Alison Assiter (1984) Althusser and Structuralism

Althusser and Structuralism
Author(s): Alison Assiter

Source: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 35, No. 2 (Jun., 1984), pp. 272-296
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Alison Assiter
Althusser and structuralism
SUMMARY
'Structure', social structure' and, recently, 'structuralism ' are

terms that are frequently used in sociology. Louis Althusser's
work is often mentionedas being both structuralistand Marxist.
In this article I first raise, and attempt to answer,the question:
'Whatis structuralism?',and then I go on to arguethat Althusser
is not both structuralistand Marxistsimultaneously.I conclude,
therefore, that, at least as far as Althusser'swork is concerned-
and his writingsare often takento be paradigmaticof structuralist
Marxism- it is misleadingto lump together structuralismand
Marxism.
The terms 'structure'and 'social structure'are widely used in soci-

ology and have been since Spencerintroducedthe term 'structure'
into the field in the nineteenthcentury. Relativelyrecently, under
the influenceof Frenchworkin linguistics,a new term 'structuralism'
has appearedin the writingsof practitionersof the discipline.Indeed,
ErnestGellnerwrote, in 1970: 'a spectreis hauntingthe intellectual
scene - structuralism,or better "le structuralisme". ,l It may be
fashionableto use the term, but its meaningis rarely explained.I
shouldlike to raise,in thispaper,arsdattemptto answer,the question:
'Whatis this spectre,or what is structuralism?'
One individualwhose work is often cited, in texts on sociological
theory, and elsewhere, as both structuralistand Marxist,is Louis
Althusser.2Indeed, the writingsof Althusserare sometimestakento
be exemplary,indeed paradigmaticof 'structuralist'Marxism.Thisis
despite Althusser'sown refusal to apply the label 'structuralist'to
his work: 'Webelieve that despite the terminologicalambiguity,the
profoundtendencyof our texts wasnot attachedto the "structuralist"
ideology.'3 I shall argue,here, that there are sometimesreasonsfor
describingAlthusser'swork as structuralist.Undeniably,too, he is
often dealingwith Marxianthemes. But, I shallclaim,he is not both
TheBritishJournalof Sociology VolumeXXXV Number2 June 1984
272

Althusserand structuralism 273
structuralistand Marxistsimultaneously.I shall also suggest that

Althusser's structuralism sometimes prevents him from solving
problemshe poses in the interpretationof historicalmaterialism.
It is misleading,therefore, as least as far as the work of Louis
Althusseris concerned,to lump togetherstructuralismand Marxism.
Sometimes, where Althusser is most clearly a structuralist,his
structuralismproduces theses which make some of Marx's ideas
nonsensical. Structuralismmay perhaps have something to offer
sociologists, and so might Marxism,but, in so faras we take Marx's
work as exemplary,the juxtapositionof the two can givenothingto
anybody.
THE BACKGROUND
In the literature, one finds a number of different definitions of

structuralism.Many of these would probablybe denouncedby those
who might, for other reasons,wish to call themselves'structuralist'.
Thereare structuralisttheoriesin mathematicallogic, philosophyof
science,4in biology, in anthropology,in linguistics,in sociology.
Piaget suggeststhat 'structuralism' has slightly differentsenses in
each of these variousareas.He describesit generallyas a theory that
dealsin self sufficientand self regulatingwholes.But,in mathematics,
it is opposed to 'compartmentalism'-it dealsin wholesratherthan
in isolated elements; in linguistics, it representsa departurefrom
diachronicstudies of isolated linguisticphenomenato a synchronic
study of unified linguisticsystems (in other words, it moves from a
study of the variationin linguisticunits over time to a comparative
analysisof differentlanguagesat any one point in time). In psychol-
ogy, structuralismis contrastedwith atomism;and in philosophyit is
opposedto historicism.
The varietyin types of structuralismand in areasof its application
has causedA. L. Kroebezto say this:
'Structure'appearsto bejust yieldingto a word that has a perfectly

good meaningbut suddenly becomes fashionablyattractive. . .
everythingthat is not wholly amorphoushas a structure. . . what
'structure'adds to the meaningof our phraseseemsto be nothing,
except to providea degreeof pleasantpuzzlement.S
MiriamGlucksmannderivesthe word 'structure'from the Latin
'structurasfrom 'struere':to construct.6Accordingto her:
Its meaningwas exclusivelyarchitecturaluntil the 17th century
when its use was extended to the study of anatomyand grammar.
The arrangementof the organsof the body came to be viewedas a

274 Alison Assiter
kind of construction,and languagewas understoodas the arrange-

ment of wordsin speechhavinga 'structured'character.7
In the nineteenthcentury,she tells us, the termwas introducedfrom

biology to the new 'sciencesof man'by HerbertSpencer.
Originally,then, the term referredto a propertyof somethingor
the way somethingis constructed.A structurewas an abstractprop-
erty of somethingelse: somethingpossessedby somethingelse. And
for what it is worth, this sense accords with some contemporary
Englishusage-buildings havestructure,argumentshavea structure.
One could not have an argumentor a buildingwithout a structure:
their structuresare part of what makesthem buildingsor arguments.
On the other hand, the buildingor the argumentis not to be identi-
fied with its structure-without a structurethereis no building,but
the buildingand its structureare not one and the same. They are
both instantiatedin the same object; one is a propertyof the other.
Structure,however, is not attached to particularthingsin the way
that, say, being made up of a collection of bricksis a propertyof a
particularhouse. Get rid of all the bricksand you have destroyedthe
house, but replacingthe bricks and rebuildingthe house leaves the
structureof the buildingintact.
Whateverelse an analysis of a randomselection of cases might
reveal about structure,it tells us this: structureseems not to be a
thing in its own right. A. Schaff sharesthis view. Accordingto him,
originallya structurewas a structureof something:'The way those
elements are interconnectedwithin a given system, i.e. the totality
of the relationsamong them, is termeda structureof that system.'8
A system was 'a whole consistingof elementsbearingsuch a relation
to one anotherthata changein the positionof one resultsin a change
in the position of the rest.'9 Therecould be no structurewithout a
system andvice versa.Schaffinformsus that de Saussure-according
to many,one of the mainstructuralists-did not use the term 'struc-
ture' at all, but only system. A system, then, is a kind of entity-an
abstract entity - and a structure is one of its properties. Some
scientistsaim, in theirwork, to uncoverthe structureof a system.
But Schaff goes on to say that 'structure'is also used to mean
'system': something which has a specified structure. This usage,
indeed, is common amongstrecentstructuralists-particularlythose
in the Frenchschool (see LeviStrauss,Barthesand Althusserhimself)
and also amongst commentatorson this school and others.l This
usage, then, has become commonplacein the literature.So thereis a
quite specificambiguityin the meaningof the term.
Theremaynot be anyset of featureswhichall 'structuralists' would
uphold, but is there a collection of views which would entitle us to
put them all togetherin a school? A. Schaff lists the followingfour
characteristicswhich form, he suggests,an intellectualtrend: first,

