established with moral integrity.
Relevant to appellants case is the procedure to be followed in the custody
and handling of the seized dangerous drugs as outlined in Section 21,
paragraph 1, Article II, R.A. No. 9165, which reads:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs
shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/orseized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof[.]
This provision is elaborated in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing
Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9165, which states:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the
drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory
and photograph the same inthe presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative orcounsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof:
Provided, thatthe physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at
the place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station
or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long asthe
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid
such seizures of and custody over said items. (Emphasis supplied)
Strictly speaking, the aforecited provision of the IRR does not even require
that the certificate of inventory must indicate the markings and the weight of
the seized items. In fact, the rule even sanctions substantial compliance with
the procedure to establish a chain of custody, as long as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are property preserved by the
apprehending officers. In People v. Pringas,42 the Court recognized that the
strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 may not always be
possible under field conditions; the police operates under varied conditions,
and cannot at all times attend to all the niceties of the procedures in the
handling of confiscated evidence.
As correctly ruled by the CA, the prosecution was able to establish the
integrity of corpus delicti and the unbroken chain of custody. Aptly noting the
findings of the trial court:
It was sufficiently established that representatives from the media and
Department of Justice and even two (2) barangay local officials were present
during the briefing and even until the conduct of the inventory. And that
immediately after seizure and confiscation of the dangerous drugs, the same
were inventoried and photographed in the presence of appellant and said
persons, who even signed copies of the inventory. The seized illegal drugs
were marked at accuseds residence and in his presence. P/S Insp. Villalobos
testified that the seized items he received from Aguilar already contained the
markings, "FBA". Besides, he also placed his own initials and signatures in
blue markings to preserve and maintain the integrity of the specimens. Thus,
there was no cogent reason why the court should doubt the trustworthiness
and credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.43
The integrity of the evidence is presumed to have been preserved unless
there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been
tampered with. Accused-appellant bear the burden of showing that the
evidence was tampered or meddled with in order to overcome the
presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits by public officers and
the presumption that public officers properly discharged their
duties.44 Accused-appellant in this case failed to present any plausible reason
to impute ill motive on the part of the arresting officers. Thus, the
testimonies of the apprehending officers deserve full faith and credit.45 In
fact, accusedappellant did not even question the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses. He anchored his appeal solely on his allegation of
frame-up and denial and on the alleged broken chain of the custody of the
seized drugs.
In sum, we find no reason to modify or set aside the decision of the CA.
Accused-appellant was correctly found to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violating Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the 24 March 2011 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04288 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
RUBEN DEL CASTILLO @ BOY G.R. No. 185128
CASTILLO,
 Petitioner, [Formerly UDK No. 13980]

Present:

- versus - VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,

PERALTA,
MENDOZA,
REYES,* and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
Respondent.
Promulgated:
January 30, 2012
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

For this Court's consideration is the Petition for Review[1] on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of Ruben del Castillo assailing the Decision[2] dated July 31, 2006 and
Resolution[3] dated December 13, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CR No. 27819, which affirmed the Decision[4] dated March 14, 2003 of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Cebu, in Criminal Case No. CBU-
46291, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 16, Article III of Republic Act (R.A.) 6425.
The facts, as culled from the records, are the following:
Pursuant to a confidential information that petitioner was engaged in
selling shabu, police officers headed by SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, after
conducting surveillance and test-buy operation at the house of petitioner,
secured a search warrant from the RTC and around 3 o'clock in the afternoon
of September 13, 1997, the same police operatives went to Gil Tudtud St.,
Mabolo, Cebu City to serve the search warrant to petitioner.
Upon arrival, somebody shouted raid, which prompted them to immediately
disembark from the jeep they were riding and went directly to petitioner's
house and cordoned it. The structure of the petitioner's residence is a two-
storey house and the petitioner was staying in the second floor. When they
went upstairs, they met petitioner's wife and informed her that they will
implement the search warrant. But before they can search the area, SPO3
Masnayon claimed that he saw petitioner run towards a small structure, a
nipa hut, in front of his house. Masnayon chased him but to no avail, because
he and his men were not familiar with the entrances and exits of the place.
They all went back to the residence of the petitioner and closely guarded the
place where the subject ran for cover. SPO3 Masnayon requested his men to
get a barangay tanod and a few minutes thereafter, his men returned with
two barangay tanods.
In the presence of the barangay tanod, Nelson Gonzalado, and the elder
sister of petitioner named Dolly del Castillo, searched the house of petitioner
including the nipa hut where the petitioner allegedly ran for cover. His men
who searched the residence of the petitioner found nothing, but one of
the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from the nipa hut several
articles, including four (4) plastic packs containing white crystalline
substance. Consequently, the articles that were confiscated were sent to the
PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. The contents of the four (4) heat-
sealed transparent plastic packs were subjected to laboratory examination,
the result of which proved positive for the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, or shabu.

