Republic of the Philippines arraignment, the respondent judge, Hon. Ramon E.
Nazareno, set the
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-37933 April 15, 1988
FISCAL CELSO M. GIMENEZ and FEDERICO B.
MERCADO, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RAMON E. NAZARENO, Presiding Judge, Court of First
Instance of Cebu and TEODORO DE LA VEGA, JR., respondents.
The Solicitor General for petitioners.
Victor de la Serna for respondents.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Two basic issues are raised for Our resolution in this petition for certiorari
and mandamus. The first is whether or not a court loses jurisdiction over
an accused who after being arraigned, escapes from the custody of the
law. The other issue is whether or not under Section 19, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution, an accused who has been duly tried
in absentia retains his right to present evidence on his own behalf and to
confront and cross-examine witnesses who testified against him.
The following facts are not in dispute:
On August 3, 1973, Samson Suan, Alex Potot, Rogelio Mula, Fernando
Cargando, Rogelio Baguio and the herein private respondent Teodoro de
la Vega Jr., were charged with the crime of murder.
On August 22, 1973 all the above-named. accused were arraigned and
each of them pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Following the
hearing of the case for September 18, 1973 at 1:00 o'clock in the
afternoon. All the acused including private respondent, were duly
informed of this.
Before the scheduled date of the first hearing the private respondent
escaped from his detention center and on the said date, failed to appear
in court. This prompted the fiscals handling the case (the petitioners
herein) to file a motion with the lower court to proceed with the hearing of
the case against all the accused praying that private respondent de la
Vega, Jr. be tried in absentia invoking the application of Section 19,
Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides:
SEC. 19. In all criminal prosecution, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall
enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial,
to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to the attendance of witnesses and
the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after
arraignment trial may proceed notwithstanding the
absence of the accused provided that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustified. (Emphasis
supplied.) *
Pursuant to the above-written provision, the lower court proceeded with
the trial of the case but nevertheless gave the private respondent the
opportunity to take the witness stand the moment he shows up in court. 1
After due trial, or on November 6,1973, the lower court rendered a
decision dismissing the case against the five accused while holding in
abeyance the proceedings against the private respondent. The
dispositive portion is as follows:
WHEREFORE, insofar as the accused Samson Suan
Alex Potot, Rogelio Mula Fernando Cargando and
Rogelio Baguio are concerned, this case is hereby
 dismissed. The City Warden of Lapu-Lapu City is hereby
ordered to release these accused if they are no longer
serving sentence of conviction involving other crimes.
The proceedings in this case against the accused
Teodoro de la Vega, Jr. who has escaped on August
30,1973 shall remain pending, without prejudice on the
part of the said accused to cross-examine the witnesses
for the prosecution and to present his defense whenever
the court acquires back the jurisdiction over his person. 2
On November 16,1973 the petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration
questioning the above-quoted dispositive portion on the ground that it will
render nugatory the constitutional provision on "trial in absentia" cited
earlier. However, this was denied by the lower court in an Order dated
November 22, 1973.
Hence, this petition.
The respondent court, in its Order denying the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the herein petitioners, expressed the opinion
that under Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, the private
respondent, who was tried in absentia, did not lose his right to cross-
examine the witnesses for the prosecution and present his
evidence. 3 The reasoning of the said court is that under the same provision,
all accused should be presumed innocent. 4Furthermore the lower court
maintains that jurisdiction over private respondent de la Vega, Jr. was lost
when he escaped and that his right to cross-examine and present evidence
must not be denied him once jurisdiction over his person is reacquired. 5
We disagree.
First of all, it is not disputed that the lower court acquired jurisdiction over
the person of the accused-private respondent when he appeared during
the arraignment on August 22,1973 and pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. In cases criminal, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is
acquired either by his arrest for voluntary appearance in court. Such
voluntary appearance is accomplished by appearing for arraignment as
what accused-private respondent did in this case.
But the question is this was that jurisdiction lost when the accused
escaped from the custody of the law and failed to appear during the trial?
We answer this question in the negative. As We have consistently ruled
in several earlier cases,6 jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the
instance of parties but continues until the case is terminated.
To capsulize the foregoing discussion, suffice it to say that where the
accused appears at the arraignment and pleads not guilty to the crime
charged, jurisdiction is acquired by the court over his person and this
continues until the termination of the case, notwithstanding his escape
from the custody of the law.
Going to the second part of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution
aforecited a "trial in absentia"may be had when the following requisites
are present: (1) that there has been an arraignment; (2) that the accused
has been notified; and (3) that he fails to appear and his failure to do so
is unjustified.
In this case, all the above conditions were attendant calling for a trial
in absentia. As the facts show, the private respondent was arraigned on
August 22, 1973 and in the said arraignment he pleaded not guilty. He
was also informed of the scheduled hearings set on September 18 and
19, 1973 and this is evidenced by his signature on the notice issued by
the lower Court. 7 It was also proved by a certified copy of the Police
Blotter 8 that private respondent escaped from his detention center. No
explanation for his failure to appear in court in any of the scheduled hearings
was given. Even the trial court considered his absence unjustified.
The lower court in accordance with the aforestated provisions of the 1973
Constitution, correctly proceeded with the reception of the evidence of
the prosecution and the other accused in the absence of private
respondent, but it erred when it suspended the proceedings as to the
private respondent and rendered a decision as to the other accused only.
Upon the termination of a trial in absentia, the court has the duty to rule
upon the evidence presented in court. The court need not wait for the
time until the accused who who escape from custody finally decides to
appear in court to present his evidence and moss e the witnesses against
him. To allow the delay of proceedings for this purpose is to render
ineffective the constitutional provision on trial in absentia. As it has been
aptly explained:
. . . The Constitutional Convention felt the need for such a
provision as there were quite a number of reported
instances where the proceedings against a defendant had
to be stayed indefinitely because of his non- appearance.
What the Constitution guarantees him is a fair trial, not
continued enjoyment of his freedom even if his guilt could
be proved. With the categorical statement in the
fundamental law that his absence cannot justify a delay
provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to
appear is unjustified, such an abuse could be remedied.
That is the way it should be, for both society and the
offended party have a legitimate interest in seeing to it
that crime should not go unpunished. 9
The contention of the respondent judge that the right of the accused to be
presumed innocent will be violated if a judgment is rendered as to him is
untenable. He is still presumed innocent. A judgment of conviction must
still be based upon the evidence presented in court. Such evidence must
prove him guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Also, there can be no violation
of due process since the accused was given the opportunity to be heard.
Nor can it be said that an escapee who has been tried in absentia retains
his rights to cross-examine and to present evidence on his behalf. By his
failure to appear during the trial of which he had notice, he virtually
waived these rights. This Court has consistently held that the right of the
accused to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses is a
personal right and may be waived. 10 In the same vein, his right to present
evidence on his behalf, a right given to him for his own benefit and
protection, may be waived by him.
Finally, at this point, We note that Our pronouncement in this case is
buttressed by the provisions of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure,
particularly Section 1 (c) of Rule 115 which clearly reflects the intention of
the framers of our Constitution, to wit:
... The absence of the accused without any justifiable
cause at the trial on a particular date of which he had
notice shall be considered a waiver of his right to be
present during that trial. When an accused under custody
had been notified of the date of the trail and escapes, he
shall be deemed to have waived his right to be present on
said date and on all subsequent trial dates until custody in
regained....
Accordingly, it is Our considered opinion, and We so hold, that an
escapee who has been duly tried in absentia waives his right to present
evidence on his own behalf and to confront and cross-examine witnesses
who testified against him. 11
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the judgment of the trial court in
Criminal Case No. 112-L in so far as it suspends the proceedings against
the herein private respondent Teodoro de la Vega, Jr. is reversed and set
aside. The respondent judge is hereby directed to render judgment upon
the innocence or guilt of the herein private respondent Teodoro de la
Vega, Jr. in accordance with the evidence adduced and the applicable
law.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22945 March 3, 1925
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. JOVITA V.
BUENVIAJE, Defendant-Appellant.
Francisco and Lualhati and Ariston Rivera for
appellant.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for appellee.
 OSTRAND, J.:
The defendant is accused of the violation of the
Medical Act, the information alleging "that on or
about the first day of June, 1923, and for some
time prior to said date, the said accused without
having obtained from the Board of Medical
Examiners the corresponding certificate of
registration for the practice of medicine in the
Philippine Islands, voluntarily, illegally and
criminally and for compensation, practiced
medicine in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands,
assisting, treating and manipulating the head and
body of Regino Noble for the purpose of curing
him of the ailments, diseases, pains and physical
defects from which he pretended to suffer, and
advertising and offering her services as a
physician, by means of cards which she
distributed and by letterheads and signs which
she exposed on the door of her office, situated at
No. 712 Calle Asuncion, and in newspapers which
are published and circulated in the City of Manila,
in which cards, letterheads, signs and advertising
she added and prefixed to her name the letters
`Dra.,' which is the abbreviation of the word
`doctor,' for the purpose of causing the public to
believe that she, the said defendant, had received
the corresponding title of doctor."
chanroble s virtual law library
To this information the defendant demurred in the
court below on the grounds: (1) That it stated
more than one offense, and (2) that it was not
drawn in accordance with the form prescribed by
law. The demurrer was overruled and the
defendant pleaded not guilty. chanroble svirtualawlibrary chanroble s virtual law library
At the trial of the case the defendant made the
following admissions: "That on the first of June,
1923, she had no certificate from the Board of
Medical Examiners authorizing her to practice
medicine in the Philippine Islands; that on that
day she treated and manipulated the head and
body of Regino Noble in order to cure him of
ailments from which he pretended to suffer, the
treatment consisting in a `thrust' by means of
the application of the hand to the spinal column;
that she for such treatment received and
collected from said Regino Noble the sum of P1;
that the said treatment took place in her office
situated at No. 712 Calle Asuncion, District of
Binondo, City of Manila, Philippine Islands; that
she on or about the first day of June, 1923, and
for some time prior to that date, advertised
herself as a `doctor of chiropractic,' in said City
of Manila, said advertisement appearing upon her
business cards and in the newspaper `El Debate,'
in its issue of April 29, 1923, edited and
published in Manila and in which cards and
newspaper advertisement the defendant prefixed
the abbreviation `Dra.' to her name; that she
was graduated a doctor in chiropractic on the
13th day of August, 1919, as evidenced by a
certificate marked Exhibit I and issued by the
American University School of Chiropractic of
Chicago, Illinois."
chanrobles virtual law library
Upon this admission and some other evidence to
the same effect, the trial court found the
defendant guilty as charged in the information
and, in accordance with section 2678 of the
Administrative Code, sentenced her to pay a fine
of P300, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and to pay the costs. From this
judgment the defendant appeals to this court and
presents four assignments of error.
I. In the first assignment of error counsel
contends that the demurrer to the information
should have been sustained on the ground that
said information charged more than one offense.
The Medical Law is contained in sections 758 to
783 of the Administrative Code and it is argued
that inasmuch as some of the illegal acts with
which the defendant is charged are prohibited by
section 770 of the Code and others by section
783, the defendant is in reality accused of two
separate and distinct offenses, namely, illegal
practice of medicine and illegally representing
oneself as a doctor.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
We cannot accept this view. It may be noted that
the Medical Law itself, as it appears in the
Administrative Code, does not declare any of the
therein prohibited acts penal offenses. The penal
provisions relating thereto are contained in
section 2678 of the Code, which reads as follows:
SEC. 2678. Violation of Medical Law. - A person
violating any provision of the Medical Law shall,
chanroble svirtualawlibrary
upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not
more than three hundred pesos or by
imprisonment for not more than ninety days, or
both, in the discretion of the court.
The offense here penalized is "violation of the
Medical Law." The statute makes no distinction
between illegal practice of medicine and illegally
chanroble s virtual law library
advertising oneself as a doctor. Both are in
violation of the Medical Law and carry the same
penalty. They are merely different ways or means
of committing the same offense and both of these
means are closely related to each other and
usually employed together. chanroble svirtualawlibrary chanroble s virtual law library
In these circumstances and where, as alleged in
the information in the present case, the various
violations have taken place simultaneously, we do
not think it was the intention of the legislator that
each single act should be regarded as a separate
offense and separate informations presented for
each. The language of this court in the case of
United States vs. Poh Chi (20 Phil., 140), in
regard to the Opium Law, is opposite to the
present case.
It is true that the Commission has provided a
certain punishment for the possession of a pipe
used in the smoking of opium, for the smoking of
opium, as well as a punishment for the illegal
possession of opium, but it is not believed that it
was the intention of the legislature to have
separate complaints filed against a person who
was found in the illegal possession of opium and
a pipe at the same time. If that were true then
every person who was found to be smoking
opium could be charged in three different
complaints: First, with the illegal possession of
the pipe; second, the illegal possession of the
opium; andthird, for smoking the opium.
Certainly the legislature did not intend any such
consequences.
In the case of United States vs. Douglass (2 Phil.,
461), the court said:
It is not objectionable, when a single offense may
be committed by the use of different means, to
charge, in the alternative, the various means by
which the crime may have been committed.
(U.S. vs. Potter, 27 Fed. Cases, 604; Bishop's
New Criminal Procedure, sec. 434.)
The same rule was followed in the case of United
States vs. Dorr (2 Phil., 332); United States vs.
Tolentino (5 Phil., 682); and United States vs.
Gustilo (19 Phil., 208) and is in harmony with the
views of the courts in other jurisdictions. That the
various means of committing the offense is
described in more than one section of the statute
does not necessarily effect the general principle
involved; the subdivision of a statute into section
is merely a matter of convenience and while it
sometimes may be of some aid in ascertaining
the legislative intent, it is, of course, not
conclusive thereof.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
II. Under the second assignment of error the
appellant argues in substance that chiropractic
has nothing to do with medicine and that the
practice of that profession can therefore not be
regarded as practice of medicine. There is no
merit whatever in this contention. Assuming
without conceding that chiropractic does not fall
within the term "practice of medicine" in its
ordinary acceptation, we have the statutory
definition contained in section 770 of the
Administrative Code and which clearly includes
the manipulations employed in chiropractic. The
statutory definition necessarily prevails over the
ordinary one.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Under the same assignment of error the
defendant also argues that the examination
prescribed by section 776 of the Administrative
Code for admission to the practice of medicine,
embraces subjects which have no connection with
chiropractic and that to require chiropractors to
take that examination is unreasonable and, in
effect amounts to prohibition of the practice of
their profession and therefore violates the
constitutional principle that all men have the right
to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness and
are entitled to the equal protection of the law.
chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
la w library
There is very little force in this argument. The
subjects in which an examination is required by
section 778 of the Administrative Code, as
amended by Act No. 3111, relate to matters of
which a thorough knowledge seems necessary for
the proper diagnosis of diseases of the human
body and it is within the police power of the State
to require that persons who devote themselves to
the curing of human ills should possess such
knowledge. (State vs. Edmunds, 127 Iowa, 333;
69 L.R.A., 504; Underwood vs. Scott, 43 Kan.,
714; People vs. Blue Mountain Joe, 129 Ill., 370;
State vs. Mylod, 20 R. I., 632; 41 L.R.A., 428;
Stewartvs. Raab, 55 Minn., 20; Matthei vs.
Wooley, 69 Ill. App., 654; State vs. Buswell, 40
Neb., 158; 24 L.R.A., 68; O'Connor vs. State, 46
Neb., 157; U. S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil., 218.)
virtual law library
III. The third assignment of error is closely
related to the foregoing. The appellant contends
that the prohibition in section 783 against the
unauthorized use of the title "doctor" must be
understood to refer to "Doctor of Medicine" and
has no application to doctors of chiropractic.
Under different circumstances that might possibly
be so, but where, as here, chiropractic is by
statute made a form of the practice of medicine,
it necessarily follows that a person holding
himself out as a doctor of chiropractic in legal
effect represents himself as a doctor of
medicine. chanroble svirtualawlibrary
IV. In her fourth assignment of error the
appellant attacks the constitutionality of Act No.
3111, amending section 770 of the Administrative
Code, on the ground that the subject of the Act is
not sufficiently expressed in its title and that it
embraces more than one subject. There is no
merit in this contention. The title of Act No. 3111
reads as follows:
An Act to amend sections seven hundred and
fifty-nine, seven hundred and sixty, seven
hundred and sixty-one, seven hundred and sixty-
two, seven hundred and sixty-five, seven hundred
and sixty-seven, seven hundred and seventy,
seven hundred and seventy-four, seven hundred
and seventy-five, seven hundred and seventy-six,
seven hundred and seventy-eight, seven hundred
chanrobles
and eighty, seven hundred and eighty-two, seven
hundred and eighty-three, and twenty-six
hundred and seventy-eight of Act Numbered
Twenty-seven hundred and eleven, known as the
Administrative Code, increasing the number of
the members of the Board of Medical Examiners,
conferring upon the same certain additional
powers and responsibilities and for other
purposes.
All of the sections enumerated in the title quoted
relate to the same general subject, namely,
defining and regulating the practice of medicine,
and section 770 is expressly mentioned as one of
chanroble s virtual law library
the sections amended. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
This is sufficient. Under constitutional provisions
similar to ours the general rule is that a title
which declares the amendatory statute to be an
act to amend a designated section or the like of a
specified Code is sufficient and the precise nature
of the amendatory Act need not be further stated.
(Ross vs. Aguirre, 191 U.S., 60; Udell vs. Citizens EN BANC
Street R. Co., 152 Ind., 507; McGuire vs. G.R. No. 180016 April 29, 2014
Chicago, etc., R. Co., 131 Iowa, 340; Lankford vs.
County Commissioners of Somerset County, 73 LITO CORPUZ, Petitioner,
Md., 105; Tabor vs. State, 34 Tex. Crim., 631; vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
Com. vs. Brown, 91 Va., 762.) For a full and
authoritative discussion of this subject, see Note DECISION
to Lewis vs. Dunne, 55 L.R.A., 833. See
PERALTA, J.:
also Government of the Philippine Islands vs.
Municipality of Binalonan and Roman Catholic This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of
Bishop of Nueva Segovia (32 Phil., 634) and Yu the Rules of Court, dated November 5, 2007, of petitioner Lito Corpuz
Cong Eng vs. Trinidad (p. 385, ante). (petitioner), seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision dated March
1

22, 2007 and Resolution dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of

chanroble svirtualawlibrary chanroble s virtual law library

Appeals (CA), which affirmed with modification the Decision dated July
3

We find no error in the judgment appealed from 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, San Fernando
and the same is therefore affirmed, with the costs City, finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the Revised
against the appellant. So ordered. Penal Code.

Malcolm, Villamor, and Johns, JJ., concur. The antecedent facts follow.

Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral

Royale Casino in Olongapo City sometime in 1990. Private complainant
was then engaged in the business of lending money to casino players
and, upon hearing that the former had some pieces of jewelry for sale,
Separate Opinions petitioner approached him on May 2, 1991 at the same casino and
offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission basis. Private
complainant agreed, and as a consequence, he turned over to petitioner
ROMUALDEZ, J., dissenting: chanroble s virtual law library

the following items: an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman's bracelet;
one (1) men's necklace and another men's bracelet, with an aggregate
I believe that the complaint charges more than value of P98,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt of even date. They both
one offense, and that the demurrer interposed on agreed that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale, and/or, if
unsold, to return the same items, within a period of 60 days. The period
that ground should have been sustained. For that expired without petitioner remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning
reason I dissent from the opinion of the majority. the pieces of jewelry. When private complainant was able to meet
petitioner, the latter promised the former that he will pay the value of the
Republic of the Philippines said items entrusted to him, but to no avail.
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of estafa,
which reads as follows:
That on or about the fifth (5th) day of July 1991, in the City of Olongapo,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, after having received from one Danilo Tangcoy, one (1)
men's diamond ring, 18k, worth P45,000.00; one (1) three-baht men's
bracelet, 22k, worth P25,000.00; one (1) two-baht ladies' bracelet, 22k,
worth P12,000.00, or in the total amount of Ninety-Eight Thousand Pesos
(P98,000.00), Philippine currency, under expressed obligation on the part
of said accused to remit the proceeds of the sale of the said items or to
return the same, if not sold, said accused, once in possession of the said
items, with intent to defraud, and with unfaithfulness and abuse of
confidence, and far from complying with his aforestated obligation, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate,
misapply and convert to his own personal use and benefit the aforesaid
jewelries (sic) or the proceeds of the sale thereof, and despite repeated
demands, the accused failed and refused to return the said items or to
remit the amount of Ninety- Eight Thousand Pesos (P98,000.00),
Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of said Danilo Tangcoy
in the aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On January 28, 1992, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel,
entered a plea of not guilty. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution, to prove the above-stated facts, presented the lone
testimony of Danilo Tangcoy. On the other hand, the defense presented
the lone testimony of petitioner, which can be summarized, as follows:
Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of Antonio
Balajadia, who is engaged in the financing business of extending loans to
Base employees. For every collection made, they earn a commission.
Petitioner denied having transacted any business with private
complainant.
However, he admitted obtaining a loan from Balajadia sometime in 1989
for which he was made to sign a blank receipt. He claimed that the same
receipt was then dated May 2, 1991 and used as evidence against him
for the supposed agreement to sell the subject pieces of jewelry, which
he did not even see.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged in the Information. The dispositive portion of the decision
states:
WHEREFORE, finding accused LITO CORPUZ GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the felony of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph one
(1), subparagraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code;
there being no offsetting generic aggravating nor ordinary mitigating
circumstance/s to vary the penalty imposable;
accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
deprivation of liberty consisting of an imprisonment under the
Indeterminate Sentence Law of FOUR (4) YEARS AND TWO (2)
MONTHS of Prision Correccional in its medium period AS MINIMUM, to
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS of Reclusion
Temporal in its minimum period AS MAXIMUM; to indemnify private
complainant Danilo Tangcoy the amount of P98,000.00 as actual
damages, and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the appeal
of petitioner and affirmed the decision of the RTC, thus:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed Judgment
dated July 30, 2004 of the RTC of San Fernando City (P), Branch 46, is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on the imposable prison term,
such that accused-appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4
years and 2 months of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years of
prision mayor, as maximum, plus 1 year for each additional P10,000.00,
or a total of 7 years. The rest of the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner, after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, filed with
this Court the present petition stating the following grounds:
A. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONFIRMING
THE ADMISSION AND APPRECIATION BY THE LOWER COURT OF
PROSECUTION EVIDENCE, INCLUDING ITS EXHIBITS, WHICH ARE
MERE MACHINE COPIES, AS THIS VIOLATES THE BEST EVIDENCE
RULE;
B. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT THE CRIMINAL INFORMATION
FOR ESTAFA WAS NOT FATALLY DEFECTIVE ALTHOUGH THE SAME
DID NOT CHARGE THE OFFENSE UNDER ARTICLE 315 (1) (B) OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE IN THAT -
1. THE INFORMATION DID NOT FIX A PERIOD WITHIN
WHICH THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY
SHOULD BE RETURNED, IF UNSOLD, OR THE
MONEY TO BE REMITTED, IF SOLD;
2. THE DATE OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE CRIME
ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION AS OF 05 JULY 1991
WAS MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE ONE
TESTIFIED TO BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT
WHICH WAS 02 MAY 1991;
C. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT DEMAND TO RETURN THE
SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY, IF UNSOLD, OR REMIT THE
PROCEEDS, IF SOLD AN ELEMENT OF THE OFFENSE WAS
PROVED;
D. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING
THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION'S CASE
WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT ALTHOUGH -
1. THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TESTIFIED ON TWO
(2) VERSIONS OF THE INCIDENT;
2. THE VERSION OF THE PETITIONER ACCUSED IS
MORE STRAIGHTFORWARD AND LOGICAL,
CONSISTENT WITH HUMAN EXPERIENCE;
3. THE EQUIPOISE RULE WAS NOT APPRECIATED IN
AND APPLIED TO THIS CASE;
4. PENAL STATUTES ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED
AGAINST THE STATE.
In its Comment dated May 5, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) stated the following counter-arguments:
The exhibits were properly admitted inasmuch as petitioner failed to
object to their admissibility.
The information was not defective inasmuch as it sufficiently established
the designation of the offense and the acts complained of.
The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the crime
charged.
This Court finds the present petition devoid of any merit.
The factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and
carry even more weight when said court affirms the findings of the trial
court, absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid of support
in the records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute
grave abuse of discretion. Petitioner is of the opinion that the CA erred in
4
affirming the factual findings of the trial court. He now comes to this Court
raising both procedural and substantive issues.
According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the trial
court, admitting in evidence a receipt dated May 2, 1991 marked as
Exhibit "A" and its submarkings, although the same was merely a
photocopy, thus, violating the best evidence rule. However, the records
show that petitioner never objected to the admissibility of the said
evidence at the time it was identified, marked and testified upon in court
by private complainant. The CA also correctly pointed out that petitioner
also failed to raise an objection in his Comment to the prosecution's
formal offer of evidence and even admitted having signed the said
receipt. The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a
timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in evidence,
such objection shall be considered as waived. 5
Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner, the formally
defective Information filed against him. He contends that the Information
does not contain the period when the pieces of jewelry were supposed to
be returned and that the date when the crime occurred was different from
the one testified to by private complainant. This argument is untenable.
The CA did not err in finding that the Information was substantially
complete and in reiterating that objections as to the matters of form and
substance in the Information cannot be made for the first time on appeal.
It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or
conversion of money or property received to the prejudice of the
owner and that the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of the
6
crime, hence, the exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the
occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do not make the
latter fatally defective. The CA ruled:
x x x An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the
statutory designation of the offense and the acts or omissions constitutive
thereof. Then Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that a
complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused;
the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party;
the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place
wherein the offense was committed. In the case at bar, a reading of the
subject Information shows compliance with the foregoing rule. That the
time of the commission of the offense was stated as " on or about the fifth
(5th) day of July, 1991" is not likewise fatal to the prosecution's cause
considering that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the
precise time only when the same is a material ingredient of the offense.
The gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is the appropriation or conversion of
money or property received to the prejudice of the offender. Thus, aside
from the fact that the date of the commission thereof is not an essential
element of the crime herein charged, the failure of the prosecution to
specify the exact date does not render the Information ipso facto
defective. Moreover, the said date is also near the due date within which
accused-appellant should have delivered the proceeds or returned the
said [pieces of jewelry] as testified upon by Tangkoy, hence, there was
sufficient compliance with the rules. Accused-appellant, therefore, cannot
now be allowed to claim that he was not properly apprised of the charges
proferred against him.7
It must be remembered that petitioner was convicted of the crime of
Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RPC, which reads:
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud another by
any of the means mentioned hereinbelow.
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
xxxx
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money,
goods, or any other personal property received by the offender in trust or
on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation
involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though
such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying
having received such money, goods, or other property; x x x
The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that
money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in
trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same;
(b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or
property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another;
and (d) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the
offender.8
Petitioner argues that the last element, which is, that there is a demand
by the offended party on the offender, was not proved. This Court
disagrees. In his testimony, private complainant narrated how he was
able to locate petitioner after almost two (2) months from the time he
gave the pieces of jewelry and asked petitioner about the same items
with the latter promising to pay them. Thus:
PROS. MARTINEZ
q Now, Mr. Witness, this was executed on 2 May 1991, and this
transaction could have been finished on 5 July 1991, the question is what
happens (sic) when the deadline came?
a I went looking for him, sir.
q For whom?
a Lito Corpuz, sir.
q Were you able to look (sic) for him?
a I looked for him for a week, sir.
q Did you know his residence?
a Yes, sir.
q Did you go there?
a Yes, sir. When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a written
demand be necessary, the law would have stated so. Otherwise, the
q Did you find him? word "demand" should be interpreted in its general meaning as to include
both written and oral demand. Thus, the failure of the prosecution to
a No, sir. present a written demand as evidence is not fatal.

q Were you able to talk to him since 5 July 1991? In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about
the money entrusted to the accused, we held that the query was
tantamount to a demand, thus:
a I talked to him, sir.
x x x [T]he law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to
q How many times?
the existence of the crime of embezzlement. It so happens only that
failure to account, upon demand for funds or property held in trust, is
a Two times, sir. circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. The same way, however, be
established by other proof, such as that introduced in the case at bar. 14

q What did you talk (sic) to him?

a About the items I gave to (sic) him, sir.
q Referring to Exhibit A-2?
a Yes, sir, and according to him he will take his obligation and I asked him
where the items are and he promised me that he will pay these amount,
sir.
q Up to this time that you were here, were you able to collect from him
partially or full?
a No, sir.9
No specific type of proof is required to show that there was
demand. Demand need not even be formal; it may be verbal. The
10 11
specific word "demand" need not even be used to show that it has indeed
In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecution was
able to prove the existence of all the elements of the crime. Private
complainant gave petitioner the pieces of jewelry in trust, or on
commission basis, as shown in the receipt dated May 2, 1991 with an
obligation to sell or return the same within sixty (60) days, if unsold.
There was misappropriation when petitioner failed to remit the proceeds
of those pieces of jewelry sold, or if no sale took place, failed to return the
same pieces of jewelry within or after the agreed period despite demand
from the private complainant, to the prejudice of the latter.
Anent the credibility of the prosecution's sole witness, which is
questioned by petitioner, the same is unmeritorious. Settled is the rule
that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, this Court gives great
respect to the evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique opportunity
to observe the demeanor of witnesses and their deportment on the
witness stand, an opportunity denied the appellate courts, which merely
rely on the records of the case. The assessment by the trial court is
15

been made upon the person charged, since even a mere query as to the
whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would be tantamount
to a demand. As expounded in Asejo v. People:
12 13
even conclusive and binding if not tainted with arbitrariness or oversight
of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence, especially when
such finding is affirmed by the CA. Truth is established not by the
16

number of witnesses, but by the quality of their testimonies, for in

determining the value and credibility of evidence, the witnesses are to be
With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that weighed not numbered. 17

demand under this kind of estafa need not be formal or written. The
appellate court observed that the law is silent with regard to the form of
demand in estafa under Art. 315 1(b), thus:
As regards the penalty, while this Court's Third Division was deliberating
on this case, the question of the continued validity of imposing on
persons convicted of crimes involving property came up. The legislature
apparently pegged these penalties to the value of the money and
property in 1930 when it enacted the Revised Penal Code. Since the
members of the division reached no unanimity on this question and since
the issues are of first impression, they decided to refer the case to the
Court en banc for consideration and resolution. Thus, several amici
curiae were invited at the behest of the Court to give their academic
opinions on the matter. Among those that graciously complied were Dean
Jose Manuel Diokno, Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Professor Alfredo F.
Tadiar, the Senate President, and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives. The parties were later heard on oral arguments before
the Court en banc, with Atty. Mario L. Bautista appearing as counsel de
oficio of the petitioner.
After a thorough consideration of the arguments presented on the matter,
this Court finds the following:
There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of
penalties that the courts continue to impose on crimes against property
committed today, based on the amount of damage measured by the
value of money eighty years ago in 1932. However, this Court cannot
modify the said range of penalties because that would constitute judicial
legislation. What the legislature's perceived failure in amending the
penalties provided for in the said crimes cannot be remedied through this
Court's decisions, as that would be encroaching upon the power of
another branch of the government. This, however, does not render the
whole situation without any remedy. It can be appropriately presumed
that the framers of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) had anticipated this
matter by including Article 5, which reads:
ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be
repressed but which are not covered by the law, and in cases of
excessive penalties. - Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which
it may deem proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall
render the proper decision, and shall report to the Chief Executive,
through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to
believe that said act should be made the subject of penal legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through
the Department of Justice, such statement as may be deemed proper,
without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict
enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition
of a clearly excessive penalty, taking into consideration the degree of
malice and the injury caused by the offense.18
The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts
bourne out of a case which is not punishable by law and the court finds it
proper to repress, the remedy is to render the proper decision and
thereafter, report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of
Justice, the reasons why the same act should be the subject of penal
legislation. The premise here is that a deplorable act is present but is not
the subject of any penal legislation, thus, the court is tasked to inform the
Chief Executive of the need to make that act punishable by law through
legislation. The second paragraph is similar to the first except for the
situation wherein the act is already punishable by law but the
corresponding penalty is deemed by the court as excessive. The remedy
therefore, as in the first paragraph is not to suspend the execution of the
sentence but to submit to the Chief Executive the reasons why the court
considers the said penalty to be non-commensurate with the act
committed. Again, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive, this
time, of the need for a legislation to provide the proper penalty.
In his book, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, Guillermo B.
19
Guevara opined that in Article 5, the duty of the court is merely to report
to the Chief Executive, with a recommendation for an amendment or
modification of the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh. Thus:
This provision is based under the legal maxim "nullum crimen, nulla
poena sige lege," that is, that there can exist no punishable act except
those previously and specifically provided for by penal statute.
No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law-making body does not
deem it necessary to prohibit its perpetration with penal sanction, the
Court of justice will be entirely powerless to punish such act.
Under the provisions of this article the Court cannot suspend the
execution of a sentence on the ground that the strict enforcement of the
provisions of this Code would cause excessive or harsh penalty. All that
the Court could do in such eventuality is to report the matter to the Chief
Executive with a recommendation for an amendment or modification of
the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh.20
Anent the non-suspension of the execution of the sentence, retired Chief
Justice Ramon C. Aquino and retired Associate Justice Carolina C.
Grio-Aquino, in their book, The Revised Penal Code, echoed the
21
above-cited commentary, thus:
The second paragraph of Art. 5 is an application of the humanitarian
principle that justice must be tempered with mercy. Generally, the courts
have nothing to do with the wisdom or justness of the penalties fixed by
law. "Whether or not the penalties prescribed by law upon conviction of
violations of particular statutes are too severe or are not severe enough,
are questions as to which commentators on the law may fairly differ; but it
is the duty of the courts to enforce the will of the legislator in all cases
unless it clearly appears that a given penalty falls within the prohibited
class of excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment." A petition for
clemency should be addressed to the Chief Executive. 22
There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in crimes against
property be based on the current inflation rate or at the ratio of P1.00 is
equal to P100.00 . However, it would be dangerous as this would result in
uncertainties, as opposed to the definite imposition of the penalties. It
must be remembered that the economy fluctuates and if the proposed
imposition of the penalties in crimes against property be adopted, the
penalties will not cease to change, thus, making the RPC, a self-
amending law. Had the framers of the RPC intended that to be so, it
should have provided the same, instead, it included the earlier cited
Article 5 as a remedy. It is also improper to presume why the present
legislature has not made any moves to amend the subject penalties in
order to conform with the present times. For all we know, the legislature
intends to retain the same penalties in order to deter the further
commission of those punishable acts which have increased tremendously
through the years. In fact, in recent moves of the legislature, it is
apparent that it aims to broaden the coverage of those who violate penal
laws. In the crime of Plunder, from its original minimum amount
of P100,000,000.00 plundered, the legislature lowered it
to P50,000,000.00. In the same way, the legislature lowered the threshold
amount upon which the Anti-Money Laundering Act may apply,
from P1,000,000.00 to P500,000.00.
It is also worth noting that in the crimes of Theft and Estafa, the present
penalties do not seem to be excessive compared to the proposed
imposition of their corresponding penalties. In Theft, the provisions state
that:
Art. 309. Penalties. Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium
periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 12,000 pesos
but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, but if the value of the thing
stolen exceeds the latter amount the penalty shall be the
maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one
year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the
penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In
such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which
may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of
this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion
temporal, as the case may be.
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than 6,000 pesos
but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods, if the value of the property stolen is more than 200 pesos
but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, if the value of the property stolen is over 50
pesos but does not exceed 200 pesos.
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but
does not exceed 50 pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such
value does not exceed 5 pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is
committed under the circumstances enumerated in paragraph 3
of the next preceding article and the value of the thing stolen
does not exceed 5 pesos. If such value exceeds said amount, the
provision of any of the five preceding subdivisions shall be made
applicable.
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50
pesos, when the value of the thing stolen is not over 5 pesos, and
the offender shall have acted under the impulse of hunger,
poverty, or the difficulty of earning a livelihood for the support of
himself or his family.
In a case wherein the value of the thing stolen is P6,000.00, the above-
provision states that the penalty is prision correccional in its minimum
and medium periods (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).
Applying the proposal, if the value of the thing stolen is P6,000.00, the
penalty is imprisonment of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision
correccional minimum period (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4
months). It would seem that under the present law, the penalty imposed
is almost the same as the penalty proposed. In fact, after the application
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law under the existing law, the minimum
penalty is still lowered by one degree; hence, the minimum penalty is
arresto mayor in its medium period to maximum period (2 months and 1
day to 6 months), making the offender qualified for pardon or parole after
serving the said minimum period and may even apply for probation.
Moreover, under the proposal, the minimum penalty after applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law is arresto menor in its maximum period to
arresto mayor in its minimum period (21 days to 2 months) is not too far
from the minimum period under the existing law. Thus, it would seem that
the present penalty imposed under the law is not at all excessive. The
same is also true in the crime of Estafa. 23
Moreover, if we apply the ratio of 1:100, as suggested to the value of the
thing stolen in the crime of Theft and the damage caused in the crime of
Estafa, the gap between the minimum and the maximum amounts, which
is the basis of determining the proper penalty to be imposed, would be
too wide and the penalty imposable would no longer be commensurate to
the act committed and the value of the thing stolen or the damage
caused:
I. Article 309, or the penalties for the crime of Theft, the value would be
modified but the penalties are not changed:
1. P12,000.00 to P22,000.00 will become P1,200,000.00
to P2,200,000.00, punished by prision mayor minimum to prision
mayor medium (6 years and 1 day to 10 years).
2. P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 will become P600,000.00
to P1,200,000.00, punished by prision correccional medium and
to prision correccional maximum (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to
6 years).24
3. P200.00 to P6,000.00 will become P20,000.00 to P600,000.00,
punishable by prision correccional minimum to prision
correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2
months).
4. P50.00 to P200.00 will become P5,000.00 to P20,000.00,
punishable by arresto mayor medium to prision correccional
minimum (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).
5. P5.00 to P50.00 will become P500.00 to P5,000.00, punishable
by arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months).
6. P5.00 will become P500.00, punishable by arresto mayor
minimum to arresto mayor medium.
x x x x.
II. Article 315, or the penalties for the crime of Estafa, the value would
also be modified but the penalties are not changed, as follows:
1st. P12,000.00 to P22,000.00, will become P1,200,000.00
to P2,200,000.00, punishable by prision correccional maximum to
prision mayor minimum (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 8
years).25
2nd. P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 will become P600,000.00
to P1,200,000.00, punishable by prision correccional minimum to
prision correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and
2 months). 26
3rd. P200.00 to P6,000.00 will become P20,000.00
to P600,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor maximum to prision
correccional minimum (4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4
months).
4th. P200.00 will become P20,000.00, punishable by arresto
mayor maximum (4 months and 1 day to 6 months).
An argument raised by Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, one of our
esteemed amici curiae, is that the incremental penalty provided under
Article 315 of the RPC violates the Equal Protection Clause.
The equal protection clause requires equality among equals, which is
determined according to a valid classification. The test developed by
jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness, which has four
27
requisites:
 (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; JUSTICE PERALTA:

(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
Then what will be the penalty that we are going to impose if the amount is
more than Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO:
28

Well, that would be for Congress to ... if this Court will declare the
According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental Penalty Rule (IPR) does not incremental penalty rule unconstitutional, then that would ... the void
rest on substantial distinctions as P10,000.00 may have been substantial should be filled by Congress.
in the past, but it is not so today, which violates the first requisite; the IPR
was devised so that those who commit estafa involving higher amounts JUSTICE PERALTA:
would receive heavier penalties; however, this is no longer achieved,
because a person who steals P142,000.00 would receive the same But in your presentation, you were fixing the amount at One Hundred
penalty as someone who steals hundreds of millions, which violates the Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos ...
second requisite; and, the IPR violates requisite no. 3, considering that
the IPR is limited to existing conditions at the time the law was DEAN DIOKNO:
promulgated, conditions that no longer exist today.
Well, my presen ... (interrupted)
Assuming that the Court submits to the argument of Dean Diokno and
declares the incremental penalty in Article 315 unconstitutional for
JUSTICE PERALTA:
violating the equal protection clause, what then is the penalty that should
be applied in case the amount of the thing subject matter of the crime
exceeds P22,000.00? It seems that the proposition poses more For every One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos in excess of
questions than answers, which leads us even more to conclude that the Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos you were suggesting an
appropriate remedy is to refer these matters to Congress for them to additional penalty of one (1) year, did I get you right?
exercise their inherent power to legislate laws.
DEAN DIOKNO:
Even Dean Diokno was of the opinion that if the Court declares the IPR
unconstitutional, the remedy is to go to Congress. Thus: Yes, Your Honor, that is, if the court will take the route of statutory
interpretation.
xxxx
JUSTICE PERALTA:
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Ah ...
Now, your position is to declare that the incremental penalty should be
struck down as unconstitutional because it is absurd. DEAN DIOKNO:

DEAN DIOKNO: If the Court will say that they can go beyond the literal wording of the
law...
Absurd, it violates equal protection, Your Honor, and cruel and unusual
punishment. JUSTICE PERALTA:
But if we de ... (interrupted) ... and determine the value or the amount.

DEAN DIOKNO: DEAN DIOKNO:

....then.... Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA: JUSTICE PERALTA:

Ah, yeah. But if we declare the incremental penalty as unsconstitutional, That will be equivalent to the incremental penalty of one (1) year in
the court cannot fix the amount ... excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.

DEAN DIOKNO: DEAN DIOKNO:

No, Your Honor. Yes, Your Honor.

JUSTICE PERALTA: JUSTICE PERALTA:

... as the equivalent of one, as an incremental penalty in excess of The amount in excess of Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
Twenty-Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
Thank you, Dean.
DEAN DIOKNO:
DEAN DIOKNO:
No, Your Honor.
Thank you.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
xxxx 29

The Court cannot do that.

