CANON 17-19

Case No. 1
G.R. No. 91298 June 22, 1990
CORAZON PERIQUET, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and THE
PHIL. NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION (Formerly Construction Development
Corp. of the Phils.), respondents.

It is said that a woman has the privilege of changing her mind but this is usually allowed only in
affairs of the heart where the rules are permissibly inconstant. In the case before us, Corazon
Periquet, the herein petitioner, exercised this privilege in connection with her work, where the
rules are not as fickle.
The petitioner was dismissed as toll collector by the Construction Development Corporation of
the Philippines, private respondent herein, for willful breach of trust and unauthorized possession
of accountable toll tickets allegedly found in her purse during a surprise inspection. Claiming she
had been "framed," she filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and was sustained by the labor
arbiter, who ordered her reinstatement within ten days "without loss of seniority rights and other
privileges and with fun back wages to be computed from the date of her actual dismissal up to
date of her actual reinstatement." On appeal, this order was affirmed in toto by public
respondent NLRC on August 29, 1980.
On March 11, 1989, almost nine years later, the petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a
writ of execution of the decision. The motion was granted by the executive labor arbiter in an
order dated June 26, 1989, which required payment to the petitioner of the sum of P205,207.42
"by way of implementing the balance of the judgment amount" due from the private respondent.
Pursuant thereto, the said amount was garnished by the NLRC sheriff on July 12, 1989. On
September 11, 1989, however, the NLRC sustained the appeal of the CDCP and set aside the
order dated June 20, 1989, the corresponding writ of execution of June 26, 1989, and the notice
of garnishment.
In its decision, the public respondent held that the motion for execution was time-barred, having
been filed beyond the five-year period prescribed by both the Rules of Court and the Labor Code.
It also rejected the petitioner's claim that she had not been reinstated on time and ruled as valid
the two quitclaims she had signed waiving her right to reinstatement and acknowledging
settlement in full of her back wages and other benefits. The petitioner contends that this decision
is tainted with grave abuse of discretion and asks for its reversal. We shall affirm instead.
Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, provides:
SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. A judgment may be executed on
motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry or from the date it becomes final and
executory. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of limitations, a
judgment may be enforced by action.
A similar provision is found in Art. 224 of the Labor Code, as amended by RA 6715, viz.
ART. 224. Execution of decision, orders, awards. (a) The Secretary of Labor and Employment or
any Regional Director, the Commission or any Labor Arbiter or Med-Arbiter, or the Voluntary
Arbitrator may, motu propio, or on motion of any interested party, issue a writ of execution on a
judgment within five (5) years from the date it becomes final and executory, requiring a sheriff or
a duly deputized officer to execute or enforce a final decision, order or award....
The petitioner argues that the above rules are not absolute and cites the exception snowed in
Lancita v. Magbanua, where the Court held:
Where judgments are for money only and wholly unpaid, and execution has been previously
withheld in the interest of the judgment debtor, which is in financial difficulties, the court has no
discretion to deny motions for leave to issue execution more than five years after the judgments
are entered. (Application of Molnar, Belinsky, et al. v. Long Is. Amusement Corp., I N.Y.S, 2d 866)
In computing the time limited for suing out of an execution, although there is authority to the
contrary, the general rule is that there should not be included the time when execution is stayed,
either by agreement of the parties for a definite time, by injunction, by the taking of an appeal or
writ of error so as to operate as a supersedeas, by the death of a party, or otherwise. Any
interruption or delay occasioned by the debtor will extend the time within which the writ may be
issued without scire facias.
xxx xxx xxx
There has been no indication that respondents herein had ever slept on their rights to have the
judgment executed by mere motions, within the reglementary period. The statute of limitation
has not been devised against those who wish to act but cannot do so, for causes beyond their
central.
Periquet insists it was the private respondent that delayed and prevented the execution of the
judgment in her favor, but that is not the way we see it. The record shows it was she who dilly-
dallied.

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The original decision called for her reinstatement within ten days from receipt thereof following
its affirmance by the NLRC on August 29, 1980, but there is no evidence that she demanded her
reinstatement or that she complained when her demand was rejected. What appears is that she
entered into a compromise agreement with CDCP where she waived her right to reinstatement
and received from the CDCP the sum of P14,000.00 representing her back wages from the date
of her dismissal to the date of the agreement.
Dismissing the compromise agreement, the petitioner now claims she was actually reinstated
only on March 16, 1987, and so should be granted back pay for the period beginning November
28, 1978, date of her dismissal, until the date of her reinstatement. She conveniently omits to
mention several significant developments that transpired during and after this period that
seriously cast doubt on her candor and bona fides.
After accepting the sum of P14,000.00 from the private respondent and waiving her right to
reinstatement in the compromise agreement, the petitioner secured employment as kitchen
dispatcher at the Tito Rey Restaurant, where she worked from October 1982 to March 1987.
According to the certification issued by that business, she received a monthly compensation of
P1,904.00, which was higher than her salary in the CDCP.
For reasons not disclosed by the record, she applied for re-employment with the CDCP and was
on March 16,1987, given the position of xerox machine operator with a basic salary of P1,030.00
plus P461.33 in allowances, for a total of P1,491.33 monthly.
On June 27, 1988; she wrote the new management of the CDCP and asked that the rights
granted her by the decision dated August 29, 1980, be recognized because the waiver she had
signed was invalid.
On September 19, 1988, the Corporate Legal Counsel of the private respondent (now Philippine
National Construction Corporation) recommended the payment to the petitioner of the sum of
P9,544.00, representing the balance of her back pay for three years at P654. 00 per month
(minus the P14,000.00 earlier paid).
On November 10, 1988, the petitioner accepted this additional amount and signed another
Quitclaim and Release reading as follows:
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
THAT, I CORAZON PERIQUET, of legal age, married and resident of No. 87 Annapolis St., Quezon
City, hereby acknowledged receipt of the sum of PESOS: NINE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FORTY
FOUR PESOS ONLY (P9,544.00) Philippine currency, representing the unpaid balance of the back
wages due me under the judgment award in NLRC Case No. AB-2-864-79 entitled "Corazon
Periquet vs. PNCC- TOLLWAYS" and I further manifest that this payment is in full satisfaction of all
my claims/demands in the aforesaid case. Likewise, I hereby manifest that I had voluntarily
waived reinstatement to my former position as TOLL TELLER and in lieu thereof, I sought and am
satisfied with my present position as XEROX MACHINE OPERATOR in the Central Office.
Finally, I hereby certify that delay in my reinstatement, after finality of the Decision dated 10
May 1979 was due to my own fault and that PNCC is not liable thereto.
I hereby RELEASE AND DISCHARGE the said corporation and its officers from money and all
claims by way of unpaid wages, separation pay, differential pay, company, statutory and other
benefits or otherwise as may be due me in connection with the above-entitled case. I hereby
state further that I have no more claims or right of action of whatever nature, whether past,
present, future or contingent against said corporation and its officers, relative to NLRC Case No.
AB-2-864-79.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 10th day of November 1988 at
Mandaluyong, Metro Manila. (Emphasis supplied.)
The petitioner was apparently satisfied with the settlement, for in the memorandum she sent the
PNCC Corporate Legal Counsel on November 24, 1988, she said in part:
Sir, this is indeed my chance to express my gratitude to you and all others who have helped me
and my family enjoy the fruits of my years of stay with PNCC by way of granting an additional
amount of P9,544.00 among others ...
As per your recommendation contained therein in said memo, I am now occupying the position of
xerox machine operator and is (sic) presently receiving a monthly salary of P2,014.00.
Reacting to her inquiry about her entitlement to longevity pay, yearly company increases and
other statutory benefits, the private respondent adjusted her monthly salary from P2,014.00 to
P3,588.00 monthly.
Then the lull. Then the bombshell.
On March 11, 1989, she filed the motion for execution that is now the subject of this petition.
It is difficult to understand the attitude of the petitioner, who has blown hot and cold, as if she
does not know her own mind. First she signed a waiver and then she rejected it; then she signed
another waiver which she also rejected, again on the ground that she had been deceived. In her
first waiver, she acknowledged full settlement of the judgment in her favor, and then in the
second waiver, after accepting additional payment, she again acknowledged fun settlement of
the same judgment. But now she is singing a different tune.

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In her petition she is now disowning both acknowledgments and claiming that the earlier
payments both of which she had accepted as sufficient, are insufficient. They were valid before
but they are not valid now. She also claimed she was harassed and cheated by the past
management of the CDCP and sought the help of the new management of the PNCC under its
"dynamic leadership." But now she is denouncing the new management-for also tricking her into
signing the second quitclaim.
Not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was
voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and
may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is only where there is clear
proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of
settlement are unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable
transaction. But where it is shown that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full
understanding of what he was doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and
reasonable, the transaction must be recognized as a valid and binding undertaking. As in this
case.
The question may be asked: Why did the petitioner sign the compromise agreement of
September 16, 1980, and waive all her rights under the judgment in consideration of the cash
settlement she received? It must be remembered that on that date the decision could still have
been elevated on certiorari before this Court and there was still the possibility of its reversal. The
petitioner obviously decided that a bird in hand was worth two on the wing and so opted for the
compromise agreement. The amount she was then waiving, it is worth noting, had not yet come
up to the exorbitant sum of P205,207.42 that she was later to demand after the lapse of eight
years.
The back pay due the petitioner need not detain us. We have held in countless cases that this
should be limited to three years from the date of the illegal dismissal, during which period (but
not beyond) the dismissed employee is deemed unemployed without the necessity of proof.
Hence, the petitioner's contention that she should be paid from 1978 to 1987 must be rejected,
and even without regard to the fact (that would otherwise have been counted against her) that
she was actually employed during most of that period.
Finally, the petitioner's invocation of Article 223 of the Labor Code to question the failure of the
private respondent to file a supersedeas bond is not well-taken. As the Solicitor General correctly
points out, the bond is required only when there is an appeal from the decision with a monetary
award, not an order enforcing the decision, as in the case at bar.
As officers of the court, counsel are under obligation to advise their clients against making
untenable and inconsistent claims like the ones raised in this petition that have only needlessly
taken up the valuable time of this Court, the Solicitor General, the Government Corporate
Counsel, and the respondents. Lawyers are not merely hired employees who must
unquestioningly do the bidding of the client, however unreasonable this may be when tested by
their own expert appreciation of the pertinent facts and the applicable law and jurisprudence.
Counsel must counsel.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

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Case No. 2
A.C. No. 10537, February 03, 2015
REYNALDO G. RAMIREZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. MERCEDES BUHAYANG-MARGALLO,
Respondent.

When an action or proceeding is initiated in our courts, lawyers become the eyes and ears of
their clients. Lawyers are expected to prosecute or defend the interests of their clients without
need for reminders. The privilege of the office of attorney grants them the ability to warrant to
their client that they will manage the case as if it were their own. The relationship between an
attorney and client is a sacred agency. It cannot be disregarded on the flimsy excuse that the
lawyer accepted the case only because he or she was asked by an acquaintance. The
professional relationship remains the same regardless of the reasons for the acceptance by
counsel and regardless of whether the case is highly paying or pro bono.

Atty. Mercedes Buhayang-Margallos (Atty. Margallo) inaction resulted in a lost appeal,

terminating the case of her client not on the merits but due to her negligence. She made it
appear that the case was dismissed on the merits when, in truth, she failed to file the Appellants
Brief on time. She did not discharge her duties of candor to her client.

This court resolves the Petition for Review filed by Atty. Margallo under Rule 139-B, Section 12 of
the Rules of Court, assailing the Resolution of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines.

In the Resolution dated March 21, 2014, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines affirmed with modification its earlier Resolution dated March 20, 2013. In its
delegated capacity to conduct fact finding for this court, it found that respondent Atty. Margallo
had violated Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Consequently, the Board of Governors recommended that Atty. Margallo be
suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.

In the Complaint filed on January 20, 2010 before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, complainant Reynaldo Ramirez (Ramirez) alleged that he
engaged Atty. Margallos services as legal counsel in a civil case for Quieting of Title entitled
Spouses Roque v. Ramirez. The case was initiated before the Regional Trial Court of
Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 68.

According to Ramirez, Atty. Margallo contacted him on or about March 2004, as per a referral
from a friend of Ramirezs sister. He alleged that Atty. Margallo had offered her legal services on
the condition that she be given 30% of the land subject of the controversy instead of attorneys
fees. It was also agreed upon that Ramirez would pay Atty. Margallo P1,000.00 per court
appearance.

On October 19, 2006, the Regional Trial Court promulgated a Decision adverse to Ramirez. Atty.
Margallo advised him to appeal the judgment. She committed to file the Appeal before the Court
4
of Appeals.1

The Appeal was perfected and the records were sent to the Court of Appeals sometime in 2008.
On December 5, 2008, the Court of Appeals directed Ramirez to file his Appellants Brief.
Ramirez notified Atty. Margallo, who replied that she would have one prepared.

On January 8, 2009, Ramirez contacted Atty. Margallo to follow up on the Appellants Brief. Atty.
Margallo informed him that he needed to meet her to sign the documents necessary for the brief.

On several occasions, Ramirez followed up on the status of the brief, but he was told that there
was still no word from the Court of Appeals.

On August 26, 2009, Atty. Margallo informed Ramirez that his Appeal had been denied. She told
him that the Court of Appeals denial was due to Ramirezs failure to establish his filiation with
his alleged father, which was the basis of his claim. She also informed him that they could no
longer appeal to this court since the Decision of the Court of Appeals had been promulgated and
the reglementary period for filing an Appeal had already lapsed.

Ramirez went to the Court of Appeals. There, he discovered that the Appellants Brief was filed
on April 13, 2009 with a Motion for Reconsideration and Apologies for filing beyond the
reglementary period.

Ramirez alleged that Atty. Margallo had violated Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04
of the Code of Professional Responsibility. By way of defense, Atty. Margallo argued that she had
agreed to take on the case for free, save for travel expense of P1,000.00 per hearing. She also
claimed that she had candidly informed Ramirez and his mother that they only had a 50%
chance of winning the case. She denied ever having entered into an agreement regarding the
contingent fee worth 30% of the value of the land subject of the controversy.

Atty. Margallo asserted that she would not have taken on the Appeal except that the mother of
Ramirez had begged her to do so. She claimed that when she instructed Ramirez to see her for
document signing on January 8, 2009, he ignored her. When he finally showed up on March
2009, he merely told her that he had been busy. Her failure to immediately inform Ramirez of the
unfavorable Decision of the Court of Appeals was due to losing her clients number because her
8-year-old daughter played with her phone and accidentally erased all her contacts.

Mandatory conference and findingsof the Integrated Bar of thePhilippines

The dispute was set for mandatory conference on June 3, 2010. Only Ramirez appeared despite
Atty. Margallo having received notice. The mandatory conference was reset to July 22, 2010.
Both parties then appeared and were directed to submit their position papers.

Commissioner Cecilio A.C. Villanueva recommended that Atty. Margallo be reprimanded for her
actions and be given a stern warning that her next infraction of a similar nature shall be dealt
with more severely. This was based on his two key findings. First, Atty. Margallo allowed the
reglementary period for filing an Appellants Brief to lapse by assuming that Ramirez no longer
wanted to pursue the case instead of exhausting all means possible to protect the interest of her
client. Second, Atty. Margallo had been remiss in her duties as counsel, resulting in the loss of
Ramirezs statutory right to seek recourse with the Court of Appeals.

In the Resolution dated March 20, 2013, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines adopted and approved the recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline.
The Board of Governors resolved to recommend a penalty of reprimand to Atty. Margallo with a
stern warning that repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.

Ramirez seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration on July 16, 2013. In the Resolution dated
March 21, 2014, the Board of Governors granted Ramirezs Motion for Reconsideration and
increased the recommended penalty to suspension from practice of law for two (2) years.

On August 20, 2014, Atty. Margallo filed a Petition for Review under Rule 139-B, Section 12 of the
Rules of Court. She alleged that the recommended penalty of suspension was too severe
considering that she had been very careful and vigilant in defending the cause of her client. She
also averred that this was the first time a Complaint was filed against her.

Ramirez thereafter filed an undated Motion to adopt his Motion for Reconsideration previously
filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline as a Comment on Atty. Margallos Petition for Review.
5
In the Resolution dated October 14, 2014, this court granted Ramirezs Motion. Atty. Margallo
filed her Reply on October 6, 2014.

This courts ruling

The Petition is denied for lack of merit.

The relationship between a lawyer and a client is imbued with utmost trust and confidence.
Lawyers are expected to exercise the necessary diligence and competence in managing cases
entrusted to them. They commit not only to review cases or give legal advice, but also to
represent their clients to the best of their ability without need to be reminded by either the client
or the court. The expectation to maintain a high degree of legal proficiency and attention
remains the same whether the represented party is a high-paying client or an indigent litigant.

Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility clearly
provide:

CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE SHALL BE MINDFUL
OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.

CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection there with shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to clients request for information.

In Caranza Vda. De Saldivar v. Cabanes, Jr., a lawyer was suspended after failing to justify his
absence in a scheduled preliminary conference, which resulted in the case being submitted for
resolution. This was aggravated by the lawyers failure to inform his client about the adverse
ruling of the Court of Appeals, thereby precluding the litigant from further pursuing an Appeal.
This court found that these actions amounted to gross negligence tantamount to breaching
Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

The relationship between an attorney and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and
confidence. In this light, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their
cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. Verily,
a lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote
his full attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he
accepts it for a fee or for free.
....
Case law further illumines that a lawyers duty of competence and diligence includes not merely
reviewing the cases entrusted to the counsels care or giving sound legal advice, but also
consists of properly representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled
hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled
cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client or the
court to prod him or her to do so.

Conversely, a lawyers negligence in fulfilling his duties subjects him to disciplinary action. While
such negligence or carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the Court has consistently
held that the lawyers mere failure to perform the obligations due his client is per se a violation .
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)

Respondent Atty. Margallo was unjustifiably remiss in her duties as legal counsel to Ramirez.