Thus, an Information was filed before the RTC against petitioner, charging
him with violation of Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425, as amended. The
Information[5]reads:

That on or about the 13th day of September 1997, at about 3:00 p.m. in the
City of Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, with deliberate intent, did then and there have in his
possession and control four (4) packs of white crystalline powder, having a
total weight of 0.31 gram, locally known as shabu, all containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, without license or
prescription from any competent authority.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[6]
During arraignment, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, pleaded
not guilty.[7] Subsequently, trial on the merits ensued.

To prove the earlier mentioned incident, the prosecution presented the

testimonies of SPO3 Bienvenido Masnayon, PO2 Milo Arriola, and Forensic
Analyst, Police Inspector Mutchit Salinas.

The defense, on the other hand, presented the testimonies of petitioner,

Jesusa del Castillo, Dalisay del Castillo and Herbert Aclan, which can be
summarized as follows:

On September 13, 1997, around 3 o'clock in the afternoon, petitioner was

installing the electrical wirings and airconditioning units of the Four Seasons
Canteen and Beauty Parlor at Wacky Bldg., Cabancalan, Cebu. He was able to
finish his job around 6 o'clock in the evening, but he was engaged by the
owner of the establishment in a conversation. He was able to go home
around 8:30-9 o'clock in the evening. It was then that he learned from his
wife that police operatives searched his house and found nothing. According
to him, the small structure, 20 meters away from his house where they found
the confiscated items, was owned by his older brother and was used as a
storage place by his father.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable of the charge
against him in the Information. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused Ruben del
Castillo alyas Boy Castillo, GUILTY of violating Section 16, Article III, Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended. There being no mitigating nor aggravating
circumstances proven before this Court, and applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, he is sentenced to suffer the penalty of Six (6) Months and
One (1) Day as Minimum and Four (4) Years and Two (2) Months as Maximum
of Prision Correccional.

The four (4) small plastic packets of white crystalline substance having a
total weight of 0.31 gram, positive for the presence of methamphetamine
hydrochloride, are ordered confiscated and shall be destroyed in accordance
with the law.

SO ORDERED.[8]
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed his case with the CA, but the latter affirmed
the decision of the RTC, thus:

WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision is AFFIRMED in toto and the appeal is

DISMISSED, with costs against accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.[9]
After the motion for reconsideration of petitioner was denied by the CA,
petitioner filed with this Court the present petition for certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court with the following arguments raised:

1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE

PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION, THE RULES OF COURT AND
ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE VIS-A-VIS VALIDITY OF SEARCH WARRANT NO.
570-9-1197-24;

2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE FOUR (4)