Dean Diokno also contends that Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code
DEAN DIOKNO: constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Citing Solem v. Helm, Dean
30

Diokno avers that the United States Federal Supreme Court has
Could not be. expanded the application of a similar Constitutional provision prohibiting
cruel and unusual punishment, to the duration of the penalty, and not just
JUSTICE PERALTA: its form. The court therein ruled that three things must be done to decide
whether a sentence is proportional to a specific crime, viz.; (1) Compare
the nature and gravity of the offense, and the harshness of the penalty;
The only remedy is to go to Congress...
(2) Compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same
jurisdiction, i.e., whether more serious crimes are subject to the same
DEAN DIOKNO: penalty or to less serious penalties; and (3) Compare the sentences
imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.
Yes, Your Honor.
However, the case of Solem v. Helm cannot be applied in the present
JUSTICE PERALTA: case, because in Solem what respondent therein deemed cruel was the
penalty imposed by the state court of South Dakota after it took into
account the latters recidivist statute and not the original penalty for
uttering a "no account" check. Normally, the maximum punishment for the
crime would have been five years imprisonment and a $5,000.00 fine.
Nonetheless, respondent was sentenced to life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole under South Dakotas recidivist statute because of his
six prior felony convictions. Surely, the factual antecedents of Solem are
different from the present controversy.
With respect to the crime of Qualified Theft, however, it is true that the
imposable penalty for the offense is high. Nevertheless, the rationale for
the imposition of a higher penalty against a domestic servant is the fact
that in the commission of the crime, the helper will essentially gravely
abuse the trust and confidence reposed upon her by her employer. After
accepting and allowing the helper to be a member of the household, thus
entrusting upon such person the protection and safekeeping of the
employers loved ones and properties, a subsequent betrayal of that trust
is so repulsive as to warrant the necessity of imposing a higher penalty to
deter the commission of such wrongful acts.
There are other crimes where the penalty of fine and/or imprisonment are
dependent on the subject matter of the crime and which, by adopting the
proposal, may create serious implications. For example, in the crime of
Malversation, the penalty imposed depends on the amount of the money
malversed by the public official, thus:
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of
malversation. Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his
office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the
same or shall take or misappropriate or shall consent, through
abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such
public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of
the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property, shall
suffer:
1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods, if the amount involved in the misappropriation or
malversation does not exceed two hundred pesos.
2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium
periods, if the amount involved is more than two hundred pesos
but does not exceed six thousand pesos.
3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion
temporal in its minimum period, if the amount involved is more
than six thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand pesos.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum
periods, if the amount involved is more than twelve thousand
pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount
exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of
perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the
funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or
property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly
authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such
missing funds or property to personal use.
The above-provisions contemplate a situation wherein the Government
loses money due to the unlawful acts of the offender. Thus, following the
proposal, if the amount malversed is P200.00 (under the existing law),
the amount now becomes P20,000.00 and the penalty is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years 4 months and
1 day to 6 years). The penalty may not be commensurate to the act of
embezzlement of P20,000.00 compared to the acts committed by public
officials punishable by a special law, i.e., Republic Act No. 3019 or the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, specifically Section 3, wherein the
31
injury caused to the government is not generally defined by any monetary
amount, the penalty (6 years and 1 month to 15 years) under the Anti-
32
Graft Law will now become higher. This should not be the case, because
in the crime of malversation, the public official takes advantage of his
public position to embezzle the fund or property of the government
entrusted to him.
The said inequity is also apparent in the crime of Robbery with force
upon things (inhabited or uninhabited) where the value of the thing
unlawfully taken and the act of unlawful entry are the bases of the penalty
imposable, and also, in Malicious Mischief, where the penalty of
imprisonment or fine is dependent on the cost of the damage caused.
In Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or uninhabited), if we
increase the value of the thing unlawfully taken, as proposed in the
ponencia, the sole basis of the penalty will now be the value of the thing
unlawfully taken and no longer the element of force employed in entering
the premises. It may likewise cause an inequity between the crime of
Qualified Trespass to Dwelling under Article 280, and this kind of robbery
because the former is punishable by prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years) and a
fine not exceeding P1,000.00 (P100,000.00 now if the ratio is 1:100)
where entrance to the premises is with violence or intimidation, which is
the main justification of the penalty. Whereas in the crime of Robbery with
force upon things, it is punished with a penalty of prision mayor (6 years
and 1 day to 12 years) if the intruder is unarmed without the penalty of
Fine despite the fact that it is not merely the illegal entry that is the basis
of the penalty but likewise the unlawful taking.
Furthermore, in the crime of Other Mischiefs under Article 329, the
highest penalty that can be imposed is arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months) if the value of the
damage caused exceeds P1,000.00, but under the proposal, the value of
the damage will now become P100,000.00 (1:100), and still punishable
by arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months). And, if the value of
the damaged property does not exceed P200.00, the penalty is arresto
menor or a fine of not less than the value of the damage caused and not
more than P200.00, if the amount involved does not exceed P200.00 or
cannot be estimated. Under the proposal, P200.00 will now
become P20,000.00, which simply means that the fine of P200.00 under
the existing law will now become P20,000.00. The amount of Fine under
this situation will now become excessive and afflictive in nature despite
the fact that the offense is categorized as a light felony penalized with a
light penalty under Article 26 of the RPC. Unless we also amend Article
33
26 of the RPC, there will be grave implications on the penalty of Fine, but
changing the same through Court decision, either expressly or impliedly,
may not be legally and constitutionally feasible.
There are other crimes against property and swindling in the RPC that
may also be affected by the proposal, such as those that impose
imprisonment and/or Fine as a penalty based on the value of the damage
caused, to wit: Article 311 (Theft of the property of the National Library
and National Museum), Article 312 (Occupation of real property or
usurpation of real rights in property), Article 313 (Altering boundaries or
landmarks), Article 316 (Other forms of swindling), Article 317 (Swindling
a minor), Article 318 (Other deceits), Article 328 (Special cases of
malicious mischief) and Article 331 (Destroying or damaging statues,
public monuments or paintings). Other crimes that impose Fine as a
penalty will also be affected, such as: Article 213 (Frauds against the
public treasury and similar offenses), Article 215 (Prohibited
Transactions),
Article 216 (Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer), Article
218 (Failure of accountable officer to render accounts), Article 219
(Failure of a responsible public officer to render accounts before leaving
the country).
In addition, the proposal will not only affect crimes under the RPC. It will
also affect crimes which are punishable by special penal laws, such as
Illegal Logging or Violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705,
as amended. The law treats cutting, gathering, collecting and
34
possessing timber or other forest products without license as an offense
as grave as and equivalent to the felony of qualified theft. Under the law,
35
the offender shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles
309 and 310 of the Revised Penal Code, which means that the penalty
36
imposable for the offense is, again, based on the value of the timber or
forest products involved in the offense. Now, if we accept the said
proposal in the crime of Theft, will this particular crime of Illegal Logging
be amended also in so far as the penalty is concerned because the
penalty is dependent on Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC? The answer is
in the negative because the soundness of this particular law is not in
question.
With the numerous crimes defined and penalized under the Revised
Penal Code and Special Laws, and other related provisions of these laws
affected by the proposal, a thorough study is needed to determine its
effectivity and necessity. There may be some provisions of the law that
should be amended; nevertheless, this Court is in no position to conclude
as to the intentions of the framers of the Revised Penal Code by merely
making a study of the applicability of the penalties imposable in the
present times. Such is not within the competence of the Court but of the
Legislature which is empowered to conduct public hearings on the matter,
consult legal luminaries and who, after due proceedings, can decide
whether or not to amend or to revise the questioned law or other laws, or
even create a new legislation which will adopt to the times.
Admittedly, Congress is aware that there is an urgent need to amend the
Revised Penal Code. During the oral arguments, counsel for the Senate
informed the Court that at present, fifty-six (56) bills are now pending in
the Senate seeking to amend the Revised Penal Code, each one
37
proposing much needed change and updates to archaic laws that were
promulgated decades ago when the political, socio-economic, and
cultural settings were far different from todays conditions.
Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a
way that it shall not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and
that in the course of such application or construction, it should not make
or supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation, modify,
revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a
construction which is repugnant to its terms. The Court should apply the
38
law in a manner that would give effect to their letter and spirit, especially
when the law is clear as to its intent and purpose. Succinctly put, the
Court should shy away from encroaching upon the primary function of a
co-equal branch of the Government; otherwise, this would lead to an
inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of powers by means of
judicial legislation.
Moreover, it is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty
or a Fine; hence, it can be increased by the Court when appropriate.
Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi-
delict shall be at least three thousand pesos, even though there may
have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning
capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be paid to the
heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed
and awarded by the court, unless the deceased on account of
permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had
no earning capacity at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the
provisions of Article 291, the recipient who is not an heir called to
the decedent's inheritance by the law of testate or intestate
succession, may demand support from the person causing the
death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact duration to
be fixed by the court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and
ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for
mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a
kind of monetary restitution or compensation to the victim for the damage
or infraction that was done to the latter by the accused, which in a sense
only covers the civil aspect. Precisely, it is civil indemnity. Thus, in a
crime where a person dies, in addition to the penalty of imprisonment
imposed to the offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the victim a
sum of money as restitution. Clearly, this award of civil indemnity due to
the death of the victim could not be contemplated as akin to the value of
a thing that is unlawfully taken which is the basis in the imposition of the
proper penalty in certain crimes. Thus, the reasoning in increasing the
value of civil indemnity awarded in some offense cannot be the same
reasoning that would sustain the adoption of the suggested ratio. Also, it
is apparent from Article 2206 that the law only imposes a minimum
amount for awards of civil indemnity, which is P3,000.00. The law did not
provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount for the award
cannot be changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity
can be validly modified and increased when the present circumstance
warrants it. Corollarily, moral damages under Article 2220 of the Civil
39
Code also does not fix the amount of damages that can be awarded. It is
discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental anguish or the
suffering of the private offended party. The amount of moral damages
can, in relation to civil indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does not
exceed the award of civil indemnity.
In addition, some may view the penalty provided by law for the offense
committed as tantamount to cruel punishment. However, all penalties are
generally harsh, being punitive in nature. Whether or not they are
excessive or amount to cruel punishment is a matter that should be left to
lawmakers. It is the prerogative of the courts to apply the law, especially
when they are clear and not subject to any other interpretation than that
which is plainly written.
Similar to the argument of Dean Diokno, one of Justice Antonio Carpios
opinions is that the incremental penalty provision should be declared
unconstitutional and that the courts should only impose the penalty
corresponding to the amount of P22,000.00, regardless if the actual
amount involved exceeds P22,000.00. As suggested, however, from now
until the law is properly amended by Congress, all crimes of Estafa will
no longer be punished by the appropriate penalty. A conundrum in the
regular course of criminal justice would occur when every accused
convicted of the crime of estafa will be meted penalties different from the
proper penalty that should be imposed. Such drastic twist in the
application of the law has no legal basis and directly runs counter to what
the law provides.
It should be noted that the death penalty was reintroduced in the
dispensation of criminal justice by the Ramos Administration by virtue of
Republic Act No. 7659 in December 1993. The said law has been
40
questioned before this Court. There is, arguably, no punishment more deliberated upon before the said values could be accurately and properly
cruel than that of death. Yet still, from the time the death penalty was re- adjusted. The effects on the society, the injured party, the accused, its
imposed until its lifting in June 2006 by Republic Act No. 9346, the Court
41
socio-economic impact, and the likes must be painstakingly evaluated
did not impede the imposition of the death penalty on the ground that it is and weighed upon in order to arrive at a wholistic change that all of us
a "cruel punishment" within the purview of Section 19 (1), Article III of the
42
believe should be made to our existing law. Dejectedly, the Court is ill-
Constitution. Ultimately, it was through an act of Congress suspending equipped, has no resources, and lacks sufficient personnel to conduct
the imposition of the death penalty that led to its non-imposition and not public hearings and sponsor studies and surveys to validly effect these
via the intervention of the Court. changes in our Revised Penal Code. This function clearly and
appropriately belongs to Congress. Even Professor Tadiar concedes to
Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the Court this conclusion, to wit:
cannot declare the provision of the law from which the proper penalty
emanates unconstitutional in the present action. Not only is it violative of xxxx
due process, considering that the State and the concerned parties were
not given the opportunity to comment on the subject matter, it is settled JUSTICE PERALTA:
that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked collaterally
because constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly and not Yeah, Just one question. You are suggesting that in order to determine
collaterally, more so in the present controversy wherein the issues never
43
the value of Peso you have to take into consideration several factors.
touched upon the constitutionality of any of the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Besides, it has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual
Yes.
punishments is generally aimed at the form or character of the
punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and
applies to punishments which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or JUSTICE PERALTA:
obsolete, for instance, those inflicted at the whipping post, or in the
pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and Per capita income.
the like. Fine and imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition. 44

PROFESSOR TADIAR:
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or
severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to the Constitution. The fact that the Per capita income.
punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel
and unusual. Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come JUSTICE PERALTA:
under the ban, the punishment must be "flagrantly and plainly
oppressive," "wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to Consumer price index.
shock the moral sense of the community." 45

PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it is for the Congress to amend
the law and adapt it to our modern time. Yeah.

The solution to the present controversy could not be solved by merely JUSTICE PERALTA:
adjusting the questioned monetary values to the present value of money
based only on the current inflation rate. There are other factors and
variables that need to be taken into consideration, researched, and Inflation ...
PROFESSOR TADIAR: PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Yes. ... has no power to utilize the power of judicial review to in order to adjust,
to make the adjustment that is a power that belongs to the legislature.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
JUSTICE PERALTA:
... and so on. Is the Supreme Court equipped to determine those factors?
Thank you, Professor.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
There are many ways by which the value of the Philippine Peso can be
determined utilizing all of those economic terms. Thank you. 46

JUSTICE PERALTA: Finally, the opinion advanced by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A.
Sereno echoes the view that the role of the Court is not merely to
Yeah, but ... dispense justice, but also the active duty to prevent injustice. Thus, in
order to prevent injustice in the present controversy, the Court should not
PROFESSOR TADIAR: impose an obsolete penalty pegged eighty three years ago, but consider
the proposed ratio of 1:100 as simply compensating for inflation.
Furthermore, the Court has in the past taken into consideration "changed
And I dont think it is within the power of the Supreme Court to pass upon
conditions" or "significant changes in circumstances" in its decisions.
and peg the value to One Hundred (P100.00) Pesos to ...
Similarly, the Chief Justice is of the view that the Court is not delving into
JUSTICE PERALTA:
the validity of the substance of a statute. The issue is no different from
the Courts adjustment of indemnity in crimes against persons, which the
Yeah. Court had previously adjusted in light of current times, like in the case of
People v. Pantoja. Besides, Article 10 of the Civil Code mandates a
47

PROFESSOR TADIAR: presumption that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to
prevail.
... One (P1.00.00) Peso in 1930.
With due respect to the opinions and proposals advanced by the Chief
JUSTICE PERALTA: Justice and my Colleagues, all the proposals ultimately lead to prohibited
judicial legislation. Short of being repetitious and as extensively
That is legislative in nature. discussed above, it is truly beyond the powers of the Court to legislate
laws, such immense power belongs to Congress and the Court should
PROFESSOR TADIAR: refrain from crossing this clear-cut divide. With regard to civil indemnity,
as elucidated before, this refers to civil liability which is awarded to the
That is my position that the Supreme Court ... offended party as a kind of monetary restitution. It is truly based on the
value of money. The same cannot be said on penalties because, as
earlier stated, penalties are not only based on the value of money, but on
JUSTICE PERALTA: several other factors. Further, since the law is silent as to the maximum
amount that can be awarded and only pegged the minimum sum,
Yeah, okay.
increasing the amount granted as civil indemnity is not proscribed. Thus,
it can be adjusted in light of current conditions.
Now, with regard to the penalty imposed in the present case, the CA
modified the ruling of the RTC. The RTC imposed the indeterminate
penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional in its
medium period, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months
of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, as maximum. However, the
CA imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision
mayor, as maximum, plus one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00, or
a total of seven (7) years.
In computing the penalty for this type of estafa, this Court's ruling in
Cosme, Jr. v. People is highly instructive, thus:
48
With respect to the imposable penalty, Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code provides:
ART. 315 Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by
any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision
mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but
does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter
sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but
the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In
such case, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be
imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the
penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case
may be.
The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of only two, not three,
periods, in which case, Article 65 of the same Code requires the division
of the time included in the penalty into three equal portions of time
included in the penalty prescribed, forming one period of each of the
three portions. Applying the latter provisions, the maximum, medium and
minimum periods of the penalty prescribed are:
Maximum - 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years
Medium - 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months, 20 days
Minimum - 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months, 10 days 49
To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prisin
correccional maximum to prisin mayor minimum should be divided into
three equal portions of time each of which portion shall be deemed to
form one period in accordance with Article 65 of the RPC. In the
50 51
present case, the amount involved is P98,000.00, which
exceeds P22,000.00, thus, the maximum penalty imposable should be
within the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years
of prision mayor. Article 315 also states that a period of one year shall be
added to the penalty for every additional P10,000.00 defrauded in excess
of P22,000.00, but in no case shall the total penalty which may be
imposed exceed 20 years.
Considering that the amount of P98,000.00 is P76,000.00 more than
the P22,000.00 ceiling set by law, then, adding one year for each
additional P10,000.00, the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21
days to 8 years of prision mayor minimum would be increased by 7
years. Taking the maximum of the prescribed penalty, which is 8 years,
plus an additional 7 years, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty is
15 years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, since the penalty prescribed
by law for the estafa charge against petitioner is prision correccional
maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower would then
be prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence should be
anywhere from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months.
One final note, the Court should give Congress a chance to perform its
primordial duty of lawmaking. The Court should not pre-empt Congress
and usurp its inherent powers of making and enacting laws. While it may
be the most expeditious approach, a short cut by judicial fiat is a
dangerous proposition, lest the Court dare trespass on prohibited judicial
legislation.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 5,
2007 of petitioner Lito Corpuz is hereby DENIED. Consequently, the
Decision dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution dated September 5, 2007
of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the Decision
dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 46, San
Fernando City, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub-paragraph (b) of the
Revised Penal Code, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
the penalty imposed is the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging Associate Justice Associate Justice
from THREE (3) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ELEVEN DAYS of
prision correccional, as minimum, to FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of reclusion No Part
temporal as maximum. BVIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-
Associate Justice BERNABE*
Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this Associate Justice
Decision be furnished the President of the Republic of the Philippines,
through the Department of Justice.
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
Also, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the Senate
and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.
C E R TI F I C ATI O N
SO ORDERED.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
Associate Justice
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
WE CONCUR: Chief Justice

See Concurring and Dissenting Opinion

MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
See Dissenting Opinion PRESBITERO J. VELASCO,
ANTONIO T. CARPIO JR. * No part.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
1
Penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (now a
TERESITA J. LEONARDO- See: Concurring Opinion member of the Supreme Court), with Associate Justices Rodrigo
DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION V. Cosico and Lucas P. Bersamin (now a member of the Supreme
Associate Justice Associate Justice Court), concurring; rollo, pp. 31-41.