The lack of communication and coordination between respondent Atty. Margallo and her client
was palpable but was not due to the lack of diligence of her client. This cost complainant
Ramirez his entire case and left him with no appellate remedies. His legal cause was orphaned
not because a court of law ruled on the merits of his case, but because a person privileged to act
as counsel failed to discharge her duties with the requisite diligence. Her assumption that
complainant Ramirez was no longer interested to pursue the Appeal is a poor excuse. There was
no proof that she exerted efforts to communicate with her client. This is an admission that she
abandoned her obligation as counsel on the basis of an assumption. Respondent Atty. Margallo
failed to exhaust all possible means to protect complainant Ramirezs interest, which is contrary
to what she had sworn to do as a member of the legal profession. For these reasons, she clearly
6
violated Canon 17 and Canon 18, Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

A problem arises whenever agents, entrusted to manage the interests of another, use their
authority or power for their benefit or fail to discharge their duties. In many agencies, there is
information assymetry between the principal and the entrusted agent. That is, there are facts
and events that the agent must attend to that may not be known by the principal.

This information assymetry is even more pronounced in an attorney-client relationship. Lawyers

are expected not only to be familiar with the minute facts of their cases but also to see their
relevance in relation to their causes of action or their defenses. The salience of these facts is not
usually patent to the client. It can only be seen through familiarity with the relevant legal
provisions that are invoked with their jurisprudential interpretations. More so with the intricacies
of the legal procedure. It is the lawyer that receives the notices and must decide the mode of
appeal to protect the interest of his or her client.

Thus, the relationship between a lawyer and her client is regarded as highly fiduciary. Between
the lawyer and the client, it is the lawyer that has the better knowledge of facts, events, and
remedies. While it is true that the client chooses which lawyer to engage, he or she usually does
so on the basis of reputation. It is only upon actual engagement that the client discovers the
level of diligence, competence, and accountability of the counsel that he or she chooses. In
some cases, such as this one, the discovery comes too late. Between the lawyer and the client,
therefore, it is the lawyer that should bear the full costs of indifference or negligence.

Respondent Atty. Margallos position that a two-year suspension is too severe considering that it
is her first infraction cannot be sustained. In Caranza Vda. De Saldivar, we observed:

As regards the appropriate penalty, several cases show that lawyers who have been held liable
for gross negligence for infractions similar to those of the respondent were suspended for a
period of six (6) months. In Aranda v. Elayda, a lawyer who failed to appear at the scheduled
hearing despite due notice which resulted in the submission of the case for decision was found
guilty of gross negligence and hence, suspended for six (6) months. In Heirs of Tiburcio F.
Ballesteros, Sr. v. Apiag, a lawyer who did not file a pre-trial brief and was absent during the pre-
trial conference was likewise suspended for six (6) months. In Abiero v. Juanino, a lawyer who
neglected a legal matter entrusted to him by his client in breach of Canons 17 and 18 of the
Code was also suspended for six (6) months. Thus, consistent with existing jurisprudence,
the Court finds it proper to impose the same penalty against respondent and
accordingly suspends him for a period of six (6) months. (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)

Caranza Vda. De Saldivar did not leave the clients without procedural remedies. On the other
hand, respondent Atty. Margallos neglect resulted in her client having no further recourse in
court to protect his legal interests. This lack of diligence, to the utmost prejudice of complainant
Ramirez who relied on her alleged competence as counsel, must not be tolerated. It is time that
we communicate that lawyers must actively manage cases entrusted to them. There should be
no more room for an inertia of mediocrity.

Parenthetically, it is this court that has the constitutionally mandated duty to discipline lawyers.
Under the current rules, the duty to assist fact finding can be delegated to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines. The findings of the Integrated Bar, however, can only be recommendatory,
consistent with the constitutional powers of this court. Its recommended penalties are also, by
its nature, recommendatory. Despite the precedents, it is the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
that recognizes that the severity of the infraction is worth a penalty of two-year suspension. We
read this as a showing of its desire to increase the level of professionalism of our lawyers.

This court is not without jurisdiction to increase the penalties imposed in order to address a
current need in the legal profession. The desire of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines to ensure
a higher ethical standard for its members conduct is laudable. The negligence of respondent
Atty. Margallo coupled with her lack of candor is reprehensible.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is DENIED. The Recommendations and Resolution of the
Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dated March 21, 2014 is ACCEPTED,
ADOPTED AND AFFIRMED. Atty. Mercedes Buhayang-Margallo is hereby SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for two (2) years, with a stern warning that a repetition of the
same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely. This decision is immediately
executory.
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SO ORDERED.

Case No. 3
Adm. Case No. 9612 : March 13, 2013
JOHNNY M. PESTO, Complainant, v. MARCELITO M. MILLO, Respondent.

An attorney who conceals his inefficiency and lack of diligence by giving wrong information to his
client regarding the matter subject of their professional relationship is guilty of conduct
unbecoming an officer of the Court. He thereby violates his Lawyer's Oath to conduct himself as
a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the
courts as to his client. He also thereby violates Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, by which he is called upon to serve his client with competence and diligence.
Antecedents
In this administrative case, Johnny Pesto (Johnny), a Canadian national, charged Atty. Marcelito
M. Millo with conduct unbecoming an officer of the Court, misleading his client, bungling the
transfer of title, and incompetence and negligence in the performance of his duty as a lawyer.
Johnny averred that in May 1990, his wife Abella Pesto (Abella) retained the services of Atty. Millo
to handle the transfer of title over a parcel of land to her name, and the adoption of her niece,
Arvi Jane Dizon; that Johnny and Abella gave to Atty. Millo the amounts of P14,000.00 for the
transfer of title and P10,000.00 for the adoption case; that Atty. Millo thereafter repeatedly gave
them false information and numerous excuses to explain his inability to complete the transfer of
title; that Atty. Millo likewise made them believe that the capital gains tax for the property had
been paid way back in 1991, but they found out upon their return to the country in February
1995 that he had not yet paid the tax; that when they confronted him, Atty. Millo insisted that he
had already paid the same, but he could not produce any receipt for the supposed payment; that
8
Atty. Millo reluctantly returned to Abella the amount of P14,000.00 only after he stormed out of
Atty. Millo's office in exasperation over his stalling tactics; and that Atty. Millo then further
promised in writing to assume the liability for the accrued penalties.
Likewise, Johnny blamed Atty. Millo for letting the adoption case be considered closed by the
Tarlac office of the Department of Social Welfare and Development (Tarlac DSWD) due to two
years of inaction. He stated that Atty. Millo made him and his wife believe that an interview with
the Tarlac DSWD had been scheduled on February 14, 1995, but when they arrived at the Tarlac
DSWD they were dismayed to be told that no such interview had been scheduled; that adding to
their dismay, Atty. Millo could not be reached at all; that it was only upon reaching home in
Quezon City when he received word from Atty. Millo that a hearing had again been scheduled on
February 23, 1995 at 10:00 a.m.; that when they went to the hearing, Atty. Millo could not be
found; and that they learned after an hour of waiting in the courthouse in Tarlac that Atty. Millo
had requested the hearing to be moved to the afternoon without their knowledge.
Exasperated by Atty. Millo's neglect and ineptitude, Johnny brought this administrative complaint
in the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on March 14, 1995, praying for disciplinary action to
be taken against Atty. Millo, and seeking the refund of P15,643.75 representing the penalties for
the non-payment of the capital gains tax, and of the P10,000.00 given for the adoption case.
Being a resident of Canada, he constituted one Tita Lomotan as his attorney-in-fact to represent
him during his and his wife's absence from the country.
On July 10, 1995, the IBP ordered Atty. Millo to file his answer. Although an extension of the
period to file was granted at his instance, he filed no answer in the end. He did not also appear at
the hearings despite due notice.
In the meantime, the IBP required Johnny through Lomotan to engage a counsel. The proceedings
were held in abeyance to await the appropriate motion from Johnny's counsel.
The administrative matter did not move for several years. The long delay prompted Johnny to
write to the President of the IBP on October 28, 1998. It was only on April 2, 2001, however, that
the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) scheduled another hearing on June 29, 2001. At
that hearing, Atty. Millo appeared through a representative, and presented a
manifestation/motion, whereby he claimed that Johnny had meanwhile died, and that Abella
would be withdrawing the complaint against him.
On October 11, 2001, the IBP-CBD, through Commissioner Victoria Gonzalez-De los Reyes,
deemed the case submitted for resolution.
On October 4, 2010, Investigating Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez, to whom the case had
been meanwhile transferred, submitted a report and recommendation, whereby he found Atty.
Millo liable for violating Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and recommended
his suspension from the practice of law for six months.
In Resolution No. XX-2011-235 adopted on November 19, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors
affirmed the findings of Investigating Commissioner Fernandez, but lowered the suspension to
two months; and ordered Atty. Millo to return the amount of P16,000.00, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A" and finding the recommendation
fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, and finding
respondent guilty of the charges level(led) against him, Atty. Marcelito Millo is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of two (2) months and is ordered to return the
amount of P16,000.00 to complainant.
On March 27, 2012, Atty. Millo moved for a reconsideration, stating that he had honestly believed
that Abella had already caused the withdrawal of the complaint prior to her own death; that he
had already caused the preparation of the documents necessary for the transfer of the certificate
of title, and had also returned the P14,000.00 paid by Johnny; that the adoption case had been
finally granted by the trial court; that he had lost contact with Johnny and Abella who resided in
Canada; that Juan Daquis, Abella's brother, could have confirmed that the charge had arisen from
a simple misunderstanding, and that Abella would cause the withdrawal of the complaint, except
that Daquis had meanwhile died in November 2011.
On June 9, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors denied Atty. Millo's motion for reconsideration.
Ruling
We affirm Resolution No. XX-2011-235, but modify the penalty.
Every attorney owes fidelity to the causes and concerns of his clients. He must be ever mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in him by the clients. His duty to safeguard the clients' interests
commences from his engagement as such, and lasts until his effective release by the clients. In
that time, he is expected to take every reasonable step and exercise ordinary care as his clients'
interests may require.
Atty. Millo's acceptance of the sums of money from Johnny and Abella to enable him to attend to
the transfer of title and to complete the adoption case initiated the lawyer-client relationship
between them. From that moment on, Atty. Millo assumed the duty to render competent and
efficient professional service to them as his clients. Yet, he failed to discharge his duty. He was
9
inefficient and negligent in going about what the professional service he had assumed required
him to do. He concealed his inefficiency and neglect by giving false information to his clients
about having already paid the capital gains tax. In reality, he did not pay the capital gains tax,
rendering the clients liable for a substantial financial liability in the form of penalties.
Without doubt, Atty. Millo had the obligation to serve his clients with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, expressly so demanded of him,
to wit:
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
xxx
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
A serious administrative complaint like this one should not be taken for granted or lightly by any
respondent attorney. Yet, Atty. Millo did not take the complaint of Johnny seriously enough, and
even ignored it for a long period of time. Despite being given several opportunities to do so, Atty.
Millo did not file any written answer. He thereby forfeited his right and chance to reasonably
explain the circumstances behind the charges against him. Had the complaint been untrue and
unfair, it would have been quite easy for him to refute it quickly and seasonably. Indeed, a
refutation was the requisite response from any worthy and blameless respondent lawyer. His
belated and terse characterization of the charge by claiming that the charge had emanated from
a mere "misunderstanding" was not sufficient. He did not thereby refute the charge against him,
which omission indicated that the complaint had substance. It mattered little now that he had in
the meantime returned the amount of P14,000.00 to the clients, and that the application for
adoption had been eventually granted by the trial court. Such events, being not only post facto,
but also inevitable from sheer passage of time, did not obliterate his liability based on the
neglect and ineptitude he had inflicted on his clients. The severe lesson that he must now learn
is that he could not ignore without consequences the liberal opportunity the Court and the IBP
allowed him to justify his neglect and ineptitude in serving his clients' concerns. Towards him the
Court now stays its hand of leniency, lest the Court be unfairly seen as too willing to forego the
exaction of responsibility upon a lawyer as neglectful and inept as he had been towards his
clients.
It even seems very likely that Atty. Millo purposely disregarded the opportunity to answer the
charges granted to him out of a desire to delay the investigation of the complaint until both
Johnny and Abella, being residents in Canada, would have already lost interest in prosecuting it,
or, as happened here, would have already departed this world and be no longer able to rebut
whatever refutations he would ultimately make, whether true or not. But the Court is not about
to condone such selfish disregard. Let it be emphasized to him and to others similarly disposed
that an attorney who is made a respondent in a disbarment proceeding should submit an
explanation, and should meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. The obvious
reason for the requirement is that an attorney thus charged must thereby prove that he still
maintained that degree of morality and integrity expected of him at all times.
Atty. Millo made his situation even worse by consistently absenting himself from the scheduled
hearings the IBP had set for his benefit. His disregard of the IBP's orders requiring his attendance
in the hearings was not only irresponsible, but also constituted utter disrespect for the Judiciary
and his fellow lawyers. Such conduct was absolutely unbecoming of a lawyer, because lawyers
are particularly called upon to obey Court orders and processes and are expected to stand
foremost in complying with orders from the duly constituted authorities. Moreover, in Espiritu v.
Ulep, the Court saw the respondent attorney's odious practice of repeatedly and apparently
deliberately not appearing in the scheduled hearings as his means of wiggling out from the duty
to explain his side. A similar treatment of Atty. Millo's disregard is justified. Indeed, he thereby
manifested evasion, a bad trait that no worthy member of the Legal profession should nurture in
himself.
Surprisingly, Atty. Millo claimed that his belated response to the charge was due to the
assurances of Abella that she would be withdrawing the complaint. The Court disbelieves him,
however, and treats his claim as nothing but a belated attempt to save the day for himself. He
ought to remember that the withdrawal of an administrative charge for suspension or disbarment
based on an attorney's professional misconduct or negligence will not furnish a ground to dismiss
the charge. Suspension or disbarment proceedings that are warranted will still proceed
regardless of the lack or loss of interest on the part of the complainant. The Court may even
entirely ignore the withdrawal of the complaint, and continue to investigate in order to finally
determine whether the charge of professional negligence or misconduct was borne out by the
record. This approach bespeaks the Court's consistent view that the Legal Profession is not only a
lofty and noble calling, but also a rare privilege reserved only for the deserving.
Verily, disciplinary proceedings against attorneys are unlike civil suits where the complainants
are the plaintiffs and the respondent attorneys are the defendants. They neither involve private
interests nor afford redress for private grievances. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for
the public welfare, for the purpose of preserving the courts of justice from the official ministration
10
of persons unfit to practice law before them. Every attorney is called to answer for every
misconduct he commits as an officer of the Court. The complainant or any other person who has
brought the attorney's misconduct to the attention of the Court is in no sense a party, and has
generally no interest in the outcome except as all good citizens may have in the proper
administration of justice.
The IBP Board of Governors recommended suspension from the practice of law for two months as
the penalty to be imposed. The recommended penalty is not well taken. We modify the penalty,
because Atty. Millo displayed no remorse as to his misconduct, and could not be given a soft
treatment. His professional misconduct warranted a longer suspension from the practice of law
because he had caused material prejudice to the clients' interest. He should somehow be taught
to be more ethical and professional in dealing with trusting clients like Johnny and Abella, who
were innocently too willing to repose their utmost trust in his abilities as a lawyer and in his
trustworthiness as a legal professional. He should remember that misconduct has no place in the
heart and mind of a lawyer who has taken the solemn oath to delay no man for money or malice,
and to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion. Under
the circumstances, suspension from the practice of law for six months is the condign and
commensurate penalty for him.
The Court notes that Atty. Millo already returned the P14,000.00 received for the transfer of title.
Although he ought also to refund the amount of P15,643.75 representing the penalty for the late
payment of the capital gains tax, the Court cannot order him to refund that amount because it is
not a collection agency. The Court may only direct the repayment of attorneys fees received on
the basis that a respondent attorney did not render efficient service to the client. Consequently,
Atty. Millo should refund the P10,000.00 given in connection with the adoption case, plus interest
of 6% per annum, reckoned from the finality of this decision.
WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and HOLDS Atty. MARCELITO M. MILLO guilty of violating Canon 18,
Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath; SUSPENDS him from
the practice of law for a period of six months effective from notice, with the STERN WARNING
that any similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more severely; ORDERS him to return to
the heirs of Johnny and Abella Pesto within ten days from notice the sum of P10,000.00, plus
legal interest of 6% per annum reckoned from the finality of this decision until full payment; and
DIRECTS him to promptly submit to this Court written proof of his compliance within thirty days
from notice of this decision.
Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to Atty.
Marcelito M. Millo's personal record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and
to the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country for
their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

Case No. 4
11
A.C. No. 4945 October 8, 2013
MA. JENNIFER TRIA-SAMONTE, Complainant, vs. EPIFANIA "FANNY" OBIAS, Respondent.

