Abella v.

COMELEC (1991)
FACTS:
Silvestre dela Cruz (Benjamin Abella was allowed to intervene) filed a petition with the COMELEC to
disqualify petitioner Larrazabal from running as governor of Leyte on the ground that she
misrepresented her residence in her certificate of candidacy as Kananga, Leyte. It was alleged that she
was in fact a resident of Ormoc City like her husband who was earlier disqualified from running for the
same office.

The COMELEC granted the petition. However, when the Commission granted the decision, Larrazabal
was already proclaimed the Governor, hence, when she was disqualified, Abella, who gathered the
second highest votes in the said area, sought to take his oath as governor of Kananga, Leyte.

The petitioner, however, avers that the COMELEC decision is erroneous when it relied on the provisions
of the Family Code to rule that the petitioner lacks the required residence to qualify her to run for the
position of governor of Leyte.

She opines that under "the Election Law, the matter of determination of the RESIDENCE is more on the
principle of INTENTION, the animus revertendi rather than anything else."
In this regard she states that ... "her subsequent physical transfer of residence to Ormoc City
thereafter, did not necessarily erased (sic) or removed her Kananga residence, for as long as she had
the ANIMUS REVERTENDI evidenced by her continuous and regular acts of returning there in the course
of the years, although she had physically resided at Ormoc City."

ISSUE #1: WON the petitioner is a registered voter of Kananga, Leyte

No. Section 12, Article X of the Constitution is explicit in that aside from highly-urbanized cities,
component cities whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials are
independent of the province. In the same provision, it provides for other component cities within a
province whose charters do not provide a similar prohibition. Necessarily, component cities like Ormoc
City whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials are treated like
highly urbanized cities which are outside the supervisory power of the province to which they are
geographically attached. This independence from the province carries with it the prohibition or
mandate directed to their registered voters not to vote and be voted for the provincial elective offices.
The resolution in G.R. No. 80716 entitled Peralta v. The Commission on Elections, et al. dated December
10, 1987 applies to this case. While the cited case involves Olongapo City which is classified as a highly
urbanized city, the same principle is applicable.

Moreover, Section 89 of Republic Act 179, independent of the constitutional provision, prohibits
registered voters of Ormoc City from voting and being voted for elective offices in the province of Leyte.
We agree with the COMELEC en banc that "the phrase 'shall not be qualified and entitled to vote in the
election of the provincial governor and the members of the provincial board of the Province of Leyte'
connotes two prohibitions one, from running for and the second, from voting for any provincial elective
official."

ISSUE #2: WON the candidate who got the second highest vote may be proclaimed as governor when
the candidate for such position was disqualified

No. The Supreme Court held that while it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petition to deny
due course to the certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed before Larrazabal could be
proclaimed, the fact remains that the local elections of February 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte
proceeded with Larrazabal considered as a bona fide candidate. The voters of the province voted for
her in the sincere belief that she was a qualified candidate for the position of governor. Her votes were
counted and she obtained the highest number of votes. The net effect is that the Abella lost in the
election. He was repudiated by the electorate.

Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest
number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms
of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he
or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election.

The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be
disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the
candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective
office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid the vote the
winner into office or maintain him there. However the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a
contrary politics and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the
candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless.

In sum, the Court does not find any reason to reverse and set aside the questioned decision and
resolution of the COMELEC. The COMELEC has not acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or in grave
abuse of discretion.