I take no part due to prior I join the Dissent of J. Abad

2
Rollo, p. 43.
action in the CA MARIANO C. DEL
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN* CASTILLO 3
Id. at 48-52.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
4
Libuit v. People, 506 Phil. 591, 599 (2005).
See Dissenting Opinion MARTIN S. VILLARAMA,
ROBERTO A. ABAD JR. 5
Blas v. Angeles- Hutalla, 482 Phil. 485, 501 (2004).
Associate Justice Associate Justice
6
Quinto v. People, 365 Phil. 259, 270 (1999).
7
Rollo, p. 37. (Citations omitted.) 1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum
8
Diaz v. People, 585 Phil. 318, 332 (2008), citing Pangilinan v. period, if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000
Court of Appeals, 378 Phil. 670, 675 (1999). pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if
such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty
9
TSN, December 17, 1992, pp. 9-10. (Emphasis supplied.) provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its
maximum period, adding one year for each
additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty
10
Tan v. People, 542 Phil. 188, 201 (2007).
which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty
years. In such cases, and in connection with the
11
Id., citing Lee v. People, 495 Phil. 239, 250 (2005). accessory penalties which may be imposed under
the provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
12
Id. termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as
the case may be.
13
555 Phil. 106 (2007).
2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its
14
Id. at 114. (Citations omitted.) minimum and medium periods, if the amount of
the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed
Cosme, Jr. v. People, 538 Phil. 52, 66 (2006), citing People v.
15 12,000 pesos;
Garillo, 446 Phil. 163, 174-175 (2003).
3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
Id., citing Sullon v. People, 500 Phil. 39, 45 (2005) ; People v.
16 period to prision correccional in its minimum
Bulan, 498 Phil. 586, 598 (2005). period if such amount is over 200 pesos but does
not exceed 6,000 pesos; and
17
Id. at 67, citing People v. Gaspar, 376 Phil. 762, 779 (1999).
4th. By arresto mayor in its maximum period, if
18
Emphasis supplied. such amount does not exceed 200 pesos,
provided that in the four cases mentioned, the
19
Third Edition, 1940. fraud be committed by any of the following
means:
20
Id. at 16. (Emphasis supplied)
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:
21
1997 Edition.
(a) By altering the substance, quantity, or quality
or anything of value which the offender shall
22
Id. at 93, citing United States v. Valera Ang Y, 26 Phil. 598 deliver by virtue of an obligation to do so, even
(1914); People v. Salazar y Gabriel, 102 Phil. 1184 (1958); Tiu though such obligation be based on an immoral or
Ua, 51 O.G. 1863; Limaco, 99 Phil. 35 (1956), and People v. Del illegal consideration.
Rosario y Natividad, 62 Phil. 824 (1936). (Emphasis supplied.)
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa). Any person who shall defraud
23
prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other
another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall be personal property received by the offender in trust
punished by: or on commission, or for administration, or under
 any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of or to return the same, even though
such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed
by a bond; or by denying having received such
money, goods, or other property.
(c) By taking undue advantage of the signature of
the offended party in blank, and by writing any
document above such signature in blank, to the
prejudice of the offended party or of any third
person.
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or
fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with
the commission of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending
to possess power, influence, qualifications,
property, credit, agency, business or imaginary
transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
(b) By altering the quality, fineness or weight of
anything pertaining to his art or business.
(c) By pretending to have bribed any Government
employee, without prejudice to the action for
calumny which the offended party may deem
proper to bring against the offender. In this case,
the offender shall be punished by the maximum
period of the penalty.
(d) [By post-dating a check, or issuing a check in
payment of an obligation when the offender
therein were not sufficient to cover the amount of
the check. The failure of the drawer of the check
to deposit the amount necessary to cover his
check within three (3) days from receipt of notice
from the bank and/or the payee or holder that said
check has been dishonored for lack of
insufficiency of funds shall be prima facie
evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or
fraudulent act. (As amended by R.A. 4885,
approved June 17, 1967.)]
(e) By obtaining any food, refreshment or
accommodation at a hotel, inn, restaurant,
boarding house, lodging house, or apartment
house and the like without paying therefor, with
intent to defraud the proprietor or manager
thereof, or by obtaining credit at hotel, inn,
restaurant, boarding house, lodging house, or
apartment house by the use of any false pretense,
or by abandoning or surreptitiously removing any
part of his baggage from a hotel, inn, restaurant,
boarding house, lodging house or apartment
house after obtaining credit, food, refreshment or
accommodation therein without paying for his
food, refreshment or accommodation.
3. Through any of the following fraudulent means:
(a) By inducing another, by means of deceit, to
sign any document.
(b) By resorting to some fraudulent practice to
insure success in a gambling game.
(c) By removing, concealing or destroying, in
whole or in part, any court record, office files,
document or any other papers.
24
May be entitled to Probation.
25
May be entitled to Probation if the maximum penalty imposed is
6 years.
26
May be entitled to Probation.
Quinto v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 189698, February
27
22, 2010, 613 SCRA 385, 414.
28
People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12, 18 (1939).
29
TSN, Oral Arguments, February 25, 2014, pp. 192-195.
30
463 U.S. 277 (1983)
31
Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. - In addition to
acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by existing
law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public
officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules
and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority
or an offense in connection with the official duties of the
latter, or allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or
influenced to commit such violation or offense.
(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift,
present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for
any other person, in connection with any contract or
transaction between the Government and any other part,
wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to
intervene under the law.
(c) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift,
present or other pecuniary or material benefit, for himself
or for another, from any person for whom the public
officer, in any manner or capacity, has secured or
obtained, or will secure or obtain, any Government permit
or license, in consideration for the help given or to be
given, without prejudice to Section thirteen of this Act.
(d) Accepting or having any member of his family accept
employment in a private enterprise which has pending
official business with him during the pendency thereof or
within one year after its termination.
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and
employees of offices or government corporations charged
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.
(f) Neglecting or refusing, after due demand or request,
without sufficient justification, to act within a reasonable
time on any matter pending before him for the purpose of
obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested
in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit or
advantage, or for the purpose of favoring his own interest
or giving undue advantage in favor of or discriminating
against any other interested party.
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any
contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public
officer profited or will profit thereby.
(h) Director or indirectly having financing or pecuniary
interest in any business, contract or transaction in
connection with which he intervenes or takes part in his
official capacity, or in which he is prohibited by the
Constitution or by any law from having any interest.
(i) Directly or indirectly becoming interested, for personal
gain, or having a material interest in any transaction or act
requiring the approval of a board, panel or group of which
he is a member, and which exercises discretion in such
approval, even if he votes against the same or does not
participate in the action of the board, committee, panel or
group.
Interest for personal gain shall be presumed against
those public officers responsible for the approval of
manifestly unlawful, inequitable, or irregular transaction or
acts by the board, panel or group to which they belong.
(j) Knowingly approving or granting any license, permit,
privilege or benefit in favor of any person not qualified for
or not legally entitled to such license, permit, privilege or
advantage, or of a mere representative or dummy of one
who is not so qualified or entitled.
(k) Divulging valuable information of a confidential
character, acquired by his office or by him on account of
his official position to unauthorized persons, or releasing
such information in advance of its authorized release
date.
 The person giving the gift, present, share, percentage or
benefit referred to in subparagraphs (b) and (c); or
offering or giving to the public officer the employment
mentioned in subparagraph (d); or urging the divulging or
untimely release of the confidential information referred to
in subparagraph (k) of this section shall, together with the
offending public officer, be punished under Section nine of
this Act and shall be permanently or temporarily
disqualified in the discretion of the Court, from transacting
business in any form with the Government.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 130709. March 6, 2002]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. MARIANITO MONTERON y who was stronger, restrained her. He placed his penis
PANTORAS, accused-appellant.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional
[1]
Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 15, dated May 28,
1997 in Criminal Cases Nos. 36,564-96, convicting
accused-appellant Marianito Monteron of the crime of
rape. The dispositive portion of the appealed decision
reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having proven the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt, Marianito Monteron is
hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua and to indemnify Mary
Ann Martenez the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00). 1
The factual antecedents are as follows:
On March 7, 1996, at 12:10 p.m., fifteen year-old
Mary Ann Martenez was walking home from Wangan
National Agricultural School, Davao City. While she was
walking on a secluded portion of the road, Mary Ann was
hit on the head by a slingshot. She turned to see where
the stone came from, she was hit again on the
mouth. She fell down unconscious. [2]
When Mary Ann came to, she found herself lying on
the grass naked. Accused-appellant was lying on top of
her, also naked. She struggled but accused-appellant,
[3]
on top of her vagina, which caused her to feel pain. She
frantically grabbed his erect penis and pushed it away
from her. This caused accused-appellant to stand up in
pain. Mary Ann ran towards the road while putting on her
clothes.
Mary Anns cousin, Arnel Arat, witnessed the whole
incident as he was then walking to Wangan Agricultural
School. He met Mary Ann while the latter was running
away and brought her home. When they got home, Mary
Ann told her uncle what happened. Her uncle, in turn,
told her mother.
That afternoon, upon complaint of Mary Ann, the
Calinan Police Precinct arrested accused-appellant.
 The following morning, Mary Ann was brought to the
City Health Office of Davao City where she was
examined by Dr. Danilo P. Ledesma. The latter found that
Mary Anns hymen was intact and had no laceration, but
her labia minora was coaptated and her labia
majora was gaping. [4]
On March 12, 1996, accused-appellant was formally
charged with rape. At his arraignment, accused-appellant
entered a plea of not guilty. After trial, the lower court
[5]
convicted him of the crime of rape.
Accused-appellant is now before us on appeal on a
lone assigned error:
DUE TO REASONABLE DOUBT, THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT IN DAVAO CITY, BRANCH 15 HAS
COMMITED AN ERROR IN NOT ACQUITTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED
IN THE INFORMATION.[6]
Accused-appellant argues that his negative plea to
the information filed against him; his filing of the notice of
appeal; and his denial of the rape charge against him
during trial indicate his innocence. [7]
We are not persuaded.
Constitutional due process demands that the
accused in a criminal case should be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. The
rationale behind this constitutional guarantee
are: First, to furnish the accused with the description of
the charge against him as will enable him to make his
defense; second, to avail himself of his conviction or
acquittal, for protection against a further prosecution for
the same cause; and third, to inform the court of the facts
alleged, so that it may decide whether they are sufficient
in law to support a conviction, if one should be had. [8]
In fulfillment of the aforesaid constitutional guarantee,
Rule 116, Section 1 (a) of the Rules of Court mandates
that an accused be arraigned in open court and asked to
enter a plea of guilty or not guilty of the crime
charged. The purpose of arraignment is, thus, to apprise
the accused of the possible loss of freedom, even of his
life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him,
or at the very least to inform him of why the prosecuting
arm of the State is mobilized against him. Consequently,
[9]
when accused-appellant entered a negative plea during
his arraignment, the same was not binding on the court
as an indication of his innocence. Rather, it is a general
denial of the charges impugned against him and an
exercise of his right to be heard of his plea.
Neither is accused-appellants filing of a notice of
appeal indicative of his innocence. On the contrary,
[10]
accused-appellants appeal was necessitated by the
judgment of conviction rendered against him by the trial
court. At the very least, the judgment below constituted a
preliminary finding of accused-appellants guilt.
 On the whole, accused-appellant denies having A: Because he is my neighbor, sir.
abused and raped Mary Ann. Time-tested is the rule that
Q: How long?
between the positive assertions of prosecution witnesses
and the negative averments of the accused, the former A: Very long time, sir.
undisputedly deserves more credence and entitled to
Q: What happened when you were brought to the grassy
greater evidentiary weight. Moreover,
[11]
positive
place?
identification of the accused by prosecution witnesses as
to his participation in the crime cannot be overcome by A: When I regained my consciousness I was already stripped
his denial of participation. [12] naked and he was on top of me.

Q: What was he doing?

In the case at bar, Mary Ann Martenez positively
identified accused-appellant as her molester in this wise: A: His penis was on top of my vagina, sir.

Q: Did you see the person who hit you with a sling shot? Q: What else happened?

A: Yes, sir. A: I felt pain in my vagina.

Q: Whom did you see? Q: What did you do?

A: (Witness pointing to a person wearing maong pants, white A: I grabbed his penis and so he felt pain and stood up.
T-shirt and when asked his name he answered that he is
Marianito Monteron.) Q: You said earlier that you saw the person who hit you with
a sling shot?
Q: What happened next?
A: Yes, sir.
A: I lost consciousness and when I regained consciousness,
I was surprised because I was already at the grassy Q: You recognized him?
area.
A: Yes, sir.
Q: This person that you saw who hit you with a sling shot, do
you know him? Q: You saw a person on top of you later on the grassy place?

A: Yes, sir. A: Yes, sir.

Q: Why do you know him?

 Q: Who is this person that you saw in the grassy place?
A: The same person, sir.
(Witness pointing to Mr. Monteron the accused).
(Emphasis provided) [13]
Mary Anns testimony pointing to accused-appellant
as the author of the crime is corroborated by her cousin
Arnel Arat, viz:
Q: What did you see?
A: (Witness pointing to a person wearing a white T-shirt) I
saw Marianito Monteron, the accused.
Q: Did you recognize him that time?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Why do you know him?
A: Because we played basketball together.
Q: What was he doing that time?
A: He was on top of Mary Ann. (Emphasis provided)[14]
It is axiomatic that negative assertions cannot prevail
over the positive testimonies of credible witnesses.
Thus, the accused-appellants denial, not being
[15]
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is
negative and self-serving evidence bearing no weight in
law. Moreover, the defense of denial is inherently weak
[16]
and has always been viewed with disfavor by the courts
due to the facility with which they can be concocted.
[17]
Accused-appellant challenges the testimony of Arnel
Arat, saying that he was a biased witness because he is
Mary Anns cousin. It is a basic precept that
[18]
relationship per se of a witness with the victim does not
necessarily mean that he is biased. On the contrary,
[19]
relatives have more interest in telling the truth for they
want the real culprits to be meted their punishment. To[20]
be sure, there is no law disqualifying a person from
testifying in a criminal case in which his relative is
involved if the former was at the scene of the crime and
witnessed the execution of the crime. Thus, the
[21]
relationship of Arnel Arat to Mary Ann does not impair the
credibility of his testimony, especially so when the same
was given in a clear, convincing and straightforward
manner.
Accused-appellant further posits that Mary Anns
charge against him was prompted by ill-will or grudge
harbored by the Martenez family against the
Monterons. More specifically, accused-appellant narrated
that his father and Mary Anns father quarreled in a
cockpit. This, however, cannot be considered as a
[22]
motive strong enough to falsely accuse accused-
appellant of so grave a crime as rape. Not a few accused
in rape cases have attributed the charges brought
against them to family feud, resentment, or revenge. But
such alleged motives have never swayed this Court from
lending full credence to the testimony of the complainant
where she remains steadfast in her direct and cross
examination. Besides, no parent would expose his or
[23]
her own daughter to the shame and scandal of having
undergone such debasing defilement of her chastity if
the charges were not true. It is unnatural for a parent to
[24]
use his own offspring as an engine of malice, especially
if it will subject a daughter to embarrassment and even
stigma.[25]
Accused-appellant also contends that it was unlikely
for him to strip naked and commit rape in broad daylight.
In this connection, suffice it to say that lust is no
[26]
respecter of time and place. It is known to happen in the
most unlikely places such as parks, along roadsides,
within school premises or even occupied rooms. Rape
[27]
has also been committed on a passageway and at
noontime. [28]
While accused-appellant is guilty of rape, the same
was committed only in its attempted stage. Mary Ann
clearly testified that accused-appellant only placed his
penis on top of her vagina. In fact, she was able to grab
it and push it away from her, causing accused-appellant
to stand up. The pain she felt may have been caused by
accused-appellants attempts to insert his organ into
hers. However, the fact remains, based on Mary Anns
own narrative, that accused-appellants penis was merely
on top of her vagina and has not actually entered the
same.Accused-appellant has commenced the
commission of the rape directly by overt acts, i.e., that of
undressing himself and the victim and lying on top of her,
but he did not perform all the acts of execution which
should produce the felony by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. In
the case at bar, it was Mary Anns violent resistance
which prevented the insertion of accused-appellants
penis in her vagina.
The foregoing conclusion is supported by the medical
findings of Dr. Danilo P. Ledesma that Mary Anns hymen
was intact and had no laceration. [29]
In People v. Campuhan, we held that the labia
[30]
majora of the victim must be entered for rape to be
consummated, and not merely for the penis to stroke the
surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the
surface of the female organ or touching the mons
pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute
consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest
penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of
either labia of the pudendum by the penis, there can be
no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted
rape, if not acts of lasciviousness. [31]
Consummated rape is punishable by reclusion
perpetua. For attempted rape, the penalty two degrees
[32]
lower shall be imposed, i.e., prision mayor.
[33]
During his direct examination, accused-appellant
testified that he was born on December 3, 1979.
 Consequently, when the crime was committed on
[34]
March 7, 1996, accused-appellant was only seventeen
years old. We have held that the claim of minority by an
accused will be upheld by the court even without any
proof to corroborate his testimony, especially so when
coupled by the fact that prosecution failed to present
contradictory evidence thereto.[35]
Therefore, considering the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority, the penalty to be imposed on
accused-appellant should be lowered by one more
degree, i.e., prision correccional. There being no more
[36]
aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the same shall
be imposed in its medium period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty to be imposed
should be four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as maximum.
The trial court correctly ordered accused-appellant to
indemnify the victim, Mary Ann Martenez, in the amount
of P50,000.00. Moral damages may also be awarded
without necessity for pleading or proof thereof. In cases
of attempted rape, the amount of moral damages is
P25,000.00. [37]
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 15, in
Criminal Case No. 36,564-96, is MODIFIED. Accused-
appellant Marianito Monteron y Pantoras is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Attempted
Rape and is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of
four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as maximum. Further, accused-appellant is
ordered to pay the victim, Mary Ann Martenez, the sums
of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and P25,000.00 as
moral damages.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001]
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner,
vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full
fury of his pen in defense of the rights of the individual from the vast
powers of the State and the inroads of societal pressure. But even as he
draws a sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on individuality beyond
which the State cannot tread - asserting that "individual spontaneity"
must be allowed to flourish with very little regard to social
interference - he veritably acknowledges that the exercise of rights and
liberties is imbued with a civic obligation, which society is justified in
enforcing at all cost, against those who would endeavor to withhold
fulfillment. Thus he says -
The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or
collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of
their number, is self-protection. The only purpose for which
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others.
Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of
the State to self-preservation. With the end of maintaining the integrity
and cohesiveness of the body politic, it behooves the State to formulate
a system of laws that would compel obeisance to its collective wisdom
and inflict punishment for non-observance.
The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic
collectivism wrought changes in the social order, carrying with it a
new formulation of fundamental rights and duties more attuned to the
imperatives of contemporary socio-political ideologies. In the process,
the web of rights and State impositions became tangled and obscured,
enmeshed in threads of multiple shades and colors, the skein irregular
and broken. Antagonism, often outright collision, between the law as
the expression of the will of the State, and the zealous attempts by its
members to preserve their individuality and dignity, inevitably
followed. It is when individual rights are pitted against State authority
that judicial conscience is put to its severest test.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to
be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the
Crime of Plunder),[1] as amended by RA 7659,[2] wishes to impress
upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses
that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the
constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this
Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of constitutionality
mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of
vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in
criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in
crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which
are purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the
accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of
the accusation against him.
Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by
petitioner to have transgressed constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1,
par. (d), 2 and 4 which are reproduced hereunder:
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset,
property, business, enterprise or material possession of any
person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired
by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees,
agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any
combination or series of the following means or similar
schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or
malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift,
share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary
benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any
government contract or project or by reason of the office or
position of the public office concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of
assets belonging to the National Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or government
owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly
any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or
participation including the promise of future employment in
any business enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial
monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of
decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or
special interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority,
relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself
or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice
of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any
public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members
of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through
a combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described
in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value
of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty
of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said
public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to
the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such
offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of
participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating
circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be
considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all
ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and
assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived
from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the
State (underscoring supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the
crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and
every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-
gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts
indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy (underscoring supplied).
On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the
Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate Informations, docketed as: (a) Crim.
Case No. 26558, for violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659;
(b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs.
3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and 3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c) Crim. Case No. 26563,
for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d) Crim. Case
No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code); and, (e)
Crim. Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as
amended by RA 6085).
On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the
remand of the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation
with respect to specification "d" of the charges in the Information in
Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for reconsideration/reinvestigation of the
offenses under specifications "a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an
opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents necessary to
prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably, the grounds raised were only
lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of
offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause. The
purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law under
which they are charged were never raised in that Omnibus Motion thus
indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.
On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a
Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that "a probable cause for
the offense of PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of warrants for
the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied by the Sandiganbayan.
On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in
Crim. Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein did
not constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was
based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended
Information for Plunder charged more than one (1) offense. On 21
June 2001 the Government filed its Opposition to the Motion to
Quash, and five (5) days later or on 26 June 2001 petitioner submitted
his Reply to the Opposition. On 9 July 2001 the Sandiganbayan denied
petitioner's Motion to Quash.
As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments
on 18 September 2001, the issues for resolution in the instant petition
for certiorari are: (a) The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being
vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the
predicate crimes of plunder and therefore violates the rights of the
accused to due process; and, (c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA
7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the power
of Congress to so classify it.
Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the
validity of legislation is predicated on the basic principle that a
legislative measure is presumed to be in harmony with the
Constitution.[3] Courts invariably train their sights on this fundamental
rule whenever a legislative act is under a constitutional attack, for it is
the postulate of constitutional adjudication. This strong predilection
for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is forbidden
for one branch of the government to encroach upon the duties and
powers of another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is based
on the deference the judicial branch accords to its coordinate branch -
the legislature.
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may
firmly rest, the courts must assume that the legislature is ever
conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and has
passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of
promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the
majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of the legislature are
in tune with the fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial
restraint and act with caution and forbearance. Every intendment of the
law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of its constitutionality,
invalidity being a measure of last resort. In construing therefore the
provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether an
interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep the question of
constitutionality.
In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon[4] we held that as
long as there is some basis for the decision of the court, the
constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched and the case
will be decided on other available grounds. Yet the force of the
presumption is not sufficient to catapult a fundamentally deficient law
into the safe environs of constitutionality. Of course, where the law
clearly and palpably transgresses the hallowed domain of the organic
law, it must be struck down on sight lest the positive commands of the
fundamental law be unduly eroded.
Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs
heavily on the party challenging the validity of the statute. He must
demonstrate beyond any tinge of doubt that there is indeed an
infringement of the constitution, for absent such a showing, there can
be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded,
will hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice Malcolm, "To doubt is to
sustain."[5] And petitioner has miserably failed in the instant case to
discharge his burden and overcome the presumption of
constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards
and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to
determine the nature of his violation. Section 2 is
sufficiently explicit inits description of the acts, conduct and
conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the
crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus -
1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or
in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity
or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other
persons;
2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth
through a combination or series of the following overt or
criminal acts: (a) through misappropriation,
conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids
on the public treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or indirectly,
any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other
form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in
connection with any government contract or project or by
reason of the office or position of the public officer; (c) by the
illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets
belonging to the NationalGovernment or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of Government
owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries; (d) by
obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any
shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or
participation including the promise of future employment in
any business enterprise or undertaking; (e) by establishing
agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other
combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders
intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
(f) by taking advantage of official position, authority,
relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself
or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice
of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines;
and,
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten
wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at
least P50,000,000.00.
As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that
would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render
them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must
sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending
one charged with its violation; and more importantly, the accused, in
identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be
understood with little difficulty that what the assailed statute punishes
is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten
wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of
acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law.
In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language
of the law, indicating with reasonable certainty the various elements of
the offense which petitioner is alleged to have committed:
"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director,
EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses
former PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG
SALONGA' and a.k.a. 'JOSE VELARDE,' together with Jose
'Jinggoy' Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio,
Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a.
Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe
a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime
of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as
amended by Sec. 12 of R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, accused Joseph Ejercito Estrada, THEN A
PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, by
himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with
his co-accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY,
RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY,
BUSINESS ASSOCIATES, SUBORDINATES AND/OR
OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE
OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY,
RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass,
accumulate and acquire BY HIMSELF,
DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the
aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION
NINETY SEVEN MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR
THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE
PESOS AND SEVENTEEN
CENTAVOS (P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY
UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES
AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE DAMAGE OF THE
FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR
A combination OR A series of overt OR criminal acts, OR
SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly,
on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE
AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-
FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR
LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF
GIFT, SHARE, PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY
FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF
AND/OR in connection with co-accused CHARLIE
'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte,
Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in
consideration OF TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF
ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating,
converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY,
for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL gain and benefit, public
funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION
PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a
portion of the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS
(P200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated for the
province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by himself
and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang,
Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr.
Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES
& JANE DOES; (italic supplied).
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS
PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government
Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO PURCHASE
351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and
the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF
STOCK, MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE
CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR
LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO MILLION
NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX
HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS
(P1,102,965,607.50) AND MORE OR LESS SEVEN
HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED
TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY
PESOS (P744,612,450.00), RESPECTIVELY, OR A
TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT
HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN MILLION FIVE HUNDRED
SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS
AND FIFTY CENTAVOS (P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY
COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR
INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN
CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES,
COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF
SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE
AMOUNT OF ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE
MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE
CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE
DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER
THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE;'
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS,
GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR
ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFITS, IN
CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in
the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO
HUNDRED THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED
FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE
PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS
(P3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING THE SAME
UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE' AT
THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK."
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous -
as there is obviously none - that will confuse petitioner in his
defense. Although subject to proof, these factual assertions clearly
show that the elements of the crime are easily understood and provide
adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. Upon
such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is completely informed of the
accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an intelligent
defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for
the statutory definition of the terms "combination" and "series" in the
key phrase "a combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in
Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec.
4. These omissions, according to petitioner, render the Plunder Law
unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and
deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to
due process.
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is
not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used
therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them;
[6]
much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is
no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the
legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is
not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to
so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in
the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is
clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is
distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that
words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and
ordinary acceptation and signification,[7] unless it is evident that the
legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those
words.[8] The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily,
untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory
phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's
New Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted
definition of the words "combination" and "series:"
Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or
process of combining. To combine is to bring into such close
relationship as to obscure individual characters.
Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming
one after another in spatial and temporal succession.
That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to
be understood in their popular meanings is pristinely evident from the
legislative deliberations on the bill which eventually became RA 7080
or the Plunder Law:
DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE
ON JUSTICE, 7 May 1991
REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of
plunder. We say THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES
OF OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS AS MENTIONED IN
SECTION ONE HEREOF.Now when we say combination, we
actually mean to say, if there are two or more means, we mean
to say that number one and two or number one and something
else are included, how about a series of the same act? For
example, through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, will
these be included also?
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.
REP. ISIDRO: Series.
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series.
REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that -
REP. GARCIA: Two.
REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the
enumerated means not twice of one enumeration.
REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.
REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?
REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but combination, two acts.
REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, thats it. When we say combination, we
mean, two different acts. It cannot be a repetition of the same act.
REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.
REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.
REP. GARCIA: A series.
REP. ISIDRO: Thats not series. Its a combination. Because when we say
combination or series, we seem to say that two or more, di ba?
REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes. That
is why, I said, that is a very good suggestion because if it is only one
act, it may fall under ordinary crime but we have here a combination
or series of overt or criminal acts. So x x x x
REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di....
SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term series?
REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.
REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two misappropriations....
REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be combination.
Series.
REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
SEN. TANADA: Two different.
REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.
REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...
REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...
DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989
SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that sometimes one
or maybe even two acts may already result in such
a big amount, on line 25, would the Sponsor consider deleting the
words a series of overt or, to read, therefore: or conspiracy
COMMITTED by criminal acts such as. Remove the idea of
necessitating a series. Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural.
SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or more of
the acts mentioned in this.
THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be....
SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because a series implies several or many; two
or more.
SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x
THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted
under the particular crime. But when we say acts of plunder there
should be, at least, two or more.
SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing
laws, Mr. President.
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is
referring to at least two (2) acts falling under different categories of
enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public
treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of
assets belonging to the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d),
subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or
more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of
enumeration found in Sec. 1, par. (d), say, misappropriation,
malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under
Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a
technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it
would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in the
law.
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the
Sandiganbayan[9] that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in
relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2 -
x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at
least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts
enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly,
pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal
acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to
enable the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-
gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an 'overall
unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to achieve said common
goal. As commonly understood, the term 'overall unlawful
scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which
the principal accused and public officer and others conniving
with him follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the
alternative, if there is no such overall scheme or where the
schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt
or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a
common goal.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give
a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under
the circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness"
doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in
various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that a statute
establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient
definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what
conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that
specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which
cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at
its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is
repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by
it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle. [10] But the doctrine does
not apply as against legislations that are merely couched in imprecise
language but which nonetheless specify
a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently
ambiguous yet fairly applicable to certain types of activities. The first
may be "saved" by proper construction, while no challenge may be
mounted as against the second whenever directed against such
activities.[11] With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where
the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for
uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite
warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common
understanding and practice.[12] It must be stressed, however, that the
"vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty
for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical
exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than
meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds
of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid
merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or
detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of
the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as
in all other statutes.
Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr.
Justice Vicente V. Mendoza during the deliberations of the Court that
the allegations that the Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do not
justify a facial review of its validity -
The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which
either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague
that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its

meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first
essential of due process of law."[13] The overbreadth doctrine, on
the other hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms."[14]
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and
to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect"
upon protected speech. The theory is that "[w]hen statutes
regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent
construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the
statutes in a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all
society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to
justify allowing attacks on overly broad statutes with no
requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that
his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with
narrow specificity."[15] The possible harm to society in
permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is
outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of
others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester
because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal
statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their
very existence, and, if facial challenge is allowed for this
reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting
laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal
law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special
application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing
the validity of penal statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it,
in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not
recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited
context of the First Amendment."[16] In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,
[17]
the Court ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth have been
entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms,
seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that
"overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed
when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to
be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been
held that "a facial challenge to a legislative act is the most
difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger
must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which
the Act would be valid."[18] As for the vagueness doctrine, it is
said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it
is vague in all its possible applications. "A plaintiff who
engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot
complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct
of others."[19]
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and
vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their
faces" statutes in free speech cases or, as they are called in
American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made
to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With
respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to
whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be
heard to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might
also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in
which its application might be unconstitutional." [20] As has
been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First
Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically
produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a
matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as
applied' to a particular defendant."[21] Consequently, there is no
basis for petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-
Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking
them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to
parties not before the Court whose activities are
constitutionally protected.[22] It constitutes a departure from the
case and controversy requirement of the Constitution and
permits decisions to be made without concrete factual settings
and in sterile abstract contexts.[23] But, as the U.S. Supreme
Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris[24]
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its
deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies
before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an
appropriate task for the judiciary.The combination of the
relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the
legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the
speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line
analysis of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a kind of
case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional
questions, whichever way they might be decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has
been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be
employed "sparingly and only as a last resort,"[25] and is
generally disfavored.[26] In determining the constitutionality of
a statute, therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have
been violated in a case must be examined in the light of the
conduct with which the defendant is charged. [27]
In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the
purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so tenaciously claimed and
argued at length by petitioner, is more imagined than real. Ambiguity,
where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts and words in
the statute to furnish support to critics who cavil at the want of
scientific precision in the law. Every provision of the law should be
construed in relation and with reference to every other part. To be sure,
it will take more than nitpicking to overturn the well-entrenched
presumption of constitutionality and validity of the Plunder
Law. A fortiori, petitioner cannot feign ignorance of what the Plunder
Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who voted for its passage,
petitioner must be aware that the law was extensively deliberated upon
by the Senate and its appropriate committees by reason of which he
even registered his affirmative vote with full knowledge of its legal
implications and sound constitutional anchorage.
The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan[28] must be
mentioned if only to illustrate and emphasize the point that courts are
loathed to declare a statute void for uncertainty unless the law itself is
so imperfect and deficient in its details, and is susceptible of no
reasonable construction that will support and give it effect. In that
case, petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the
constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act for being vague. Petitioners posited, among others, that
the term "unwarranted" is highly imprecise and elastic with no
common law meaning or settled definition by prior judicial or
administrative precedents; that, for its vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e),
violates due process in that it does not give fair warning or sufficient
notice of what it seeks to penalize.Petitioners further argued that the
Information charged them with three (3) distinct offenses, to wit: (a)
giving of "unwarranted" benefits through manifest partiality; (b)
giving of "unwarranted" benefits through evident bad faith; and, (c)
giving of "unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable negligence
while in the discharge of their official function and that their right to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them was
violated because they were left to guess which of the three (3)
offenses, if not all, they were being charged and prosecuted.
In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e),
of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer from the
constitutional defect of vagueness. The phrases "manifest partiality,"
"evident bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable negligence" merely
describe the different modes by which the offense penalized in Sec. 3,
par. (e), of the statute may be committed, and the use of all these
phrases in the same Information does not mean that the indictment
charges three (3) distinct offenses.
The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking
adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized
(Webster, Third International Dictionary, p. 2514); or without
justification or adequate reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.
v. US Dept. of Justice, C.D. Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in
Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 43-A 1978,
Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, p. 19).
The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act consider a corrupt practice and make unlawful the act of
the public officer in:
x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, x x
x (Section 3 [e], Rep. Act 3019, as amended).
It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the
aforequoted penal provisions penalize is the act of a public
officer, in the discharge of his official, administrative or
judicial functions, in giving any private party benefits,
advantage or preference which is unjustified, unauthorized or
without justification or adequate reason, through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or
ambiguous in the use of the term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par. (e),
of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which was understood in
its primary and general acceptation. Consequently, in that case,
petitioners' objection thereto was held inadequate to declare the section
unconstitutional.
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched
theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable
obligation of the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only
proof of a pattern of overt or criminal acts showing unlawful scheme
or conspiracy -
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the
crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and
every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the
scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-
gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative
of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the
simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other
crimes, the accused always has in his favor the presumption of
innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the
State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond reasonable doubt that
culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal. [29] The use of
the"reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to command the
respect and confidence of the community in the application of criminal
law. It is critical that the moral force of criminal law be not diluted by
a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men
are being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every
individual going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his
government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without
convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost
certainty. This "reasonable doubt" standard has acquired such exalted
stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the Due
Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except
upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to
constitute the crime with which he is charged. [30] The following
exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep. Pablo Garcia on
this score during the deliberations in the floor of the House of
Representatives are elucidating -
DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080, 9 October 1990
 MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal
law that what is alleged in the information must be proven beyond
reasonable doubt. If we will prove only one act and find him guilty of
the other acts enumerated in the information, does that not work
against the right of the accused especially so if the amount
committed, say, by falsification is less than P100 million, but the
totality of the crime committed is P100 million since there is
malversation, bribery, falsification of public document, coercion,
theft?
MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information
needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. What is required to be
proved beyond reasonable doubt is every element of the crime
charged. For example, Mr. Speaker, there is an enumeration of the
things taken by the robber in the information three pairs of pants,
pieces of jewelry. These need not be proved beyond reasonable
doubt, but these will not prevent the conviction of a crime for which
he was charged just because, say, instead of 3 pairs of diamond
earrings the prosecution proved two. Now, what is required to be
proved beyond reasonable doubt is the element of the offense.
MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in
the crime of plunder the totality of the amount is very important, I
feel that such a series of overt criminal acts has to be taken
singly. For instance, in the act of bribery, he was able to accumulate
only P50,000 and in the crime of extortion, he was only able to
accumulate P1 million. Now, when we add the totality of the other
acts as required under this bill through the interpretation on the rule
of evidence, it is just one single act, so how can we now convict him?
MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an
essential element of the crime, there is a need to prove that element
beyond reasonable doubt. For example, one essential element of the
crime is that the amount involved is P100 million. Now, in a series of
defalcations and other acts of corruption in the enumeration the
total amount would be P110 or P120 million, but there are certain
acts that could not be proved, so, we will sum up the amounts
involved in those transactions which were proved. Now, if the
amount involved in these transactions, proved beyond reasonable
doubt, is P100 million, then there is a crime of plunder (underscoring
supplied).
It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in
any manner refashion the standard quantum of proof in the crime of
plunder. The burden still remains with the prosecution to prove beyond
any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to constitute the
crime.
The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every
component of the crime suffers from a dismal misconception of the
import of that provision. What the prosecution needs to prove beyond
reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a
combination or series which would constitute a pattern and involving
an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each
and every other act alleged in the Information to have been committed
by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or
conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To
illustrate, supposing that the accused is charged in an Information for
plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on the public
treasury. The prosecution need not prove all these fifty (50) raids, it
being sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond
reasonable doubt provided only that they amounted to at
least P50,000,000.00.[31]
A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the
logical conclusion that "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of
the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the very acts of
accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth. Stated otherwise,
such pattern arises where the prosecution is able to prove beyond
reasonable doubt the predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par.
(d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the predicate
acts. This conclusion is consistent with reason and common
sense. There would be no other explanation for a combination or series
of
overt or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme
or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill gotten wealth." The
prosecution is therefore not required to make a deliberate and
conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily follows with the
establishment of a series or combination of the predicate acts.
Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec.
4 is his submission that "pattern" is "a very important element of the
crime of plunder;" and that Sec. 4 is "two pronged, (as) it contains a
rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime," such that
without it the accused cannot be convicted of plunder -
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be convicted
under the Plunder Law without applying Section 4 on the Rule of
Evidence if there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of the
commission of the acts complained of?
ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes
enumerated in the Revised Penal Code, but not plunder.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the crime
are proved beyond reasonable doubt without applying Section 4, can
you not have a conviction under the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4
in convicting an accused charged for violation of the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays down a
substantive element of the law x x x x
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of Section 4
when there is proof beyond reasonable doubt on the acts charged
constituting plunder?
ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, it
contains a rule of evidence and it contains a substantive element of
the crime of plunder. So, there is no way by which we can avoid
Section 4.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt
insofar as the predicate crimes charged are concerned that you do
not have to go that far by applying Section 4?
ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a
very important element of the crime of plunder and that cannot be
avoided by the prosecution.[32]
We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the
essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its
definition in Sec. 2, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not
one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4 is
clear and unequivocal:
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of
establishing the crime of plunder x x x x
It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the
prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural
measure, Sec. 4 does not define or establish any substantive right in
favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is
only a means to an end, an aid to substantive law. Indubitably, even
without invoking Sec. 4, a conviction for plunder may be had, for what
is crucial for the prosecution is to present sufficient evidence to
engender that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even granting
for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated for the
reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed from the rest
of the provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of the
law; after all, the existing rules on evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more
than enough. Besides, Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a separability
clause -
Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions of this
Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance
is held invalid, the remaining provisions of this Act and the
application of such provisions to other persons or
circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act
from being declared invalid as a result of the nullity of some of its
provisions, assuming that to be the case although it is not really so, all
the provisions thereof should accordingly be treated independently of
each other, especially if by doing so, the objectives of the statute can
best be achieved.
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza
that plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal
intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring Opinion -
x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in
se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for
plunder. It is noteworthy that the amended information alleges
that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully
and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of
petitioner.
In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the
requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the
statute is void, petitioner cites the following remarks of
Senator Taada made during the deliberation on S.B. No. 733:
SENATOR TAADA . . . And the evidence that will be required
to convict him would not be evidence for each and every
individual criminal act but only evidence sufficient to establish
the conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime of plunder.[33]
However, Senator Taada was discussing 4 as shown by the
succeeding portion of the transcript quoted by petitioner:
SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman
feels that it is contained in Section 4, Rule of Evidence, which,
in the Gentleman's view, would provide for a speedier and
faster process of attending to this kind of cases?
SENATOR TAADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .[34]
Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is
conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove
each and every criminal act done to further the scheme or
conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable
doubt a pattern of overt or ciminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting
the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime
must be proved and the requisite mens rea must be shown.
Indeed, 2 provides that -
Any person who participated with the said public officer in the
commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder
shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition
of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of
mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the
Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in
the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder
Law indicates quite clearly that mens rea is an element of
plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is
determined by his criminal intent. It is true that 2 refers to "any
person who participates with the said public officer in the
commission of an offense contributing to the crime of
plunder." There is no reason to believe, however, that it does
not apply as well to the public officer as principal in the
crime. As Justice Holmes said: "We agree to all the
generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they
omit, but there is no canon against using common sense in
construing laws as saying what they obviously mean." [35]
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is
a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the
affirmative by the decision of Congress in 1993 to include it
among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death. Other heinous crimes are punished with death as a
straight penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to these groups of
heinous crimes, this Court held in People v. Echegaray:[36]
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes
that are, by their very nature, despicable, either because life
was callously taken or the victim is treated like an animal and
utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal
course of his or her growth as a human being . . . . Seen in this
light, the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the
victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to dehumanizing acts;
destructive arson resulting in death; and drug offenses
involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the
case of other crimes; as well as murder, rape,
parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention,
where the victim is detained for more than three days or
serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats
to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with
homicide, rape or intentional mutilation, destructive arson, and
carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the
carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by
reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very
nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in
the significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in
the scheme of the larger socio-political and economic context
in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and
provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from
decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the
government and impoverished the population, the Philippine
Government must muster the political will to dismantle the
culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated
criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of
society and the psyche of the populace. [With the government]
terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic
services to its people, any form of misappropriation or
misapplication of government funds translates to an actual
threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the
very survival of the people it governs over. Viewed in this
context, no less heinous are the effects and repercussions of
crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson resulting in
death, and drug offenses involving government officials,
employees or officers, that their perpetrators must not be
allowed to cause further destruction and damage to society.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a
heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the
acts punished are inherently immoral or inherently wrong, they
are mala in se[37]and it does not matter that such acts are
punished in a special law, especially since in the case of
plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it
would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though
they are mere prosecutions for violations of the Bouncing
Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against
jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the
acts.
To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the
amendatory law of RA 7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice it to
say however that it is now too late in the day for him to
resurrect thislong dead issue, the same having been eternally
consigned by People v. Echegaray[38] to the archives of jurisprudential
history. The declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659 is
constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes,
by necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral
part of it.
Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene
profligacy of officials in high places which have shaken its very
foundation. The anatomy of graft and corruption has become more
elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous people
relentlessly contrive more and more ingenious ways to bilk the coffers
of the government. Drastic and radical measures are imperative to
fight the increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical and
economically catastrophic looting of the national treasury. Such is the
Plunder Law, especially designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues
of grand-scale corruption which, if left unchecked, will spread like a
malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral and institutional
fiber of our nation. The Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to
the will of the legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus
secure society against the avarice and other venalities in public office.
These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of
this nation, few issues of national importance can equal the amount of
interest and passion generated by petitioner's ignominious fall from the
highest office, and his eventual prosecution and trial under a virginal
statute. This continuing
saga has driven a wedge of dissension among our people that may
linger for a long time. Only by responding to the clarion call for
patriotism, to rise above factionalism and prejudices, shall we emerge
triumphant in the midst of ferment.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080
otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is
CONSTITUTIONAL. Consequently, the petition to declare the law
unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr. C.J., Melo, Quisumbing, JJ., join concurring opinion
of J. Mendoza.
Puno, Vitug, JJ., concurred and joins J. Mendoza's concurring
opinion.
Kapunan, Pardo, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Ynares-Santiago, JJ., see
dissenting opinion.
Mendoza, J., please see concurring opinion.
Panganiban J., please see separate concurring opinion.
Carpio, J., no part. Was one of the complainants before
Ombudsman.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-42050-66 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE AMANTE P. PURISIMA, COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH VII, and PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS,
NESTOR BAES, ELIAS L. GARCIA, SIMEON BUNDALIAN, JR.,
JOSEPH C. MAISO, EDUARDO A. LIBORDO, ROMEO L. SUGAY,
FEDERICO T. DIZON, GEORGE M. ALBINO, MARIANO COTIA, JR.,
ARMANDO L. DIZON, ROGELIO B. PARENO, RODRIGO V. ESTRADA,
ALFREDO A. REYES, JOSE A. BACARRA, REYNALDO BOGTONG,
and EDGARDO M. MENDOZA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-46229-32 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, and REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO, ELPIDIO
ARPON, VICTOR EUGENIO Y ROQUE and ALFREDO
VERSOZA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-46313-16 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, and JUANITO DE LA CRUZ Y NUNEZ,
SABINO BUENO Y CACAL, TIRSO ISAGAN Y FRANCISCO and BEN
CASTILLO Y UBALDO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-46997 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE WENCESLAO M. POLO, Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Samar, and PANCHITO REFUNCION, respondents.
Jose L. Gamboa, Fermin Martin, Jr. & Jose D. Cajucom, Office of the
City of Fiscal of Manila and the Office of Provincial Fiscal of Samar for
petitioners.
Norberto Parto for respondents Candelosas, Baes and Garcia.
Amado C. de la Marced for respondents Simeon Bundalian Jr., et al.
Manuel F. de Jesus for all the respondents in L-46229-32 and L-46313-
16.
Norberto L. Apostol for respondent Panchito Refuncion.
Hon. Amante P. Purisima for and in his own behalf.
MUOZ PALMA, J.:
These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the
Philippines represented, respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of
Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the
Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve
one basic question of law.
These Petitions or appeals involve three Courts of First Instance, namely:
the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VII, presided by Hon.
Amante P. Purisima (17 Petitions), the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch XVIII, presided by Hon. Maximo A. Maceren (8 Petitions) and, the
Court of First Instance of Samar, with Hon. Wenceslao M. Polo,
presiding, (1 Petition).
Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective
accused with "illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of
Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by the accused,
the three Judges mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed
before them the details of which will be recounted below an Order
quashing or dismissing the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that
the Information did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized
by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one essential
element of the crime.
Thus, are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and
substance to constitute the offense of "illegal possession of deadly
weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9? This
is the central issue which we shall resolve and dispose of, all other
corollary matters not being indispensable for the moment.
A The Information filed by the People
1. In L-42050-66, one typical Information filed with the Court presided by
Judge Purisima follows:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus
PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y DURAN, accused.
Crim. Case No. 19639
VIOLATION OF PAR. 3, PRES. DECREE No. 9 OF
PROCLAMATION 1081
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y
DURAN of a violation of paragraph 3, Presidential Decree
No. 9 of Proclamation 1081, committed as follows:
That on or about the 14 th day of December, 1974, in the
City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in
his possession and under his custody and control one (1)
carving knife with a blade of 6- inches and a wooden
handle of 5-1/4 inches, or an overall length of 11-
inches, which the said accused carried outside of his
residence, the said weapon not being used as a tool or
 implement necessary to earn his livelihood nor being
used in connection therewith.
Contrary to law. (p. 32, rollo of L-42050-66)
The other Informations are similarly worded except for the name of the
accused, the date and place of the commission of the crime, and the kind
of weapon involved.
2. In L-46229-32 and L-46313-16, the Information filed with the Court
presided by Judge Maceren follows:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus
REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO, accused.
CRIM. CASE
29677
VIOL. OF PAR. 3,
That on or about the 28 th day of January, 1977, in the
City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly carry outside of his
residence a bladed and pointed weapon, to wit: an ice
pick with an overall length of about 8 inches, the same
not being used as a necessary tool or implement to earn
his livelihood nor being used in connection therewith.
Contrary to law. (p. 14, rollo of L-46229-32)
The other Informations are likewise similarly worded except for the name
of the accused, the date and place of the commission of the crime, and
the kind of weapon involved.
3. In L-46997, the Information before the Court of First Instance of Samar
is quoted
NO.hereunder:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant, versus
PANCHITO REFUNCION, accused.