For the Court's resolution is an administrative Complaint-affidavit filed by Ma. Jennifer Tria-
Samonte (complainant) against Epifania "Fanny"Obias (respondent) charging her for grave
misconduct and/or gross malpractice.
The facts
In 1997, spouses Prudencio and Loreta Jeremias (Sps. Jeremias), through respondent, offered for
sale a parcel of agricultural land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 597 (subject
property) to the late Nestor Tria (Nestor) and Pura S. Tria (Sps. Tria), for a consideration of
P2,800,000.00 and payable in installments. Respondent, who was to receive the payment from
Sps. Tria and transmit the same to Sps. Jeremias, undertook to deliver the deed of sale and
owners copy of the title to her clients (Sps. Tria) upon full payment of the purchase price. She
further undertook to cause the conversion of the subject property from agricultural to residential,
and the transfer of the title to the names of Sps. Tria as part of the package agreement.
Respondent received all the installment payments made by Sps. Tria and issued receipts therefor.
After full payment of the purchase price on July 11, 1997, and after giving an additional
P115,000.00 for capital gains tax and other expenses, Sps. Tria requested from respondent the
delivery of the deed of sale and the owners copy of the title to them but respondent failed to
comply explaining that the Department of Agrarian Reform clearance for conversion of the
subject property from agricultural to residential was taking time. Despite several subsequent
demands, respondent still failed to fulfill her undertakings under the package agreement.
On May 22, 1998, Nestor was fatally shot and died. Thereafter, complainant, daughter of Sps.
Tria, again demanded from respondent and Sps. Jeremias the delivery of the deed of sale and the
certificate of title of the subject property to them, but to no avail. For their part, Sps. Jeremias
informed complainant that they had received the consideration of P2,200,000.00 and they had
executed and turned-over the sale documents to respondent.
Complainant later discovered that a deed of sale over the subject property was executed by Sps.
Jeremias and notarized by respondent favor of someone else, a certain Dennis Tan, on May 26,
1998 for a consideration of P200,000.00.
In defense, respondent, in her Comment, claimed that Nestor instructed her in November 1997
not to proceed with the processing of the deed of sale and, instead, to just look for another
buyer. She further averred that Nestor also demanded from her the return of the purchase price,
and that she complied with the said demand and returned the P2,800,000.00 in cash to Nestor
sometime during the latter part of January 1998. However, she did not ask for a written receipt
therefor. In fact, Nestor told her not to return the P115,000.00 intended for capital gains taxes
and other expenses, and to just apply the said sum as attorneys fees for the other legal services
that she rendered for him.
In the Courts Resolution dated August 30, 1999, the case was referred to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation. After numerous
postponements, mostly at the instance of respondent, only the complainant and her witnesses
testified before the IBP. Eventually, respondents right to present evidence was considered
waived.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
On September 25, 2007, the IBP Investigating Commissioner, Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes (Investigating
Commissioner), issued his Report and Recommendation, finding respondent to have violated her
oath as a lawyer due to her participation in the second sale of the subject property despite the
lack of any lawful termination of the prior sale of the same property to Sps.Tria. The Investigating
Commissioner observed that respondent received, and admitted to have received, from Sps. Tria
the P2,800,000.00 purchase price and the amount of P115,000.00 for expenses. He further found
the second sale of the same property to Dennis Tan as a clear indication that respondent: (a)
employed serious deceit or fraud against Sps. Tria and their family; (b) violated their proprietary
rights; and (c) violated the trust and confidence reposed in her. On the other hand, the
Investigating Commissioner did not give credence to respondents defense that she returned the
P2,800,000.00 purchase price given by Sps. Tria and that the latter caused the cancellation of
the sale of the subject property in their favor, absent any receipt or documentation to prove the
same. As counsel for Sps. Tria, respondent failed in her obligation to observe honesty and
diligence in their transaction and, as such, she was found guilty of grave misconduct and gross
malpractice in violation of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code).
Accordingly, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that respondent be suspended from
the practice of law for a period of five years.
Finding the recommendation to be fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, and considering respondents violation of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code, the IBP
Board of Governors adopted and approved the Investigating Commissioners Report and
Recommendation in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-185 dated October 19,2007 but reduced the
suspension of respondent from the practice of law from five years to one year.
12
Both complainant and respondent filed their respective motions for reconsideration which were,
however, denied in the IBP Board of Governors Resolution No. XX-2012-109 dated March 10,
2012.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should beheld administratively
liable for violating Canons 17 and 18 of the Code.
The Courts Ruling
The Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the IBP. Indeed, respondent, in her
Comment, already admitted that she rendered legal services to Sps. Tria, which necessarily gave
rise to a lawyer-client relationship between them. The complete turnaround made by respondent
in her motion for reconsideration from the IBP Board of Governors Resolution No. XX-2012-109,
where she contended that there was no lawyer-client relationship between her and Sps. Tria,
cannot thus be given any credence.
Since respondent publicly held herself out as lawyer, the mere fact that she also donned the hat
of a real estate broker did not divest her of the responsibilities attendant to the legal profession.
In this regard, the legal advice and/or legal documentation that she offered and/or rendered
regarding the real estate transaction subject of this case should not be deemed removed from
the category of legal services. Case law instructs that if a person, in respect to business affairs or
troubles of any kind, consults a lawyer with a view to obtaining professional advice or assistance,
and the attorney voluntarily permits or acquiesces with the consultation, then the professional
employment is established. Thus, in view of the fact that Sps. Tria knew respondent to be, and
transacted with her as, a lawyer, her belated and unilateral classification of her own acts as
being limited to those of a real estate broker cannot be upheld. In any case, the lawyer-client
relationship between Sps. Tria and respondent was confirmed by the latters admission that she
rendered legal services to the former. With this relationship having been established, the Court
proceeds to apply the ethical principles pertinent to this case.
It is a core ethical principle that lawyers owe fidelity to their clients cause and must always be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in them. They are duty-bound to observe candor,
fairness, and loyalty in all their dealings and transactions with their clients. Irrefragably, the legal
profession demands of attorneys an absolute abdication of every personal advantage conflicting
in any way, directly or indirectly, with the interests of their clients. As enshrined in Canons 17 and
18 of the Code:
Canon 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him.
Canon 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
In the present case, respondent clearly transgressed the above-mentioned rules as her actions
were evidently prejudicial to her clients interests. Records disclose that instead of delivering the
deed of sale covering the subject property to her clients, she willfully notarized a deed of sale
over the same property in favor of another person. Accordingly, far removed from protecting the
interest of her clients, Sps. Tria, who had, in fact, already fully paid the purchase price of the
subject property, respondent participated and was even instrumental in bringing about the
defeat of their rights over the said property. Hence, respondent grossly violated the trust and
confidence reposed in her by her clients, in contravention of Canons 17 and 18 of the Code. To
add, by turning against her own clients, respondent also violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code
which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful
conduct. Lest it be forgotten, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal
proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. These unyielding standards
respondent evidently failed to adhere to.
Anent the proper penalty to be imposed, records bear out that the penalty of suspension from
the practice of law recommended by the Investigating Commissioner was decreased from a
period of five years to just one year by the IBP Board of Governors in Resolution No. XVIII-2007-
185. However, the Court observes that the said resolution is bereft of any explanation showing
the bases for such modification in contravention of Section 12(a), Rule 139-B of the Rules of
Court which mandates that "the decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and
shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based." Verily, the Court
frowns on the unexplained change made by the IBP Board of Governors in the recommended
penalty. Be that as it may, the Court proceeds to correct the same.
Jurisprudence reveals that in similar cases where lawyers abused the trust and confidence
reposed in them by their clients as well as committed unlawful, dishonest, and immoral or
deceitful conduct, as in this case, the Court found them guilty of gross misconduct and disbarred
them. In Chua v. Mesina, Jr., the Court disbarred the lawyer who, upon his misrepresentations,
breached his promise to his clients to transfer to them the property subject of that case, but
instead, offered the same for sale to the public. Also, in Tabang v. Gacott, the penalty of
disbarment was meted out against the lawyer who, among others, actively sought to sell the
properties subject of that case contrary to the interests of his own clients. As the infractions in
the foregoing cases are akin to those committed by respondent in the case at bar, the Court
13
deems that the same penalty of disbarment be imposed against her. Clearly, as herein discussed,
respondent committed deliberate violations of the Code as she dishonestly dealt with her own
clients and advanced the interests of another against them resulting to their loss. For such
violations, respondent deserves the ultimate punishment of disbarment consistent with existing
jurisprudence.
As a final point, it bears to note that the foregoing resolution does not-as it should not -include an
order for the return of the P2,800,000.00 purchase price and the amount of P115,000.00 for
expenses allegedly received by respondent, albeit the Investigating Commissioner's findings on
the same. In Roa v. Moreno, it has been held that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are
only confined to the issue of whether or not the respondent-lawyer is still fit to be allowed to
continue as a member of the Bar and that the only concern is his administrative liability. Thus,
the Court's findings during administrative-disciplinary proceedings have no bearing on the
liabilities of the parties involved which are purely civil in nature -meaning, those liabilities which
have no intrinsic link to the lawyer's professional engagement as the same should be threshed
out in a proper proceeding of such nature.
WHEREFORE, respondent Epifania "Fanny" Obias is found guilty of gross misconduct and is
accordingly DISBARRED.
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts.
SO ORDERED.

Case No. 5
A.C. No. 5239 November 18, 2013
SPOUSES GEORGE A. WARRINER and AURORA R. WARRINER, Complainants, vs. ATTY.
RENI M. DUBLIN, Respondent.

This resolves the administrative Complaint filed on March 14, 2000 by complainant-spouses
George Arthur Warriner (Warriner) and Aurora R. Warriner against respondent Atty. Reni M. Dublin
for gross negligence and dereliction of duty.
In their Complaint filed directly before the Office of the Bar Confidant of this Court, complainants
alleged that they secured the services of respondent in the filing of a Complaint for damages
captioned as Aurora M Del Rio-Warriner and her spouse-husband George Arthur Warriner,
plaintiffs, versus E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co. Ltd. and docketed as Civil Case No. 23,396-95 before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Davao City, Branch 16; that during the proceedings in Civil Case
No. 23,396-95, respondent requested the RTC for a period of 10 days within which to submit his
Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence; that despite the lapse of the requested period,
respondent did not submit his Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence; that respondent did not
file any comment to E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. s motion to declare complainants to have
waived their right to file Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence; that respondent belatedly filed a
Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence which the RTC denied; that respondent did not oppose or
file any comment to E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd.s move to dismiss the Complaint; and that
the RTC eventually dismissed Civil Case No. 23,396-95 to the prejudice of herein complainants. In
a Resolution dated June 26, 2000, we directed respondent to file his Comment to this
administrative Complaint. Upon receipt of the Resolution on August 24, 2000, respondent
requested for an extension of 30 days which was granted.
However, as of August 5, 2002, or after a lapse of almost two years, respondent had not yet filed
his Comment. Thus, we resolved to require respondent to "show cause why he should not be
disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure and to comply with the resolution
requiring said comment, both within ten (10) days from notice." Respondent received our
directive but chose to ignore the same. In another Resolution dated August 4, 2003, we imposed
a fine of P1,000.00 on respondent and reiterated our directives requiring him to file his Comment
and to submit an explanation on his failure to file the same. However, respondent again ignored
this Courts directive. Thus, on February 15, 2006, we increased the fine to P2,000.00 but
respondent continued to ignore our Resolutions. Consequently, on March 10, 2008, we resolved
to order respondents arrest and detention until he complies with our Resolutions.
This time, respondent heeded our directives by submitting his Compliance and Comment.
Respondent claimed that he failed to file his Comment to the instant administrative case because
he lost the records of Civil Case No. 23,396-95 and that he tried to get a copy from the RTC to no
avail.
In his Comment belatedly filed eight years after the prescribed period, respondent averred that
complainant Warriner is an Australian national who married his Filipino spouse as a convenient
scheme to stay in the country; that he rendered his services in Civil Case No. 23,396-95 free of
charge; that he accepted the case because he was challenged by Warriners criticism of the
Philippine judicial system; that he doubted the veracity of Warriners claim that the construction
being undertaken by E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. indeed caused the erosion of the soil
towards his property; that Warriner was his only witness during the trial; that the reluctance of
14
other witnesses to testify for Warriner strengthened his suspicion of the veracity of Warriners
claim; that upon inquiries, he discovered that the bits of evidence presented by Warriner were
fabricated; that the barangay officials do not wish to participate in the fraudulent scheme of
Warriner; that he visited Warriners property and saw that Warriner authored the damage to his
property by draining the soil erosion prevention ditches provided by E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co.,
Ltd.; that he had a heated argument with Warriner during which the latter threatened him with a
disbarment suit; that based on his discovery, respondent did not wish to submit his Formal Offer
of Documentary Evidence; that complainants no longer saw him or inquired about the status of
the case; that he did not withdraw from the case because complainants no longer visited him at
his law office; that if he withdraws, Warriner would only hire another lawyer to perpetrate his
fraudulent scheme; and that he could not be held administratively liable for filing a belated
Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence as he only did the same to protect the legal profession
and in accordance with his oath not to do any falsehood or promote unlawful causes.
In a Resolution dated July 16, 2008, we found respondents explanation for failing to comply with
our directives not fully satisfactory hence, we admonished him to be more circumspect in his
dealings with the Court. At the same time, we referred the Complaint to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.
The parties submitted their respective Position Papers before the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline.
In their Position Paper, complainants insisted that respondent mishandled their case before the
RTC by filing a motion to admit the formal exhibits almost three months after the prescribed
period; that respondent did not present complainants Marriage Contract and General Power of
Attorney that would have allowed Warriner to represent his wife while the latter is out of the
country; that complainants marriage is not for convenience; that complainants have a son out of
said marriage; that respondent was paid for his services; that E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd.
did not secure an Environmental Compliance Certificate (ECC) before undertaking the
construction; that Warriner was not the sole witness for the prosecution; that the records of Civil
Case No. 23,396-95 would show that a representative from the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) and the Barangay Captain were likewise presented; and that these
witnesses proved that Warriners claim was not a fabrication.
In his Position Paper, respondent contradicted his earlier assertion in his Comment filed before
the Court that Warriner was his only witness in Civil Case No. 23,396-95 by claiming this time
that aside from Warriner, he also presented as witnesses a former barangay official and a
representative from DENR. He conceded that E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. indeed failed to
secure an ECC but claimed that this alone would not prove that E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd.
did not institute corrective measures to prevent soil erosion and damages to neighboring houses
such as Warriners. He insisted that it is the natural topography of the place which caused the
soil erosion which again contradicted his earlier allegation in his Comment before this Court that
it was Warriner who caused the soil erosion by destroying the ditches constructed by the
developer. Moreover, he alleged that the estimate of damages provided by Benings Garden
which he offered as an exhibit in Civil Case No. 23,396-95 was a fabrication as there is no such
entity in Laurel St., Davao City.
In their Supplemental Position Paper, complainants argued, among others, that since more than
eight years have lapsed, it is possible that Benings Garden relocated to another address but it
does not mean that it never existed.
In his Report and Recommendation, the Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of
mishandling Civil Case No. 23,396-95 in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
thus recommended respondents suspension from the practice of law for a period of six months.
The IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XIX-2010-442 dated August 28, 2010, approved
with modification the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. The IBP
Board of Governors noted that aside from mishandling the case of complainants, respondent also
showed his propensity to defy the orders of the court, thus it recommended respondent's
suspension from the practice of law for one year.
Respondent moved for reconsideration insisting that the IBPs Resolution is not supported by
facts. He maintained that his actuations did not amount to a violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and that the filing of the Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence, although belated,
exculpated him from any liability. He asserted that the exhibits were fabricated thus he
deliberately belatedly filed the Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence in the hope that the same
would be refused admission by the RTC. He denied defying lawful orders of the RTC or this Court.
He insisted that defiance of lawful orders connotes total, complete or absolute refusal and not
mere belated filing. He argued that he did not oppose or file comment to the Motion to Dismiss
as he deemed the same proper considering the fabricated allegations of his clients. Respondent
argued that the penalty recommended by the IBP is not commensurate to his infractions. He
alleged that the records of this case would show that he did not utterly disregard the orders or
processes of the Court or the IBP. He claimed that this Court should have deemed his failure to
timely file a Comment as a waiver on his part to file the same, and not as defiance of this Courts
15
orders. Besides, he insisted that the only issue to be resolved by the IBP was the alleged
mishandling of Civil Case No. 23,396-95; the IBP should not have delved on whether he
disregarded or was disrespectful of the Courts orders because he was not given any opportunity
to rebut the same.
Finally, respondent posited that his penalty is oppressive, excessive and disproportionate. He
argued that with his suspension, the other cases he is handling would be affected.
Complainants also filed their Motion for Reconsideration insisting that respondent should be
disbarred or suspended for five years from the practice of law. To this, respondent filed his
Comment asserting that the Investigating Commissioner erred and was inaccurate when he
stated in his Report and Recommendation that respondent had a heated argument with the
complainants. He averred that after the filing of the Formal Offer of Documentary Evidence and
until the dismissal of Civil Case No. 23,396-95, he had no occasion to meet the complainants. He
maintained that he had nothing to be remorseful about and that there is absolutely no evidence
that would justify his suspension. He maintained that "being basic and elementary in any legal
procedure, a failure or refusal to submit comment is but a waiver to so comment and puts the
controversy submitted for resolution based on the evidence available at hand x x x. It is
unfortunate that the Supreme Court did not consider respondents failure or omission as having
such effects, but such failure cannot be considered as a contemptuous act x x x."
The IBP Board of Governors, however, was not persuaded hence it denied respondents Motion
for Reconsideration.
On May 6, 2013, respondent filed before this Court An Ex Parte Manifestation (Not a Motion for
Reconsideration) insisting that his failure to timely file comment on the administrative case does
not constitute defiance of the Courts directives but is only "a natural human expression of
frustration, distraught and disappointment" when this Court and the IBP entertained a clearly
unmeritorious Complaint. In any case, he averred that on April 12, 2013, the IBP Davao City
Chapter presented him with a Certificate of Appreciation for his invaluable support to the local
chapter. He claims that
x x x Even a feeble minded average person will find it ridiculously hilarious and comical that the
[IBP] National Office condemns undersigned for his acts allegedly inimical to the profession but
will be praised to the heavens, so to speak, by the local chapter of the same organization for his
invaluable support to that same organization whose object, among others, is to discipline its
members to be respectful and [subservient] to the rule of law by serving justice in an orderly and
dignified manner. Weight and credence must be accorded the recognition and appreciation by
this local chapter being logically considered as having the first hand observation and, thus, the
personal knowledge of undersigneds personal character, integrity, uprightness, reputation and
sacrifices in the practice of his legal profession.
As a gesture of meek obedience, respondent will not pray for the reconsideration and setting
aside of that resolution adopted by the Honorable Board of Governors suspending him from the
practice of law for one (1) year, erroneous, disproportionate and harsh as it may be. Undersigned
only prays that, by way of protecting the prestigious image of the [IBP], measures be adopted to
prevent it from becoming a laughing stock of professional organizations in the Philippines worthy
for the books of wonders by its inconsistent, ridiculous and contradictory stance of disciplining its
members exemplified by the predicament of respondent in this instant proceeding on the one
hand but on the other hand is extolled by its local chapter to high heavens for his "invaluable
support" of the tenets and foundation of that very same organization that condemns him. THIS IS
HILARIOUSLY COMICAL AND ABSURDLY ODD.