Al thusser and s truc turalism 275
structuralistsapproach the subject matter of their research as a

specific whole which dominatesall its elements.They are criticalof
atomism, where things are studiedas discreteparts of an aggregate,
and where wholes are no more than the sum of their parts. The
whole, accordingto the structuralist,formsa systemwhose elements
are interconnectedand where the structureof the whole determines
the position of each element.Second,structuralistsbelievethat every
system has a structure:the task of science is to find out what that
structureis. And third,structuralistsare interestedin 'morphological'
or 'structural' laws.Thelawsdeal not in changesbut with co-existence.
They thereforetend towardshavinga static approachto facts. And,
finally, most structuralistswould not deny that the dynamicor the
diachronicis importantin science, but they would say that this is
wholly complementaryto synchronicanalysis.
Those are four featureslisted by Schaff. Thereis a fifth we might
mention, one which figuresin C. Sumneras the definingfeatureof
structuralism,and that is to see 'structures'as the real thingswhich
underlie the appearances,and which are usuallyopaque to the eye.
Sumner: 'Structuralismis a method which examinesphenomenaas
the outward expressionsof their inner, invisiblestructures.'ll And
for this featuresee also Keat and Urry.l2
Let us see how these propertiesof structuralismare exemplifiedin
those who apply the label to their work. The first featureof struc-
turalismappearsin Saussure'sdescriptionof the functionof language.
Languagehe characterizes as a system of signs.13 Collectionsof noises
count as languageonly when they serveto expressor communicate
ideas; and to communicateideas, they must be part of a system of
conventions:a system of signs. A sign is a union of a 'form which
signifies' - a signifier;and the idea signified. (Philosophersmight
label these, respectively,the word and the concept-although they
might say that, as it stands,Saussure'sclaimdoes not distinguishthe
'referent'of the sign-what it picks out, from its sense;what Frege
describedas the 'mode of presentation'of the sign.)l4 The linguistic
sign, for Saussure,is arbitrary:there is no naturallink between the
signifierand the signified.Thereis no link, for instance,betweenthe
soundof the signand its signification,and signschangetheirmeanings
-for instance,a 'silly'personwas once happy,blessedand pious.
Signifiersare not autonomous,but they are defined by theirrela-
tions with other membersof the system.Whatgivesthe word'brown'
its identityis not anythingintrinsicto it, but its differencefrom other
colour words. The identity of the sign consists in its place in the
system ot slgnl:lers.
^ . . ..
And the first of the outlined featuresof structuralismis apparent

in Levi-Strauss,who perceivesceremonies,rites, methodsof cooking
not as discreteentities but in terms of the contrastiverelationsthey
bear to each other. 'Like phonemes, kinshipterms are elementsof

Assiter
Alivon
276
meaning only if they are
meaning;like phonemes, they acquire for him then 'are of
integratedinto systems.15 Kinship terms, italics)Each
(Levi-Strauss'
sametype as linguisticphenomena'.l6
the of the total
system-kinship, food etc. containsa partialexpression
culture. in Levi-Strauss. Accordingto him,
Thefifth featureis apparenttoo
which moves fromconsciouslin-
are to use structurallinguistics,
we infrastructures,in the study
phenomenato their unconscious
guistic
ofkinshipsystems.
Saussureas a distinctionbetween
This fifth featureappearsin de signsunderlyingeverydayspeech
langue-the systemof linguistic 'We must take la langue as our
la
patterns,and the latter: le parole. normof all other manifesta-
of departureand use langueas the
point structuralismis apparentalso in
of language.'l7This aspect ofBarthes
tions lie in the 'garment'system
thework of Barthes.Examplesin semiology,food is not just that
andin the 'food' system. In Barthes' signify.l8 Withinthis system,
which
butis also a system of signs find de Saussure'slangueon the one
to Barthes,one can
according exclusion (alimentarytaboos); (ii)
hand-it is made of '(i) rules of the type of which remainsto be
signifying oppositions of units, (iii) rules of
determined (for instance, the type savoury/sweet);
of a dish) or successive
association, either simultaneous(at the level italics) One finds also,
(Barthes's
atthe level of the menu etc.'l9'parole'.So the menu, for Barthes,
withinthe system, de Saussure's meaning in the way that sentencesdo.
isa kind of language, and has And
meaning of a menu has to be 'read'from variousmenus.
The of some structuralisms- partic-
herewe uncover another featureway in which the 'real essence' is
ularlysemiologicalones -that with the 'appearance'.For Barthes,
uncoveredfrom an aquaintance has a 'code of significance'like a
a menu, or a system of clothing menu has a structuredeterminingby
the
language has a grammar. The
structure is to be extracted be
nature of possible menus. This structure of the menu may not
'reading'the menu. Thus the actual menus;for they present the
transparentlyrecoverablefrom As in the hermeneutictradi-
structureonly partially,or opaquely. structuresof systemsfrom only
tion, one may have to reconstruct
partialevidence.20 common to most structuralisms
We have uncoveredfive features in semiologicalstructuralism.
and a sixth which appearsparticularlylanguageand other 'signsystems'
is
In the latterthe analogybetween furnituAe
taken to be important.Foras Barthes,menus, car systems,
havemeaning.
systems2lhavemeaningjust languages Althusser's structuralism,I should
Before proceedingto discuss one mightlevelagainststructural-
just like to mentiona few criticisms
ism as so farpresented.

CRITICISMS
De Saussure,for instance, emphasizesthat elements in a language

should be combined,but it could be said to be a failingthat he does
not offer detailedremarkson the way in which this combinationis
to be effected: on how individualwords combine to form sentences
and how sentencesformlanguages.Morerecentlinguistsand logicians,
e.g. Chomskyand D. Davidsonhave stressedthe importanceof rules
governingthe combinationof units in a languageand have offered
detailedaccountsof the way the ruleswork.
A moredetailedcriticismmightbe presentedof thosestructuralists
-the semiologists-who extend the idea of a sign system outside
the realm of language.Saussurehimself envisagedthis extension of
his thinking.He said: 'A science that studies the life of signs within
society is conceivable;it would be a part of social psychology . . . I
shall call it semiology (from Greeksemeion 'sign'). 2 In the workof
Levi-Strauss,as we have seen, anthropologycame to be seen as a
branchof semiology;and with Barthesall sorts of aspects of reality
- traffic light systems, furnituresystems, menus etc. are seen as
havingmeaningin the way that languagesdo. They are said to have
structureand are supposedto be able to be used to convey informa-
tion of some kind. But it is a little difficult to see how the analogy
can work.Whateverstructurea menuhas is without semanticimport.
A menu does not have a grammar;it does not have a way of deter-
miningthe contributionof the meaningsof the partsto the meaning
of the whole. And hence therecanbe no way of determiningwhether
or not unactualizedmenus are legitimateaccordingto the structure.
The problemof how it is that a person can produceinfinitelymany
sentences on the basis of a knowledgeof a finite numberof partsis
one that occupied Chomskyand also Davidson.23In other words,
they were concernedto show how a knowledgeof the 'structure'of
language-for Chomskythe rulesof syntax, innatein the mind,and
for Davidsona knowledgeof the meaningsof the partsof a language
together with an understandingof the 'logical' rules building up
wholes fromparts-yields the possibilityof distinguishing meaningful
from meaninglessunutteredsentences.But there can be no such pro-
cedurein the case of a menu. Any proposedstructureis arbitraryin
a strongerthan Saussureansense-it is not limitedas is languageby
the constraintof the possibilityof communication.Some unuttered
sentencesmust be ruledout on the groundsthat they haveno seman-
tic import; ultimately they cannot be used to say anything. But,
though some meals may be ruled out as inedible, this will not be
becauseof the structureof any menu. A menu may havea perfectly
acceptable structureand the meal still be inedible;alternativelythe
menu may appearto have no acceptablestructureat all yet the meal
could be very tasty.

278 Alison Assiter
It appears, then, that there are difficulties with some sorts of

structuralism,and particularlywith those of the semiologicalvariety.
I proposenow to go on to discussAlthusserand structuralism.
ALTHUSSER AND STRUCTURALISM
Althusserupholdsenoughof the thesesI haveidentifiedto be labelled

a 'structuralist'.He dislikesempiricismand emphasizes'totalities',24
the 'structure a d ominante 25 and 'complexwholes. 26 Theseentities
are not separablefrom the elements they compose27nor are they
nothing but the sum of their parts-they are elements:relationsof
production, forces of production etc. connected in specific ways.
Indeed the natureof eachpartof the whole is determinedby its role
in the totality. Economicpractice,for example,does not exist on its
own but only as partof the 'complexstructure'.
Althusser and the first prtnciple of structuralism I shouldlike now to