PD 9 IN REL. TO CRIM. C
LOI 933

No. 266 of the For:

Chief
ILLEGAL
Executive dated POSSES
April 1, 1975
DEADLY
INFORMATION
(VIOLAT
The undersigned accuses REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO PD NO.
of a VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH 3, PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE NO. 9 in relation to Letter of Instruction No. 266 INFORMATION
of the Chief Executive dated April 1, 1975, committed as
follows: The undersigned First Assistant Provincial Fiscal of
Samar, accuses PANCHITO REFUNCION of the crime of
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DEADLY WEAPON or
 VIOLATION OF PD NO. 9 issued by the President of the
Philippines on Oct. 2, 1972, pursuant to Proclamation No.
1081 dated Sept. 21 and 23, 1972, committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of October, 1976, in the
evening at Barangay Barruz, Municipality of Matuginao,
Province of Samar Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorabe Court, the abovenamed accused,
knowingly, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously carried with
him outside of his residence a deadly weapon called
socyatan, an instrument which from its very nature is no
such as could be used as a necessary tool or instrument
to earn a livelihood, which act committed by the accused
is a Violation of Presidential Decree No. 9.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 8, rollo of L-46997)
B. The Orders of dismissal
In dismissing or quashing the Informations the trial courts concurred with
the submittal of the defense that one essential element of the offense
charged is missing from the Information, viz: that the carrying outside of
the accused's residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon is in
furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or related to
subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public
disorder.
1. Judge Purisima reasoned out, inter alia, in this manner:
... the Court is of the opinion that in order that possession
of bladed weapon or the like outside residence may be
prosecuted and tried under P.D. No. 9, the information
must specifically allege that the possession of bladed
weapon charged was for the purpose of abetting, or in
furtherance of the conditions of rampant criminality,
organized lawlessness, public disorder, etc. as are
contemplated and recited in Proclamation No. 1081, as
justification therefor. Devoid of this specific allegation, not
necessarily in the same words, the information is not
complete, as it does not allege sufficient facts to
constitute the offense contemplated in P.D. No. 9. The
information in these cases under consideration suffer
from this defect.
xxx xxx xxx
And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not
difficult to believe the murmurings of detained persons
brought to Court upon a charge of possession of bladed
weapons under P.D. No. 9, that more than ever before,
policemen - of course not all can be so heartless now
have in their hands P.D. No. 9 as a most convenient tool
for extortion, what with the terrifying risk of being
sentenced to imprisonment of five to ten years for a
rusted kitchen knife or a pair of scissors, which only God
knows where it came from. Whereas before martial law
an extortion-minded peace officer had to have a stock of
the cheapest paltik, and even that could only convey the
coercive message of one year in jail, now anything that
has the semblance of a sharp edge or pointed object,
available even in trash cans, may already serve the same
purpose, and yet five to ten times more incriminating than
the infamous paltik.
For sure, P.D. No. 9 was conceived with the best of
intentions and wisely applied, its necessity can never be
assailed. But it seems it is back-firing, because it is too
hot in the hands of policemen who are inclined to
backsliding.
The checkvalves against abuse of P.D. No. 9 are to be
found in the heart of the Fiscal and the conscience of the
Court, and hence this resolution, let alone technical legal
basis, is prompted by the desire of this Court to apply
said checkvalves. (pp. 55-57, rollo of L-42050-66)
2. Judge Maceren in turn gave his grounds for dismissing the charges as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
As earlier noted the "desired result" sought to be attained
by Proclamation No. 1081 is the maintenance of law and
order throughout the Philippines and the prevention and
suppression of all forms of lawless violence as well as
any act of insurrection or rebellion. It is therefore
reasonable to conclude from the foregoing premises that
the carrying of bladed, pointed or blunt weapons outside
of one's residence which is made unlawful and
punishable by said par. 3 of P.D. No. 9 is one
that abets subversion, insurrection or rebellion, lawless
violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder or is
intended to bring about these conditions. This conclusion
is further strengthened by the fact that all previously
existing laws that also made the carrying of similar
weapons punishable have not been repealed, whether
expressly or impliedly. It is noteworthy that Presidential
Decree No. 9 does not contain any repealing clause or
provisions.
xxx xxx xxx
The mere carrying outside of one's residence of these
deadly weapons if not concealed in one's person and if
not carried in any of the aforesaid specified places, would
appear to be not unlawful and punishable by law.
With the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 9,
however, the prosecution, through Assistant Fiscal Hilario
H. Laqui, contends in his opposition to the motion to
quash, that this act is now made unlawful and punishable,
particularly by paragraph 3 thereof, regardless of the
intention of the person carrying such weapon because
the law makes it "mala prohibita". If the contention of the
prosecution is correct, then if a person happens to be
caught while on his way home by law enforcement
officers carrying a kitchen knife that said person had just
bought from a store in order that the same may be used
by one's cook for preparing the meals in one's home,
such person will be liable for punishment with such a
severe penalty as imprisonment from five to ten years
under the decree. Such person cannot claim that said
knife is going to be used by him to earn a livelihood
because he intended it merely for use by his cook in
preparing his meals.
This possibility cannot be discounted if Presidential
Decree No. 9 were to be interpreted and applied in the
manner that that the prosecution wants it to be done. The
good intentions of the President in promulgating this
decree may thus be perverted by some unscrupulous law
enforcement officers. It may be used as a tool of
oppression and tyranny or of extortion.
xxx xxx xxx
It is therefore the considered and humble view of this
Court that the act which the President intended to make
unlawful and punishable by Presidential Decree No. 9,
particularly by paragraph 3 thereof, is one that abets or is
intended to abet subversion, rebellion, insurrection,
lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder.
(pp. 28-30, rollo of L-46229-32)
3. Judge Polo of the Court of First Instance of Samar expounded his
order dismissing the Information filed before him, thus:
... We believe that to constitute an offense under the
aforcited Presidential decree, the same should be or
there should be an allegation that a felony was committed
in connection or in furtherance of subversion, rebellion,
insurrection, lawless violence and public disorder.
 Precisely Proclamation No. 1081 declaring a state of
martial law throughout the country was issued because of
wanton destruction to lives and properties widespread
lawlessness and anarchy. And in order to restore the
tranquility and stability of the country and to secure the
people from violence anti loss of lives in the quickest
possible manner and time, carrying firearms, explosives
and deadly weapons without a permit unless the same
would fall under the exception is prohibited. This
conclusion becomes more compelling when we consider
the penalty imposable, which is from five years to ten
years. A strict enforcement of the provision of the said law
would mean the imposition of the Draconian penalty upon
the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
It is public knowledge that in rural areas, even before and
during martial law, as a matter of status symbol, carrying
deadly weapons is very common, not necessarily for
committing a crime nor as their farm implement but for
self-preservation or self-defense if necessity would arise
specially in going to and from their farm. (pp. 18-19, rollo
of L-46997)
In most if not all of the cases, the orders of dismissal were given before
arraignment of the accused. In the criminal case before the Court of (First
Instance of Samar the accused was arraigned but at the same time
moved to quash the Information. In all the cases where the accused were
under arrest, the three Judges ordered their immediate release unless
held on other charges.
C. The law under which the Informations in question were filed by the
People.
As seen from the Informations quoted above, the accused are charged
with illegal possession of deadly weapon in violation of Presidential
Decree No. 9, Paragraph 3.
We quote in full Presidential Decree No. 9, to wit:
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9
DECLARING VIOLATIONS OF GENERAL ORDERS NO.
6 and NO. 7 DATED SEPTEMBER 22, 1972, AND
SEPTEMBER 23, 1972, RESPECTIVELY, TO BE
UNLAWFUL AND PROVIDING PENALTIES
THEREFORE.
WHEREAS, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated
September 21, 1972, the Philippines has been placed
under a state of martial law;
WHEREAS, by virtue of said Proclamation No. 1081,
General Order No. 6 dated September 22, 1972 and
General Order No. 7 dated September 23, 1972, have
been promulgated by me;
WHEREAS, subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless
violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder mentioned
in the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 are committed
and abetted by the use of firearms, explosives and other
deadly weapons;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, in older to attain the desired result of the
aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and General Orders
Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and decree that:
1. Any violation of the aforesaid General Orders Nos. 6
and 7 is unlawful and the violator shall, upon conviction
suffer:
(a) The mandatory penalty of death by a firing squad or
electrocution as a Military, Court/Tribunal/Commission
may direct, it the firearm involved in the violation is
unlicensed and is attended by assault upon, or resistance
to persons in authority or their agents in the performance
of their official functions resulting in death to said persons
in authority or their agent; or if such unlicensed firearm is
used in the commission of crimes against persons,
property or chastity causing the death of the victim used
in violation of any other General Orders and/or Letters of
Instructions promulgated under said Proclamation No.
1081:
(b) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twenty
years to life imprisonment as a Military
Court/Tribunal/commission may direct, when the violation
is not attended by any of the circumstances enumerated
under the preceding paragraph;
(c) The penalty provided for in the preceding paragraphs
shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager,
members of the board of directors or other responsible
officers of any public or private firms, companies,
corporations or entities who shall willfully or knowingly
allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company,
corporation or entity concerned to be used in violation of
said General Orders Nos. 6 and 7.
2. It is unlawful to posses deadly weapons, including
hand grenades, rifle grenades and other explosives,
including, but not limited to, "pill box bombs," "molotov
cocktail bombs," "fire bombs," or other incendiary device
consisting of any chemical, chemical compound, or
detonating agents containing combustible units or other
ingredients in such proportion, quantity, packing, or
bottling that ignites by fire, by friction, by concussion, by
percussion, or by detonation of all or part of the
compound or mixture which may cause such a sudden
generation of highly heated gases that the resultant
gaseous pressures are capable of producing destructive
effects on continguous objects or of causing injury or
death of a person; and any person convicted thereof shall
be punished by imprisonment ranging from ten to fifteen
years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.
3. It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed,
pointed or blunt weapon such as "fan knife," "spear,"
"dagger," "bolo," "balisong," "barong," "kris," or club,
except where such articles are being used as necessary
tools or implements to earn a livelihood and while being
used in connection therewith; and any person found guilty
thereof shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging
from five to ten years as a Military
Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.
4. When the violation penalized in the preceding
paragraphs 2 and 3 is committed during the commission
of or for the purpose of committing, any other crime, the
penalty shall be imposed upon the offender in its
maximum extent, in addition to the penalty provided for
the particular offenses committed or intended to be
committed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 2nd day of October in the
year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-two.
(SG
D)
FE
RDI
NA
ND
E.
MA
RC
OS
Presiden
 Rep
ubli
c of
the
Phil
ippi
nes
D. The arguments of the People
In the Comment filed in these cases by the Solicitor General who as
stated earlier joins the City Fiscal of Manila and the Provincial Fiscal of
Samar in seeking the setting aside of the questioned orders of dismissal,
the main argument advanced on the issue now under consideration is
that a perusal of paragraph 3 of P.D. 9 'shows that the prohibited acts
need not be related to subversive activities; that the act proscribed is
essentially a malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy. 1
The City Fiscal of Manila in his brief adds further that in statutory
offenses the intention of the accused who commits the act is immaterial;
that it is enough if the prohibited act is voluntarily perpetuated; that P.D. 9
provides and condemns not only the carrying of said weapon in
connection with the commission of the crime of subversion or the like, but
also that of criminality in general, that is, to eradicate lawless violence
which characterized pre-martial law days. It is also argued that the real
nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or
preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of
law alleged to have been violated but by the actual recital of facts in the
complaint or information. 2
E. Our Ruling on the matter
1. It is a constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a
criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. 3
Pursuant to the above, Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,
expressly requires that for a complaint or information to be sufficient it
must, inter alia state the designation of the offense by the statute, and
the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. This is
essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the
opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. 4
To comply with these fundamental requirements of the Constitution and
the Rules on Criminal Procedure, it is imperative for the specific statute
violated to be designated or mentioned 4 in the charge. In fact, another
compelling reason exists why a specification of the statute violated is
essential in these cases. As stated in the order of respondent Judge
Maceren the carrying of so-called "deadly weapons" is the subject of
another penal statute and a Manila city ordinance. Thus, Section 26 of
Act No. 1780 provides:
Section 26. It should be unlawful for any person to carry
concealed about his person any bowie knife, dirk dagger,
kris, or other deadly weapon: ... Any person violating the
provisions of this section shall, upon conviction in a court
of competent jurisdiction, be punished by a fine not
exceeding five hundred pesos, or by imprisonment for a
period not exceeding six months, or both such fine and
imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.
Ordinance No. 3820 of the City of Manila as amended by Ordinance No.
3928 which took effect on December 4, 1957, in turn penalizes with a fine
of not more than P200.00 or imprisonment for not more than one months,
or both, at the discretion of the court, anyone who shall carry concealed
in his person in any manner that would disguise its deadly character any
kind of firearm, bowie knife, or other deadly weapon ... in any public
place. Consequently, it is necessary that the particular law violated be
specified as there exists a substantial difference between the statute and
city ordinance on the one hand and P.D. 9 (3) on the other regarding the
circumstances of the commission of the crime and the penalty imposed
for the offense.
We do not agree with petitioner that the above-mentioned statute and the
city ordinance are deemed repealed by P.D. 9 (3). 5 P. D. 9(3) does not
contain any repealing clause or provision, and repeal by implication is not
favored. 6 This principle holds true with greater force with regards to penal
statutes which as a rule are to be construed strictly against the state and
liberally in favor of the accused. 7 In fact, Article 7 of the New Civil Code
provides that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and their violation
or non- observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to
the contrary.
Thus we are faced with the situation where a particular act may be made
to fall, at the discretion of a police officer or a prosecuting fiscal, under
the statute, or the city ordinance, or the presidential decree. That being
the case, the right becomes more compelling for an accused to be
confronted with the facts constituting the essential elements of the
offense charged against him, if he is not to become an easy pawn of
oppression and harassment, or of negligent or misguided official action
a fear understandably shared by respondent Judges who by the
nature of their judicial functions are daily exposed to such dangers.
2. In all the Informations filed by petitioner the accused are charged in
the caption as well as in the body of the Information with a violation of
paragraph 3, P.D. 9. What then are the elements of the offense treated in
the presidential decree in question?
We hold that the offense carries two elements: first, the carrying outside
one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as
a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act of
carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in
connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence,
criminality, chaos, or public disorder.
It is the second element which removes the act of carrying a deadly
weapon, if concealed, outside of the scope of the statute or the city
ordinance mentioned above. In other words, a simple act of carrying any
of the weapons described in the presidential decree is not a criminal
offense in itself. What makes the act criminal or punishable under the
decree is the motivation behind it. Without that motivation, the act falls
within the purview of the city ordinance or some statute when the
circumstances so warrant.
Respondent Judges correctly ruled that this can be the only reasonably,
logical, and valid construction given to P.D. 9(3).
3. The position taken by petitioner that P.D. 9(3) covers one and all
situations where a person carries outside his residence any of the
weapons mentioned or described in the decree irrespective of motivation,
intent, or purpose, converts these cases into one of "statutory
construction." That there is ambiguity in the presidential decree is
manifest from the conflicting views which arise from its implementation.
When ambiguity exists, it becomes a judicial task to construe and
interpret the true meaning and scope of the measure, guided by the basic
principle that penal statutes are to be construed and applied liberally in
favor of the accused and strictly against the state.
4. In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure a
presidential decree in these cases the primary rule is to search for and
determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the
controlling factor, for in the words of this Court in Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, per
Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, whatever is within the spirit of a statute is
within the statute, and this has to be so if strict adherence to the letter
would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions. 8
There are certain aids available to Us to ascertain the intent or reason for
P.D. 9(3).
First, the presence of events which led to or precipitated the enactment
of P.D. 9. These events are clearly spelled out in the "Whereas" clauses
of the presidential decree, thus: (1) the state of martial law in the country
pursuant to Proclamation 1081 dated September 21, 1972; (2) the
desired result of Proclamation 1081 as well as General Orders Nos. 6
and 7 which are particularly mentioned in P.D. 9; and (3) the alleged fact
that subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality,
chaos, aid public disorder mentioned in Proclamation 1081 are
committed and abetted by the use of firearms and explosives and other
deadly weapons.
The Solicitor General however contends that a preamble of a
statute usually introduced by the word "whereas", is not an essential part
of an act and cannot enlarge or confer powers, or cure inherent defects
in the statute (p. 120, rollo of L-42050-66); that the explanatory note or
enacting clause of the decree, if it indeed limits the violation of the
decree, cannot prevail over the text itself inasmuch as such explanatory
note merely states or explains the reason which prompted the issuance
of the decree. (pp. 114-115, rollo of 46997)
We disagree with these contentions. Because of the problem of
determining what acts fall within the purview of P.D. 9, it becomes
necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can
be found among others in the preamble or, whereas" clauses which
enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the
decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.
A "preamble" is the key of the statute, to open the minds
of the makers as to the mischiefs which are to be
remedied, and objects which are to be accomplished, by
the provisions of the statute." (West Norman Timber v.
State, 224 P. 2d 635, 639, cited in Words and Phrases,
"Preamble"; emphasis supplied)
While the preamble of a statute is not strictly a part
thereof, it may, when the statute is in itself ambiguous
and difficult of interpretation, be resorted to, but not to
create a doubt or uncertainty which otherwise does not
exist." (James v. Du Bois, 16 N.J.L. (1 Har.) 285, 294,
cited in Words and Phrases, "Preamble")
In Aboitiz Shipping Corporation, et al. v. The City of Cebu, et al. this
Court had occasion to state that '(L)egislative intent must be ascertained
from a consideration of the statute as a whole, and not of an isolated part
or a particular provision alone. This is a cardinal rule of statutory
construction. For taken in the abstract, a word or phrase might easily
convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended and
evident when the word or phrase is considered with those with which it is
associated. Thus, an apparently general provision may have a limited
application if read together with other provisions. 9
Second, the result or effects of the presidential decree must be within its
reason or intent.
In the paragraph immediately following the last "Whereas" clause, the
presidential decree states:
NOW, THEREFORE, I , FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
Commander-in-Chief of an the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, in order to attain the desired result of the
aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and General Orders
Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and decree that:
xxx xxx xxx
From the above it is clear that the acts penalized in P.D. 9
are those related to the desired result of Proclamation
1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7. General Orders
Nos. 6 and 7 refer to firearms and therefore have no
relevance to P.D. 9(3) which refers to blunt or bladed
weapons. With respect to Proclamation 1081 some of the
underlying reasons for its issuance are quoted hereunder:
WHEREAS, these lawless elements having taken up
arms against our duly constituted government and
against our people, and having committed and are still
committing acts of armed insurrection and rebellion
consisting of armed raids, forays, sorties, ambushes,
wanton acts of murders, spoilage, plunder, looting,
arsons, destruction of public and private buildings, and
attacks against innocent and defenseless civilian lives
and property, all of which activities have seriously
endangered and continue to endanger public order and
safety and the security of the nation, ...
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, it is evident that there is throughout the land
a state of anarchy and lawlessness, chaos and disorder,
turmoil and destruction of a magnitude equivalent to an
actual war between the forces of our duly constituted
government and the New People's Army and their
 satellite organizations because of the unmitigated forays,
raids, ambuscades, assaults, violence, murders,
assassinations, acts of terror, deceits, coercions, threats,
intimidations, treachery, machinations, arsons, plunders
and depredations committed and being committed by the
aforesaid lawless elements who have pledged to the
whole nation that they will not stop their dastardly effort
and scheme until and unless they have fully attained their
primary and ultimate purpose of forcibly seizing political
and state power in this country by overthrowing our
present duly constituted government, ... (See Book I, Vital
Documents on the Declaration of Martial Law in the
Philippines by the Supreme Court of the Philippines, pp.
13-39)
It follows that it is only that act of carrying a blunt or bladed weapon with
a motivation connected with or related to the afore-quoted desired result
of Proclamation 1081 that is within the intent of P.D. 9(3), and nothing
else.
Statutes are to be construed in the light of purposes to be
achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. (U.S. v.
American Tracking Association, 310 U.S. 534, cited in
LVN Pictures v. Philippine Musicians Guild, 110 Phil. 725,
731; emphasis supplied)
When construing a statute, the reason for its enactment
should be kept in mind, and the statute should be
construed with reference to its intended scope and
purpose. (Statutory Construction by E.T. Crawford, pp.
604-605, cited in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Filipinas Compania de Seguros, 107 Phil. 1055, 1060;
emphasis supplied)
5. In the construction of P.D. 9(3) it becomes relevant to inquire into the
consequences of the measure if a strict adherence to the letter of the
paragraph is followed.
It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid
presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a
legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly
susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous,
indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences. 9-a
It is to be presumed that when P.D. 9 was promulgated by the President
of the Republic there was no intent to work a hardship or an oppressive
result, a possible abuse of authority or act of oppression, arming one
person with a weapon to impose hardship on another, and so on. 10
At this instance We quote from the order of Judge Purisima the following:
And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not
difficult to believe the murmurings of detained persons
brought to Court upon a charge of possession of bladed
weapons under P.D. No. 9, that more than ever before,
policemen - of course not all can be so heartless now
have in their hands P.D. No. 9 as a most convenient tool
for extortion, what with the terrifying risk of being
sentenced to imprisonment of five to ten years for a
rusted kitchen knife or a pair of scissors, which only God
knows where it came from. Whereas before martial law
an extortion-minded peace officer had to have a stock of
the cheapest paltik, and even that could only convey the
coercive message of one year in jail, now anything that
has the semblance of a sharp edge or pointed object,
available even in trash cans, may already serve the same
purpose, and yet five to ten times more incriminating than
the infamous paltik. (pp. 72-73, rollo L-42050-66)
And as respondent Judge Maceren points out, the people's interpretation
of P.D. 9(3) results in absurdity at times. To his example We may add a
situation where a law-abiding citizen, a lawyer by profession, after
gardening in his house remembers to return the bolo used by him to his
neighbor who lives about 30 meters or so away and while crossing the
street meets a policeman. The latter upon seeing the bolo being carried
by that citizen places him under arrest and books him for a violation of
P.D. 9(3). Could the presidential decree have been conceived to produce
such absurd, unreasonable, and insensible results?
6. Penal statutes are to be construed strictly against the state and
liberally in favor of an accused.
American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be "the
tenderness of the law of the rights of individuals; the object is to establish
a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the
discretion of the court limited." 11 The purpose is not to enable a guilty
person to escape punishment through a technicality but to provide a precise
definition of forbidden acts. 12
Our own decisions have set down the same guidelines in this manner,
viz:
Criminal statutes are to be construed strictly. No person
should be brought within their terms who is not clearly
within them, nor should any act be pronounced criminal
which is not made clearly so by the statute. (U.S. v. Abad
Santos, 36 Phil. 243, 246)
The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction
is not the only factor controlling the interpretation of such
laws, instead, the rule merely serves as an additional,
single factor to be considered as an aid in determining
the meaning of penal laws. (People v. Manantan, 5 SCRA
684, 692)
F. The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective.
The two elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9(3) must be alleged in
the Information in order that the latter may constitute a sufficiently valid
charged. The sufficiency of an Information is determined solely by the
facts alleged therein. 13 Where the facts are incomplete and do not convey
the elements of the crime, the quashing of the accusation is in order.
Section 2(a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that the defendant
may move to quash the complaint or information when the facts charged
do not constitute an offense.
In U.S.U. Gacutan, 1914, it was held that where an accused is charged
with knowingly rendering an unjust judgment under Article 204 of the
Revised Penal Code, failure to allege in the Information that the judgment
was rendered knowing it to be unjust, is fatal. 14
In People v. Yadao, 1954, this Court through then Justice Cesar Bengzon
who later became Chief Justice of the Court affirmed an order of the trial
court which quashed an Information wherein the facts recited did not
constitute a public offense as defined in Section 1, Republic Act 145. 15
G. The filing of these Petitions was unnecessary because the People
could have availed itself of other available remedies below.
Pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court follow:
Rule 117, Section 7. Effect of sustaining the motion to
quash. If the motion to quash is sustained the court
may order that another information be filed. If such order
is made the defendant, if in custody, shall remain so
unless he shall be admitted to bail. If such order is not
made or if having been made another information is not
filed withuntime to be specified in the order, or within such
further time as the court may allow for good cause
shown, the defendant, if in custody, shall be discharged
therefrom, unless he is in custody on some other charge.
Rule 110, Section 13. Amendment. The information or
complaint may be amended, in substance or form,
without leave of court, at any time before the defendant
pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all
matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the
court, when the same can be done without prejudice to
the rights of the defendant.
xxx xxx xxx
Two courses of action were open to Petitioner upon the quashing of the
Informations in these cases, viz:
First, if the evidence on hand so warranted, the People could have filed
an amended Information to include the second element of the offense as
defined in the disputed orders of respondent Judges. We have ruled that
if the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute a punishable
offense, the case should not be dismissed but the prosecution should be
given an opportunity to amend the Information. 16
Second, if the facts so justified, the People could have filed a complaint
either under Section 26 of Act No. 1780, quoted earlier, or Manila City
Ordinance No. 3820, as amended by Ordinance No. 3928, especially
since in most if not all of the cases, the dismissal was made prior to
arraignment of the accused and on a motion to quash.
Section 8. Rule 117 states that:
An order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense unless the
motion was based on the grounds specified in section 2,
subsections (f) and (h) of this rule.
Under the foregoing, the filing of another complaint or Information is
barred only when the criminal action or liability had been extinguished
(Section 2[f]) or when the motion to quash was granted for reasons of
double jeopardy. (ibid., [h])
As to whether or not a plea of double jeopardy may be successfully
invoked by the accused in all these cases should new complaints be filed
against them, is a matter We need not resolve for the present.
H. We conclude with high expectations that police authorities and the
prosecuting arm of the government true to the oath of office they have
taken will exercise utmost circumspection and good faith in evaluating
the particular circumstances of a case so as to reach a fair and just
conclusion if a situation falls within the purview of P.D. 9(3) and the
prosecution under said decree is warranted and justified. This obligation
becomes a sacred duty in the face of the severe penalty imposed for the
offense.
On this point, We commend the Chief State Prosecutor Rodolfo A. Nocon
on his letter to the City Fiscal of Manila on October 15, 1975, written for
the Secretary, now Minister of Justice, where he stated the following:
In any case, please study well each and every case of
this nature so that persons accused of carrying bladed
weapons, specially those whose purpose is not to subvert
the duly constituted authorities, may not be unduly
indicted for the serious offenses falling under P.D. No. 9. 17
Yes, while it is not within the power of courts of justice to inquire into the
wisdom of a law, it is however a judicial task and prerogative to
determine if official action is within the spirit and letter of the law and if
basic fundamental rights of an individual guaranteed by the Constitution
are not violated in the process of its implementation. We have to face the
fact that it is an unwise and unjust application of a law, necessary and
justified under prevailing circumstances, which renders the measure an
instrument of oppression and evil and leads the citizenry to lose their
faith in their government.
WHEREFORE, We DENY these 26 Petitions for Review and We
AFFIRM the Orders of respondent Judges dismissing or quashing the
Information concerned, subject however to Our observations made in the
preceding pages 23 to 25 of this Decision regarding the right of the State
or Petitioner herein to file either an amended Information under
Presidential Decree No. 9, paragraph 3, or a new one under other
existing statute or city ordinance as the facts may warrant.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, Teehankee, Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Castro, C.J. and Antonio, J, concur in the result.
Aquino, J, took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-42050-66 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE AMANTE P. PURISIMA, COURT OF FIRST
INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH VII, and PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS,
NESTOR BAES, ELIAS L. GARCIA, SIMEON BUNDALIAN, JR.,
JOSEPH C. MAISO, EDUARDO A. LIBORDO, ROMEO L. SUGAY,
FEDERICO T. DIZON, GEORGE M. ALBINO, MARIANO COTIA, JR.,
ARMANDO L. DIZON, ROGELIO B. PARENO, RODRIGO V. ESTRADA,
ALFREDO A. REYES, JOSE A. BACARRA, REYNALDO BOGTONG,
and EDGARDO M. MENDOZA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-46229-32 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, and REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO, ELPIDIO
ARPON, VICTOR EUGENIO Y ROQUE and ALFREDO
VERSOZA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-46313-16 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, and JUANITO DE LA CRUZ Y NUNEZ,
SABINO BUENO Y CACAL, TIRSO ISAGAN Y FRANCISCO and BEN
CASTILLO Y UBALDO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-46997 November 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE WENCESLAO M. POLO, Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Samar, and PANCHITO REFUNCION, respondents.
Jose L. Gamboa, Fermin Martin, Jr. & Jose D. Cajucom, Office of the
City of Fiscal of Manila and the Office of Provincial Fiscal of Samar for
petitioners.
Norberto Parto for respondents Candelosas, Baes and Garcia.
Amado C. de la Marced for respondents Simeon Bundalian Jr., et al.
Manuel F. de Jesus for all the respondents in L-46229-32 and L-46313-
16.
Norberto L. Apostol for respondent Panchito Refuncion.
Hon. Amante P. Purisima for and in his own behalf.
MUOZ PALMA, J.:
These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the
Philippines represented, respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of
Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar, and joined by the
Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve
one basic question of law.
These Petitions or appeals involve three Courts of First Instance, namely:
the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch VII, presided by Hon.
Amante P. Purisima (17 Petitions), the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Branch XVIII, presided by Hon. Maximo A. Maceren (8 Petitions) and, the
Court of First Instance of Samar, with Hon. Wenceslao M. Polo,
presiding, (1 Petition).
Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective
accused with "illegal possession of deadly weapon" in violation of
Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash filed by the accused,
the three Judges mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed
before them the details of which will be recounted below an Order
quashing or dismissing the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that
the Information did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized
by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one essential
element of the crime.
Thus, are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and
substance to constitute the offense of "illegal possession of deadly
weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for short) No. 9? This
is the central issue which we shall resolve and dispose of, all other
corollary matters not being indispensable for the moment.
A The Information filed by the People
1. In L-42050-66, one typical Information filed with the Court presided by
Judge Purisima follows:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus
PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y DURAN, accused.
Crim. Case No. 19639
VIOLATION OF PAR. 3, PRES. DECREE No. 9 OF
PROCLAMATION 1081
INFORMATION
The undersigned accuses PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y
DURAN of a violation of paragraph 3, Presidential Decree
No. 9 of Proclamation 1081, committed as follows:
That on or about the 14 th day of December, 1974, in the
City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in
his possession and under his custody and control one (1)
carving knife with a blade of 6- inches and a wooden
handle of 5-1/4 inches, or an overall length of 11-
inches, which the said accused carried outside of his
residence, the said weapon not being used as a tool or
implement necessary to earn his livelihood nor being
used in connection therewith.
Contrary to law. (p. 32, rollo of L-42050-66)
The other Informations are similarly worded except for the name of the
accused, the date and place of the commission of the crime, and the kind
of weapon involved.
2. In L-46229-32 and L-46313-16, the Information filed with the Court
presided by Judge Maceren follows:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus
REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO, accused.
CRIM. C
29677
VIOL. O
PD 9 IN
LOI
No. 266
Chief
 Executive dated DEADLY
April 1, 1975
(VIOLAT
INFORMATION PD NO.