Our Ruling
Respondent is indeed guilty of mishandling Civil Case No. 23,396-95. Records show that the 10-
day period given to respondent to submit his formal offer of documentary evidence pursuant to
the RTC Order dated November 11, 1997 lapsed without any compliance from the respondent.
Consequently, the RTC, in its January 23, 1998 Order deemed respondent to have waived the
submission of his formal offer of exhibits. Instead of asking the RTC to set aside the above Order,
respondent filed on February 3, 1998 a Motion to Admit the Belated Formal Exhibits in Evidence.
As to be expected, the RTC denied the motion. At the same time, it directed E.B. Villarosa &
Partner Co., Ltd. to file its Motion to Dismiss by way of Demurrer to Evidence. Again, respondent
failed to comment or oppose the Motion to Dismiss despite the opportunity given by the RTC. As
a result, Civil Case No. 23,396-95 was dismissed.
Plainly, respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility particularly Canon 18 and
Rule 18.03 which provide:
Canon 18 A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Worse, it appears that respondent deliberately mishandled Civil Case No. 23,396-95 to the
prejudice of herein complainants. Culled from the pleadings respondent submitted before this
Court and the IBP, respondent admitted that he deliberately failed to timely file a formal offer of
16
exhibits because he believes that the exhibits were fabricated and was hoping that the same
would be refused admission by the RTC. This is improper. If respondent truly believes that the
exhibits to be presented in evidence by his clients were fabricated, then he has the option to
withdraw from the case. Canon 22 allows a lawyer to withdraw his services for good cause such
as "[w]hen the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct with the matter he is
handling" or "[w]hen the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons
and rules." Respondent adverted to the estimate of damages provided by Benings Garden as a
fabrication as there is no such entity in Laurel St., Davao City. Unfortunately, respondent
anchored his claim that Bening's Garden does not exist merely on the claim of Rudolph C.
Lumibao, a "sympathetic client" and a part-time gardener. Complainants refuted this allegation
by claiming that Bening's Garden must have relocated its business considering that more than
eight years have passed since the estimate was secured. Complainants also pointed out that
since the filing of this case, respondent has thrice relocated his office but this does not mean
that his practice has ceased to exist.
We also agree with the IBP that respondent has a propensity to disobey and disrespect court
orders and processes. Note that we required respondent to submit his Comment to this
administrative Complaint as early as year 2000. However, he was only able to file his Comment
eight years later, or in 2008 and only after we ordered his arrest. "As an officer of the court,
respondent is expected to know that a resolution of this Court is not a mere request but an order
which should be complied with promptly and completely.
Finally, it has not escaped our notice that respondent is also prone to resorting to contradictions
in his effort to exculpate himself. In his Comment filed before this Court, respondent claimed that
Warriner was his only witness in Civil Case No. 23,396-95. However, in his Position Paper filed
before the IBP, he admitted that aside from Warriner, he also presented as witnesses a former
barangay official and a representative from DENR. Next, he claimed in his Comment filed before
this Court that he had a heated argument with Warriner during which the latter threatened him
with a disbarment suit. The Investigating Commissioner took this into account when he
submitted his Report and Recommendation. Surprisingly, respondent claimed in his Comment to
complainant's Motion for Reconsideration before the IBP that the Investigating Commissioner
erred and was inaccurate when he stated in his Report and Recommendation that respondent
had a heated argument with the complainants. Moreover, respondent claimed in his Comment
before this Court that Warriner authored the damage to his property by draining the soil erosion
prevention ditches provided by E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. However, he again contradicted
himself when he claimed in his Position Paper that the natural topography of the place was the
cause of the erosion. At this juncture, respondent must be reminded that as a lawyer and an
officer of the Court, he "owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court." He "shall not do any
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be
misled by any artifice."
Under the circumstances, and considering that we had already admonished respondent and had
him arrested for his adamant refusal to obey our directives, we find the penalty of suspension
from the practice of law for six months, as recommended by the Investigating Commissioner,
and as we similarly imposed in Hernandez v. Padilla and Pesto v. Millo, commensurate to
respondents infractions. Besides, we wish to emphasize that "suspension is not primarily
intended as a punishment but a means to protect the public and the legal profession."
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Atty. Reni M. Dublin is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six months
effective upon receipt of this Resolution with a WARNING that a similar violation will be dealt with
more severely. He is DIRECTED to report to this Court the date of his receipt of this Resolution to
enable this Court to determine when his suspension shall take effect.
Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in the personal records of respondent as a member of
the Bar and copies furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.

Case No. 6
A.C. No. 7766 August 5, 2014
JOSE ALLAN TAN, Complainant, vs. PEDRO S. DIAMANTE, Respondent.

For the Court's resolution is an administrative Complaint for disbarment dated February 1, 2008
filed by complainant Jose Allan Tan (complainant) against respondent Pedro S. Diamante
(respondent), charging him of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and the
lawyers oath for fabricating and using a spurious court order, and for failing to keep his client
informed of the status of the case.
The Facts

17
On April 2, 2003, complainant, claiming to be a recognized illegitimate son of the late Luis Tan,
secured the services of respondent in order to pursue a case for partition of property against the
heirs of the late spouses Luis and Natividad Valencia-Tan. After accepting the engagement,
respondent filed the corresponding complaint before the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City,
Branch 46 (RTC), docketed as Civil Case No. 03-11947. The complaint was eventually dismissed
by the RTC in an Order dated July 25, 2007 for lack of cause of action and insufficiency of
evidence. While respondent was notified of such dismissal as early as August 14, 2007,
complainant learned of the same only on August 24, 2007 when he visited the formers office. On
such occasion, respondent allegedly asked for the amount of P10,000.00 for the payment of
appeal fees and other costs, but since complainant could not produce the said amount at that
time, respondent, instead, asked and was given the amount of P500.00 purportedly as payment
of the reservation fee for the filing of a notice of appeal before the RTC. On September 12, 2007,
Tan handed the amount of P10,000.00 to respondent, who on even date, filed a notice of appeal
before the RTC.
In an Order dated September 18, 2007, the RTC dismissed complainants appeal for having been
filed beyond the reglementary period provided for by law. Respondent, however, did not disclose
such fact and, instead, showed complainant an Order dated November 9, 2007 purportedly
issued by the RTC (November 9, 2007 Order) directing the submission of the results of a DNA
testing to prove his filiation to the late Luis Tan, within 15 days from receipt of the notice.
Considering the technical requirements for such kind of testing, complainant proceeded to the
RTC and requested for an extension of the deadline for its submission. It was then that he
discovered that the November 9, 2007 Order was spurious, as certified by the RTCs Clerk of
Court. Complainant also found out that, contrary to the representations of respondent, his appeal
had long been dismissed. Aggrieved, he filed the instant administrative complaint for disbarment
against respondent.
In his Comments/Compliance dated September 4, 2009, respondent alleged that it was
complainants failure to timely produce the amount of 1,400.00 to pay for the appeal fees that
resulted in the late filing of his appeal. According to him, he informed complainant of the lapse of
the reglementary period to appeal, but the latter insisted in pursuing the same. He also claimed
to have assisted complainant "not for money or malice" but being a desperate litigant, he was
blamed for the courts unfavorable decision.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation dated September 21, 2010, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner found respondent administratively liable, and
accordingly recommended that the penalty of suspension for a period of one (1) year be meted
out against him.
The Investigating Commissioner found complainants imputations against respondent to be well-
founded, observing that instead of meeting complainants allegations squarely, particularly, the
issue of the nondisclosure of the dismissal of the partition case, respondent sidestepped and
delved on arguments that hardly had an effect on the issues at hand.
Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner did not find credence in respondents accusation that
the spurious November 9, 2007 Order originated from complainant, ratiocinating that it was
respondent who was motivated to fabricate the same to cover up his lapses that brought about
the dismissal of complainants appeal and make it appear that there is still an available relief left
for Tan.
In a Resolution dated April 16, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors unanimously adopted and
approved the aforesaid report and recommendation.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively
liable for violating the CPR.
The Courts Ruling
After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the IBPs findings, subject to the
modification of the recommended penalty to be imposed upon respondent.
Under Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR, it is the lawyers duty to keep his client constantly
updated on the developments of his case as it is crucial in maintaining the latters confidence, to
wit:
CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to clients request for information.
As an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to inform his client of whatever important
information he may have acquired affecting his clients case. He should notify his client of any
adverse decision to enable his client to decide whether to seek an appellate review thereof.
Keeping the client informed of the developments of the case will minimize misunderstanding and
loss of trust and confidence in the attorney. The lawyer should not leave the client in the dark on
how the lawyer is defending the clients interests. In this connection, the lawyer must constantly
keep in mind that his actions, omissions, or nonfeasance would be binding upon his client.
18
Concomitantly, the lawyer is expected to be acquainted with the rudiments of law and legal
procedure, and a client who deals with him has the right to expect not just a good amount of
professional learning and competence but also a whole-hearted fealty to the clients cause.
In the case at bar, records reveal that as of August 14, 2007, respondent already knew of the
dismissal of complainants partition case before the RTC. Despite this fact, he never bothered to
inform complainant of such dismissal as the latter only knew of the same on August 24, 2007
when he visited the formers office. To add insult to injury, respondent was inexcusably negligent
in filing complainants appeal only on September 12, 2007, or way beyond the reglementary
period therefor, thus resulting in its outright dismissal. Clearly, respondent failed to exercise such
skill, care, and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in such
matters of professional employment.
Worse, respondent attempted to conceal the dismissal of complainants appeal by fabricating the
November 9, 2007 Order which purportedly required a DNA testing to make it appear that
complainants appeal had been given due course, when in truth, the same had long been denied.
In so doing, respondent engaged in an unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct that caused
undue prejudice and unnecessary expenses on the part of complainant. Accordingly, respondent
clearly violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, which provides:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect
for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal
proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing, failing in which whether in
his personal or private capacity, he becomes unworthy to continue his practice of law. A lawyers
inexcusable neglect to serve his clients interests with utmost diligence and competence as well
as his engaging in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct in order to conceal such neglect
should never be countenanced, and thus, administratively sanctioned.
In view of the foregoing, respondents conduct of employing a crooked and deceitful scheme to
keep complainant in the dark and conceal his cases true status through the use of a falsified
court order evidently constitutes Gross Misconduct. His acts should not just be deemed as
unacceptable practices that are disgraceful and dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw that
makes him unfit to practice law. In this regard, the Courts pronouncement in Sebastian v. Calis is
instructive, viz.:
Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable. They reveal
moral flaws in a lawyer. They are unacceptable practices. A lawyers relationship with others
should be characterized by the highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor. This is the
essence of the lawyers oath. The lawyers oath is not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a
sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable. The nature of the office of an attorney
requires that he should be a person of good moral character. This requisite is not only a condition
precedent to the admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the practice of law. We have sternly warned that any gross misconduct of a lawyer,
whether in his professional or private capacity, puts his moral character in serious doubt as a
member of the Bar, and renders him unfit to continue in the practice of law. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
Jurisprudence reveals that in analogous cases where lawyers failed to inform their clients of the
status of their respective cases, the Court suspended them for a period of six (6) months. In
Mejares v. Romana, the Court suspended the lawyer for the same period for his failure to timely
and adequately inform his clients of the dismissal of their petition. In the same vein, in Penilla v.
Alcid, Jr., the same penalty was imposed on the lawyer who consistently failed to update his
client of the status of his cases, notwithstanding several follow-ups.
However, in cases where lawyers engaged in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct by
falsifying documents, the Court found them guilty of Gross Misconduct and disbarred them. In
Brennisen v. Contawi, the Court disbarred the lawyer who falsified a special power of attorney in
order to mortgage and sell his clients property. Also, in Embido v. Pe, the penalty of disbarment
was meted out against the lawyer who falsified an in existent court decision for a fee.
As already discussed, respondent committed acts of falsification in order to misrepresent to his
client, i.e., complainant, that he still had an available remedy in his case, when in reality, his
case had long been dismissed for failure to timely file an appeal, thus, causing undue prejudice
to the latter. To the Court, respondents acts are so reprehensible, and his violations of the CPR
are so flagrant, exhibiting his moral unfitness and inability to discharge his duties as a member
of the bar. His actions erode rather than enhance the public perception of the legal profession.
Therefore, in view of the totality of his violations, as well as the damage and prejudice caused to
his client, respondent deserves the ultimate punishment of disbarment.
WHEREFORE, respondent Pedro S. Diamante is hereby DISBARRED for Gross Misconduct and
violations of Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF from the roll of attorneys.

19
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Pedro S. Diamante's record in this Court.
Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all the courts in the
country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

Case No. 7
A.C. No. 6484, June 16, 2015
ADELITA B. LLUNAR, Complainant, v. ATTY. ROMULO RICAFORT, Respondent.

The present administrative case stemmed from the complaint-affidavit that Adelita B. Llunar
(complainant) filed against Atty. Romulo Ricafort (respondent) for gross and inexcusable
negligence and serious misconduct.

Antecedents

In September 2000, the complainant, as attorney-in-fact of Severina Bafiez, hired the respondent
to file a case against father and son Ricardo and Ard Cervantes (Ard) for the recovery of a parcel
of land allegedly owned by the Banez family but was fraudulently registered under the name of
Ricardo and later was transferred to Ard.

The property, which Ard had mortgaged with the Rural Bank of Malilipot, Albay, was the subject
of foreclosure proceedings at the time the respondent was hired. The respondent received from
the complainant the following amounts: (a) P70,000.00 as partial payment of the redemption
price of the property; (b) P19,000.00 to cover the filing fees; and (c) P6,500.00 as attorney's
fees.

Three years later, the complainant learned that no case involving the subject property was ever
filed by the respondent with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Legaspi City. Thus, the complainant
demanded that the respondent return to her the amount of P95,000.00.

The respondent refused to return the whole amount of P95,000.00 to the complainant. He argued
that a complaint for annulment of title against Ard Cervantes had actually been filed in court,
though not by him, but by another lawyer, Atty. Edgar M. Abitria. Thus, he was willing to return
only what was left of the P95,000.00 after deducting therefrom the P50,000.00 that he paid to
Atty. Abitria as acceptance fee for handling the case.

The complainant refused to recognize the complaint for annulment of title filed by Atty. Abitria
and claimed that she had no knowledge of Atty. Abitria's engagement as counsel. Besides, the
complaint was filed three (3) years late and the property could no longer be redeemed from the
bank. Also, the complainant discovered that the respondent had been suspended indefinitely
from the practice of law since May 29, 2002, pursuant to this Court's decision in Administrative
Case No. 5054, which the complainant suspected was the reason another lawyer, and not the
respondent, filed the complaint for annulment of title in court.

In a resolution dated February 2, 2005, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.

In a report dated May 22, 2009, IBP Investigating Commissioner Cecilio C. Villanueva found the
respondent to have been grossly negligent in handling the complainant's case and to have
gravely abused the trust and confidence reposed in him by the complainant, thereby, violating
Canons 15 and 17, and Rules 1.01, 16.03, 18.03, and 18.04 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).

Also, the Investigating Commissioner found the respondent to have erred in not informing his
client that he was under indefinite suspension from the practice of law. Due to these infractions,
Commissioner Villanueva recommended that the respondent remain suspended indefinitely from
the practice of law.

In Resolution No. XIX-2011-224 dated May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors agreed with the
Investigating Commissioner's findings on the respondent's liability but modified the
recommended penalty from indefinite suspension to disbarment. It also ordered the respondent
20
to return to the complainant the amount of P95,000.00 within thirty (30) days from notice. The
respondent moved for reconsideration.

In his motion for reconsideration, the respondent argued that his referral of the complainant's
case to Atty. Abitria was actually with the complainant's knowledge and consent; and that he
paid Atty. Abitria P50,000.00 for accepting the case. These facts were confirmed by Atty. Abitria
in an affidavit dated November 17, 2004, but were alleged to have been overlooked by
Commissioner Villanueva in his report. The IBP Board of Governors, in Resolution No. XX-2013-
710 dated June 21, 2013, denied the respondent's motion for reconsideration.

Our Ruling

We find the respondent guilty of Grave Misconduct in his dealings with his client and
in engaging in the practice of law while under indefinite suspension, and thus impose
upon him the ultimate penalty of DISBARMENT.

The respondent in this case committed several infractions making him liable for grave
misconduct. First, the respondent did not exert due diligence in handling the complainant's case.
He failed to act promptly in redeeming the complainant's property within the period of
redemption. What is worse is the delay of three years before a complaint to recover the property
was actually filed in court. The respondent clearly dilly-dallied on the complainant's case and
wasted precious time and opportunity that were then readily available to recover the
complainant's property. Under these facts, the respondent violated Rule 18.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR), which states that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."

Second, the respondent failed to return, upon demand, the amounts given to him by the
complainant for handling the latter's case. On three separate occasions, the respondent received
from the complainant the amounts of P19,000.00, P70,000.00, and P6,500.00 for purposes of
redeeming the mortgaged property from the bank and filing the necessary civil case/s against
Ard Cervantes. The complainant approached the respondent several times thereafter to follow up
on the case/s to be filed supposedly by the respondent who, in turn, reassured her that actions
on her case had been taken.

After the complainant discovered three years later that the respondent had not filed any case in
court, she demanded that the respondent return the amount of P95,000.00, but her demand was
left unheeded. The respondent later promised to pay her, but until now, no payment of any
amount has been made. These facts confirm that the respondent violated Canon 16 of the CPR,
which mandates every lawyer to "hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may
come into his possession" and to "account for all money or property collected or received for or
from the client." In addition, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or property he
holds for his client gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated these funds or
property for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by his
client.

Third, the respondent committed dishonesty by not being forthright with the complainant that he
was under indefinite suspension from the practice of law. The respondent should have disclosed
this fact at the time he was approached by the complainant for his services. Canon 15 of the CPR
states that "a lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his clients." The respondent lacked the candor expected of him as a member of
the Bar when he accepted the complainant's case despite knowing that he could not and should
not practice law.