PACKS OF WHITE CRYSTALLINE POWDER ALLEGEDLY FOUND ON THE FLOOR
OF THE NIPA HUT OR STRUCTURE ARE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST
THE PETITIONER, NOT ONLY BECAUSE THE SAID COURT SIMPLY PRESUMED
THAT IT WAS USED BY THE PETITIONER OR THAT THE PETITIONER RAN TO IT
FOR COVER WHEN THE SEARCHING TEAM ARRIVED AT HIS RESIDENCE, BUT
ALSO, PRESUMING THAT THE SAID NIPA HUT OR STRUCTURE WAS INDEED
USED BY THE PETITIONER AND THE FOUR (4) PACKS OF WHITE CRYSTALLINE
POWDER WERE FOUND THEREAT. THE SUBJECT FOUR (4) PACKS OF WHITE
CRYSTALLINE POWDER ARE FRUITS OF THE POISONOUS TREE; and

3. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF THE

ELEMENT OF POSSESSION AS AGAINST THE PETITIONER, AS IT WAS IN
VIOLATION OF THE ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE ON THE MATTER. HAD THE
SAID COURT PROPERLY APPLIED THE ELEMENT IN QUESTION, IT COULD HAVE
BEEN ASSAYED THAT THE SAME HAD NOT BEEN PROVEN.[10]

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), in its Comment dated February 10,
2009, enumerated the following counter-arguments:

I
SEARCH WARRANT No. 570-9-11-97-24 issued by Executive Judge Priscilla S.
Agana of Branch 24, Regional Trial Court of Cebu City is valid.

II
The four (4) packs of shabu seized inside the shop of petitioner are
admissible in evidence against him.

III
The Court of Appeals did not err in finding him guilty of illegal possession of
prohibited drugs.[11]

Petitioner insists that there was no probable cause to issue the search
warrant, considering that SPO1 Reynaldo Matillano, the police officer who
applied for it, had no personal knowledge of the alleged illegal sale of drugs
during a test-buy operation conducted prior to the application of the same
search warrant. The OSG, however, maintains that the petitioner, aside from
failing to file the necessary motion to quash the search warrant pursuant to
Section 14, Rule 127 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, did not
introduce clear and convincing evidence to show that Masnayon was
conscious of the falsity of his assertion or representation.

Anent the second argument, petitioner asserts that the nipa hut located
about 20 meters away from his house is no longer within the permissible
area that may be searched by the police officers due to the distance and that
the search warrant did not include the same nipa hut as one of the places to
be searched. The OSG, on the other hand, argues that the constitutional
guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure is applicable only
against government authorities and not to private individuals such as
the barangay tanod who found the folded paper containing packs of shabu
inside the nipa hut.

As to the third argument raised, petitioner claims that the CA erred in finding
him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of prohibited drugs,
because he could not be presumed to be in possession of the same just
because they were found inside the nipa hut. Nevertheless, the OSG
dismissed the argument of the petitioner, stating that, when prohibited and
regulated drugs are found in a house or other building belonging to and
occupied by a particular person, the presumption arises that such person is
in possession of such drugs in violation of law, and the fact of finding the
same is sufficient to convict.

This Court finds no merit on the first argument of petitioner.

The requisites for the issuance of a search warrant are: (1) probable cause is
present; (2) such probable cause must be determined personally by the
judge; (3) the judge must examine, in writing and under oath or affirmation,
the complainant and the witnesses he or she may produce; (4) the applicant
and the witnesses testify on the facts personally known to them; and (5) the
warrant specifically describes the place to be searched and the things to be
seized.[12] According to petitioner, there was no probable cause. Probable
cause for a search warrant is defined as such facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense
has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched.[13] A finding of probable cause
needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime
has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable
cause demands more than bare suspicion; it requires less than evidence
which would justify conviction.[14] The judge, in determining probable cause,
is to consider the totality of the circumstances made known to him and not
by a fixed and rigid formula,[15] and must employ a flexible, totality of the
circumstances standard.[16] The existence depends to a large degree upon the
finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination. This Court,
therefore, is in no position to disturb the factual findings of the judge which
led to the issuance of the search warrant. A magistrate's determination of
probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is paid great deference
by a reviewing court, as long as there was substantial basis for that
determination.[17] Substantial basis means that the questions of the
examining judge brought out such facts and circumstances as would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been
committed, and the objects in connection with the offense sought to be
seized are in the place sought to be searched.[18] A review of the records
shows that in the present case, a substantial basis exists.