describein more detail the way in whichAlthusser's'totality'fits or
fails to fit the first outlined feature of structuralism.I shalldescribe
the type of totality of which he is critical;and I shall drawon the
ideas of a thinker whom he acknowledgesas havinginfluencedhis
views in this area:Spinoza.ThenI'll ask whetheror not it tallieswith
the other outlined properties of structuralism.k discussingeach
feature, I shall raise the question whetherAlthusser'spicturecan be
appliedto that of Marx.
Societyor at leastsomeabstractionfromit is describedby Althusser
as a 'complexwhole' which has '. . . the unity of a structurearticu-
lated in dominance.'28He contraststhis whole with the CHegelian'
totality and the type of totality assumedby Cmechanistic material-
ists.'29 He believes that these two mistakenpositions derive from
common presuppositions.What is common to the two viewpoints,
and the respect in which they areboth wrong,is theirbelief that one
can 'readoff' an understandingof the essenceof some phenomenon
by looking at its appearances.(Thisdoctrineappearsin 'empiricism',
the view from which Althusserderives Cmechanical' materialismas
'abstractionism',and it appearsin Hegelas the theory that the events
in historyareto be treatedas manifestationsof the Idea.)
Althusserclaims that he and Hegelhavein commonthe use of the
word 'totality'30but that the conceptionsto whichthe wordrefersin
each case arevastlydifferent.TheHegeliantotalityis 'simple';3levery
Cconcrete difference'featuredin (it) for examplecivilsociety,the state,
religion,philosophyetc, is 'negatedas soon as (it is) affirmed.'32
In Hegel,accordingto Althusser;
(all the concrete differencesare) no more than 'moments'of the

simple internal principle of the totality, which fulfils itself by

negatingthe alienated difference that it posed; furtheras aliena-
tions - phenomena - of the simple internal principle, these
differences are all equally 'indifferent',
that is practicallyequal
besideit ... and thereforeequalto one another....33 (Althusser's
italics)
In Hegel'sPhilosophyof Right,to givean example,the State is dealt
with only in so far as it pertainsto the courseof developmentof the
Idea.34
In contrastwith the Hegelian'totality', it looks as though Althus-
ser's 'whole' fits tenet one of structuralism.His totality, his abstract
model of society, is a 'complex' one 'structured-in-dominance'. It
contains four levels or elements, each of which is itself structured
and is describedby Althusseras a 'practice'.Practicein generalhe
characterizesas
any process of transformation of a determinategivenraw material
into a determinate product, a transformationeffected by a
determinatehumanlabour,using determinatemeans (of 'produc-
tion').35 (Althusser'sitalics)
There are four types of practice going to make up the totality:
economic practice, political, ideological and theoretical practice.
Economic practice is the practice of producinguse-valuesby the
activity of men and women working with means of productionin
production relations.36Political practice is that one organizedon
the basis of historical materialism,and which transformsits raw
material -social relations -into new ones.37 Ideologicalpractice
transforms its object - people's consciousness. And theoretical
practicetakes two forms: on the one handit is 'ideological'theoret-
ical practice-the forms that go to make up the pre-historyof a
science and their philosophies;and on the other it is 'scientific
theoretical practice'. The term 'Social practice', then, coversall of
these types. Althussertells us that every 'simplecategory'e.g. labour
or productionpresupposesthe structuredwhole of society.38
Now I believe that Althusseris conflatingtwo typesof explanation
here. He confuses a logical connection between two things with a
factual -in this case historical-relation between them. He says
that every 'simple category'presupposesthe existence of the struc-
tured whole of society. One might interpret'presuppose'here either
in a logical or in a factual historicalmanner.Viewed in the former
way, Althusser'sview is structuralistand conformswith the thinking
of his mentor, Spinoza. It is also compatiblewith his sympathetic
reference to Marx'scritique of the concept 'production-in-general'.
However, Althusser'sview, on this reading, does not allow us to

Assiter
Alison
280
Understoodin the
makesense of other aspects of Marx'sthought. of some examplesof
fashion, Althusser'spicturemakes sense
latter presentsin favourof
Marxand of the actual evidencehe, Althusser, Althusser not a struc-
only is
picture. Seen like this, however,not
his not fit with the ideas
by criterionone, but his thinking does
turalist with a rather boring
Spinoza.Moreover,his ideas are compatible
of quite definitely out of
of 'production-in-general' which is
reading Althusser'sstructural-
tuneuith Marx'scritiqueof the concept. So but not to another,
ismconforms to one part of Marx's thinking
failsto fit a different
wherehe is not a structuralist,his thinking
while to those of his
In addition, his ideas do not then conform
Marx.
mentor Spinoza.
AlthusserdescribesSpinozaas
daringto pose
the only theoreticianwho had the unprecedented
elementsof a whole by
(the problemof the determinationof the first solutionto it....39
the structureof the whole) and outline a
bringinto the open the
Let us look brieSy at Spinozain order to to light the conflict
pointsof similaritybetweenthe two and to bring
inAlthusser'sthinking. a worm livinginside the
In a letter, Spinoza paints a picture of worm,he suggests,each
bloodstream. From the point of view of the
and not part of a total
dropof blood appearsto be independent of each drop of blood
system.But in fact, says Spinoza,the nature
only in the context
andof the bloodstreamitself can be understood of which the blood-
ofa largersystem. The nature of the system
before one can identify each
streamis a part must be understood the system as a whole
dropletof blood. Similarly,in any system, the part. The natureof
mustbe graspedbefore one can understand system.40
thepart is determinedby its role in the whole is somethinghe refers
The 'whole' in which Spinozais interested these beingtwo namesfor
to as 'Godor Nature'(or God and Nature; whichhe definesas
thesamething).41The whole is a substance,
through itself: in other
that which is in itself and is conceivednot need the conception
words that the conception of which does
of anotherthingfrom whichit must be formed.42
as 'that which the
Substances'have' attributes,which are definedits essence'.43Attri-
intellect perceivesof substanceas constituting a substance,ratherthey
butes, D. F. Hallett says, do not 'inherein attributingsomethingto
constitute its essence.44Any proposition45
of that substance.Since
a substancewill be exhibiting the essence a necessary truth. Spinoza
each proposition is doing this it will be propositions.As Macyntre
doesnot acceptthe existenceof contingent

Althusserand structuralism
puts it: '(Spinoza)fail(s) to distinguishthe identifylngfrom the des- 281
cribing functions of expressions,he cannot distinguishbetween a
substance incorrectly identified and a substance incorrectly des-
cribed'.46All truths,for Spinoza,then, arenecessarytruths.
So, revertingto the example of the worm and the bloodstream,
if the drop of blood is an attributeof the bloodstreamin accordance
with definition 4 (though this is open to question,in fact, since the
bloodstreamwouldnot be a Spinozist'substance'and even supposing
it were, the drop of blood may not be one of its essentialattributes)
then the drop of blood 'presupposes'the bloodstreamin a very
special sense: propositionsassertingof the drop of blood that it is
'in' the bloodstreamwill be necessarilytrue, and the proposition
'that'sa drop of blood' will be deductivelyrelatedto the proposition:
'that's the bloodstream'.
Returningnow to Althusser,if we interprethis claimto the effect
that every 'simple category'presupposesthe existence of the struc-
turedwhole of society in Spinozistfashion,we have to say that every
proposition expressinga relationbetween the social whole and one
of its elementswill be a necessarytruth. But, it is difficult to think
of examples which make sense in this light. Some of Althusser's
examples, following Marx, of simple categories are 'labour'and
'exchange'. Of the first, he says, 'the individualproducer - the
individualas the subject of productiononly appearedin developed
capitalistsociety.' Here,individualeconomicactivitypresupposesthe
existence of capitalistsociety. And, of exchange,he says, quoting
Marx,that it 'did not appearhistoricallyin all its intensityuntil the
most developedstates of society.'47He concludes,then, that 'it is the
structuredwhole which gives its meaningto the simple category.'48
Can one say that Althusserreally means that all descriptionsof ex-
change entail descriptionsof society? Thiswouldbe a highlyimplaus-
ible claim,and would not be what Marxintended.
Perhaps,rather than using quite this strong Spinozist sense of
'presuppose' Althusser means something weaker. According to
P. F. Strawson:
( ) a statementS presupposesa statementS' in the sensethat the

truth of S' is a preconditionof the truth or falsity of S.... This
is the relationbetween the statementthat all John's childrenare
asleep (S) and the statement that John has children,that there
exist childrenof John's (S').49
Similarlywe could say 'an act of exchangehas taken place (S) and
'a society exists' (S'). As in the first case, the truth of S' is a precon-
dition of the truth or falsity of S. But our secondcase is not so clear-
cut as is that of Strawson.Wecan only get the appropriaterelationif
we build in the requiredassumption-namely that exchangescannot