Lastly, the respondent was effectively in the practice of law despite the indefinite suspension
imposed on him. This infraction infinitely aggravates the offenses he committed. Based on the
above facts alone, the penalty of suspension for five (5) years from the practice of law would
have been justified, but the respondent is not an ordinary violator of the profession's ethical
rules; he is a repeat violator of these rules. In Nuez v. Atty. Ricafort, we had adjudged the
respondent liable for grave misconduct in failing to turn over the proceeds of the sale of a
property owned by his client and in issuing bounced checks to satisfy the alias writ of execution
issued by the court in the case for violation of Batas Pambansa Big. 22 filed against him by his
client. We then suspended him indefinitely from the practice of law - a penalty short of
disbarment. Under his current liability - which is no different in character from his previous
offense - we have no other way but to proceed to decree his disbarment. He has become
completely unworthy of membership in our honorable profession.

21
With respect to the amount to be returned to the complainant, we agree with the IBP that the
respondent should return the whole amount of P95,000.00, without deductions,
regardless of whether the engagement of Atty. Abitria as counsel was with the complainant's
knowledge and consent.

In the first place, the hiring of Atty. Abitria would not have been necessary had the respondent
been honest and diligent in handling the complainant's case from the start. The complainant
should not be burdened with the expense of hiring another lawyer to perform the services that
the respondent was hired to do, especially in this case where there was an inexcusable non-
delivery of such services.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Romulo Ricafort is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law
and his name REMOVED from the Roll of Attorneys, effective immediately upon his receipt of
this Decision. Also, he is ORDERED to RETURN the amount of P95,000.00 to complainant
Adelita B. Llunar, within thirty (30) days from notice of this Decision.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the respondent's personal record and furnished the
Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court
Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country. This Decision should likewise be posted
on the Supreme Court website for the information of the general public.

SO ORDERED.

Case No. 8
A.C.No.10138 (June 16, 2015)
(Formerly CBD Case No. 06-1876)
ROBERTO P. NONATO, vs. ATTY. EUTIQUIO M. FUDOLIN, JR.,

We resolve the administrative complaint filed by Roberto P. Nonato (complainant) charging Atty.
Eutiquio M. Fudolin, Jr. (respondent) with gross neglect of duty.
Factual Background
In a verified complaint dated October 18, 2006, the complainant alleged that his father, the late
Restituto Nonato (Restituto), was the duly registered owner of a 479-sq.m. real property
(property) at Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. The property became the subject of ejectment
proceedings filed by Restituto against Anselmo Tubongbanua (Anselmo), before the Municipal
Trial Court (MTC) of Hinigaran, Province of Negros Occidental, docketed as Civil Case No. MTC-
282. When the complaint was filed, Restituto was represented by Atty. Felino Garcia (Atty.
Garcia). However, at the pre-trial stage, Atty. Garcia was replaced by Atty. Fudolin, the
respondent in the present case.
The complainant alleged that although his father Restituto paid the respondent his acceptance
fees, no formal retainer agreement was executed. The respondent also did not issue any receipts
for the acceptance fees paid.
The respondent, on the other hand, averred that Restituto, and not the complainant, engaged his
services on Restitutos representation that they were relatives. For this reason, he accepted the
case on a minimal acceptance fee of P20,000.00 and appearance fee of P1,000.00, and did not
execute any formal retainer agreement.
The complainant asserted that during the pendency of the ejectment proceedings before the
MTC, the respondent failed to fully inform his father Restituto of the status and developments in
the case. Restituto could not contact the respondent despite his continued efforts. The
respondent also failed to furnish Restituto copies of the pleadings, motions and other documents
filed with the court. Thus, Restituto and the complainant were completely left in the dark
regarding the status of their case. After an exchange of initial pleadings in the ejectment
proceedings, the MTC ordered the parties to submit their respective position papers. Since
neither party complied with the courts directive, the MTC dismissed the complaint as well as the
counterclaim on May 26, 2005. The respondent filed a motion for reconsideration from the order
of dismissal. He justified his failure to file the position paper by arguing that he misplaced the
case records, adding that he was also burdened with numerous other cases. The MTC denied the
motion.
The respondent filed a second motion for reconsideration, this time alleging that the ejectment
case was a meritorious one such that its dismissal would cause injustice to Restituto (the
plaintiff). He also filed a supplemental motion, but the court denied both motions.

22
On September 15, 2005, Restituto died and all his properties passed on to his heirs, the
complainant among them.
The complainant alleges that he and his father Restituto did not know of the ejectment suits
dismissal as the respondent had failed to furnish them a copy of the MTCs dismissal order. The
complainant also asserts that the respondent did not inform them about the filing of the motion
for reconsideration or of its denial by the MTC. The complainant claims that he only found out
that the case had been dismissed when he personally went to the Office of the MTC Clerk of
Court and was informed of the dismissal.
Because of the patent negligence, the complainant informed the respondent that his failure to
file the position paper could be a ground for his disbarment. Furthermore, the complainant,
without the respondents intervention, entered into an oral extrajudicial compromise with the
daughter of defendant Anselmo.
On August 17, 2007, the respondent wrote the complainant and apologized for his repeated
failure to communicate with him. He reasoned out that he failed to file the position paper due to
his poor health. He also claimed that he had suffered a stroke and had become partially blind,
which caused the delay in the preparation of the pleadings in the ejectment case.
In his Answer dated December 22, 2006, the respondent asserted that at the time he received
the MTCs directive to submit a position paper, he was already suffering from Hypertensive
Cardiovascular Disease, Atrial Fibrillation, Intermittent, and Diabetes Mellitus Type II. The
respondent also alleged that further consultations confirmed that he had an undetected stroke
and arterial obstruction during the previous months. His health condition led to his loss of
concentration in his cases and the loss of some of the case folders, among them the records of
the ejectment case. The respondent also claimed that he focused on his health for self-
preservation, and underwent vascular laboratory examinations; thus, he failed to communicate
with the late Restituto and the complainant.
The respondent further averred that his failure to file the position paper in the ejectment
proceedings was not due to willful negligence but to his undetected stroke. He never revealed
the gravity of his illness to his clients or to the court out of fear that his disclosure would affect
his private practice.
Lastly, the respondent alleged that after the ejectment suits dismissal, he exerted all efforts, to
the point of risking his poor health, by filing successive pleadings to convince the court to
reconsider its dismissal order.
Because the dismissal was purely based on a technical ground, he maintained that his failure to
file the position paper did not amount to the abandonment of his clients case.
The IBPs Report and Recommendation
IBP Investigating Commissioner Acerey C. Pacheco issued his Report and Recommendation,
finding the respondent guilty of both negligence and betrayal of his clients confidence. The
Investigating Commissioner found that the respondents failure to file the position paper in the
ejectment proceedings and to apprise the client of the status of the case demonstrated his
negligence and lack of prudence in dealing with his clients.

The Investigating Commissioner likewise held that the respondents failure to promptly inform his
clients, including the complainant, of his medical condition deprived them of the opportunity to
seek the services of other lawyers. Had he notified the complainants father of his illness before
the case was dismissed, the latter could have engaged the services of another lawyer, and the
case would not have been dismissed on a mere technical ground.
The Investigating Commissioner recommended the respondents suspension for one (1) month
from the practice of law.
In a Resolution dated May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
Investigating Commissioners Report and Recommendation after finding it to be fully supported
by the evidence on record and by the applicable laws and rules.
The complainant moved to reconsider the resolution but the IBP Board of Governors denied his
motion in a resolution dated June 21, 2013.
The Issue
The issue in this case is whether or not the respondent could be held administratively liable for
negligence in the performance of duty.
The Courts Ruling
Except for the recommended penalty, we adopt the findings of the IBP.
A lawyer is bound to protect his clients interests to the best of his ability and with utmost
diligence.
He should serve his client in a conscientious, diligent, and efficient manner; and provide the
quality of service at least equal to that which he, himself, would expect from a competent lawyer
in a similar situation. By consenting to be his clients counsel, a lawyer impliedly represents that
he will exercise ordinary diligence or that reasonable degree of care and skill demanded by his
profession, and his client may reasonably expect him to perform his obligations diligently.
The failure to meet these standards warrants the imposition of disciplinary action.
23
In this case, the record clearly shows that the respondent has been remiss in the performance of
his duties as Restitutos counsel. His inaction on the matters entrusted to his care is plainly
obvious. He failed to file his position paper despite notice from the MTC requiring him to do so.
His omission greatly prejudiced his client as the Court in fact dismissed the ejectment suit.
In addition, the respondent failed to inform Restituto and the complainant of the status of the
case. His failure to file the position paper, and to inform his client of the status of the case, not
only constituted inexcusable negligence; but it also amounted to evasion of duty.
All these acts violate the Code of Professional Responsibility warranting the courts imposition of
disciplinary action. The pertinent provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility provide:
Canon 17 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him.
Canon 18 A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the clients request for information.
In Perla Compania de Seguros, Inc. v. Saquilabon, we considered a lawyers failure to file a brief
for his client to be inexcusable negligence. We held that the lawyers omission amounted to a
serious lapse in the duty he owed his client and in his professional obligation not to delay
litigation and to aid the courts in the speedy administration of justice.
Similarly in Uy v. Tansinsin, we ruled that a lawyers failure to file the required pleadings and to
inform his client about the developments in her case fell below the standard and amounted to a
violation of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We emphasized the importance
of the lawyers duty to keep their clients adequately and fully informed about the developments
in their cases, and held that a client should never be left in the dark, for to do so would be to
destroy the trust, faith, and confidence reposed in the retained lawyer and in the legal profession
as a whole. We also emphasized in Villaflores v. Limos that the trust and confidence reposed by a
client in his lawyer impose a high standard that includes the appreciation of the lawyers duty to
his clients, to the profession, to the courts, and to the public. Every case a lawyer accepts
deserves his full attention, diligence, skill and competence, regardless of its importance and
whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.
Because a lawyer-client relationship is one of trust and confidence, there is a need for the client
to be adequately and fully informed about the developments in his case. A client should never be
left groping in the dark; to allow this situation is to destroy the trust, faith, and confidence
reposed in the retained lawyer and in the legal profession in general.
The respondent has apparently failed to measure up to these required standards. He neglected
to file the required position paper, and did not give his full commitment to maintain and defend
his clients interests. Aside from failing to file the required pleading, the respondent never
exerted any effort to inform his client of the dismissal of the ejectment case.
We also find the respondents excuse that he had an undetected stroke and was suffering from
other illnesses unsatisfactory and merely an afterthought. Even assuming that he was then
suffering from numerous health problems (as evidenced by the medical certificates he attached),
his medical condition cannot serve as a valid reason to excuse the omission to file the necessary
court pleadings. The respondent could have requested an extension of time to file the required
position paper, or at the very least, informed his client of his medical condition; all these, the
respondent failed to do.

Furthermore, the respondents subsequent filing of successive pleadings (after the ejectment
case had been dismissed) significantly weakens his health-based excuse. His efforts not only
contradict his explanation that his physical predicament forced him to focus on his illnesses; they
also indicate that his illnesses (allegedly Hypertensive Cardiovascular Disease, Atrial Fibrillation,
Intermittent, and Diabetes Mellitus Type II) were not at all incapacitating.
All told, we find that the respondent violated Canon 17, Canon 18, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. We, however, find the IBPs recommended penalty (one
(1) month suspension from the practice of law) to be a mere slap on the wrist considering the
gravity of the infractions committed. Thus, we deem it appropriate to impose the penalty of two
(2) years suspension, taking into account the respondent's acts and omissions, as well as the
consequence of his negligence.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby SUSPEND Atty. Eutiquio M. Fudolin, Jr. from the
practice of law for a period of two (2) years for violating Rules 18.03 and Rule 18.04, Canon' 18,
and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. We also WARN him that the commission
of the same or similar act or acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Atty. Eutiquio M. Fudolin, Jr. is DIRECTED to formally MANIFEST to this Court, upon receipt of this
Decision, the date of his receipt which shall be the starting point of his suspension. He shall
furnish a copy of this Manifestation to all the courts and quasi-judicial bodies where he has
entered his appearance as counsel.
24
Let a copy of this decision be attached to Atty. Fudolin's records with the Office of the Bar
Confidant and posted on the Supreme Court website as a notice to the general public.

SO ORDERED.

Case No. 9
A.C. No. 7749, July 08, 2013
JOSEFINA CARANZA VDA. DE SALDIVAR, Complainant, v. ATTY. RAMON SG CABANES, JR.,
Respondent.

For the Courts resolution is an administrative complaint filed by Josefina Caranza vda. de
Saldivar (complainant) against Atty. Ramon SG Cabanes, Jr. (respondent), charging him for gross
negligence in violation of Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (Code).

The Facts

Complainant was the defendant in an unlawful detainer case, docketed as Civil Case No. 1972,
filed by the heirs of one Benjamin Don (heirs) before the Municipal Trial Court of Pili, Camarines
Sur (MTC), wherein she was represented by respondent. While respondent duly filed an answer to
the unlawful detainer complaint, he, however, failed to submit a pre-trial brief as well as to
attend the scheduled preliminary conference. Consequently, the opposing counsel moved that
the case be submitted for decision which motion was granted in an Order dated November 27,
2003. When complainant confronted respondent about the foregoing, the latter just apologized
and told her not to worry, assuring her that she will not lose the case since she had the title to
the subject property.

25
On December 30, 2003, the MTC issued a Decision (MTC Decision) against complainant, ordering
her to vacate and turn-over the possession of the subject property to the heirs as well as to pay
them damages. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court of Pili, Camarines Sur, Branch 32 (RTC),
reversed the MTC Decision and dismissed the unlawful detainer complaint. Later however, the
Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the RTCs ruling and reinstated the MTC Decision. Respondent
received a copy of the CAs ruling on January 27, 2006. Yet, he failed to inform complainant about
the said ruling, notwithstanding the fact that the latter frequented his work place. Neither did
respondent pursue any further action. As such, complainant decided to engage the services of
another counsel for the purpose of seeking other available remedies. Due to respondents failure
to timely turn-over to her the papers and documents in the case, such other remedies were,
however, barred. Thus, based on these incidents, complainant filed the instant administrative
complaint, alleging that respondents acts amounted to gross negligence which resulted in her
loss.

In a Resolution dated March 10, 2008, the Court directed respondent to comment on the
administrative complaint within ten (10) days from notice.

Accordingly, respondent filed a Manifestation with Compliance dated May 19, 2008, admitting to
have agreed to represent complainant who claimed to be the tenant and rightful occupant of the
subject property owned by the late Pelagia Lascano (Pelagia). He alleged that upon careful
examination of the heirs' unlawful detainer complaint, he noticed a discrepancy between the
descriptions of the subject property as indicated in the said pleading as opposed to that which
complainant supplied to him. On the belief that the parties may be contesting two (2) sets of
properties which are distinct and separate from one another, respondent, at the preliminary
conference conducted on October 28, 2003, moved for the suspension of further proceedings
and proposed that a commissioner be appointed to conduct a re-survey in order to determine the
true identity of the property in dispute. The MTC allowed the counsels for both parties to decide
on the manner of the proposed re-survey, leading to the assignment of a Department of Agrarian
Reform Survey Engineer (DAR Engineer) for this purpose. In relation, the heirs counsel agreed to
turn-over to respondent in his office certain documents which indicated the subject propertys
description. Thus, pending the conduct and results of the re-survey, the preliminary conference
was tentatively reset to November 27, 2003.

As it turned out, the heirs counsel was unable to furnish respondent copies of the above-stated
documents, notwithstanding their agreement. This led the latter to believe that the preliminary
conference scheduled on November 27, 2003 would not push through. Respondent averred that
the aforesaid setting also happened to coincide with an important provincial conference which he
was required to attend. As such, he inadvertently missed the hearing. Nonetheless, he proffered
that he duly appealed the adverse MTC Decision to the RTC, resulting to the dismissal of the
unlawful detainer complaint, albeit later reversed by the CA.

Thereafter, pending the heirs' appeal to the CA, respondent came upon the information that the
disputed property was subject of a petition for exemption from the coverage of Presidential
Decree No. (PD) 27 filed by Pelagia against complainants mother, Placida Caranza (Placida).
Based on several documents furnished to him by certain DAR personnel, respondent was
satisfied that Placida indeed held the subject property for a long time and actually tilled the
same in the name of Pelagia, thereby placing it under PD 27 coverage. Due to such information,
respondent was convinced that Placida and consequently, complainant (who took over the
tilling) was indeed entitled to the subject property. Hence, he advised complainant that it would
be best to pursue remedies at the administrative level, instead of contesting the appeal filed by
the heirs before the CA. It was respondents calculated legal strategy that in the event the CA
reverses the decision of the RTC, an opposition to the issuance of a writ of execution or a motion
to quash such writ may be filed based on the afore-stated reasons, especially if an approved plan
and later, an emancipation patent covering the subject property is issued.

Meanwhile, the survey conducted by the DAR Engineer revealed that complainant's tillage
extended to about 5,000 square meters of the subject property which was determined to belong
to the heirs, the rest being covered by the title of Pelagia. Dissatisfied, complainant manifested
her intention to secure the services of a private surveyor of her own choice, and promised to
furnish respondent a copy of the survey results, which she, however, failed to do. Later,
complainant accused respondent of manipulating the DAR Survey Results which caused their
lawyer-client relationship to turn sour and eventually be severed. She has since retrieved the
entire case folders and retained the services of another lawyer.

In a Resolution dated July 7, 2008, the Court resolved to refer the instant administrative case to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for its evaluation, report and recommendation.
26
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline set the case for mandatory conference on April 15, 2009
and required the parties to submit their respective position papers.

The IBPs Report and Recommendation

On June 18, 2009, the Investigating IBP Commissioner, Rebecca Villanueva-Maala (Investigating
Commissioner), issued a Report and Recommendation (Commissioners Report), finding
respondent to have been negligent in failing to attend the preliminary conference in Civil Case
No. 1972 set on November 27, 2003 which resulted in the immediate submission of the said case
for decision and eventual loss of complainants cause.