The undersigned accuses REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO INFORMATION

of a VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH 3, PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE NO. 9 in relation to Letter of Instruction No. 266
of the Chief Executive dated April 1, 1975, committed as
follows:
That on or about the 28 th day of January, 1977, in the
City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly carry outside of his
residence a bladed and pointed weapon, to wit: an ice
pick with an overall length of about 8 inches, the same
not being used as a necessary tool or implement to earn
his livelihood nor being used in connection therewith.
Contrary to law. (p. 14, rollo of L-46229-32)
The other Informations are likewise similarly worded except for the name
of the accused, the date and place of the commission of the crime, and
the kind of weapon involved.
The undersigned First Assistant Provincial Fiscal of
Samar, accuses PANCHITO REFUNCION of the crime of
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DEADLY WEAPON or
VIOLATION OF PD NO. 9 issued by the President of the
Philippines on Oct. 2, 1972, pursuant to Proclamation No.
1081 dated Sept. 21 and 23, 1972, committed as follows:
That on or about the 6th day of October, 1976, in the
evening at Barangay Barruz, Municipality of Matuginao,
Province of Samar Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorabe Court, the abovenamed accused,
knowingly, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously carried with
him outside of his residence a deadly weapon called
socyatan, an instrument which from its very nature is no
such as could be used as a necessary tool or instrument
to earn a livelihood, which act committed by the accused
is a Violation of Presidential Decree No. 9.