With regard to the second argument of petitioner, it must be remembered

that the warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched
and persons or things to be seized in order for it to be valid. A designation or
description that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all
others, and on inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the
constitutional requirement of definiteness.[19] In the present case, Search
Warrant No. 570-9-1197-24[20] specifically designates or describes the
residence of the petitioner as the place to be searched. Incidentally, the
items were seized by a barangay tanod in a nipa hut, 20 meters away from
the residence of the petitioner. The confiscated items, having been found in a
place other than the one described in the search warrant, can be considered
as fruits of an invalid warrantless search, the presentation of which as an
evidence is a violation of petitioner's constitutional guaranty against
unreasonable searches and seizure. The OSG argues that, assuming that the
items seized were found in another place not designated in the search
warrant, the same items should still be admissible as evidence because the
one who discovered them was a barangay tanod who is a private individual,
the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure being
applicable only against government authorities. The contention is devoid of
merit.
It was testified to during trial by the police officers who effected the search
warrant that they asked the assistance of the barangay tanods, thus, in the
testimony of SPO3 Masnayon:

Fiscal Centino:
Q For how long did the chase take place?
A Just a very few moments.

Q After that, what did you [do] when you were not able to reach him?
A I watched his shop and then I requested my men to get a barangay tanod.

Q Were you able to get a barangay tanod?

A Yes.

Q Can you tell us what is the name of the barangay tanod?

A Nelson Gonzalado.

Q For point of clarification, how many barangay tanod [did] your driver get?
A Two.

Q What happened after that?

A We searched the house, but we found negative.

Q Who proceeded to the second floor of the house?

A SPO1 Cirilo Pogoso and Milo Areola went upstairs and found nothing.

Q What about you, where were you?

A I [was] watching his shop and I was with Matillano.

Q What about the barangay tanod?

A Together with Milo and Pogoso.

Q When the search at the second floor of the house yielded negative
what did you do?
A They went downstairs because I was suspicious of his shop
because he ran from his shop, so we searched his shop.

Q Who were with you when you searched the shop?

A The barangay tanod Nilo Gonzalado, the elder sister of Ruben del
Castillo named Dolly del Castillo.

Q You mean to say, that when (sic) SPO1 Reynaldo Matillano,

Barangay Tanod Nilo Gonzalado and the elder sister of Ruben del
Castillo were together in the shop?
A Yes.

Q What happened at the shop?

A One of the barangay tanods was able to pick up white folded
paper.

Q What [were] the contents of that white folded paper?

A A plastic pack containing white crystalline.

Q Was that the only item?

A There are others like the foil, scissor.

Q Were you present when those persons found those tin foil and others
inside the electric shop?
A Yes.[21]
The fact that no items were seized in the residence of petitioner and that the
items that were actually seized were found in another structure by
a barangay tanod, was corroborated by PO2 Arriola, thus:

FISCAL:

Q So, upon arriving at the house of Ruben del Castillo alias Boy, can you still
recall what took place?
A We cordoned the area.

Q And after you cordoned the area, did anything happen?

A We waited for the barangay tanod.

Q And did the barangay tanod eventually appear?

A Yes. And then we started our search in the presence of Ruben del Castillo's
wife.

Q What is the name of the wife of Ruben del Castillo?

A I cannot recall her name, but if I see her I can recall [her] face.

Q What about Ruben del Castillo, was she around when [you] conducted the
search?
A No. Ruben was not in the house. But our team leader, team mate
Bienvenido Masnayon saw that Ruben ran away from his adjacent electronic
shop near his house, in front of his house.