The Investigating Commissioner observed that respondent could have exercised ordinary
diligence by inquiring from the court as to whether the said preliminary conference would push
through, considering that the November 27, 2003 setting was only tentative and the heirs
counsel was not able to confer with him. Further, the fact that respondent had to attend an
important provincial conference which coincided with the said setting hardly serves as an excuse
since he should have sent a substitute counsel on his behalf. Also, respondent never mentioned
any legal remedy that he undertook when the heirs elevated the decision of the RTC to the CA. In
fact, he did not file any comment or opposition to the heirs appeal. Finally, respondents
enumerations of his legal options to allegedly protect the complainants interests were found to
be thought only after the fact.

Thus, based on the foregoing, the Investigating Commissioner ruled that respondent failed to
exercise ordinary diligence in handling his client's cause, warranting his suspension from the
practice of law for a period of six (6) months.

The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Commissioners Report in Resolution No.
XIX-2011-266 dated May 14, 2011, finding the same to be fully supported by the evidence on
record and in accord with applicable laws and rules.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied, in Resolution No. XX-
2012-517 dated December 14, 2012.

The Court's Ruling

The Court resolves to adopt the IBP's findings and recommendation.

The relationship between an attorney and his client is one imbued with utmost trust and
confidence. In this light, clients are led to expect that lawyers would be ever-mindful of their
cause and accordingly exercise the required degree of diligence in handling their affairs. Verily, a
lawyer is expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, and to devote his
full attention, skill, and competence to the case, regardless of its importance and whether he
accepts it for a fee or for free. Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18 of the Code
embody these quintessential directives and thus, respectively state:

CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him.

CANON 18 A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

xxxx

Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond
within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.

Case law further illumines that a lawyers duty of competence and diligence includes not merely
reviewing the cases entrusted to the counsel's care or giving sound legal advice, but also
consists of properly representing the client before any court or tribunal, attending scheduled
hearings or conferences, preparing and filing the required pleadings, prosecuting the handled
cases with reasonable dispatch, and urging their termination without waiting for the client or the
court to prod him or her to do so.

27
Conversely, a lawyer's negligence in fulfilling his duties subjects him to disciplinary action. While
such negligence or carelessness is incapable of exact formulation, the Court has consistently
held that the lawyers mere failure to perform the obligations due his client is per se a violation.

Applying these principles to the present case, the Court finds that respondent failed to exercise
the required diligence in handling complainants cause.

Records show that he failed to justify his absence during the scheduled preliminary conference
hearing in Civil Case No. 1972 which led the same to be immediately submitted for decision. As
correctly observed by the Investigating Commissioner, respondent could have exercised ordinary
diligence by inquiring from the court as to whether the said hearing would push through,
especially so since it was only tentatively set and considering further that he was yet to confer
with the opposing counsel. The fact that respondent had an important commitment during that
day hardly exculpates him from his omission since the prudent course of action would have been
for him to send a substitute counsel to appear on his behalf. In fact, he should have been more
circumspect to ensure that the aforesaid hearing would not have been left unattended in view of
its adverse consequences, i.e., that the defendants failure to appear at the preliminary
conference already entitles the plaintiff to a judgment. Indeed, second-guessing the conduct of
the proceedings, much less without any contingent measure, exhibits respondents inexcusable
lack of care and diligence in managing his clients cause.

Equally compelling is the fact that respondent purposely failed to assail the heirs appeal before
the CA. Records disclose that he even failed to rebut complainant's allegation that he neglected
to inform her about the CA ruling which he had duly received, thereby precluding her from
availing of any further remedies. As regards respondents suggested legal strategy to pursue the
case at the administrative level, suffice it to state that the same does not excuse him from failing
to file a comment or an opposition to an appeal, or even, inform his client of any adverse
resolution, as in this case. Irrefragably, these are basic courses of action which every diligent
lawyer is expected to make.

All told, it cannot be gainsaid that respondent was guilty of gross negligence, in violation of the
above-cited provisions of the Code.

As regards the appropriate penalty, several cases show that lawyers who have been held liable
for gross negligence for infractions similar to those of the respondent were suspended for a
period of six (6) months. In Aranda v. Elayda, a lawyer who failed to appear at the scheduled
hearing despite due notice which resulted in the submission of the case for decision was found
guilty of gross negligence and hence, suspended for six (6) months. In Heirs of Tiburcio F.
Ballesteros, Sr. v. Apiag, a lawyer who did not file a pre-trial brief and was absent during the pre-
trial conference was likewise suspended for six (6) months. In Abiero v. Juanino, a lawyer who
neglected a legal matter entrusted to him by his client in breach of Canons 17 and 18 of the
Code was also suspended for six (6) months. Thus, consistent with existing jurisprudence, the
Court finds it proper to impose the same penalty against respondent and accordingly suspends
him for a period of six (6) months.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ramon SG Cabanes, Jr. is found guilty of gross negligence in
violation of Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months,
effective upon his receipt of this Resolution, and is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the
same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts.

SO ORDERED.

Case No. 10
A.C. No. 10164 March 10, 2014
STEPHAN BRUNET and VIRGINIA ROMANILLOS BRUNET, Complainants, vs. ATTY. RONALD
L. GUAREN, Respondent.
28
On August 9, 2002, complainant spouses Stephan and Virginia Brunet (complainants) filed a
complaint against respondent Atty. Ronald L. Guaren (Atty. Guaren) before the Commission on
Bar Discipline (CED), Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
Complainants alleged that in February 1997, they engaged the services of Atty. Guaren for the
titling of a residential lot they acquired in Bonbon, Nueva Caseres; that Atty. Guaren asked for a
fee of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) including expenses relative to its proceeding; that it was
agreed that full payment of the fee shall be made after the delivery of the title; that Atty. Guaren
asked for an advance fee of One Thousand Pesos (Pl,000.00) which they gave; that Atty. Guaren
took all the pertinent documents relative to the titling of their lot-certified true copy of the tax
declaration, original copy of the deed of exchange, sketch plan, deed of donation, survey plan,
and original copy of the waiver; that on March 10, 1997, Atty. Guaren asked for additional
payment of Six Thousand Pesos (P6,000.00) which they dutifully gave; that from 1997 to 2001,
they always reminded Atty. Guaren about the case and each time he would say that the titling
was in progress; that they became bothered by the slow progress of the case so they demanded
the return of the money they paid; and that respondent agreed to return the same provided that
the amount of Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) be deducted to answer for his professional fees.
Complainants further alleged that despite the existence of an attorney-client relationship
between them, Atty. Guaren made a special appearance against them in a case pending before
the Metropolitan Circuit Trial Court, Oslob, Cebu (MCTC).
Atty. Guaren admitted that he indeed charged complainants an acceptance fee of P10,000.00,
but denied that the amount was inclusive of expenses for the titling of the lot. He claimed,
however, that he received the payment of P1,000.00 and P6,000.00; that their agreement was
that the case would be filed in court after the complainants fully paid his acceptance fee; that he
did not take the documents relative to the titling of the lot except for the photocopy of the tax
declaration; and that he did not commit betrayal of trust and confidence when he participated in
a case filed against the complainants in MCTC explaining that his appearance was for and in
behalf of Atty. Ervin Estandante, the counsel on record, who failed to appear in the said hearing.
In the Report and Recommendation, dated August 24, 2012, the Investigating Commissioner
found Atty. Guaren to have violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility when he accepted
the titling of complainants lot and despite the acceptance of P7,000.00, he failed to perform his
obligation and allowed 5 long years to elapse without any progress in the titling of the lot. Atty.
Guaren should also be disciplined for appearing in a case against complainants without a written
consent from the latter. The CBD recommended that he be suspended for six (6) months.
In its May 20, 2013 Resolution, the IBP Board of Governors, adopted and approved with
modification the Report and Recommendation of the CBD, suspending Atty. Guaren from the
practice of law for three (3) months only.
The Court adopts the findings of the IBP Board of Governors on the unethical conduct of Atty.
Guaren, except as to the penalty.
The practice of law is not a business. It is a profession in which duty to public service, not money,
is the primary consideration. Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a money-making venture,
and law advocacy is not a capital that necessarily yields profits. The gaining of a livelihood
should be a secondary consideration. The duty to public service and to the administration of
justice should be the primary consideration of lawyers, who must subordinate their personal
interests or what they owe to themselves.
Canons 17 and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that:
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust
and confidence reposed in him.
CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
In the present case, Atty. Guaren admitted that he accepted the amount of P7,000.00 as partial
payment of his acceptance fee. He, however, failed to perform his obligation to file the case for
the titling of complainants' lot despite the lapse of 5 years. Atty. Guaren breached his duty to
serve his client with competence and diligence when he neglected a legal matter entrusted to
him.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Ronald L. Guaren is found GUILTY of having violated Canons 17
and 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS effective from receipt of this Resolution, with a warning that a
similar infraction in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be included in the records of the
respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters; and the Office
of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.

29
Case No. 11
IPI No. 12-205-CA-J December 10, 2013
RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF THOMAS S. MERDEGIA AGAINST HON. VICENTE S.E.
VELOSO, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, RELATIVE TO CA G.R. SP No.
119461.
x---------------x
A.C. No.: 10300
RE: RESOLUTION DATED OCTOBER 8, 2013 IN OCA IPI No. 12-205-CA-J AGAINST ATTY.
HOMOBONO ADAZA II.

On October 8, 2013, we issued a Resolution dismissing the administrative complaint of Tomas S.

Merdegia against Court of Appeals Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso. In this same Resolution,
we also directed Atty. Homobono Adaza II, Merdegias counsel, to show cause why he should not
be cited for contempt.
After considering Atty. Adazas explanation, we find his account insufficient, and find him guilty of
indirect contempt.
According to Atty. Adaza, he should not be punished for indirect contempt as he was merely
performing his duty as Merdegias counsel when he assisted him in preparing the administrative
complaint against Justice Veloso. Atty. Adaza asserted that both he and his client observed Justice
Velosos partiality during the oral arguments, but instead of immediately filing an administrative
complaint against him, he counseled Merdegia to first file a Motion to Inhibit Justice Veloso from
the case. However, upon finding that Justice Veloso refused to inhibit himself, Merdegia repeated
his request to file an administrative complaint against Justice Veloso, to which Atty. Adaza
acceded. Thus, Atty. Adaza pleaded that he should not be faulted for assisting his client,
especially when heal so believes in the merits of his clients case.
Atty. Adazas explanation, read together with the totality of the facts of the case, fails to convince
us of his innocence from the contempt charge.
As Atty. Adaza himself admitted, he prepared the administrative complaint after Justice Veloso
refused to inhibit himself from a case he was handling. The complaint and the motion for
inhibition were both based on the same main cause: the alleged partiality of Justice Veloso during
the oral arguments of Merdegias case. The resolution dismissing the motion for inhibition should
have disposed of the issue of Justice Velosos bias. While we do not discount the fact that it was
Justice Veloso who penned the resolution denying the motion for inhibition, we note that he was
allowed to do this under the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals. Had Merdegia and Atty.
Adaza doubted the legality of this resolution, the proper remedy would have been to file a
petition for certiorari assailing the order denying the motion for inhibition. The settled rule is that
administrative complaints against justices cannot and should not substitute for appeal and other
judicial remedies against an assailed decision or ruling. While a lawyer has a duty to represent
his client with zeal, he must do so within the bounds provided by law. He is also duty-bound to
impress upon his client the propriety of the legal action the latter wants to undertake, and to
encourage compliance with the law and legal processes.
A reading of Merdegias administrative complaint shows an apparent failure to understand that
cases are not always decided in ones favor, and that an allegation of bias must stem from an
extrajudicial source other than those attendant to the merits and the developments in the case.
In this light, we cannot but attribute to Atty. Adaza the failure to impress upon his client the
features of our adversarial system, the substance of the law on ethics and respect for the judicial
system, and his own failure to heed what his duties as a professional and as an officer of the
Court demand of him in acting for his client before our courts.
To be sure, deciding administrative cases against erring judges is not an easy task. We have to
strike a balance between the need for accountability and integrity in the Judiciary, on the one
hand, with the need to protect the independence and efficiency of the Judiciary from vindictive
and enterprising litigants, on the other. Courts should not be made to bow down to the wiles of
litigants who bully judges into inhibiting from cases or deciding cases in their favor, but neither
should we shut our doors from litigants brave enough to call out the corrupt practices of people
who decide the outcome of their cases. Indeed, litigants who feel unjustly injured by malicious
and corrupt acts of erring judges and officials should not be punished for filing administrative
cases against them; neither should these litigants be unjustly deterred from doing so by a wrong
signal from this Court that they would be made to explain why they should not be cited for
contempt when the complaints they filed prove to be without sufficient cause.
What tipped the balance against Atty. Adaza, in this case, is the totality of the facts of the case
that, when read together with the administrative complaint he prepared, shows that his
complaint is merely an attempt to malign the administration of justice. We note Atty. Adazas
penchant for filing motions for inhibition throughout the case: first, against Judge Ma. Theresa
Dolores C. Gomez Estoesta of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, who issued an order unfavorable
30
to his client; and second, against all the justices of the Court of Appeals division hearing his
appeal, for alleged bias during the oral arguments on his case. These indicators, taken together
with the baseless administrative complaint against Justice Veloso after he penned an order
adverse to Atty. Adazas client, disclose that there was more to the administrative complaint than
the report of legitimate grievances against members of the Judiciary.
In Re: Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, etc., we cited a litigant in indirect contempt
of court for his predisposition to indiscriminately file administrative complaints against members
of the Judiciary. We held that this conduct degrades the judicial office, interferes with the due
performance of their work for the Judiciary, and thus constitutes indirect contempt of court.
Applying this principle to the present case, we hold that Atty. Adazas acts constitute an improper
conduct that tends to degrade the administration of justice, and is thus punishable for indirect
contempt under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
As a final note, Atty. Adazas contemptuous conduct may also be subject to disciplinary sanction
as a member of the bar. If we do not now proceed at all against Atty. Adaza to discipline him, we
are prevented from doing so by our concern for his due process rights. Our Resolution of October
8, 2013 only asked him to show cause why he should not be cited in contempt, and not why he
should not be administratively penalized. To our mind, imposing a disciplinary sanction against
Atty. Adaza through a contempt proceeding violates the basic tenets of due process as a
disciplinary action is independent and separate from a proceeding for contempt. A person
charged of an offense, whether in an administrative or criminal proceeding, must be informed of
the nature of the charge against him, and given ample opportunity to explain his side.
While the two proceedings can proceed simultaneously with each other, a contempt proceeding
cannot substitute for a disciplinary proceeding for erring lawyers, and vice versa. There can be
no substitution between the two proceedings, as contempt proceedings against lawyers, as
officers of the Court, are different in nature and purpose from the discipline of lawyers as legal
professionals. The two proceedings spring from two different powers of the Court. The Court, in
exercising its power of contempt, exercises an implied and inherent power granted to courts in
general. Its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings; to the
enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts; and, consequently, in the
administration of justice; thus, it may be instituted against any person guilty of acts that
constitute contempt of court. Further, jurisprudence describes a contempt proceeding as penal
and summary in nature; hence, legal principles applicable to criminal proceedings also apply to
contempt proceedings. A judgment dismissing the charge of contempt, for instance, may no
longer be appealed in the same manner that the prohibition against double jeopardy bars the
appeal of an accuseds acquittal.
In contrast, a disciplinary proceeding against an erring lawyer is sui generis in nature; it is
neither purely civil nor purely criminal. Unlike a criminal prosecution, a disciplinary proceeding is
not intended to inflict punishment, but to determine whether a lawyer is still fit to be allowed the
privilege of practicing law. It involves an investigation by the Court of the conduct of its officers,
and has, for its primary objective, public interest. Thus, unlike a contempt proceeding, the
acquittal of the lawyer from a disciplinary proceeding cannot bar an interested party from
seeking reconsideration of the ruling. Neither does the imposition of a penalty for contempt
operate as res judicata to a subsequent charge for unprofessional conduct.
Contempt proceedings and disciplinary actions are also governed by different procedures.
Contempt of court is governed by the procedures under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, whereas
disciplinary actions in the practice of law are governed by Rules 138 and 139 thereof.
IN THESE LIGHTS, the Court finds Atty. Homobomo Adaza II GUILTY OF INDIRECT CONTEMPT for
filing a frivolous suit against Court of Appeals Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso, and hereby
sentences him to pay, within the period of fifteen days from the promulgation of this judgment, a
fine of P5,000.00. The respondent is also WARNED that further similar misbehavior on his part
may be a ground for the institution of disciplinary proceedings against him.
SO ORDERED.