282 Alason Assiter
take place outside of society. If society is defined in such a way as

to make it true by definition that exchangestake place in it, the
relationholds, but only in a trivialsense.So, if we interpretAlthusser
in Spinozist fashion, as he apparentlywishes us to do, we cannot
make much sense of the particularexampleshe offers us of 'simple
categories'presupposingthe existence of the structuredwhole. We
could on a Spinozist readingof Althusser,however,make sense of
Althusser'ssympatheticreferenceto Marx'scritiqueof 'production-
in-general'.Production,on the Spinozistreadingof Althusser,would
be more like a large particularthing-more like Spinoza'sGod or
Nature-than like a concept. It would not be somethingof which
particularproductions' were instances. Rather, particularacts of
production would be simply exemplificationsof 'production'.In
producing a part of a car in the capitalistmode of production, I
would be simplyexemplifyingproductionfor exchangevalue.
So there is a way of makingAlthussera structuralistby criterion
one, but though this readingof him allows us to give a certainkind
of meaningto one idea of Marx's,it does not make much sense of
some of the examplesfromMarxAlthusserhimselfcites.
These examples are made more intelligibleif we interpret 'pre-
suppose' in 'simple categoriespresupposesociety' in an historical
fashion. As a matter of historicalfact, exchangeandproductiondid
not appearoutside of society-they presupposesociety only in this
weak sense. Althusserhimselfappearsto readthe examplesthis way.
But, seen in this light, they do not of coursejustify any connection
with KSpinoza. Reading them this way, indeed, is compatiblewith
referringto production-in-general' as Althussersometimesseems to
want to, as a generalconcept, which has instances.'Production'in
'productionpresupposessociety' is a particularcase of the concept
production-in-general '. It is conceivable(thoughunlikely) that there
are other types of productionoccurringoutsidesociety.
So, the answer to the question: 'is Althussera structuralistby
criterionone?' is 'yes and no'. If he is reada la Spinoza,he is a struc-
turalist,but his own examplesfromMarx,then, makeno sense. And
if he is not readthroughthe eyes of his mentor,he is not a structural-
ist. In such circumstances,however,Althusserfails to do justice to
anothertheme of Marx.
THE SECOND CRITERION FOR STRUCTURALISM
Whatabout the second criterionfor being a structuralist?Althusser

occasionallymentionsthe word 'system'and describesit as havinga
structure,Sso at least sometimeshe is a structuralistby this tenet.
He does not discusslaws of co-existence(at least not by that name)
instead he emphasizesthe particulartype of causation'metonymic

causality' which is characteristicof his structuralism.But in fact, 283
what he actuallymeansby 'cause'may be morelike what othershave
characterizedas 'co-existence'.So he may indeed be a structuralist
by the third criterion.Let us have a look at Althusser'sconcept of
causation in order to see whether he is a structuralistin the third
sense.
Althusserand causationAs vvithhis pictureof the natureof the total-
ity, here too Althusseris influencedby Spinoza. In discussingthe
relationshipof the structureto its elements,Althusserrefers to the
latter. He says:
. . . the structureis immanentin its effects, a cause immanentin
its effects in the Spinozistsense of the term, that the whole exas-
tenceof thestructureconsastsin its effects . . .51 (Althusser'sitalics)
Let us look once moreat Spinoza,this time to understandwhathe
meant by cause. The cause of any being, for Spinoza,is that which
makes it what it is. Causesproducetheir effects necessarily.'Froma
given defined cause, an effect necessarilyfollows.... If somethingis
the adequate cause of something else, the latter can be adequately
conceivedthroughthe former.'52
The conception of an effect dependsupon and involvesthe con-
ception of cause. 'x is not the cause of y' entails'y cannot be under-
stood by x'. There is thus a very close connection, for Spinoza,
betweenthe causeof a being(whatmakesit what it is) and the beings'
essential properties. To explain somethingcausally is to show the
necessaryconnection of the essentialpropertiesof a substancewith
the substanceof which they areproperties.Thatis to say, to explain
something causally is to show, of an essentialproperty,that that is
w zat lt lS.
. .
Spinoza'sconception of causalityis in markedcontrastto that of

the person whom many regardto be the primerepresentativeof the
empiricisttradition:DavidHume.Accordingto Hume,the connection
between cause and effect is never necessary;it is alwaysconceivable
that a given cause might be conjoinedwith the negationof its usual
effect.53 Causalrelationsare analysedas regularsuccession of the
effect upon the cause. Not only is the notion of necessaryconrlection
between cause and effect expelled from Hume'sanalysis,but so too
is any idea of causalpower or agency.
In a sense, then, Spinoza'sconception of causalityis more like a
law of co-existencethan like a law of succession:if, for instance,a
table is defined as a body with four legs and a top, then possessing
four legs and a top is necessarilypart of what makes the tablewhat
it is. The legs and the top 'co-exist' in the table. But it would be
harderto understandsuccessivephenomenain this Spinozistlight.

Assiter
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284
of his mentorkSpinoza,
conceptionof causefits thatcriterion
SoAlthusser's
if by three.
he it to, then he is a structuralist
aswants describes as his 'Spinozist' con-
Althusser makesmuch of what he
ceptionof causality.
an essence outside the economic
Thestructure, he says, is not theiraspect,formsand relations
phenomenawhich comes to alter as an absentcause,absentbecause
andwhich is effective on them of the cause in the structure's
it is outside them. The absence is not thefault of the extertor-
'metonymiccausality'on its effects to the economicphenomena;on
ity of the structurewith respectof the interiorityof the structure,
the contrary,it is the veryform italics)
asa structure,in its effects.54 (Althusser's
of a
from this is this: 'the 'essence'
Onething that seemsto emerge appearance, a 'transcend-
structure is not something'underlying'its Rather,for Althusser
realm.
reality distinct from the knowable
ent' overand aboveits appear-
here,the essence of a structureis nothing Of course, it is possible
ance. Essence and appearancecoincide.55 realistAlthusser;56
thatthere is no conflict with the epistemological
but the two may not be seen
essence and appearancemay coincide, be identical,but becauseof
may
tocoincide. Metaphysically,they of their identity. Some-
human limitations,people may unaware
be
relationbetweenthe realand
thing like this was Locke'sview of theThe real essence is the set of
thenominal essence of a substance. set of propertiesby means
properties which causallyaccount for the
identified-the nominalessence.
ofwhich the substanceis normally propertiesof gold would include
its
Forexample, the real essence nominalessencepropertieswould be
atomicnumber,and some of its etc. For most of us, though
itsshiny yellow colour, its malleability
not unknowable.But if we were
God,
realessenceis not known,it isbecome knowableand known and we
realessencepropertieswould connection between real and
wouldbe able to see the necessary realessencepropertiesand those
in
nominalessence. In other words,
thenominalessencewould coincide. the relation between reality and
Does this Lockean reading of in one guise,Althusseris present-
appearancefit Marx,whose views, doctrineof fetishismas a phenomenon
ing?AlthussermentionsMarx's One case of that doctrineis the
forwhichhis pictureis appropriate.57to the cost of reproducingthe
following:really wagesare equivalent
family). Really the labourer cost
works
labourer (and sometimes, his an equivalent in value to the
longerthan is sufficientto produce or she producessurplusvaluefor the
He
of reproducinghim/herself. though the laboureris being given an
capitalist. But it appearsas he or shehascontributedto producing.
equivalentin valueto thatwhich essence and appearancecoincide
Is it appropriateto say that really