Q Did you find anything during the search in the house of Ruben del Castillo?
A After our search in the house, we did not see anything. The house was
clean.

Q What did you do afterwards, if any?

A We left (sic) out of the house and proceeded to his electronic shop.

Q Do you know the reason why you proceeded to his electronic shop?
A Yes. Because our team leader Bienvenido Masnayon saw that (sic) Ruben
run from that store and furthermore the door was open.

Q How far is the electronic shop from the house of Ruben del Castillo?
A More or less, 5 to 6 meters in front of his house.

xxxx

Q So, who entered inside the electronic shop?

A The one who first entered the electronic shop is our team leader
Bienvenido Masnayon.

Q You mentioned that Masnayon entered first. Do you mean to say that there
were other persons or other person that followed after Masnayon?
A Then we followed suit.

Q All of your police officers and the barangay tanod followed suit?
A I led Otadoy and the barangay tanod.

Q What about you?

A I also followed suit.

Q And did anything happen inside the shop of Ruben del Castillo?
A It was the barangay tanod who saw the folded paper and I saw
him open the folded paper which contained four shabu deck.

Q How far were you when you saw the folded paper and the tanod open the
folded paper?
A We were side by side because the shop was very small.[22]

SPO1 Pogoso also testified on the same matter, thus:

FISCAL CENTINO:

Q And where did you conduct the search, Mr. Witness?

A At his residence, the two-storey house.

Q Among the three policemen, who were with you in conducting the search
at the residence of the accused?
A I, Bienvenido Masnayon.

Q And what transpired after you searched the house of Ruben del Castillo?
A Negative, no shabu.

Q And what happened afterwards, if any?

A We went downstairs and proceeded to the small house.

Q Can you please describe to this Honorable Court, what was that small
house which you proceeded to?
A It is a nipa hut.

Q And more or less, how far or near was it from the house of Ruben del
Castillo?
A 5 to 10 meters.

Q And could you tell Mr. Witness, what was that nipa hut supposed to be?
A That was the electronic shop of Ruben del Castillo.

Q And what happened when your team proceeded to the nipa hut?
A I was just outside the nipa hut.

Q And who among the team went inside?

A PO2 Milo Areola and the Barangay Tanod.[23]

Having been established that the assistance of the barangay tanods was
sought by the police authorities who effected the searched warrant, the
same barangay tanodstherefore acted as agents of persons in
authority. Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code defines persons in authority
and agents of persons in authority as:

x x x any person directly vested with jurisdiction, whether as an individual or

as a member of some court or governmental corporation, board or
commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A barangay captain and
a barangay chairman shall also be deemed a person in authority.
A person who, by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by
competent authority, is charged with the maintenance of public order
and the protection and security of life and property, such as barrio
councilman, barrio policeman and barangay leader, and any person
who comes to the aid of persons in authority, shall be deemed an
agent of a person in authority.

The Local Government Code also contains a provision which describes the
function of a barangay tanod as an agent of persons in authority. Section 388
of the Local Government Code reads:

SEC. 388. Persons in Authority. - For purposes of the Revised Penal Code, the
punong barangay, sangguniang barangay members, and members of the
lupong tagapamayapa in each barangay shall be deemed as persons in
authority in their jurisdictions, while other barangay officials and
members who may be designated by law or ordinance and charged
with the maintenance of public order, protection and security of life
and property, or the maintenance of a desirable and balanced
environment, and any barangay member who comes to the aid of
persons in authority, shall be deemed agents of persons in
authority.

By virtue of the above provisions, the police officers, as well as the barangay
tanods were acting as agents of a person in authority during the conduct of
the search. Thus, the search conducted was unreasonable and the
confiscated items are inadmissible in evidence. Assuming ex gratia
argumenti that the barangay tanod who found the confiscated items is
considered a private individual, thus, making the same items admissible in
evidence, petitioner's third argument that the prosecution failed to establish
constructive possession of the regulated drugs seized, would still be
meritorious.