3. In L-46997, the Information before the Court of First Instance of Samar CONTRARY TO LAW. (p. 8, rollo of L-46997)
is quoted hereunder:
B. The Orders of dismissal
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant, versus
PANCHITO REFUNCION, accused. In dismissing or quashing the Informations the trial courts concurred with
the submittal of the defense that one essential element of the offense
charged
CRIM. CASE NO.is missing from the Information, viz: that the carrying outside of
933 the accused's residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon is in
furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or related to
For: subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public
disorder.
ILLEGAL
1. Judge
POSSESSION OFPurisima reasoned out, inter alia, in this manner:
 ... the Court is of the opinion that in order that possession
of bladed weapon or the like outside residence may be
prosecuted and tried under P.D. No. 9, the information
must specifically allege that the possession of bladed
weapon charged was for the purpose of abetting, or in
furtherance of the conditions of rampant criminality,
organized lawlessness, public disorder, etc. as are
contemplated and recited in Proclamation No. 1081, as
justification therefor. Devoid of this specific allegation, not
necessarily in the same words, the information is not
complete, as it does not allege sufficient facts to
constitute the offense contemplated in P.D. No. 9. The
information in these cases under consideration suffer
from this defect.
xxx xxx xxx
And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not
difficult to believe the murmurings of detained persons
brought to Court upon a charge of possession of bladed
weapons under P.D. No. 9, that more than ever before,
policemen - of course not all can be so heartless now
have in their hands P.D. No. 9 as a most convenient tool
for extortion, what with the terrifying risk of being
sentenced to imprisonment of five to ten years for a
rusted kitchen knife or a pair of scissors, which only God
knows where it came from. Whereas before martial law
an extortion-minded peace officer had to have a stock of
the cheapest paltik, and even that could only convey the
coercive message of one year in jail, now anything that
has the semblance of a sharp edge or pointed object,
available even in trash cans, may already serve the same
purpose, and yet five to ten times more incriminating than
the infamous paltik.
For sure, P.D. No. 9 was conceived with the best of
intentions and wisely applied, its necessity can never be
assailed. But it seems it is back-firing, because it is too
hot in the hands of policemen who are inclined to
backsliding.
The checkvalves against abuse of P.D. No. 9 are to be
found in the heart of the Fiscal and the conscience of the
Court, and hence this resolution, let alone technical legal
basis, is prompted by the desire of this Court to apply
said checkvalves. (pp. 55-57, rollo of L-42050-66)
2. Judge Maceren in turn gave his grounds for dismissing the charges as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
As earlier noted the "desired result" sought to be attained
by Proclamation No. 1081 is the maintenance of law and
order throughout the Philippines and the prevention and
suppression of all forms of lawless violence as well as
any act of insurrection or rebellion. It is therefore
reasonable to conclude from the foregoing premises that
the carrying of bladed, pointed or blunt weapons outside
of one's residence which is made unlawful and
punishable by said par. 3 of P.D. No. 9 is one
that abets subversion, insurrection or rebellion, lawless
violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder or is
intended to bring about these conditions. This conclusion
is further strengthened by the fact that all previously
existing laws that also made the carrying of similar
weapons punishable have not been repealed, whether
expressly or impliedly. It is noteworthy that Presidential
Decree No. 9 does not contain any repealing clause or
provisions.
xxx xxx xxx
 The mere carrying outside of one's residence of these
deadly weapons if not concealed in one's person and if
not carried in any of the aforesaid specified places, would
appear to be not unlawful and punishable by law.
With the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 9,
however, the prosecution, through Assistant Fiscal Hilario
H. Laqui, contends in his opposition to the motion to
quash, that this act is now made unlawful and punishable,
particularly by paragraph 3 thereof, regardless of the
intention of the person carrying such weapon because
the law makes it "mala prohibita". If the contention of the
prosecution is correct, then if a person happens to be
caught while on his way home by law enforcement
officers carrying a kitchen knife that said person had just
bought from a store in order that the same may be used
by one's cook for preparing the meals in one's home,
such person will be liable for punishment with such a
severe penalty as imprisonment from five to ten years
under the decree. Such person cannot claim that said
knife is going to be used by him to earn a livelihood
because he intended it merely for use by his cook in
preparing his meals.
This possibility cannot be discounted if Presidential
Decree No. 9 were to be interpreted and applied in the
manner that that the prosecution wants it to be done. The
good intentions of the President in promulgating this
decree may thus be perverted by some unscrupulous law
enforcement officers. It may be used as a tool of
oppression and tyranny or of extortion.
xxx xxx xxx
It is therefore the considered and humble view of this
Court that the act which the President intended to make
unlawful and punishable by Presidential Decree No. 9,
particularly by paragraph 3 thereof, is one that abets or is
intended to abet subversion, rebellion, insurrection,
lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder.
(pp. 28-30, rollo of L-46229-32)
3. Judge Polo of the Court of First Instance of Samar expounded his
order dismissing the Information filed before him, thus:
... We believe that to constitute an offense under the
aforcited Presidential decree, the same should be or
there should be an allegation that a felony was committed
in connection or in furtherance of subversion, rebellion,
insurrection, lawless violence and public disorder.
Precisely Proclamation No. 1081 declaring a state of
martial law throughout the country was issued because of
wanton destruction to lives and properties widespread
lawlessness and anarchy. And in order to restore the
tranquility and stability of the country and to secure the
people from violence anti loss of lives in the quickest
possible manner and time, carrying firearms, explosives
and deadly weapons without a permit unless the same
would fall under the exception is prohibited. This
conclusion becomes more compelling when we consider
the penalty imposable, which is from five years to ten
years. A strict enforcement of the provision of the said law
would mean the imposition of the Draconian penalty upon
the accused.
xxx xxx xxx
It is public knowledge that in rural areas, even before and
during martial law, as a matter of status symbol, carrying
deadly weapons is very common, not necessarily for
committing a crime nor as their farm implement but for
self-preservation or self-defense if necessity would arise
specially in going to and from their farm. (pp. 18-19, rollo
of L-46997)
In most if not all of the cases, the orders of dismissal were given before
arraignment of the accused. In the criminal case before the Court of (First
Instance of Samar the accused was arraigned but at the same time
moved to quash the Information. In all the cases where the accused were
under arrest, the three Judges ordered their immediate release unless
held on other charges.
C. The law under which the Informations in question were filed by the
People.
As seen from the Informations quoted above, the accused are charged
with illegal possession of deadly weapon in violation of Presidential
Decree No. 9, Paragraph 3.
We quote in full Presidential Decree No. 9, to wit:
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9
DECLARING VIOLATIONS OF GENERAL ORDERS NO.
6 and NO. 7 DATED SEPTEMBER 22, 1972, AND
SEPTEMBER 23, 1972, RESPECTIVELY, TO BE
UNLAWFUL AND PROVIDING PENALTIES
THEREFORE.
WHEREAS, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated
September 21, 1972, the Philippines has been placed
under a state of martial law;
WHEREAS, by virtue of said Proclamation No. 1081,
General Order No. 6 dated September 22, 1972 and
General Order No. 7 dated September 23, 1972, have
been promulgated by me;
WHEREAS, subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless
violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder mentioned
in the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 are committed
and abetted by the use of firearms, explosives and other
deadly weapons;
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, in older to attain the desired result of the
aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and General Orders
Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and decree that:
1. Any violation of the aforesaid General Orders Nos. 6
and 7 is unlawful and the violator shall, upon conviction
suffer:
(a) The mandatory penalty of death by a firing squad or
electrocution as a Military, Court/Tribunal/Commission
may direct, it the firearm involved in the violation is
unlicensed and is attended by assault upon, or resistance
to persons in authority or their agents in the performance
of their official functions resulting in death to said persons
in authority or their agent; or if such unlicensed firearm is
used in the commission of crimes against persons,
property or chastity causing the death of the victim used
in violation of any other General Orders and/or Letters of
Instructions promulgated under said Proclamation No.
1081:
(b) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twenty
years to life imprisonment as a Military
Court/Tribunal/commission may direct, when the violation
is not attended by any of the circumstances enumerated
under the preceding paragraph;
(c) The penalty provided for in the preceding paragraphs
shall be imposed upon the owner, president, manager,
members of the board of directors or other responsible
officers of any public or private firms, companies,
corporations or entities who shall willfully or knowingly
allow any of the firearms owned by such firm, company,
corporation or entity concerned to be used in violation of
said General Orders Nos. 6 and 7.
2. It is unlawful to posses deadly weapons, including (SG
hand grenades, rifle grenades and other explosives, D)
including, but not limited to, "pill box bombs," "molotov FE
cocktail bombs," "fire bombs," or other incendiary device RDI
consisting of any chemical, chemical compound, or NA
detonating agents containing combustible units or other ND
ingredients in such proportion, quantity, packing, or E.
bottling that ignites by fire, by friction, by concussion, by MA
percussion, or by detonation of all or part of the RC
compound or mixture which may cause such a sudden OS
generation of highly heated gases that the resultant
gaseous pressures are capable of producing destructive Presiden
effects on continguous objects or of causing injury or
death of a person; and any person convicted thereof shall Rep
be punished by imprisonment ranging from ten to fifteen ubli
years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct. c of
the
3. It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed, Phil
pointed or blunt weapon such as "fan knife," "spear," ippi
"dagger," "bolo," "balisong," "barong," "kris," or club, nes
except where such articles are being used as necessary
tools or implements to earn a livelihood and while being D. The arguments of the People
used in connection therewith; and any person found guilty
thereof shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging In the Comment filed in these cases by the Solicitor General who as
from five to ten years as a Military stated earlier joins the City Fiscal of Manila and the Provincial Fiscal of
Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct. Samar in seeking the setting aside of the questioned orders of dismissal,
the main argument advanced on the issue now under consideration is
4. When the violation penalized in the preceding that a perusal of paragraph 3 of P.D. 9 'shows that the prohibited acts
paragraphs 2 and 3 is committed during the commission need not be related to subversive activities; that the act proscribed is
of or for the purpose of committing, any other crime, the essentially a malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy. 1
penalty shall be imposed upon the offender in its
maximum extent, in addition to the penalty provided for The City Fiscal of Manila in his brief adds further that in statutory
the particular offenses committed or intended to be offenses the intention of the accused who commits the act is immaterial;
committed. that it is enough if the prohibited act is voluntarily perpetuated; that P.D. 9
provides and condemns not only the carrying of said weapon in
Done in the City of Manila, this 2nd day of October in the connection with the commission of the crime of subversion or the like, but
year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-two. also that of criminality in general, that is, to eradicate lawless violence
which characterized pre-martial law days. It is also argued that the real
nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or
preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of
law alleged to have been violated but by the actual recital of facts in the
complaint or information. 2
E. Our Ruling on the matter
1. It is a constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a
criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. 3
Pursuant to the above, Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court,
expressly requires that for a complaint or information to be sufficient it
must, inter alia state the designation of the offense by the statute, and
the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. This is
essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the
opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. 4
To comply with these fundamental requirements of the Constitution and
the Rules on Criminal Procedure, it is imperative for the specific statute
violated to be designated or mentioned 4 in the charge. In fact, another
compelling reason exists why a specification of the statute violated is
essential in these cases. As stated in the order of respondent Judge
Maceren the carrying of so-called "deadly weapons" is the subject of
another penal statute and a Manila city ordinance. Thus, Section 26 of
Act No. 1780 provides:
Section 26. It should be unlawful for any person to carry
concealed about his person any bowie knife, dirk dagger,
kris, or other deadly weapon: ... Any person violating the
provisions of this section shall, upon conviction in a court
of competent jurisdiction, be punished by a fine not
exceeding five hundred pesos, or by imprisonment for a
period not exceeding six months, or both such fine and
imprisonment, in the discretion of the court.
Ordinance No. 3820 of the City of Manila as amended by Ordinance No.
3928 which took effect on December 4, 1957, in turn penalizes with a fine
of not more than P200.00 or imprisonment for not more than one months,
or both, at the discretion of the court, anyone who shall carry concealed
in his person in any manner that would disguise its deadly character any
kind of firearm, bowie knife, or other deadly weapon ... in any public
place. Consequently, it is necessary that the particular law violated be
specified as there exists a substantial difference between the statute and
city ordinance on the one hand and P.D. 9 (3) on the other regarding the
circumstances of the commission of the crime and the penalty imposed
for the offense.
We do not agree with petitioner that the above-mentioned statute and the
city ordinance are deemed repealed by P.D. 9 (3). 5 P. D. 9(3) does not
contain any repealing clause or provision, and repeal by implication is not
favored. 6 This principle holds true with greater force with regards to penal
statutes which as a rule are to be construed strictly against the state and
liberally in favor of the accused. 7 In fact, Article 7 of the New Civil Code
provides that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and their violation
or non- observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to
the contrary.
Thus we are faced with the situation where a particular act may be made
to fall, at the discretion of a police officer or a prosecuting fiscal, under
the statute, or the city ordinance, or the presidential decree. That being
the case, the right becomes more compelling for an accused to be
confronted with the facts constituting the essential elements of the
offense charged against him, if he is not to become an easy pawn of
oppression and harassment, or of negligent or misguided official action
a fear understandably shared by respondent Judges who by the
nature of their judicial functions are daily exposed to such dangers.
2. In all the Informations filed by petitioner the accused are charged in
the caption as well as in the body of the Information with a violation of
paragraph 3, P.D. 9. What then are the elements of the offense treated in
the presidential decree in question?
We hold that the offense carries two elements: first, the carrying outside
one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as
a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and second, that the act of
carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in
connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence,
criminality, chaos, or public disorder.
It is the second element which removes the act of carrying a deadly
weapon, if concealed, outside of the scope of the statute or the city
ordinance mentioned above. In other words, a simple act of carrying any
of the weapons described in the presidential decree is not a criminal
offense in itself. What makes the act criminal or punishable under the
decree is the motivation behind it. Without that motivation, the act falls
within the purview of the city ordinance or some statute when the
circumstances so warrant.
Respondent Judges correctly ruled that this can be the only reasonably,
logical, and valid construction given to P.D. 9(3).
3. The position taken by petitioner that P.D. 9(3) covers one and all
situations where a person carries outside his residence any of the
weapons mentioned or described in the decree irrespective of motivation,
intent, or purpose, converts these cases into one of "statutory
construction." That there is ambiguity in the presidential decree is
manifest from the conflicting views which arise from its implementation.
When ambiguity exists, it becomes a judicial task to construe and
interpret the true meaning and scope of the measure, guided by the basic
principle that penal statutes are to be construed and applied liberally in
favor of the accused and strictly against the state.
4. In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure a
presidential decree in these cases the primary rule is to search for and
determine the intent and spirit of the law. Legislative intent is the
controlling factor, for in the words of this Court in Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, per
Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, whatever is within the spirit of a statute is
within the statute, and this has to be so if strict adherence to the letter
would result in absurdity, injustice and contradictions. 8
There are certain aids available to Us to ascertain the intent or reason for
P.D. 9(3).
First, the presence of events which led to or precipitated the enactment
of P.D. 9. These events are clearly spelled out in the "Whereas" clauses
of the presidential decree, thus: (1) the state of martial law in the country
pursuant to Proclamation 1081 dated September 21, 1972; (2) the
desired result of Proclamation 1081 as well as General Orders Nos. 6
and 7 which are particularly mentioned in P.D. 9; and (3) the alleged fact
that subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality,
chaos, aid public disorder mentioned in Proclamation 1081 are
committed and abetted by the use of firearms and explosives and other
deadly weapons.
The Solicitor General however contends that a preamble of a
statute usually introduced by the word "whereas", is not an essential part
of an act and cannot enlarge or confer powers, or cure inherent defects
in the statute (p. 120, rollo of L-42050-66); that the explanatory note or
enacting clause of the decree, if it indeed limits the violation of the
decree, cannot prevail over the text itself inasmuch as such explanatory
note merely states or explains the reason which prompted the issuance
of the decree. (pp. 114-115, rollo of 46997)
We disagree with these contentions. Because of the problem of
determining what acts fall within the purview of P.D. 9, it becomes
necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and this can
be found among others in the preamble or, whereas" clauses which
enumerate the facts or events which justify the promulgation of the
decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.
A "preamble" is the key of the statute, to open the minds
of the makers as to the mischiefs which are to be
remedied, and objects which are to be accomplished, by
the provisions of the statute." (West Norman Timber v.
State, 224 P. 2d 635, 639, cited in Words and Phrases,
"Preamble"; emphasis supplied)
While the preamble of a statute is not strictly a part
thereof, it may, when the statute is in itself ambiguous
and difficult of interpretation, be resorted to, but not to
create a doubt or uncertainty which otherwise does not
 exist." (James v. Du Bois, 16 N.J.L. (1 Har.) 285, 294,
cited in Words and Phrases, "Preamble")
In Aboitiz Shipping Corporation, et al. v. The City of Cebu, et al. this
Court had occasion to state that '(L)egislative intent must be ascertained
from a consideration of the statute as a whole, and not of an isolated part
or a particular provision alone. This is a cardinal rule of statutory
construction. For taken in the abstract, a word or phrase might easily
convey a meaning quite different from the one actually intended and
evident when the word or phrase is considered with those with which it is
associated. Thus, an apparently general provision may have a limited
application if read together with other provisions. 9
Second, the result or effects of the presidential decree must be within its
reason or intent.
In the paragraph immediately following the last "Whereas" clause, the
presidential decree states:
NOW, THEREFORE, I , FERDINAND E. MARCOS,
Commander-in-Chief of an the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, in order to attain the desired result of the
aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and General Orders
Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and decree that:
xxx xxx xxx
From the above it is clear that the acts penalized in P.D. 9
are those related to the desired result of Proclamation
1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7. General Orders
Nos. 6 and 7 refer to firearms and therefore have no
relevance to P.D. 9(3) which refers to blunt or bladed
weapons. With respect to Proclamation 1081 some of the
underlying reasons for its issuance are quoted hereunder:
WHEREAS, these lawless elements having taken up
arms against our duly constituted government and
against our people, and having committed and are still
committing acts of armed insurrection and rebellion
consisting of armed raids, forays, sorties, ambushes,
wanton acts of murders, spoilage, plunder, looting,
arsons, destruction of public and private buildings, and
attacks against innocent and defenseless civilian lives
and property, all of which activities have seriously
endangered and continue to endanger public order and
safety and the security of the nation, ...
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, it is evident that there is throughout the land
a state of anarchy and lawlessness, chaos and disorder,
turmoil and destruction of a magnitude equivalent to an
actual war between the forces of our duly constituted
government and the New People's Army and their
satellite organizations because of the unmitigated forays,
raids, ambuscades, assaults, violence, murders,
assassinations, acts of terror, deceits, coercions, threats,
intimidations, treachery, machinations, arsons, plunders
and depredations committed and being committed by the
aforesaid lawless elements who have pledged to the
whole nation that they will not stop their dastardly effort
and scheme until and unless they have fully attained their
primary and ultimate purpose of forcibly seizing political
and state power in this country by overthrowing our
present duly constituted government, ... (See Book I, Vital
Documents on the Declaration of Martial Law in the
Philippines by the Supreme Court of the Philippines, pp.
13-39)
It follows that it is only that act of carrying a blunt or bladed weapon with
a motivation connected with or related to the afore-quoted desired result
of Proclamation 1081 that is within the intent of P.D. 9(3), and nothing
else.
Statutes are to be construed in the light of purposes to be
achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. (U.S. v.
 American Tracking Association, 310 U.S. 534, cited in
LVN Pictures v. Philippine Musicians Guild, 110 Phil. 725,
731; emphasis supplied)
When construing a statute, the reason for its enactment
should be kept in mind, and the statute should be
construed with reference to its intended scope and
purpose. (Statutory Construction by E.T. Crawford, pp.
604-605, cited in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Filipinas Compania de Seguros, 107 Phil. 1055, 1060;
emphasis supplied)
5. In the construction of P.D. 9(3) it becomes relevant to inquire into the
consequences of the measure if a strict adherence to the letter of the
paragraph is followed.
It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid
presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a
legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly
susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous,
indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences. 9-a
It is to be presumed that when P.D. 9 was promulgated by the President
of the Republic there was no intent to work a hardship or an oppressive
result, a possible abuse of authority or act of oppression, arming one
person with a weapon to impose hardship on another, and so on. 10
At this instance We quote from the order of Judge Purisima the following:
And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not
difficult to believe the murmurings of detained persons
brought to Court upon a charge of possession of bladed
weapons under P.D. No. 9, that more than ever before,
policemen - of course not all can be so heartless now
have in their hands P.D. No. 9 as a most convenient tool
for extortion, what with the terrifying risk of being
sentenced to imprisonment of five to ten years for a
rusted kitchen knife or a pair of scissors, which only God
knows where it came from. Whereas before martial law
an extortion-minded peace officer had to have a stock of
the cheapest paltik, and even that could only convey the
coercive message of one year in jail, now anything that
has the semblance of a sharp edge or pointed object,
available even in trash cans, may already serve the same
purpose, and yet five to ten times more incriminating than
the infamous paltik. (pp. 72-73, rollo L-42050-66)
And as respondent Judge Maceren points out, the people's interpretation
of P.D. 9(3) results in absurdity at times. To his example We may add a
situation where a law-abiding citizen, a lawyer by profession, after
gardening in his house remembers to return the bolo used by him to his
neighbor who lives about 30 meters or so away and while crossing the
street meets a policeman. The latter upon seeing the bolo being carried
by that citizen places him under arrest and books him for a violation of
P.D. 9(3). Could the presidential decree have been conceived to produce
such absurd, unreasonable, and insensible results?
6. Penal statutes are to be construed strictly against the state and
liberally in favor of an accused.
American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be "the
tenderness of the law of the rights of individuals; the object is to establish
a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the
discretion of the court limited." 11 The purpose is not to enable a guilty
person to escape punishment through a technicality but to provide a precise
definition of forbidden acts. 12
Our own decisions have set down the same guidelines in this manner,
viz:
Criminal statutes are to be construed strictly. No person
should be brought within their terms who is not clearly
within them, nor should any act be pronounced criminal
which is not made clearly so by the statute. (U.S. v. Abad
Santos, 36 Phil. 243, 246)
 The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction
is not the only factor controlling the interpretation of such
laws, instead, the rule merely serves as an additional,
single factor to be considered as an aid in determining
the meaning of penal laws. (People v. Manantan, 5 SCRA
684, 692)
F. The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective.
The two elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9(3) must be alleged in
the Information in order that the latter may constitute a sufficiently valid
charged. The sufficiency of an Information is determined solely by the
facts alleged therein. 13 Where the facts are incomplete and do not convey
the elements of the crime, the quashing of the accusation is in order.
Section 2(a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that the defendant
may move to quash the complaint or information when the facts charged
do not constitute an offense.
In U.S.U. Gacutan, 1914, it was held that where an accused is charged
with knowingly rendering an unjust judgment under Article 204 of the
Revised Penal Code, failure to allege in the Information that the judgment
was rendered knowing it to be unjust, is fatal. 14
In People v. Yadao, 1954, this Court through then Justice Cesar Bengzon
who later became Chief Justice of the Court affirmed an order of the trial
court which quashed an Information wherein the facts recited did not
constitute a public offense as defined in Section 1, Republic Act 145. 15
G. The filing of these Petitions was unnecessary because the People
could have availed itself of other available remedies below.
Pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court follow:
Rule 117, Section 7. Effect of sustaining the motion to
quash. If the motion to quash is sustained the court
may order that another information be filed. If such order
is made the defendant, if in custody, shall remain so
unless he shall be admitted to bail. If such order is not
made or if having been made another information is not
filed withuntime to be specified in the order, or within such
further time as the court may allow for good cause
shown, the defendant, if in custody, shall be discharged
therefrom, unless he is in custody on some other charge.
Rule 110, Section 13. Amendment. The information or
complaint may be amended, in substance or form,
without leave of court, at any time before the defendant
pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all
matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the
court, when the same can be done without prejudice to
the rights of the defendant.
xxx xxx xxx
Two courses of action were open to Petitioner upon the quashing of the
Informations in these cases, viz:
First, if the evidence on hand so warranted, the People could have filed
an amended Information to include the second element of the offense as
defined in the disputed orders of respondent Judges. We have ruled that
if the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute a punishable
offense, the case should not be dismissed but the prosecution should be
given an opportunity to amend the Information. 16
Second, if the facts so justified, the People could have filed a complaint
either under Section 26 of Act No. 1780, quoted earlier, or Manila City
Ordinance No. 3820, as amended by Ordinance No. 3928, especially
since in most if not all of the cases, the dismissal was made prior to
arraignment of the accused and on a motion to quash.
Section 8. Rule 117 states that:
An order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense unless the
 motion was based on the grounds specified in section 2,
subsections (f) and (h) of this rule.
Under the foregoing, the filing of another complaint or Information is
barred only when the criminal action or liability had been extinguished
(Section 2[f]) or when the motion to quash was granted for reasons of
double jeopardy. (ibid., [h])
As to whether or not a plea of double jeopardy may be successfully
invoked by the accused in all these cases should new complaints be filed
against them, is a matter We need not resolve for the present.
H. We conclude with high expectations that police authorities and the
prosecuting arm of the government true to the oath of office they have
taken will exercise utmost circumspection and good faith in evaluating
the particular circumstances of a case so as to reach a fair and just
conclusion if a situation falls within the purview of P.D. 9(3) and the
prosecution under said decree is warranted and justified. This obligation
becomes a sacred duty in the face of the severe penalty imposed for the
offense.
On this point, We commend the Chief State Prosecutor Rodolfo A. Nocon
on his letter to the City Fiscal of Manila on October 15, 1975, written for
the Secretary, now Minister of Justice, where he stated the following:
In any case, please study well each and every case of
this nature so that persons accused of carrying bladed
weapons, specially those whose purpose is not to subvert
the duly constituted authorities, may not be unduly
indicted for the serious offenses falling under P.D. No. 9. 17
Yes, while it is not within the power of courts of justice to inquire into the
wisdom of a law, it is however a judicial task and prerogative to
determine if official action is within the spirit and letter of the law and if
basic fundamental rights of an individual guaranteed by the Constitution
are not violated in the process of its implementation. We have to face the
fact that it is an unwise and unjust application of a law, necessary and
justified under prevailing circumstances, which renders the measure an
instrument of oppression and evil and leads the citizenry to lose their
faith in their government.
WHEREFORE, We DENY these 26 Petitions for Review and We
AFFIRM the Orders of respondent Judges dismissing or quashing the
Information concerned, subject however to Our observations made in the
preceding pages 23 to 25 of this Decision regarding the right of the State
or Petitioner herein to file either an amended Information under
Presidential Decree No. 9, paragraph 3, or a new one under other
existing statute or city ordinance as the facts may warrant.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring.
I concur with the qualification that under existing jurisprudence conviction
is possible, without the need of amending the information, for violation of
other laws or ordinances on concealment of deadly weapons.
Makasiar, J, concurs.
CONCEPCION, JR., J, concurring:

I concur with the additional observation that accused could properly be

convicted of a violation of Act 1780 of the Philippine Commission or of
the ordinance.