285
here, and it just seems to us that they differ?Of course, if we take
appearanceto be equivalentto what Marxdescribedas reality,then
the two will coincide. But Marx-and Althussertoo -wants to
make the point that the capitalist'appearance'is as much 'reality'as
is the one he has analysed.And surelyit is just not true that were we
God - were we to have perfect knowledgeof existing reality, of
capitalist social relations-essence and appearancewould coincide.
The distinction Marx drew attention to, between the essence and
appearanceof the capitalistworld, would not disappearjust through
our coming to understandthe reality-on the contrary,action has
to be takento do awaywith it. In this respect,the distinctionbetween
essence and appearancein Marx'sanalysisof capitalismis absolutely
unlike that, for instance, in a Lockean substance.And, one could
offer a parallelargumentagainstthe Spinozistreadingof Althusser
on cause and the relationbetweenappearanceandrealityfitting this
example from Marx.Marx would have disagreedjust as much with
the Spinozistclaim that appearanceand reality coincide, as he does
with the Lockeanview that really they coincide, but they are not
seen to be the sameby we, limited,beings.
And the emphasison the appearancedisappearinginto the reality
is very differentfrom Althusser'sSpinozistemphasis,which is on the
'structure'or the 'essence'being nothingoutsideits 'effects';in other
words, he seems to want to collapse the distinctionin favourof the
appearance.So it seems that it does not make much sense of the
examplesfrom Marxto describethem as caseswhere'really'essence
and 'appearance'coincide, but it just seemsotherwiseto us, limited,
human beings. It seems then that thereis, indeed,a conflict between
the 'realist'readingof Althusserand the Spinozistreading.
Wherewe take the 'Spinozist'readingof Althusser,then, it is plaus-
ible to say that he is a 'structuralist'by criterionthree. But as in our
discussion of the first property of 'structuralism'so, here, does it
appearthat, to the extent that Althusseris a 'structuralist'he cannot
claimto be analysingMarx.
Perhaps,however, we can get a 'structuralist'readingAlthusser,
by this criterion,one whichis compatiblewith Marx,if we look else-
where in Althusser for an understandingof the way in which he
appliesthe concept of cause.
Cause:anotherattempt Remember that, for kSpinoza,causes and
effects are necessarilyrelated to one another.Thereis anotherim-
portant featureof cause, for him, which on the face of it, appearsto
be in conflict with the necessaryrelationshipbetween the two. This
is that the concept of causeis 'conceivedas action'.58How are these
two ideas reconciledin Spinoza?The answeris that the concept of
activity, here, is that of makingexplicit somethingwhich is already
latently there: it is activity in the sense in which the proof of a

286 Alison Assiter
theoremcould be said to involvethe activityof applyingaxiomsand

rules. The 'effect', the theorem, is producedfrom the 'cause':the
axiomsandrules. So, the cause 'contains'the effect.
It may be that this Spinozist concept of cause is relevant to
Althusser'sconceptionof reading,for Althussersays:
. . . a philosophicalreadingof Capitalis only possibleas the appli-
cation of that whichis the very object of our investigation,Marx's
philosophy.... It is thereforea question of producing,in the
precisesense of the word,whichseemsto signifymakingmanifest
what is latent . . .59
This passageis directlyreminiscentof Spinoza.In orderto under-
stand the way in which the concept of cause has application,we
must examine the theory of reading.Let us look at this theory,and
see whether we can produce an interpretationof Althusser'sstruc-
turalism,in this sense,whichis compatiblewith Marx.
RE ADIN G
The notion of reading, for Althusser,is connected, in some way,

with the questionof the scientificityof what is expressedin Capital:
'We read Capital (in order to pose) the question of scientific dis-
course.60
Readingshould not be 'innocent''thereis no such thing as an in-
nocent reading.'6l'Innocent readings'go along with 'the empiricist
conception of knowledge'.62Althusserdislikes the conception of
knowledge which, in his view, underpinsa technique, and not a
particulartechniqueor particulartechniquesof reading.(One could
of course criticizea techniquewithout criticizingthe view of knowl-
edge underlyingit -one might suggest that a techniqueof for in-
stance placing emphasisupon particularwords when readingEliot's
The WasteLand, fails to do justice to the meaningof the poem.)
Althusser criticizes 'innocent readings'for viewing the relation
between the text and its subjectmatteras an 'expressive'one. This,
as we alreadyknow, is an empiricistway of seeingthe relation.As an
example of an innocentreading,take our readingof Marx'sCapital-
'Whenwe read Marx,we immediatelyfind a reader who reads to us,
and out loud.963 (Althusser'sitalics) When Marx reads to us 'in-
nocently', '(he) readshis predecessorsdiscourse(Smith'sfor instance)
throughhis own discourse.'64Whenhe readsin his way, Marx'stext
is just Smith'swith a few thingsadded.
Althusseris concerned,not with methods of reading,generally,
nor with just any method of readingCapital. He is interestedquite
specificallyin the way to read Capital in orderto understandMarx's

* a
Althusser and structuralism

287
relation to the classical political economists. The question of the
scientificity of historicalmaterialismis seen here as that of Marx's
relation to Smith and Ricardo.So Althussermakescertainassump-
tions about the way of going about answeringthe questionof scien-
tltlClty.
On the faceof thingstherearesomesimilaritiesbetweenAlthusser's
conception of readingand that of Derrida(althoughDerridais, in
Accordingto the latter, the
fact, critical of earlier'structuralisms').
text is a 'de-centredstructure'.65There is an infinite numberof
possible'readings'of a text. Eachact of consumingthe text produces
a differentreadingof it. The text is not a given entity with a fixed
meaning.Rathera particularmeaningis producedby a readingfrom
the 'semioticfield'. The text is, as it were, produced' in the process
of readingor consumingit.
The text, for Althussertoo, is not simply given. Its meaningis
producedby the readingof it. And wherethereare similaritiesthere
are shared difficulties. The text ceases to have any identity-how
does one distinguishKing Lear from The Third Policeman?The
words on the page might produce identical 'readings'of each. But
there are differencesbetween Althusserand Derrida.There may be
an infinity of possiblereadingsof a text for Althusser,as for Derrida,
but for him only one of these resultsin a knowledge.Only one read-
ing of Capitalis correctfrom the viewpoint of uncoveringthe scien-
tificity of historicalmaterialism.
We will see that Althusser'spicture is directly reminiscent of
Spinoza's view of the iproduction'of nature by God: nature is a
necessaryeffect of God's productivity,as the proof of a theoremis
the necessaryeffect of the applicationof axiomsandrules.In Althus-
ser, the text and the theory of scientificityare the necessaryeffects
of a readingof the text. In order to see how this is, we will need to
take a little detour.
LECTURE SYMPTOMATIQUE
Spinoza,accordingto Althusser,gives us the beginningsof a correct

view of reading.Spinozaproposed: '. . . a philosophyof the opacity
of the immediate.66 Spinoza 'linked together (in this way) the
essence of readingand the essence of history in a theory of the dif-
ferencebetween the imaginaryand the true'.67
The correctview of readingis what Althussercalls 'symptomatic':
'lecturesymptomatique'.Onthisconception,we must not understand
Marxas having operatedwith the same assumptionsas the classical
political economistsbut simply to have seen morethan they did, on
those assumptions.We must not readthe texts of Smithand Ricardo
as containinggapswhich Marxfilled in. On the contrary:

Assiter
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288
what classicalpolitical economy does not see, is not what it does

not see, it is what it sees; it is not what it lacks, on the contrary,
it is what it does not lack;it is not what it misses,on the contrary,
itiswhatitdoesnotmiss.68
The oversight,then, is not to see what one sees, the oversight
no longer concernsthe object, but the stght itself.69 (Althusser's
italics)
Sowhat is wrongwith the classicalpoliticaleconomistsis contained and in