31
Case No. 12
A.C. No. 9149 (September 4, 2013)
JULIAN PENILLA vs. ATTY. QUINTIN P. ALCID JR.
Before this Court is an administrative complaint filed against respondent Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr.
for violation of the Iawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility, and for gross
misconduct in the performance of his duty as a lawyer.
The antecedent facts follow:
Complainant Julian Penilla entered into an agreement with Spouses Rey and Evelyn Garin (the
spouses) for the repair of his Volkswagen automobile. Despite full payment, the spouses
defaulted in their obligation. Thus, complainant decided to file a case for breach of contract
against the spouses where he engaged the services of respondent as counsel.
Respondent sent a demand letter to the spouses and asked for the refund of complainants
payment. When the spouses failed to return the payment, respondent advised complainant that
he would file a criminal case for estafa against said spouses. Respondent charged P30,000 as
attorneys fees and P10,000 as filing fees. Complainant turned over the relevant documents to
respondent and paid the fees in tranches. Respondent then filed the complaint for estafa before
Asst. City Prosecutor Jose C. Fortuno of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
Respondent attended the hearing with complainant but the spouses did not appear. After the
hearing, complainant paid another P1,000 to respondent as appearance fee. Henceforth,
complainant and respondent have conflicting narrations of the subsequent events and
transactions that transpired.
Complainant alleges that when the case was submitted for resolution, respondent told him that
they have to give a bottle of Carlos Primero I to Asst. City Prosecutor Fortuno to expedite a
favorable resolution of the case. Complainant claims that despite initial reservations, he later
acceded to respondents suggestion, bought a bottle of Carlos Primero I for P950 and delivered it
to respondents office.
Asst. City Prosecutor Fortuno later issued a resolution dismissing the estafa case against the
spouses. Respondent allegedly told complainant that a motion for reconsideration was needed
to have [the resolution] reversed. Respondent then prepared the motion and promised
complainant that he would fix the problem. On February 18, 2002, the motion was denied for
lack of merit. Respondent then told complainant that he could not do anything about the adverse
decision and presented the option of filing a civil case for specific performance against the
spouses for the refund of the money plus damages. Complainant paid an additional P10,000 to
respondent which he asked for the payment of filing fees. After complainant signed the
complaint, he was told by respondent to await further notice as to the status of the case.
Complainant claims that respondent never gave him any update thereafter.
Complainant asserts having made numerous and unsuccessful attempts to follow-up the status
of the case and meet with respondent at his office. He admits, however, that in one instance he
was able to talk to respondent who told him that the case was not progressing because the
spouses could not be located. In the same meeting, respondent asked complainant to determine
the whereabouts of the spouses. Complainant returned to respondents office on January 24,
2005, but because respondent was not around, complainant left with respondents secretary a
letter regarding the possible location of the spouses.
Complainant claims not hearing from respondent again despite his several letters conveying his
disappointment and requesting for the return of the money and the documents in respondents
possession. Complainant then sought the assistance of the radio program Ito ang Batas with
Atty. Aga to solve his predicament. Following the advice he gathered, complainant went to the
Office of the Clerk of Court of the Caloocan City Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial Court
(RTC). Complainant learned that a civil case for Specific Performance and Damages was filed on
June 6, 2002 but was dismissed on June 13, 2002. He also found out that the filing fee was only
P2,440 and not P10,000 as earlier stated by respondent. Atty. Aga of the same radio program
32
also sent respondent a letter calling his attention to complainants problem. The letter, like all of
complainants previous letters, was unheeded.
On January 9, 2006, complainant filed before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on
Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) the instant administrative case praying that respondent be found guilty
of gross misconduct for violating the Lawyers Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility,
and for appropriate administrative sanctions to be imposed.
Respondent harps a different tale.
In an Answer filed on January 30, 2006, respondent prayed that the case be dismissed for lack of
merit. He denied charging complainant P10,000 as filing fees for the estafa case and claimed
that he charged and received only P2,000. He also countered that the payment of P30,000 made
by the complainant was his acceptance fee for both the estafa case and civil case. Respondent
likewise denied the following other allegations of complainant: that he assured the success of the
case before the prosecutor; that he asked complainant to give a bottle of Carlos Primero I to the
prosecutor; that he promised to fix the case; and that he charged P10,000, as he only charged
P5,000, as filing fee for the civil case.
Respondent explained that it was not a matter of indifference on his part when he failed to
inform petitioner of the status of the case. In fact, he was willing to return the money and the
documents of complainant. What allegedly prevented him from communicating with complainant
was the fact that complainant would go to his office during days and times that he would be
attending his daily court hearings.
The IBP-CBD called for a mandatory conference on April 28, 2006. Only complainant and his
counsel attended. The conference was reset and terminated on June 9, 2006. The parties were
directed to file their verified position papers within 15 days, to which complainant and
respondent complied.
On July 18, 2006, respondent filed a Reply praying for the dismissal of the case for lack of factual
and legal bases. He stated that he had performed his duties as complainants counsel when he
filed the criminal case before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and the civil case
before the RTC of Caloocan City. He averred that he should not be blamed for the dismissal of
both cases as his job was to ensure that justice is served and not to win the case. It was
unethical for him to guarantee the success of the case and resort to unethical means to win such
case for the client. He continued to deny that he asked complainant to give the prosecutor a
bottle of Carlos Primero I and that the filing fees he collected totalled P20,000. Respondent
argued that it is incredulous that the total sum of all the fees that he had allegedly collected
exceeded P30,000 the amount being claimed by complainant from the spouses.
In its Report and Recommendation dated September 12, 2008, the IBP-CBD recommended the
suspension of respondent from the practice of law for six months for negligence within the
meaning of Canon 18 and transgression of Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
viz:
In the case under consideration, there are certain matters which keep sticking out like a sore
thumb rendering them difficult to escape notice.
One is the filing of a criminal complaint for estafa arising out of a violation of the contract for
repair of the Volks Wagon (sic) car. It is basic that when an act or omission emanates from a
contract, oral or written, the consequent result is a breach of the contract, hence, properly
actionable in a civil suit for damages. As correctly pointed out by the Investigating Prosecutor,
the liability of the respondent is purely civil in nature because the complaint arose from a
contract of services and the respondent (spouses Garin) failed to perform their contractual
obligation under the contract.
xxxx
Another one is the filing of a civil complaint for specific performance and damages (after the
dismissal of the criminal complaint for estafa) in the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City where
the actual damages claimed is P36,000.00.
It is also basic that the civil complaint for P36,000.00 should have been filed with the MTC
[which] has jurisdiction over the same. One of the firsts that a lawyer ascertains in filing an
action is the proper forum or court with whom the suit or action shall be filed. In June 2002 when
the civil complaint was filed in court, the jurisdiction of the MTC has already expanded such that
the jurisdictional amount of the RTC is already P400,000.00.
xxxx
Another thing is the various follow-ups made by respondents client as evidenced by the letters
marked as Exhibits D, E, F, G and H which were all received by complainants secretary,
except for Exhibit H which was received by Atty. Asong, not to mention Exhibit M which was
sent by Atty. Aga. These efforts of the complainant were not reciprocated by the respondent
with good faith. Respondent chose to ignore them and reasoned out that he is willing to meet
with the complainant and return the money and documents received by reason of the legal
engagement, but omitted to communicate with him for the purpose of fixing the time and place
for the meeting. This failure suggests a clear disregard of the clients demand which was done in
bad faith on the part of respondent.
33
On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVIII-2008-646,
adopting and approving the recommendation of the IBP-CBD. The Resolution reads:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part
of this Resolution as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence
on record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering Respondents violation of Canon 18
and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for his negligence, Atty. Quintin P. Alcid,
Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.
On April 24, 2009, respondent sought reconsideration and asked that the penalty of suspension
be reduced to warning or reprimand. After three days, or on April 27, 2009, respondent filed a
Motion to Admit Amended Motion for Reconsideration Upon Leave of Office. Respondent
asserted that the failure to inform complainant of the status of the cases should not be attributed
to him alone. He stressed that complainant had always been informed that he only had time to
meet with his clients in the afternoon at his office in Quezon City. Despite such notice,
complainant kept going to his office in Tandang Sora. He admitted that though he committed
lapses which would amount to negligence in violation of Canon 18 and Rule 18.04, they were
done unknowingly and without malice or bad faith. He also stressed that this was his first
infraction.
In its Resolution No. XIX-2011-473 dated June 26, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors denied
respondents Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit. On August 15, 2011, respondent filed a
second Motion for Reconsideration which was no longer acted upon due to the transmittal of the
records of the case to this Court by the IBP on August 16, 2011.16
On September 14, 2011, the Court issued a Resolution and noted the aforementioned Notices of
Resolution dated December 11, 2008 and June 26, 2011. On December 14, 2011, it issued
another Resolution noting the Indorsement dated August 16, 2011 of Director Alicia A. Risos-Vidal
and respondents second Motion for Reconsideration dated August 15, 2011.
We sustain the findings of the IBP that respondent committed professional negligence under
Canon 18 and Rule 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, with a modification that we
also find respondent guilty of violating Canon 17 and Rule 18.03 of the Code and the Lawyers
Oath.
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his
duties, or an odious deportment unbecoming an attorney. A lawyer must at no time be wanting in
probity and moral fiber which are not only conditions precedent to his entrance to the Bar but are
likewise essential demands for his continued membership therein.
The Complaint before the IBP-CBD charged respondent with violation of his oath and the
following provisions under the Code of Professional Responsibility:
1. a) Canon 15 A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his client;
2. b) Rule 15.06, Canon 15 A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any
public official, tribunal or legislative body;
3. c) Rule 16.01, Canon 16 A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or
received for or from his client;
4. d) Canon 17 A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of
the trust and confidence reposed in him;
5. e) Canon 18 A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence;
6. f) Rule 18.03[Canon 18] A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and
his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable; and
7. g) Rule 18.04[Canon 18] A lawyer shall keep his client informed of the status of his case
and shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information.
A review of the proceedings and the evidence in the case at bar shows that respondent violated
Canon 18 and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Complainant
correctly alleged that respondent violated his oath under Canon 18 to serve his client with
competence and diligence when respondent filed a criminal case for estafa when the facts of
the case would have warranted the filing of a civil case for breach of contract. To be sure, after
the complaint for estafa was dismissed, respondent committed another similar blunder by filing a
civil case for specific performance and damages before the RTC. The complaint, having an
alternative prayer for the payment of damages, should have been filed with the Municipal Trial
Court which has jurisdiction over complainants claim which amounts to only P36,000. As
correctly stated in the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD:
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129[,] as amended by R.A. No. 7691 which took effect on April 15, 1994[,]
vests in the MTCs of Metro Manila exclusive original jurisdiction of civil cases where the amount
of demand does not exceed P200,000.00 exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorneys fees, litigation expenses and costs (Sec. 33), and after five (5) years from the
effectivity of the Act, the same shall be adjusted to P400,000.00 (Sec. 34).
The errors committed by respondent with respect to the nature of the remedy adopted in the
criminal complaint and the forum selected in the civil complaint were so basic and could have
34
been easily averted had he been more diligent and circumspect in his role as counsel for
complainant. What aggravates respondents offense is the fact that his previous mistake in filing
the estafa case did not motivate him to be more conscientious, diligent and vigilant in handling
the case of complainant. The civil case he subsequently filed for complainant was dismissed due
to what later turned out to be a basic jurisdictional error.
That is not all. After the criminal and civil cases were dismissed, respondent was plainly negligent
and did not apprise complainant of the status and progress of both cases he filed for the latter.
He paid no attention and showed no importance to complainants cause despite repeated follow-
ups. Clearly, respondent is not only guilty of incompetence in handling the cases. His lack of
professionalism in dealing with complainant is also gross and inexcusable. In what may seem to
be a helpless attempt to solve his predicament, complainant even had to resort to consulting a
program in a radio station to recover his money from respondent, or at the very least, get his
attention.
Respondents negligence under Rules 18.03 and 18.04 is also beyond contention. A client pays
his lawyer hard-earned money as professional fees. In return, [e]very case a lawyer accepts
deserves his full attention, skill and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he
accepts it for a fee or for free. Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enjoins a
lawyer not to neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable. He must constantly keep in mind that his actions or omissions
or nonfeasance would be binding upon his client. He is expected to be acquainted with the
rudiments of law and legal procedure, and a client who deals with him has the right to expect not
just a good amount of professional learning and competence but also a whole- hearted fealty to
the clients cause. Similarly, under Rule 18.04, a lawyer has the duty to apprise his client of the
status and developments of the case and all other information relevant thereto. He must be
consistently mindful of his obligation to respond promptly should there be queries or requests for
information from the client.
In the case at bar, respondent explained that he failed to update complainant of the status of the
cases he filed because their time did not always coincide. The excuse proffered by respondent is
too lame and flimsy to be given credit. Respondent himself admitted that he had notice that
complainant had visited his office many times. Yet, despite the efforts exerted and the vigilance
exhibited by complainant, respondent neglected and failed to fulfill his obligation under Rules
18.03 and 18.04 to keep his client informed of the status of his case and to respond within a
reasonable time to the clients request for information.
Finally, respondent also violated Canon 17 of the Code which states that [a] lawyer owes fidelity
to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
The legal profession dictates that it is not a mere duty, but an obligation, of a lawyer to accord
the highest degree of fidelity, zeal and fervor in the protection of the clients interest. The most
thorough groundwork and study must be undertaken in order to safeguard the interest of the
client. The honor bestowed on his person to carry the title of a lawyer does not end upon taking
the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys. Rather, such honor attaches to him for the
entire duration of his practice of law and carries with it the consequent responsibility of not only
satisfying the basic requirements but also going the extra mile in the protection of the interests
of the client and the pursuit of justice. Respondent has defied and failed to perform such duty
and his omission is tantamount to a desecration of the Lawyers Oath.
All said, in administrative cases for disbarment or suspension against lawyers, it is the
complainant who has the burden to prove by preponderance of evidence the allegations in the
complaint. In the instant case, complainant was only able to prove respondents violation of
Canons 17 and 18, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the
Lawyers Oath. Complainant failed to substantiate his claim that respondent violated Canon 15
and Rule 15.06 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when respondent allegedly instructed
him to give a bottle of Carlos Primero I to Asst. City Prosecutor Fortuno in order to get a favorable
decision. Similarly, complainant was not able to present evidence that respondent indeed
violated Rule 16.01 of Canon 16 by allegedly collecting money from him in excess of the required
filing fees.
As to respondent's proven acts and omissions which violate Canons 17 and 18 and Rules 18.03
and 18.04 of the Code of professional Responsibility, and the lawyer's Oath, we find the same to
constitute gross misconduct for which he may be suspended under Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court viz:
SEC.21. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. - A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for
any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing
as an attorney a party to a case without authority to do so. x x x.
WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors adopting and approving the Decision
of the Investigating Commissioner is hereby AFFIRMED with a MODIFICATION that respondent
35
Atty. Quintin P. Alcid, Jr. is hereby found GUILTY of gross misconduct for violating Canons 17 and
18, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility as well as the Lawyers
Oath. This Court hereby imposes upon respondent the penalty of SUSPENSION from the practice
of law for a period of SIX (6) MONTHS to commence immediately upon receipt of this Decision.
Respondent is further ADMONISHED to be more circumspect and diligent in handling the cases of
his clients, and STERNLY WARNED that a commission of the same or similar acts in the future
shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Court Administrator to be
disseminated to all courts throughout the country, to the Office of Bar Confidant to be appended
to Atty. Quintin P. Alcid Jr.'s personal records, and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its
information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

Case No. 13
[Adm. Case No. 2417. February 6, 2002]
ALEX ONG, complainant, vs. ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO, respondent.

This is a disbarment case filed by Alex Ong, a businessman from Dumaguete City, against Atty.
Elpidio D. Unto, for malpractice of law and conduct unbecoming of a lawyer.
The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP-Pasig City) found
Atty. Unto guilty of malpractice and recommended the penalty of one-month suspension from the
practice of law or, at the very least, a severe reprimand against him.
First, we look at the antecedent facts. The records show that the complainant received a
demand-letter from the respondent, in the latters capacity as legal counsel of one Nemesia
Garganian. The full text of respondents letter reads:
Dear Mr. Ong:
This is in connection with the claim of support of Miss Nemesia Garganian (my client) from you
for your only child, Anson Garganian, with her (Miss Nemesia Garganian) and other claims which
Miss Garganian is demanding from you. It is now about two months that you have abandoned
your legal and moral obligations to support your only child with her (Miss Nemesia Garganian)
and up to this moment you have not given said financial support.