Appellate courts will generally not disturb the factual findings of the trial
court since the latter has the unique opportunity to weigh conflicting
testimonies, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their
deportment and manner of testifying,[24] unless attended with arbitrariness or
plain disregard of pertinent facts or circumstances, the factual findings are
accorded the highest degree of respect on appeal[25] as in the present case.

It must be put into emphasis that this present case is about the violation of
Section 16 of R.A. 6425. In every prosecution for the illegal possession
of shabu, the following essential elements must be established: (a) the
accused is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the person is not
authorized by law or by duly constituted authorities; and (c) the accused has
knowledge that the said drug is a regulated drug.[26]

In People v. Tira,[27] this Court explained the concept of possession of

regulated drugs, to wit:

This crime is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent is not an

essential element. However, the prosecution must prove that the
accused had the intent to possess (animus posidendi) the drugs.
Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also
constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in the
immediate physical possession or control of the accused. On the other hand,
constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and
control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and
control over the place where it is found. Exclusive possession or control is not
necessary. The accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise
control and dominion over the place where the contraband is located, is
shared with another.[28]

While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized

should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is
issued, there must be sufficient showing that the property is under
appellants control or possession.[29] The CA, in its Decision, referred to
the possession of regulated drugs by the petitioner as a constructive one.
Constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and
control of the accused or when he has the right to exercise dominion and
control over the place where it is found.[30] The records are void of any
evidence to show that petitioner owns the nipa hut in question nor was it
established that he used the said structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as the
CA, merely presumed that petitioner used the said structure due to the
presence of electrical materials, the petitioner being an electrician by
profession. The CA, in its Decision, noted a resolution by the investigating
prosecutor, thus:

x x x As admitted by respondent's wife, her husband is an electrician by

occupation. As such, conclusion could be arrived at that the structure, which
housed the electrical equipments is actually used by the respondent. Being
the case, he has control of the things found in said structure.[31]

In addition, the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution do not also
provide proof as to the ownership of the structure where the seized articles
were found.During their direct testimonies, they just said, without stating
their basis, that the same structure was the shop of petitioner.[32] During the
direct testimony of SPO1 Pogoso, he even outrightly concluded that the
electrical shop/nipa hut was owned by petitioner, thus:

FISCAL CENTINO:

Q Can you please describe to this Honorable Court, what was that small
house which you proceeded to?
A It is a nipa hut.

Q And more or less, how far or near was it from the house of Ruben del
Castillo?
A 5 to 10 meters.

Q And could you tell Mr. Witness, what was that nipa hut supposed
to be?
A That was the electronic shop of Ruben del Castillo.

Q And what happened when your team proceeded to the nipa hut?
A I was just outside the nipa hut.[33]
However, during cross-examination, SPO3 Masnayon admitted that there was
an electrical shop but denied what he said in his earlier testimony that it was
owned by petitioner, thus:

ATTY. DAYANDAYAN:
Q You testified that Ruben del Castillo has an electrical shop, is that
correct?
A He came out of an electrical shop. I did not say that he owns the
shop.

Q Now, this shop is within a structure?

A Yes.

Q How big is the structure?

A It is quite a big structure, because at the other side is a mahjong den and
at the other side is a structure rented by a couple.[34]

The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge of

the existence and presence of the drugs in the place under his
control and dominion and the character of the drugs.[35] With the
prosecution's failure to prove that the nipa hut was under
petitioner's control and dominion, there casts a reasonable doubt as
to his guilt. In considering a criminal case, it is critical to start with the
law's own starting perspective on the status of the accused - in all criminal
prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary
is proven beyond reasonable doubt.[36] Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or
that quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would
convince and satisfy the conscience of those who act in judgment, is
indispensable to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence.[37]

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G. R. No. 27819, which affirmed the Decision dated March 14, 2003 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Cebu, in Criminal Case No. CBU-46291 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Ruben del
Castillo is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.