intheir texts: what they see, concealswhat they don't see;elimin-
orderto see what they don't see, what they do see had to be
atedfrom the field of visionor at least radicallytransformed.
Consideringthe texts of Smith, Ricardo and Marx, theCapital, theory
Althusser comesup with is as follows; he quotes from Marx's
Chapter XIX, on wages.70Marx,in that passage,is dealingwith the
politicaleconomists'calculationof the valueof labour.Marx
classical how
tellsus that the classicalpolitical economistsbeganby asking
theprice of labouris determined. They recognized that oscillations
only
insupplyand demandcould explainnot the priceof labour,but and
thevariationin price arounda certain norm. As soon as supply
their
demandbalanced,the price of labourno longer dependedon in
action,and mustbe determined by something else. He argues that,
or Adam Smith's 'natural price' or the
theirview, the necessaryprice goods
valueof labour, is determinedby the value of subsistence
necessaryfor the maintenance and reproduction of the labourer.
Althusser,quotingMarx,goes on:
of
It thusunwittinglychangedterrainby substitutingfor the value
labour, up to this point, the apparent object of its snvestigations
per-
the value of labourpower, a power which only exists in the
sonality of the labourer,and is as different from its function,
labour,as a machineis from lts performance.71(Althusser'sitalics)
not
And he continues: 'The result the analysisled to, therefore,was of
a resolutionof the problem.a72 (Althusser'sitalics).Althusser says
this that the classicalpolitical economists produced a correct answer
to
to a question that was neverposed. He mentionsEngels''Preface' to the
Vol. 2 of Capital,whereEngelscomparesthe relationof Marx
classicalpolitical economiststo that betweenLavoisierand Priestley.so the
Just as Priestley,and phlogisticchemistry,producedoxygen, left to
classicalpolitical economistsproduced surplusvalue. It was
produced. And
Lavoisier,however,to identify the substancePriestly that
it was left to Marxto identiJfysurplusvalue. Althussersuggests the
the texts of Smith and Ricardo are at fault. He formulates
two
appropriatesentence of the classical political economists in
possibleways as follows:

AltStusser
andstructuralism
(i) 'The valueof labour( ) is equal to the valueof the subsistence 289
goods necessary for the maintenanceand reproductionof
labour.'73 (Althusser'sitalics)
and
(ii) The value of labour is equal to the value of the subsistence
goods necessaryfor the maintenanceand reproductionof the
labourer.74(Althusser'sitalics)
And he says: '(the first)sentencemeansnothing:what is the main-

tenance of "labour?"what is the reproductionof "labour?"'75 And
in the secondsentence,
the term at the end of the sentence(now) clasheswith the termat

the beginning:they do not havethe samecontent and the equation
cannotbe made,for it is not the labourerwho is boughtfor wages,
but his 'labour.76
Althussergoes on to tell us that there is presentin the answerthe
absenceof its question.Marxcan go on, he tell us, to 'pose the un-
uttered question', simply by 'utteringthe concept presentin an un-
utteredform in the emptinessin the answer.'77(Althusser'sitalics).
How does the theory look? The examinationof the text of Capital
is to play a crucialrole in determininghistoricalmaterialism'sscien-
tificity. How exactly does it do this? We will find the answerby
examininganotherconcept whichis importantas faras the scientific-
ity of historicalmaterialismis concerned.Marx,in Capital,produced
a new object: labourpower. Impliedin the productionof this new
object was
a transformationof the entireterrainand its entirehorizon,which

are the backgroundagainstwhich the new problemis produced. . .
the production of a new problem endowed with this crztical
character(criticalin the sense of a critical situation) is the un-
stable index of the productionof a new theoreticalproblematic,of
which this problemis only one symptomaticmode.78(Althusser's
italics).
PROBLEMATIC
Canthe conceptsproblematic' throwlighton the techniqueof reading

Capitaland its relevancefor the theory of scientificity and can it
reveal a sense of Althusser'sstructuralismwhich is compatiblewith
Marx?To facilitateansweringthese questions,it would be usefulto
list a few occurrencesof the concept, in Althusserhimself, and in a
couple of his commentators.A. Callinicossays:

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290
that of the underlying
theconceptof theory'sproblematicbecomes of certainquestionsin a
structurewhichrenderspossiblethe raisingof others.79
particularform, whilerulingout the raising
with Lakatos'heuris-
And CallinicoscomparesAlthusser'sconcept (scientific) discoveries
tic:'the theoretical structures that made
possible'.80
more or less with
There is one usage in Althusserwhich accords says: '. . . it is not so
In discussingthe young Marx,Althusser
this. as the way the
the immediatecontent of the objects reflected
much ideological essence
problems are posed whichconstitutesthe ultimate
an ideology.82
of the presuppositions
So, in this sense, problematichas to do witha text.
a theory, and not with the concept of
of reading
characterizes'proble-
Ben Brewster,in his Glossaryto For Marx,
matic'as the view that:
in isolation; it only
A word or a concept cannot be considered in which it is
exists in the theoreticalor ideologicalframework that problematic
used, its problematic. . . It should be stressed
of the thought of an
is not a world view. It is not the essence
from a body of texts
individualor epoch which can be deduced centeredon the absence
by an empirical,generalizingreading;it is as muchas their
of problemsand concepts within the problematic
by a symptomatic
presence, it can therefore only be realisedmodel of the Freudian
reading(lecture symptomaleq.v.) on the
analystsreadingof his patients'utterances.'82
his accountof 'Proble-
Brewstermentions the notion of readingina symptomaticreading.
matic'.A problematic,he says is realized by
procedure.
Andhe comparesthe latternotion with Freud's in operationin
So there are at least two senses of 'problematic'
of the term,a pairof
Althusser.PaulPatton distinguishestwo senses
distinguished.On the one
senseswhich correspondsto those I have
hand,'problematic'
existence of a science,
may refer to the conditions of historical
which are external to it.... On the other hand, problematic
svhichdefine
refers,in the case of a science, to the 'conditions'
the formaland semantic
the science as such, that is, which definein orderthat a statement
rulesthe observationof whichis required the intelligibilityof its
belong to the science, and which governsto the discourseof the
discourse. These conditions are internal
scienceitself.83
by pointing out that as far
Patton goes on to illustrate the distinction

291
as the latter sense of 'problematic'goes, Marx'sconceptionof the
capitalist mode of productionand exchangeimpliesa non-Hegelian
theory of the form of the social totality and its parts;whereas,as
faras the first sense goes, 'Hegel'sconceptionrepresentsan essential,
historical condition of the possibilityof Marx'scritiqueof political
economy.84
It is the second, Spinozistsense of 'problematic'whichis relevant
to the outlined picture of reading. Althusseris drawingboth on
Freudand on Spinoza.
Letus take Freud'sInterpretationof Dreamsprocedurefor illumin-
ation. In interpretinga dreamFreudpays as much attention to the
'errors'and 'omissions'of the dreamas he does to what he termsits
'manifest'content.85
The latter, in his terminology, is a 'condensed'and 'displaced'
version of the dreamthoughts.86It is by enlargingon the manifest
dreamcontent and replacingsome of it that one arrivesat the latent
dream thoughts. The latter are responsiblefor the dream;and the
dream has the function of fulfilling wishes which are expressedin
those thoughts.
Freud 'reads' a dream in a particularway, taking into account
'absences'in it, which he obtains from elsewhere,in order to arrive
at the latent dream thoughts. Althusserreadsa text in a particular
way, also taking into account 'absences'which he, too, gets from
elsewhere, in order to obtain the problematicof that text. And
sometimes, that problematicwill contain the theory of scientificity
(for the science expressedin that text). In Althusser'sview, just as
Marx 'symptomaticallyreads' the classicalpolitical economists, so
do we 'symptomaticallyread'Marx'sCapital.Wereadit in this way,
in orderto uncoverMarx'sphilosophy-or the theory of scientificity
for Capital. In fact Marx employed philosophicalconcepts which
were 'essentialto his thought,but absentfrom his discourse.'87And,
just as the classical political economists producedan answer to a
question they were unable to pose, so did Marxproducethe answer
to a question he did not 'havetime' to pose; the question,namely
'what is the specific difference distinguishingthe Marxistdialectic
from the Hegelian dialectic?88 Althusser 'reads' Capital from a
particularpoint of view, taking into account what is not there as
much as what is there, and obtains, by this means, the theory of
scientificity, or Marx's philosophy. Althusserreads Capitalin this
way and causally 'produces',in Spinozist fashion, the theory of
scientificity. Just as the proof of a theorem is 'containedin' the
axioms and rules, and its productionis the productionof what is
already, latently, there; so too the production of the theory of
scientificity is an act of makingmanifest what is already,latently
there. The theory of reading is crucially required for uncovering
Marx'sphilosophy. The Spinozist conceptionof the causalrelation