36
I am doing this as a preliminary basis to a possible amicable settlement, if you desire so, so that
you will not be dragged unnecessarily to a court proceeding in connection with your legal and
moral obligations to your son with Miss Garganian.
May I advise you that within three (3) days from your receipt of this letter, you should return to
her house her television and betamax which you got from her house during her absence and
without her knowledge and consent. Your failure to comply with this demand, this office will be
constrained to file the proper action in court against you.
I hope within three (3) days from your receipt of this letter you may come to my Law Office at the
above address or you may send your lawyer and/or representative to discuss with me about the
preliminary matters in connection with all the claims of Miss Garganian against you.
I hope that you will not fail us, so that we can thresh out this matter smoothly, otherwise your
intentional failure or refusal to discuss these claims amicably with our office might be construed
as your absolute refusal really.
Expecting you then.
Very truly yours,
ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO
Counsel for Miss Nemesia Garganian
Dumaguete City
WITH MY CONSENT:
NEMESIA GARGANIAN
A few days thereafter, the respondent wrote a letter addressed to Dr. Jose Bueno (Agaw), an
emissary of the complainant. In this letter, the respondent listed down the alleged additional
financial demands of Ms. Garganian against the complainant and discussed the courses of action
that he would take against the complainant should the latter fail to comply with his obligation to
support Ms. Garganian and her son. The relevant portion of the respondents second letter reads:
These are the demands which my client would want to be complied (with):
1. P1,500.00 monthly For the sustenance of Mr. Ongs son. x x x (Note: That this amount of
P1,500.00 should be up to the completion of Mr. Ongs son in the elementary course and this is
subject to adjustment when the son is already in the secondary course or up to his college
course).
2. P50,000.00 - This amount should be given to Miss Garganian as her starting capital for her
planned business venture to give her a source of her living since she cannot anymore be a
teacher in any government position because of her status, having a child without being lawfully
wedded. x x x.
3. The TV and the Betamax should be returned and delivered to the house of Miss Garganian,
without the presence of Mr. Alex Ong x x x.
4. The amount of P5,000.00 as my attorneys fees should be given or paid to me tomorrow before
noon in my Law Office, through my cousin, Dr. Jose Bueno.
Criminal, civil and administrative actions that I am contemplating to file against Mr.
Alex Ong will be withheld pending the compliance by Mr. Ong of these compromise
agreements.
Gaw, if not of (sic) your representation I believe that one-week time as grace period for Mr. Ong
is too long a time.
Thank you very much.
Very truly yours,
ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO
Counsel for Miss Nemesia Garganian
It was alleged that the real father of Ms. Garganians son was the complainants brother and that
the complainant merely assumed his brothers obligation to appease Ms. Garganian who was
threatening to sue them. The complainant then did not comply with the demands against him.
Consequently, the respondent filed a complaint with the Office of the City Fiscal (now Prosecutors
Office) of Dumaguete City against the complainant, his wife, Bella Lim, and one Albina Ong, for
alleged violation of the Retail Trade Nationalization Law and the Anti-Dummy Law.
The next day, the respondent filed another criminal complaint against the complainant, Lim, Ong
and Adela Peralta for their alleged violation of the Anti-Dummy Law.
In addition, the respondent commenced administrative cases against the complainant before the
Bureau of Domestic Trade, the Commission on Immigration and Deportation, and the Office of the
Solicitor General. According to the complainant, these cases were subsequently denied due
course and dismissed by the aforesaid government agencies.
The foregoing prompted the complainant to file the present case for disbarment. Essentially, the
complainant alleged that the respondent manufactured the criminal and administrative cases
against him to blackmail him or extort money from him. He claimed that the respondent solicited
for any information that could be used against him in the aforementioned cases by offering any
informer or would-be witness a certain percentage of whatever amounts they could get from him.
The complainant branded the respondents tactics as highly immoral, unprofessional and
unethical, constituting malpractice of law and conduct gravely unbecoming of a lawyer.
37
In support of his accusations, the complainant submitted the following documents: (1) the afore-
quoted letters of the respondent addressed to the complainant and Dr. Bueno; (2) Nemesia
Garganians affidavit where she denied any knowledge regarding the demands listed in the letter
addressed to Dr. Bueno; (3) an unsigned affidavit allegedly prepared by the respondent for the
complainant, wherein the latter was acknowledging that he sired Ms. Ganganians son illegitimate
child; (4) the criminal complaints filed against the complainant for alleged violation of the Retail
Trade Nationalization Law and the Anti-Dummy Law; and (5) an affidavit of Manuel Orbeta, a
neighbor of the complainant who claimed that a representative of the respondent had asked him
to sign an affidavit allegedly prepared by the respondent, with an offer to give any informer 20%
and witness, 10%, of any amount he can get from Mr. Alex Ong. To further bolster the disbarment
case against the respondent, the complainant also included a Supplemental Affidavit, citing
several cases previously filed against the respondent by other parties.
The records show that the respondent was directed to submit his comment on the complaint
lodged against him. He did not file any. Subsequently, the case was endorsed to the Office of the
Solicitor General for investigation, report and recommendation. In turn, the OSG forwarded the
records of the case to the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Negros Oriental, authorizing said office
to conduct the investigation.
It appears that the respondent did not appear before the investigating officer, then Provincial
Fiscal Jacinto Bautista, to answer the charges against him. Instead, he moved for postponement.
After denying the respondents third request for postponement, Fiscal Bautista proceeded with
the reception of the complainants evidence. The respondent was duly notified of the on-
going investigation but he did not show up. When it was the respondents turn to present
evidence, notices of the preliminary investigation were sent to his home address in Valenzuela,
Negros Oriental, his law office in Dumaguete City and his last known address in Quezon City. The
return cards showed that he could not be located, although his wife received some of the notices
sent to his home in Dumaguete.
Meanwhile, the case was transferred from one investigating officer to another, with some of them
inhibiting from the investigation. Finally, the case was assigned to 2 nd Asst. Provincial Prosecutor
Cristino Pinili. Atty. Pinili deemed the respondents absence as waiver of his right to present his
evidence. Finding merit in the complainants cause, the investigator recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one month, or, at the very least, be
severely reprimanded.
The records of the case were endorsed to the Office of the Solicitor General. Thereafter, the OSG
transmitted the records to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in Manila, for proper disposition,
conformably with adopted policies and procedures. The IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline
adopted Atty. Pinilis report and recommendation in toto.
We affirm with modification.
The complainant seeks the disbarment of the respondent. Thus, it is meet to revisit the
importance of the legal profession and the purpose of the disbarment as aptly discussed in
Noriega vs. Sison. We then held:
In resolving this disbarment case, (w)e must initially emphasize the degree of integrity and
respectability attached to the law profession. There is no denying that the profession of an
attorney is required after a long and laborious study. By years of patience, zeal and ability, the
attorney acquires a fixed means of support for himself and his family. This is not to say, however,
that the emphasis is on the pecuniary value of this profession but rather on the social prestige
and intellectual standing necessarily arising from and attached to the same by reason of the fact
that every attorney is deemed an officer of the court.
The importance of the dual aspects of the legal profession has been wisely put by Chief Justice
Marshall of the United States Court when he said:
On one hand, the profession of an Atty. is of great importance to an individual and the prosperity
of his life may depend on its exercise. The right to exercise it ought not to be lightly or
capriciously taken from him. On the other hand, it is extremely desirable that the respectability
of the Bar should be maintained and that its harmony with the bench should be preserved. For
these objects, some controlling power, some discretion ought to be exercised with great
moderation and judgment, but it must be exercised.
The purpose of disbarment, therefore, is not meant as a punishment depriving him of a source of
livelihood but is rather intended to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those
who exercise this function should be competent, honorable and reliable in order that the courts
and clients may rightly repose confidence in them.
The relevant rule to the case at bar is Canon 19 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It
mandates lawyers to represent their clients with zeal but within the bounds of the law. Rule
19.01 further commands that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the
lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate or threaten to present
unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or
proceeding.

38
Considering the facts of this case, we find that respondent has not exercised the good faith
required of a lawyer in handling the legal affairs of his client. It is evident from the records that
he tried to coerce the complainant to comply with his letter-demand by threatening to file
various charges against the latter. When the complainant did not heed his warning, he made
good his threat and filed a string of criminal and administrative cases against the complainant.
We find the respondents action to be malicious as the cases he instituted against the
complainant did not have any bearing or connection to the cause of his client, Ms. Garganian.
Clearly, the respondent has violated the proscription in Canon 19, Rule 19.01. His behavior is
inexcusable.
The records show that the respondent offered monetary rewards to anyone who could provide
him any information against the complainant just so he would have a leverage in his actions
against the latter. His tactic is unethical and runs counter to the rules that a lawyer shall not, for
corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding and he shall not do any act
designed primarily to solicit legal business. In the case of Choa vs. Chiongson, we held:
While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine
interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his right, as well as the exercise of his
utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law. He must give a
candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of his clients case with the end
view of promoting respect for the law and legal processes, and counsel or maintain such actions
or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be
honestly debatable under the law. He must always remind himself of the oath he took
upon admission to the Bar that he will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit nor give aid nor consent to the same; Needless to
state, the lawyers fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and the
administration of justice, and it must be done within the bounds of reason and common sense. A
lawyers responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not
warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions against
the other party. (emphases ours)
The ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoin lawyers to act with the highest standards of
truthfulness, fair play and nobility in the course of his practice of law. A lawyer may be
disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity.
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct
of a member of the Bar. Thus, every lawyer should act and comport himself in such a manner
that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.
Finally, we note that during the investigation of the case, despite being duly notified thereof as
evidenced by the motions for postponement he filed on several occasions, the respondent chose
not to participate in the proceedings against him. His nonchalance does not speak well of him as
it reflects his utter lack of respect towards the public officers who were assigned to investigate
the case. He should be watchful of his conduct. The respondent should keep in mind the solemn
oath he took before this Court when he sought admission to the bar. The lawyers oath should not
be reduced to mere recital of empty words for each word aims to promote the high standard of
professional integrity befitting a true officer of the court.
The recommended penalty for the unprofessional conduct of the respondent was one (1) month
suspension or reprimand. We believe that the same is too light vis-a-vis the misconduct of the
respondent.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO is hereby declared guilty of conduct
unbecoming of a lawyer. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of five (5)
months and sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more
severely.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to Atty. Untos personal record in the Office of the Bar
Confidant and a copy thereof be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
SO ORDERED.

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Case No. 14
Adm. Case No. 1424 October 15, 1991
ISMAELA DIMAGIBA, complainant, vs. ATTY. JOSE MONTALVO, JR., respondent.
This is a complaint filed by Ismaela Dimagiba against Atty. Jose Montalvo for Malpractice, for
stretching to almost a half a century a litigation arising from the probate of a will of the late
Benedicta de Los Reyes which instituted Ismaela Dimagiba as the sole heir of all the properties.
The letter of the private complainant, Ismaela Dimagiba, received on January 15,1975 by the
Supreme Court, states:
xxx xxx xxx
The clients of Atty. Montalvo, namely: Dionisio Fernandez, Eusebio Reyes, Luisa Reyes, Mariano
Reyes, Cesar Reyes, Leonor Reyes, filed a case against me with the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan in 1946 for annulment of sale and was docketed as Civil Case No. 108 of said Court. This
case was terminated annulling the sale, as per decision in 1954 in G.R. No. L-5618 and L-5620.
On January 19, 1955, 1 filed a case for Probate of Will with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
regarding the same property subject of the annulment of sale and was docketed with the Court
of First Instance of Bulacan as Sp. Proc. No. 831-M. Luckily, the said case was terminated on June
20, 1958, probating the said will. The oppositors in this case who are the same persons
mentioned above appealed this case to the Higher Court of the Philippines and was decided by
the Hon. Supreme Court of the Philippines on October 12, 1967 in G.R. No. L-23638 and L-23662,
affirming the decision of the Lower Court;
That after the decision of the above-mentioned case was promulgated, the same parties filed on
June 5, 1968 Civil Case No. 3677-M with the CFI of Bulacan for annulment of will; this case was
filed through their counsel, Atty. Gregorio Centeno.
Said case was dismissed by the Court on February 11, 1970 without pronouncement of costs;
That on August 13,1971, again, the clients of Atty. Montalvo filed Civil Case No. 4078 with the
Court of First Instance of Bulacan for annulment of the said will; this case was again dismissed by
the Court on December 21, 1971;
That on April 22, 1972, again the same parties, through their counsel Atty. Montalvo, filed
another case with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, allegedly for Partition of the same
property mentioned in the probate of will which was docketed as Civil Case No. 4151. This case
was again dismissed by the Court in its Order dated October 11, 1972;
That on May 25, 1972, still another case was filed by the same parties, through Atty. Montalvo,
for specific performance, with the CFI of Bulacan and was docketed as Civil Case No. 4188-M.
This case was again dismissed by the Court in its Order dated October 24,1973. On August 12,
1974, the said case was remanded to the Court of Appeals, Manila, by the Court of First Instance
of Bulacan;
Still on April 5, 1974, I was again surprised to know that there was another case filed by the
same persons mentioned above through Atty. Montalvo with the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan and was docketed as Civil Case No. 4458. This case is still pending before said court.
In view of the numerous cases filed against me by the same parties, through their counsel, Atty.
Montalvo, I am constrained to report to that [sic] Honorable Court of the actuation of said lawyer
who is a member of the Philippine Bar attending to cases of non suit, which cause harassment on
may part.
The parties in this case are the ones in possession of the property Subject of Sp. Proc. No. 831 of
the CFI, Bulacan. They cannot be ejected from the land holdings because they claim that the
case filed by Atty. Montalvo is still pending in Court. In all the foregoing [sic] I respectfully submit
to this Honorable Court for appropriate action. xxx xxx xxx
In the Resolution of the Second Division of the Supreme Court dated January 27, 1975, the
respondent Montalvo was required to file an Answer within ten days from notice.
In his Answer dated March 3, 1975, Montalvo, claims that the case filed against the complainant
were done. xxx xxx xxx
at the instance of different parties; or by reason of different causes of action and all the
pleadings filed by the undersigned were and/or the result of a very painstaking, diligent, and
careful study and evaluation of the facts and law involved therein such that even before signing
the same, the undersigned has always been of the honest and sincere belief that its filing is for
the interest of justice certainly never for harassment; (2) that the reason why the parties
tenant could not be ejected from their land as stated by complainant in her complaint is because
of the passage of Presidential Decree No. 27 which emancipated the farmers from their bondage
and declared them as owners of the rice and corn land they tilled upon the passage of the decree
40
coupled with the very acts of the complainant herself; and that (3) the complainant by filing this
instant complaint for disbarment wants to cow and intimidate the undersigned in order to
withdraw as counsel of his clients because she has been thwarted in her erroneous belief that
she owns exclusively all the properties comprising the estate of the late Benedicta de Los Reyes
and could not accept and take into account the reality that by virtue of the final decision of the
Supreme Court in G.R. No. 5618 and 5620 she is not the sole owner of the present estate of the
deceased but only a co-owner with the clients of the undersigned.
In addition, Montalvo stated that it was Dimagiba who refused to be bound by the Supreme Court
Decision in G.R. Nos. 5618 and 5620.
As a Rejoinder to the Respondent's Answer, the complainant Dimagiba stated that in Civil Case
No. 3677-M, the plaintiffs are the same parties-oppositors who opposed the petition for probate
of the Last Will and Testament of the deceased Benedicta De Los Reyes in Special Proceeding No.
831. The same case was dismissed by the Court of First Instance of Bulacan on the ground that
the issue raised had been decided by the Court.
Likewise Civil Case No. 4078-M was also dismissed by Branch 2 of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan presided by Judge Ricardo C. Pronove, Jr., in the order of August 24, 1973 on the ground
of res judicata. xxx xxx xxx
But a closer analysis [sic) it is clear that this action is merely a rehash of the other cases
previously litigated between the plaintiffs and the defendant and already settled by final
judgment.
In fact, in that case, Atty. Jose Montalvo, Jr., included himself as one of the defendants. xxx xxx
xxx
Finally, the fact that plaintiffs counsel, Jose Montalvo, Jr., had decided to join cause with the other
plaintiffs in this case does no mean that there is no Identity of parties between this case and Civil
Case No. 3677-M. Atty. Jose Montalvo, Jr., is not alleged to be are party in interest in this case so
that Ills inclusion herein as a p plaintiff can not produce any legal significance.
This notwithstanding, Montalvo filed another case against Dimagiba which was docketed as Civil
Case No. 4458-M of the CFI Bulacan where the plaintiffs and causes of action were again the
same as 3677-M and 4188-M. Again, the CFI Bulacan dismissed the cases.
On April 16, 1975, the Second Division, following the procedure then obtaining for the resolution
of disciplinary case against lawyers, referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation,
report, and recommendation.
It was only on May 4,1990, or almost fifteen years later, that the entire records of Adm. Case No.
1424 involving Ismaela Dimagiba versus Atty. Jose Montalvo was returned to the Clear of Court of
the Supreme Court by the Office of the Solicitor General through Solicitor Aurora P. Cortes.
In summary, the following are the litigations that ensue from the probate of the Will of De Los
Reyes as found by the Solicitor General involving the same parties and the same cause of action:
1. Special Proceedings No. 831 instituted on January 1 1955. The Will was admitted to probate
but was subsequently appealed.
2. CA-G.R. No. 31221-R. This was an appeal of the decision in Spec. Proc. No. 831. The decision
was affirmed.
3. G.R. Nos. L-23638 and L-23662. This decision dated October 12, 1967, in the Supreme Court,
upheld the decision CA-G.R. No. 31221-R, in effect, affirming the due execution the Will and the
capacity of the Testator as well as the institution of the complainant.
4. Civil Case No. 3677-M. Filed in the Court of First Instance of Bulacan on June 4, 1968, this was
a petition for the nullification of the Will. This was dismissed.
5. Civil Case No. 200 which was redocketed as Civil Case No. 4078-M. This complaint dated
November 3, 1970 was again dismissed.
6. Civil Case No. 4151-M. This case, filed on February 16, 1972, for the partition of the property
left by the deceased Benedicta De los Reyes on the ground of the nullity of the Will, was again
dismissed for failure to prosecute.
7. Civil Case No. 4188-M. Filed on May 25,1972, with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan,
Branch 2, the respondent Atty. Montalvo, Jr., joined the descendants of the collateral relatives of
the deceased De Los Reyes against herein complainant Dimagiba. This case was dismissed.
8. Civil Case No. 4458-M. Civil Case No. 4188-M was appealed. But without waiting for the
outcome, Atty. Montalvo, Jr., filed Civil Case No. 4458-M on April 5, 1974 which was a complaint
for the cancellation of the transfer certificates of title in the name of Ismaela Dimagiba and the
issuance of new certificates of title in the name of the late Benedicta de los Reyes.
Clearly, the respondent Montalvo, Jr. repetitively filed several complaints in various forms
involving the same parties and the same subject matter, persistently raising issues long laid to
rest by final judgment.
This misbehavior in facie curia consisting of a stubborn refusal to accept this Court's
pronouncements is in fact even summarily punishable under Rule 71, Suction 1 of the Rules of
Court.
Any lawyer who assumes the responsibility for a client' cause has the duty to know the entire
history of a case, specially if any litigation has commenced. In the case at bar, even Atty.
41
Montalvo does not deny the fact that the probate of the will o the late Benedicta de los Reyes
has been an over-extended an contentious litigation between the heirs.
A lawyer should never take advantage of the seemingly end less channels left dangling by our
legal system in order wangle the attention of the court. Atty. Montalvo may have thought that lie
could get away with his indiscriminate filing o suits that were clearly intended to harass Ismaela
Dimagiba When court dockets get clogged and the administration of justice is delayed, our
judicial system may not be entirely blame less, yet the greater fault lies in the lawyers who had
take their privilege so lightly, and in such mindless fashion.
The Code of Professional Responsibility states that:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 1.03 A lawyer shall not for any corrupt motive or interest encourage any suit or
proceeding or delay any man's cause.
On the basis of the foregoing, we find him guilty of malpractice as charged. He has violated his
oath not to delay any ma for money or malice, besmirched the name of an honorable profession,
and has proven himself unworthy of the trust repose in him by law as an officer of the Court. We
have not countenanced other less significant infractions among the ranks of our lawyers. He
deserves the severest punishment of DISBARMENT.
WHEREFORE on the basis of the foregoing, and consisted with the urgent need to maintain the
high traditions an standards of the legal profession and to preserve undiminished public faith in
attorneys-at-law, the Court Resolved to DISBAR the respondent Atty. Jose Montalvo, Jr. from the
practice law. His name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. Copies of this
Resolution shall be circulated to all courts of the country and entered in the personal record of
respondent Atty. Jose Montalvo, Jr.
SO ORDERED.

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