292 Alison Assiter
between 'appearance'and reality has clearapplication:the 'proble-

matic', the appearance,is the set of techniquesemployedto uncover
the 'reality':the theory of scientificityin Capital.
But there are difficulties with this SpinozistlFreudianpicture.
Indeed the Freudianclashes with the Spinozist one to produce a
problemfor Althusser.Whichabsencesneed to be takeninto account
in the readingof Capital?Clearlyit is not just any old idea which
happens not to be in the text -the theme of Blake'sMarrsageof
Heavenand Hell for instance.In Freud'scase, we know the answer:
the relevant absences are culled from the waking thoughts of the
individualwhose dream is undergoinganalysis. (And it may be a
problemfor Freudwhetheror not the decisionas to whichthoughts
are to be consideredthe appropriateones makesthe whole procedure
of analysiscircular.)But what are the relevantabsencesin Althusser?
If we are to take what he says he takesinto accountas givingus some
idea of what he considersto be relevant,he tells us that the absences
containMarx'sphilosophy.And herewe get the Spinozism.
A philosophicalreadingof Capitalconstitutesthe causal'produc-
tion' in the SpinozistsenseSof what is alreadythere. An uncharitable
interpretationof Althusserhere would be to say that he is simply
'readingin' to Marx'stext what he wantsto find. Marxhimselfcould
not have producedthe rules and procedurenecessaryto understand
the scientificityof his own theory, for
the age Marxlivedin did not providehim, and he could not acquire
in his lifetime, an adequateconcept with which to think whathe
produced:the concept of the effectivity of a structureon its ele-
ments.89
We could say, then, that Althusseris 'readingin' to his understanding

of Marx'stext the very generalizationhe wants to discover.Might
there not be other techniqueswhichare 'latent'in ^'Iarx's text? How
do we knowthat Althusser'sis the rightone? Whyshouldwe accept
his reading?Thereseems to be a crucialdisanalogybetweenthe type
of case Spinoza offered us and the one Althusseris presentingus
with. It makessense to say that the axioms and rules are 'latent'in
the proof of a theoremand that if the proof works out, the axioms
and theorems were the right ones. And similarly,because of the
propertiesGod is supposedto possess,accordingto Spinoza,it makes
sense to talk of God being latent in natureand God as cause with
Natureas effect being the 'right'cause. But it doesn'tmakesensein
the sameway to referto Althusser'sproblematicbeingthe 'right'one
for the productionof the theory of scientificityin Capital,becauseit
does not makesenseto referto the relationbetweenthe problematic
and the theoreticalobject as a necessaryone in the way that the
others are. So there could be other possible 'problematics'and it

becomes viciouslycircularof Althusserto 'readin' to his understand-

ing of particularsciences,the verygeneralization he wantsto discover.
It seems, then, that if Althusser'sSpinozistnotion of causeis like
the structuralist'law of co-existence'then he is indeeda structuralist
by criterion three. This time his structuralismhas led him into a
different kind of difficulty. Whereas,in the previous two cases,
Althusser'sviews either fitted the tenets of 'structuralism'but did
not tally with the ideas of Marxor compliedwith the ideasof Marx
but not of structuralism; this time the problemis different.Althusser
is tryingto answera questionhe thinksis latent in Marx,the question
namely; 'Is historicalmaterialismscientific?'And this time his struc-
turalismpreventshim from answeringthat questionin a non-circular
fashion.
Althusseris at painsto emphasizethat the 'socialformation'is not
revealedfor what it is to the untutoredeye: graspingit requiresthat
one penetrate the appearances.So he is a structuralistby the fifth
criterion.Here indeed, he is like Marx;in severalplacesMarxholds a
slmliarvlew.
* . .
If one takes 'structuralism'to indicatea trend, it is not necessary

that every structuralistexhibit all of the features picked out as
characteristicof the trend,nor indeedthat any individualshouldup-
hold all of them. Such tidy fitting of the facts is not characteristic
of e.g. the 'Enlightenment'or Protestantismany more than it need
be of structuralism.Althusseris a structuralistin so far as his thought
fits at least some of the propertiesof the phenomenon.So, although
A. Schaff may be right when he criticizesAlthusserfor using terms
ambiguouslyand for lackingin logicalprecision,90he is goingtoo far
when he refers to Althusser'sthought as 'pseudo-structuralism'.9l
Timpanaro,too, is too criticalwhen he labels'Frenchstructuralism'
(includingAlthusser's)as 'sophisticatedcharlatanry'; and talksabout
'old literary foxes who, as their final and most sophisticatedtrick,
have taken to playingat science'.92If fitting the principlesof struc-
turalismmakes one a structuralist,then Althusseris one, and not a
'pseudo'one.
CONCLUSION
It seemsthatthereis someevidencethatAlthusserfits the structuralist

bill, though it is difficultto give any overallconceptionof the nature
of his version of the view. Sometimeshis thinkingis ambiguousand
only one of the interpretationsof it is a structuralistone. Clearlyhe
believes in 'wholes' and he thinks of them as somethingmore than
the sum of their elements. Furthermore,the conception of cause
with which he is sympatheticmakeshis view out to be closerto the
structuralistone of emphasizinglaws of co-existence rather than

294 Alison Assiter
causal laws in the sense of relations between temporallydistinct

items. Despite his renunciationof the structuralistlabel, then, his
thinking is close to structuralismin severalways. But, often where
Althusseris a structuralist,he cannot be describedas a Marxist.His
structuralismconflicts with his Marxism.Althusseris reputedto be
the paradigmaticstructuralistMarxist.I have arguedhere, however,
that often, where he is one, he is not the other. Sociologists,there-
fore, should not lump together 'structuralism'and 'Marxism'.The
two terms refer to very differentbodies of thought;traditionsthat
areunlikelyto be happilymarried.
Alison Assiter
School of Humanities
ThamesPolytechnic
NOTES
1. E. Gellner, On Structuralismin Routledge & Kegan Paul, London,

Cause and Meaning in the Social Henley and Boston, 1975, p. 124; R.
Sciences, Routledge & Kegan Paul, Bhasker, 1975, p . 24, and throughout
London, 1 9 7 3. the book and see C. Sumner: Reading
2. See e.g. J. Piaget, Structuralism,
Ideologies: an investigation into the
Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, Marxist Theory of Ideology and Law,
1971, p. 101; S. Hall Class and ClassAcademic Press, London, New York,
Structure, (ed.) A. Hunt, Lawrence & San Fransisco, 1979.
Wishart, London, 1 9 7 8. 11. Sumner,1979, p. 102.
12. Keat and Urry,1975, p .124.
3 . Althusser & Balibar, 19 7 0, p . 7 .
4. See J. Piaget, Structuralism, 13. F. de Saussure: Course in General
1971, Routledge & Kegan Paul, Lon- Linguistics, in R. and F. de George
don, Henley and Boston, 19 71. (eds), The Structuralists from Marx to
5. A. L. Kroeber, Anthropology, Levi-Strauss, Anchor Books, Garden
New York, 1948, quoted in C. Levi- City, New York,1972, p. 67.
Strauss: Structural An thropology, 14. P. Geach and M. Black (eds),
Basic Books, New York, London, Translations from the Philosophical
1963,p. 278. Writings of Gotlob Frege, Blackwell,
6. M. Glucksman, Structuralist Oxford, 1960, pp.56-78.
Analysis in Contemporary Social 15. Levi-Strauss,1963; p .34.
Thought,A Comparisonof the theories 16. Ibid., same page.
of Claude Levi-Strauss and Louis 17. F. de Saussure,1966, p.9, quoted
Althusser, Routledge & Kegan Paul, in S. Timpanaro, On Materialism, NLB,
London, Boston and Henley, 1974, London,1975, p. 143.
p. 15. 18. See R. Barthes, Elements of
7. Ibid.,p. 15. Semiology, Cape, London, 1967,
8. A Schaff, Structuralism and Chapter 1, Sect. 2,3, pp. 27-8.
Marxism, Pergamon Press, Oxford, 19. Ibid.,pp.27-8.
New York, Toronto, Sydney, Paris, 20. See H. G. Gadamer, Truth and
Frankfurt, 1 9 7 8, p . 4. Method, Sheed&Ward, London,1979.
9. Ibid., same page. 21. See Barthes,1967, pp. 26-9.
10. See , for example R . Keat and 22. F . de Saussure, Course in General
J. Urry, Social Theory as Science, Linguistics, C. Bally and A. Sechehaye

(eds), in collaboration with A. Ried- Loggsal Theory, Methuen London,

linger. McGraw-HillBook Company, 1960,p.175.
New York, Toronto, London, 1966, 50. See e.g. ibid., pp. 231-3.
p.16. 51. Althusser and Balibar, 1970, p.
23. See N. Chomsky, Knowledge of 189.
Langllagein Minnesota Studies in the 52. Spinoza C1 Ethics, quoted in A.
Philosophy of Science, University of Naess: Freedom, Emotion and Self-
Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1975, Subsistence, Universitats Verloget,
and D. Davidson,Meaningand Truth, Oslo,1975.
Synthese, 1967. 53. See Hume, 1968, Part III, Sects.
24. See e.g. Althusser, 1969, pp. II, III, IV and XIV.
102-3,202-4, and elsewhere. 54. Althusser and Balibar, 1970, p.
25. See, ibid., pp. 204-7, 209-11, 188.
213-17. 55. See Paul Patton: Althusser's
26. See, ibid., pp. l 94-202. Epistemology: the limits of the theory
27. See Glossary,ibid., under Struc- of theoretical practice, in Radical
ture. Philosophy, No. 19, Spring 1978, for
28. Ibid., p. 202. an account of the conflicting senses
29. See, ibid., p.202. of the term 'production' in Althusser
30. See, ibid., pp. 202-3. -one derivingfrom a Spinozist read-
31. See, ibid., p. 203. ing of him, and the other from a
32. Ibid., p. 203. 'realist'reading.
33. Ibid., p. 203. 56. See Chapter 1 of my D. Phil
34. See T. M. Knox (trans.), Hegel's thesis: 'The Limitsof Althusserianism',
Philosophy of Right, OxfordUniversity Sussex University, 1983, for a des-
Press, London, Oxford, New York, cription of the epistemologicalrealist
1980. Althusser.Accordingto this Althusser,
35. Ibid., p. l 66. there is a contingent causalconnection
36. See, ibid., p.167. between 'essence'and 'appearance'.
37. See, ibid.-,same page. 57. See Althusserand Balibar,1970,
38. See, ibid., p.196. pp.191-2.
39. Althusser and Balibar, 1970, p. 58. See H. F. Hallett: Benedict de
187. Spinoza: The Elements of his Philos-
40. See Spinoza to Oldenburg, in ophy, The Athlone Press, London,
J. Wild (ed.), Spinoza Selections, 1957,p. 9.
Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 59. Althusser and Balibar, 1970, p.
Boston,1930,p. 291. 34.
41. See Spinoza, Ethics, in Wild, 60. Althusser and Balibar, 1970, p.
1930. 14.
42. Wild,1930, p.94. 61.Ibid.,p.14.
43. Wild,1930, p. 94. 62. Ibid., p. 35.
44. H. F. Hallet: Substance and its 63. Ibid., p. 18.
Modes, in M. Grene (ed.), Spinoza: A 64.Ibid.,p.18.
Collection of CriticalEssays, Double- 65. See J. Derrida:Writingand Dif-
day, Anchor Press, New York, 1973. ference, Routledge & Kegan Paul,
45. All of which, are of subject London, Henley and Boston,1978,
predicate form, see A. Macyntre: pp.278-81.
Spinoza, in the Encyclopaedia of 66. Althusser and Balibar, 1970, p.
Philosophy, Macmillan, London, and 16.
the Free Press, New York 1967, p. 67. Ibid., pp. 16-17.
532. 68. Ibid., p. 21.
46. Macyntre,1967, p. 532. 69. Ibid., p. 21.
47. Althusser,1969, p. 196. 70. Seeibid.,p.20.
48. Ibid.,p.196. 71. Ibid., Althusser quoting Marx,
49. P. F. Strawson:Introduction to p. 20.

Alison Assiter
296
83. Patton,1978, p. 13.
72. Ibid., Althusser quoting Marx, 84. Steibid.,p.13.
p. 21. 85. See S. Freud: TheInterpretation
73. Ibid.,p.22. of Dreams, Avon Books, New York,
74.Ibid.,p.22. 1965.
7 5. Ibid., p. 22. 86. Ibid., Sect. IV, (A) & (S).
7 6. Ibid. , p . 2 2. 87. Althusser and Balibar, 1970, p.
77.Ibid.,p.23. 30.
7 8. Althusser and Balibar, 19 7 0, pp . 88. Althusser and Balibar, 1970, p.
24-5 . 33.
7 9. Callinicos, A., 197 6, pp. 34-5 . 89. Althusser,1970, p . 29.
80. Ibid., p. 54. 90. Schaff,1978, p. 40.
81. Althusser, 1 969, p . 69. 91. See Schaff,1978, ch. 2.
8 2. Ben Brewster in Althusser, 19 69, 92.. See Timpanaro,1975, pp. 171 -2.
pp. 252-3.


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Althusser and Structuralism

Author(s): Alison Assiter

This content downloaded from 146.232.129.75 on Wed, 24 Jul 2013 15:49:16 PM

Althusser and structuralism

'Structure', social structure' and, recently, 'structuralism ' are

The terms 'structure'and 'social structure'are widely used in soci-

This content downloaded from 146.232.129.75 on Wed, 24 Jul 2013 15:49:16 PM

structuralistand Marxistsimultaneously.I shall also suggest that

In the literature, one finds a number of different definitions of

'Structure'appearsto bejust yieldingto a word that has a perfectly

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kind of construction,and languagewas understoodas the arrange-

In the nineteenthcentury,she tells us, the termwas introducedfrom

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structuralistsapproach the subject matter of their research as a

And the first of the outlined featuresof structuralismis apparent

This content downloaded from 146.232.129.75 on Wed, 24 Jul 2013 15:49:16 PM

This content downloaded from 146.232.129.75 on Wed, 24 Jul 2013 15:49:16 PM

De Saussure,for instance, emphasizesthat elements in a language

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It appears, then, that there are difficulties with some sorts of

ALTHUSSER AND STRUCTURALISM

Althusserupholdsenoughof the thesesI haveidentifiedto be labelled

Althusser and the first prtnciple of structuralism I shouldlike now to

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simple internal principle of the totality, which fulfils itself by

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This content downloaded from 146.232.129.75 on Wed, 24 Jul 2013 15:49:16 PM

( ) a statementS presupposesa statementS' in the sensethat the

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take place outside of society. If society is defined in such a way as

THE SECOND CRITERION FOR STRUCTURALISM

Whatabout the second criterionfor being a structuralist?Althusser

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Spinoza'sconception of causalityis in markedcontrastto that of

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This content downloaded from 146.232.129.75 on Wed, 24 Jul 2013 15:49:16 PM

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theoremcould be said to involvethe activityof applyingaxiomsand

The notion of reading, for Althusser,is connected, in some way,

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Althusser and structuralism

Spinoza,accordingto Althusser,gives us the beginningsof a correct

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what classicalpolitical economy does not see, is not what it does

Sowhat is wrongwith the classicalpoliticaleconomistsis contained and in

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And he says: '(the first)sentencemeansnothing:what is the main-

the term at the end of the sentence(now) clasheswith the termat

a transformationof the entireterrainand its entirehorizon,which

Canthe conceptsproblematic' throwlighton the techniqueof reading

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This content downloaded from 146.232.129.75 on Wed, 24 Jul 2013 15:49:16 PM

This content downloaded from 146.232.129.75 on Wed, 24 Jul 2013 15:49:16 PM

between 'appearance'and reality has clearapplication:the 'proble-

We could say, then, that Althusseris 'readingin' to his understanding

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becomes viciouslycircularof Althusserto 'readin' to his understand-

If one takes 'structuralism'to indicatea trend, it is not necessary

It seemsthatthereis someevidencethatAlthusserfits the structuralist

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causal laws in the sense of relations between temporallydistinct

1. E. Gellner, On Structuralismin Routledge & Kegan Paul, London,

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